ML19309G314
| ML19309G314 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Crane  |
| Issue date: | 10/23/1979 |
| From: | Cherry B GENERAL PUBLIC UTILITIES CORP. |
| To: | NRC - NRC THREE MILE ISLAND TASK FORCE |
| Shared Package | |
| ML19309G309 | List: |
| References | |
| TASK-TF, TASK-TMR NUDOCS 8005050542 | |
| Download: ML19309G314 (6) | |
Text
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O soo3oso F W TELEPHONE INTERVIEW
SUMMARY
Bernard H. Cherry Vice President, Corporate Planning 3
Ceneral Public Utilities Mountain Lakes, New Jersey Telephone:
(201) 263-6500, Extension 6244 The information listed below is a summary of a telephone interview of Mr. Bernard H. Cherry of General Public Utilities (GPU), conducted'on October 23, 1979 by Mr. Hartmut Schierling of the U.S. Nuclear Aegulatory Commission Special Inquiry Group (SIG) for the Three Mlle Island Unit. 2 (TMI-2) accident.
Mr. Cherry was informed of the contents of the SIG Witness Notification (Attachment A).
He informed that the interview was voluntary, notes would ba taken and he would was be provided with a copy of this report for his comments. The following informa-tion was given by Mr. Cherry in response to questions by Mr. Schierling on the subject of his pati:icipation in and knowledge of the industry support effort to the THI-2 accident.
On about Friday, March 3G, 1979, Herman Dieckamp, William Murray and Bernard Cherry of GPU determined that additional technical resources from outside the GPU/ Met-Ed organization would be required to cope with the situation 'at TMI-2.
The conclusion was based on the recognition and awareness, among others, of.
a potential for high radiation releases from the containment. Accordingly, they began to conta:t outside organizations requesting assistance. While the
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timing of the constantly changing circumstances surrounding the TMI-2 avent during the early days are fuzzy in his memory, Cherry recalled that qucations such as "What do wa have to be concerned with next?" and "How can we construct a defense in depth?" were on his mind. Cherry recalled that reactor vendors had called GPU. earlier to obtain detailed technical information on the develop-ments and status of the TMI-2 plant, in part because they themselves were re-ceiving many inquiries regarding TMI-2.
He recalled the fetlowing contacts:
on Wednesday with T. Stern of Westinghouse, on late Wednesday with Jack Moulton of CE, on Wednesday night with James Tulenko of B&W lhe was in Denver), and an.
unsuccessful attempt to call Bertrand Wolfe of CE in Schenectady, New York.
On Friday, Cherry talked about 3 or 4 times with Romano Salvatori of Westing-house, who assembled a group of engineers in Pittsburgh, Pa, Dieckamp also participated in some of the calls.
The subject of the calls was quite general at first, mostly speculating what.
the next pro ' ams could be, for example, what to do if all reactor coolant pumps were lost. On late Friday night GPU requested Salvatori to come with his Westinghouse team to the GPU office in Mountain Lakes, New Jersey where the team was briefed on Saturday. Subsequently they went to the site where CPU thought they could be more ef fective.
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_3-The contact between GPU and CE was handled by Marvin Haber of GPU. CE had already been asked to perform certain tasks by the NRC and had assembled a group which was led by Fred Stern. The CE goup stopped in Mountain Lakes on the way from Windsor, Connecticut to the site.- Robert Keaton of GPU briefed the group on late Saturday.
Cherry requested support from CE on Friday, (does not recall point of contact).
CE had designated a group of about four' individuals who had been on standby for support. They subsequently left for the site where they arrived later Sat-urday.
Cherry ; recalls that Tulenko, B&W, had already lef t for TMI-2 on the' initiative of B&W.
Other contacts of which Cherry was aware or participated in included the following:
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Philadelphia Electric and Public Service Electric and Gas Co. were requested on l
about Saturday to send health physics personnel. They sent about 10 people.
ORNL (contact unknown) was requested late Friday to perform a confiratory reactor coolant sample analysis. ORNL reported that the sample did not show indication of fuel melt.
Saul Levy, an industry consultant from Campbell, California was aked to come i
I to the site to assist in thermal hydraulic evaluations. He arrived Sunday.
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4-I Palladino o'f Penn State' called 'GPU on Friday offering his help. - There were
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. a few additional calls between CPU and Palladino who was considering different i
i techniques to obtain d. sample of, th,e bubble in the reactor vessel.
He later l
r came to the site where he joined the Industry Advisory Group (IAG).
i Cherry himself was called to the site by Dieckamp on Sunday morning. He went 4
directly to the~iir National Guard Armory, near the Harrisburg Airport where he arrived auring the briefing of the IAG by Dieckamp. He recalls that J. Hendrie and R. Mattson of the NRC were present at the briefing. Of the issues that i
4 were high-lighted Cherry recalls only the identification of the core status.
I Dieckamp suggested that Cherry join in the IAG subgroup considering this problem i
under Ed Zebroski of EPRI (Cherry had experience in nuclear fuel technology).
However, he participated in only one meeting of about one-half hour of this subgroup on Sunday night. He returned to Mountain Lakes on Monday to attend to r.atters at the GPU offices where he initiated a 24-hour day communications and information service.
2 GPU assigncd individuals for technical liaison between the IAG and GPU. They assisted by providing documents (e.g., FSAR and plant system diagrams), by expedit--
ing communications, obtaining plant status information and identifying individuals of the CPU / Met-Ed staff with expertise in required areas'of. interest to the
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Cherry did not recall any personal contact with the NRC.'
Cherry did not recall any particular personal consideration on the " bubble explo-sion" issue. The CPU staff in Mountain Lakes did not recognize and appreciate the explosion potential and Cherry does not reca11' talking about it until his arrival at the site. He recalls that subsequent to the IAG subgroup meeting on Sunday night he discussed this issue with Zebroski (" grumbling") that the NRC did not understand why it was a non problem.
Cherry was of the opinion that the mobilization of the nuclear experts on a nationwide basis into the IAC was very effective, in particular since this effort was not preplanned and probably had never been_ considered. He attributes this to the realization and initiative of Dieckamp. Cherry stated that in some instances probably more expertise and personnel was assembled than was needed. This was a conscious decision on the part of Dieckamp who wanted to assure that all bases ~
were covered.
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l IRC SPECIAL INQ'JIRY GROUP: WIT';ESS t;0TIFICAT10N
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This' interview is baing coriucted by trx.bcrs of the fluclear Regulatory Ccnaission's (!?RC's) Sp'.cial Inquiry Group on Three :;ile Island. This Group, f
is being directed independently of the f;RC by an outside law firm, Rogovin, 4
Starn and Huge.
It includes both i:RC persennel who have been detailed to the Special Inquiry Staff, cnd out' side staff and atterneys.
Through a delegation of authority from the !MC under Sec. tion 161(c) of the Atonic Energy Act of 19S4, as Stenr!ad, the Spacial Inquiry Groep has a becad mandate. to inquire 4
into the causes of the accidant at Three :ile Island, to identify major problem 1
areas and to make recommendations for change.
At the conclusion of its investi-I cation, the Group will issue a detailed public report setting forth its findirgs cod recor.cndations.
Unless you have $2en served with a subpoena, your participation in this a'
- narview is voluntary cnd there will be no effect en ycu if ycu decline to unswer scme or all of the qu sticns adad you.
I b ayer, the Special Inquiry
- as been given the power '.o s Amana wi t, esses to appa=.r and' testify undeY oath, or to appaar and produce.'oconts, or t >th, at any desigr.ated place. Any per-son interviewed -- whethar he :.as been subpcenced or is being intervievied inforc: ally -- c3y have an aticenay prasent or any other person he wishes accorpan'y him at the interview as his reprsnntat;ve.
'litr.es::es should r?alize that while ue will try to raspect any requests for cor.fidentiality in ccnn3ction with the cublic'ation of cur report, we can ri :e r.c guranties.
- ames of~ witnesses and t
the information they provide tray e'.antually becane.;3ublic, ir.asnuch as the entire record of the Special Inquiry Group's investigation will be made avail-able to the t:RC for whatever uses it may deem appropriate.
In time, this information may be made available to the public -voluntarily, or become avpilable to the public through the Eroedom of Inforcation Act.
!!oreover, other departgents.
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and agencies of governr. ant ray r2 quest access to this infernation pursuant to the Pet.r:y Act of 1974.'
Th2 infornticn riy ciso he rMe avail 3ble in '.Acle or in
, et b ccr.aittees.or abcomitices of the
'). S. C;ngre
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