ML19309G282
| ML19309G282 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Crane  |
| Issue date: | 08/02/1979 |
| From: | PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION ON THE ACCIDENT AT THREE MILE |
| To: | |
| References | |
| TASK-TF, TASK-TMR NUDOCS 8005050506 | |
| Download: ML19309G282 (65) | |
Text
d i~o d n ! d%;
e 1
PRESIDENT'S CCMMISSION ON THE ACCIDENT AT THREE MILE ISLAND 2
8005050 p
4 PUBLIC HEARING S
TdURSDAY August 2, 1979 6
Hall of Nations
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7 D**
- D emunc Walsh Builcing Gecrgetown Universi v L
_ c o.
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8 36th 5 reet N.W.
Washington, D.C.
9 The hearing was convened pursuant to notice at 9:10 a.m.
10 John G. Kemeny, Chairman, presiding.
11 PARTICIPANTS:
12 John G. Kemeny President of Dartmouth College 13 14 Bruce Babbitt Governor of Ari::ena 15 Patrick E. Haggerty 16 Retired President of Texas Instruments 17 Carolyn Lewis Associate Professor of Journalism 18 Graduate School of Journalism Columbia University 19 Paul E. Marks 20,
Vice President for Health Sciences l
Columcia University 21 i
[ 22 l C:ra 5. Marre::
Associate Professor of Scciciegy i
i University Of Wisc:nsin
- 2 i
Licyc McBrice j 24 Presicent of Uni ed Steeiwcr<ers :f A erica i
2$
I l
3 PARTICIPANTS:
(continued) j o
2 Harry Mc?herson Attorney Russell Peterson President of Audubon Society 5
Thomas Pigford Professor & Chairman
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6-Department of Nuclear Engineering University of California a: Berkeley 7
Theodore Taylor 8
Professor of Aerospace & Mechanical Science Princeton University 9
Anne Trunk 10 Resident of '4iddletown, Pennsylvania 1 1 Ruth Dicker Associate Chief Counsel 12 Charles Harvey 13 Associate Chief Counsel 14 Stanley Gorinson Chief Counsel D"*D
~ T 15 co) o o
Xevin J. Mellov 16 Director Dauphin County Office of 17 Emergency Preparedness i
18 Col. Oran K. Henderson Director of Civil Defense 19 Comonwealth of Pennsylvania 20 Thomas M. Gerusky Director 21 Bureau of Radiation Proteccion Decar ment of Envirorme:.tal Resources
[ 22 Comenwealth cf Pennsylvania 23 Gordon K. MacLecd
,j Secretary of Health i 21 Comenwealth of :ennsylvania l
i Lt. Gover :or '4illiam *i. Scran:on, :::
i l
Cc=cnweal:5 of :ennsylvania l
l l
i PARTICIPANTS:
(continucd) 2 John Villforth Director 3
Bureau of Radiological Health
- l Food and Drug Administration A
U.S. Department of Health, Education & Welrara 3
Harold " Doc" Collins Assistant Director for Emercencv Precaredness
~
~
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6 Office of State Pr5grai,s i
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission 7
Lake H. Barrett 8
Sec. tion Leader, Section B Environmental Evaluation Branch 9
Division of Ocerating Reactors 0,ffice of Nuclear Reactor Regulation to U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission l
11 12 13 14 T\\h A l(bb D 9%D 0
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CRAI.v>21 KI. W :
Just fc the infc :atien cf the 2
CO. issien, chese are our final ritnesses tcday.
3 Whereupen, O
4 LAKI E. 3ARFZZ f
EAROLD CCLLINS 4
were called as witnesses and, after beinc firso duly swc:n, 7
were examined and testified as follcws :
S CEAIF.v>2T KI. W :
Mr. Barrett, would you state for 9
the racc d ycur full nar.e and the position ycu currently 10 c c c u e. v. ?
11 MR. 3 ARF.C :
My name is J.ake E. Barrett.
Ia 12 section leader in the Invircnmental Ivaluation Branch in the 13 office of Nuclear Reacter Regulation, ti:e staff of the 14 Cer= sis sicn.
13 CEA.IP."AN KI. W :
And Mr. Collins?
16 MR. COLLINS:
Earcld I.
Collins, assistant director t
17 for emergency p aparedness, Office of State P cgrams, NRC.
t3 CEAIP.M.AN KIMINY :
Counsal?
Ip MR. EATIIY :
Mr. Barratt, you are wich che NRC in
- 6 che Invironmental Ivaluaticn 3
- anch.
Is that cc rect?
C MR. 3ARRIC :
"' hat 's cc rect.
I MR. EARVIY :
Ceuld you give us a ge.e:a1 descriccien i
1 3 ' cf ycur duties in chat branch?
i
.- l MR. 3 ARPIr :- I ' n secticn leader cf a g cup of six i
g p;ciessicnals -hat handle basically radici:gical issues fc:
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1 cperating reactor plants - that's operating power reactor r4dAh4I 2
plants.
We do evaluations of
- 5;; systems, which are sys-3 tems to control the radioactive material within the reac or i
4 plant, systems that are also used in the event of an accident 5
to contain that radioactivity, also systems that are used for 6
no=al radioac ivity control, radiation protection for the
~
7 workers within the plant, and the. i= pact of normal amounts of 8
radioactivity that are released during nor a1 plant operations, 9
and also accident scenarios that might occur.
10 MR. HAFNRY:
During the Three Mile Island incident, 11 what function were you performing within the NRC?
12 MR. BARPITT:
I was a member of the technical staff 13 that was in the what we call incident response center, which la was the NRC headcuarters co= mand post in Bethesda, Maryland.
15 My duties were to handle =any of the radiological problems i
16 that would come up, assess the radiological info =ation as it 17 would come in, t:ying to grasp.an understanding of what was 18 happening at Three Mile Island to brief senior management 19 officials.
j 20 MR. HARVEY:
Would it be f air to say that you would 1
21 take infor=ation concerning the state of the system at the i
>; :: i reactor site and perform =athematical calculations to calculate 5
the a:<posure off site?
e aj 24 MR. 3ARRET :
We would do that, using cur judgemen:
G j ;5 as :: what was occurring.
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MR. EARvrY:
New, could ycu describe the state og
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2 the system as you understood it early Friday norning?
3 MR. 3ARRITT:
Early would be before 9:00?
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MR. 3A.2.C :
We thought it was basically stable.
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We thought core coolin-had been prettv. well established a:
7 7
that time, although with a damaged core.
We knew we had 8
substantial arounts of radioactive material in the primarv.
9 coolant system.
This is the cooling water that surrounds de 10 reactor cere.
We were having sporadic releases of radioactivit.y 11 from the facilite that we had theorized these were caused. 5v 12 various small leaks in what we' call the make-up and let-down 13 system and waste gas systa=s.
These are systa=s that will 14 take sc=e of the primary coolant cut of the big centainment.--
15 that's the bi'g doce building with the fcur-foot thick concrete 16 valls - into de auxiliary building.
Sc=e of these systa=s 17 had small leaks.
The radioactivity was getting into the air 18 in the auxiliary building and it was being carried th cugh' 19 the filters
>.d cut to the enviren= ant.
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e 20 MR. HARVIY :
Was there any par iculaE 9 m c:. A.eb "L 2:. svsta= that you were c=ncerned about en Friday =c ning bef :e i
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MR. 3ARRETT:
Well, through the whcle scenaric, -ince!
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_.e begi.nning, we were ccncerned with
_.e capabil y Of what I
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As the 2
pri=ary coolan: is taken out o# the reac cz, it is injected I
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3 back in again.
And this we call rika-up and let-down system.
4 And part of that system contains a tank called the make-uc i
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primary ecolant at high pressures will evolve ou l
6 1
under lower f
7 pressures.
And this was happening during the accident.
As 8
water was let down, the highly radioactive gases would 9
accumulate in this tank and had to be vented someplace.
10 Under normal conditions, these gases are passed to what we 11 call a waste gas compressor, which is like an air compressor l
r 12 and it compresses the gas into a big storage tank.
And as long 1
13 as there's capacity i.n that tank and room to put it, the radioactive material is held in those tanks'"and there was no 14 D"' g *]D"T }Lg' 15 i==ediate concern.
6 MJu o Jua b 16 We were concerned about how full tanks were and did they have capacity to keep receiving these gases as the let-17 18 down continued.
19 MR. EAREY :
So do I understand correctly that you 20 were conce=ed tha: these waste gas decay tanks wculd becc=a I
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21 filled, resulting in a continuour emissien of radicactive cas e
i 22 : inte the atmosphere?
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That's correct.
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And the emissien would be u. filtered.
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Yes, :.f the tanks became cvarfilled, f
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the relief valves en these tanks would lift and ic would ge i
2 l := a vent header, which would bypass the filters that filter l
3 all the air that exits the build:ng.
A M2. EARVI" :
So you were watching this systa= t=
5 see if these tanks were filled Is that a fair stata=ent?
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7 MR. HARVEY:
As of 9:00, did you receive infer =ation 8
about those tanks?
9 MR. BARRE"T:
Yes, we did.
We'd always put questions 10 cut to the site t= find out the status of these tanks and 11 would get sometimes c=nflicting infor=atien back, bt:t never
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12 anything that was concise.
At a little before 9:00, one of 13 our inspection and enfor:e=ent pecple that had the direct 14 phene lines to the IF.I centrol room alled me over and told if me he had received the nessage from the site that those tanks 16 were new full an6 that the relief valves en those tanks had lifted and th.st gases were passing,fr== the make-up tank to 17 18 a saste gas dec'ay t*-k where they could not go and the gases mm m
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y-c, r 19 were being vented fr== the clan.
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HARVEY:
In an unfiltered a=issien, continuous.
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MR. 3ARRETO:
In an unfiltered emissien, and i was 2.:.
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MR. BAFJ.ETT:
Well, I was stand.ing, you know, next 2i to the fellow.
Just to get an. order of magnitude feel for i!
3 what that would be as far as any off site dose consequences, 4
we made a very quick calculatien, just a mass transper calcu-5 lation based on sc=e primary coolan: cencentratien data we 6
had from the previous evening.
A..d we calculated a hypothe-tical release rate of about 60 curies per second of noble 7
8 gases.-
9 MR. EARVEY :
So, in effect, you took that informa-10 tion and made a calculation as to what the of f site radiation 11 dose would be?
12 MR. 3AREETT:
No, we made a calculation as to what 13 the release rate of radioactive material would be.
I did not la have an off site dose calculation for that.
15 MR. F.ARVEY:
All right.
What did you do with that 16 information?
17 MR. BARRETT:
Well, as I was standing there, on my 18 right' shoulder was John Davies, who was t.he director of the 19 Office of Inspection and Enforcement.
And he was part of the 20, other half of the incident response center, which was the l
l 21 ma.agement side.
I talked to him and briefed him many times i 22 ; during the course of events.
And he asked s :.f that was r
- 22 a.ything significant.
.ud : said,-yeah, I felt it was.
A.d e.
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.e executive management team, sc=e:hing like tha: -
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i 7-1,6. cver dare and brief the ecco. le that were in the room.
So.
2 went with hi= into the other rocs a?.d star _ed to talk to the 3
people in dere.
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i MR. HARVEY:
Well, what did you tell them?
I f
MR. 3ARRETT:
Okay, what I told then was dat i:.*cr-6 matien that I had 'ust received from the I&E pecple who were 7
in direct phene line to the site was that these tanks were new a
full and that we had a continuing release occurring and that 9
the release would be about 60 curies per second.
10 MR. HARVEY:
What was the reaction when you told 11 them?
Well, first of all, who was in the roc = at that time?
12 MR. BARRETT:
Okay, Lee Gossick, who was the 13 executive director of cperaticas, Harold Denten, director of n
14 reactor regulaticn, John Davig, who is director of the Office 1f of Inspection and Enforcement.
16 MR. EARVEY:
So this was NRC senior management.
These are NRC senior manac.ement.0e.:1a.
18
'MR. EARVEY:
Mr. Collins was dere as well?
19 MR. 3Ap3.EC :
Mr. Collins was there.
Victer Stello 20 was dere, and several other people I j us t can't recall right b
1 Inew.
I think Mr. Ecuchard from schlic aff airs sas there.
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Okav, so vcu :Old de: c.a: de wasta l
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2 MR. HARVEY:
What was the reaction when ycu said T
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MR. BARRIO :
I don't think there was a lot of 5
reaction, because I den :: think anyone really knew what 60 6
sc=e curies per second would mean.
We did initiate a discus-sion with some of the systems people about maintaining con-7 8
tainment integrity.
I think I made some statements like, we have the containment there and we should be verf careful about 9
bringing the radioactivity out of containment through these 10 11 let-down systems, and were there any other alternatives to 12 operating a let-down system, some way we could keep that gas
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inside containment, which was, you knew, a very substantial 13 l"-. -l 14 building, and it was/ a negative pressure.
It wouldn't get cut 15 to the environment.
16 MR. HARVEY:
Were you asked to translate that calcu-17 lation into an off site dose?
18 MR. BARRETT:
Yes, the. syst=~= discussion was ter-minated when semebody asked, what's the off site dese.
1;):r 19 I
- O had not calcula:s.d an of f site dose.
Su I was able c give a -
1 21 projection as to what that might be.
We had previctsly, the I
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[ 2: ; day before, made various calculations and.we had had seme I
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-d e that we had about a curie per second m.
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f ;f. ; release rate with an off site dese of about 20 millirem per i.
! 23;hcur at a distance net unlike the site boundary distahce that f
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==~ e:s of the public would be -- for that =crning.
So it 4
was j ust a s::aight ra:ic, a ra:ic endd:g up at least new f
50 " es higher.
So d us t nulti=lv. ine. that, 60 " es 20 wculd a
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6 he 1200 millirem per hour.
So we had a hypothetical situation
'1 rs 7
that we cculd have a 1200 nilliram per hcur dose off site, 8
though there is considerable uncertainty with this.
It was i
9 daust an extreralv. rough calculation, mace ric.h en the sc.ot
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10 as I stood there.
1.1
.MR. EARVEY :
What was the reaction when you came up 12 with that calculation?
13
.MR. BARFr r:
I think I reme=ber a statement like, 14
. =y gosh, that 's over the Environ = ental P rotec-den Agency 's 13 what we call PAGs, which are uretective action guidelines.*
16 These are guidelines that are established for taking off site Ecmv 17 actions.
- he icwer bound is one ff This was a dose race of b
18 1200== ce hour, which is ecuivale.t to 1.2 *'.=e hour.
/
19
.MR. HA.VIEY :
So your calculatien had resulted in a 0
reading of 1200 millire= per hour at that peint and you related 2il ha: :: the group, a=d pecple becar.e ccnce ned abcut its i
- 22 effac w
- .,.h respec: to prc:ec ive acticn g=das.
Is that a i
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.MR. EAEt. E.Y :
Yna: hat =ened next?
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MR. BAR_=sTT:
Well, very quickly, a reper: cama in --
2 sc=eone reported on the telephone -- sc=ebody in the room 3
stated that they had a telephone report tha: the licenses was A
reporting a reading of 1200 mr per hour.
It was the exact 5
same nurber that I had just said from a calculational view-6 point.
7 MR. HARVEY :
So your theoretical prediction was just 8
ve rified, it ac.ceared, b.v a telephone report right from the 9
site.
Yes.
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11 MR. EARVEY:
The exact same nurber.
12 MR. B AR2.1TT :
It was the exact same number, and it 13 was within maybe 10 or 15 seconds from cy first 1200 millire la per hour prediction.
13 MR. EARVEY :
What was the reaction in the operations 16 center at that point when that informatien came in?
i 17 MR. BARRETT:
My perception was that that had a very 4
I 18
.crofound imo. act on the whole center, that we had shifted from 19 sort of a lack of info =ation on things and ncthing really fim to, well, here is a real piece of neaty info =atien tha:
20 i
21 ' has significance te it.
I believe it :cok a hype hetical
$ 22, si:uaticn and rather carved it in stone and se it en a
=cuntain with a burning bush behind i:.
There was considerabis.
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4 I remerber a few pecple making seme statements S
that j 25 tha:' was over the protective action gn:. felines, that action t
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should be taken.
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2 MR. D.RVIY:
We've got to bite the bullet.
3 MR. BARPI*T: Site the bullet, better safe than scr:f,
/.
if we ' re going to err, let us err en the side of public safe:v.
5 MR.
- ARVEY :
People began to talk about evacuation d
6 at that point, did the.v not?
7 MR. 3ARPITT:
Pecple i =ediately starued talking 8
about evacuation.
Well, movine. cec.cle and evacuatien to me 9
are ene and the same.
But, yes.
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liL 10 MR. EARVEY:
What happened with respect to what you 11 were doing.at that point?
12 MR. BARRETT:
I was kind of hearing all that.
I was 13 rather surc.rised we jum=.ed that c.uickl.v, but : cuess I was a
still rather surprised that we were getting this report of 14 1200 se quic.kly frem what I thought was a hypothetical situa-13 16 tien to having this being the real situation.
17 MR. EARVEY:
So this vas. an extraordina:7 coincidence that precipitated an evacuation discussion ameng the senior 18 19 management in the operaticas center.
Is that a fair statement?
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Were you asked to perfor= any cther 3
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.r atements 2 I about need ec be moving people,, need :
take action.
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no negative statements frem anybody in the management group 4
that I could see.
3 MR. EARVIY :
Were you asked for a recommendation?
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MR. 5ARRETT:.Ysah, Mr. Dennen, after a few stats-7
=ents of, you know, we ought to do something, asked me how 8
far should people be moved.
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9 MR. EARVEY:
What was your respense?
10 MR. BARRETT:
I told him I could not recc= mend any 11 specific distance to move people, i
12 MR. HARVEY :
And what did he say?
13 MR. BARRETO:
He said a second time, tell me how i
14 far we should move pecple.
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i 15 MR. EARVEY:
Was he saying that nore e=phatically?
16 MR. 3ARRETT:
Yes.
17 MR. EARVEY :
And what did.vou sav?
MR. BARRETO :
A lot of things went through =y mind 18 I
19 at that point.
One thing,I had not seeng the Pennsylvania v
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20. plan for evacuatica er access to any of these th_..gs.
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So : le: that sink for a millisecond
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.}f decided, well, if I'm scing :c have :: F ve a number and I'n i
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not gettine. anv hele. frem an.ve. lace else, I ' = =. c i n e. to e.ive a 2
conservative nu=ber.
And I put a cualifier en thau, at leas:
3
- fel: I had sufficiently, tha: if we're geing ec have := have l
I 4-a number, I'd =ake it high.
-And O.a:-vas--the-f+rs
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him, you knew, I'm =ct sure, I can't tell you fer sure, but 6
tan miles is.cre than enough, ten miles is plan:y, or sc=e-7
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3 MR. EARVEY:
And what hac.cened then?
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9 MR. 3ARRITT:
Then there was discussion abcut the 10 pres and cens of ten miles.
Against the ten =iles, it was sc aud 11' said that ten =iles included 3nsma l
parts of Harrisburg.
And i
12 semeene made a ce" uter preposal of five miles.
And then there
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13 was discussion about the five miles.
I guess one way I visualized it was ten siles had opposition, five miles had 14 b
if ncne.
So withou any cpposition to the five =iles, there was e
16 talki.ng back and for h.
I don ' t recall any specific =ctions
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anything like that, but it seemed-to be generall.y agreed f
E 'o r 13 um.en, in =v coinien an.ywa.v, that the I'C had reached a cen-19 I sensus that pecple were := he =cved cut j '-
recc =.endation, I
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MR. HARVEY:
All right.
Now, did you -- Since the 2
information that started all this was the waste gas decay 3
tanks' were filled -- is that correct?
4 MR. BARRETT:
That's what was reported to us from 5
the unit two control room.
6 MR. HARVEY:
Did you subsequently discover that tha:
7 information was wrong?.
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'MR. 3ARRETT:
Oh, veeh it was about a half hour after thefphone call was made[y h, L)g,41 d_)
ce arn5
.=:/ h J stok is.
9 I went back and received a 10 phone call from the site and things weren't -- information 11 wasn't jiving.
The 1200 millirem per hour dose rate was a 12 local dose rate right over the containment, not an off site 13 location.
And the relief valve that had lifted was not a 14 waste gas decay tank relief valve, but another relief valve 15 f rom another tank, called the make-up tank.
16 MR. HARVEY:
If you had known that when you were making your original calculations, would you have been as 17 18 concerned?
19 MR. 3ARRETT:
No, if I'd known either of those two 20 facts, h
--he -- there would not have been the concern 21 that prevailed in the EMT.
>; 22 MR. *>ARVEY :
Thank you.
?
l 3
I
$ 22,!
Should go Oc Mr. Collins?
e I 2.1 ;
CHA!R!'.JN KEMENY :
Oc on to Mr. Collins.
I e.c a
3 9
l
~
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0A 05 1
MR. EARVIY:
Mr. Cellins, what is your official 2
position again, just for the record?
3 MR. COLLINS:
I am the Assistant Director for I=ergency Preparedness in the office of State Programs, 4
Nuclear 5
Regulatcry Cc:=:ission.
O D
D'T ao m
.0a o
n 6
MR. EARVIY:
And how 1cng have you been involved with emergency planning in the Nuclear Regulatory Cc=rission 7
er its predecessor, the Atemic Inergy Cc: mission?
8 9
MR. COLLINS:
Ten years.
10 MR. HARVEY :
Are you involved in the review cf 11 state plans that are submitted te the NRC for concurrence?
13 MR. COLLOis: Yes, I am.
~
13 MR. EARVIY:
Do you have any idea whether the State of Pennsylvania has, er the C0=monwealth of Pennsylvania 12 13 has submitted a plan for cencurrence?
16 MR. COLLINS:
They did not for= ally submit a plan 17 to us for concurrence.
Back in 1$75, I believe it was the la lieutenant-governc: of the state,at that time did send us sc=e draf t docu=ents which we reviewed in the menth of May,
),
"'4
- 1 i
was, and we sent a letter back to de lieutenan -
e.cverner with cur evaluation of these draf: decu=ents w'd 1-4.-,
essentia_..v was n.ev =ax.e a nice star, but we c.on,:. n r n x.
i
, thev meet cur guidelines standards.
9 i
MR. EARVIY:,Did they ever resubmit the plan?
- 3,
MR. CO L*. INS :
They did no:
= the b e s :
- c f =.v I
av:
1 knowlgdge.,,b'e,.p.ay, have getten pieces of draf t material 2
through the side deer, but we really did not see anything 3
of substance, at least in our office until about December
- 4. cf last year when we got a copy of the then existing emergency l.
5 plan for the state for these kinds of accidents through the D
D 3
~
mm mv 6
side door.
_w o o
.:2 7
Cne of our staf f people acquired this from an I
l 8
official of the state, but the state did not send us a letter, i 9
to the best of =y knowledge, saying, "Here is our plan.
We 10 would like you to review it and concur in it or tell us what 11 you think about it. "
12 MR. EARVIY: So that the State of Pennsv1vania at i
13 the time of the Three Mile Island incident did not have an la NRC concurred plan.
Is that correct?
If MR. COLLINS:
That is correct.
16 MR. EARVIY:
Wer.e you in the operatic =s center 17 on Friday during the period of time that Mr. Barrett has 18 described to us?
19 MR. COLLINS:
Yes.
I don't think we both arrived 20, at the same time, but we were both there during the period i
21 of time that he was just talking about.
i i 22 MR. EARVIY:
Could you describe the a:=csphere of r:
i
~p..9 the operatiens center earlv Fridav. morning?
c
=.a MR. COLLINS:
Well, hev earl.*/ Fridav mo rninc. ?
l l
J3 MR. EARVIY:
Say before 9 c'cicck?
1
- (# 9 D
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MR. COLLI:75 :
3efcre 9 o'cleck. dere.was net =uch 3
geing en between 7 and 3, j us t, it *was reascnably reutine.
3 I think about a between the period 5 an.d 9 a.m., we sta_ ed 4
to hear about the, I like to characteri::e i: as sert of a 5
percolations ce=ing frc= a tea kettle, the b=rping of gas and 6
so forth fre= the Three Mile Island statien.
We started te i
I 7
hear reports that things were starting to emanate f cm that 8
facility, more than they had been emanating en previous 9
days.
Was it certain where these e=anations 11 were ccming from c these e=issions?
12 MR. COLLINS:
Well, it wasn't entirely clea: 'I =e 13 where they were ecming f=cm.
It =ight have been clear to 11 other people who had more direct access to the infor=ation if that was ccming f:c= the site, but I think in general the 16 feeling was that there were,. and. I thi=k this is a fair and 17 true statement, that there were ra'dicactive e=issions ccming -
18 f ce the facility f:cm more than ene point, and in other 19 words, there were peints where these emissiens were cecu. ring I
20 l which were =cre i=pertant than other parts, but nevertheless l
1
-'ere was radicactivity e=anating frc= a ic: cf different i,
t 4 ::
pein s, and
-"i-k pecple were a little
'3-
-- '" sed 4- -' e i
i
?
t i
! ;. 23
- cperations center, at least sc=e cf the =anage=ent pecple l
l1 t.
l I 24 as :c precisely where all these peihts were and exactly what i
1 all these diff eren: readings that -hey were ge::ing mea.:.
f f
e
1 JV/
1 I think.that is a fair characteri:ation, at least D**D
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in =v = nd.
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MR. HARVIY:
All right, and when the 1.2 rems 1
4 reading that Mr. Barrett referred to came in, did that change
)
5 the atmosphere of the operations center?
6 MR. COLLINS:
.Yes, I would say at that point the 7
at=csphere changed.
It turned frem sert of a routine operation into what I think in =.v deposition ! characterized as an a-9 at=osphere of significant apprehension.
10 MR. EARVIY:
Would it be a fair statemen: to say 11 that at that point when the 1.2 rems figure came in, and 12 the infor=ation that the waste gas decay tanks were filled 13 that the senior management discussiens appeared to focus la on the idea that the people at the site did not seem to have
- 15 a handle'on what was happening in the plant?
16 MR. COLLINS:
Yes, I think that seemed to me to be j7 a pervasive = cod in the management part of the center which
~
jg seme of us called "the bullpen. "
19 I think that is f air.
I, 20 MR. EARVEY:
So that you had a situation where i
i
.e,1 there was some uncertainty about where these releases were I
4
..e
- =c n e :.rc= anc where these readines were ccm. n c. :rc= en :n.e
=
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cne hand and on the other hand when the 1.2 rens release l
i e
4 t
f2 cenes in, there is a general uncertain:v ahcut whether the 4
l
=
f
.i
.e.m pecple a: the site are really =anaging the accident in the l
l l
.. +
o m
e 1
- .ght way.
Is that a fair statement?
~~
2 MR. COLLINS:
Yes, it is.'
think there was l
2 uncertainty in the cperatiens center as to precisely what was 4
goinc en at the facility and the cuestien was being raised
~
f in the =1: ids of many as to whether c net these pecple up 6
there would de the right thing at the righ: time, if it had me o
T 7
to be done.
D D
la b
oe a
8 MR. EAREY:
Was any attempt made to centact the 9
site to :enfi:n the 1.2 re=s release?
10 MR. COLLINS:
I den ' t knew if there was.
Perhaps 11 Mr. Barrett' could answer that, but I am sure that phene calls 12 were =ade conce==ing that reading, but I have ne direct 13 kncwledge of that.
14 MR. EARVIY:
Were phone calls made to the site 4
13 to confi = varicus readings while you were there c= Friday e
t 16
=czna.ng?
1 1
17 MR. COLLINS:
I don't reallv recall hearing.
I was
~ "
13 not privy to the actual cenversations of the people that 19 were werking cur radiological desk to the site; so whether
'1
\\
i 2o c: net they were calling back when they heard abou: this i
1220 millircentgen per hour reading c not : have no idea,
_ _-, but I wculd assume that that kind cf fcil' v-up was going e
i I
, en, but as : s a v.,.Oe:hans Mr. 34. re:: kncws.
MR. EARVIY:
Was i: v. cur inc.ression fren beinc.
'1
..c.
in :ne size en Fridav =c =ine. that atte==:s to confir:
l p
I l
g 20 information coming frem the site were general'.y unsuccessful 2
c unsatisfactory?
3 PJ.. COLLINS:
They sure were in my mi.d.
4 M.A; HARVIY-Did M.r. Denten use the werd "= crass"
.e for exam le, in referrine. to the.orchlems of confining 6
infc =atien at.the site?
D D
q-oc e
.1.
oo o
.m 7
P.R. COLLINS:
Yes, P.r. Denton made that statement.
I think it was about 11 o ' clock Friday =crning when he was,
g I
I believe, talking to the Chai=an, Dr. Hendry in which he 10 said something to the effect that when Dr. Hendry asked him,
);
you know, why can't we seem to get better inferntation out of this place up there and so forth and so on, M.r. Denton said, 12 "We have got a lot of pecple up there, Dr. Hendry, but they 73 just seem to go up there and fall in a = crass, and we never ja 1.e hear 2 rom them again."
16 So, I think that what that indicated to me, at j7 least, was that the primary problem here was an information 18 ficw. problem and a communications problem.
I think the 1y ce=.unicatiens setum. all the wa.v throu c.h, ri c. h t um to the 10, state level, to the facilitv, down to Washincton, the whole e
i t
l ce=.unications thine. had really broken dcwn and was evericaded'.
e.
in
\\
t.'
There was infc=atien c.et:ine. thrcuch, bu: th e r
system was everloaded.
2 j
i F.R. HARVIY:
s it fair to sav that -h at really i
was the activation for the evacuatien decisien a 9 c' clock
= --
t
t
'1 ' cr so, that you had releases c==ing out cf de plant that 2l really were having difficulty confi=ing the releases; here l
3' was an inf==: atien ficw croblem; there,was a pr:blem in I
I 4! centacting NRC pecple en the site; and dere was a general 5
. feeling that the people at the plant just did net see: te have 6
a handle en the prcSle= and could net be expected t=
do the 7
right thing at the right time?
'D m
~
D h
m L
8 MP.. COLI.DS :
I certainly think that Ia. iduea t.at..
3 9
you have just expressed, the uncertainty f actor which we could 10 sum it up as certainly, at least frem what I could see, l
11 caused the =anagement people in that site to opt for naking i
12 a rec==endation for precautionary evacuatien.
I would like 1
13 to make that clear.
I ja
'Ihe decision to =ake a rece=mendation for evacuatien 13 was not necessarily based on any real per=eived need for such 16
-an evacurtica, and I want to be careful hcw I say this because 17 I want to get the right thought abress.
It was done
.e,.
18 because there was uncertainty as to what =ight happen later 19 en that nerning with respect to these radiological releases,
.n.I.=cor infer =ation c==ine. in; would the releases e.e: b ie. t. e r:
i
(
- .s long were they going on?
i A 10: cf these c.uestions were verv., verv vac..:e in th e minds =f sc=e.
Sc, I think the decisien was an Opting for
.e ~
recautienarf evacuation, and as Mr. Bar e:: said *=s: a few
- Cents ac.O, it was a sCO: Of a, we had be :er he Safe than I
u l
311 1
se :;y type of situation.
2 MR. HARVIY:
As a result, you were instructed to 3
call the state to recc= mend evacuation?
4 MR. COLLINS:
I was.
5 MR.HARVIY:
And what did you recc= rend when you 6
called Colcnel Henderson?
c, g
' T }
ma oo o
7 MR. COLLINS :
All right.
I would like to start this off by saying that Mr. Barrett made some statements here a
9 concerning the distances, 5 and 10 miles and so forth.
Che 10 discussion that I reme=ber hearing concerning these distances is generally compatible with what he has just told you, 11 that I don't remember anybody in that center coming 12 except
~
13 down on a recc=mendatien for 5, 10, 15 or 20.
It was all 14 vague.
i 15 I called Colonel Oran Hendersen, the Director of 16 PIMA, and the firrt thing I asked him was"What have you heard, 17 Oran?"
And he said that he told me he had heard about this 1200 milliroentgen per hour ' release or I asked him that, 18 and 19 ' he said, "Yes," he had heard about it, and I said, "What have i
20 i you been told to do?" and he said, "Nothing, right now."
i 21 ; And so then I said to him as best I can reccliect, "It is the t
1 -
I ccinien of the management pecple in this NRC cperaticas cente:
44
?
I f
o
- that veu shculd start thinking about evacuation, and it is t
?
t c
r the recc=nendatien of these peccle that ycu start evacuating i
i j ;3, pecple cut in the directicn cf the plume,"and he said to me, l
I
444
~
1 "Yes," and I said, "Do you know where.tdur,=1ume is going? "
2 And he said, "Yes, I think I do new; I was given scme 3
errenecus information before.
Semeene had told me it was bicwing dcwn the Susquehanna, and new, it was geing in a 4
S ncrtherly directien," and I said, "Ycu have :ve or three 6
towns up there," and he said, "Yes,"and so I said, "It is our 7
recc=mendation that you evacuate people in the direction of 3
the plu=e cut to
- .J miles."
TD *
- D
- D ~3' 1
[esS S-N o
9 He came back to me,and he said, right there en the lo same conversation, "I will start with 5 miles," and I said, 11 "That is your preregative, but you should icok to 10 miles."
12 Ee thanked me, and I told him I would get back to 13 hi= with any further infermation tha: I had.
I made it clear la to him that this was a recem=endation ecming frem the 15
=anagement people in the NRC center at that time, which it 16 was -
17 MR. EA22IY:
one final question, Mr. Collins.
You 18 mentioned the uncertaint.v and the difficultv. in verifv.ing
!. and obtaining infer =ation frem the coerations center and 19 I
2 0 i, elsewhere.
Could.veu ce==ent on vcur thought en hew that I
i informa:icn prebiam caused manage =ent 0: :ne ace cent oc shift; I
[;
frc: level c level?
r 1
MR. CCLLINS:
Yes.
As bes t as :
l can characteri:e i:;-
A i
.!. 4 in a few weris, in all the a: err.encv..clanninc..iece cf i
l i
,j f
business tha: I have been invcived in in the agency fer nearly, l
10 1#
i D
D 9 D'3'Y
~
1 a decade, there never was, i: a
,f d y M og,n=,3 t
2i emergency plans or local gcVer{.=ent energency plans any real definitive role spelled out for, the Nuclear Regulatory 3
s 4' Cc= mission as to exactly, precisely what it was going to do.
5 There was a manual chapter in the NRC Manual which 6
told about hcw the operaticas center would be manned and so forth.and so en, but it never was really clear in emergency 7
a plans what the NRC or the Commission itself, when I say the p
Commission, the body of five ecliegial men, what they would 10 do and what their role would be.
As I saw it, the 11 Metrepelitan Edison folks had a responsibility to call the 12 state and local authorities when they saw that somethine I
13 was scing amiss.
This is the way the emergency plans are la currentiv set us., and this is the wav. thev. are sue..csed to 15 work, and they are, also, supposed to call the NRC Region 1
)6 office, and for them it is in King of Prussia, Pennsylvania.
17 Well, the NRC Region 1 Office responded right away with s'eme inspectors and so forth, and the state was starting 13 19,. :o c.et cranked up for whatever the.v were c.oine. :o de, and then t.
.e n. i I think, because the ec=munica icns were breakine. dcwn, and 1
he information was not coming back to the NRC cperations i
.e.
g
{
- ' center in Ee
- hesda, this started :c cause scme encern, and l
naturally the =anagement of the cperatiens center a: 3e:nesca e
l T
.e 4 started :: ge: =cre invcived in, : wen't sav. runnine th e shev, 1 e
i l
..e but :h ev. seemed te be c.e :ine. =cre involved in :he activity s
L N'
,-m-j FU Ltd U fLINL 1, cencorning the whcle matter, and then when the 1200 =1111-i.
2 l roentgen per hcur release was reperted, which Mr. Barrett l
3i talked about, I think at that pein it was within an hcur 4l after : called Colonel Hendersen that it had escalated tc the 5
level of the Cc=r#=sion itself.
6i The Chairman started getting invcived.
The ether 7
Cc==issioners were starting to get involved, and we all kncv 8
how all that ca=e out, but it j us t se e=ed, you knew, frc=
9 Wednesday to Friday that the whole matter just escalated up, 10 until finally it got to the President of the United States 11 himself, and that is what wound up with Mr. Denton being 12 sent as the President's perscnal representative, up there to 13 Three Mile Island to try to lend seme se:blance of order and 14, discipline to the whole operation.
15 So, that is the way I saw it happening, and I think l'
it was all because of information, cec.munication flew c cble=s4 17 and there =ay Fast been some political considerations as well,
.as la but I a= 'not c' e=petent to do anything =cre than speculate 19 cn tho se.
20 l MP.. HA?,vIY :
Thank you.
I have no further questions, 4
21, Mr. Chairman.
em
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e.
1 l
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hbhI) MI)IM kk u.seau woucaumnu s
I CHAIPS.Mi KE.e. NY :
Mr. Barre :, firs: of all, we are
.?WCCD 2l very grateful t: you for your extremely frank description of 3
that famous incident.
4 I just had one cuestien, and :=ied :c su==arize it 5
so I understand it clearly.
When that phone call care in 6
that there actdally was 1200 millircen gen per hcur release, 7
did anyone ask then where that measurement had been taken?
8 MR. BARRETT:
You are referring to the reported 9
1200, not the --
10 CHAI?F_2.N KE.C.:.NY :
Yes, not your calculated one, but 11 the reported one.
12 MR. EARRETT:
I don't know.
That phone, that 13 message came in ca the phones in the =anagement side, and 14 sc=eene, whoever ansvared that phone was one of the =anagement 15 people, and I den't knew if he ever asked dae what the
,16 location was or not er if it was in the original message.
17 Whoever spoke that nt=ber, it was right in the centext of the off-site ' dose nu=bers that we are all talking about.
18 I do g
19 remember he did not sav that it was not the off-site location.!
i I.
i 1
20 That was the only subjec: of discussion.
So, it was assumed l
21 to be that.
i i
4
>; 22 I den't knew if anycne, if he, whcever it was who r:
$ 23 said that, did check it out.
We checked it cu: within a i
E i2
=atzer of =inutes, chay, and it :urned cu net := be : rue,
=,
} 25 but that was af:er a decision that had been =ade and s
e A
w D O
h.
y "d a i
a 1
Mr. Col-lins had made his call.
~
2 CEA?F.AN KIMINY :
Yes.
56, therefore, in effect, 3
frc= your cwn testi=cny, and again, I said that it was 4
extremely fra=k, vcu were e.lven sc=e wrene. infer =ation.
Ycu 5
=ade the calculatica of an of f-site dese which happened to ec=e 6
cut to 1200 millireEs per hour, and then in came an actual 7
report of 1200 millire=s pe hour which you.later found out 8
was frc= a quite different source, and it was net an off-site 9
nurber at all. So, it was cc=parine aceles'and c anges.
There
'O sas that horrible coincidence of the same nt=ber coming in
.11 that had nothing whatsoever to do with your calculations that 12 led to the evacuatien recc==endation.
Is that a fali state-13
=ent?
1.t MR. 3 A_EE"": :
That is a f air stateme=t.
15 i CEAI?F.AN KE' G :
Thank v.ou.
16
?:ofesscr Pigford?
17 COMMISSIONIE PIGFORD:
Iou said that looking at it 18 hisucrically when the nu=ler of 1200 millircs.=er hour ac. t. eared, 19, them evacuation was suggested hecause of the IPA Prctective I
20 Action guidelines of 1 rem.
!s that ec::ecu?
I, 21 i MR. BAA..ITT :
That state =ent was made.
i C '. w.....:.2 w" T...
. - e ?. ^s.= " -
c.' e.=. s =.. a..i..'.Me
...w vc". p--
l
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6
} 23 j f:c= 1200 millirems per hcur := this cec:.s: cn c: 1 re en a
=
I y e.4. A. e.*.i..e. e *.)
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1 only surmise what the persen who said that would mean, how 2
he was thinking.
I did not saf anything about 3
COMMISSIONZR PIGTORD:
I wonder if ycu can explain the logic to me because you are giving us a dose rate, 4
3 1200 :..illirems per hour, and'the" Protective Action Guide 6
says nothing about a dose rate?
7 MR. BARRETT:
That is right, a
COMMISSIONER PIGFORD:
I am trying to find what 9
is the logic of ce= caring one number with the second?
I 10 MR. BARRETT:
Since ! did not do that ec=parison, 11 I don': think -- I can only speculate as to what the person 12 was thinking who said that.
I think what he was thinking, i
13 i: would not take verv lonc to ce: to 1 rem with a 1200==
I j.,.
.ter hour dose rate.
i 13 COMMISSIONER PIGFORD:
I see.
There is no policy t
16 of NRC taat when you have 1200 millire=s per hour that then j7 is going to exceed the Protegtive Action Guide or equal to' i
1.=
it.
Is that right?
~
19 MR. 3AP22TT:
There is nene to =v kn0wledce, but 40 I am not an expert in eraergency lannine.
c
.u.
CC.v_v.IS3ICNIR PIGFORO :
Mr. Collins, do you knew
- t. s.-.
the answer :
that?
r
=
2 73 MR. COLLINS:
No, I think Mr. Earrett's -- the NRC l
.F
,4 l accep_s the Enviren= ental ? ::ection Agency's Protective r
A::icn kides cf 1 :: 5 rem whole bcdy and 5 :0 25 rems
e I
':1 Q 1
MR. 3APS2TT:
P.ay I add that think that is very 2
hypothetical.
Wind directions.would shift. We had very 3
unfavorable =eteorology at th at time, that it is not an apple 4 l and an apple.
I think it is an apple and an crange.
5 CO.TCSSIO!ER PIGFORD:
.-So, you had seme data at that 6
time on the s.tability of the wind?
7' MR. BA?S2TT:
Oh, yes.
8 COMMISSIO!ER PIGFOP.D:
And the frequency of the 9
wind direction?
10 t
MR. BAA?2TT:
It was about as had a wind as we I
i 11 could have, nice and gentle, blowing right i
toward what we 12 called "the North Gate" in the Northeast Shore.
13 COMMISSICIER PIGFORD:
Did.vou have anv information'
~
at this time as to whether this release was of short 4
duration 15 or was expected to continue?
16 MR. B A ?.? 2 T T :
Our theory was that it was th e 17 relief valves en the waste ga.s decay tanks stuck open, and la that was going to continue as l'eng as the letdown continued I
19 So, it was going to be a continuous release i
i 20 l COM".!SSIO!ER ?!GTORD:
4 Why was that your theory?
21 MR. 3 A A." 2 T T :
3ecaus e that is what we were cid t
- 2; i frc= the control rec =, that the relief valves were stuck r
0.:en.
p 2
E
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C w^.v.v. ~ c c ~ "w."< T.'... a :7...".."..- a'o :" u
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- Old you that?
D""]D P]DNY$
hJu o JL 1; ifh t
5 4
. c. s 1.
MR. 3 A.:.R E r :
I den': k.cw =yself, but ! k=cw I
2 there is a message fer= in our rec =--ds en dis da: has dis 2
rece ded because it rec =rded in our King of Prussi'a office.
4
- a= sure veu could c.e back throuc.h and find who eat f
. individual was.
CO!'_v.!SSIGNER PIGTOF,D :
It is your u.derstanding 7
then that the release occurred b.y c.oen relief valves en the a
waste gas. decay tank?
Was it your understanding that thes e 9
relief valves opened because of excessive pressure?
10 MR. BARREC :
Yes, because the tanks were filled 11 to ca acity, and the.v could hold no mere.
12 Co."MISSIONER PIG 70RD:
Now, do you know of 1.,
testi=cnv bv Mr. Flevd of GPU that en same ' day he opened the 1.t valve and caused the release to occur?
1 MR. 3 A R.".E C :
I have not read Mr. Flevd's 16
' tes ti==ny.
I have heard about Mr. Floyd's testimony, and 1/
what I think he is referring to is' cpening of the valve on IS the =ake-up tank to transfer the gases := the waste gas.
19 ! decay ta..ks.
There were leaks between de nake-up tank and
.e j the waste gas decav. tanks.
I dink what he neant was he
,a I
e.... _ : -. a _' _'.. a..a.. a d.
'~. a... a *. *.
_=. _k
_ - - =..._-..
a. a_ _--.,'
' a' 2,
I
. wnen ne :...:.: t..a: n e.<n ew.ne was :::.n
- cause i
- 22 <, an r
' ;n an increased release, but :. : was a d.fferen:
4 i
- i...
C a u_V_** O..O t.'.* t.? S.
.O _ f.T *' T M 1_. 4.
_4 _
s a.s.
s 4_4
_ - m_
_- a _ _ a.#
m.v.~
~~
90'W_
b W
hun 6MMJ c en as a resEl: =f what he did?
valve :=
O i
321 1
MR. 3ARP2TT:
No, it is a different ding.
He was 2
transferring gas to the waste as decay tank.
In reality the 3
tank was not full, okay, and there was ree: in the tank.
~
4
- d.c w e v e r, there were leaks in the header, ce piping between 5
the make-up tank and the vaste' gas decay tanks.
So, he knew 6
when he nade the decision to open that valve to vent that 7
there would be an increased release, but he did not, th ere B
was not, and he knew there would not be a lifting of the i
?
relief valves en the waste c.as decav tanks, because in 1
,t 10 reality --
i i
l1 COMMISSICNER PIGFORD:
Mr. Barrett, is that a 12 different release than the ene we are talking about to you?
't 13 MR. BA?JITT:
Yes.
14 COMMISSIONIR PIGFORD:
I see.
That occurred, also?
I5 MR. BARRITT:
Yes.
16 COMM.ISSIONIR PIGFORD:
Later er earlier?
17 MR. 3ARP2**:
Earlier, but that was the release....
P '4 18 that got confused.
Okay, what happened was there was a i
19 lif ting of the relief valve en the make-up tank.
This, in 20 itself, caused an increase in airborne effluents, and then 21 additi:nally, Mr. Ficyd opened the ven: valve en the make-up c
- 22,
11=k, and :ha, 11sc, crea:ed an increase in release rates.
r i
l
$ 22 l COMMISSICNIR ?:GTORD:
Abcut how far apart were i
D**]O *]D 3Yi I 24 these in time?
ooM oM,j lab e.
} 25,
MR. 3A?22TT:
They were cccurring be ween like --
6 I
.: c 2 t
.,.' I can ref er te =y notes, if you like, 6 cut 4 e'cicek, i
in the nerning 7 C
.i 4 anc 8 c'cicek er so.
4,
l COvv?ce?ONIR ?!GFORD:
So that the ti.e d at Flevd
-t
!! coened the ven was about 8 e ' clock.
Is da: correct?
4i I
MR. 3A?J.ITT:
It was venting arcund S c'cicck.
It takes ti=e.
~
6 7
CO.W.!55IONER FIGTORD:
All right.
Ecwever, th e release vou are talking about thrcugh the open relief valves
-e cccurred about when?
gg, /c. /
9
- g MR. 3A?J.IOT
Well, the/ relief valves opened earlier.
You kncv, I dink that. relief valve opened around j) a' ' '
12 Comd.!SSIONIR PIGIORD:
And you believe the release 73 occurred at that ti=e?
),
MR. 3A?JGTT:
I a= afraid we are en different wave-15
'nfor=ation I had in bt respense center lengths.
Tha g
17 was the waste cas decay tank reli'ef valves are open.
That 13 l was not true at all.
It was a bad nessace.
19 l CO.W.ISSIONIR PIGTORD: Oh, I see.
Onat was not --
4 1
in hindsich th en, dat was net the scu ce cf the release?
2C -
I i
!s that right?
.i I
M?.. 3A?J.I C :
Mc, the was te gas decay tank rel:.ef va_, ves, Oc cur kncw,ec.ge, never cpenec at a,..:..
.: was jus:
- a a,
D D
g-mm o
i a cac messace.
i
- 24 o3-
.m i
oo 3m :
., a -......:
- -.u.
..e - m.-
--a.
~. %.....
..~
l I
e 323 1
tho releaso?
2 MR. 3ARRETT:
The actual source of the release 3
was p cbab1v two thine.s.
The bic.e.est scurce was.::cbably 4
Mr. Floyd venting the make-up tank to the waste gas decay 5
tanks, and the reason radioactivity get cut to the i
6 environment was there were leaks in the piping between these l
7 two tanks.
Additionally, there was p cbably an earlier S
release wh'en the relief valve en the make-up tank cpened.
e 1 9
COMMISSIONIR ?"GFORD:
Now, which one of these 10 two releases was the source that resulted in the measurement 11 of 1200 =illirets per hour, the helicopter?
12 MR. B ARPI':"? :
Probably the venting of the make-up 13 tank.
l 14 COMMISSIONIR PIGFORD:
By Mr. Floyd?
15 MR. 3ARPITT:
By Mr. Flcyd, though the two of them 16 could have been additive, because it would take sc=e time, 17 because what happens when the relief valve on the =ake-up.
18 tank opens, it directs the water and the ater in the
~
kdicactivi nether tank called the bleed tank, and tha:
19 i
f cank.c chablv had its relief valve ocen, ventine. to ancther e
I l
i I
1 21 ! relief valve header.
So, it is a cumulative thing that the
' releases wculd net be ius: fer a few seccnds and s:co..
Th ev.
- t..- e.
0
, c.. wculd e.c ut.,
ceak and come dcwn.
50, :: was an accumulation mm o
3-3 '.
cf the twe.
a WW c
.d..
J 1
j ;g COMMISSIONIR ? GFORD :
F::: what ycu knew new, is it 4
_a 3:~
I
,1' cer ce: that Mr. Ficyd could have cut dcwn that release 2 l whenever he wanted to by clesing be valve?
I
-t
.u..
w e-er
-~w--....
.v. 4 a
s.y 4
COMMISSIONIR ?!G707.0:
Nc: to say s:cp it, cut i:
5 down?
6 MR. SARRETT:
In =y epinien, he could have deferred 7
the release.
He made a decision to restere water.
Here is 8
what happened.
The relief valve en the make-up tank opened, 9
releasing the water f c= the =ake-up tank which caused him 10 to have a different letdewn mode.
He ceuld ne icnger use 11 the charging pu=ps to take water frc= the make-up tamk.
He 12 had to direct it frc= a big storage tank which is not a 13 preferable =cce of cperation.
My understanding was he tried 14
- = =u=c. water back into the make-up tank with transf er cu=m. s 15 but could ne't because of the excessive pressure in the 16 nake-up tank.
17 Sc, he chese te vent the make-up tank te get rid is of this excess gas, se he could put water back in there.
19 Scccer er later he would probably have had to have done that 2C I anyway.
I I
21 i Sc, e
re.vu. z o-. C". 7 2
- 2. c..?m.:a -
- i--.v....-
". d e --..=.. d i...
.a a
e l 3 ::
that after he started :he release by cpening tha valve, he f
?
i I
? 24
- Ould have, shcr:1y thereaf ter clesed that valve, if he had E
I 3
wan:ed :0?
D
'"D i
6"-
- a
a
., 2.,
1' MR. 3ARPITT:
He cculd have closed the valve and 2
s:cpped that release, but then he could : c; have used his ncrmal charging system which had other safety implications l
3 t
4 to it.
1 3
fj COP _v.ISSIONER PIGFORD:
He would have had to later t
6 en de something about the continued built-up pressure?
I i
7 MR. 3ARPITT:
I think his concern was mere of usine i
1 3 l the water that he had in the lare.e safetv tanks.
He was 9
trying to chose, probably the lesser of the evils in his 10 opinion.
I1 COP _u. SSIONER pIGFORD:
So, from what you knew new, 12 was it proper to assume that this was necessarily a 13 centinuous release corresponding to an airborne dose rate 12 of 1200 millirems per hour?
13 MR. 3ARRETO:
In my opinion, che f acts of the 4
16 situation was, it was not a continucus release, in my opinion.
17 18 19 l i
8 20 I
i 21 D**
T[
i 1
I
.3 oo o
- 3
.4 2
e I
i i
- n *.
a
=
D es as i
.- e t
c.
t t
1l CCitt*SSICIER ?!GFORD:
29cw, wich ::;-;rf to your ca'- l s
l 2i culatiens, ! can see the logic cf vhat you have dene.
Ycu have
., I 2, _.a
,s
'. =..vo u s. = _- _ w d "..b.
'".,a.
us "- = '.-"__' e c_E - '. ". _. ' -
'. a. c. e i
i I
i curie of echalt 60 will give us a radiatien leve' of one : per 5
heur; and you n. ave an expe:'imenza;. =easure=ent cf de actua, i
s I
1 A c s e ~ = e * - 'n a c ' e ~* ' ' ' ' ' ' ' * ~ s a ~' ' e '
6i ve s '*
4 MR. SARPITT:
That is -- ue get chat informatien en 1
/.
I' 3 l
..w.. _3 wa.v. i c. h..
4 9
CO."u._-.e.g C"..".3 3 GT. ORD -
- v. e s '.
10 MR. 3APS2 r:
And that is what I used to know what 11 de activitv. was.
12 CO!Oi:SSICIER ? GTORD:
Aad yce have stated that ex-peri =ent was one hundred ::illirems, yes?
g3 t
14 MP. 3ARPIT:
The informatien was reported to us frc::v.
j3 de site, dat was the readings frem the sample.
33 COMMISS!C ER FIGFORD:
That is.1 rems, yes?
MR. BARREr:
.1 rem.
D m
ma D) i 9
.ds o N b- 'l 13 CO!2 CSS 0!ER PIGFORD:
And veu have den concluded
.:1 19,' da: cat cerras.cends to an ec.uivalent of one hundred thousand 4
t
<_ _i _. 4.,.._. e 3 mE
-_b 9
---g__
Ag.e
_4_3_1_:_1_4. e, _4s
...a Cw.
3 i
,0 w.
w w
f i
I t
a.
9,f *lp t * '"'. *3 7 *.'.P9 re b.e e.
e 4*14i_..m_
rL i
.w-e f
1
. 9 #9 8 O..C "" 8,.,".. **. ":. "".
F"." f.'%.*}."%.
~b. 3
.m.
3 s = C m. Jg 4.=.
3
.=.m. e..._. 9 _
1 t
- - _i 4_
g3 c
o.
%... _,.'. _== a_ M_
-*--_4a_s
.E e.=., _b a '. '.3 e
t
.% IS..
.I.t"..D.I..T. Y.
3...
.E3 m...$. 9. 3.
d.*
.w c, m.i..,..c..:.
w. r.a a
w..
9
%.:.. ?. a ; *.
.w
.. e. d 2... - - *....a 4 **
....e.
-..w..
.3.a
.3 1
l
327 5
2 1
thousand curies, is that correct?
2 MR. SAF2ETT:
lio, no,, microcuries.
3, CO!MISSIOMER PIGFOPS:
I am so rrv., your testimonv.
'i 1
I 4i says millicuries.
5 MR. 3 ARF 2TO:
I cc rected that.
That says mierecuries 6'
I went through it.
The court stenographer didn't unde rs tand 7
microcuries and wrote them all as millicuries.
As I went t.
8 through them I believe that I penned in ink all the milli's to 9
micro's.
If I missed one I apologize.
10 COlS!!SSIONER PIGFORD: I can't find any place that 11 is corrected in my copy.
12 MR. BARRET*:
Well, do you have the signed version P
13 that has been penned in ink?
9 0
14 MR. HARVEY:
It came in yesterday afternoon.
15 CO!EISSIOUER PIGFORD:
Thank you.
Then you finally 16 compared -- and you stated you calculated a dose rate at the 17 north gate, which you calculated to be 1,200 millirems per 18 hour2.083333e-4 days <br />0.005 hours <br />2.97619e-5 weeks <br />6.849e-6 months <br />.
Can you tell me what the actual dose rate at the north l gate was corresconding to the heliepeter measurement of 1,200 1Y o
' milliera:s cer hour?.
i I
MR. 3A?JITO:
At tha t tire, which was -- when we had i z.
I s
t-.'~u c.-,a.,, u.- -.. _ e :w e e n e :.,
g- ;-. : -,.,,.., C.K,
.._ e re a.,;. Oo s e a
--w s.
p. a-at the north cate was erobablv jus: a few mill. rems per hour, E
e
.i.u What had happened was the wind had basicallv sten.ced bicwing in I
j n tha directi:n.
We had practically a fla calm and what had i
~
Wu YM X
-*~
1,
..n..~. ~y a..n
- l ".a
. a d _' c a. ~._' ~. '.v. s-a'- -
e' e c.V..=. = ^_ " e~
v e _- ~'. =.." ". _' _' _
a t
i
+
- ; dings and that was wha
- the helicepter was c=ading.
Sc -2.e ::ne i
4
,I
-l dese at the north gate was a few millirens.
I believe there t
8 u
a,
._- s..=."__vev w'=~..= s e...e'.(.. =..- =.b.a. s..c w s
'.a..
I
.e >
CC101:5 SIC :ZR ?:GFCP.D:
So you used as a basis for u
1 i
your cwn calculaticas an earlier neasurement of 20 millire=s 6
i per hcur and which you state ec respends cc cne curie per secend 7
t g
release?
gg 9
Yy
' 2
~
~i i
=
y
.v3.. 3e.ap-..,.
v.es.
jo Comi:SS CUIR ?!GFCRD:
What was the scurce of -- hcw did veu knew it vas one curie per seccnd celease?
11 12 MR. BARRE"'C :
Okav.
I am concerned, ! am afraid that.
73 you might have things cut of secuence.
You knew, at the time what 7,
I first initially said here was what we knew at that time.I Ckav.
We di'd not knew that it was eniv a few millirems at the 15 north gate.
New, I will answer.vcur 'cuestien.
When I was 4
asked at that tine what were the off site doses, what we had dcne f
le 18 the crevicus dav, we were trving to ' estimate what the releases,
i 19 were and we had an eff site reading cf 20 =illires ce: hour a.-S
.i w e,s P..=.d s....=. ~. e
.'. ' a-..., c _' v e t.s a c.". _3 cve
.a..s a eu
...e. =... _ c..' c = ' d ' s e. s _'.-..-.. s. =...,
-.-..'.a._c.=.__..,
...... =
t
. _i.
.. g..,.
2._:_a.
.. -.. _,. _ _ _-,_ _,.,. g e
- _,.. c " -
r
...e
.._. _a,
e sec t
4 N. cu,
'. _. >.,. - _ '. =,.'..d.~~~._'_'__'.s_'..-'._=_..'..~..=.'...d
^^
_ 2 _.:,..
w, __,_ _..c"..
.= sa..=.
...a__=.. "_". - - ". _ _.- = _ _.-
as VN kl.+14.l329 i
4 1
thG dis tancas, that it would be as great a ratioj Mow, ! did 2
not knew that the wind wculd st.oo, tha: the reading was over 3
the site, et cetera, et cetera.
i 4
COMMISSIOMER P!GFORO:
Cid you ask the Met Ed people 3
what was the conditien of the vent tank, as to whether the 6
relief valves had opened or not?
I 7
MR. BARRETT:
We were always asking those cuestions, g
all the time.
We did not -- when I was told to go to the 9
management side, you know, I told basically what happened, like i
10 I just said, I did not tell them no, let us go back and try to I
11 call back and verify, et cetera.
There was no verification of j2 that.
D D
oD
<m ao ww g
,1 i
_p i
j3 COMMISSIONER PIGFORD:
Then I will try to wind this 14 up this way.
Assuming the relief valves had opened, which is j3 what you were calculating, then I suppose the source of the 16 radioactive gas would be the accumulated gas within that tank j7 which would come out.
Is that right?
~-
Plus what was entering through the 'let down.
The 60 curie per second was a steady state calculation. i 19
.l We wculd have had abou 60 curies a second of noble gas evoi-
,.0 t i
ving cf the centinuing le: down.
We were centinually brin-21 i
- r...!
eine racaoactiviev cut of the containment via
'-= '*: down.
~
COMMISSIONER PIGFORD:
Now, if the release valve was p
h.s cpen, one of the sources would be radicactive gas that had al-
- j ready accumulated in thac vent sys tem in che tank.
Is tha:
33
.:0
.i 1
i ;...-.. c. '.
i I
I i
1 21
!!R. BAFRETT:
No, that would basically stay there.
i I
i What wculd happen, you would have a steady state situation and 1 2
the valve would cpen um..arcund 100 PSI and the c.as wculd just 4
i 1
5 i stay the:: e.
The only gas that would.be leavi.y-would be the i
6 gas that you *are putting in.
You knew, it would be a constan I
7 nass system.
8 CO!P.ISSIONER P!GFORD:
Mr. Barrett, you have also men.-
i tiened the fact that the icdine charecal filters were retaining-
- y 10 the iodine at the other places when the gas would go through 1i the filters before getting to the atmosphere.
You pointed out 12 that that would not occur if this particular relief valve had ja vented.
.I D"mD D T\\
14 liR. 3ARRETT:
That is correct.
J
..(,
we a
13 CCt"CSSIONER PIGFORD:
"he filters would be bypassed.
16 tiR. 3ARFITT:
That is cc rect.
17 Co!2CSSIONER PIGFORD:
Mcw, have you assessed the 15 condition of the filters?
We have dene a let of wc k en the fil-l 19 MR. 3ARP2TT:
i
.n
- ers s:: ce --
s l
1 C ^.".u. -' c - - ^ ". *_.s 3. ?"s.S.D -
N. a_ _- =_
. '... s e
.# _3 _' _ =_. s _'....-. :. e -
v s_..
i i
--.a._..__:-.,.
.u_g.
_ c_,..e r...
-...e
.2 4 _.. _ a_
e.
_,a_
., y.-
ee.. -.__._
-w fi'. e:s were re=cving I think sene of :he last nu.bers :.saw, i
i 2
M. g - M.g M.
w.-
&g
--M.
s g
4 M
- ... g 6 6..6...
.M -
g &=..M A.
.M..$
- 9. g O -
Wg
e aci
- ~ 5 1
perfo-.ing a very beneficial service by converting a lot of the iodine from -- I am going to have to explain a little bit 2
of 3
iodine chemistry I am afra' there is one form of iodine cal-4 led elemental iodine --
5 CGI-ili!SSIC:iER-PIGFORD :
I think we -- j us t tell us 6
were the filters in proper condition.
7 MR. BARRETT:
The filters could have been better.
8 Thev were ve m eeeec y.
_4n..,_4 u _ega.4-ng me consecuences --
9 CCliMISSICMER PIGFRCD:
Did they meet the liRC 's speci--
4 10 fications?
I I
11
!dR. BARRITT:
As far as I know, okay, yes, they met 12 the NRC's specifications.
13 CO!2iISSIONER PIGFORD:
Was there any indication thev l
14 were near the breakthrough 'coint?
D"D D
3 3_
15 MR. BARRETT:
Yes.
oI S
o 16 COMMISSIONER PIGFORD:
And s till they net the !!RC's
}/
specifications?
18 liR. 3ARRETT:
I am goinc. to have -
.vou knew vou r
t I
l o,' ask a specific -- all ric.ht, the filters we are talkine. abcut, :
I i
.0
.vcu are generallv concerned abou: are the auxilliarv building i
23 ; fil:ers --
e k
c.
.u_u...e..e~-... 2 - e.-..s ~..
v s.
r r
v, 2
.v_g.
e n, e r....
Ok=v.
".ha a
.v. _' _' _' a _ _v
"_ _'. = s
.. ~
f.
e i
". 2..C -.. e c _' '.'.. _* - _d a.. s 'c
.'..=
a_',
-.e a.".,
v -
...a.
"... = _ -
, a e
O
- -. a _I.M.
.g g
c
--a.
h.
-m
_g.
a.gf*----_E-3h A
-M
..a-.....O-
... O 2..
t a a t.
1 i
. I g..w. 4 "a '
t s ~ra C ' # '."...' a... s
-a i
--~~~.u~-
r f...,
- - - -..S Q.
M. 3 c.. ' v. !
'.u.
c-e i
". a d. - ". = c "... 4 - = ' s = e c ' " _d a -i
..s c.. c.".a,--
a '
"-a 2
-.ev a - =-
2 i
i e,.,-
w..
-_-.-.-...-. a =. d-e s -3..a.e d as w.'.a we c=
- a... ; d.. = a - = d s a ' e.v.
I i
4 feature filter systems.
feh/ auxillia y but iding fil:ers were j
i v
i e'not encineered safety feature filter systems se consequently i
t thev had ne tech s=. ecs.
A.
i I
i I
COtUCSSICER P!GTORD:
I see.
Then was the actual
/ 1 g
removal ef ficiency en those below what it specified for other
-ifilters when v.ou do have a safetv. spec cn them?
y 10 l'.R. BARPITT:
Yes.
We thoucht those filters should 11 have functioned better than they did.
12 CO!CCSSIOER FIGFORD:
Can you be mere precise?
You to-said thev. were removin7 90.=ercent.
What de v.ou nornally ex-eo 1s e
our nor=al technical 1.<
MR. BARRE *T:
We would expect l e.
assumptiens for that P.ind of a filter would be 99 percent re-moval.
l,e D**
- D T
6b CO!SCSSIOER PIGFORD:
I see.
18 eo o
a MR. BARPITT :
" hey were re=cvine. 90.
19 i I
i
~..,,,,.e:-....,.
n..O = m.
..u..s
,e.
t,:....
.: es s
', =cre elemental icdine than your safety specified filters would.
.g
..g.
- - - =....
i r
.u e.. :: e..m e -...
Nc,
.a -
a- ---a.'.'..c,..'..'...
.." a - ' s e
1
-, ----y--
a c t..,,,,.., -
.......1...,;-
-n..
..e.
i 2.
..,... e,..... ;
3
.:. i.., w
.---a., -,
-w--
a
333 i
3.
1 I would say in excess of 99 percent removal of the elemental t
?
2jicdine.
The organic iodine that they were
'a-'d ng through, wha:..
i i
3 they were really doing was, elemental iodine would enter into E
the filters and organic also; they would filter out tne elemen-I 4
i 1
5I tal quite efficiently but they would let some of the organic 4
6 pass.
The overall effect on the environment was we had verv.
f 7
little elemental iodine going out"inte the environment.
i.io s t CL l
c.
of it was organic.
And the organic iodine m not settles.
I J
p down on the c.rass and sar. become cart of the c.rass.uathwa.v 10 that is why we never saw much iodine in the milk.
We did see 11 it in the air sometimes but it stayed in the air.
That was 12 ve r.v important as far as citigatine. the consecuences of the iodine that was coming out.
13 14 Cot 21ISSICIER FIGFORD:
A moment ago you said that 15 those filters allowed 99 percent of the iodine to pass through.
16 MR. 3ARRETT:
I am sorry.
99 percent of the iodine D**
"D T
[ A 0 17 was removed.
L oc o
13 CCl!.MISSIOMER pIGFORD:
I am sorry, I misstated it.
19; It allcwed ten percent of the iodine to pass through.
Is that
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7 MR. COLLINS:
Well, yes, I am.
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31 in my particular area there :.
j
.s a great ceal c:. e f:.c:t going 1
i en in trying to get a radiological emergency respense plan 12 in place in seme 20-cdd states that need these kinds of 13 put 14 plans that have operating reactors and states sitting next dcor to those states where the reactor is en a border.
1.c.
16 When I sa.v.eutting the. clans in.olace, I mean.=lans that 5:culd measure up to our current veluntary guideline 77 38 s ta: dards, because we de not have anv legal cicut to require
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coun trv., and sittinc on these cc==ittees are the other seven 10
- ec.e ra _,. agenc* es t.s.at are invo_3 vec. in t..n'.s business with us.
11 N.ow e...nere are six r.eceral ac.enci.es oecause ou. the new.Tec.eral' 12 T e.. :- a.. c v, ". _=.. a 3,.... a.. '.
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13
.v.R. COLLINS:
Well, I don't c.uite know exacti.v what la yo u mean, the whole process follcwed through.
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legislatures would come along with funds and pecple so tha:
6
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So there. s a wnoAe host c:. reasons wnv n.e twen:v 8
or so odd states out there that our..:: t.o have cencurred-in t
t.
9 plans or some kind of plans in place that are maybe better l
10 than they have, why they don't have these plans concurred in 11 at this time, a variety of reasons, many of which are poli-
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13 COtCCSS*0NER MARRETT:
With reference to the kinds 14 of c.uidelines that vou have used in reviewing plans, has there, 13
- or exam.e e, been an.v e.ur..ce ne w tn re:erence to publ'.c 16 information.
Do you icok at a plan and ask the extant to 17 which it makes allewances, prepares for the disseminatien cf 4
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17 accident er an incident at that fi.cility which will cause or 1S ca. "._' d
= ".s e,
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Is that what is going on?
4 MR. COLLINS:
In the --
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MR. COLLINS:
In that sense, that is what it means,l!
8 and it also encompasses that the appropriate governmental 9
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10 tien as the accident or incident situation changes.
In other 11 wordst that'vou J'ust don't call them -- the idea here is not 12 to just call them and leave it at that, but to keep them 13 advised on a continuous basis se that i= something changes, 14 they are ready to make the necessary moves that they have tc 15 make.
16
.n ot,er worc.s, we envision :nts wno.,e noti::ca en i
1 17 and warning anc..cumaic in_,ormation.crocess _,or emerc.encv 18 planning as a dvnamic c. recess Which starts at the time seme-19
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ness?
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=
t 7i shake out, you know, if I a= iccking in
- 7. crystal ball, the i
S way it.will all shake out is tha:
he..tw Federal Imergency 9
3137.a, e.,. e.... nye cy we,, ass e,
..e.i. c e,
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10 and.cos., :. v e : c.3. e :..n coc c:.natine. :.s.e act:.v:. t es c:. :ne tech-4-
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is a technical federal ac.enev like the ISA and 1.ke EIW.
13 So we wculd assume that the new FIMA would be set-I 1.,.
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a 12 of the areas for which EPA and "IW and NRC are responsible.
13 What we think is that we should keep the current deck of cards 14
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9 the N?.C Contingency Plan.
10 Tha.t bill also calls for a national clan,
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COMMISSICNIR 3A3SITT:
Mr. Collins, folicwing On this!
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4l tion were ultimatelv...aut toc. e:he r,
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emergency plans, radiological and otherwise, do I understand 7
you as f avoring the ultimate evolution of that approval go' D D
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authority from NRC to FIMA?
D we o
9 MR. COLLINS:
No, for the radiological emergency 10 response plans, the way it's set up in the Hart bill --
11 COMMISSIONIR 3A33ITT:
Excuse me, I understand the 12 Hart bill, but I would prefer to hear your position or FI'.A's I
13 position as a matter of what ought to be.
14 MR. COLLIMS:
Well, I don't know what FIMA's position 1.5 is.
I have an inkling of what
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16 COMMISSIONIR 3A33ITT:
I'm sor:f, NRC's position.
17 MR. COLLINS:
NRC's position.
No, we would like to 18 concur in the future in state plans with FIMA, the radiological.i i
19, elans.
In other voids, it would be a joint concurrence by l
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21 I think that's what we'd like to do.
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t 3, data, excuse ne, Mr. Barrett -- would that have been enough, w'
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S have done the same thin 5 I c.uess so.
I su=.=ose the.v woulc.
t 9
COMMISSICNER PETERSON :
When v. ou were talkine abcut 10 this, you referred to the information etting to the v
11 corr.issioners and how the escalating -- I had heard a rumor, 12 I guess it was, that the corr.issioners on the weekend, on 13 Sunday, I think it was, sc=e of them, had met arid at that 1.1 time decided to recommend evacuatien.
Do vou have anv. infor-I.
15 mation on that?
16 MR. COLLINS:
On the weekend, talk about evacuation?
I I
t 17 COMMISSIONER PETERSON:
Yes.
18
'MR. COLLINS:
Well, there was talk over the weekend. I I.
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14 Sc in that sense, evacuation was discussed on
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i 17 cther words, making certain sys tem changes and things.
And 1 8. t h e n i f s c = e t h i n e. ha=pened while thev were doing these thine.s,
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5 but I think..: least-2 four were.
I remember seeine four there.
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6 MR. COLLINS:
That would have besn on Sunday.
I 7l think this whole thing that i
I just talked about occurred 8
arou '.d Sunday af ternoon.
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COI!MISSIONER PETERSON':
And'thosefourcommissioners,l 10 did the.v all ac.ree that, on the basis of the discussion, l
11 that thev oucht to recommend an evacuation?
12 MR. COLLINS:
Well, you see, this list -- there were -
13 no recommendations for evacuation or anything going out.
This 14 was just sort of a list of what protective measures might be 15 recuired if certain manipulations were done at the plant.
16 And that's simply what it was.
It was kind of a look into 1,,
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'.k. ' s 18 happens or goes wrong, then wh.at should we do, you see.
So 19, it was a sort of looking in the future type thi. c.
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20.
COMMISSIONIR PETERSON:
You lcok like y0u wan
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3'bacause that emphasis might stifle the develcpment of nuclear pcwer?
D D
FD T}
,j MR. COLLIMS:
I have.
f og g
j f
COMMISSIONER PITERSON:
Does that permeate a lo cf Ij the thinki.g and clanning in the ac.encv?
o 3
Well, when I first joined the Atemic s
Enere.v. Ccr.missien in 1969, that particular attitude, I would f
t i
1 i s av,.=revailed in,:.any c.uart ers.
There were ver.v few of us I
I3 i involved in reacter safety or emergency planning in those I
! days, frc= an operational standpoint.
And the whole emergencv.
o I =lannin, business in the AEC was a ve:v.
icw cro file situation.
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hang-ups chout trotting emargency planning ou and giving 1:
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4 i
CO:/_'CSSIONE R PETIRSON :
Oo you have that sa e I
5 experience, Mr. Barre :?
I 6!
- MR y RRECT:._No,_I_have act had.-hat experience, bu:
1 i
7 I'm not that involved in emerc.an.cv =lannine..
8-COMMISSIONER PETERSON:
Mr. Chairman, Cc=:nis sioner 9
Pigford had a questien he wanted me to ask for him.
It's 10 a follow-up on something I asked.
Can he do that at this 11 time?
oc a
D D
3 T-12 CHAIR'4AN KEMENY:
Yes.
So
.1; o
_m I
i.
13 COMMISSIONER PETERSON :
I couldn't follow it 14 thoroughly.
I.
1 15 CHAIRMAN KIMENY:
Okay, it's now seven after seven.
i i
16 What is your wish?
Are you ready to call it a dav?
I 17 The witnesses are thanked.
And I have one question 18 to ask the commissioners.
The* witnesses are excused.
Could l
19. I just ask the commissioners, because of the change of plans,
I, 20 1 for a cuick shew of hands about the star ing time omorrow 21 ; me :-.ing, 9:00 versus 9:20.
These who prefer 9:00, please rais e i,
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_P _R _O _C _E _E _D _I N _G _S
_12 28 e..
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2 CHAIRMAN IGMENY:
I have a very brief opening 3
statement.
First of all, I would'like to int oduce Associate l
d Chief Counsel Charles Harvey, who, with his colleague, Ruth
..-_..5
. D.ick.e.r; d. i. d..eart of.^.th. e taking of -depes'itichs ahd~wa'si in~
~M 6
charge of preparing the Commission for this set of hearings.
7 Secondly, I wanted to ec= ment on the Commission's 8
decision to try to get all the witnesses in today.
It amodnt:
1 9
to our feeling very much the burden of cond g up to our 1
1 10 October 25 deadline, and we wanted to spend as much 'ime as i
lI possible at this meeting to make sure that all the investi-i 12 gative activity that needs to be done is underway, because 13 w e.c. r e t t v. well have to wind up 'he investigatiit.e_stace du-ing 14 the month of August.
i.
15 It also meant, as a result of that, of the very
[
16 many things we found in the area of emergency preparedness 17 and public health, we had to make a selection of the themes 18 that we could bring out at this open hearing.
You will vasti - l i
19
= ore in the depositicas that were taken, all of which, of 20 course, will be made public at the conclusica of the Co= mis-21 sien's werk.
D 9*
D 3'Y d t --
No S..
a
.,or exa=ple -
A w:.1 :. g.ve you cni, one examp_e.
4-s 0
m.
l 44 Chere was a fascinating story cencerning the provisicn of I 24 pocassium iodide which we were very much te.pred c bring cut.
j t
2< r cc: we cec:. cec ' t woulc. precably ac..c at _eas- =- beur to the i
2
[
i length of the hearings.
It is an examplo of sems,hing that 2
we decided not to do.
D D
A we 6
L 3
'Yes?
4 QUESTICN:
Dr. Fa eny, there are at least, as you 5
know, fcur gover==ent groups that are studying the Three Mile Island situatien.
One of the= ca=e out with"a volu=ihous
~~]
.~,,c.-
......w 6
~
7 rescrt today.
Two weeks age, the President said in Kansas j
4 1
8 City, in effect, that nuclear pcwer is here to stay, and he 9
would wait to'see what else you all could add to it.
i 10 My questien is, is there a danger that this Cet:: sis-11 sien's charge is being watered down by all these repc..-ts and 12 by the President's statement?
Eas he usurped your role?
1 13 CHAIP. MAN.v N:
No.
Let ne comment on the Presi-14 dent's statement, specifically, because I have clearly thought 15 about it a great den 1 and I have gotten copies of the state-16 nents that were nada and looked at news reports of what he 17 said during the retreat at Camp David.
1 18 I believe in all statements he and other key govern-i l
l 19 sent officials made, the state =ent included that they would i
20 wait until -ki s particular Cccaission reper ed until ta'd.ng i
21 final acti n.
I think that was crucial.
l 22 New, en the President 's statament that he felt that
- 23 i nu='. ear pcwer was an essential par: cf the energy picture, l
24!
he has a
unique pr=blem that is different fr:m 9.e proble=
t 25 Of -his C:==issi=n.
He has := c=me up with a national plan I
r D #'#
- 3 '9
~
A L 1
2ht(
rc I
1 o.
of how to colve tha energy crisis,.and I do u ieTr, J
2 is a serious energy crisis.
In that, any chief executive has 3
to take the best possible guesses as to to what will be avail-4 able to help relieve the crisis.
I mean, a plan that would 5
. have. s.. aid.,...We. are. going to_.do,, wd.th, a. huge uncertainty as to 6
whether nuclear power will or will not be part of it, would 7
have been a nonsensical plan to rece: mend to the nation.
4
- 8 Clearly,..I.. would interpr::t the President's statement.
9 as his guessing that whatever this Cerrission would come out 10 with would not recommend the total abolitien of nuclear power.
1I I think that is the only way I can interpret his guess.
12 Yet he has publicly p ccised that he would implement-13 the recc=nendations of this Ccesission.
Therefore, if this 14 Cec =ission should come out with a reccc=endation that nuclear 15 power is not sufficiently safe, I have every confidence that 16 the President would accept that, and it would be one more i
17 piece of very bad news the President of the United States 4
18 would get in trying to solve an almost impossible problem.
19 QUISTION:
This mornine the NRC issued a report that l
1 20 said an accident, the accident at T.'C could have been avcided 21 if the plan operators had jus allcwed the safety system :=
s i 22 werk.
De voc acree with that conclusion of he NRC?
vi 23 CEAIPF.AN KEENY:
Yes, I de agree with that state-1 E
l E 24 ment.
We have had a number of witnesses who have testified t
i 1
} 25 before this Cc:=ission on that.
But I think it shculd be, cut
- 3 into tn.e fol cwing context, anc
- 2. bel. eve. sa:. tn.. sa
=y
-l n
last press' conference, that one cf the sad -hd gs tha: we are 3
find',g is -- I said se=e:hing like, Sefere we are th: ugh, I predict we are going to find ten to twenty different things
~
~'
~
~
~
~
~~
5
~
about which we cecid'~s'ay, Ifenly se and so had happened, this
~
l 6
accident wecid not have occurred.
D""D 9 D'T t
we
.S..h.
a 7
I believe the NRC cc rectly identified one of these 8
m*".y this s.
9 QUISTION:
Che NRC also said, Mr. Chairman, the 10 design factors could also have prevented the accident and that II there is a long list of nonce =pliance.
Does that c== pert with 12 what vou have found f:=m witnesses?
~
I3 CEAI?h!AN KT.M:
Let =e take that questien in two I4 parts.
Certainly en equip =ent failure we have had a=ple IS tes dmeny.
C= the questica of =ence=pliance, I do not have 16 first hand evidence yet, but we are new in the process of 17' deposing a large nu=ber of officials of the Nuclear Regulatory 13 Cc 4 ssien, a=d therefere we hcpe by our next public hearings l9 to have all -lat info =ati=n available.
.O CCIS'"!CN :
In ter=s of nen=== pit ance by the licensee,
.'I the ncnc =plia-.ce of Nuclear Regulate:7 Cc==issica regulatiens.,
i
, ^2 is that what you are new in the pr: cess =f finding f==
I
..i ; witnesses?
-4 I
r=2.?m.N C m :
We are lecking a
-le entire i
I i
.m 5
l l
1 out its functions to enforce its regulctions.
2 QUESTION:
Well, when the NRC's inspectic:
taff 3
reports that there was nonce =pliance by a licensee, would yc.
4 assess the blame, if that be correct, en the licensee, or 5
would that also fix some blame on the NRC?
6 CEAI?yAN KI.W:
From the way I answered your 7
earlier cuestion, very clearly I was assigning -- if that 8
statement is correct -- that one - would have to place --- and..
9 this was known to the NRC -- would have to place blame both 10 on the licensee and on the NRC..I m$ tan, that is their con-
'll stitutienal responsibility, to enforce these regulations.
12 QUESTION:
Would it not also be the NRC's fault if 13 they did not know or if they were supposed to know?
14 CHAIRMAN KEMENY:
Yes.
In that case, one would havr 15 to have evidence as to whether it was possible for them to 16 find out, you know, whether there was an intentional cover-up, 17 and I have not heard any evidence to that effect, and/or 18 whether somehow they did not find it out or, as we have new 19 fcund in two other areas where we have looked, cecc.le within l
l 20 the organization may have known and the news did not ge up 21 high enough to de se=ething about it.
l w
i 22 QUES:ICN:
Dr. Ke=eny, do 2 understand you ccrrect.
l m.
wnen v.ou say chat the Pres:... cent has premised in advance tc I
p 44 t
I I 24 implement ycur recc=nendations withcut knowing what they mig; i
D D
D 3T-me a
ooj o.f.2 A"
l 4 25 be?
a
6 l
1 CHAIRMM KIMINY:
Yes, that was the cuite remarkable 1
2 stata=ent that President Ca ter made just before the firs:
3 meeting ever of t..n:.s cc==ission.
=e. :.nv:.tec. us to the white l
4 Ecuse, and there was a press pool present.
Therefore, it 5
cJ.early is a public statement de Preside.: =ade, not a J'
4 private one, and while I cannot quote it verba-d I will 7
never ferget the essence of it.
He said how importa=t the 8
Cc==ission was and then said, "I not only loclc forward to your 9
recc=mendations, but it is my intention to accept your recem-10 nendatiens and to do everything I can within =y pcwers to 11 imclenent them."
D D qy oc o
1.
3 l
wa s
2 12 I coc:mented on that at our first public hearing, 13 that when I accepted this jeb, =y first words were,~"It is 14 an aweseme responsibility," and after the President's state-15 ment to the entire Cer ission, it becane an even scre aweseme 16 responsibility.
17 QUISTICN:
Mr. Chairmai, do you feel there is a 18 greater pressure; given the ec=plexities of de energy prob-19 lem, does that increase the pressure en you to come up wid
~
20 scme kind Of cecc=nendatien : hat dces nc: preclude nuclear 21 pcwer?
gyp.;li.UlENY :
Nc.
I de not think it inc: eases 20 the pressure en us.
It clearly el nates car ain rery easy m_
a--
.s.
nean, if one simply== tid say el' ". ate
-t-2.
ac 3
?
S w h,. _S 9._u. e enerh*/ dat have 1".*** dh.ncer assCCiE'88 win i-o
/
I at all, I would assums this Cc:=tissien would not exist in the 2
first place.
3 Unfortunately, I do'not knew cf a majc source of 4
energy that is totally free of dangers, ed therefore it crea:
5 a context within which. thi.s. Co. =tissien is necessary.
3ut on-6 charge is not'to compare this with other sources but to make 7
a deter:tination as to whether nuclear power does constitute 8
acceptable risks presently or if we can ecme up with recem~
9 mendatiens under which, if implemented, nuclear power would 10 represent an acceptable risk.
11 QUESTICN:
Are you worried about conditions at TMI I
12 now as they try to bring it back, from the testimony you j
13 have heard to date?
D D q6 l
9, 13.
m m
_e6 14 CEAI:i(MAN.M'Y:
Yes.
I think you are in a situa-t i
15 tion where there is se=e continuing degree of risk.
Actually,i 16 and here I am speaking only personally because the Cen=tission 17 has not had a chance to go in depth into that questien, that 18 I suspect the very great li=telight that has been turned ento 19 Three Mile Island I suspect will lead to extreme cautien on 20 the part of everycne, = cst notably the Nuclear Regulatery 21 Cc =ission, to do everything humanly,cssih'.e to avcid any
>; 22 fu--her naj or incident, e.
I c
23 CUISTION:
Suu the last witness said that the l
i I 24 defense barriers are sicwly geing dcwn as -hey get into uhe l
5 3 25 fuel.
Does that wer y you, that che closer they get to
1 a
i 1
l' iceking at that fuel, the less defenses there are for expcsure?
2 CEAIRM;s.Cm:
I did not quice hear hd-say that, 3
but what I heard =cstly was the proble=, cf course, of the d
very large a= cunt of contaminated wa-a-
"a e, and that is i
5.a p chle=, but I thirJ: time is of de. essence here in the -
6 opposite sense of the usual; that is, de nere slowly cne does 7
it, the safer it can be.
8
~
What =y hope, again speaking persenally, is is that 9
1 people will take their time here to make sure that it is done r
)
10 sicwly and safely, rather tha= feel the econc=ic pressure to II get it done as quickly as possible.
12 QTrSTION:
Mr. Chairman, how will you determine 13 what is an acceptable risk?
D**D "D ~T
~
~
i cc c
.t
- 3 14 CEAI??.AN.C m :
That is going to be one of the 15
= cst difficult issues the Cc==ission will have to deal with, 16 very clearly.
We have had, you knew, sc=e very icese, free-17 for-all discussion en this subject, and it is one of the 18 difficult issues on which we will eventually have to reach a I9 consensus as to hcw to dete ine.
20 CTrSCICN:
Will it be done en a Oc=parisen basis to cder indust-ies?
22 CEAI??'3 Em -
den ' t knew that.
- mean, 22 have ny Own views, bu chat is senething #==-'y -- it is one of the key issues that the Cc==ission, as a Co r.ission, will l
25!
ha~e to dete =ine, and I do act wish to pre-guess where che l
l
--_~
9 1
Cc ission vill coma out on that.
2 QUESTION:
Cne other questien, Mr. Chairman.
3 Your changing your schedule. today and ec=orrow indicates you l
4 are. continuing to feel pressure := neet your deadli.ne. We have 5
asked you befcre whether you censidered delaying your deadline-6 Eave you consi~dered it now?
l 7
CEAIMG.N KEENY:
No, we have not considered 8
delaying the deadline.
I think we would~do so only if we
~
9 find we absolutely cannot cceplete our charge.
Frankly, there l.0 are a large number of staff members who are working straight 11 out, so many hours a day.
I think if we had any significant l
d 0
12 slippage, particularly in the work of the staff, we would 4
1 13 have a dead staff on ou: h.nds.
D**D "D 4' b
\\
-\\
gfQ oo 14 QUESTION:
Do yot have any con,cerns la J -
3 Aily; 15 of your repo..t =ay be damaged by the haste in which you are l
l
'16 preparing it?
(
17 CHAIP24AN KEMENY:
I don't know if haste is quite 18 the right term for it.
People are working extremely hard, 19 and we are doing everything hu=anly possible to have all e.c 20 major issues investigated.
I think " haste" would be an 21 accurace characterization only if we came cc: with reccnnenda-
>i, 22 tiens befcre we had all the relevez.: facts that we could s
0y 23 pessibly collect.
r
! 24 QUESTICN:
Dr. Kemeny, having read the su= mary of
.:1 25 the NP.C's repc : today, do you have any feelings tha 9.e h
10 a
~
1 blama may ha placed upon cporat== orror in ceder to re=cve 2
blas.e frem either the NRC, the designers, de indus ey?
i 3
CHAIPELN m'Y:
Yes, $1ere cert *411y have been a 4
nu=cer of g cups whose simple su==ary of i: has been d at 5
opera:=r error is the cause of d e accident,.and I dink by 6.
new everyone concedes that there has been operator error.
7 That is very different f:cm saying that operator
- 8 er=== is~the t:tal explanation of de problem.
You =ay recall, 9
at our last hearings we questioned one of the nanufacturers 10 very, very hard.
I, myself, remember questioning the 'vice 11 president is charge of nuclear generatien, and peinted out 12 that the very same kind of doubt that I noted in the intro-13 duction of the NRC 'docu:::ent is mentioned, ahcut the pressuricer 14 level, that the very came kind of doubt that. existed in the 15
=inds of the operators that he said should net have existed, 16 existed en the part of one of the senior officials in that 17 company,.and perhaps this may have been very widespread.
18 CUISTION:
Dr. Kemeny, there was a congressional 19 repe r: also issued today that basically says tha: de NRC 20 lulled the n ddas and the A=erican public into ce=placency 21 ahcut reac.=r safety.
Wecid you====e.: enda?
.; 22 CHAI?F.AN KIMINY:-
Ceuld you say that again?
I r:
$ 23 vecid apprecir.:e it.
D,,D
,D
_ ).
B S. _h Jcdse"(
M:n-I 2A CUISTICN:
Yes.
He asked aft:
y
} 25 ne.: Operati ns Cc
'::ee re crt, which says the Anerican
7~
1, l
1 and utilitics woro lulled into c==plcconey by tho NRC regard-2 ing reacecr safety.
3 CHAIRMAN KEGNY:
Yes, I would be happy to co= ment 4
en that.
May I make one unasked-for ec:=.ent?
I would be 5
terribly grateful if both the NRC and ccngressional ecW ttee:
-H 6
ca=e out with.important reports the day after our public 7
hearings rather than the morning of, so I have some chance 8
to_ look at them before I comment on them.
D**D "D'3'3 1 A o
(Laughter.)
oo o
10 But to c,_ke your questien, which is a very good 11 ene, we have the testimony of the five NRC commissioners 12 themselves, which seems to me the best way to answer that, 13 who said in so many words that the basic safety standards 14 were set down in 1974, if my memory is correct, which was be 15 year before this particular co= mission came into existence, 16 and they had not, as a co= mission, spent any serious time 17 discussing safety issues because they believed that sufficiant 18 safety standards had been laid.down.
I think that answers l
19 your question, wouldn't you agree?
20 QUISTION:
Dr. Kemeny, since this Cc= mission was 21 f :=ed, it has served as scmething of, a: leas in essence, I 22 a wa hdog ever the NRC and its activi_ies related to this r
5 l
U 23 accident.
Fr m the testimony today frc= Mr. Gerusky and frer e=
A 24 the previous witnesses frem Babcock & Wilcox, we are led ::
I i
E l
l
} 2f believe tha: the duration of the Chree iile Island acciden:
12 I
is roa11y a fcur-year duratica, fcur-year span.
2 After October 25, who is going to be watching the 3
watchdog, NRC7 4
CEAI??.AN K7: m :
I wculd hcpe whatever strue:ure 5
this Cc==issics recc== ends is a icng term st:c.cture for that 5
kind of task.
D D
7 QUESTION:
Do you anticipate a reccc=endation along i
8 these line, that there will be sc=ebody te watch the NRC?
9 CEAIPS.AN 3GDENY:
I den't quite want to put it in 10 that fc=.
I mean, you are foreclesing a =
- er of optiens.
1I For example, veu are assuming that we would recc==end cen+4 u-
\\
12 ation of the NRC.
I am not saying that we are going to recom-13 mend abolishing it.
I mean, we are scw really just in the I4 midst of looking at the NRC.
But I think it is fairly clear 15 that there are st=uctural p chle =, and it is certainly within
{
\\
16 the purview of this Cc==issien and its charge to =essihiv l
17 recon: mend sc=a fairly =ajor structural changes.
{
t l
18 quZsTICN:
M. Chai: m.,'do you feel that you have 1
l l
l 19 sufficient staff te =eet the deadline new, c veuld vou like l
t 20
= ore people?
21 CE w y.AN Kr: m :
I think I a= --
s Sg a;
CUISTION:
Sc=e are wc king icng hours at a -i e.
4
~, 23 CHAI??_2.N II ENY:
Yes, I a= tempted := answer that 1
i
{ 24 in che sa=e te==s that ene of -he Opera:O:s answered when I l
s i
1 25 suggested that it wculd have been helpful := have an alar =
l i
1
(.
1 that indicated when they crossed over into the steam region, 2
and he said, " Sir, one more alarm was the last -ling in the 3
world we needed."
4 I think,.in ter=s of the sice of the staff, which 5...i.ncidenta. ll. v.new s..ta. n. ds.,..at s.c=ething like roughlv-6 0_fu11...
6 people plus outside consu;tants, plus the Cc=missioners, that 7
while we certainly could always use more staff, the questien 8
is whether we could manage on such a short time period to 9
mold them into a team.
D 10 QUESTION:
You used the analogy, I believe, at your '
11 first' public session that this Cc=ission was something like 12 a university.
Is that analogy still holding for you?
13 CHAIRMAN KIMINY:
Yes.
As a matter of fact, the 14 more I think about it, the better that analogy is.
I said 15 that the Comission members, in effect, were the board of 16 trustees, that the staff was the admi nistration of the insti-17 tution, and that the Chairman has the famous ambiguous role 18, that university presidents play:
on the one hand, he is a 19 member of the heard of trustees but has enly one vote and 20 also takes instructions from the cc=ission members ; en the 21 ether hand, he is the head of the staff..
>; 22 I think all the ambiguities and ecmplicaricas of the i 23 univeristy s ructure have manifested themselves in the work-e!
! 24 ings cf the Cc=ission.
F
$ 25 CUISTION:
In that case, then, hew does the
1,e s
I ci i: ens' group which did some public c==pladning fit into 2
the university analogy?
What would they be in a university?
2 CEA Py.AN KIMENY:
0he faculty, perhaps.
4 (Laughter.)
.3.
gCIst:CN.:.The.oct=ber 25; deadline, does-- that - sean---
6 that this has to be off the presses en Oct ber 25 c it has D{
{
7 to be en the President's desk?
8 CEAI??.AN KE.M Y:
I would certainly hope not.
I 9
mean, it only says to report to the President within six 10
=enths of the first meeting, and that is one thing on which II I am going to receive clarification f:=m The White Ecuse.
I 12 hope very =uch that it means that we will have finished 13 ccmd.g up with our findings and reco=mendatiens and are able 14 to present a copy of that to the President.
13 If it meant off the press, I think it would be a ~
1 16 hopeless deadline, though obviously we want to get it off the i
17 press as quickly a."cer that as possible.
I would imagine we' 18 would want to have a public meeting where we would have a l
19 chance to make cur findings and recc==endatiens public.
20 cczs;;0N:
Dr. Kemeny, is there going t: he ancther 2I citi: ens' gr:cp established?
l
! 22 CEA_.:S.N.U.INY:
I don't knew hat yet.
In the t
-1
-4 executive sessien ::cc_-
=w, that is One of,he i:=-= I put en I
- l L
the acenda := seek the C==issien's advice.
A
.c CCIsTION:
C0uld I =ake, I think en behalf cf =y
-r
.t:
1 colloagues, a plea to be able to se_e the report at least an 2
hour before you hold your press conference on it?
It is verf 3
difficult to even atta=pt to ask meaningful questions --
4 CHAI?F.AN KDENY:
That is a good point.
Barbara --
. )
,I see_she,is_taking.no.t,.es..on it.
Yea,.thank.you.
It. is.the s.
6 kind of thing I could have slipped on, but I hope Barbara 7
would not have.
D""D
- D T]$
2.A m oo e
8 I.reali:e-what-you are saying.
Clearly, we have to 9
~
report to the President first, but we will not report to the 10 President until-we have finalized our findings and recc= men-11 dations, and I have to ask President Carter how he wishes the 12 Cc= mission to do that, and certainly we want to go public j
I t
13 as quickly after it as physically possible.
14 What you are saying is_ that somehow we time it so 13 that you have time to study our findings and recc..cmendations i
16 beforehand.
I think that is very helpful advice.
17 QUESTION:
Mr. Chairman, if I could ask you, I 18 would like to just get seme idea of your opinion, your reac-19 tien, to the NP.C's report today.
20 CHAIPp.AN KIENY:
I have cnly read the introducticq 21
- = it, and that is thanks to the kindness of cne of you here s
[ 22 in the rocm that I had a copy I :: Jd glance at two minutes s
3 l
23 before this press conference.
y r
2 I 24 I think that the statements that were =ade there in E
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} 25 the su==ary seem to be true statements and nce very surpr:.s:.. \\
-c.
( ---
l 16 L
I cnes, the enes I have seen in the st"
- y.
Clearly, ; =ay
=
2 ce cc_cg an ng.ustice withcut havd c.
y-e d e who1e reyc:.
-=
3 Thank you.
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