ML19309G291
| ML19309G291 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Crane  |
| Issue date: | 05/07/1979 |
| From: | Keimig R NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION I) |
| To: | |
| References | |
| TASK-TF, TASK-TMR 203, NUDOCS 8005050519 | |
| Download: ML19309G291 (21) | |
Text
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8005050 b i UNITED STATES OF AMERICA i
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NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION l
d In t,'e Matter of:
?
R IE TMI INVESTIGATION INTERVIEW l
3i of Mr. Richard R. Keimig i
Chief 4l Reactor Projects Section No. 1 Si i
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l Trailer #203 91 NRC Investigation Site TMI Nuclear Power Plant 10j Middletown, Pennsylvania 1 11 j
May 7, 1979 12!
(0 ate of Interview) i 131 June 27, 1979 (Date Transcript Typec) 14l 149 15i (Tape Numcer(s))
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NRC PERSONNEL:
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Bob Marsh l
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Tim Martin 24i t
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1, MARSH:
The date is May 7, 1979.
The time is 1:50 p.m.
This is Bob Marsh 2'
I'm an inspector--I am an investigator for the U. S. Nuclear Regulatory 3
Commission, assigned to Region III, Chicago, Illinois.
This afternoon we 4
are at the USNRC's Region I Headquarters in King of Prussia, Pennsylvania, 5
to conduct an interview of Mr. Richard R. Keimig, who is Chief, Reactor 6
Projects Section No. 1, concerning his knowledge and impressions of the TMI 7
incident on March 28th of this year.
Rick, if I may, why don' t we begin--
8 would you give us a brief summary of your background, your experience with 9
NRC, and then proceed with how you first received word of the incident up 10 at TMI, and how you came to be up there.
11 KEIMIG: Okay, I joined the Atomic Energy Commission in June of '72 and was 12 13 assigned at that time to the Construction Branch.
After about a year I was transferred to the Operations Branch.
After about a year I was transferred 14 back to the Construction Branch.
In 1976, I guess it was, I was promoted 15j to Section Chief in the Operations Branch, Nuclear Support Section 2.
16 Shortly thereafter, I returned to the Construction Branch as Acting Project 17 Section Chief for Mr. Heishn'an, who had been promoted to Branch Chief in 18(
Region III.
I remained in that acting capacity for approximately 4 to 5 g
months, and then returned to Nuclear Support Section 2 in the Operations Branch. After returning to the Operations Branch for about 3 months or so, I was transferred to the Safeguards Branch, as Acting Section Chief, Nuclear Material Control and Accounting, which position I stayed in for approximately l
9 months.
Then returned to the Reactor Operations Branch, Nuclear Support 24 Section 2, for 4 or 5 months, and was then transferred to Reactor Projects Section No. 1. That's my background.
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MARSH:
You could say you have a broad base of experience.
2, 3
KEIMIG:
Okay, on March the 28th, I arrived at work at approximately 7:50.
4 I was met at the head of the stairs by the Operations Branch Secretary, who 5
told me that there was an emergency at Three Mile Island, and that the 6l telephone call from the plant was down in George Smith's office.
I grabbed 7
my coffee cup on the way down to George Smith's office, filled it, and I 8
got to his office, I guess several minutes after the call had been made.
9 After getting some early information from the plant, we attempted to trans-10 fer the call to the Incident Response Center and lost the line, telephone 11.-
line. We eventually reestablished that line from the Incident Response 12 Center about 10 minutes later, I guess--5 to 10 minutes later.
13 MARSH:
Okay Tim, why don't you pick up then with your 14 l
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MARTIN:
16 Rick, would you continue with the scenari> of your involvement in this event?
17 18l KEIMIG:
Yep, certainly.
After we reestablished communications with Three 7g 20 Mile Island Unit 2 and got some more preliminary data from the plant, I proceeded to determine who we should send to the plant, how and when they should be sent.
The first people that I sent up there were Jim Higgins, Walt Baunack; shortly thereafter, Bill Raymond, because of his familiarity with the plant and B&W systems.
I remained in the Incident Response Center probably all of the day, and I did leave everyeonce in a while to get coffee, PNIDs, and the FSAR for Three Mile.
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3 1.
MARTIN:
Rick, before we go on we reestablished phone communication would 2,
you say at 8:15.
3 4
KEIMIG:
That's approximately the correct time, yes.
5 61 MARTIN:
Who were you in communication with at Three Mile Island?
7 8
KEIMIG:
I think it was the Operations Supervisor, and his name escapes me g
at the moment.
10 11!
MARTIN:
At this time we were not taping the Region I telephone link.
l 12l Inf rmation that was available then is lost to posterity unless you can recall it.
So anything that you can recall prior to about 9:15, information 13 14 that was transmitted to the Region, would be most appreciated.
15j KEIMIG:
16 Well, in the early hours there, other than the preliminary infor-77 mation that they were having problems, that they had a site emergency, and some plant parameters, I can't be of much assistance then because, as I 8l said, I was trying to gather up people to determine who should go cut to 19l the plant and look for FSARs and things like that. So that the first hour was kind of fuzzy.
22 MARTIN:
Who was taking the phone call? Who was, was anyone recording the information that was coming from the licensee?
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KEIMIG:
Yes, I believe most of the information was taken down on the Incident Response Forms, the preliminary data.
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3; MARTIN:
All right, and those are held here in the Region?
i Si KEIMIG:
Yes, that's correct.
6 7l MARTIN:
Okay, so during this period, you really were managing the Incident Response Center.
Is that a fair assessment?
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KEIMIG:
No, managing the Incident Response Center is not a good way to ll!
characterize it. I was trying to form the Response Team from the Operations 12!
Branch and to get information which we needed in the Response Center, such 131 l
as FSARs, in order to better understand what we were being told over the 14i telephone.
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MARTIN:
Okay, let's carry the scenario from this point on.
17 18f KEIMIG:
You mean for the rest of the day?
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20 MARTIN:
Affirmative.
21 22' KEIMIG:
Well,...
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MARTIN:
Your involvement, specifically.
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i 3l KEIMIG:
My involvement, specifically, was, I guess primarily to try to i
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assess what was going on at the plant in the early stages--how much of an emergency there was--and try to respond accordingly. Okay. I was involved S
in taking some notes later on in the afternoon, Incident Response Forms, as 6i a communicator. Other pecple were getting tired of talking and listening.
7 8
MARTIN:
Okay, most of this is recorded on tape, Rick.
At what point did g
i you know that you were going to the site?
11' KEIMIG:
At about 4:30 that afternoon, or 4:00 that afternoon.
Somewhere in the late afternoon, Boyce told me that I should prepare to go to the i
site.
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L 15i MARTIN: What time did you arrive at the site?
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KEIMIG:
Okay, I left here about, I left the office here about 6 p.m.,
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arrived home about 6:20, had a bite to eat, packed a bag, and I left home 19l about quarter after 71sh.
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21ll MARTIN:
Were there any communications from the Region during this period 22 you were home to update you on the status of the plant?
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KEIMIG:
No.
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MARTIN:
Okay, so you left home about quarter of 7.
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l KEIMIG:
Quarter after 7.
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MARTIN:
Quarter after 7.
8 KEIMIG:
Arrived at the Observation Center, Three Mile Island, at about 9:00.
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MARTIN: What was the status of the plant at that time? What did they tell 12' you?
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KEIMIG:
Okay, I didn't get a status of the plant when I arrived at the 15j i
Observation Center.
What I did then, I went into the Center and met with 16I 17!
Phil Stohr to determine what he was doing with the environmental monitoring l
l then--what kind of activities we had as far as environmental moni'toring 18(
going on at the time.
After getting briefed by--Is that too far away?
191 (The microphone)--After getting briefed by Phil, I then met with Jack 20f Herbein in the Observation Center to get the licensee's assessment of where i
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the plant stood. Okay. I really couldn't get very much information from 22 Jack because he was quite busy.
I think it was at that time that I estab-23 lished communication back to the Regional Office with the telephone in the 24 Observation Center to tell them that I was there.
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MARTIN:
Excuse me, Rick, you said that Jack Herbein was quite busy.
What j
was he doing?
l 3l KEIMIG:
Jack was, at that time, running the Emergency Control Operation from the Observation Center.
Si MARTIN:
This is the radiological aspect of'their response?
8 KEIMIG: Well, the radiological aspect of the response was being worked out i
of there, but he was in communications with the control room, determining what was going on in the plant also.
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MARTIN: What was the nature of his communication link with Unit 2 control 131 l
room?
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KEIMIG:
I think they had walkie-talkies, as well as hardline telephones.
16i 17(1 MARTIN: Who was assisting Mr. Herbein at this time?
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191 KEIMIG:
There was a room full of people.
I really don't know who they all 20' were.
21 22I MARTIN:
Did they have good information on the plant there-prints, FSARs, 23 Tech Specs, things like that--or were they apparently relying on memory?
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If KEIMIG:
I guess outside in the auditorium part of the Observation Center, they did have some prints.
I didn't specifically look at them to see if 2
they were PNIDs of the plant or what, but there was an awful lot of paper 3
y laying around.
In the Emergency Response Room they had, I guess they had s me FSARs in there and some Emergency Response type, environmental type 5
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, let's continue from this point on in the scenario.
8 9
KEIMIG:
Okay.
I spent about an hour and a half, maybe two hours all told, j
at the Observation Center, and then I left the Observation Center and I
proceeded to the North Gate, trying to get into the plant.
It took me 12l quite a while to get in.
As a matter of fact, I had to wait until Karl 131 i
Plumlee showed up, who escorted me into the plant.
They were, I would say, 14!
probably about a half hour at gate, trying to get into the plant.
At 15; first, they tried to get an okay from Herbein to get me into the plant, and 161 i
he thought I was supposed to be up at the Observation Center.
And I said 171 l
"no I want to go into the plant," and then they were trying to get somebody 181 3
from the plant to come out to escort me in.
They were in the process of 19 doing that when Karl Plumlee showed up.
And he had been there for most of 20 the day and was the HP Inspector at the plant previously so he didn't 21l l
require an escort.
And I entered the plant with Karl.
We took a few 22 survey measurements as we drove in and went into the Unit 1 control room 23 where the...
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i MARSH:
Can I ask what the results of your surveys were on your way in?
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KEIMIG:
Bob, I don't even remember at this point. There was radiation 3
levels in the parking lot and around the plant that was readily observable, I
but exactly what the figures were I don't know.
Then I went into the Unit Si J
l control room with Plumlee and remained there until about 3:30 in the el morning.
Let's see... when I got into the Unit 1 control room I spoke with the Unit 1 Plant Superintendent, whose name escapes me right now.
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MARTIN:
Seelinger?
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12;j Seelinger, Jim Seelinger, right, and discussed what was going on KEIMIG:
i at that time with him for about 15 minutes or so.
Seelinger then excused 13i himself because he was going over to Unit 2.
I spent some time calling the 14) office again from the Shift Superintendent's office.
And at that time Karl 15i Plumlee left me, so I did not have an escort.
I left the plant, as I said, 16i about 3:30 in the morning, or thereabout, with Walt Baunack, Karl Plumlee.
17 I
Walt had been in the Unit 2 control room and I did also speak with the Unit 18t 2 control room and the Unit 1 control room.
I think Bill Raymond left with 19l us also. It may not have been Bill Raymond,it may have been somebody else.
20 There were about 3 people that left at the same time, 3 or 4 maybe.
21l 22 MARTIN:
All right Rick, let's carry it from, I guess the next morning when 23 you arrived, and comments on observations, things you did, the things the i
2 41 licensee was doing.
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KEIMIG: One observation that I would like to make at this point, is that from the time we initially established communication with the Unit 2 control room on the morning of March 28th, throughout the early days of the incident, 3
that I found the licensee personnel, the operating personnel, to be extremely 4
calm and apparently having presence of mind, and not running around like Si chickens with their heads cut off, as they have been characterized by some people.
Okay, the next morning I arrived at the Observation Center about 9:00, I guess, somewhere around 9... let's see, what in the heck did we do then... that was Thursday morning...
Oh, I guess I met with Phil Stohr, i
who was in the environmental monitoring van, to determine what kind of 101 i
surveys we were conducting at that time--what the survey teams were doing 11.
and what i. hey were finding.
What was the rest of your question?
12, 13 l
MARTIN: What I would like to do is to continue on with the scenario, I am 14!
particularly interested in your observations, the operation of their emer-15i l
gency plan, the operation of their monitoring teams, communications, just 16i how things were being conducted, who was in charge--that kind of stuff.
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18 KEIMIG:
Okay.
As far as their environmental monitoring, I can only relate 19 what I was being fed by Phil Stohr, who was following up on that from the licensee's point of view and also from the NRC's point of view, and that 21 was that everything seemed to be going all right, as far as the survey teams.
Observations--there were hoards of reporters at the Observation l
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Center and they severely impacted upon our ability to get around.
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11 MARTIN: What day was this Rick?
2I KEIMIG: Well, I was accosted by about five reporters on Wednesday night 3
when I arrived, because--I guess because I was wearing my hard hat, which I will never do again when I respon'd to an incident.
The next day, from the 5
time I got there, well there must have been a half a dozen there when I got el there, and many more throughout that day. I am serious about, to the point 7
that it severely impacted on our mobility.
There certainly should have been PR people at the Observation Center where all the activity was.
I didn't personally subject myself to any interviews by any press people because I realized that there was a lack of communication between the site llj l
and our public affairs people, because information that I heard'on the 12l radio was not only old information--much of it was inaccurate from what I 13l l
knew from being at the site.
There needs to be some system set up for NRC 14!
Public Affairs to give current information to reporters and-news media 15!
people where the activity is taking place, not from a remote press room in 16 the Capitol Building or the Governor's Mansion, or wherever our public 17{!
affairs person was.
I am'sure because of this, the press thought I was 18(
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being uncooperative, but I did not know what the licensee people were
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putting out, nor did I know what our people were putting out, other than 20!
ifstening to it on the radio as I drove up to the site.
So I didn't think 21!
that I was in any position to to further confuse the issue by giving any I
22l interviews.
My recollection of the first few days at Three Mile Island is 23 somewhat poor because of the long hours that we spent.
I don't even remember 24t if that was the day that the Congressional people showed up--I guess that 25l was Friday...
I really don't remember if it was Thursday or Friday.
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12 MARSH: While you were up at Three Mile Island, how did you do your duties, what were they? What was your job while you were up there?
3 KEIMIG: When I first got up there?
4l; 5'
MARTIN:
Yeah, and what did it evolve in to?
7 KEIMIG:
Okay, when I first arrived at the site--and my marching orders from Boyce Grier was to be the Senior IE person on site, or the Senior NRC person on site.
I was relieved of that duty sometime late Thursday after-10 noon when Dick Vollmer from NRR arrived.
They had been agreement in NRC 11!
l Headquarters that he would take over.
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MARSH: When you first arrived up there did you find an adequate flow of 14:
information from the licensee to you? Were you able to get what information 15i you needed?
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KEIMIG:
Yes, from the licensee, I was able to get the information that I 18l needed.
19l 20 MARSH:
Did you have a particular point of contact, or was it just seeking 21, out the proper person each time you needed info?
22 23 KEIMIG:
Basically, it was try and find the right person, and talking to 241 I
him.
I knew that plant information was being provided through our telephone 25j l
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lines to the control room.
So other than occasionally getting updates on olant status, I didn't really bother doing that.
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4l MARTIN:
Rick, I am going to open it up here...
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KEIMIG:
I thought it was pretty much open all along...
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MARTIN:
We were trying to lead you down a road to give us the scenario.
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KEIMIG:
Yeah.
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l 11; MARTIN:
I guess at this point, what we'd like to do is open it up.
You 12l recognize that we are doing an investigation.
We are looking at both the 13 operational and radiological aspects.
If you have any insights or tccts 14i that you know, or things that you feel might assist us in our efforts, we 15i would appreciate you providing them to us.
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KEIMIG:
Well, when you talk about facts I., as I said, my recol? ection of ISl the first several days up there is really quite jumbled, because
- don't '
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really know one day from the next. It was hectic from the point o view d
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that there really weren't enough NRC people at the site to do everything 2 11 j
that was being requested to be done from Headquarters and and frca this 22'
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office.
We had to provide people to go to Governor briefings, atd those 23 people were taken out of the control room, out of there assigned jobs in 24; I
the c.ontrol room, to attend these briefings.
If they weren't taken off of 25i
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l 14 duty to do that, they should have been sleeping, when instead they were at briefings. There was also the Congressional Contingence that arrived on 2
site, either on Thursday or Friday--I guess it was Friday that they arrived on sita--also quite heavily impacted on our operations up there, in that I was personally requested to go to the airport and pick these people up and 5
show them how to get to the site, and to brief them on the latest informa-tion on the way back from the airport.
Also, to show them how to get back to the airport, which I didn't do.
Maybe if you'd tell me some of the types of things that you might be interested in, Tim.
10!
l MARTIN:
I can only give you by example, Rick, operationally we're focussing 11:
in on time before you arrived.
So that, you probably are not able to 12l provide other than second source.
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KEIMIG:
Right.
15i 161 MARTIN:
The radiological people are very interested in how the event was 17 managed, radiologically, by the licensee during a several week period 18{
there. And so if you have any insights, or remember something that might 19!
assist them in analyzing the event, we'd appreciate it.
But again it's 201 l
open, cnd I can't identify the fact that only you know.
21!
22 KEIMIG:
Yeah, well, it seemed to me from the time I got to the Observation 23 j
Center on the night of March 28th, that the licensee's survey teams were 24 out and were reporting back quite regularly to the Emergency Control Center 25\\
at the Observation Center.
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MARTIN: We've had confirming reports of that.
2l KEIMIG-They seemed to know what they were doing.
The people in the 3
Emergency Control Center seemed to know what they were doing.
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MARTIN:
Do you know who was managing those groups?
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KEIMIG:
No, right off hand, I don't know. I guess Herbein was in overall charge of the entire operation, the entire response.
10, MARTIN:
Did you normally interface with Mr. Herbein?
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KEIMIG:
You mean once I got up there?
13l 14l MARTIN:
Yes.
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KEIMIG:
Other than the first meeting I had when I arrived there I talked 17l to him on several occasions after that but he wasn't specifically one of 18I j
the people I sought out to get information from.
He was quite busy and 191 I
there were other sources to get this information from, besides bothering 20 him.
21l 22 MARTIN:
Did you ever interface with Mr. Arnold?
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KEIMIG:
No.
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MARTIN:
How soon did corporate GPU people arrive? Do you have any feel for that?
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Si KEIMIG:
Yeah, there was somebody there that night when I got to the Observa-Si tion Center.
8 MARTIN:
At the Observation Center?
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KEIMIG:
Yeah.
I can't think of who it was, though.
11l 12f MARTIN: What about B&W people? Did you ever interface with any of them?
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Were any of them assisting Mr. Herbein when you first arrived at the Obser-141 vation Center? When you got to the Control Room, were there B&W people?
15j 16i KEIMIG:
I really don't know.
There was so many people around and I didn't 17l go around asking everybody who they worked for. I know the next day there 18l were some B&W people at the site.
19i 20' MARTIN:
After arriving on site, when was the first time you got a briefing 21 on the status of the plant?
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KEIMIG:
When I had my initial meeting with Herbein.
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MARTIN:
Can you remember the content of that discussion or that briefing?
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KEIMIG:
It's rather vague, but he related to me the plant parameters at 3
the time and so:ne of the results of the survey teams, as I recall.
It's fuzzy whether I got those results from Herbein or whether I got them from Sl 6!
Phil Stohr, who was there also. Communications back to this office, for somebody at the in the area of the Observation Center, were very difficult 7
also.
There were two phones in the Observation Center which were made al available for our use, I guess from the time I got there, because I told Jack Herbein that I needed to call my office--where could I get a phone?
101 And there were two phones in a little side office that he made available 11{
and he said we could use them any time we wanted to.
Other than that, 121 there was a pay phone outside the Observation Center but that was almost 13l impossible to get to.
And the next day, although I never verified it, they 14!
i claimed it was broken, "they"-the reporters, the news pecpie claimed it was 15 broken.
They claimed that Met Ed did that purposely.
They also claimed 16j that the afternoon before, that Met Ed had sent somebody out with a pocket 17' full of dimes to make sure that nobody else could use that telephone. I 181 don't know how true that is.
I did sense, though, that many of the local 19; media people, news media people, were very antagonistic toward Met Ed.
20 Also, some of the local people, who happened up to the environmental van 2 11 where we were working out of for the first couple days, just wanted to chit 22 chat.
One such person came up to me, I guess it was Thursday evening, the l
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29th, or it may have been Friday evening, and said that everybody working 24i j
at the plant was very tired and were overworked. Later on in the conversa-25j i
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lj tion I determined that he was, in fact, a worker at the plant. The reason I presumed that he was bad mouthing the plant, was that only the licensed perators were being given overtime.
The unlicensed people, maintenance 3
crews, were only given a limited' amount of overtime. I guess this was a part of Met Ed's austerity program during the outage on Unit 1. We were Si aware that there was a cash flow problem, or something to that effect, with Gi i
Met Ed ead GPU because we had a management meeting with Met Ed about two 7!
weeks previous to this, at which time they informed us of that,-that they.
would have to take some cost saving' actions.
So it did not come as a 91 l
surprise to me, to have the worker complaining.
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11l MARTIN: ' Rick, I am going to ask you for some quick opinions here.
How can we improve the NRC's response to an event like this?
13l 141 KEIMIG: Well, the first thing we need to do is to establish some type of 15i mobile office with telephones--to be available to call for instance, if we 16i j
want to take the Three Mile Island incident, to call from the Observation 17!
Center, where we were based, into the control room to get update information, 18f and also to call back to the regional office. I guess in general, just 19i i
improve communications somehow.
That includes our public affairs people.
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I think communications is a big item.
What else...
We need more periodic 21l briefings--or not briefings as such but briefing papers--so that any inter-i 22 ested party within NRC can get updated information.
I think one of the 23 biggest problems in responding to this incident, frrm the NRC point of 24 view, is that somewhere information was not being propeMy communicated to 25:
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people who needed it. It seems to me that that information was readily available here all day on Wednesday while I was in the office, and I'm sure it didn't all of a sudden dissipate the following day.
The information was 3
available, was being made available to Headquarters, and why it was not getting to upper NRC management, I'll never know. Another thing I think we 5
should not be doing without running it through a review process, is making 61 i
recommendations to the licensee on what he should do with his plant.
I think there needs to be a type of review organization established within NRR for these types of incidents, where they will sit down and before anybody gives a licensee a recommendation, a team of NRR people will review the recommendation to ensure that it's not going to do further damage.
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l MARTIN:
Okay Rick, we appreciate it.
I'll turn it back over to Bob to see 13l l
if he has anything?
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15j MARSH:
No, I have got nothing.
I think we have covered what we can cover.
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17 KEIMIG:
I am sorry I couldn't help you out any more on the facts 18 19l MARSH:
Well, I think you are floating at a little higher than where we've 20l i
been talking. We've been down more with the people who were on the survey i
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teams and all that, but certainly your insights also have got to be of 22 value also because it's a different perspective on what we are looking at.
23 With no more to go into then, I am going to terminate the tap 3 at 2:36, and 24 I've got a reading of 702 on the meter.
So we'd just like to say thank you 25f i
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f r y ur time, recognizing you are still busy.
With that I am going to cut l!
i the tape.
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