ML19309G989
| ML19309G989 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Indian Point, Zion  |
| Issue date: | 04/01/1980 |
| From: | Dircks W NRC OFFICE OF THE EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR FOR OPERATIONS (EDO) |
| To: | Schweiker R SENATE |
| Shared Package | |
| ML19309G990 | List: |
| References | |
| NUDOCS 8005080108 | |
| Download: ML19309G989 (4) | |
Text
8005080(08 a
-':. at:,
,4 UNITED STATES j
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d i NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
,,, 3 7:::p,
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20555 i{ '%' /
$O-247[DG"i Eb APE 1W so vts The Honorable Richard S. Schweiker United States Senate
'dashington, D. C.
20510
Dear Senator Schweiker:
Enclosed are responses to questions posed by Mrs. Nancy Iannuzzelli which
';ere transmitted to the Muclear Regulatory Commission by your memorandum dated arch 4,1980.
I am also enclosing copies of Confirmatory Orders on Zi:n 1 & 2 and Indian Point 2 & 3 nuclear power plants which are referenced in the resoonse to the first question.
I trJst that you will find this information responsive to Mrs. Iannuzzelli's ques! ions.
Sincerely, (Signed) I. Kevin Cornell
- William J. Dircks Acting Executive Director for Operations
Enclosures:
1.
esponses to "rs. Iannuzzelli's Questions 2.
Confimatory Orders 3.
- ncoming Memorandum from Schweiker dtd 3/4/S0 with enclosure c
~
ssnonse to Questions Posed by Mrs. Nancy Isrnuzzelli o
D esti:n:b Has NRC made a decision rc opening nuclear power plants outside Chicago and at Indian Point, New York?
Ans,;e r:
Because of the high population density in the vicinity of the Zion 1 & 2 olants near Chicago and the Indian Point 2 & 3 plants in New York, the Commission has recently undertaken a reassessment of the potential radiological hazards associated with the operation of these olents.
The purpose of this study is to identify measures which can be teen to co,apensate for the high population at risk.
Although energency planning reviews and consideration of mitigating features for severe accidents may take one to two years to complete, a number of interim measures have been identified which will enhance the operational safety of these plants. Confirmatory Orders were issued to the licensees for Indian Point Units 2 & 3 on February 11, 1980, and to the licensee for Zion Units 1 & 2 on February 29, 1980, requiring the inplementation of these interim measures.
The Conaission received a petition from the Union of Concer ned Scientists, dated September 17, 1979, requesting that the license be revoked for Indian Point 1, which is presently defueled and has not operated for several years, and that operation o.f Indian
?oint Units 2 & 3 be suspended because of alleged design problems and high pcoulation density. With refoect to Indian Point 1, the licensee has been ordered to show cause why the operating license of that plant should not be terminated and the plant decommissioned.
Insufficient justification was found to warrant suspension of ooeration of Indian Point Units 2 & 3.
The Co mission does not view the potential hazard associated with the ooeration of Zion Units 1 & 2 to be gres-eno0gh to warrant suspension of operation.
2 Mcw close to a Q ated area will NRC allow a nuclear power plant l
.esti:1:
to be built?
Answer:
"RC's current r..
lation requires that:
(a) a reactor site is located in a low Population Zone (LPZ),
(b) the nearest pooulation center is located at a distance at j
least one and one-third times the distance to the outer boundary of the LPZ.
With the presen criteria, the exact radius of the LPZ is determined by a number of site and plant specific factors, including the actual and :rSjected population density within the LPZ and the safety features incorporated in the reactor, i
. Concerning requirements for future plants, the f;RC is working on revisions to the regulations ('10 CFR 100) which would incorporate additional detailed requirements addressing the flRC's siting policy with respect to population density.
Question:3 Have they made demands for more stringent safety precautions for all plants (nuclear power)?
Answer:
The NRC has taken a number of actions which have established requirements for more stringent safety prectutions at nuclear power plants. These actions flowed mainly from the activities of the Bulletins and Orders Task Force and the short-term recommen-dations of the Lessons Learned Task Force. Work by these groups began in fiay 19B. Further actions are planned in connection with implementing the recommendations of various internal flRC studies of the Tiil-2 accident, the President's Commission and the NRC Special Inquiry Group, directed by !iitchell Rogovin.
The Bulletins and Orders Task Force (BOTF) activities were related to loss of feedwater transients and small break loss of coolant accidents (LOCAs) and covered (1) reliability of systems; (2) analysis; (3) guidelines for preparation of emergency pro-cedures; and (4) training of operators in emergency operating procedures. All of '.hese activities were related to reducing the potential for and upgrading the capability to cope with transients like that at T!il-2.
Implementation of changes by licensees (e.g.,
retraining of operators, improvements in auxiliary feedwater system
' reliability, specific thanges in instrument set points, and changes to emergency operating p ocedures) were imposed through IE Bulletins and Commission Orders. As a result of BOTF studies of a generic nature a number of additional requirements for systems and pro-cedural changes will be issued in the near future.
The short-term recommendaticns by the Lessons Learned Task Force (LLTF) covered the followint areas:
(1) emergency power supply; (2) safety and relief valve testing; (3) accident instrumentation; (4) containment isalation; (5) post-accident hydrogen control; (6) post-accident radiation control; (7) emergency feedwater reliability; (8) radiation instrumentation for accidents; (9) analysis and training for abr.ormal operation; (10) on shift engineering advisor to control room supervisor; (11) in-plant emergency procedures; and (12) operator reliability.
In all, 24 specific administrative and design changes were imposed by the Director of Regulation on September 13, 1979.
Implementation has proceeded in two stages, the first to be completed by about January 1,1980, with all changes to be fully implemented no later than January 1,1981.
These reauirements affect all operating olants, and must be implerented l
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, before operation of new plants will be approved. Teams of NRC specialists have been established to assure that licensees have properly implemented the first stage requirements and that approp-riate commitments (e.g., design and equipment procurement) have been made to properly implement the second stage. Licensee progress will be followed closely.
Changes in requirements that are anticipated for the near future include additional improvements in emergency preparedness; substantial upgrading of operator training and personnel qualifications and ir.provements in control room design to improve the capability of operators to comprehend plant status and respond correctly to abnormal conditions. Additional requirements of a somewhat longer range will undoubtedly result from detailed studies required in connection with the actions recommended by various internal and external studies.
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