ML19309G285
| ML19309G285 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Crane  |
| Issue date: | 10/09/1979 |
| From: | Landry L METROPOLITAN EDISON CO. |
| To: | METROPOLITAN EDISON CO. |
| Shared Package | |
| ML19309G284 | List: |
| References | |
| TASK-TF, TASK-TMR NUDOCS 8005050509 | |
| Download: ML19309G285 (6) | |
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8005050 Of g-Interviewee: Leonard J. Landry, Health Physics Engineer, TMI Interviewer:
H. S. North, SIG/T4 Date::
October 9,1979, Informal
.s Mr. Landry stated that he had previously been interviewed only by NRC/OIE in connection with the accident. He stated that he has acted as the Emergency Planning Coordinator, an informal position,since one week after'the start of his employment with Met-Ed in October 1977. He was preceded in this position by Alexis Tsaggaris, who familiarized him with the job. He reports to Dubiel l
who is principally responsible for the emergency plan. Updates and, changes to the plan are delegated to Landry by Dubiel. The delegation includes the authority to make changes and to employ consultants (S.
Porter of Porter-Gertz).
Changes to the plan are occasionally specific at the direction of Dubiel and sometimes on the basis of very general instructions.
Dubiel, however, did a final review of any changes. Landry stated that the principal changes to the emergency plan occurred in January 1978 when NRC/OIE, (Donaldson and Gal (ina) dis-cussed changes in the plan. Landry understood that the review (preoperational) was to Reg. Guide 1.101 requirements. Subsequently, the changes were reviewed by OIE in approximately January 1978 and as Revision 1, 1/16/78 submitted to PORC (meeting #250). The January 1978 revision was performed in order to obtain the facility license (issued February 8,1978). Additional changes in the emergency plan and procedures were made in January 1979 in response to problems which had
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been identified during drills conducted in late 1978.
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Landry said the changes which resulted from comments by OIE were basically small items.' The major areas concernied training, modification of the off-site dose calculation procedure, Xe/I dose conversion charts which came from EPA documents (provide more guidance to users).
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2 Landry said that the conversion of the Unit 1 emergency plan to the Unit 1 plan plus an adjoining construction site started with S. Porter (Porter-Gertz),anl that.
Landry became involved later. The two unit emergency plan incorporated such.
items as the effected and uneffected unit concept, revised dose calculations, an' additionalsetofRMSinstruments,alternatelocationfortheECS(Unit'1, hhp-
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and Unit 2 control room), emergency action levels, however without a change.in basic concept, i.e.,
125 mr/hr fence line dose rate, 8B/hr dome monitor and river
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concentrations.
Concepts were changed in the area of on and off..,.. _.
-a site monitoring, kit contents were changed (included SAM-2's, PIC-6 in place of PRM-5, inverter, air sampler and I cartridge). The other major change was in training, which was taken directly from Reg. Guide 1.101.
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With respect to Reg. Guide 1.101, Landry was asked to review the J. Sears',. NRR, review of Amendment 65 to the emergency plan. He commented with respect to the
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individual items as follows:
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1.
He did not comment on the absence of the alert classification. On 125mr/hr 4
at security fence, he believed this was derived from a calcul' tion of a a
containment dose rate, not a release, at some worst case condition (po'ssibly
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a class 2 IDCA).,The value was accepted in the plan.revisio.,n,b.ecause nSN;'i,. ;
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reason existed to challenge the value at that time. None of the action..~1evels.. 7.
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- were challenged during the plan revision.
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2.
With respect to the Spectrum of Accidents, this would have been no help during "_
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the emergency and probably wouldn't have been read at that time.
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. A have been some help in training however. With respect to mannin,g, p;;rior to g
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the accident, it might not have had much effect, however, during the accident it could have stimulated' thinking in the direction of advanced planning.
3.
Evidence of agreements. The letters of agreement were of no help duringithe accident, they existed in Emergency Procedure 1004, and had been omitted from Amendment 65.
4.
With respect to the notification of state and local authorities, early notif-ication could have reduced the time required for call out and could have changed the attitude of the control room personnel.
Overall early notification could have been beneficial.
5.
Assessment actions: Believes this is a good contment and one that was included
.in the emergency plan developed post-accident.
The problem was that RMS and process instrumentation was~1ost during th'e accident because the instrument range was inadequate to respond to the radiation levels which existed.'
Reg.
..,.~7 Guide 1.101 identifies the use of such equipment, however, it nakes no mention of a requirement for instruments with extended ranges.
If calculated dose rates at various locations under certain presumed accident conditions had been 1
available it would have been beneficial during the accident.
6.
Emergency declaration activation based on control room indications would have been beneficial.
It is being done now and was used in some instances prior to and during the accident, i.e., effluent monitors and RMS, an alarm in each
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of two buildings. A more extensive.use of such indication could have resulted h '*/.
in better informing teams before they went out.
,.,e 7.
With respect to Section 6.4 of Reg. Guide 1.101: Security Procedur& 1005.12'.
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Interface with Visitors during an Emergency addresses this area. A method of contacting persons in the LPZ would have helped. Contact with this group prior to the emergency could have improved understanding at the time of the emergency. Landry wondered why the Emergency Broadcast System was not used
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for official announcenents.
8.
Meteorological instrumentation readouts are available in both control rooms.
J In addition, the information would be available from the Harrisburg Inter-national Airport.
If all else failed observation of the plant plume would give approximate direction and stability class.
The Emergency Plan implementing procedures address first aid and rescue, how-9.
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ever, they were of no help during the accident.
10.
The items called for in Section 10 of Reg. Guide 1.101 were available at the site.
Landry stated a Health Physicist arriving at the site on about the 30th brought a supply of KI 1000 doses of 10,170 mgr. pills each. The licensee brought in E. Saenger, M.D. to evaluate risk vs. benefit. Met-Ed Safety Director was opposed, Met-Ed's physicians not informed in area except for RMS physician Brennan, M.D.
. *--7 Saenger and Brennan were in favor of use. Material was not used.
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Frank McCormick's concerns about completing training were discussed. Landry said that very rough lesson plans were developed by himself and Mulleavy. The plans were not smooth like the Training Department wanted them. There was a feeling of uncooperation on both sides of the issue. Landry felt that Training could have developed the training plans based on the rough plane prepared by the HP people.
l He said that noncompliance could result from failure to achieve 100% attendance
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and that training took time that was not available. He said that he heard some of,
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the Chem Rad Techs' complaints concerning the practice of using the training shift for work rather than training, and that there was some justification but' that there was more work than could be handled by the staff without using the Training Shift.
5 Concerning the amendments to E.P. 1670.9, Landry said that as prepared the re-quirement was for 100% training. He was aware of the discussion concerning changes to the procedure but that he didn't prepared or review the changes.
He said that procedure changes could originate with anyone from a foreman up and that he would not be consulted concerning the change (or even aware of it) unless he happened to be on PORC the day the change came up.
Landry said Donaldson, OIE, said that TMI might be in noncompliance because of failure to complete. training.
The response was that the training program had not completed one full cycle. As a result the procedure was changed. Landry said that the position 'of Emergency Plan Coordinator is now official and is held by A. Tsaggaris and that he reviews all Emergency Plan related matters.
With respect to the accountability problems raised by the Mulleavy and Busansky memos: The Mulleavy memo of 10/13/78 was followed by TCN No.78-254 (temporary
..,.7 change notice) on November 1, 1978.
(TCN No.78-254 was approved by PORC meeting
- 292, October 30 - November 3,1978.)
The Busansky memo detailed a test of a revised accountability system to be used during drills November 6 & 8, 1978 only.
(Document reference TM-508; 7906150012).
With respect to post-accident period: NSS began to take over manning of monitoring teams on the 30th and 31st,possibly earlier. The A and C teams were not manned.
On the 30th, Tsaggaris and Potts relieved Landry and Seelinger in the Unit 1 Control Room ECS and Landry was then assigned to off-site dose projection assisted by Pittsbur-
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Power and Light and Houston Power and Light personnel.
Landry said,that he had been impressed by the drills conducted in 1978. During the accident the control of off and on-site monitoring teams and dose assessment was good but that problems were experienced in the area of plant reentry. He said that l
6 personnel were reacting instead of thinking. There were also problems with communications in that available phones were quickly used up by the establishment In addition radio blind spots effected communications with off-of open lines.
In the second site teams and between the control room and the observation center.
case a relay (an individual with a radio) located on the island outside the plant was used.
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