ML19309G233
| ML19309G233 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Crane  |
| Issue date: | 01/03/1980 |
| From: | Willie Lee DUKE POWER CO. |
| To: | Deyoung R NRC - NRC THREE MILE ISLAND TASK FORCE |
| References | |
| TASK-TF, TASK-TMR NUDOCS 8005050450 | |
| Download: ML19309G233 (7) | |
Text
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t Duios POWE11 GourL40 0 5 0 50 9fD P.O. Box XXNK 33189 dHARLOTTE, N. G. 28242 CARL HORN, JR.
WILLIAM S. LEE Ce*AspeeAse or Ynt moano e PRf 5tDEfef &
CMetr Emacu?E OFFaCER CMetr OPERAreNG OFFICER (7043
.4ee4 4704:373-4283 January 3, 1980 Mr R C DeYoung, Deputy Staff Director NRC/TMI Special Inquiry Group U S Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, DC 20555 Re:
NTFTM 791219-01
Dear Mr DeYoung:
Returned herewith is the file memorandum of the telephone interview with me marked to show certain corrections of fact.
Sincerely, W S Lee WSL/s Encl l
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SUMMARY
OF TELEPHONE INTERVIEW William (Bill') Lee President Duke Power Company Charlotte, North Carolina 28242 Telephone: (704) 373-4283 The information listed below is a summary of a telephone interview of Mr. William (Bill) Lee, President of Duke Power Company, conducted on October 5,1979 by Mr. Hartmut Schierling of the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Ccumission Special Inquiry Group (SIG) for the Three Mile Island Unit 2 (TMI-2) accident.
Mr. Lee was informed of the contents of the SIC Witness Notification (Attachment A).
He was informed that the interview was voluntary, notes would be taken and he would be provided with a copy of this report for his comments. The following information was given by Mr. Lee in response to questions by Mr. Schierling on the subject of his participation in and knowledge of the industry support effort to the TMI-2 accident.
Lee received a call from Herman Dieckamp, President of GPU, in the l_te rerninG of Saturday, March 31.
Dieckamp requested from Duke Power Company support, not in a specific area but the best available talent, in particular operations oriented people. Lee assigned Warren Owen to assemble a group of about 4 to l
5 people. They went to the site as soon as possible (charter flight on Sunday l
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7-
. morning). During the next days Owen called Lee frequently to a'ppraise him of situation at TMI. Lee received a call form Owen on Wednesday morning, April 4, saying that he felt " uneasy about way things were going." Owen stated that there were continuing problems in communications among people at the site, that there was a definite need for an organizational structure for the entire support effort, and that there were contin,ing difficulties between Met-Ed and NRC.
Owen strongly suggested the presence of Lee at the site because it would be constructive, it would lend support to individuals and it would calm people down. Shortly thereafter, W. Kuhns, Chairman of GPU, called Lee and asked.him to come to the site and assist in directing the recovery effort. Kuhns indicated that he had discussed the involvement of Lee at the highest management level with J. Hendrie or H. Denton of NRC. Lee left Charlotte, N.C. by charter plane, arrived early Wednesday af ternoon and met with Dieckamp, Owen and John MacMillan (B&W). Robert Arnold of GPU Service Corporation also might have been there.
They agreed on a TMI recovery organization that previously had been developed.
Lee assumed the position of deputy to Dieckamp. Lee immediately called Byron Lee, President of Commonwealth Edison, to come to TMI and assume an active role in waste management activities.
Lee stated that the ef fectiveness of some individuals in the organization was in-fluenced by presence and interaction with NRC individuals on all levels but mostly l
a
( on the active working level.
NRC people were acting very much in their normal y[n,e4 & cd*O &
role of a regulator. There was no apparent strx:ture withis the NRC organiza-N W'ad tion at the site and ee b ivi u..
===umeu one posi6ivu coac ne=== : ~~=ese and ha @ us.hvi dy vvu.-f e retivity bc was involvud in.
On Wednesday at midnight Lee got in touch witt the NRC and worked out a communications procedure between the TMI Recovery Orgar ization and the NRC.
He recalls that Denton identified these procedures in a memo to the NRC staff. This resulted in better communications and less NRC interference. For example, prior to this understand-
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ing the NRC reviewed emergency procedureF after they had been prepared by the staff in the Technical Support Croup under R. Wilson. Any proposed changes by the NRC would then go back to the procedure writing group, be evaluated, be approved (frequently more than one signature) and then returned to NRC for con-This was a redundant and time-consuming method, especially because currence.
in many casess the,NRC was not fully aware of all the reasoning that had been put into the procedure. After the memo of understanding the NRC representative I
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was assigned directly to the procedure writing group and participated in the de-liberations.
This was very ef fective.
Lee stated that on his arrival at the site on Wednesday, individuals (management, operations staff, workers) were exhausted and very easily would become irritated.
'Jhis impaired good communications. People i.eemed to be picking at each other l
for the smallest reasons.
In his opinion cheir experience during the early days must have been tratsatic.
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1 i The organization that was implemented on Wednesday was a paper organization.
It required the dedication of all people to make it work. Lee had excellent relationships with all managers and as Dieckamp's Deputy had the authority to make any decision when necessary.
For example, one morning at about 3 a.m.
(date unknown), charcoal filter trains (to be used for exhaust system on the roof of auxiliary building) were located at. WPSS in the State of Washington.
Lee called WPSS management and at his request and authority they were made available by WPSS management for immediate shipment. The NRC night' shift ar-(W ranged for transportation ir ; force base; however, shipment by the air force was delayed for some time because of bureaucratic red tape.
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Duke Power Company made available a total of about 30 people to the support effort. They were assigned on a rotating basis. Duke people were at the site until the end of April.
Lee had the following comments about the Industry Advisory Group (IAG).
It was an extremely effective operation. The IAG analyzed a given problem on the basis of all assumptions they could think of.
They arrived then at a number of different alternatives to achieve an objective and made appropriate recom-mendations at the Technical Working Group (TWG) meetings. Other organizations, mostly the Technical Support Group (TSG), looked at the same problem from a more practical viewpoint such as "is there sufficient room at the location" l
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. and "can we get there because of contamination." Lee did not detect any kind of animosity between the IAG and the operations people. There were legitimate differences of opinion. Lee participated frequently in the TWG meetings and there was no doubt that Arnold was in charge and members of the TWG respected his authority. Lee developed a very high respect for many individuals based on his participation in the recovery ef fort.
The Task Management and Scheduling group was under Fred Stern of Combustion e
Engineering. He ran the group with a strong hand and many people did not appreciate his approach. Warren (Buzz) Cobean (Burns & Roe) who headed the Plant Modifications Group had many top priority activities going on at the same time. Stern would sort these out with Cobean and arrive at the neces-sary priority and schedule assignments ("with all activities priority one, nothing was getting done").
A fundamental problem in meeting the challenge to stabilize the plant condi-tions was that the plant was in a situation it was not designed for and which i
had not been considered in the operations. It was necessary to write new pro-cedures for these conditions immediately to cope with continuously changing conditions. These procedures had to be prepared both from a practical viewpoint (which required the complete understanding of the function and capability of a system) and from a safety viewpoint.
In these areas much help was needed.
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. Lee feels that the people from Duke had the much needed operations experience l
with the Oconee plants, also B&W designs.
He thinks that the effectiveness of the recovery organization was as good as anyone could have expected under the circumstances. The TMI accident should demonstrate to the entire nuclear industry the need to initiate an industry-wide emergency plan to make available all resources, including those at the national laboratories through DOE.
I
y I:';C SPECIAL Iq'llRY MOUP:
Wl',':ISSN0ilFIfAT103 This intarview is being. con facti.d by ic.c :.Lcrs of the !!uclear Regulatory l
Conaission's (I;RC's) Special Inquiry Grnop on Three Mile Island.
This Group is beir.g directed independently of the NRC by an outside law firm, Rogovin, Stern and Huge..It includes both HRC personnel who have been detailed to the Special inquiry Staff, cnd c.utside staff an'i attorneys.
Through a delegation of authority from the !!RC under Section 161(c) of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as m. add, the Spacial Inquiry Creep ts a b. cad I,andate to inquire into the causes of the iccident at Thrre Mile Island, to identify ir.ajor problem areas ar.d to make recomendations for change. At the conclusion of its investi-cation, the Group will issue a detailed public report setting forth its findings cod recorz.:ndations.
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Unless you have Scen served with a subpoena, your participation in this i
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- o'..r cicu is uluntary cnd thcre will be no efTect en you if ;.su decline to unswer sc. e or all of the qu?stiens asked you.
Ho.zaver, the Special Inquiry i
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has been given the pouer to subpoena witnesses to appear and testify under oath, or to appear and produce documents, or both, at any designated place. Any per-son intervievied -- whether he has been subpoenaed or is being interviewed -
informa.ly -- may have an attorney present or any other person he wishes accompany l
him at the interview as his representative. Witnesses should realize that while
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ue will try to respect any requests for confidentiality in connection with the publication of our report, we can trike no guarantees, flames of witnesses and r
the information they provide n'ay eventually becane public, inasmuch as the cntire record of the:Special Inquiry Group's investigation will be made avail-able to the l'RC for whatever uses it may deem appropriate.
In time, this 1
i inforuation may be made available to the public voluntarily, or become available i.
l to the public.through the freedom of Information Act. Moreover, other dr partronis and agencies.of governc. nt r:cy request access to this information pursuant to thec l
Pri.5:y_Act of 1974.
Th ic.forntienity >.ho ha 7.fe available in t. tole cr in i
or t M cc;ciittees cr r A.ce" Tit!Os of !%
'J. S. &%.tss.
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