ML19316A026

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Louisiana Energy Services, LLC - 60 Day Written Follow-up Report for Event Notification 54324
ML19316A026
Person / Time
Site: 07003103
Issue date: 11/01/2019
From: Cowne S
Louisiana Energy Services, URENCO USA
To:
Document Control Desk, Office of Nuclear Material Safety and Safeguards
References
54324, LES-19-157-NRC
Download: ML19316A026 (7)


Text

LES-19-157-NRC Nov* o 1 2019 Attn: Document Control Desk Director Office of Nuclear Material Safety and Safeguards U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, DC 20555-0001

Subject:

Louisiana Energy Services, LLC License Number: SNM-2010 NRG Docket Number: 70-3103 60 Day Written Follow-up Report for Event Notification 54324 The National Enrichment Facility On October 10, 2019 Louisiana Energy Services, LLC dba URENCO USA (UUSA), submitted Event Notification 54324 to the NRG Operations Center in accordance with 10 CFR 70.74(a). As required by 10 CFR 70 Appendix A(b), UUSA is providing this letter which contains the 60 day written follow-up to the initial report. contains the written content of the notification submitted on October 10, 2019. of this letter contains additional information. Together, these enclosures contain the content required by 10 CFR 70.50(c).

If you have any questions, please contact Scott Diggs, Acting Licensing and Performance Assessment Manager at 575-394-6203.

Respectfully, Ste en Cowne Chief Nuclear Officer and Compliance Manager

Enclosures:

1. Event Report Notification 54324
2. Written Follow-up Report

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Louisiana Energy Services, LLC UUSA I P.O. Box 1789 I Eunice I New Mexico 188231 I USA T: +1 (575) 394 4646 I W: www.uusa.urenco.com

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LES-19-157-NRC cc:

Kevin Ramsey, Senior Project Manager U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Kevin.Ramsey@NRC.gov Jacob Zimmerman, Enrichment & Conversion Branch Chief U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Office of Nuclear Material Safety and Safeguards Jacob.Zimmerman@NRC.gov Robert Williams, Branch Chief - Senior Projects Inspector U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Robert.Williams@NRC.gov

r-1 LES-19-157-NRC ENCLOSURE 1 Event Report Notification 54324

PAGE 1 OF 2 NRC FORM 361A (B-2010)

U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION LICENSE NUMBER FUEL CYCLE AND MATERIALS EVENT NOTIFICATION WORKSHEET REPORT TIME FACILITY OR ORGANIZATION NAME OF CALLER 1735 EDT Louisiana Energy Services, LLC (URENCO USA)

Jim Rickman SNM-2010 CALL BACK TELEPHONE NO.

(575) 394-6558 EVENT TIME EVENT DATE LOCATION OF EVENT (Include County and State)

PORTION OF PLANT AFFECTED 10:30AM MS 06/06/2018 Lea County New Mexico SBM 1001 Autoclave EVENT CLASSIFICATIONS EVENT TYPES INCIDENT REPORTS (30.50, 40.60, 70.50)

D

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D LOSS/THEFT D

PROTECTIVE ACTION GENERAL EMERGENCY*

FUEL CYCLE 20.2201 (a)

PREVENTED D SITE AREA EMERGENCY D MEDICAL/ ACADEMIC D 20.2202 ACTUAL/THREATENED D (b)(1) UNPLANNED OVEREXPOSURE CONTAMINATION D ALERT D TRANSPORTATION D 20.2202 ACTUAL/THREATENED D (b)(2) SAFETY EQUIPMENT RELEASE FAILURE D

NOTIFICATION OF D WASTE MANAGEMENT D 21.21 DEFECT/

D (b)(3) MEDICAL TREATMENT UNUSUAL EVENT

  • NONCOMPLIANCE WITH CONTAMINATION D INCIDENT REPORT D INDUSTRIAL/ COMMERCIAL D 26.719 FITNESS FOR DUTY D (b)(4) FIRE / EXPLOSION D TRANSPORTATION EVENT D FOREIGN EVENT D 35.3045 MEDICAL EVENT D 70.52 CRITICALITY/ SNM LOST D INFORMATION ONLY D OTHER (Specify)

D 36.83 IRRADIA TOR EVENT D 70.52 ACTUAL /ATTEMPTED THEFT

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OTHER (Specify)

D 39.77 RUPTURED WELL D

CRITICALITY CONTROL 4-HOUR LOGGING SOURCE (BULLETIN 91-01) 10 CFR 70 Appendix A D 39.77 IRRETRIEVABLE WELL D

CRITICALITY CONTROL 24-HOUR Criteria b.2 LOGGING SOURCE (BULLETIN 91-01)

D 40.26 TAILINGS/ WASTE D OTHER NON-CFR REQUIREMENT

  • ONLY UNDER OLD 1981 ORDER DAM FAILURE NOTIFICATIONS YES NO WILL D YES (Explain below)

BE ANYTHING UNUSUAL OR NRC REGION?

D D

[81 NOT UNDERSTOOD?

[X] NO STATE?

D

[Zl D

DID ALL SYSTEMS FUNCTION

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YES LOCAL?

D

[X]

D AS REQUIRED?

D NO (Explain below)

OTHER GOVERNMENT D

[X]

D D

AGENCIES?

ADDITIONAL INFORMATION YES PRESS RELEASE?

D

[X]

D ON PAGE 2?

[X] NO EVENT DESCRIPTION (Continue on Page 2 if necessary)

EN54324 On October 10, 2019 at approximately 6:30 PM, a responsible individual at Louisiana Energy Services LLC, dba URENCO USA was informed that on June 5th, 2018, at approximately 4:00 PM MDT, pressure instrument isolation valve, 1001-471-1A12, was found open when it should have been shut to maintain the pressure boundary of autoclave lLSl. The autoclave is used to homogenize UF6 and obtain samples. The autoclave pressure boundary forms IROFSlO.

Prior to the event, on May 31 2018, annual maintenance was performed on the autoclave as required by the IR0FS10 surveillance requirements. Subsequently, a homogenization and UF6 sampling was performed June 1st through June 5th on a 30B cylinder ofUF6.

During preparations for a subsequent homogenization cycle, valve 1001-471-1A12 was found open. The valve should have remained closed from the previous homogenization. There was not an initiating event (no release ofUF6) and no initiation of an accident sequence. The valve has been shut and the IROFS boundary has been restored. The plant is in a safe configuration.

This event has been identified in UUSA's corrective action program as EV 133619 and a causal investigation is planned.

End of report.

NRC FORM 361A (8-2010)

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PAGE20F 2 RADIOLOGICAL/ CHEMICAL RELEASES: CHECK OR FILL IN APPLICABLE ITEMS ISOTOPE ACTIVITY PHYSICAL FORM CHEMICAL FORM STACK LIQUID EFFLUENT OTHER MONITOR READING ALARM SETPOINT D ONGOING RELEASE PERSONNEL EXPOSURE/ CONTAMINATION DATA D TERMINATED RELEASE NUMBER OF PERSONNEL EXPOSED:

NUMBER OF PERSONNEL CONTAMINATED:

D OFFSITE RELEASE MAXIMUM EXTERNAL DOSE:

MAXIMUM EXTERNAL LEVEL:

D ONSITEAREAS EVACUATED MAXIMUM INTERNAL DOSE:

MAXIMUM INTERNAL LEVEL:

D OFFSITE PROTECTIVE ACTION RECOMMENDED CRITICAL ORGAN (if known):

CIRITIAL ORGAN (if known):

DEGRADED CRITICALITY SAFETY CONTROLS FOR ACCIDENT SCENARIO(S) (BULLETIN 91-01)

D ALL CONTROLS LOST D ALL BUT SINGLE D DEFICIENT SAFETY D SAFETY SIGNIFICANCE D >45% MINIMUM CRITICAL MASS CONTROLS LOST ANALYSIS UNKNOWN PRESENT OR READILY AVAILABLE NUMBER AND TYPES OF CONTROLS NECESSARY UNDER NORMAL OPERATING CONDITIONS NUMBER AND TYPES OF CONTROLS WHICH FUNCTIONED PROPERLY UNDER UPSET CONDITIONS NUMBER AND TYPES OF CONTROLS NECESSARY TO RESTORE A SAFE SITUATION SAFETY SIGNIFICANCE OF EVENTS SAFETY EQUIPMENT STATUS STATUS OF CORRECTIVE ACTIONS EVENT DESCRIPTION (Continued)

NRC FORM 361A (8-2010)

LES-19-157-NRC ENCLOSURE 2 Written Follow-up Report

LES-19-157-NRC Written Follow-up Report I.

Applicable information required by 10 CFR 70.50(c)(2)

a.

The probable cause of the event, including all factors that contributed to the event and the manufacturer and model number (if applicable) of any equipment that failed or malfunctions is provided below:

i. UUSA has determined that the causes are the same as the event described in EN54101. As such, the investigation determined that the apparent cause was complacency due to infrequent operation of the 1001-471-1A 12 isolation valve.

The contributing causes were;

1. Improper verification of valve positions by use of visual verification -vs-hands on verification.
2. MA-3-2470-01, Autoclave Leak Check Surveillance IROFS10, leaves the valves out of their normal position
3. Steps that ensure integrity of IROFS10 and 28 in OP-3-0470-01 are not flagged as critical steps and commitment steps
4. Valves that are not usually operated makeup the IROFS10 established boundary
5. Steps that ensure integrity of IROFS are not flagged as critical steps and commitment steps
6. Not all personnel are aware of the impact their day to day jobs may have on the safety function of IROFS
b.

Corrective actions taken or planned to prevent occurrence of similar or identical events in the future and the results of any evaluations or assessments are:

i.

UUSA has determined that the corrective actions are the same as the event described in EN54101. The operators will receive coaching on the dangers of complacency when doing routine evolutions. The planned corrective actions that will strengthen the robustness of the I ROFS 1 O boundaries include retraining the operators in the preferred method of performing valve verifications and procedural enhancements to minimize the probability of recurrence.

c. UUSA is subject to Subpart H of 10 CFR 70; therefore, a discussion of whether the condition was identified and evaluated in the Integrated Safety Analysis (ISA) is provided below:
i.

The IROFS was identified in the UUSA ISA as a safety control to mitigate the consequences of a release of UF6 within the autoclave. The ISA evaluated accident sequences that could result in consequences to the workers and public.

The valve was determined to be needed to mitigate the adverse consequences to workers and public.