ML19312C981
| ML19312C981 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Millstone, Crane  |
| Issue date: | 02/10/1977 |
| From: | Caphton D NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION I) |
| To: | Seyfrit K NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE) |
| Shared Package | |
| ML19312C976 | List: |
| References | |
| TASK-TF, TASK-TMR NUDOCS 8001170608 | |
| Download: ML19312C981 (4) | |
Text
I jf "" ""4, UNITED STATES Jg
.4 NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMisSIOrJ EID 1.$[
O REGION I I E' k#, E su eAnn avenur
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- i. m F8101977 MEMORANDUM FOR:
Karl V. Seyfrit, Chief, Reactor Technical Assis-tance Branch, IE:HQf, y
TilRU:
Eldon J. Brunner,' hief, Reactor Operations and Nuclear Support B anch TROM:
D. L. Caphton, Section Chief, Reactor Projects Section #2
SUBJECT:
BWR CONTROL ROOM PANEL DESIGN ADEQUACY
( AITS F14488Hl)
As a result of the inspection conducted at the Millstone 1 facility relative to the recent inadvertent criticality, certain design problems with the basic Control Room Panel design became apparent.
Although human factors engineering is a less rigorous field than other disciplines involved in the design and operation of power plants, it is none the less a critical one.
The specific problems which were identified during the Millstone crit-icelity inspection include:
1.
Operating switches physically separated from the instrumentation location which provides indication of correct or incorrect action.
2.
Confusing and ambiguous designation of control rods including numbering formats.
3.
Sizing and proximity of matrix switches to one another which when examined collectively with existing control rod numbering schemes increases the possibility of human error.
4.
Reliance on a non-safety related process computer (which is not required to be operable, and in fact was only reliable during a portion of the incident in question), to enable the operator to establish a sequence of events and aid the operator in determining what had transpired.
CONTACT:
D. Sternberg, Region I 488-1256 8001170dCD
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M. Nordlinger Paragraph 90.
No NRC documents have been cited by the plaintiff in this paragraph, Information on the incpact of mining 3 resented by the plaintiff in this paragraph is not readily availaale to the NRC staff, P
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back E. Rothflei ch Uranium Recovery Licensing Branch Division of Waste Management i
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5 Adequacy of existing SRM instrumentation without extensive usage of
" dunking chambers" providing more sensitive response.
In a broader perspective, additional problems which have been identified in this area include; non-unifonn panel designs from plant to plant, including mirror image panels at dual unit sites; a confusing collection of operating switches and levers such that switcl es that can aggravate a situation are located in close proximity to the :esired switch and identical levers are used on both switches; a general lack of identi-fying nomencature on switches and indicators other than a valve number; non-uniform indicating breaker, motors, and valve. status light schemes such that nonnal and off-normal conditions are not readily apparent; console layouts such that meters and recorders can net be read clearly if the operator is standing up, which he is required to do to respond to alarms or take action.
It is recommended that a human factors study be initiated to determine what control room panel changes should be made to reduce the probability of operator error.
This study might begin by a study of the Millstone I control room layout for performing the shutdown margin test.
The study should include a cost benefit analysis to assist standards, NRR, and licensees in utilizing the information generated by this study.
w
- t r1-D. L. Caphton, Se mio ' Chief Reactor Project Section #2 cc:
F. Dreher, IE:HQ bcc: Reactor Operations & Nuclear Support Branch Section Chiefs D. Sternberg E. Greenman RO&NS Track File
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