ML19309G259

Statement by GP Miller Re 790328 Incident

ML19309G259
Person / Time
Site:	Crane
Issue date:	03/28/1979
From:	Geoffrey Miller METROPOLITAN EDISON CO.
To:
References
TASK-TF, TASK-TMR NUDOCS 8005050481
Download: ML19309G259 (31)

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TMI STATION MARCH 23,1979 INCICENT STATEMENT SY G. P. MILLER STATICN MANAGER l/ r / ' C E 2-

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TMI-MARCH 23, 1979 G. P. MILLER STATEMENT CCNTdTS INTROCUCTICN E'/ENT3/C8dECTI'lES/AC~ CNS s

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TMI 3-28-79 98 G. P. MILLER STATEMENT s

INTR 00UCTICN Ky name is Gary Paul Miller and I am employed by Metropolitan Edison C mpany as the Station Manager for the Nuclear Generation Units at Three Mile Island, Middletown, Pennsylvania, and in this position I am responsible for the operation and main-tananca of Units 1 and 2 at IMI. To ac::molish these organi:atienal objectives, I have escorting directly to me the respective Uret Superintancents, Maintenanes and Acministrative Superintandants.

I rescrt d'rtetly :: Mr. J. G. Hertein, 'lica Presicent-Generation.

In my s:stament I have not attamated to produce an event secuence or to go into an analysis or intricacies of the uni trip as this is satisfactorily covered in atner 00cuments.

I have honestly attamatad :s the maximum of my recall ability Oc pr duca in writing my actions and logic cn that day as I =cved through those events of Maren 23, 1979. The events art traced frem 4 A. M. until accreximataly 3 7. M. the night of March 23, since by this hour c:nmand type c:municatiens were in. place with the Cbserv'iticn Cantar and Senior C:=cany officials wert in enarge of cceraticns.

I have :een at 7'4I sinca ne beginning of 1973 and I have served in :he folicwing l

pcsitions : rice :: being named Staticn Manager.

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(i) Tes: Su:erintancent for Uni: 1 Res:ensible for initial s:2Nuoandac:ac:ance:astinginUni: 1 (2) Uni: Su erin:ancen: for TMI Uni: 2 Res:cnsible for :lanning, criani:ation inc execution of ini:ial Ocerations Inc maintananca cf "ni 2 during :ne star:ua :: c:=mer:ial :hases.

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J STATEMENT INTRODUCTICN (3) Station Superintandent for TMI Senior Superintendent for both Units 1 and 2.

As a ;articipan in the ciganization as tilustra:ad above, I was a par y :c the accac:anca and initial ecmercial c;eraticn of both TMI units.

3ctn TMI units wers ;ut en line usin'g a defined and formal accactance program win critaria Oc assurt safe and reliable operaticn and this included ths ecuipment, acministrative ;r: gram, precadures and ccerator qualification.

I consider and have fornally stated that TMI Unit 2 was tecnnically and c;:eratienally accactacie to go

,l cn line for f:s firs fr21 cycle. The acpropriata p.egulator/ Agencies were fully cognirant and Oc scme extan: partici;:atad in the above ;recassas thrcugn their ins;:ection and enfer: ament actions.

It is worthy of mention that many of the " times given in. tis statament are f em my memor/ and r/ ;erscnal cesariaticn is :na: all of us involved with -he inciden:

have an henes: preolem in ceing precise on times.

I believe this is due Oc =e extreme ;rtssure I felt and the fact that time seemed Oc pass verf rapidly. As I arrived en sita =a: =crning, my mind firmly and quickly grasced Oe ver/ sericus situation wnica had deveicced and I %:iep the ;;uclic must be protactad but I cic nc enti siy reali:e until la:ar =e full ex:an: of camage ce Uni: nac suf.fartc.

My :rimarf scal was Oc ;r :ac: 2e :uclic and cur acticns.ers an attacc Oc min mi:e i

Nieases, Oreject and mccr:renc avacuati:n, if warrantad, wi2. axi. tm acvanca ac:ifica:icn, Oc tar :inata ce incican; and :c s:acili:s ce Unit.

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TMI 3-28-79 G. 7. MILLER STATEMENT INTROCUCTICh The first concern I had as I arMved in the Centrol Rocm at approximately 7:05, was to beceme fully c:gni: ant of the situation as it existed and enca I fully underst:cd the plant c:nditions and the radiation emergency, I imediataly ::ck charge of the Centrol Recm and appointad Senior people to dirtet the necassary evoluttens in the vital areas to assure tha: the public was protectad, that the release was ment:: red, that c:munica icas uere cc:urring and that the plant was brougnt in staos to a stable c:ndition. The c: mand set uc, wnich I just descHbed, maf. frequently througacut

ne day. The greuc presan:ad Unit c:nditions, status of bergenc Plan ac:1:ns, f

shared cpinions, discussed :echnical data, and made rec:mendations. Discussiens were held with Management, and/or Babc ck & '4ficcx, Lynchburg, the Stata, *he NRC, and following these evaluaticns, I made accropriata decisions and so dirtetad the imclementaticn :s the C ntrol Recm and informed others both inside and cutside the plant as necessary.

Basically, I sat up this bergency c: mand :eam in the early hcurs as I arrivec a:

ne clan: and the radiation emergency was in progress, by essentially forming my senior i

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eccie into a network

: sucertisa, c::ncuct ne emergency anc re:cr: Oc e wnile bringing the plant :s a safe c:nditicn. Mr. Acss was put in charge of C::eraticns

s direc: the Shift Sucertisce, Mr. Cuciel was put in charge of radia:icn ::ncarns, including radia:icn surieys, Onsita - 5ffsita taams, ac: untacility eneck, assem::ly Of :eccle, ge::ing in ::ntac with ne Bergency C:n rel 5:2:icn (ICS)P e :., Mr.

Seelinger was in Over 11 :narge Of Uni: 1, T'qe Eergency C:n:r:1 5:2:icn, :ne 'ini-1 Centrol R:cm anc := assure :nat all facats of :ne amergency :lan were f:llcwec,

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STATEMENT INTROCUCTION Mr. Logan was charged to assure that all the required procedures and plans were reviewed and to look through each to assure that every item was covered, this included the precadures for both emergency plan and for the Unit itself, and to previce me assuranca tha: all actions wers being :sken and to be sure the notiff-ca:icn calls were made, that management was notified, and all ecmmunica:1cns were in-placa. Mr. Lee Rcgers was retuestad to provide tachnical assistanca clus link-uc witn his ncme offica as he cculd. Mr. Xunder was in charge of :acanical sue;cr: and emununica:icns and Mr. Shcylin was in charge of energency maintenance.

For informatien, normal jco functicns of these persens is proviced below:

Gary Miller - TMI Station Manager Jce Logan - 24I Uni: 2 Superin:anden:

Jim Seelinger - TMI Unit 1 Superintanden:

Can Shevlin - TMI Maintenanca Sucerintandent Cecrge Xunder - TMI Unit 2 Superintandent-Technical Succor:

Mike Rcss - Uni: 1 Cceraticns Sucervisar l

01ck Cubiel - Statien Chemistry / Heal-h Physics l

Superviscr 1

l 3fil ewe - A TMI Statien Shift Supertisce l

Lee Rcgers - Cnsita 3abccck i 'Ailecx Manager i

3ecause cf my raining, I fel a strong celiga-icn c ne cucifc and c making surt na: :ners was minimal release cf radicactivity anc :na: :ners was avacua:f cn in cienty cf -ite if :na: was escuirsc. The ;nene, :ne cressurt. ne fac: ::a

Me cian was in age i cf 3C

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Q G. 2 MILLER D g STATEMENT INTROCUCTICN a stata that I had never been schooled in, ccmhined to make condittens almost intolerable. Mcwever, the Ccntrol Rcem remained calm as can be tastified to separately.. All of the meetings of the ecmmand team were held in the Shift Sucervisors's Offica in a calm a:nosphere, at a point remcved frem the Ccntrol Recm, and the decision making was dcne precisely, at intarvals dictated :y the plant, and in no case icnger than 20 to 40 minutes acart.

This sta: ament is formattad such that I will attempt tc go through :ne three time ceriods, placa the chronology of times and events as I can tes: ;ut them, and in accition, describe what I thougnt to my knowledge, the clan: s:sta was, where I thougnt we were within :he emergency plan and protaction of :he pucif e, and our scals and pur;cses to reach the next succeeding safe ccndi icn througnou: the day.

These facts are the bes I had kncwledge of at tha; mcment anc the assessment was mace in an oc imum fashicn Oc make te next decisien and imclement ac:icn,

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D TMI 3-28-79 Ok G. p. MILLER STATEMENT EVENTS /C8JECTIVES/ ACTIONS 0a00 The Unit i Shift Forsman informed Senior Station personnel of a turbine and reac cr trip in Unit 2.

Unit I was at hot shutdcwn c:ndition fc11cwing a successful refueling and prior :: the trip Unit 2 was cperating at accut 98% ;cwer. This was my first notifica:icn of a Uni 2 problem. Nota that detailed events and acticns follcwing the :Mp art c:ntained in other dccuments and are not again rt' viewed hers.

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'T G. ?. Miller called the Unit 2 Centrol Recm :: find cut the sta:us of the Uni: and.: tview recovery ac:f cns. I was this day, scaeculed :: travel t Oystar Cetsk Nuclear Station :: ::articipata in a Refuel Cu:sge Criticue and price :: departing I wanted :: he sure of :he acticns underway in Uni: 2 at TMI. A: this Oke I was infer::ed that $he tureine and reacter trip rec:very was in ;r gress in ace:rdanca wita ne desigr.atac peccecures. Une plant was recortad to be s: sole at tha: time, but I was inf::rmec that the Uni had undergene a safe-guards initiation (acta this hac Oc:ur td in the :as: a: :nis Unit and in c:her 31W units follcwing nign

cwer

Mes, so by itself it dcas not raise ax:me or :uciic ::ncarn).

Zie plan: had dc artmetars' wnica :istur:ed me:

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A lcw pressure l

(1::roxima:aly liC0 psi), and 2.

? tssuri:ar level of a r$xima:aly 295 incnes (near scifc). 1~1is caii ias:4d a:cu: 20 minu:as anc :ne

erten I aikee :: was 3ecrge Encer.

20licwing -he :ali, I inf:rmec Jf:

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STATE.ME.'IT EVENTS /C8JECTIVE3/ ACTIONS Seelinger and Dan Shovlin of the Uni: 2 trip and essentially encouraged them to go to the site as scen as practical. Additionally, due to my c:ncarn ever the plant pressure and pressuri:ar level, I arranged to have a c:nferenca call with Mr. 4. G. Hertain of Me:-Ed Mr. Lee Acsers of S&W, George Kunder and myself.

G. Xunder had also direc ad calis :o the Leae Engineers := aid in the recovery actions for :he Unit.

C605 :o C630 (acc rox. )

The.cenferenca call described with :ne above parties was c:nductad.

Parties participating in the call were briefed en the Uni: trip anc subsequent fclicwuc acticns and c:nditions of the pressuri:er level and Ortssure wert described. Folicwing scme discussien of the c:nditions it was agreed we must believe cur instruments.

It was at:0 c.otad by the plant that.:he react:r c: alan: pumes wert resently off due :o a loss of flew indication, the electr:matic valve was ncugn: :c te snut, anc : tere nas no indication of radiation at : Mis time. Additionally, ne ruptura disc cn the reac:ce c: clan: drain :ank in :te Reac:ce Building

=as notad t: have been ruc:ured and, ther$ fare, we wers awart Ma: here was scme watar within :ne React:r Building succ. At this time, it was I

ecided tha-I wculd nc: ;c ': Oystar Cettk and :na I woulc get reacy and ;

into :ne plan; anc :nen rt:cr: tack :: Jack Mer:efn en -he U$1: c:nci icns.

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ST WOE.1T EVENTS /C8JECTIVES/ ACTIONS INFOPFATICN I

1.

Accroxima:aly the ar-ival times 2: Til staticn en 3-23-79 were:

George :<under - 0450 A. M.

Jce Logan - 0515 A. M.

Mike Acss - 0520 (NOTE: Initially Mike wen: to Unt: 1 in a nonnal fashten as the Unit was in not shutdcwn canditten and preparing Oc go critical following refueling.)

Richard Cucial - C545 A. M.

Jim Seelinger - C650 A. M.

Lee Regers - acproximately 0700 A. M.

Gary Miller - accroximately 0705 A. M.

2.

Indicatiens of radiation: Tarcugn a review of sequence of events fc11cwing the incident, I noted that early in :Me incicen:, nc:

sure of the Ofes, he intermedia:a cooling to the 1e::cwn cocier radiation monitor gave a hign alarm. Note tha: his mcnitor has a l

icw set:cin: and in-fac we were seeking a field change and, tycically, 1: has been in the ater s:2:e due u teing ;csitionec l

in a hign backgrcunc arta.

It is locatec near :he Reac:ce 3uiicing i

su=c anc cue to ne ine.icaciens we Mac in :Me ;ast, nis was 1cc I

considerte an unusual incit.a:icn or an indic3=r of an emergency si va-icn.

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STATEME:IT EVEitTS/08JECTIVE5/ ACTIONS i

0630 The chenists had been recirculating the Unit 2 reac:ce c:olant sample in crder to obtAin a boren analysis felicwing the : rip. The first result obtained was 700 ;om, which was no: c:nsidered ac:urata by the coeraters. Sackup samples were requestad and two backup sameles indicated accreximately aC0 ;cm boren.

C6:0 There was an indication of radiation by an area radiatien moni: r near the

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het macnine shop at a location near the sampling lines in Unit 1 (.'lota: The Unit 2 react:r c:alant samole line runs througn Unt: 1 into Unt: I and :: the primary samoling wnich is located witnin Unt: 1). We at the plant have cal-cula:ad na: the lead time for a re:resentative samole to ga frem Uni 2 ::

Unit i due Oc the Ifne leng:n and ficw rata is a: proxima:ely 30 minutas.

Source range and intermediata range nuclear instruments:1cn indica:ad ucscale accroximataly one decade. The C:ntr:1 Recm ::ck action immedia:aly re-ini:iating high =ressure injection and initiating energency :cra-icn. They af sc attam::ac 03 star: eacn of ne fcur react:r c: alan: ;um:s bu: indics icns were of only 100 amos and no ficw indica:icn, theref:re, the ;umas were :avits ing and not

uccing. The :umes c:uld not be run.

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STATEMENT EVENTS /C8JECTI'IE5/ ACTIONS C620 Oick Oubiel along with the Chenistry/ Health Physics tachnicians surveyed, with portable monitors, toch Auxiliary Buildings in Uni s 1 and 2.

Radiation indica:1cns were evident and at this time Cuciel direc:ad that

oth Units Auxiliary Buildings be evacuated and Dick wen :s the Unit 2 Centrol Recm.

0645 Oan Shay 11n called G. P. ' tiller, described radia:1cn ;rcolems in :he Hot Machine Shop and i'n :he Samcle Recm in Uni: 1.

A: this time I was en my way :s the site rec:gni:ing tha: the radiaticn indications indicated a severs ;roblem. At the :ime I got is the site I notad :raffic :1ed un at the South Gate and due to the ;c:antial traffic at -he North Ga:e, I entered the scuth and of the Island :s have accass :: Uni: 2 as quickly as ;ractical.

C555 A site emergency was declared :y Secrge Xunder and 3111 ! awe.

This was

asec n radiation menit:rs increasing in all areas and :ne Reac :r Building dcme tonit:r in aler; and increasing.

Direc:ad an :: era:Or : man :ne swit:n:carc anc hel: in ne ::mmunica-icns aff:rt.

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(1) Unit 2 Auxiliary Building Sumo The Reacter Butid.ing has a su=p with pumps wnich normally discharge on a high level indication to the miscellanecus wasta holduo tank.

There is a path to de Auxiliary Building sume unk, but the ocerators believe that this path es valved closed. Also 1: should be noted that the Auxiliary Building sume unk had a bicwn rupture disc for a few weeks prior :: this event and tha: tank was isciated frem the vent header. To sumari:n, the Unit 2 Reac:ce Building sumo nor : ally fills up and ;umes au.:matically to the mscallanecus wasta holduo unk.

Water in significant volume as avidenced by the sume tackup, was transferred by some path fr m me Unt: 2 React:r Suf1 ding to the Auxiliary Building and I do not fully understand this path. React:r Building isciation oc:ur ed en a 1 psig signal a: aceut 3:00 A. M.

Neverteless, react:r c:olant was discharged by scme path Oc de Uni: 2 Auxiliary Building and did in-fact have Radioactive Isot:ces in 1: wnica caused scme of ce hign radiation levels in the Auxiliary Building.

(2) Uni: 2 'len: Meader This is ::nsidered me majcr ;a:n weere gas ar.c ;articula:as ca:

Oc:urred in :ne a=cs:'nyre ;rceably :2me from in Uni: 2 and the :a-I 4as in 111 ;reta:iit:y fr:m d e ven: Of the makeue unx.nnica nas cegassing fissicn r:cuc u at a signif cant rata, i

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STATDENT O/ENTS/09dECTI'/ES/ ACTIONS Information (continued)

(3) Unit 2 Letdown System Fecm early in the incident, the amount of letdcwn ficw varied fecm small amounts te zerc as thrcughout the day we ::ursued all the practical alternatives of valving and etc., also monitoring,he cogni: ant radiation levels in the varicus recms, to res u rs as much lettcwn as we could, but we were never acle u restors significant letdown during the day of the incident.

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DQh E4I 3-23-79 G. P. MILLER STATE. MENT INITIAL.vARCH 23, 1979 NOTIFICATIONS 0655 Sita emergency declared.

0702 Pennsylvania Civil Defense Cuty Officer notified.

0702 Notified Cauphin Coun:y Civil Defense (Xavin Malloy).

0704 NRC Regicn I notified. No one there but secretary to teep duty officer.

0704' Civii Defense called Sureau of Radiological Heal:n (SRH). Noted by Lt.

at 0704, 0707 A :amated :: notify J. 3. Hertein, ' lice President Generation, Met-Ed.

(approx.) Unable to c:ntact him.

0709 ERDA (RAP Team) notified.

0709 At1:amated to notify L. L. Lawyer, Manager, Generation Ocera:icns, Me:-Ed.

(approx.) Unacle to contact him.

0710 Notified R. M. Klingaman, Manager Engineering, Met-Ed.

0710 Notified Pennsylvania Sureau of Radiological Health.

0711 Natified Caupnin C unty Civil Defense.

0713 Called Radiation Management Cer:cration at Philacelchia Electric nummei.

(accrex.) Answering service will forward numeer.

0714 0:ntactad Stata ?clica and notified of General bergency.

'/crk Haven ;ortable radiation meni=r urned on, (0) reacir.g - 5 ata 0717 Folice neliccater recuestad and confirmed i wculc te sant = T'i!.

1 (Fer GFM recall and from s atus beard in Central Recm). Notified i

3ennsylvania Sta:a Polica of Sita bergency.

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0720 At:ame:ad : c:ntac: ANI. No answer.

(accr x.)

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- i 072a General Bergency declarec ::P 3. ?. Miller. *niti G M 'c:ifica:icn f:r a General bergency (Nota: These are :ne same ;ar < as ?rev.icusly notifiec Of si:a emergency).

0725 Fa. 5 a a 3creau Of Raciciegical Heal:n nc W,a

.eneral bergency via :f rec: ;none line fr=: Jni: 2 Cen:r:1 Ly:m. ?nts line was :nen held ccen be:seen 3RH anc 'Jni: 2 C:ntr:1 Recm.

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G. P. MILLER STATEMENT INITIAL MARCH 23, 1979 NOTIFICATICNS (continued) 0725 On-Site radiation ment:aring taam dispatched in dcwnwind direction.

0735 Pennsylvania State Civil Defense notified of General bergency.

I 0735 Notified ANI. No one thers excast for cperator. Laft message for them to call us and that it was imccr: ant.

0736 Radiation Management Cce:cration (Mr. Fred Rec:c) natified of General Emergency.

0738 Recalled Radiation Management Cor:cration at Philadelchia Electric ::

tall of General Sergency. He will forward message.

0740 Ycrk Haven radiation monitor reading (0) - helicoptar at TMI - dis;:atched

(.:cr:x.) offsite teams in helicacter and one secarataly in car :: Wes Shors (from G. 7. Killer and R. W. Cubiel recali cf :ne incident).

0750 On-Sita monit: ring team recoru less than 1 MR/hr. readings in downwind (a:crex.) directica at West Side of TMI (a boundary).

~j 0755 0:en iine established between 112 Centrol Accm and NRC Region I.

Notified

nem of General bergency. Tney will send a :aam :: the sita.

0755 Off-Sf:a radiation moni cring taams recor: readings of less : nan 1 MR/hr.

at North Gata and Cbservation Canter.

0800 2 rtar-3er.: (Radiation Consultan:s) notified of General Bergency anc-0 asked to provide assistance in cur mcnitoring effort.

CSCO Offsita :aam in Helic:ptar at West Shore (Goldstcro)

(a crex.)

'O' reading - we ac.ually wers ahead of the plume - :1us :nsi a :aam at our west sita tcuncary

'O' reading.

0930 ANI returned ;hene call and were notiff ec Of General Bergency.

(accrex.)

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STAT D ENT 0730 to 0830 At approximately C800 I dfracted Jim Seelinger Oc rascr: to the Unit 2 Control Rocm. This was based en the fact that the Emergency Plan and Emergency Centro 15taticn in Uni I were in full cperation, Unit I was in a stable condition and I needed Jim Seelinger's tachnical help due to his past experience in the Unit 2 Star:ue program. The Unit Status - high pressure injection was en as I had directed it c de kect en, hot leg U

temcerature was pegged high, cold leg tamcerature was less than 2CO, :ne (3) steam generator was isciated and at acproximataly a 95% level, -he i

(A) staam generator downc:mer emeerature was a:pecximately $10, we 0

attempted :c start a reacter c:clant pumo in each iccp, but again, we get 100' amp indication and caviation withcut ficw indica:icn, we were du=cing steam condenser at this time frem the 'A' steam genera:cr and we ;ut a i

Shift Foreman and opera:ce in charge of each panel within the Ccntrci R0cm as we new had scme extra crews in place. A: this time, I believed based on the tamceratures incicated above, there was some natural circula:icn l

cc:urring and I nac hcced with the HP injection Oc cnarge :he clan sci 10.

Status of the Emergency Plan Imolemen:a:icn The plan was 'ully initia:ad a: this time. All staps within Our precacures and plans were carried cut, all c:mmunicatiens both en and offsita were fully esuc11sned, ac::unubility was in ;r gress, nams were dis at=ed teta :n 1,

and offsi:a, all readings 4ere less taan i MR :er hcur and 3 cines were less than backgrounc. Addi:icnally, we are taking f scuent anncun'caments :ver =e

. age = inform ;eccle of me si::a:icn anc -ha: we were in a generai l

emergency anc us: i vas real. At Ois time : :lacac cne :ersen in carga Of te Observa:icn Cantar, and san: ;er:ces f :s te ga:a :: =e Observation page 13 Of 30

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STATB D T 0730 to C830 (continued)

Center and others to the designated 'assemoly areas onsita. At approximataly 0730 or a I.tle before, I had received predictions of an offsite dose of 10 R at Goldsbarc, this was based on the Reacter Building deme mcnitor, wnica was still increasing and f-om our pas: ex:erience with this scurce calculation, we did feel thesa were really this high, but as a precaution, l

I dispatened a Stata Polica helicoptar with an offsite team alcng with an offsita team in a car and separataly, to the ' des: Shors (Goldstore).

Curing this time period, the comand team met in tne Unit 2 Shift Sucerviscr's office in the Unit 2 Centrol Recm and we assassad essentially wnat cur scals and cojectives were during this cay and during One time of s

l-this incident.

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k TMI 3-23-79 G. P. MILLER STATEMENT C830 to 1200 I decided that our objectives ind scals for this day were as follows, and in order of priority listed:

1.

To protect the public and to assure that the Emergency Plans and procedures along with the Units precedures were fully carried cut in an effective manner.

2.

To maintain the reactor care covered with watar-and to cool and stabili:e it.

3.

To ;retect. Met-Ed personnel and minimi:e plant damage.

It might be ncted that Oese scals were restatad by me 13 this grouc throughcut the day in order that we maintain Our priorities in proper

erscective.

The greitp also decid:d Sa at this time, the E%egency Plan was fully in effect and working and that the Unit was in an essentially stable condi:1cn but that high pressure injecticn did not a:: ear Oc be taking the plant solid and this was most evident by the fac: tha: the reactor c: clan: ;umes still cavitated during a: tam::ts :: run them.

Incore thermcc uoles readings were taken en the ::meu:ar. Tne c:m:utar ;u cut a *:;uestion mart" wnich means that ne were no in 1:s ;r: gram, therefore, we sent instrumenta:1cn ;erscnnel :s take readings at :ne ;enetratien, anc additicnally, Oc me this indicated that the ;ctential for hign readings On t e der.ncc: ules were evident. T1e readings ne got back fr:m tne

enetra:icn varied from 2CCO '. 240C0 :: na cing. Tne :acnnical e.x:iana-tion that I was given indica:ac :na: 2ey were ;r::aciy hot,.: hat if Oey were het, ta: care ::uid be tel ing Of de ce mcc:ucles anc differen:

juncti:ns wculd have been fornec and =eref:re, ce am: era ure incica:icn aas nc: ::nsiderec reif acie :n a acanitsi :ast s, tu:

te :erscna iy, 1:

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9 G.?. MILLER 9

STATEMENT 0830 c 1200 (Continued) indicated we certainly had high temperature readings within the core.

Additionally, we had had a recorder hccked up to a reactor protection channel camperature indicator which indicated that the het leg was grea:ar than 700c, in c her words, essentially the het leg indicatad grea:ar nan 7000 on a :ero Oc 3000 full range scale. We had lost over 1/3 to 1/2 of the pressuri:er hea:ars and throughout the day we kect trying to maintain anc increase heaters and control with de ;:ressuri:er.

Plant conditions were essartially ce same as I describec earlier and I had notified Mr. Ross ca: HPI must be kept on unless I cersdnally direc:ac c:her-wise., Hign ;ressure injection was kept en a: my direction.

I =nducted

. a meeting in the Shif: Su;:erviscr's office and we decided s keep :rying :o

ake the ;1 ant solid using high pressure injection and thrc:: ling nic RC'l-2 (the electromatic block valve) and to maintain approximately 2000 lbs. wnfle a:tamating Oc go solid. We charged the plant for accroximataly three hcurs and pressure cycled at around 2000 lbs. and HP. fnjection ficw was scmewnere around 200 to 5C0 gpm. Plant parameters remained ce same as I described in the 0730.c 0330 time ;ericd. The baratad water surage tank was essentiaily ;cing to the Reac=r 3uilding ficer and my concarn egan :s become :he ability =

keec a wa:ar source as ce 3NST was down almes: 20 feet ce mcre er:ugn cis perice and a: :he existing makaue ca:a 1: wculd have lef: as wi ecut water in a ma nar cf nours. T'qis was he: an im=eciata =ncern tu: one wnica I was attamo:ing

c keec an eye on sc ca: we did c; enc ua vie a sur:ri.se : nc wa:ar availa::le.

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C820 to 1200 (Continued)

The altarnative would have then required me to usa the water fecm within the Reactor Building by utilizing the Low Pressure Decay Heat System to feed the High Pressure Injection Systam. Additionally, I became concarned over the possibility of the excassive cycling en RC7-2 causing it to fail. This has been a problem valve both in tJnits 1 and 2 and at other sitas (it is in a very hot environment and has failed in the past). Curing the same pericd we Icst auxiliary steam and we were attampting to put the auxiliary boiler back on ifne but we had problems with the boiler and therefcre, we had.: break vacuum and staam the A staam genera :r to atmosphere. :10TE: At my direction, :ne 3 staam generat:r was maintained isola:ad at all times as we had suspected fecm the early hours it had a leak. We had sat:;,les taken in both staam generat:rs and thase confirmed that the A steam generat:r was not c:ntaminated. This was done

rice

c steaming to the atmos;nere. Additionally, we put a man cut on the roof as cicsa as practical : the steam pipe and during s:aaming, c:nsistantly got readings indicating no activity.

The c mand grouc met periodical.ly thecughcut the morning and restatac cur cejectives, re-reviewed the emergency Olan and c:munica:icns. Our concarns became One Of a fear that HPI mign: be shcr: circui ing the : re :: Se React:r Building ficar, that possibly :Me ::re mignt not be c:vered, and =e ;ctan-ial l

of having ROV-2 fail (ccen or snut). Instnments available did not c:nvince us =at watar was in fact en :ne ::re but my firm decisicn was to always maintain hign ressure injection. The gr0uc discussad and I direc:ad nat ae go ccwn in

ressure and a tamo: :: use =e c:re ficcc anks = : nvinca.;urselves Ma-

-Me : Ore was c:verec anc cssibly arcugn nis mechanism we mign: get :te ian-

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STATEME?iT 0830 :c 1200 (Continued) heat made which we considered at that time to be the ultimata candition and place of stability and safety. Additionally, we had level indication on the core ficed tanks and the core ficed comes in directly ever the vessel through separate no::les and we felt this would give us additional essurance that the core was covered. During the pressure decrease I specifically directed and it was imolamented that Hign Pressure Injection be maintained at all times.

Status of the E=ergency Plan e

The on and offsite teams were fully out, One wind had changed several

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'N times; but early in :he merning it was bicwing very sicwly,1 :c 2 mch, and j

at times assentially it died. During the times that :ne winds shifted or died, we did obtain ensite readings which were acave ! MR/hn. Readings through this period affsita were less than i MR/hr. and Icdines less than background. We had had one Iodine taken in Goldstore that, indica:ad essentially background.

We had directed a backup sample be taken using a helicactar. It was taken and analy:ed by Me 3ureau of Raciclcgical Heal-h (3RH) wnere One analysis of

ne backuo sample confirmed the results of :he earlier samole :sken in 3cidsocro.

Therefore, we simply felt ina: there was not an offsita concarn at this particular ime and additienalii.e were not in any level of ac icn in accorcanca sith ::e Environmental Protac 'en Agency (EFA) guidelines. The Sta a concurred with this

• • t evaluation and i: shci ld te 5c:ac that we nad an ccen line wi:n ne 5:a a

? age 20 of 30

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TMI 3-29-79 G.P. MILLER l

STATEMENT C820 :s 1200 (Centinued) throughout the whole day frem both Control Recms and an caen ifne to Region I of the NRC and that NRC inspectors were in both Units who had knowledge of the.

data and essentially did not object to cur c:urse of action and there was not a public concern. We did have at this :ime ansite readings'jn the area of 7 to 14 MR/hr. Additionally, ac::untability was c:c.cleted during this ;eriod so we knew where aii the sita personnel were loca:ad. Our concern became to assure that the ;eeple in the designated assem:1y areas were not ex;csed Oc high readings and therefore, we decided to send people both cn and offsita, excact for the ones we needed, heme. This would alicw us :: minimize,the ex:csure of cur cwn

r...

eople and by this !me we reali

ed tha: the normal werk day was not going :s aciur. Several :imes we sen: persennel :hrough the entire sita including all buildings to assure that the sita was evacuatac. Acditionally, hroughcut this 1

1

ericd bota Units were in and cut of respira

ses and due :: the high readings in Unit I we acved the ECS (Emergency C:ntrol Station) cfficially :: : e Unit 2 Control Recm Oc minimize excesure of personnel. A review of :ne ::mmunications in effect at this time were:

1.

All the recuired ifnes and c:mmunications in the Emergency. lan were fully in effect. Teams ere c:nstantly r.ni : ring and sameling :s assure pucif e-and Met-Ed ;erscnnel safety.

2.

We had a direc: line :: :he 3RF starting at 7:20 :: Mr. Gerusky anc 'dargare:

Reilly of ::a: cffice. t i, 3.

Mr. Lee Regers of SaW, starting at accu: 7:25 anc in trmi,::an:!y nereafter 4as talking :: ne Lyncncurg Mcme Of'ica nreugn himself anc.Mr. 3 reg Senaecei e

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G.P. MILLER STATEMENT C830 to 1200 (Ccntinued) 4.

The NRC had a direct line in our Centrol Accm to Mr. Ocn Haverkamp cf the Region I cffice.

I 5.

The Unit 2 Ccntrol Recm also had a direct line to the 3RH in Harrisburg.

.' t 6.

The NRC had representatives in both Units' Control Recms.

NRC representatives ensita, frem memcry, personal icgs or securf:y Icgs as available :: day were:

Mr. Neely, Mr. Galina, Mr. Nimit:, and I believe Mr. Higgins who arrived at approxima:aly 10:10 in ene scrining. Appecxima:aiy 10:3a in the scening, Mr. Smith and Mr. Saunack arrived." Acprcxima:aiy 10:30 RAP {NRC taam) arrived with a plane or a helicopter, I am not sure. At acpecx-i imataly necn Mr. Stahr and Mr. Raymond were here and at 11:00 P.M. that night, Mr. Kaimig was hers. I might nota that thers seemed c be an abundanca of the NRC fr m abcut ncen on, and we were very carefui o assure that we c mmunicatad with the NRC; Mey were ve y satisfied with the interface and previced us ccm-munication and advice as they c uld, 'but it was made very clear that the decisica process and decision maker was the Licensee, tha: is me. One a:Mer entry of intartst Oc the sita that I 0 uid rememcer' wculd te Mr. Syc Porter On the :ncne early in :he day anc as the magnitude cf the situation became evident, he came to the si a abcut 3:00 P.M. alcng with scme HP tachs., a: rexima aly a, frem the Salem Olant.

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g TMI 3-28-79 G.P. MILLER D

STATEMENT D

Dkk 1200 to 1130 Plant parametars remained abcut the same, again I insured HP Injection was maintained and additionally, the c:nsnunications between myself and Senior persons in Management, plus the Stata and the'NRC were increasing to a very high level during this pericd and the pressure was of an intensa level and that the grasp of the situation and the sericusness was beginning to take hold on all of cur people. I was directed :s s: p staaming because it was believed that I was releasing radicactive steam. I c:nsidered that staaming only the ' A' steam genera::r was satisfactory sinca I did not feel we were in fact releasing radicactivity thr ugh this path.

I had been pressured to do -his thrcugneut the morning but I could not do this withcut a vacuum as I did not feel it was rescensible to give up my heat sink which was needed :: help assure the c:re was c:aled, but I was making a::emets :: redraw vacuum and to secure that staaming. Eventually, I as directed :s s::p steaming, and I did. We did at that time, have seme vacuum and were able to steam intarnally.

It should be noted that we are designed to staam Oc atmcsphere in :his acde withcut a vacuum far this plant c:ndition. Plant ;ressure came :: accu 1a0 ;sig at accut la30.

Care ficed tanks went dcwn abcut a f ct or f:ot and a hcif wnich c us indicated that we did have a high level in tne ::re and :nis gave us some reassurance that tne methods we had been emmloying were keecing the c:re covered. Addi-ticnally, I was direc:ac Oc ge es the Lieutanant 3cvernor's offica, and :herefers, I decarted the sita at accrexima:aly 1430 with as much information as ! c:uld accut tne incident.

It snculd be noted that I returned Me si a accut 15CO.

Pricr to leaving :ne si a, ! hac seen the first res:ense on ihe Tu anc To.

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STATE.NENT 1200 to 1430 (Continued) instrumentation. This seemed to occur when we pumped HPI heavier to the C injection leg and after the pressure was icwered to core ficed ability.

Since the respense of the :=nceratures had cc:urred, this made us feel we indicated, c ming close had some natural circulation as both Tg and TC toge ther. It shculd be noted that at apercxima:aly 1440 I hearc a icud deep noise and.at that time the Reactor Suilding spray pumas started. Sub-sequently :a the events cf this day I learned :na: was a 23 lb. pressure spika which occurred in the React:r Building due to Hydr gen. Nota that price ::

my leaving for the Lieutenant Governor's offica in Harrisburg, I had direc:ad

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-he staaming thrcugn the atmospheric valve be ceased and only.a rec:=menced I

at by direction. Please note again that we had nct seen any activity with a m-and a meter ensita and I did not feel Ma: we were releasing radicactive steam, -

and the staim generat:r samples indicated there was no c:ntaminaticn af the A staam generater. The emergency plan was fully in effect including offsita c:mmunications and we had full agreement witn the Stata tha: :here were,1 the time, no offsita actions required based On Our EPA guidelines, cur :ast.experienc and cur Emergency. Clan requirements. Please nota : Mat they c: asis:an:1 y rev i ewe <,

both -he ensi a and offsita readings :nreugncut ne entire :ericd. Ofck Ouciel did an excalien: jc of '<aecing us current, wat: Ming f:r wind snif ts, discussing actions wi:n :ne State in attamc:ing : hold dcwn -ne trenenccus amcun: Of c:m-munica:icns anc pressures is evacuata cr :: increase One saverity Of ne inci-den: teyond ana we hac seen'a :nis :ime Offsi 3.

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STATEME?iT 15C0 :: 2000 The unit parameters remained essentially the same as described earlier.

We did maintain our charging ifneup through HPI and heavier :s the (C) leg to maintain the A instrument response en tamcerature indicating bettar heat removal as we nad earlier. This convinced us we had as much natural circulaticn as we c:uld get to remcve the heat from :Me c:re. We were additionally staaming the A steam genera:ce :: the c:ndensar and with the tamcerature res:cnse, we did feel we were getting natural circulation and discharging a minimum amcun of SWST watar to the Reac::r Building ficer.

Our c:ncern still was tha-the unit was not in 1:s final c:ndition and that we would eventually run cut of water in the 3WST. A: :nis time we were still

' ~

hoping to get down to One decay hea ;cint, or :c get a solid water c:ndition in the lcco and s:ar a reac::r c:clant puma.

5:stus of the 9:ercency ?lan We continued cur en and offsita monitoring and at this time..we did see readings offsita of 2 :c 3 MR/hr. whfie some ansita readings were 10 Oc.

20 MR/hr. due to the wind dying with mos readings 2 :s 3 MR/hr. During the day we had a helicacter overnead giving us readings which was ex:remely hel:ful, and we hac at one :cin: during this ;ericd 10 MR/hr. accve Me Uni: 1 Cecifng Tcwer and 20 MR/hr. a: 3C0 feet accve :Me Reac:Or Building Uni 2.

As :he wind wcuid s::p during :his :ericd :Me readings woulc a:

cints get as hign as 70 MR/br. and we nere in res: irs: rs mas: Of :ne time.

I had Mr. Mit:, Shift Su erviscr, 0:nduct a ::ur Of ne auxiffary Builcing wi M Me Ocerat:rs anc we did nota :ha: there was watar ' ackac 20 in :ne Fage 23 Of 20

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1600 Oc 20C0 (Continued)

Auxiliary Suilding sumo. We reviewed the Environmental Protection Agency guidelines and we had not reached any of those which required evacuation or any public action and ccmunication was still occurring and.he Stata was recorted Oc me to be in full agreement on this point.

It is imcortant Oc note nat for the mos part, I was given offsita readings of less : nan l

1 MR/hr. except for a few indications at:cve that level. At this ti:ne I felt that the.cublic'was being pectacted and tnat our major concarn was to get One Unit.c a safe condition and c stop the release.

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G.P. MILLER 49 g

STATEME?iT li 17C0 Management (Jack Herbein and Bob Arnold) ordered me t0 c mmenca taking the unit solid at a high perssure, and additionally, I had gottan work fecm Lynchburg to attamot to maintain 400 g;m HPI to assure core cooling and this was imolemented at this time. I was at this time also attempting to get preparaticns underway to again start the reactcr c clant ;umes. During the day I had lost scme vital swit:hgear wnich disaoled.he lift and backst:o oil pumas for :ne reacter c:alant ;umes. During, the af arncen we made various attamots :: trouble snoot and reclose the necessary breakars :

obtain ;cwer Oc these ;u=cs. 'ie had high axcosure risk cr:blems due to radiation levels in the building (Auxiliary Building) Ind I had to precaed very carefully to insure minimum er no injury t: personnel and yet be timely to ready.he RC pums for starting.

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G.p. MILLER STATDE.'iT D

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D b Ig30 V

We had available the DC (Direct Current) oil lift pumps and we attamptec to start the 2A reactor c:alant pump.

I had salected ' A' loop due to the fact that its instruments had shown the most response en temperature and natural

~

circulation and we thougn: that thers might be watar in the A Iccp and encugh for the pump to be effective. The 2A pump did not start and we went over to the 1A react:r coolant pump using the CC cil pump and energi:ad/ bumped it and it did in fact run for 10 sacands. pressures and temperatures responded immed-iataly and it indicated c:alant ficw. We secured the ;umo, waited acproxima. ely 15 minutes in order to assure that we didn't harm tne mot:r from an electrical standpoint. It is normally required to wait 15 minutas Ee-.veen starts due to the exesssive starting currents these :umes experience and I did not want to damage it at this time since we needed it Oc assure flow and put the unit in a stable c:nci ten.

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- o DtI 3-23-79 G, 9. MILLER STAT"ME.'iT 1945 g

I directad the Control Rocm to start the lA Reactor Ccolant pumo, the pumo startad, ran and had flow indica:icns, pressuit dropped frem 2000

s 1320 lbs., tamcerature equalized in all lecps to 3800, and the plant, for the first time acpeared stable and we wers convincad. hat we now had necessary ficw and c: cling to maintain the c:re. It should be notad that during this same period, Mat we were c ncarned about the release and scme way tc st:0 it, we inspected and trcublesho: the Vent Header, wnich is very c:mplicated, and we were laying poly en te ficers ever the

~

,e water in an a :amet Oc s:Op the evaporation or release that c:uld be cc:urring fr:m :nere. The highest readings, wnich I was given, offsita for the day for the infor nation Occurnd a: 2220, that is,10:20 P. M.

and :nat was at the Airport and these readings were 12 MR/hr. and a:

Kunkle School near the turnpika at 13 MR/hr.

This c:maletas the secuenca of events for this day of Maren 2Eth througn 3 7. M. a:

nign:. 3y 3 9. M. I was still in enarge of *he Centrol Recm but I was essentially uncer ne directicn of Senice Management and we hac at this time an acundanca of

.IRC pecple anc ccsarters and I spent many periods clearing the Cantni Rccm in Orcer to maintain the calm atmcs; hen tnat was eviden: arcugncut.tne cay.

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STATE. MENT 9

CCNCLUSION It should be notad that this emergency lastad for an extended period but the at=csphere within the Unit remained calm and professional. The response of all Met-Ed personnel was excellent and the courage of the operators, health physics and maintananca cersonnel was evident throughout the day and that there was not, during the entire time, a cericd of panic or unsureness within that Centrol Rcem.

I perscnally feel that we must suffer the puolic pressure and media distertien as we have, and that we should be criticized that we surely could nave d_cne battar, but it is my hece that the full stcry and the calm decision making that did cccur are eventually put befc s public attantien, as I believe we minimized the exposure of the public, of cur cwn ceople, and placed the plant in a stable condition and frcm a si~Jation which ncne of us had been schecied in and wnich few of us, including myself, had probacly never believed we would ever be in, I left the Unit 2 Cent ci Recm at approximately 0300 3-29-79r

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,y df j G. ?. Miller 5/7/79 w-Manager, ~enerating 5 stien-Nuclear

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