ML19309G795

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Forwards Evaluation of Auxiliary Feedwater Sys to Meet SRP 10.4.9 & Branch Technical Position ASB-10-1.Reliability Study by Kaman Sciences Corp Encl
ML19309G795
Person / Time
Site: Sequoyah  Tennessee Valley Authority icon.png
Issue date: 04/28/1980
From: Mills L
TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY
To: Rubenstein L
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
Shared Package
ML19309G796 List:
References
NUDOCS 8005070582
Download: ML19309G795 (3)


Text

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400 Chestnut Street Tower II April 28, 1980 Director of Nuclear Reactor Regulation Attention: Mr. L. S. Rubenstein, Acting Chief Light Water Reactors Branch No. 4 Division of Project Management U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, DC 20555

Dear Mr. Rubenstein:

In the ibtter of the Application of .) Docket Nos. 50-327 Tennessee Valley Authority ) 50-328

Reference:

Letter from D. F. Ross, Jr., to All Pending Operating License Applican.ts of Nuclear Steam Supply Systems Designed by Westinghouse and Combustion Engineering dated March 10, 1980 In the referenced letter, TVA was instructed to respond in four specific areas regarding the Auxiliary Feedwater (AFW) System at Sequoyah Nuclear Plant (SNP). Enclosure 1 provides an evaluation of the SNP AFW aystem which shows how the requirements of Standard Review Plan.10.4.9 and Branch Technical Position ASB-10-1 are met. Enclosure 2 is a reliability study of the SNP AFW system prepared by Kaman Sciences Corporation under contract to TVA. Tha remaining two items were answered in a letter from L. M. Mills to L. S. Rubenstein dated January 25, 1980, in which TVA responded to NRC short and long-term recommendations regarding the AFW system and the questions regarding the design basis for AFW system flow requirements.

If you have any questions, please get in. couch with M. J. Burzynski at FTS 854-2581.

Very truly yours,

! TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY

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L. M. Mills, Manager Nuclear Regulation and Safety Enclosures (5) (

ENCLOSURE 1 SEQUOYAi! NUCLEAR PLAUT AUXII,I ARY FEED *clATER SYSTEM C0. PARIS 0N TO SRP 10.4.9 AMD BTP ASB 10-1 The follouing co:mnents evaluate the Scquoyah auxiliary feedwater ( AF1.')

system with respect to the acceptance criteria of SRP 10.4.9 The nu:aboring corresponds to part II of SRP 10.4.9 Each requirement of SRP 10.4.9 har been previcualy addressed in the Sequoyah FSAR or in previous responses to l'RC questions. Reference will be made to this existing material as appropriate.

1. GDC1 - See PSAR section 10.4.7.2.2.
2. GDC4 - Scc FSAR ccction 10.4.7.2.2.

3 GDCS - Sec FSAR section 10.4.7.2.2.

4. GDC19 - See the entire FSAR section 10.4.7.2 and the responses to questions 05.28 and QS.28A.

S. GDC44 (a) Sanc as nunber 4 above.

(b) See FSAR sections 10.4.7.2.1, 10.4.7.2.2, and 10.4.7.2.3 (c) The only nonesncntial portion of the AFU is the condensato supply uhich is isolnted from the remainder of the systen by chech valves. All conponents required to traintain the essential function:, of the AF'.!, including isolc.tien of disabled equipment, are self-actuated, automatic, er opernble fro:a the inin control room. This infernation is includen in FSAR secticns 10.4.7.2.1, 10.4.7.2.2, and 10.4.7.2.3, but not explicitly stated. These statements are made here for clarification.

6. GDC45 i See PSAR scetion 10.4.7.2.4.

7 GDC46 - Sc6 FSAR sections 10.4.7 2.4 and 14.1, FSAR Tabic 14.1-1 (page 14.1- B3) und STS section 3/4.7.1.

8. RG 1.25 - Systen conponents were classified in accordance uith the draf t version of ANS 18.2 issued Argust 1970. A point-by-point connarisen uith RG 1.26 quality croups choun no nignificant differences for the AFh', See FSAR c ce t. ion 10.4.7.2.3, 3.2.2, PiSure 10.4-19, Tables 3 2-2, 3 2-4, and 3.2-4a.
9. RG 1.29 - See FSAR sections 10.4.7.2.1 and 3 9.2.5.1.

l

10. RC 1.62 Sec FSt.!! cectica 10.4.7.2.5.
11. 1;G 1.102 - See FSAR section 2.1;A.
12. RG 1.117 - See FSAE cections 10.4.7.2.2 and 3 5 and FSAR quection Q3 27 13 BTP A3B 3-1 and !!EB 3 See TVA Report flo. 72-22.
14. DTP ASB 10 The AFU meets all requirementn of thic BTP an described in FSAR section 10.4.7 uith one exception. Each AFU train cannot cupply any cor.binatin of steam cencratora. Diverse means are provided to supply AFU to any ntea; generator.

The stcam-driven AFU pump dalivers AFU to all four steam generetors. Train A of the motor-driven supply delivers AFU to stcan genera tors 1 and 2. Train B of the notor-driven supply delivers AFU to stcan generators 3 and 4.

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