ML19309G301
| ML19309G301 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Crane  |
| Issue date: | 09/21/1979 |
| From: | Ernst M, Molloy K DAUPHIN COUNTY, PA, Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation |
| To: | |
| References | |
| TASK-TF, TASK-TMR NUDOCS 8005050534 | |
| Download: ML19309G301 (59) | |
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N U CLE A R REG UL ATC R'f CO MMIS SIO N i
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.e IN THE MATTER CF:
THREE MILE ISLAND SPECIAL INTERVI.".fS DEPCSITION OF KEV!N MOLLOY I
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Plece.
Harrisburg, Pennsylvania Date-Friday, Septe.Ther 21, 1979 Pages 1 - 55
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1 UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 1
NUCLEAR REGULATORY CO tMSSION 2
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In the Matter of:
4 THREE MILE ISLAND 5 l SPECIAL INTERVIEWS 6
- _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _x 7
Holiday Inn Town Motel 2nd and Chestnut Streets 8
Harrisburg, Pa.
9 Friday, September 21, 1979 1:00 p.m.
II DEPOSITION OF KEVIN J.
MOLLOY 12,
i APPEARANCES:
13 For the Nuclear Regulatory Commission:
14 MALCOLM ERNST 15,
FREDERICK HERR ROBERT SCHAMBERGER 16 17 13 19 l
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EXAMINATION-v l
Kevin J. Molloy 3
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MR. ERNST:
On the record.
2 Whereupon, t
3 KEVIN J. MOLLOY d
was called as a witness and, having been first duly sworn, 5
was examined and testified as follows:
4
~
XXX 6
EXAMINATION 7
BY MR. ERNST:
8 Q
State your full name and title for the record.
9 A
Kevin J. Molloy.
I am the director of Emergency 10 Preparedness for Dauphin County, Harrisburg, Pennsylvania.
II Q
Mr. Molloy, did you previously receive a letter 12 from us providing you with certain important information 13 concerning this deposition?
Id A
Yes.
IS Q
Is this a copy of that letter?
16 A
Yes, it is.
3,
.I will mark this Exhibit 1.
MR. ERNST:
18 XXX (Exhibit 1 identified.)
I9 BY MR. ERNST:
20 Q
Have you read this document in full?
2I A
Yes.
l 22 Q
Do you understand the information set forth' in this 23 letter including the general nature of the NRC TMI Special 1
24 Inquiry, your right to have an attorney present here today as
-a sec.i nemnus. ine.
2*C your representative, and the fact that this information'you
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1 provide here may eventually become public?
2 A
Yes.
3 Q
Is counsel representing you personally today?
4 A
No.
5 Q
I would like to note for the record the witness is 6
not represented by counsel today.
Mr. Molloy, if at any time 7
during the course of this interview you feel that you would liketoberepresentedbycoubselandhavecounselpresent, 8
9 please advise me and we will adjourn these proceedings to 10 afford yon the opportunity to make the necessary arrangements.
II Is this procedure agreeable to you?
12 A
Yes.
13 Q
Did you bring a copy of your resume to this 14 deposition?
15 A
Yes, I d id.
16 MR. ERNST:
I will mark this Exhibit 2.
XXX 17 (Exhibit 2 identified.)
18 BY MR. ERNST:
19 Q
Is this document I have labeled Exhibit 2, which 20 consists of three pages, the top headed "Kevin J..Moiloy" the 21 resume you provided?
22 A
Yes.
23 Q
Does this resume accurately summarize your educational 24 and employment background?
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25 A
Yes.
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O You were asked to supply any documents that you felt 2
might be pertinent to this particular inquiry that weren't i
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already in our possession at the time of this deposition.
In 4
a conversation previous to this deposition, we indicated that 5
we had most of the documents, if not all, of the ones that 6
you thought were pertinent.
~
7 However, you did provide us with a two-page document 8
entitled, " Dauphin County Emergency Preparedness Rumor-Control 9
Calls -- Type of Questions Asked."
10 Is this the document you provided?
II A
Yes.
12 MR. ERNST:
I will mark this Exhibit 3.
13 (Exhibit 3 identified.)
Id BY MR. ERNST:
15 Q
Mr. Molloy, before we get into the detailed questions 16 for the deposition, I would like it understood for the record 17 that we have provided an opportunity to hear from you or other 18 county officials or local officials as to what they perceive l'
l were the important events and the problems and possible 20 remedies to problems that existed during the TMI accident, 21 and such opportunity has been provided and you will get back 22 to us at some later time as to whether or not a meeting with 23 these county and local officials would be of use to this 24 inquiry or of use to the county and local officials; is that
., vecue neoo,ws. une.
25 correct?
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1 A
That is correct.
2 Q
We are in this deposition relying to a large extent 3
on the previous record that has been developed by yourself 4;
and others so the questionu we have today are generally to I
5!
fill in the gaps or investigate areas where there may be some l
6 question as to what was said before and what is on the record.
7,l The first question I have is:
What responsibility does the I
8, county or you have for assuring the existence of local plans --
9 emergency plans -- and that such plans and staffing are adequate 10 and capable of being implemented?
II A
Under the new state law, the municipalities -- local 12 municipalities are required to have an organization and local 13 plans.
The new state law was enacted in November of 1978.
14 Up until this time, it has not really become an effective 15 tool in the emergency preparedness program.
16 Prior to the passage of this law and the incident at TMI, 17 we did in fact have a law that required local directors and they 18 were required to do some planning.
We at the county level have I9
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no enforcement legislation to use against municipalities that 20 don't have any local plans.
21 Since I have been the director in the county, since April 22 of 1974, time and time again we made efforts to have interested 23 people recommended for appointment to local positions.
We have 2d not met with much success.
And to get written plans from the
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25 local level is virtually impossible.
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1 O
Your statement that is virtually impossible, is that an 2
appropriate statement for the situation before TMI or before 3
the public law was passed or presently?
4 A
Under the old law. As I indicated earlier, the new 5
law requires the municipalities will, in fact, have a written 6
plan and we are in the process right now of educating the local C
7 emergency preparedness people.
We have several new ones a
recently appointed.
And the local government elected officials 9
as to what the law is and what their requirements are under 10 it.
II Q
Are there enforcement mechanisms for the new law 12 in this area of preparation of local plans?
13 A
Without a copy of it here, I would prefer not to 14 comment at this time on any specifications.
15 Q
What steps have you taken since TMI -- specific 16 steps -- to enhance or ensure the preparation of local plans?
17 A
As a direct result of the Three Mile Island incident, 18 within a matter of two days after the incident, we had quite 19 a few local plans appear, written local plans.
20 What we have done since then is we have been in touch with 21 local directors and we have been encouraging them to update 22 those plans that pertained to a nuclear incident, number one, 23 and also to expand on those plans to cover other types of 24
-emergency situations.
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25 I have dealt with not only 1ccal directors, but also with I
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1 local elected officials.
In turn, we have utilized the media 2
to a limited extent to try and get the public a little bit 3
more interested in the fact that their local municipalities 4
should have an effective emergency plan to cover all types S.
of emergency situations.
6 Q
At the time of TMI, was there in existence a local 7
emergency coordinator or disaster coordinator, whatever the 8
proper terminology is, in existence for all of your local 9
jurisdictions?
10 A
All the local municipalities have local coordinators, Il as required by law.
12 Q
How many of these are there in Dauphin County, 13 roughly?
14 A
We have 40 political subdivisions.
15 Q
What is PDQs -- that is Pennsylvania Emergency 16 Management Agency -- responsibility regarding the existence or 17 adequacy of local emergency plans?
18 A
Under the new law, PEMA has responsibility to come
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19 up with a state disaster operations plan and to provide training 20 to the county directors to ensure there is a county plan that 21 dovetails theirs, offe whatever help they can from their various 22 groups -- their medical people, mass-care facilities people, 23 things of that nature.
24 The county, in turn, has to offer the same type of assistance nJ oere n. pen.,s. inc.,,
25 fto the local director.
The training of areas of responsibility i
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1 as far as training goes, the county is to train the local.
2 The state to train the county.
And so forth.
I 3
Q Do I properly interpret the answer, then, that PEMA 4
has no responsibility for assuring the existence or adequacy 5
of local plans?
6 A
I am not certain what their legal responsibilities 7
are.
As I say, the law does indicate that we at the county 8
level and the local level will in fact have written plans.
9 I am sure that the state emergency management agency will 10 make sure that we do, in fact, have the plans.
11 If not, then I would assume they have the responsibility 12 to do this for us.
I am not sure of the legal ramifications 13 under the law.
14 Q
Not being sure of the legal ramifications, then, you 15 would assume that the county organization or your office 16 is responsible to assure that ther are adequate local plans?
17 A
The way I personally view it is if we have requested 18 '
a local municipality to come up with an effective emergency 19 plan to cover all types of incidents and we have offered 20 them assistance and things of that nature, if they can' t do 21 it, we will do _t for them whether they like it or not.
22 O
In your view, what kind of detail should be present 23 in local plans?
24 A
Basically, you have to have -- you do a hazard ace Federal Reporters, inc,7 25 !
analysis of tne community.
You see what can go wrong in that i
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community.
What is the subject?
Do you have a chemical plant?
2, That type of situation.
You check on special problem areas.
l 3
Nursing homes, hospitals, things of that nature.
To me, much a
more important than a written plan is a written resources 5 ;
manual.
You have to do a survey to know what resources you l
6 l have in the community.
7 Basically the actions taken by emergency personnel during 8
an emergency situation are nothing but common sense as far 9
as I am concerned.
In order to make the efforts of the 10 emergency personnel easier, if they know where they can get 11 the resources to make the job easier, that is a big part of the 12 problem.
13 Once again, you have to have a staff at the local level.
It 14 need not be as large as the county or state staff, but what end 1 15 a local director feels comfortable with.
One he can work with.
16 17 IS 19 20 21 22 23 24 3 Fedef41 Resorters, Inc.
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11 7203 02 01 amnLRW I
O Should you have a planned evacuation route, for 2
example, the details of wnich roads will be one-way and from S
w ha t sectors going to what eno-point, things of that nature?
l 4
A Well, I personally have mixed emotions on that.
5 In some cases, perhaps, yes, you should.
In other cases, I 6
don't really think it would be valid to have streets already 7
identified as major evacuation routes.
To cite an incident, 6
assume we had a plan for kiddletown that listed say Union Y
Street as a major evacuation route.
Any time an incident 10 occurs, everybody goes to Union Street and heads out to the 11 shelters and so forth.
12 They have a chemical plant in Middletown.
Assume that 13 they have en incident at the chemical plant and the wind 14 blows toxic fumes up Union Street.
You announce to the 15 people there has been a chemical accident.
We want to 16 evacuate the area.
17 The people pull out their written piece of pa per tha t 16 says in an emergency use Union Street.
That seems like you 19 are sending them right into the danger area.
20 As long as the emergency personnel know the major roads 21 that they want to utilize during a disaster situation, a 22 dacision as to which streets will be utilized can be made 23 literally on the spot.
In my personal opinion, that is the 24 more intelligent way to handle the situation.
25 duch the same with a nuclers power plant.
This subject
12 7203 02 02 amnLRd I
came up in 1977, curing the licensing hearings, when I 2
testified in Harrisourg.
I was asked the same question.
We 3
were talking strictly of a five-mile zone back then.
4 You got involved with a situation of the thought was if 5
the wind is coming out of :ne north, you evacuate the o
northeast quadrant or wha tever.
Once gain, if you list an 7
evacuation route'being in that sector, and that is the one 6
you evacuate, it is ridiculous to seno people into a danger 9
zone.
10 As long as the emergency personnel know the area, know 11 which routes can handle the most traffic, are the easiest to d
get traffic control personnel on and so forth, I think that 13 is all you need.
14 0
You mentioned your testimony at the TMI licensing 15 hearings.
At that time you testified that you f elt the 16 state plan was adequate.
17 Subsequent to TMI, would you have any additional 18 observations on the acequacy of the state or county plans?
19 A
Obviously, we have a totally diff erent county plan 20 that came into being as a direct result of TMI.-
That is 21 going to have to be literally scrapped, which is what we are t
22 in the process of doing now because they are saying we have 23 to plan for 20 miles.
24 In view of the f act we already started revising our 25 20-mile plan, I really. can't comment on changing that too-
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much.
We are 1: the process of also reviewing and upda ting 2
and revising the county opera tions plan, which is more 3
extensive.
It covers more areas than we ever got involved 4
with before.
5 It is an ongoing task.
We have been at it for about a o
year.
It has not been approved by the commissioners yet.
7 We have not asked for approval.
It will take quite a bit of 8
time.
As f ar as the state operations plan goes, I have no 9
proolems with it at this time.
10 0
You sta ted that the county plan is being revised 11 to include more areas.
What does t..
t mean specifically?
12 A
We are ge tting involved in mere specifics.
As an 13 example, we got involved with a flash-flood self-help 34 program.
We are putting in an annex dealing with strictly 15 flash-flood responsioilities anc capabilities and so forth.
16 As a result of incidents that nave happened in the past, 17 mainly in other counties, we are going to get involved in lo putting cown in writing, for example, what should the county 1
19 oirector ao or not do during a disaster situation 1.n terms 20 of spending the money for emergency assistance.and things of 21 that nature.
22 We are getting that ironed out between the county 23 commissioners in our office so we know what we can do 24 witnout getting them terrioly upse t.
25 0
You mentioned money.
In the TMI accident, there
14 idO3 02 04 amnLRd I
was no declaration of a disaster emergency, as identif ed and 2
described under the public law of 1978.
3 Did this lack of a declared emergency or declared 4
disaster by the governor provide any probelms at the county 5
level, either from the ability to direct activities are to 6
finance additional expenditures?
7 A
It caused problems, not during the incident.
8 Whatever funds were necessary to take actions to provide f or V
the saf ety of people, I was advised by the commissioners 10 where to go, take whatever actions were necessary at
.11 whatever cost.
Where it caused a problem is in view of the 12 fact there was no emergency declara tion, there was no chance
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13 of us receiving any type of aid.
14 It chopped our budget for the year by about 500 percent 15 in terms of overtime I paid out, meals f or the people there, lo things of that na ture.
That was the only bad impact.
17 Sut during any disaster situation, money ir, usually the 16 last thing that is really discussed.
19 0
So you don't feel that this was a present problem 20 during the TMI accident but now it is a problen that you 21 have to try to figure out how to cope with.
22 A
That is a f air statement.
23 0
If you know you are going to have to cope with a 24 problem like this, hcw does it keep f rom entering into your 25 minc during an accident?
If you had an action you would i
l l
15 1203 02 05 amnLRa i
like to take that might cost your budoet <10,000 or 2
some thing, but it is a like to rather than a got to --
3 A
Once again, anything that we feel is necessary 4
during the time of an emergency to provide for the health 5
and safety and welfare of tne residents, that is the bo ttom 6
line.
That is what we do first.
In most accident 7
situa tions, you don't really spend an awful lot of money 6
ac /way.
We were forunate that we had never been put in a 9
sicuation where we know we have to spend $ 100,000 to do 10 some thing, being a got to or like to situation.
'/ie have not 11 been put in to tha t po si tion.
12 The incidents we ran into so far, we always got the 13 moneyt.
The same probably is to the people a t the local 14 level.
They, of course, don't spend as much as the county 15 but obviously tne buaget in some of the twonships is smaller lo than ours.
They had to pay out overtime to police and 17 things of that nature.
16 They took it on the chin.
The ef f ort to recoup any f unds IV right now is being directed toward the insurance company.
20 If that is not successful, at least at the county level 21 there will be lawsuits to get some of the money back.
22 The f eeling is, and the reason it is being pursued, 23 during a flood, for example, that is a natural disaster.
24 There is not much you can do abot it.
You can't stop the 25 rain.
Here there was some human error, it appears, in this
16 7203 02 Oo amnLRN i
particular incicent and it is basically felt since a human 2
caused it some numan should pay for it.
3 0
Co you have a rough ioea of what your additional 4
costs were in your own buoget?
Not o ther county budgets.
5 A
I can only give a rough estimate.
Our county c
controller and treasurer and so forth were involved in 7
ge tting the statistics f rom the county home, where we got e
f ood and things of that nature.
9 The county's total extra expenditures was around s25,000 10 or s26,000.
11 0
Tha t i t the total county or out of your budget?
12 A
That is for the country operations.
It effected 13 o ther de par tments.
The sheri f f's peo ple put in overtime and 14 things of that na ture.
It was submitted as a total bill.
15 Formally, s20,000 does not sound like much money.
The 16 county has a bucget of around s26 million.
Tha t doesn' t 17 sound like a large amount of money.
18 The county has been in financial difficulty so it is 19 quite a bit of money.
20 0
W ha t provisions are made for staffing and 21 equipaent for emergency resconse at the local level?
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22 A
W ha t exac tly da you mean by the local level?
23 0
Not the coun ty.
I 24 A
It would vary f rom municipality to municipality.
i 25 To take Lcndenderry Township, which is where the f acility
17 1203 02 07 amnLRa i
is located, they have their own volunteer fire department.
2 They have a local civil def ense coordinator.
He has a 3
volunteer staff of half a dozen people that a ssist him 4
during er.'ergency si tua tions.
5 The state police provide the law enforcement protection 6
f or them.
The Township does not have and didn't have prior 7
to tne incident a wri tten plan as such, although they have a
been involved in many emergency situations cown in that 9
area.
10 Ine main reason that I f eel Londenderry and the other il municipalities don't have wri tten plans is that every time 12 we had a situation occur in Dauphin County -- flood, 13 tornado, so f orth -- we send equipment out and they can't 14 handle the situation and need help and we get it for them, 15 everything worked out extremely well.
16 The opir.lon is we have done it before. We know what we 17 are ceing.
We don't need to put it in writing.
e. b 16 19 20 21 22 23 i
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18 CR7203 1
0 Speaking of Londonderry, then, the answer is j
13 rip 1 2
basically for civil defense emergency preparedness there is LRW 3l no additional funding or equipment.
They use the existing l
i 4
services in that township.
i 5l A
That is correct.
Normally, across the country, l
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your police and fire rescae forces are your first line of l
7!
civil defense.
They're the first to respond to an incident.
I s'
Civil defense is mainly a coordinating agency.
9 Q
Who is basically rerponsible for civil defense i
leadership and coordination
- tuo separate words -- in a 10 l 11 l multi-county accident sitt'ation like TMI?
12 i A
Under the new law, to t.he best of my knowledge, i
13 we get involved with a multi-county situation, basically la the state is the overall -- has overall command of the situ-15 ation.
The local directors still retain their responsibi-16 lity of providing for the health, safety, ana cifare of U
their own residents.
This has been discussed at cther
- 3 ;. emergency preparedness meetings.
I don't think it was U
i?
totally resolved who is the leader of the band and who is il? in charge.
All I can say is every municipality and every 20 21 county, whether the governor is quote unquote, in charge, 22 ;
and supposed to provide leadershop, they have their responsi-23 bilities and so forth.
1 24 j It's a ticklish question to answer at this time because
.. w e.,e n. con.n. inc.,
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the law is so new, it hasn't had a chance to really go into i
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9 19 1
effect, and it's just in my nind difficult to answer.
I rip 2 1
f LRW 2l 0
Do you preceive there might be a'different 13 I answer to this depending on whether it's a declared emergency l
4 under the law or just what some people have described as a l
i Si planning exercise if there is not a declared emergency?
Let
~
l 6l me rephrase the question.
I 7'
PEMA, the state agency, would its responsibilities change 8
from perhaps a purely coordination role with no declared l
9l disaster to perhaps a command function if there were a declared i
10 disaster that affected several counties?
11 f A
Personally, I don't feel that PEMA's role should 12 be other than strictly a coordinating agency and assisting I
L 1
i3 '
agency.
I don't think the county should be under any coor-14 ll dinating assisting agency for the local municipalities, i
15 '
whether it's a declared emergency or undeclared emergency or 16 so forth.
You get involved in quite a heated discussion
'7, where the locals say we're not letting the county take over.
i They can help us but they're not going to take over.
Most N
I? ~
of the counties feel the state is not going to take over i
20 l' during a disaster situation for us.
Part of the line of 21 l; reasoning is that I feeel that I in my county, I know it 22 much more intimately than the state or federal government and i
23!!
I don't want them tongue in cheek telling me what to do i
24f during a disaster.
I should be telling them what my needs
.u Fewen neporwe. sne. ;
25 '
are to provide for the health, safety, and welfare of the
T l
20 rip 3 1;
residents of the community and they should be fulfilling my LRW l
2:i needs as opposed to telling me what I need.
3 Q
But it's still being debated, this question, as 4
to the legal implications of what the state law means?
5 A
That question will be debated for many years to l
come.
I'm sure that if a legal principle is rendered by 6l 7
the state, somewhere some county or local municipality will 8
get a legal opinion that will perhaps say something different.
9 MR. ERNST:
Off the record.
10 (Discussion off the record.)
11 BY MR. ERNST:
12 Q
There is now a draft annex to the disaster --
13 state disaster operations plan for nuclear incidents dated 14 July '79?
Are you in general familiar with this document?
15 A
I am aware that it exists.
16 Q
Do you know if this is still a draft or whether
- 7 there is a final document of this nature in existence?
13 A
I'm not certain.
19,.
O Whe're does a document like this fit in the 2; '
overall state emergency plan or, to be more explicit, the 21 state disaster operations plan?
I guess the question related 22 to the fact that this state plan consists of a basic plan 23 and about 27 annexes or something like that, and then this 1
24 l draft exists, and I was wondering about the relationship as
.,,w.<.. m.poneri, inc. i 25 ;
you perceive it of this document to the basic state plan.
t l
21 rip 4 i
A I think it's basically an addition and updating l
LRW 2 lt! to the basic plan.
As a result of TMI, obviously they found I
3!
certain problem areas existed and they're taking steps to i
I 4l correct those deficiencies.
Also, once again, as a training I
5r mechanism for the counties.
6!
O Does a plan of this nature have county input or 7
is it, like you stated with locals, if the locals provide 8
a plan, we will?
Does the state just put out a document and 9l: say this is it or is there interaction with the counties?
10 A
In regard to that specific document, I don't 11 l recall being asked for any input.
On the other hand, I don't l
12 recall not being asked for any specific input.
Over the past 13 several months, at the state level, the counties have been 14 asked for more input on various projects that they're involved 15 in.
Training and things of that nature.
So we're being 16 l asked for more input.
I think indirectly the counties were f
I7;l asked for the input because we had several meetings at the M ':
state level at which we have discussed problems we ran into ll I? ' during TMI and how we handled them and suggestions we would I
20 !
have for other people.
As a result of these interviews, I'm f
21,
sure a lot of our problems and viewpoints were addressed in 22 the document.
I don't know the specifics of the document 23 so I can't tell you exactly what was or was not put in.
2d Q
Does PEMA review, comment on, and/or approve
+:eeers aeoonen, inc. j 25 county emergency plans?
I l
22 rip 5 1
A They're supposed to review and comment and l
LRW 2
offer suggestions and so forth and approve the plans.
i 3
During the Three Mile Island incident, for example, the plans 4
they were coming up with, we didn't send a copy over and say 5
this is for your review.
We didn't have the time during the i
I 6
incident.
However, there were si' Ntions where they would 7
call and say I noticed you have your plan.
Sould you do it 8 !
this way?
If not, why not?
And so forth.-
t 9
With the Three Mile Island incident, because of the nature 10 of the incident, they reallt didn't have any time or choice l
11,
between -- they did not have the time nor the choice of what 12 f to approve in the plans we were coming up with.
13 0
You mentioned that PEMA was at least afforded 14 the opportunity to review and comment on these evolving plans.
15 I understand that PEMA did send a representative down at the 16 county level at sometime to provide this kind of coordination;
'7 is that correct?
3; A
That is correct.
We had a representative from l? ~
the central headquarters in our office on Saturday morning.
I 20 That was when he showed up.
21 Q
Are you aware of any other groups that were audit-22 ing or evaluating the adequacy of the state or county or 23 local planning other than PEMA?
24 A
We had federal people in that were assigned to
.oFeceval Reporters, Inc.
25 !
our county to assist us.
I was not aware the PEMA man was I
i 1
l I
i 23 there to evaluate our plan as such but rather to assist us rip 6 1
LRW j
2 lI in drawing up a plan, lending us expertise.
3' O
Let me change that word with respect to PEMA.
4i PEMA was assisting.
Are you aware of any groups or people f
5l that were there assessing the adequacy of planning?
I 6j A
The civil defense preparedness agency had a group i
of people that were in our emergency operations center at 7lI 8!
one time or another during the incident.
I believe they were i
9f from the Human Research Management Corporation, or some name-l 10 j similar to that.
I 11 i To this day, I am still not quite positive of what they 12 !
were studying.
They were studying our plans.
There were 13 many questions asked about it.
Whether they were studying 14 us --
15 Q
DCPA actually cent two people down to each county; 16 is that correct?
17 A
That is correct.
What I was referring te were non-federal employees that belonged to a company that had a n
17 '
grant of some type to study what we were doing.
20 MR. ERNST:
Off the record.
21 (Discussion off the record.)
22 MR. ERNST:
Back on the record.
23 BY MR. ERNST:
24 i O
Were you aware of any evaluation of county plans I
aoseeers newnm. ix. l 25 or county state of preparedness being made by FDAA or by l
l 1
i 24 I
rip 7 1
Mr. Adamcik's representative or somebody of that sort.
LRW j
2 I A
Once again, during the incident, there were i
I I
3 so many people from so many agencies that showed up, we t
4' really had no idea what they were doing there.
I know there 5
were people from FDAA in the area.
They did stop at our EOC.
~
l 6:
Exactly what they were doing, I am not sure.
7 Q
Were you aware of any individual or individuals 81 from the governor's office looking at the adequacy of 1,
9:
emergency plans, like Dr. Bill Burn or anybody associated I
i 10 l with him?
i 11 A
We didn't have anybody from the governor's 12 '
office come down to our emergency operations center or contact 13 us by telephone until Sunday morning, I believe, when the 14 lieutenant governor showed up along with a couple of his 15 staff.
I heard there was conversation between the governor's 16 i office and the state emergency management agency concerning, I
I 17' number one, did the county have some plans; number two, were
- 2 :
they adequate, and so forth.
ll Q
What were your radiological responsibilities in IEi!
20 ;
the event of a nuclear power accident?
21 A
I am not quite sure of what our responsibilities We have always been under the impression that if an 22 are.
23j event ever did occur down at the f acility, that between the l
24 [ NRC and the utility and the state Bureau of Radiological
. ~.... -,....
25 Health, that they would conduct the monitoring, sift through l
t
25 l
1finformation, and with their expertise they would come up j
rip 8 LRW j
2 [ with recommendations as to what actions we should take.
I l
3 am not very knowledgeable in the area, but we don't have I
the type of equipment that is available, I believe, to them, 4l:
I S!
and therefore, obviously could not perform a good job in the
~
i 6l first place.
1 7
During the incident, we did have a few of the locals do some monitoring, but they did that on their own.
Not at 6l:
9l!
our insistence.
At one point -- I believe this might have 10 been Thursday -- we got a call from the state agency and the 11 :
gentleman on the other end of the line suggested we get the i
1 12 :
monitors we had trained out running around with geiger counters I
13 to give them a training exercise type situation.
I told them 14 we would not do that.
We felt there was enough concern with-IS '
out having people playing around with geiger counters.
They_
l 16 !
hadn't used them that much.
The last thing we needed was l
17 l for someone to misread an instrument which would have caused
- 3 l( a whole round or headaches.
So we did not delve into that h
((
17,
area.
II 20 '
MR. ERNST:
Off the record.
21 (Discussion off the record.)
e.- '3 22 MR. ERNST :
Back on the record.
23 24
.seceral Reoorters, Inc.
25 i
0 I
l
203 04 01 26 rc LRM i
BY MR. ER:iST:
2 0
You issues a Daupnin County emergency preparedness 3
plan on or aoout April 6, I celieve, which, in essence, I 4
guess can ce characterized as a 20, 10 and five-mile plan 5
that had evolved during the early days of the Three Mile 6
accidenti is that correct?
s A
That is correct.
8 0
I believe you may have answered this question 9
previously -- to some estent, anyway -- Dut was this 10 particular plan. reviewed and commented on or concurred in by 11 pEMA, and if so, when?
12 A
Once again, during the incident, as we were coming 13 up with the plans, we were le tting the state agency know --
14 we kept them abreast of what we were doing.
They would come 15 up with comments or suggestions and so forth.
16 Since that time, we have not had any formal comments on t
il our plan.
As I indicated earlier, this plan is already 19 outdated because of the fact that we are going back to 19 planning for a 10-mile zone, so we have-to entirely revamp a 20 large portion of this plan.
21 Incidentally, just to get this on the record; the 22 document -- the large document with all the pages and so 23 f orth that was printed anc released around the 6th' or 7th of 24 April, whatever that particular date was, but as of the ist 25 of April, 12:30 Sunday morning, we have our initial draft
27 233 04 02 rc LRN I
cocument together.
I just wanted to make that clear.
2 0
Th at is a good poin t.
that is a lot of work that 3
went into tnat plan.
4 A
de had all the elements.
We just didn't have it 5
put together in packaged form.
But they were in existence.
6 0
de didn't ; aview this plan in any great detail, s
but in my skimming of the plan, I noted one thing that, just 8
out of curiosity, I wanted to ask acout.
On e t a b -- I 9
believe it is tas G -- talks about hospital evacuation, and 10 upon completion of hospital evacuation, emergoncy medical 11 care for those remaining in the evacuation rone would be 12 turned over to PEMA.
13 In tao J, under the city of Harriseurg, there was a 14 statement that af ter evacuation, the Hershey Medical Center 15 would remain in operation for emergency care.
One could 16 imply an inconsistency in those two tabs.
14 I was wondering -- my basic thrust is not at the 18 inconsistency, but how woula emergency care have been 19 provided in the event of a 20-mile evacuation?
20 A
In the event of a 20-mile evacuation, it would 21 have been turned over to PEMA because we at the county level 22 woulo have lost all our medical f acilities.
Once the 23 hospitals were evacuated, our feeling was that they were 24 lost for use by medical personnel.
25 This is where the state agency -- we would advise them of
203 04 03 28 rc LRa i
particular problems and they would tell us where to send 2
people.
That is ooviously an inconsistency.
3 0
It is.
Tne Hershey Center would not have been 4
available to remain open for emergency care.
5 A
Not under a 20-mile plan.
I once again would 6
assume there could be some variables involved.
Perhaps the i
emergency. department, for example, could remain open on a 3
very limited basis.
Maybe not at Hershey Medical Center 9
since it is so close te the facility, bu t, for example, 10 Polyclinic, so we might have very limited medical capaci11ty in the county, conditions permitting.
12 O
PEMA's responsibility in this case is not one of 13 saying I hav'e an injured patient.
Here he or she is.
Take 14 care of the person.
But one of saying I have an injured 15 patient.
Where shall I take the injured patient?
16 A
That is cor set.
Part of the PEMA role is to il know, for example, where the closest medical facility would 18 be located that we could go to to handle this type of 19 patient.
They have the f acilities to perform that type of 20 task.
21 MR. ERNST:
Off the record.
22 (Discussion off the record.)
23 MR. ERNST Back on the record.
24 BY MR. ERNST:
25 Q
I would like to say for the record, since we have
29 203 04 04 rc LRei i
ceen talking about a consistency that is one small part of 2
the plan which, in my view, seemed to be very comprehensive 3
and not inconsistent.
4 However, we always look f or wea'cnesses in 5
inv e s tiga tions.
There are a large number of specifics in 6
this plan.
Names, telephone numbers, numoer and type of I
equipment, number of people, road signs and where they would
~
8 be placed and what they would say, and things of that 9
nature.
How long would a plan of this nature be a useful 10 document?
11 A
dell, I think, first of all, one has to bear in 12 mind the conditions we were operating under when that 13 particular plan was put together.
I had mentioned before a 14 resources manual.
Formally that contains, for example, the 15 local CD staff people and home phone numbers, things of that 16 nature.
It is ooviously easier to enange our resources Ie manual than it is the entire plan.
18 One of the things that we will be working on, we will 19 come up with a 10-mile plan which will void this plan to a 20 degree.
de don't want specific names and phone numbers in 21 the plan itself, out rather in the re source manual.
22 This plan, I would assume some of the phone numbers in 23 there are outdated already.
Perhaps two weeks af ter the 24 incident, tney were outdated.
That is one of the things we 25 are aware of that will be taken care of under the new plan.
i l
l
30 233 04 05 rc LRJ l
This was done under comoat conditions.
2 O
I assume, then, you envision this cocument as the 3
kinc of document -- maybe not bound in a ' nice form like 4
this -- out the kind of information that would have to be 5
developed ad hoc af ter an emergency, but the plan 6
formulation would be in accordance with resources available 7
and things of that nature.
~
8 A
Tnis plan is basically a cuilding block for our 9
next one.
We learned an awful lot f rom this plan.
We 10 learned important f acts like, to cite an example, every 11 morning when I come to work. I drive past two hosiptals and 12 the county prison.
I never imagined we would have to 13 evacuate an entire hospital or anything of that nature.
We 14 were shocked into reality and so forth.
15 There are other things of that nature in there that you l
16 see everyday and don't thint about.
This document will give Ie us a good casic ouilding block for our next plan we will 13 come up with.
It will probably be in more intelligent order 19 than this particular document is in also.
This document 20 covers just about se rything, but it is not perhaps in the 21 oest of order.
22 0
A plan of this nature -- again, I perhaps ask the 23 question out of ignorance, not having studied the plan in 24 great detail -- how much of the detail here would hdve had 25 to have been public in an understandable way to the public 1
l
31 203 04 06 rc LR,4 I
in order to effectuate the plan?
2 A
I think the only things that would have to ce mad) 3 puclic is, number one, how will you alert the public?
For 4
example, we want them to keep listening to their media and 5
the o fficial evacuation word would come in from the Governor's o ffice or the County Commissioner's.
So there is 7
nottlication.
8 And, in my, opinion, the only other thing they needed to 9
knod was where are they going to? /or example, to Centre 10 County.
And which routes do they take?
11 I don't think the puolic has to know there will be a 12 policeman at this corner directing traffic.
I would say 13 perhaps I or 2 percent of the information contained in that 14 document is really all the public has to be aware of.
15 0
Could'the route information have oeen made 16 available to every member of the public in an intelligiole I/
form, and if so, by what mechanism?
13 A
Well, numoer one, yes, it could, and it was.
We id utilized the radio and television and print media to get the 20 information to the public.
21 Af ter we had things coordinated, we told the local 22 people, for example, if you lived in this municipality, the 23 ultimate destination to arrive at would be Centre County.
24 There was tna road they would use.
At the local level, they 23 printed that up.
Me had it printed up in the newspaper, t
I l
203 04 07 32 rc LRN I
tne entire county plan.
It was on radio and television.
2 The word was put out.
3 0
How about a municipality the size of Harrisburg, 4
whicn likely would provide more complication as to who goes 6
where and how?
6 A
Basically, it was the saoe principle.
We advised e
Harrisburg as to where we had shelter facilities availaole B
for their people.
?
Once again, that information was printed in the 10 ne wsp ap er.
Harris burg, itself, printed the local 11 information as to where they were to go and so forth.
12 Obviously, there would be more proclems getting information 13 out to 63,000 people in Harrisburg as opposed to 3000 in 14 Londenderry Township.
15 0
Do you have any criteria for ordering protective 16 measures such as take cover, evacuation, use of potassium 1/
iodine or food interdiction or placing cows on store f eed, 18 things of that nature ?
19 A
We rely on, for example, the Department of 20 Agric ul ture, Bureau of Radiological protection.
Je would 21 rely on the state agencies who are much more kn6wledgeable 22 in that field to provide us with information.
23
/or example, the situation is such that we suggest the 24 cows be put inside the barn.
We will take the action from 25 there.
l J
33 233 04 08 rc LRN I
O So you see no f unction at the county level for 2
this kind of --
3 A
If the state and Federal Governments, who have the 4
expertise, more resources and things of that nature, 5
available to them, which th3y do, and if they are using it 6
properly, for the county to do the same thing is reinventing I
the wheel.
8 We at the county level have a certain role to play in 9
this type of situation.
I think ours is basically the 10 evacuation type role, making sure it can be accomplished 4
11 properly and so forth.
12 I personally don't f eel I should get involve with what 13 makes a cow sick or something of that nature.
14 15 a
16 le 18 19 23 21 22 23 24 25 1
1
1 i
34 i
~
CR7203 1
Q You stated in testimony before the President's
- 5 rip 1 2'
Commission that you could evacuate in six hours in good LRW 3
weather.
Was this from a white alert which existed, as I l
4 understand it, for a good period of time, or from some other 5
stage of readiness, or does this six hours come from an 6
initiation of an event that needs an immediate evacuation?
i I
7 A
I am not familiar with a white alert or anything 8
of that nature.
The six hour figure we have always maintained 9.
we could evacuate a five-mile zone upon notification that i
I 10 t evacuation is to take place -- we felt we could accomplish 11 l that task in about six hours.
12 For some reason or another, the number of hours that you 13 can move people in has become extremely important to a lot 14 of people.
I think the time frame has to be put in the proper 15 perspective.
Assume an incident happened at Three Mile 16 Island and they said we want you to evacuate the five-mile 77 area.
We have indicated we can do it in six hours.
15 If we have not accomplished that task in six hours, that
[
I 12 doesn't mean we will stop doing it, conditions permitting.
20 -
A lot of people are losing sight of that.
Sometimes the l
21 numbers game is a bit ridiculous.-
22 0
Thw white alert basicclly, as I understand it, 23 is a stand-by situation for the state police and National 24 Guard in which the requirement is that they should be able to D8eceral Regeriers, Inc.
25 report to duty within four hours of being notified.
Do you
35 rip 2 1 ! depend to any substantial extent on the state police LRW l
2e the National Guard, or would you depend to any substantial 3
extent in the evacuation of the five-mile area within the 4l-six-hour time period?
5, A
The five-mile area, I don't think the National i
6!
Guard would play that important a role in.
This is because I
7' of the fact we have so many other police departments and a;
fire departments in nearby countis that can provide us with i
9 I the resources for traffic control and notification.
Where 10 the National Gur.rd came into play was when we went to a 20-11 mile zone and I lost half my resources and shelter capabili-12,!
ties and things of that nature.
The five-mile zone, no, 13 they don't.
The state police play an important role in the 14 five-mile plan obviously, but once again, I don't think that 15 if they -- assume they called for extra troops from around 16 j the state and so forth, I don't think them showing up two 17 !
or three hours later would cause us any real great headaches.
l 3 hl The five-mile zone strictly was a movement that would take l
1 places within the county utilizing mainly resources from O
20 j the county with some resources from Cumberland County, for l
21 example.
They could get here in 10 or 15 minutes, for 22 example.
When we went to the 10 and 20, that is when we 23 start with the headaches.
l 24 0
To what extent are good physical communication
..o.,e n.oo,t.,.. i nc.
25 networks your responsibility?
I
36 rip 3 1
A Well, we run the police, fire, and ambulance l
LRW g
2 communications for the county.
We dispatch all the depart-mentswiththeexceptionofthecityofkarrisburgandstate 3i 4j police.
We are responsible for maintaining the communica-5l tions capabilities in the county.
i 6!
O So you don't rely upon PEMA in the area of I
7' communications.
You feel that is your responsibility for a
the adequcy of county and local communications?
9 A
once again, I think, as a result of the TMI 10 incident, we obviously have need for better communications ll i in some areas.
For example, we now realize -- by we, I mean 1
12 the local governments and county -- realize the importance 13 of having mobile communication with the local directors.
14 So we are making every effort.
We filed a grant application 15 to get funds to provide radios at the local level.
PEMA 16 is going to have to provide some type of communications 17 capability, mainly two-way capability between there office
- 3., and our office and perhaps other counties, as a back-up ll
!7 '
system in case the phone is overloaded or things of that ll0 nature.
They play a role.
Not that big a role.
20 l 21 Q
What communications exist between you and PEMA 22 or the other state agencies?
23 A
It was strictly between PEMA and our office.
24 Obviously, we had the phones.
The land line.
They have t
.c, sews neaames, enc.
25 the capability of transmitting on our fire frequency.
Those l
1 37 I
rip 4 1
are the two basic.
LRW 2l During the incident, itself, they sent over commmunica-i 3l tions gear on their frequency and so forth.
Normally, we l
4 don't have t!'at.
In addition, a hotline was established --
5!
a direct line.
We pick it up and it rings at their office.
l 6l That was established during the incident and disconnected i
7 eventually.
8 0
Do you know why that was disconnected or whether 9
that is a good idea?
10 A
Well, I would assume part of the problem is the 11 financial end of it.
I think it should have remained in 12 '
existence for the three counties that would be affected by 13 a 5-or 10-nile evacuation, which is Lancaster, D;uphin, 14 i and York counties.
We should still have that.
I 15 Q
There is a dedicated' teletypewriter system, I 16 guess, isn't there?
- 7 A
Right.
We have that capability also.
That's
- ,. not the fastest thing in the world by any stretch of the i;
imagination.
'O 20 O
How long did it take to install that dedicated 21 r phone line from the time that it was determined -- two l
22 ;
questions.
When was it determined to be necessary to have 23 l that phone, and hcw long did it take to install it?
i 24 A
That decision was made at the state level, to s eer.i nemneri. inc.
25 install the phone.
The time frame -- this would be based I
i I
i
l 38 rip 5 1
on -- we had extra phones installed.
We usually had about LRN lj 2 f a day's wait.
If we asked for sc=etbing on Saturday, they I
3 I were in on Sunday to put it in.
Normally about a day l
4l waiting period.
It could have been shorter.
The decision 5'
to install the phone was made from PEMA.
l 6
0 You don't recall how long it took to have it --
7 A
No.
All I knew is one day this phone appeared si on my desk.
i 9
Q Do you know how long it might take to reinstall 10 it?
I guess now there must be some wiring or something in 11 place in the county office.
l 12 ;
A I would assume it could be done in a matter of 13 hours1.50463e-4 days <br />0.00361 hours <br />2.149471e-5 weeks <br />4.9465e-6 months <br />.
I can't say specifically.
a 14 Q
How about communications between you and the 15 I other counties?
16 A
We share fire frequencies with Lancaster, York, 17 and Lebanon counties.
- s '
So we have that two-way capability with them.
We i? :
cross with Cumberland County.
We are on different frequencies 0
20 but monitor each others frequency.
We have that capability 21 to cross talk.
We utilized that a couple of times during 22 the situation.
23 Q
You indicated, I think, a rumor control phone 24 was -- you had indicated sometime that a rumor control phone n voems nexners, sne.l 25 was installed.
Was this a special dedicated line or a special i
39
- . o 1
phone number or something that was advertised over the LRW 2l media?
3i A
Yes.
It was a separate phone.
We were getting 4l an enormous amount of calls on our regular lines.
We did i
I Si want to answer the questions, because one of our functions 6
during this thing was to act as a calming factor for the 7l residents of the county.
We felt if we set up a special i
1 8
phone, it would take the load off our emergency lines and, 9
number two, if we called it a rumor control phone, it would i
10 i have a better effect on the public.
So that was set up in 11 our emergency operations center.
12 ;
Mr. Perry, who is the head of the county detectives, l
1 13 l who was assisting us, said he had taken it over and he made i
14 provisions to have it manned 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> a day and utilized 15 senior citizens.
l 16 Q
To what extent were you hampered in your job, 17 '
or perhaps in your job in the broadest sense, your understand-
- s ing, the understanding of the local people, and perhaps the g
11 1?
understanding of the people, by lack of understanding of the 2; [ jargon related to radiological matters or by lack of under-2;i standing of the meaning of certain terms regarding plant 22 ;
systems or plant operations, things of that nature.
I 23 In other words, the technical nature of the TMI aciQent.
24 A
We were too darn busy over Friday, Cesa'4ta,
.:..p.e.,.i neoo,t...inc.
25 '
and Sunday really to worry too much about techt.ical jaicon.
t N
]
4 i
40 rip 7 1l I don't think it really hampered us in achieving our main LRW 2 [i goal, which was coming up with an evacuation plan for a l
3.
20-mile area.
I do note,'aere were times we were asked i
i i
I 4j technical questiona and we referred them to the Bureau l
5; of Radiological Health and so forth.
It was a time-consuming l
l 6
type thing for some of my staff members, but it didn't i
I really hamper us in any way.
ei I didn't tnink then, and I still don't think now, that I
I 9'
we need an engineer's knowledgt of how a nuclear power plant 10 operates.
We all, by now, have a basic idea of how it 11.
operates.
I just don't feel that we have to have a detailed
/
\\
end I.
12 '
knowledge of the workings of a nuclear power plant.
13 14 15 16 17 IS '
17 ;
l 20 21 :
22 23 24
..,Jeoer i n woners. ex.
2b l
i
f CR 7203 41 LRW #6 je 1 1
O Is there anything you perceive that could have been 2
done in this area of communications that would have made either 3
your job somewhat easier or perhaps might have done a better a
job in informing the public of what the true situation 5
was, realizing there was a lack of understanding among all 6.
people about what the actual situation was from time to time?
7 A
We got reports from the state over the teletype 8
system.
They finally started getting into sending us reports.
9 They covered three areas.
Basically the weather, operations 10 was the second area, and I don't recall off the top of my head 11 what the third area was.
i 12 '
Anyway, basically, the word we were getting as far as i
13 what was going on at the plant was conditions are stable.
No 14 change.
Which means absolutely nothing.
Which is one of the 15 things we were complaining about.
Our county and other 16 counties.
17 Then it got to the point where I think on April 8, we 18 got a teletype which pertained to events of the 6th and 7th 19 of April which talked about the thermocouple ahd the IWGT and 20 !
other things I can't even remember.
So we went from one 21 extreme to the other.
22 What would have been helpful then, and would be helpful 23 now -- I have talked to the state people -- is that we come 24 up with some type of format.
Basically, what the format should I
o
.w mew annmr. une.
25 say -- this is just my opinion.
Obviously everybody else will
jc 2 42 1
have an opinion -- number one, everybody knows there is a core 2l in a nuclear reactor.
The worst thing that can happen is it s
3 l gets uncovered.
Number one, is it covered?
Yes or no.
l 4
Number two, is there any leakage going on?
If there is, S
how much?
What danger does it present?
I think those O
6 are two very simple ;hings that basically are yes or no questiops.
7 That would have been extremely helpful.
8 I didn't care what IWGT waste tank was doing or whatever, 9
but I was curious about whether that core was uncovered or 10 not.
II I think, in the future, we have to come up with a standard 12 form that obviously can be utilized anywhere in the country, 13 but that can be readily understood by the emergency people Id and the general public.
15 I think too much was foisted upon them during this particular 16 incident.
Tha news madia kept asking questions about the i
17 different systems and all sorts of questions.
I think the 18 public was trying to digest as much as they could. I still 19 don't know whether that was good or bad.
20 Q
Perhaps one of the problems in that area might be 21 that if one says a core is uncovered, there can be various 22 degrees of uncoverage or various consequences,and if there are 23 releases, there can be various degrees of future potential.
i 24 A
As I indicated before, when I cited those two things z.:o s.we neoenen. inc.
25 as basically a yes or no situation, that was an oversimplification.
I
43 jc 3 1
I am aware of that fact.
2 To me, those are the two most important things that 3
people really want to know.
The average person knows that 4
that core must be covered to keep it safe.
Obviously, there 5
are degrees.
That is why I say those two were my personal 6
opinion.
~
7 I am sure,other experts would have their input.
But I 8
am sure we could and we must come out with some intelligent, 9
simple format.
10 Q
I think we have probably covered most of this question.
11 T1e question was:
How could PEMA have improved communications 12 l with you?
You did indicate that perhaps better physical 13 communications might have helped.
Are there any other areas 14 where PEMA could have improved?
15 A
Once again, when you talk communications, some people 16 interpret it as a radio system.
Other people interpret it 17 talking back and forth, flow of information.
In terms of 18 flow of information, at no time did we have any trouble with 19 the state agency.
20 Any time we requested assistance from them in, terms of 21 additional manpower or things of that nature, or any time 22 they needed information, the communications channel remained 23 open.
The only problem I ran into there -- I am talking in 24 the verbal sense -- was we would get calls from the general
. :, %rei neoon,t inc.
25,
public about a situation that occurred down at the plant.
r c
jc 4 44 1
We weren't made aware of statements made at press conferences
~
2 and so forth.
3 In a lot of cases, we weren't made aware of it.
That, I 4
guess, was beaten to death in time.
The problem has been S
addressed.
I understand that it has been pretty much 6
straightened out.
7 0
In the area of communications, when was the governor's 8
advisory to remain indoors lifted?
Do you recall?
9 A
I think it was Friday, around noon time.
Somewhere 10 in that particular area a teletype was sent out.
I don't 11 have the teletype with me in view of the fact that the 12 !
accident happened several months ago.
13 Q
We are aware of that teletype.
This was.sent out 14 by PEMA, 15 A
Yes.
16 0
Were you aware of any of the governor's announcements 17 made at about that time, around noon, regarding the take-18 cover action?
Regarding the possible lifting of the take-19 cover action?
20 A
I honestly don't recall.
21 Q
So to the best of your knowledge, the take-cover 22 advisory was lifted at noon officially?
23 A
To the best that I can recollect.
2d Q
How was Dauphin County or yourself or whoever was oseeero neooners, ine. l 2S I advised, advised of the governor's advisory to evacuate women i
jc 5 45 1
and children?
Or pregnant women and small children?
2 A
I don't remember specifically.
I believe there was 3
a teletype involved and I think there was a telephone 4
conversation -- not with me but with a member of my staff --
5 because on Friday morning, we did have the Red Cross people 6
and that is when we made the decision to open up the shelter 7
at Hershey.
8 Who specifically got the phone call, I don't remember.
We 9
were extremely busy on Friday morning.
10 Q
Can you order roads closed or made one way?
If not, 11 who can and what kind of concurrence is required?
12 A
In an emergency situation -- I don't think it has 13 to be a declared emergency -- the local officials can take 14 whatever action is necessary to provide for the health, safety, 15 and welfare of the residents of the municipality.
16 What that means is, although it doesn't say anywhere in writ-17 ing you can close a road, you can.
18 Q
That is any kind of a road?
19 A
This has been b:ought up in past emergency situations.
20 If it is a state highway, can the local people close it?
21 That is something you discuss after you close the road, if you 22 think it is necessary.
If someone wants to be childish, well, 23 that is a shame.
i 24 Q
How about the turnpike?
wee,e a.oorms, inc.
23 A
You get involved in a whole different ball game there.
f
46 jc 6 1
That obviously goes across the state.
I am talking about 2
something that runs through Middletown or Steelton or 3
something of that nature.
4 Obviously, closing the turnpike would be a state decision.
5 Q
Do you know who turned on the county civil defense 6
siren at 10:00 o' clock and why?
7 A
In one book that was printed since the incident, 8
I think we have been credited for that.
I was specifically 9
named.
We have the capability of activating all the 10 sirens in the county at the emergency operations center.
II We normally use it on a day-to-day basis for police and 12 fire calls.
When a siren goes off, if we have not activated 13 it, we can tell if it is on our system or not because we have Id a cancel button that sends out tones that shuts the siren down.
15 I think the siren in question was located on state property 16 and it can only be activated from the state capitol complex.
17 I understand from one of the guards up there, but I am not 18 positive, when we heard it was going off, we were obviously I'
called.
We hit our cancel buttons.
It didn't cancel the siren 20 out.
There was no way ve could have activated it.
The same 21 goes for the other sirens that went off in the city of Harrisburg 22 on two other occasions.
We will not take credit for any of 23 those activations.
2#
MR. ERNST:
Off the record.
ActJederal Reoorters, Inc.
25 (Discussion of f the record.)
i.
jc 7 47 end 6 I
MR. EEiST:
Back on the record.
2 3
4 5
6 7
8 9
10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19
~
20 21 22 23 24 Ae,J.o < : Reporte,. ix.
25 1
48 l203 07 01 LRaros 1
BY MR. ERNST:
2 0
That concludes my list of specific questions 3
regarding tnis ce posi tion.
4 We would be interested if you have anything else that you 5
would like to state for the record regarding any aspect of o
TMI emergency response that might help our inquiry and might 7
focus on some of the more problems, or perhaps some of the 8
more important solutions that might be of benefit to anyone 9
else in the f uture that might have to go through this kind 10 of a problem.
II A
Okay.
First of all, to talk about the 12 communicationst we didn't discuss this earlier, but to me 13 i t's importan t.
We have a monitor in our emergency 14 operations center on the utilities frequency down at the 15 control room, down at the unit one control room.
And they, 16 in turn, monitor our fire frequency.
Unfortuna tely, the 17 system was not working perf ectly when the accident 18 o ccurrec.
We noved antennas and have taken steps since 19 tnen.
20 That's another backup communications capabil.ity that gave 21 us with the facility.
I wanted to bring that out.
A lot of 22 people aren't aware of that.
23 As f ar as problems that we f aced, our biggest problem --
24 not to beat the horse to dea th -- was the f act of the press 25 conferences being called and the information being given
49 7203 07 02 L&iros i
out by 14r. Denton anc the governor pertaining to the 2
situation at Three Mile I sland.
It caused us enormous 3
headaches.
4 We weren't told that the press conf erences were being 5
held so we could have listened to them on the radio or o
anything of that nature.
We had no idea what was going on.
7 We would get calls from the general public that, this was 8
saic at a press conference.
Can you confirm or deny it?
We 9
were in no position to.
It hurt out credibility.
10 In many cases we called the state agency, PEMA, and said 11 we got a call on this.
Can you confirm it?
They hadn't 12 heard it either.
13 We had a chain of command for flow of information and 14 requests f or assistance and so forth.
If everybody played 15 by the rules, an enormous amount of headaches and 16 unnecessary grief would nave been saved on our part and on 17 the part of the residents of the coun ty.
16 The news media, the local media, acted quite responsibly 19 during this particular event.
To the best of our knowledge 20
-- we didn't have much time to listen to the radio and 21 television and read the papers -- but f rom what we heard the 22 local media provided factual information about what was 23 going,on down at the plant and in the county and so forth.
24 That was a great he l p.
25 The national news media, from what little I saw, and what
i 50 7203 07 03 LRWros i
I have neard since unen and read since then, they had be tter 2
do a pretty darn good review of themselves about the way 3
they report an incicent of this nature, and understand that 4
what they say in Washington or New York has a huge impact on 5
the residents of an eff ected area.
6 They better examine their role a little bit more 7
closely.
Their reporting lef t an awful lot to be desired.
e Federal officials in Washington have to be careful of 9
w hat they do also.
We heard one report that an NRC official 10 had mace a statement that X number of thousands of people 11 were going to die if the core melted down, or something of 12 that nature.
We heard this report came out of Washington.
13 From what I have found out later on, whether this is f actual 14 or no t I don' t know.
Nobody told me it's not.
15 Apparently there were officials in Washington and other 16 areas that were coming up with diff erent scenerios.
If this 17 were to ha ppen, this is what would happen, and so forth.
18 Apparently a couple of times that information was given 19 to the media.
The media would jus t come out with a 20 statement that an NRC official said boom, X number of people 21 will die or be injured or this, tha t, and the other thing.
22 The impact that had on the people in our area who we were 23 trying to keep calm was very, very negative.
We were so 24 irate we called the White House and demanded and did receive 25 an apology, and asked if they could control as f ar as j
51 203 07 04 LHuros i
statements mace to tne media.
2 They weren't being made maliciously, I understand that, 3
but they certainly weren't using their heads as f ar as we 4
were concerned.
We learned an awful lot of things during this particular 5
o even; that we had a t the county level. Our operations 7
initially weren't the smoothe st in the world, so we learned 8
that we obviously had quite a way to go in be tter preparing 9
ourselves to keep with this large a situation.
10 We have taken efforts to improve our capability and 11 performance during this type of incident.
There was renewed 12 interest in emergency planning at the local level as a 13 resul t of the Three Mile Island interest.
A renewed la interest in te re s t on the part of the local directors, who we 15 have been trying to ge t to do something over the past 16 several years.
An awakening on the part of a lot of local 17 government officials that never cared before.
So there have 18 been quite a few benefits.
19 Another thing that we became quite concerned about the 20 word par ic -- this to me is important for f uture problems 21 that might occur -- was thrown around too much to the news 22 media by officials both at the state and federal level, and 23 even in some cases at the local levels.
24 There was no panic in this area.
There just wasn't.
25 Procably some individual cases, but there just was no
52 7203 07 05 LHWros I
panic.
2 We were upset that this word was being thrown out so much 3
that af ter a while if you tell somebody something for so 4
long they start to believe it.
We were quite concerned that 5
the people were going to say, "They are telling me I 6
shouldn't panic.
They have been saying it for three days 7
now.
Obviously tnere is some rea son why I should."
8 I guess it goes back to what I said before about the 9
people that are in a position to make statements have just 10 got to be darn caref ul and consider their implications.
It
.l l can cause an awful lot of problems.
12 That is basically about all I can think of.
In the past, 13 I said probably 12,000 other things before different 14 co mmi tt ee s.
I remember some and forget others.
I think 15 those are the main points I want to bring up now.
16 0
Thank you.
17 I had a couple of residuals, I guess.
18 Do you know, or has there been any study performed, f rom 19 wha tever source, about how many people lef t the Dauphin 20 County area?
21 A
During the incident -- I believe it was Saturday 22 night -- we asked our local directors to do a suryey of 23 their community to give us an approximate number of people 24 that had evacuated the area.
Our figure that we came up 25 with in the 20 mile zone just in our county alone was
53
'i203 07 06 LRWros I
about 45 to 50 percent of the po pul a ti on.
That was a little 2
over 200,000 is the population figure for the 20 mile zone.
3 There was a stucy done by Elizabethtown College, located 4
in Elizabethtown in Lancaster County and it basically 5
supported the figure we had.
I think their figures showed 6
it was between 40 and 45 percent that lef t.
Our figures 7
were pretty accurate.
8 An interesting statistic, very unscientific mind you, but 9
interesting none thele ss
- f rom noontime on Friday, which was 10 the 31st -- the 30th of March -- until Sunday at noontime, 11 we checked our records to see how many traffic accidents we 12 had.
This was the time f rame we f elt that most of the
~
13 movement o ccurred.
There were a total of 12 accidents that 14 we dispa tched.
Vehicular accidents.
Five-involving 15 injuries.
cr) 16 We took the same time f rame about two months later and 17 t ha t particular weekend we had 18 accidents.
That was under 18 a normal weekend without this huge movement of people.
19 We went to a couple of months prior to the accident 20 during the winter months, once again the same time f rame, 21 noon Friday to midnight Sunday, and there were only 12 22 a ccidents tha t weekend.
23 So I think tha t very unscientifically proves our point 24 t ha t there was no mass panic and so forth.
25
CR 7203 LRW #8 54 jc 1 1
Q The study, was that made during the weekend -- was 2
the survey made during the weekend or during the week where you 3
came up with this roughly 50 percent?
4 A
As I say, we asked the directors, I believe, on 5
Saturday night or sometime Sunday, it was one of those days, 6
I don't remember specifically, how many people left the area.
7 We wanted to know for several reasons.
Number one, obviously 8
the more people that left, the easier our task was.
This 9
way we would know if we needed any extra National Guard troops 10 or things of that nature.
II Q
So your survey in essense was made on a Saturday-I2 Sunday time frame?
13 A
Right?
Id Q
And by what, knocking on doors, that kind of thing?
15 A
We asked the local directors to do the survey.
16 Exactly how they did it, I am not sure.
It might have been 17 their best guess based on just driving around town or looking 18 at the amount of traffic flowing out.
The figures were 19 pretty much borne out by the study that was done by t
20 Elizabethtowa Collegu, 21 Q
You mentioned that you called the White House, 22 as I recall.
Iden't recall the name of the person or whether 23 he was ever identified.
24 Do you.know who did call the White House?
aecersi neaar,ers. Inc.
25 A
Yes.
I made the phone call.
My commissioner, John l
i
jc 2 55 1
Minnich was there with me when I called.
We weren't allowed 2
to talk to the President, but got hold of a gentleman named 3
Gene Eidenberg with the President's staff.
4 0
You did call or the commissioner --
5 ~
A I placed the phone call.
After I talked to Mr.
6 Eidenberg, the commissioner took over the conversation.
7
.Q I also understand there was a call Saturday :.ight 8
or something like that to the lieutenant governor's office.
9 I think it may be on the record, but I am not sure who made 10 that call.
11 A
Friday night or late Saturday night, I think it was, 12 we tried to call the governor's of fice.
Senator George Gekas 13 and Jeff Piccola were in my' office.
We discussed the 14 fact we weren't getting sufficient information.
They called 15 the governor's office.
They couldn't get through to him.
16 They called the lieutenant governor's office.
He was too 17 busy at the time to talk.
They were informed that if we 18 weren't contacted by somebody, that we were going to evacuate 19 our county by 9:00 o' clock the next morning.
20 At 2:00 o' clock that morning I received a phone call 21 personally from the lieutenant governor and then he came and 22 visited the EOC that day.
23 MR. ERNST:
Questions?
24 MR. SCHAM3ERGER:
I have one question.
e Feoerei neconers, inc.
25 n
56 Jc 3 1
BY MR. SCHAM3ERGER:
l 2
Q In relation to your comment about radiological
^
3*
monitoring, you indicated the county did virtually none.
4 Some of the locals did some.
5 Do your plans have any mechanism for utilizing any data 6
that the locals or the county might take under perhaps different 7
circumstances?
I 8'
Is there a mechanism for feeding the information, for 9:
example?
10 A
The chain of command -- we would feed information 11 to the State Emergency Management Agency.
They would feed it 12 to --
13 Q
No question you can.
Do you have any plans to do so 14 at any time under any circumstances?
15 A
We are in the process of getting a radiological M
defense office structure in the county.
There was renewed 17 interest at the local levels as far as having classes and so 18 forth.
19 There has been a push in this area.
Once we get trained 20 people and so forth, we obviously will come up with plans as 21 to how to handle the information they come up with and things 22 of that nature.
We don't have it right now.
t 23 BY MR. HERR:
l 24 Q
Let me ask one clarification question.
This is on the
-nveere neoorws. w..
I 25 advisories on Friday morning March 30.
About 10:00 o' clock, l
l t
57 jc 4 j
1 the' governor advised people to stay indoors.
About noon the 2
governor advised pregnant women and small children to evacuate.
3 Was Dauphin County notified before these advisories were 4
made public by the governor in the news conferences that this 5
action was about to be taken so you could begin your 6
preparations,.or were you notified again by the ringing 7
telephones from the public?
8 A
To the best of my knowledge, at one point in time 9
we received a phone call concerning the pregnant women and 10 preschool children.
Whether it was prior to or after the Il press conference, I don't remember.
I didn't have an 12 '
opportunity to listen to the radio Friday morning.
13 Once again, I had absolutely no idea of what the governor Id was doing.
I do recall a teletype coming in.
It sticks in my 15 mind we were aware of certain things prior to the teletype 16 coming in.
I7 Q
This wasn' t a case where you were starting to get 18 calls from pregnant women saying where should I go and you 19 were saying what are you talking about?
20 A
We were getting calls from pregnant women on 21 Thursday, after Dr. Sternglass went on the local radio 22 station and advised pregnant women and preschool children to 23 l evacuate on Thursday afternoon.
24 i
We were getting calls from pregnant women as early as
-cesecere newrsers. sne.
25 Thursday afternoon.
Had there been a lot of calls from i
l I
i i
jc 5 58 1
pregnant women on Friday morning, it probably would not have 2
struck us as being that strange.
3 BY MR. ERNST:
4 O
In conclusion, let me say this is an ongoing 3
investigation.
Although I have completed the questions I 6:
have for you today, it is possible we may need to ask questions 7
in the future.
8 We will, however, make every ffort to avoid having to do 9
so.
I will now recess this deposition rather than terminate 10 it, but I do wish to thank you very much for your time and 11 effort in being here today.
Thank you, xxx 12 (Whereupon, at 12:30 p.m.,
the taking of the end 8 13 deposition was concluded.)
14 15 16 17 18 e
19 20 21 22 h
23 24
-m Federal Reporters, Inc.
25 r
I