ML19312E512
| ML19312E512 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Summer  |
| Issue date: | 05/28/1980 |
| From: | SOUTH CAROLINA ELECTRIC & GAS CO. |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML19312E508 | List: |
| References | |
| NUDOCS 8006050047 | |
| Download: ML19312E512 (2) | |
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l 10CFR50.55(e) - SIGNIFICANT DEFICIENCY 1.
Identification of Nonconformance A DC power feeder circuit was routed from a safety related distribution panel to
' a non-safety related panel with no isolation device as required by design criteria.
2.
Number and Location of Nonconformance-One circuit was involved that fed non-safety related DC panel DPN-8015 from safety related DC panel DPN1RAl-ED.
Ns 3.
Significant Deficiency Created and Evaluation Isolation devices are required between safety rela'ted and non-safety related devices
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to prevent a disturbance, such as a short circuit, in the non-safety related device from affecting the operation of the safety related device.
In this case, loss of the panel would have resulted in loss of switchgear control power, DC power to (continued on next page) 4.
Corrective Action The omission of the isolation device occurred when the circuit was added to the drawings as a revision and was issued before being verified as required by the design control program. Therefore no program deficiency exists. To correct this situation the requirements of the design control program for verification of one line diagrams,
have been reviewed with the project electrical engineers and technicians.
In addition (continued on next page)
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80060500 W
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e 10CFR50.55(e), Significant Deficiency Page Two 3.
portions of the main control board and the control room evacuation panel, DC power to the underfrequency and undervoltage panel for reactor protection and other miscellaneous items.
If this panel were lost, train A safety related motors could not be sequenced on by the load sequencer, thus emergency cooling may not be available under loss of offsite power conditions.
Therefore, the safety of the plant could be adversely affected.
4.
a schedule has been established to review the documentation of the safety related one-line diagrams and to complete the required design verification by 6/30/80.
The circuit involved in this case has been rerouted to a non-safety related panel.
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