ML19309G325
| ML19309G325 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Crane  |
| Issue date: | 03/28/1979 |
| From: | Troffer G METROPOLITAN EDISON CO. |
| To: | METROPOLITAN EDISON CO. |
| References | |
| TASK-TF, TASK-TMR NUDOCS 8005050551 | |
| Download: ML19309G325 (7) | |
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MEMORANDUM OF INTERVIEW On August 28, 1979, George J. Troffer, Manager of Quality Assurance, Metropol-itan Edison (Met Ed) was interviewed by William Foster and Robert Chin. The interview was conducted in Met Ed's corporate offices at 2800 Pottsville Pike, Reading, Pa. and lasted one hour and 40 minutes.
Mr. Troffer stated that the tape recording of his July 25, 1979 interview with the President's Commission, to the best of his knowledge, was an accurate repre-centation of his involvement with the news media. Notes of a review of these tapes by the Special Inquiry Group are attached.
Troffer advised he was first notified of the accident about 7:20 a.m., Wednes-day, March 28 by Dick Klingaman. He said Klingaman advised of a reactor trip and high radiation levels.
Troffer did not remember being given any specifics with respect to high radiation levels.
Troffer said he remembered thinking we have a major transient and radiation problems which were probably being caused b: a primary to secondary leak. Troffer said he then reviewed a copy of the npergency plan and notified Walter Crietz's secretary of the information pro-vided by Klingaman.
Troffer stated about 7:50 a.m. he notified Bob Arnold of the situation and that a site and general emergency had been declared. He did not remember who told him a general emergency had been declared, but did believe he was notified within minutes of the declaration. Troffer said he advised Arnold he believed Met Ed had a serious problem, but added Arnold would have known this.
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Troffer said it was generally understood within Met Ed that he would notify upper management in such an event.
Troffer said that he believed the general emergency was declared because readings offsite (the North gate) were above the minimum required for a declar-ation.
Troffer said he called Joe Hilbish, his lead licensing engineer and ask him to come to the office to discuss the situation. He and Hilbish decided not to attempt to get information directly from the plant, as the plant staff had its hands full dealing with the accident.
He eaid he was able to get information on the accident status by mid-morning from Terry Macke, lead quality control engineer, who was at the Observation Center.
Troffer said he did talk to Gary Miller around 9:30 a.m. and Hiller recognized he had a serious problem, but there was no indication of fuel damage.
Troffer said he did not remember participating in the draf ting of Met Ed's public statements Wednesday morning.
He said one would have to be careful about including a statement of a general emergency declaration because people would not know what it meant.
If you did put on such a statement, a detailed explana-tion would also be needed. He added this could also cause problems because people wouldn't know what the numbers meant.
Troffer said he received several calls on Wednesday from Macke and one from Miller who was in the Unit 2 shif t supervisor's office.
He couldn't remember the specifics of any of the conversations but,in general the information he e
3 received was 1) radiation was measured onsite and at the North gate and moni-toring teams were deployed, 2) high pressure injection was keeping the core cool, 3) susoected damage to B steam generator tubes, 4) evente were related which caused the trip, 5) vapor locks in the loops were blocking coolant flow, and 6) there were bubbles in the candy canes. Troffer said Miller did convey late that afternoon that the situation was under control. He added in his conversation with Miller earlier that morning, Miller felt the situation was not entirely under control.
Troffer said he was distressed with NRC's statement that radiation levels in the containment building were 1000 times normal. He said there was no way of knowing what the levels were at the time that statement was made.
Troffer said at that time he felt levels were 10 times normal, choosing not to believe the dome monitor (instrumentation failure) which was consistent with Jack Herbein's public position.
Troffer stated he received word that Herbein had assigned him to the Hershey Motor Lodge news center, where he arrived Thursday.
He said the charter of the news center, headed by Blaine Fabian, was to provide technical explanation to the press and confirm known facts. Troffer added, however, press officials were successful in "weedling" other information out of himself and other news center staff. Trof fer said he sought advise from the public relations personnel in the news center when questions arose concerning interface with the press outside of technical explanations.
Troffer said he was not in charge of the news center in the absence of Fabian - one of the public relations people was always in charge.
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4 Troffer stated representatives of the Atomic Industrial Forum (AIF) were present in the news center and were gathering information to pass back to Washington.
Troffer said because he felt there were too many sources of baformation within Met Ed, he suggested to Fabian that AIF be made the sole source of information, but no actior. was taken on his suggestion.
Troffer stated one of his functions was to prepare information for Herhein's public statements. He did this by reviewing public statements made by NRC (Harold Denton) and Met Ed.
He supplemented this with information he received from MacKay, Rick Barley, lead mechanical engineer, and Vic Orlande, lead I&C engineer who were at the Observation Center and in contact with the plant. He said Don Curry and Harold Seldomridge assisted him in this task. Temperatures and other data were charted on a display board.
Troffer said he was afraid to use some of the information because it would subsequently be proven false (e.g.,
the hydrogen recombiners are operation - an hour later told they hadn't been hooked up yet). Troffer said before he would pass on information to Herbein he would attempt to confirm facts by going over and over again information he was discussing with an individual.
Troffer said, if requested, news staff personnel could grant private interviews, but no photos were allowed or television cameras.
This was on instruction from Fabian.
Troffer stated on Friday evening Bob Arnold visited the news center and Troffer told Arnold he did not have enough guidance.
Troffer said Arnold told him to develop his own guidance which he did. Troffer couldn't remember the specifics
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of the guidance but said there were eight general points along the lines of don't create news, just explain, respond to inquiries.
Troffer said when asked he would give out the phone numbers of NRC representa-tives in the Observation Center.
Troffer could not remember when he learned of hydrogen generation or uhen he learned when a bubble had formed. Although Troffer could not remember the timeframe he did recall calling Herbein and telling hLa the news center was getting a large number of calls asking confirmation on oxyg'n generat:.on in the bubble and possible explosion. He said Herbein responded that they weren't generating any oxygen, where would a spark come from and hydrogen generation was part of the normal shutdown process and directed Troffer to " counter" such calls. Troffer said he passed this on to the staff and when such calls came in the news center staff would relate Met Ed's position on the bubble.
Troffer stated this was the only out and out disagreement get Ed had with NRC. He said he was aware the bubble situation had the public quite alarmed.
Trof fer said Fabian informed him on Saturday that NRC was to be the sole spokes-man on public statements, but also told him that did not change the ns.ws center's method of operation. Troffer stated as far as he could remember, the news center continued to provide callers with Met Ed positions on the bubble Saturday and Sunday.
Troffer said on Monday morning he advised AP reporters that the bubble was gone.
Shortly thereaf ter he received a call from Fabian who said NRC was angry l
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P over his statement and directed Troffer to call the reporter back and ask him to retract the story. Trof fer said he did this, but the reporter would not retract the story so Troffer advised the reporter he was retracting his statement.
Troffer said the bubble was gone at this point, but believed NRC was mad because he was " stealing Denton's thunder." Troffer felt he was caught in a political game where Denton wanted to be the first to make the announcement.
Troffer said on several occasions information would come out of NRC headquarters which was different than what Denton was saying. He added it didn't seem like information was coming from one organization.
Troffer said it was interesting to see the sources of information drop by the wayside - first Herbein, then NRC Washington, then the news center leaving only Denton.
Troffer said after Monday's episode of the bubble he decided to shut the news center down fs r all intents and purposes.
He said the purpose of the news center was to calm the public and that was no* longer necessary. He advised Fabian of his decision later Monday and Fabian concurred. Troffer said that callers were given the numbers of NRC's information recordings.
He added he called these numbers and the information was one and two days oli.
Troffer said Met Ed's credibility was damaged when the utility did not announce in advance Friday mornings release. He added Herbein should not have called the hour-long release controlled. Troffer said Herbein also should not have I
l referred to the radioactive water in the auxiliary building as a controlled process.
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7 Troffer felt while these were significant factors, the press amplified petty conflicting statements (e.g., Herbein, the crisis is over - Denton, the crisis is not over). Troffer also was disturbed by the press using hype headlines over i
more mundane, accurate text.
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