ML19310A837

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Requests Commission Approval to Publish Advanced Notice of Proposed Rulemaking on Tech Specs.New Tech Specs Sys, Congressional Ltr & Preliminary value-impact Statement Encl
ML19310A837
Person / Time
Issue date: 04/28/1980
From: Harold Denton
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
To:
References
TASK-CC, TASK-SE SECY-80-214, NUDOCS 8006300575
Download: ML19310A837 (35)


Text

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c UNITED STATES NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION April 28, 1980 SECY-80-214 CONSENT CALENDAR ITEM.

For:

The Commissioners From:

Harold R. Denton, Director, Office of Nuclea actor Regulation Thru:

Acting Executive Director for Operations y;I

Subject:

STANDARDS FOR THE CONTENT OF TECHNICAL SPEC ~FICATIONS

Purpose:

1.

Provide the Comission with the staff's views on defining standards for the content of technical specifications.

2.

Obtain Comission approval to publish an Advance Notice of Proposed Rulemaking on the content of technical specifications.

Category:

This paper covers a minor policy question.

Issue:

To publish the enclosed Advance Notice of Proposed Rulemaking on technical specifications.

Background,:

By memorandum from Chilk to Gossick, dated January 9, 1980, the staff was requested to prepare a paper to address proposed amendments to 10 CFR Part 50, Sections 36 and 59 to define standards for the content of technical specifications and to streamline the existing format of the Standard Technical Specifications (STS).

In addition, the staff was requested to issue an Advance Notice of Proposed Rulemaking to solicit public comments.

This paper and accompanying Advance Notice of Proposed Rule-making were prepared in response to that request.

Discussion:

In the staff's view, there are three major difficulties that have grown out of the existing system of technical specifications.

These are:

(1) occasional disagreements among the parties to licensing proceedings regarding which items, derived from the safety analysis report, should be included in technical speci-fications, (2) a decrease in the effectiveness of technical specifications to focus the attention of licensees on matters.

important to safe reactor operation, and (3) an increase in the paperwork burden for both licensees and the NRC staff in processing proposed changes to technical specifications.

The first difficulty stems from the fact that the existing regulations do not contain an explicit standard for deciding CONTACT:

Jack Wetmore/D. Eisenhut Ext. 27306 8 0 o c 3 0 0 57f

.r which items must be included in-technical specifications.

The second and third difficulties have arisen because of the large volume and detail of~the technical specifications associated with the current system.

t The Advance Notice of Proposed Rulemaking at Enclosure (1)

. ould invite public comments and recommendations regarding w

the. adoption of appropriate changes to the regulations to resolve these difficulties. The changes would (1) establish a standaid for deciding which items derived from the safety l

analysis report must be incorporated into the technical specifications for a facility, (2) modify the definitions of categories of technical specifications to reduce their volume and to focus more directly on the aspects of reactor cperation that are important to the protection of the health and safety of the public. (3) define a new category of l

requirements that would be of lesser imediate importance to safety than technical specifications, thereby providing greater flexibility to both the NRC and licensees in processing proposed changes, and (4) establish appropriate conditions that must be met by licensees to make changes to the require-ments in the new category without prior NRC approval.

Enclosure (3) contains the staff's views on a new system uf technical specifications that could be developed from the concepts outlined in the Advance Notice of Proposed Rulemaking.

Enclosure (4) illustrates possible changes to the regulations i

that could be adopted to implement a new system.

j Both Enclosures _(3) and (4) are intended to illustrate the general framework of changes-that are currently contemplated.

l A key question that the staff recognizes must be addressed before any specific changes to the regulations can be proposed is: How will the enforceability of the requirements in the new category be maintained? The staff would like the benefit of further review and the consideration of public comment on this subject before proceeding with any specific proposal.

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i The anticipated value of the new system of requirements that is contemplated, and the impacts associated with converting ll existing plants to it are discussed in the Preliminary Value-Impact Statement at Enclosure (5).

Recommendation:

To initiate rulemaking on these issues, we recommend that the enclosed Advance Notice of Proposed Rulemaking oe approved for issuance.

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,. 1 Note::

1.

The resource estimate for the rulemaking is six -(6) person months over a 9-month period..

2.

The Subcommittee on Energy and the Environment of the House Committee on Interior and Insular Affairs, the Subcommittee on Energy and Power of the House Comittec on Interstate and Foreign Comerce, the Subcomittee on Environment, Energy and Natural Resources of the

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House Comittee on Government Operations, and the Subcommittee on Nuclear Regulation of the Senate Committee on Environment and Public W rks will be infonned by letter such as Enclosure (2).

3.

No environmental impact' statement, negative declaration',

or environmental impact appraisal need be prepared in connection with this action because it will not signi-ficantly affect the quality of the human environment.

Coordination:

This recomendation is concurred in by the Office of Standards Development, and the Office of Inspection and Enforcement.

The Office of Public Affairs has concurred that no Public Announcement is necessary. The' Office of the Executive Legal Director has no legal objection.

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/ Harold R. Denton, Director 1

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Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation

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Enclosures:

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1.

Advance Notice of Proposed Rulemaking l

2. -Draft Congressional Letter
3..A New System of Technical Specifications 4.

Possible Changes-to Section 50.36 and 50.59 5.

Preliminary Value-Impact Statement 4

1 DISTRIBUTION Commissioners Comission Staff Offices Exec Dir for Operations ACRS -'

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Commissioners' comments or consent should be provided directly to the Office of the Secretary by c.o.b. Tuesday, May 13, 1980.

Commission Staff Office comments, if any, should be submitted to the Commissioners NLT May 6,1980, with an information copy to the Office of the Secretary.

If the paper is of such a nature that it requires additional time for analytical review and comment, the Commissioners and the Secretariat ;hould be apprised of when comments may be expected.

This paper is tentatively scheduled for affirmation at an Open Meeting during the Week of May 19, 1980.

Please refer to the appropriate Weekly Commiss.on Schedule, when published, for a specific date and time.

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Enclosure No. 1 NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMISSION

[10 CFR Part 50]

DOMESTIC LICENSING OF PRODUCTION AND UTILIZATION FACILITIES Technical Specifications for Nuclear Power Reactors AGENCY: Nuclear Regulatory Comission.

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ACTION: Advance Notice of Proposed.lulemaking.

SUmARY: The Nuclear Regulatory Comission (NRC) is considering the adoption of changes to its regulations pertaining to technical specifications for nuclear power reactors. The changes would (1) establish a standard for deciding which items derived from the safety analysis report must be incorporated in o technical s'pecifications, (2) modify the definitions of categories of technical specifications to focus more directly on reactor operation, -(3) define a new category of requirements that would be of lesser imediate significance te safety than technical specifications, and (4) establish appropriate conditions that must be met by licensees to make changes to the requirements in the new category without prior NRC approval. The Comission seeks written public comment on the changes to the regulation.

DATES: Coment period expires (60 days from publication).

ADDRESSES:

Interested persons are invited to submit written coments and suggestionr. to the Secretary of the Comission, U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Comission, Washington, D. C.

20555, Attention:

Docketing and Service Branch.

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- '2-Copies of comments received by the Commission may be examined in the Commission's Public Document Room at 1717 H Street, N. W., Washington, D. C.

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Mr. J. Wetmore, Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation, U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, D. C.

20555, phone 301-492-7306.

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: Each license for operatial of a nuclear power reactor, issued by the NRC, contains technical specifications which set forth the specific characteristics of the facility and the conditions for its operation that are required to provide adequate protection to the health and safety of the public.

Technical specifications cannot be changed by licensees without prior NRC apprcval.

Historical

Background:

Before 1968, 10 CFR Part 50, 550.36, " Technical Specifications", required technical specifications to include "those significant design features, operating procedures, and operating limitations which (were) 1 considered important in providing reasonable assurance that the facility (would) be constructed and operated without undue h,azard to public health and safety".

Technical specifications that were formulated in accordance with this regulation, as it was then written, generally contained more detailed design information than was considered to be necessary to assure safe reactor operation. These technical specifications proved to be difficult to organize, unduly rastricted flexibility of reactor operation and necessitated the processing of many changes that were not'significantly related to safety.

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In 1968 the Atomic Energy Comission (AEC), predecessor of the NRC, amended its regulations in 5850.36 and 50.59 (33 F.R. 18612, December 17. 1968).

l 550.36 was amended to include a more precise definition of those categories of technical specifications that must be included in an application for an operating license. The amended regulation narrowed the scope of the mat eial contained in technical specifications by defining five specific categories of technical specifications. The five categories defined for nuclear reactors are:

(1) safety limits and limiting safety system settings, (2) limiting conditiens foroperation,(3)surveillancerequirements,(4)designfeatures,and(5) administrative controls. The design information that was required to be retained included only those items which, if altered, would have a significant effect on safety. Amendments to 550.59, among other things, clarified requirements 4

for keeping records of design changes and defined more adequately the tem "unreviewed safety question". The latter change established criteria for allowing licensees to make certain kinds of design changes (i.e., those not involving an urmeviewed safety question or a change to technical specifications) without prior NRC approval. These amendnents to 5950.36 and 50.59 (1) eliminated detailed design information from technical specifications, which in turn, reduced the need for a large number of change requests, and (2) resulted in a system of technical specifications and regulations that more effectively directed the attention of both licensees' management and the NRC to matters important to safety.

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, As knowledge in the field of reactor safety increased, the level of complexity and detail in technical specifications also increased, and a divergence in content of technical specifications from one facility to another began to emerge.

In addition, an increasing diversity of opinion among applicants and the staff as to what should be included as technical specifications resulted in protracted negotiations during the licensing process, and misapplication and misinterpreta-tion of requirements by plant operating staffs after a license was issued.

In recognition of these difficulties, in 1972, the AEC instituted the Standard Technical Specifications (STS) program. The first set of STS were applicable to reactors designed by the Westinghouse Electric Corporation. Other sets of STS were later developed for reactor types designed by other vendors.

For the latest revisions of these documents see: NUREG-0452 Rev. 2, July 1979; NUREG-0123, Rev. 2 August 1979; NUREG-0212, Rev.1, August 1979; and NUREG-0103, Rev. 3, July 1979 for Westinghouse, General Electric, Combustion Engineering and Babcock and Wilcox, respectively. The STS provide applicants with model specifications-to be used in fomulating plant specific technical specifications.

They served to make technical specifications for facilities licensed since 1974 more consistent with one another, and they tended to reduce the number of disagreements between applicants and the NRC staff r.egarding items to be included as technical specifications.

Current Problem:

Recent disagreements among parties to a proceeding, (In the Matter of Portland General Electric Company, et al (Trojan Nuclear Plant), ALAB-531, 9NRC263(1979)), have highlighted the need te establish a specific standard

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in' the regulations for deciding which items derived from the safety analysis report must be incoroorated into the technical specifications.

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. In addition, the substantial growth in both tt number of items and in the detail of the requirements contained in technical specifications that has taken place since the STS were instituted, indicates that more precise definitions of the existing categories of technical specifications contained in 550.36, may need to be considered. The Commission is concerned that the increased volume of technical specifications may be decreasing the effectiveness of these specifications to focus the attention of licensees on matters of more intnediate importance to r.afe operation of the facility.

While each of the requirements in today's technical specifications plays a role in protecting public health and safety, some requirements have greater immediate importance than others in that they relate more directly to facility operation. These are the requirements that pertain to items which the facility operator must be aware of and which he must control to operate the facility in a safe manner. To a large extent, the relative importance of these require-ments, as distinguished from those related to long term effects or concerns, has been diminished by the increase in the total volume of technical specification requirements.

Moreover, the increased volume and detail of technical specifications and the resultant increase in the number of proposed change requests that must be processed,has increased the paperwork burden for both licensees and the NRC staff. This is because 950.36 requires that technical specifications be included in each operating license; and thus, any proposed change, regardless o'f its importance to safety, must be processed as a license amendment.

For changes involving matters of lesser importance to safet.y the process'ing of a license amendment with the associated increased l

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. paperwork has had no significart benefit with regard to protecting'the public health and safety.

Proposed Solution: To resclve the difficulties associated with the current system of technical specifications for nuclear power reactors, the Comission is contemplating changes to 5850.36 and 50.59 of 10 CFR Part 50. The, changes would (1) establish a standard for deciding which items derived from the safety analysis report must be incorporated into the technical specifications for a facility, (2) modify the definitions of categories of technical specifications to focus more directly on the aspects of reactor operation that are important totheprotectionofthehealthandsafetyofthepublic,(3)defineanewcategory of requirements that would be of lesser imediate importance to safety than technical specifications, thereby providing greater flexibility to both the NRC and licensees in processing proposed changes, and (4) e'stablish appropriate conditions that must be met by licensees to make changes to the requirements in the new category without prior NRC approval.

Advice and recomendations on the proposed areas of revision to the reculation are invited from all interested persons. Specifically coments are requested on the following questions:

1.

Would it be appropriate to establish a fixed standard for deciding which items derived'from the safety analysis report must be incorporated into the technical specifications?

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2.

If so, what should the standard be based on?

l 3.

Would a standard incorporating the concept of "imediate importance to safety" be appropriate?

4.

Would it be appropriate to modify 650.36 to require technical specifications to focus more directly on reactor operation?

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Are surveillance requirements, as currently defined in 550.36, appropriate subjects for technical specifications?

l 6.

Should the current scope of surveillance requirements be reduced?

7.

If so, would it be appropriate to change the scope to include only those requirements related to assuring that safety limits and limiting conditions for operation are being met, and not to include other requirements?

8.

Would it be appropriate to define a new category of requirements separate from technical specifications, that would have a different level of importance to safety?

9.

What types of requirements currently included in technical specifications would be appropriately included in the new category?

10. Should requirements in the new category be retained:

a.

in a separate appendix to the operating license?

b.

in the Final Safety Analysis Report (FSAR) as commitments?

c.

in a document separate from the FSAR and operating license?

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11. How should the enforceability of the requirements that are moved into the new category be maintained?
12. Would it be appropriate to allow licensees to make certain changes t

to the. requirements in the new category without prior NRC approval?

13.

If so, what conditions should be established to assure tha,t such changes would not adversely effect safety?

14. What specific changes to the regulations should be included in' response to the preceding questions?
15. What advantages and disadvantages could be expected from the system of requirements derived from the answers to the preceding questions, for:

4 a.

license applicants?

b.

operating licensees?

c.

the NRC?

d.

the public?

The Comission has concluded that the changes being considered would be insignificant from the standpoint of ervironmental impact and thus will not require the preparation of an environmental impact statement, negative declaration, or environmental impact appraisal pursuant to 10 CFR Part 51, 551.5(d)(3).

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[5 U.S.C. 552;.* :.161b and 1, Pub. L.83-703, 68 Stat. 948; Sec.~ 201, Pub. L.83-438, 88 Stat.1242 (42 U.S.C. 2201, 5841 )].

1 Dated at Washington, D. C., this day of 1980.

FOR THE NUCt. EAR REGULATORY COPEISSION

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ENCLOSURE 2

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Enclosuie No. 2 DRAFT CONGRESSIONAL LETTER

Dear Mr. Chaiman:

Enclosed for your infomation are copies of an Advance Notice of Proposed Rulemaking that will be published in the Federal Register.

This advance notice of proposed rulemaking is being issued to invite public connents and recomendations regarding the adoption of changes to the Commission's regulations pertaining to technical specifications for nuclear power reactors.

Technical specifications are appended to each operating license of a tuclear power reactor, and set forth the specific characteristics of the facility and tne conditions for its operation required to provide adequate protection to the health and safety of the public.

At present, technical s'pecifications contain a large volume of material relating to a wide spectrum of subjects. The exi: ting regulations identify a number of different categories of technical specification requirements, but do not contain a specific standard for the conte t of technical specifi-cations. The Comission believes that the interet:

f public safety could be better served if such a standard were adopted. Such a change to the regulations would produce a sharper focus.of requirements on matters important to safe reactor operation, and would provide greater flexibility in administering requirements associated with matters of lesser, or longer-tem, safety importance.

In addition, the pr3 cessing of proposed changes to technical specifications could be greatly 5.implified.

Sincerely, i

Harold R. Denton, Director Off4ce of Nuclear Reactor Regulation

Enclosure:

Advance Notice of Proposed Rulemaking cc: ' Vice Chai', nan i

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-- Enclosure No.' 3 A NEW SYSTEM OF TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS Pending consideration of the coments received in response to the Advance Notice of Proposed Rulemaking at Enclosure (1), the staff has considered what changes to the regulations could be adopted to resolve the difficulties outlined in the Advance Notice of Proposed Rulemaking.

.I Defining a Standard for the Content of Technical Specifications The difficulty in defining a uniform standard for what should be included as technical specifications revolves around the variability in the perception of what is significant from a safety standpoint.

InALAB-531ktheboardstated that:

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"... as best we can discern it, the contemplation of both the act and the regulations is that technical specifications are to be reserved for those matters as to which the imposition of rigid conditions or limitations upon reactor operation is deemed necessary to obviate the possibility of an c.bnormal situation or event giving rise to an imediate threat to, the public health and safety."

In the staff's opinion, the "imediate threat" standard, taken in isolation, would not be definitive enough to adopt as a reguition.

But, in conjunction with appropriate modifications of the definitions of categories of technical specifications contained in !i50.36, it could go a long way toward solving the difficulty. Possible language to affect these changes is contained in Enclosure (4).

E n the Matter of Portland General Electric Company, et al.

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Plant), 9 NRC 263 (1973).

2-The concept of immediacy, taken in the context of the board's decision, involves e

a time element that the staff believes should be central to any such standard.

That is, an explicit distinction needs to be made in the regulations between those technical specification requirements that are directed toward assuring that operation of the plant is maintained within acceptable bounds (i.e., the implication being that operation outside these bounds would be a threat of some innediacy if the operator failed to take reasonably prompt corrective action),

and those directed toward the prevention of the long-term degradation of the quality of structures, systems and components. Under the current regulations, both types are included in today's technical specifications.

As further discussed in the section below, requirements of the former type are directly related to plant operation and the potential release of radioactive fission products, and thus should be considered short-term and of greater immediate importance to safety. Failure to adhere to such requirements constitutes an invalidation of the safety analysis report and therefore should require plant shutdown.

Requirements of the latter type are related more to effects or concerns that, over the long-term, say the length of a fuel cycle or longer, could lead to the invalidation of the safety analysis report, and an eventual threat to public safety, if allowed to persist. These requirements should be explicitly recognized to be of lesser short-term, or immediate importance to safety.

f Streamlining the Existing Format of' Technical Specifications In addition to the need for a standard for the content of technical specifications, the staff believes that.the existing system of technical specifications has become unwieldy in its present form, and needs to be revised.

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,. The difficulties that have arisen are especially evident in the category of surveillance requirements, and are principally the result of the level of detail that is involved under the existing regulation. The current dafinition of a surveillance requirement not only addresses the need to assure compliance with safety limits and limiting conditions for operation, but also includes requirements "... relating to test, calibration, or inspection to assure that the necessary quality of systems and components is maintained...". Generally, these types of requirements must be substantially more detailed than other technical specification requirements, and, for that matter, other surveillance requirements as well. And since they are directed more toward the prevention of long term degradation of the facility, they are considered by the staff to be of lesser imediate importance to safety than other technical specification requirements.

Placing these more detailed and voluminous requirements into the existing framework of technical spe ifications has had two major effects.

First, the resultant increase in the number of proposed change requests that must be processed has increased the paperwork burden for both licensees and the NRC staff. This is because the existing rev>1ations (550.36) require that technical specifications be included in each operating license; and thus, any proposed change, regardless of its importance to safety, must be processed as a license amendment.

For changes involving matters of lesser immediate importance to safety the processing of a license amendment with the associated increased paperwork has had no significant benefit with regard to protecting the public health and safety.

(It was this difficulty that motivated the staff to develop the Operational Surveillance Program (OSP) concept described in

SECY-79-395). Second, the increased volume of requirements is tending to j

dilute the effectiveness of the technical specifications to focus the attention of licensee management and operators on those matters most important to safe reactor operation. While each of the requirements in today's technical specifications plays a role in protecting public health and safety, some

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more directly to facility operation. These are the requirements that pertain i

to items the operator must be cognizant of, and have control over, to operdte l

the facility in a safe manner. To a large extent, the relative importance of these requirements, as distinguished from those related to long term effects or concerns, has been diminished by the increase in the total volume of technical specification requirements.

To alleviate these problems, the staff believes that the existing system of i

technical specifications should be modified to focus more directly on those aspects of a facility that are most important to its safe operation, and that requirements in the existing system that.do not directly pertain to facility operation should be placed in a format consistent with their lesser immediate safety importance and excluded from the operating license. And to reduce the number of proposed changes, certain kinds of changes to requirements in this group should be permitted without prior NRC approval.

Redefining the focus of technical specifications could be accomplished with relatively minor wording revisions to 550.36 which would modify the definition I

of a limiting condition for operation (LCO) to clarify that the plant must be placed in a safe operating mode (including shutdown), in accordance with the

.. technical specification, when an LCO is not met; and would narrow the definition of a surveillance requirement to include only those directed toward assuring that safety limits and LCOs will be met, and to exclude requirements related to maintaining the long term quality of systems and components. The staff estimates a resultant volume reduction of approximately 25% for a typical set of technical specifications, if there changes were to be adopted.

Establishing regulations to allow changes to be made to the excluded requirements without prior NRC approval could be accomplished by adding new language to 550.59.

The staff has prepared enclosure (4), which contains possible changes to the regulations that reflect the redefinition of focus for LCOs and surveillance requirements, and that adopt a standard for deciding when an item should be included as a technical specification for a facility. The appropriateness of pursuing these changes through rulemaking will be determined after considering comments received in response to the Advance Notice of Proposed Rulemaking at Enclosure (2).

The types of changes to the regulations contemplated here constitute a different approach than that envisioned for the OSP concept and that was outlined in SECY-79-395.

Instead of all of the Surveillance Requirements being removed from technical specifications, only those note directly related to assuring that safety limits and limit.ing conditions for operation are being met, that is those directred toward the maintenance of long tenn quality, would be removed. And instead of the 15 day "no veto" approval procedure that was planned for OSP i

changes, a procedure more closely paralleling existing 550.59(a) requirements l

regarding design changes, and 550.54(p) requirements regarding changes to the physical ~ security plan, would be employed.

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The appeal of this approach is twofold. First, the one to one correspondence between LCOs and surveillance requirements that is currently contained in technical specifications could be maintained. Thus, the explicit linkage between the surveillance requirements and the Safety Limits and LCOs would be maintained in one document, rather than splitting them up. The staff believes that this

-i linkage is very important because it serves as a way of defining wha,t constitutes compliance with Safety Limits and LCOs, ari because it assures that the reactor operator is paying attention to these limitations through the perfonnance of the surveillance requirements. Second, this approach has more appeal than the l

OSP concept because the staff would not be confined to a time constrained approval loop (i..e. the 15 day "no veto" approval procedure would not be necessary).

Staff review of changes to requirements not included in technical specifications could be handled in the same way 550.59 design changes are currently handled (i.e., periodic submittal by the licensee and after-the-fact review by the staff).

I A decision as to what would be a proper format for those requirements that would be excluded from technical specifications by changes to $50.36 cannot be made until public responses to the enclosed advance notice have been received.

However, one possibility that the staff believes may be workable, if properly controlled, would be to utilize the FSAR. During Policy Session 76-41 on September 30, 1976, the Consnission approved for publication in the FEDERAL REGISTER a notice of proposed rule making (contained in SECY-76-425) to require that the FSAR be updated, on an annual basis, for nuclear power plant licensees that would be or were issued after January 1,1963. The notice of proposed rule making inviting public comments was published in the FEDERAL REGISTER (41 F.R. 49123) on November 8,1976.

Implementation of this rule has been

.. delayed primarily tacause of a lack of consensus among the licensing staff regarding the need for the rule. However, the accident at Three Mile Island has reinforced the importance ef.having an updated FSAR, and thus the staff is pursuing more expeditious action to implement the rule.

Aside,from the need to have an up-to-date source of design and construction information for coping with abnormal events or situations at a nucle'ar power plant, an updated FSAR could also serve as an adjunct to technical specifications a

because it could serve as a catalog of licensee commitments relative to plant maintenance, testing and inspection that fall into the new category of requirements contemplated above. Another major advantage of an updated FSAR would be that the more detailed commitments relating to some testing and inspection could be retained in the FSAR instead of transferring them to the technical specifications as is currently done when a plant receives its operating license.

A large majority of these types of requirements in today's technical specifi-cations are essentially duplicacions of FSAR commitments; and it is these more detailed testing and inspection requirements that are generally of lesser short-term safety significance, and that require such large expenditures of manpower to process their proposed changes.

The FSAR update rule, coupled with the changes contemplated for 1850.36 and 50.59, could produce a system of requirements that utilized the technical specifications 'to focus on plant operation, and an updated FSAR to specify detailed long-term requirements directed toward maintaining the quality and integrity of systems and components.

In the staff's view, the two documents would then work together more harmoniously to assure the protection of public health and safety.

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8-The anticipated value of such a new system of requirements, and the impacts associated with converting existing plants to it are discussed in the Preliminary Value-Impact Statement at Enclosure 5.

The details of any particular approach will be worked out after receiving industry and public comments in response to the Advance Notice of Proposed Rulemaking at Enclosure (1).

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Enclosure N). 4 POSSIBLE CHANGES TO THE LANGUAGE OF 550.36 AND 550.59

1. '550.36(b): ' Revise this paragraph as shown below in comparative text:

'"Each license authorizing operation of a production or utilization facility of a type described in 550.21 or E50.22 will include technical specifications.

Except for administrative controls, technical specifications for nuclear reactors will be those limitations and conditions imposed upon facility operation that are necessary to provide reasonable assurance that an anticipated operational occurrence or other event will not give rise to an imediate threat to the health-and safety i

of the public.

The Technichl Specifications will'be ' derived from~ the analyses and evaluation included in the safety analysis report and amendments thereto, submitted pursuant to 550.34.

[The Commission may include such additional technical specifications as the Commission finds appropriate]."

2.

550.36(c)(2), " Limiting conditions for operation":

Revise the second sentence as shown below in comparative text:

"When a limiting condition for operation of a nuclear reactor is not met, the licensee shall shut down the reactor, or follow [anyl remedial action

[ permitted by the technical specification until the condition can be met.]

to place the facility in a safe condition in accordance with the technical specification".

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2-3.'550.36(c)(3),"Surveillancerequirements":

Revise to read as shown below in comparative text:

"Surveillancerequirementsarerequirementsrelatingtoperiodicchecksand[

tests [ test, calibration, or inspection) to assure t' hat [the necessary quality of systems and components is maintained, that] facility _ operation will be within the safety limits, and that the limiting conditions for op'eration will be met".

4.

150.59, " Changes, tests and experiments": Add the following new paragraphs:

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"(d) The holder of a license authorizing operation of a nuclear reactor may make changes to the procedures for testing, inspection, and calibration of structures, systems, and components without prior Comission approval unless the proposed change (i) reduces the

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effectiveness of the procedure to assure that the necessary quality of structures, systems, and components is maintained, or (ii) conflicts with the technical specifications".

"(e) The holder of a license authorizing operation of a nuclear reactor who desires a change to the procedures for testing, inspection, and calibration that (i) will reduce the effectiveness of the procedures to assure that the necessary quality of structures, systems, and components is maintained, or (ii) that conflicts with the technical specifications, shall submit-a proposed change along with the basis and justification for the propos'ed change".

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ENCLOSURE 5 a-6 1

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Enclosure No. 5

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,s-PRELIMINARY VALUE-IMPACT STATEMENT-FOR ADVANCE NOTICE OF PROPOSED RULEMAKING CONCERNING TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS FOR NUCLEAR POWER PLANTS l

I.

INTRODUCTION This value-impact statement provides preliminary cost or burden information to assist in determining the proprietary of the action proposed. The reader should recognize, however, that in the context of health,. safety,

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and environment, the usefulness of cost information is limited; health, safety and environmental protection are not economic considerations since they concern quality and operating confidence, not monetary value. However, i

where alternative means exist for realizing equivalent benefits in regulatory action, cost is given important consideration.

II.

PROPOSED ACTION A.

Descriptio:.

Rulemaking currently under consideration would (1) establish a standard l

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for deciding what items must be included in technical specifications, (2) modify the definitions of categories of technical specifications to focus more directly on reactor operation, (3) define a new category of requirements that would be of lesser imediate importance to safety than technical specifications and which would provide greater flexibility j

to both the NRC and licensees in processing proposed changes, and (4) establish appropriate conditions that must be met by licensees to make l

changes to the requirements in the new category without prior NRC i

approval.

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2-1 B._

Need for the Proposed Action A January 9,1980 memorandum from S.J. Chilk to L. V. Gossick requested the staff to initiate an advanced notice of proposed rulemaking to solicit public coments regarding the definition of standards for the content of technical specifications. Therefore, the imediate need is to implement the Comission request.

It is anticipated'that advance notice of proposed rulemaking will provide an avenue for indu:;try and public input that will give further insight into the question of whether or not changes need to be made to the existing system of technical specifications required by the regulations or that further action l

along these lines is not needed.

C.

Value-Impact of the Proposed Action 1.

NRC - the new system of technical specifications would reduce the current volume of technical specification requirements, and thus would be expected to reduce the paperwork burden on the staff because of the reduced number of technical specification change requests that would nave to be processed. For new facilities licensed under the revised regulations, we estimate a savings of 0.25 person-years per plant per year based on the assumption that the need for at least two technical specification change requests per year would be eliminated.

For currently operating plants that were licensed with Standard Technical Specifications (STS),'this savings would be iiitially offset in part by an estimated 0.1 person-years needed to convert l

their technical specifications to the new system. There are

. 19 plants in this group. So, for an initial investment of 1.9 person-years to convert to the new' system, a total savings of about 4.75 person-years per year could be expected to accrue for this group of plants.

For operating plants that were not licensed with STS (i.e., those licensed before Octob'er 1974), the savings would be initially offset by an estimated 0.4 person-years needed to convert their technical spacifications to the STS format and the new system.

~ We would not convert any of the 51 plants in this group to the new system unless they are also converted to the STS ' format.

Thus, for each plant in this group, savings would begin to accrue some 20 months after conversion to the new system. After this initial period, a total savings of about '.2.75 person-years per year would be expected for this group.

2.

Other Government Agencies - No change in value or impact involving other Goverment agencies is, anticipated.

3.

Industry - The reorganization of requirements contemplated by the i

rule change would serve to fccus the attention of licensees on operational safety matters and would provide more flexibility in administering activities related to other requirements that are of lesser imediate importance to safety.

This flexibility could result in payoffs both in managing human resources of the utility and in improved plarit availability. While it is i

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. difficult to demonstrate that the new system of requirement-would produce such payoffs, the following puts the potential benefits in i

perspective:

For a 1000 MWe unit in 1981, it is estimated that a one tenth of one percent improvement in plant availability (only about 9 hours1.041667e-4 days <br />0.0025 hours <br />1.488095e-5 weeks <br />3.4245e-6 months <br /> per year) could result in a savings of $60,000 to

$240,000 in replacement power costs,N epending on the' area of d

the country.

.There would be essentially no adverse impact of the new system of technical specifications on new plants that would be licensed after the change to the regulations is promulgated. For plants that are currently operating or are nearing the issuance of an OL, 1

an initial expenditure of manpower would be required to convert to the new system. Depending on the particular plant and its current system of reuqirements, this expediture, in our judgement, could range from 0.1 to 2.0 manyears per plant.

4.

Public - for the reasons discussed in (1) and (3) above, the new system of technical specifications and requirements is expected to produce an improvement in the safety of nuclear power plants through more efficient use of HRC and licensee resources.

Improved plant availability is expected to result as well. Depending on the extent that various utilities are able to pass on the associated

-1/Based on data taken from the NRC's Draft Negative Declaration for proposed rule changes associated with emergency planning (10 CFR Part 50, 55 50.33, 50.47, 50.54, and Appendix E), Federai Register, Volume 45, No.14, January 21, 1980.

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sayings to the public,.this savings can be substantial as discussed in (3) above.

No adverse impact on the public is foreseen.

~D.

Decision on the Proposed Action The Commission has directed advance notice of proposed rulemaking.

Therefore, this decision has been made. A decision concerning whether or not to _ change the existing system of technical specifications, and what form the change to the regulations should take, will be made after public comments are reviewed and evaluated.

Similarly, cost i

information contained in this preliminary value-impact statement will be revised as appropriate to reflect cost data received from public

+ comments.

III. Technical Approach Since tha proposed action has been directed by the Commission and involves only a redefinition and reorganization of existing requirements, discussion of technical alternatives is not c'onsidered applicable.

IV. Procedural Approach Since Advance Notice of Proposed Rulemaking has been directed by the Commission, precedural alternatives have not been considered.

V.

Statutory Considerations A.

NRC Authority A proposed rule on this subject wowld fall under the authority of sections 161b and 1611 of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended.-

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o.os B.

Need for NEPA Assessment The proposed action would be insignificant from the standpoint of environ-mental impact, and thus would not require an environmental impact statement, negative declaration, or environmental impact appraisal pursuant to 10 CFR Part 51, s51.5(d)(3).

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VI. Relationship to Other Existing or Proposed Regulations or Policies During Policy Session 76-41 on September 30, 1976, the Commission approved for publication in the FEDERAL REGISTER a notice of proposed rule making (contained in SECY-76-425) to require the FSAR to be updated on an annual basis, for nuclear power plant licenses that would be or were issued after January 1,1963. The notice of proposed rule making inviting public comments was published in the FEDERAL REGISTER (41 F.R. 49123) on November 8,1976.

Implementation of this rule has been delayed primarily because of a lack of consensus among the licensing staff regarding the need for the rule.

However, the accident at Three Mile Island has reinforced the importance of having an updated FSAR, and thus the staff is pursuing more expeditious action to implement the rule.

Aside from the need to have an up-to-date source of design and construction information for coping with abnormal events or situations at a nuclear power plant, an updated FSAR could also serve as an adjunct to technical speci-fications because it could serve as a catalog of licensee cmanitments relative to plant maintenance, testing and inspection that fall into the new category of requirements contemplated in Enclosure (3).

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VII. Summary ~and' Conclusion

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j An advance. notice of proposed rulemaking will be prepared.

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