ML19309H737
| ML19309H737 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Crane  |
| Issue date: | 04/03/1980 |
| From: | Adler T, Alder T THREE MILE ISLAND ALERT, WIDOFF, REAGER, SELKOWITZ & ADLER |
| To: | METROPOLITAN EDISON CO. |
| Shared Package | |
| ML19309H738 | List: |
| References | |
| NUDOCS 8005190659 | |
| Download: ML19309H737 (11) | |
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UNITED STATES OF AMERICA NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION BEFORE THE ATOMIC SAFETY AND LICENSING BOARD In the Matter cf
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METROPOLITAN EDISON COMPAN
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Docket No. 50-289 g gf j
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(Restart)
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(Three Mile Island Nuclear
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/f Station, Unit No.1)
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TMIA'S ANSWERS TO INTERROGATORIES 6 hftiME#
Eh OF LICENSEE a, y CONTENTION - 1 1 1-14. A report answering these questions has been submitted to Licensee previously. A copy is attached hereto.
1-15. Long-term health effects are those which are not presently manifest, but which may become so after years, decades and into other generations yet unborn.
1 1-16. TMIA presently is not able to identify the long-term health effects of each gas listed in (a)-(n). The ef'ects of exposure to radiation at any level are widely known and include: (a) a greater incidence of cancer, and (b) genetic mutations. In addition, the mental health effects of not knowing when and if a person will become "a greater incidence" statistic are includable as a long-term health effect.
1-17. Yes.
l l-18. At present, a method to decontaminate TMI-2 has not been approved. If l
TMI-1 were to open while the decontamination process remained in limbo, publicly j
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O available assessments indicate that planned and unplanned releases of radiation will occur. To our best knowledge, these assessments are presently in the pos-session of Licensee.
1-18(a). Yes.
,1-18(b), (c) & (d). TMIA presently does not have the information requested, other than that information presently publicly available. If additionalinformation is developed, it will be made available to Licensee.
CONTENTION - 2 2-1. Additionallow-level radiological discharges from Unit 1 are those which I
would result from normal operations of a nuclear powered electrical generating station. This would ini.de any releases through water or air resulting from such normal operation.
2-1(a). A low-level radiological discharge, as used in Contention No. 2, is defined as those levels which the NRC, in licensing a nuclear power plant, would characteriza as low-level radiological discharges.
2-1(b). 20 C.F.R. Section 20.1 et seq.
2-2. TMIA does not, in revised Contention 2, contend that there will be signifi-cant adverse effects on the water quality in the Susquehanna resulting solely from the low-level radiological discharges from Unit No.1.
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2-2 (a), (b) & (c). See answer to 2-2 above.
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2-3. TMIA has not, as yet, been able to discover any high-level discharges which were made into the Susquehanna as a result of the TMI accident. If such informa-tion comes.into its possession, it will be provided.
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2-3 (a), (b) & (c). See answer to 2-3 above.
2-3(d) & (e). High-level discharge is intended to mean that level of radioactivity over concentrations of one microcurie per milliliter or those levels of radioactivity from any pathway which are defined by any rule and regulation of the NRC as being high level.
2-4. High-level discharges as described above may find their way into the Sus-quehanna River from resin bed disintegration in the Epicor II system, leaks from the auxiliary building and related water holding tanks, leaks from high-level readioactive waste disposal equipment currently under construction for treatment of water in the containment building, leaks into the ground water from disrupted storage of highly radioactive resin beds from the Epicor II system. The levels and make-up of the types of radioactivity to be found in these discharges may vary with source, and TMIA does not, as yet, have information in its possession which would allow us to specifically identify the make-up of each such discharge.
2-4(a). See answer to 2-4 above.
2-4(b). To date, TMIA has not discovered any documents which contain any eyidence or information bearing upon or relating to such high-level discharges.
If such information becomes available, it will be provided to Licensee.
2-4 (c). See answer to 2-4(b) above.
2-5. See answer to 2-3 above.
2-6. See answer to 2-4 above.
2-7. See answers to 2-3 and 2-4 above.
2-8. Yes.,
2-9. See answers to 2-3 and 2-4 above.
2-10. Those additional discharges of radiation into the Susquehanna which would occur if Unit 1 were to reopen include those types of releases which normally occur under normal operating conditions of a reactor at a nuclear generating station such as TMI-1.
2-10 (a). See answer to 2-10 above.
2-10 (b). TMIA has no such documents in its possession.
2-10 (c). TMIA has not identified any persons who have any information. elated to this allegation.
2-10 (d). Such discharges will occur no matter when Unit 1 reopens.
2-10 (e). Yes.
2-11. See answer to 2-4 above.
2-12. See answer to 2-4 above.
2-13. The present plan for decontamination, to which TMI refers in its revised Contention No. 2, is a combination of the Epicor II system for the treatment of radioactive wastes now housed in the auxiliary building and those stored in other places of similar radioactivity. It then includes the decontamination of highly radioactive waste water found in the containment building and primary cooling systems. The plan would also necessitate the decontamination of equipment at Unit 1 which has been contaminated by radioactivity from various systems at Unit 2.
The decontamination of the containment building and prim' ry cooling sys-a l
l tem will utilize a demineralization system currently under study and preliminary I
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construction by the Licensee to be housed in underground fuel storage pools or similar facilities.
2-14. TMIA presently has not developed the information requested. If and when it obtains such information, it will be provided to Licensee.
2-15. The pre-March,1979 levels of contamination to which Unit 2 should be returned prior to the reopening of Unit 1 is that level of contamination.found in a normally operating nuclear powered electric generating station.
CONTENTION - 5 5-1. Contention 5 was based primarily on the information provided in an article published in the Philadelphia Inquirer on Monday, April 16, 1979. This informa-tion was gathered by twelve reporters of that newspaper, based on interviews with fifty past and present employees of the Licensee at Three Mile Island. That article is a matter of public record and available to the Licensee as easily as to TMIA.
Based on the information contained in this article, TMIA has reviewed hundreds i
I of work orders, and summaries of work orders, depositions and interviews con-l l
ducted by the NRC and the President's Commission and has deposed twenty-one individuals. All information gathered was either in the possession of Licensee or is now in its possession. Numerous areas of concern have been identified in this l
process, many of which have been further identified in the depositions. TMIA,
if resources permit, will attempt to continue to identify these areas of concern.
Since all the information is already in Licensee's possession, it would appear to be unnecessary, burdensome and improper to require TMIA to attempt to describe in writing and in advance of hearing all of the many dozens of areas of concern -
where deferral of necessary or required maintenance has taken place. Since Licensee is fully aware at this point of TMIA's area of concern, since it has itself provided the documents upon which it is based, and since it knows (through the depositions) many specific work orders that have provoked concerns, Licensee can adequately prepare for trial.
5-2. See answer to 5-1 above.
5-3. See answer to 5-1 above.
5-4. See answer to 5-l above.
5-5. TMIA contends that deferral of maintenance and repairs until a fuel outage may be inappropriate in specific instances -- depending on the item of repair.
In addition, TMIA contends that so substantial a backlog may accumulate so as to make it impossible to fully and properly perform maintenance during the limited time available during outages.
5-5(a), (b) & (c). See answer to 5-1 above.
5-5 (d). It is clearly inappropriate to defer "all" maintenance and repairs until a plant outage. This much has been conceded by Licensee's employees in their depositions. A multitude of criteria must be used to determine what maintenance and repairs can be deferred. In some cases, " tech-specs" can be helpful. In others, the skill, maturity, concern and good-faith of the operators must be relied upon to balance the economic benefits of running the plant without doing the repairs against the risks to the general public involved.
5-6. See answer to 5-1 above. " Essential maintenance" is that maintenance which was identified by the operator itself as most important or is understocod in the industry to be cf great importance to safe or efficient operation.
CONTENTION - 6 6-1. TMIA contends that neither the Licensee nor the NRC can, at this time, fully or properly anticipate the expenditures that will be required to clean up the present contamination and damage at TMI and to reconstruct and modify TMI-1 and TMI-2 sufficiently to satisfy NRC imposed requirements that may be necessitated. Until the SER is released, it is impossible to state what these changes may be. Recent testimony in the PUC proceedings presently going on suggest that -- based on the inadequate information available now -- the Licensee's cost estimates are seriously deficient. TMIA intends to show, if resources permit, that the Licensee will not be able to raise the capital necessary to accomplish the work required -- except perhaps at a prohibitively expensive price -- and still maintain its other obliga-tions. All information and documents upon which TMIA relies are of record in the PUC proceedings that have taken place to date and are equally available to Licensee.
TMIA has no independent cost analyses at this time and believes, further, that any such analysis -- until Unit 2 can be carefully inspected --is highly speculative.
TMIA obviously does not know what further technical changes will be required, but anticipates that the NRC will continue to make such requirements as are rea-sonably necessary to protect the public health and safety. Licensee's financial condition will not permit it to meet these requirements.
6-2. See answer to 6-l above.
6-3. Those regulations of the NRC bearing upon the safe operation of TMI have required and will require the NRC to mandate technical changes or procedures which have required and will require the expenditure of additional sums of money.
As the cost of these requirements and clean-up and reconstruction of TMI-1 become fully known, it is contended that Licensee will be unable to raise the necessary funds except perhaps at exorbitant and prohibitive rates. See also answer to 6-1 above. This is reinforced by the actions announced by Moody's Investor Services on March 27, 1980, whereby Met-Ed bond ratings were reduced to the lowest such ratings for any utility in America.
6-4. TMIA has no estimates at the present time except those provided by the Company in the PUC proceedings.
6-5. At a meeting between TMIA counsel, Licensee's counsel and NRC counsel on October 16, 1979, to discuss TMIA's contentions, a copy of a letter was given to counsel Trowbridge. This letter provided the basis for the conclusion that Met-Ed might not be able to meet new financial protection requirements imposed on nuclear utilities. It is assumed that a copy of that letter is, therefore, still in Licensee's possession.
6-6. TMIA has no cost estimates at the present time.
6-7. TMIA was referring to Met-Ed's financial obligations to pay for energy pur-chased from the PJM interconnect as a result of not being able to produce the power normally anticipated.
6-8. There have been no occasions of inability to meet financial obligations up to now, so far as TMIA is aware. Contint el large purchases, however, will add to the financial strain being experienced e ad make it even more difficult to raise capital for clean-up, construction, repair und modification of TMI.
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6-9. Licensee has testified extensively on this issue and about its growing deferred energy balance in the PUC proceedings. As the need for borrowed money increases to cover that balance, Licensee's ability to borrow will be affected. TMIA relies, at this point, on data and testimony submitted in the PUC proceedings and obviouslyavailable to Licensee. Preparation of documents or data by TMIA has not yet been done.
CONTENTION - 7 7-1. TMIA contends that Licensee will be unable to appropriately deal with con-sequences similar to those that resulted from the accident at TMI-2 if an accident were to occur at TMI-1. The design basis of the accident is irrelevant to the contention, since the contention concerns itself only with the consequences of any accident, e.g., general site emergency, uncontrolled release of radioactive gas or large quantities of highly radioactive water in containment.
7-2. See answer to 7-l above.
7-3. See answer to 7-1 above.
7-4. Presently, in excess of 600,000 gallons of radioactive water are contaminated at TMI-2. Licensee has previously identified eight (8) TMI-l facilities that are being used to help in the decontamination of TMI-2. Licensee has also stated that the period of time these facilities will continue to be used during this process is uncertain. Thus, TMI-1, were it to open :omorrow, will be short of facilities pre-viously designed for TMI-1 use.
7-4(a), (b), (c) & (d). TMIA presently does not have the information requested, other than that information publicly available. If additional information is developed, it will be made available to Licensee.
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7-5. No.
7-6. TMIA presently does not have the information requested, other than that information publicly available. If additional information is developed, it will be made available to Licensee.
7-7. No accidents were identified in response to 7-5.
7-8. See answer to 7 7 above.
7-9. Abnormal amounts of radioactive waste water is that amount in excess of what is produced in normal operations.
7-10. Sufficient storage capacity is equivalent to all the storage that:
(1) was and is needed to contain contaminated water as a result of the TMI-2 accident, (2) was and is needed as additional storage space for uncontaminated water, and (3) was and is needed to clean up TM7-2.
7-11. TMIA presently has not developed the risk assessment requested. When it is developed, it will be made available to Licensee.
7-12. " Safely decontaminated" means cleaned and repaired and ready to be refueled.
7-13. Yes.
7-13 (a), (b), (c) & (d). Because of the lack of funds, TMIA has not been able to retain an expert to review these elements of the Restart Report. When and if that is done, the results of the evaluation will be made available to Licensee.
7-14. See answer to 7-13 above.
CONTENTION - 8 8-1. TMIA has not decided what witnesses it intends to call. When it does, the list and testimony will be made available to Licensee.
Respectfully submitted, WfDOFF, REAGER, SELKOWITZ ADLER, P.C.
By:
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Theodore A. Adler P. O. Box 1547 Harrisburg, PA 17105 (717) 763-1383 Dated: April 3,1980 i l i
AFFIDAVIT I, THEODORE A. ADLER, do hereby aver that the information contained in the foregoing Answers To Licensee's Interrogatories are true and correct to the best of my knowledge, information and belief.
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TheodorTt A.vAdler Sworn to and subscribed before me this wNv day of April, 1980.
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!;otary Public Audrey C. l'eNer, Notary Public My Commission Expires:
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