ML19309E837

Transcript of Commission & ACRS 800411 Joint Meeting in Washington,Dc.Pp 1-43

ML19309E837
Person / Time
Issue date:	04/11/1980
From:	Advisory Committee on Reactor Safeguards, NRC COMMISSION (OCM)
To:
References
REF-10CFR9.7 ACRS-T, NUDOCS 8004240476
Download: ML19309E837 (45)

Text

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UNITED STATES NUCLEAR REG UL ATO RY COMMISSION In the matter af:

JOINT MEETING WITH THE COMMISSIONhi*,

AND THE ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON REACTOR SAFEGUARDS Plaee:

Jashington, D. C.

Date:

april 11, 1980 Pages:

1 - 43 IMIMNATIONA1. Ves mu REPCemues. INC.

AS SOUTH CAPtTOL. f.TFtEIT. S. W. SUITE 107 WASHINGTCW. D. C. 20001 331 184 3550 I

4tG 8004240

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l UNITED STATES I

NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION 2

i 1717 H Street, N.W.

I Washington, D.C.

Friday, April 11, 1980 l

The Joint Meeting with the Commissioners 7

and Advisory Committee on Reactor Safeguards, met, i

3 pursuant to notice, at 1:00 p.m.,

Mr. Plesset, 9

to Chairman of the meeting, presiding.

i 11 j

PRESENT :

!3 l

Dr. J. Carson Mark j

T3 I

l Dr. Siess la i

I Dr. Steven Lawroski i.!

Dr. Dave Moeller l

I4 6

Mr. Jeremiah J.

Ray i

17 1

I Mr. W. Kerr i

it Mr. Harold Etherington

,9 i

Mr. J. Ebersole i

,0 Mr. H. Lewis.

21 i

Mr. Okrent i

Mr. Paul Shewmon g

24 Mr. Vollmer i

I 15 Commissioner Ahearne i-v m.m. m r e

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PRESENT: (continued) i 2

Commissioner Gilinsky Commissioner Bradford 2

l Mr. A. Womack 4

3 Mr. M. Salerno l

I 6

Mr.

D. Terrill f

I Mr. V. Stello 3

Mr. S. Bassett I

7 M. B. Weiss 1

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Mr. E. Novak 11 Mr. Porter i

12 Mr. J. Taylor 13 l

l Mr. Alan 14 I

and others l

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' CHAIRMAN PLESSET:

Let's reconvene, and as you 2

know this session is with the Commissioners and Chairman 4

Ahearne is with us, and I'd like to have John begin.

3 Maybe you'd like to use that microphone, John, and tell i

6 us what we ought to know and what you'd like to hear from I

us.

1 3

l COMMISSIONER AHEARNE:

All right. We only have l

an hour.

In your letter, you had indicated an interest to in TMI-2 containment venting, and I gather what you're It interested in are the status and process that we have 12 underway.

13 i

As you probably know, we did put out an en-14 vironmental assessment that Harold Denton and his staff l

15 i

had prepared.

Harold's proposal is to vent the concain-I4 l

i ment.

He also examined several other a.lternatives.

17 l

i The other alternatives he examined ended up in his la estimation to be ones that would take 12, 18, 24 rianths.

19 He also included that the impact eventing 20 21 in the sense of the radiological health damage would be very small -- minimal, non-existent.

And as a result I

22 he strongly recommended the venting.

We've gone out for g

that comment.

We added to it two addenda fer comment:

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one short one briefly mentioning a number of the studies 3

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l that we knew of that addressed the psychological stress i

question, and the other one addressing the question of a i

3 more rapid release.

Environmental assessment that he went out with talked about a 50-day release.

That was based upon any I

5 period of time over the next several months and releasing.

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t into the standard weather conditions at a very low 1

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adribble rate.

In the more recent addendum that he put t

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out, it was addressing that in any three week period 10 l

during the next couple of months based upon past records,.

11 he has concluded that there would exist in any such 12 l

three period five days of very good weather conditions t

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for rapid dispersion.

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i And so the second addendum addressed the questioni - ;~ -

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of is it advisable to vent over in a much rapid way over the five-day period.

We have received so far a number

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r of public comments.

As I'm sure you know, there were F

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several public meetings up in the Pennsylvania area..

l'P The Governor of Pennsylvania has discussed 3

with the Union of Concerned Scientists -- Bob Pollard 21 l

and Henry Kendell -- doing a review of the venting i

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n question and has asked them to do so, and they have I

• 4 accepted it.

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Bob has talked at some length with Harold i

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Denton and with Bernie Snider who was our director for 2

the TMI clean-up.

They will be meeting with Met-Ed people, 3

I I think, next week.

4 We don't yet have a schedule of what they're 3

going to do.

So we don't yet know when they're estimated i

8 completion time is, and as far as I know we haven't heard I

I yet formally from the Governor with respect to that.

8 So where we stand at the moment is that getting I

9 a lot of comments -- examining' these -- essentially l

to the options -- looking at what is the condition inside 11 the containment -- so far there doesn't seem to be any 12 change.

13 I'

j The concerns, I'm sure, that you've heard are la i

the maintenance of equipment that is inside and possibly f

13 the replacement of the equipment that's inside.

Vic, id do you have anything else you want to add?

I 17 l

COMMISSIONER GILINSKY:

No, I don't.

COMMISSIONER AHEARNE:

Any questions on that?

19 MR. MOELLER:

In looking at the reviews of i

20 i

the planning and thoughts relative to this problem, l'

I have not seen any reference to what probably is one 7

of the most authoritative discussions of the subject.

3 And that is the National Council on Radiation Protection 24 3

and Measurements, Report Number 44, which is titled, s

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" Krypton 85 in the Atmosphere - Accumulation Biological l

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Significance and Control Technology."

Now, this is a report issued in 1975 so it may be dated five years 2

i because of that but at the same time it's something that e

was written before any psychological or emotional aspects i

might have entered into the discussion.

i 7

I would think that if the NRC made.this i

8 l

l available in multiple copies to the local people, or if 9

Met-Ed or someone, it would be a very useful report to 10 have available.

Why don't you pass it up?

II COMMISSIONER AHEARNE:

Can you spare that one, 12 l

i Dave?

l 13 l

MR. MOELLER:

Yes, sir.

Your remarks on the

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6 i

13 Union of Concerned Scientists remind me some of the NRC e

people were there, but last week there was the annual meeting of the National Council and Radiation Protection 17 i

1 and Measurements, and at that meeting, Dr. Thomas Cochran of the Natural Resources Defense Council stated I

l that franthe standpoint of dose and projected biological effects, there's really no problem to the venting of 21 l

l 22 the containment.

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And he said he would agree to beil.g publically i

24 quoted and, I think he even agreed to offering that as a 3

written statement.

And I would think that might be helpful 4

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i COMMISSIONER AHEARNE: Very interesting.

Any 2

j other questions on the -- okay.

Let me then, at least, 4

l for me go on to mention at what I am looking forward to, 5

l I think, is the ACRS letter on the Action Plan that I-5 i

believe is one of the items you'll be addressing tomorrow-7 l

l CHAIRMAN PLESSET:

Well, I'll give a guarantee 3

that we'll finish it at this meeting.

9 MR. LEWIS:

Finish the letter or the action?

10 CHAIRMAN PLESSET:

A letter on the action plan.

i 11 l

COMMISSIONER AHEARNE:

Depending on how you use i

3 the word finish, Harold.

I'm not sure.

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CHAIRMAN PLESSET:

We're going to write a letter 74 on the Action Plan to be precise.

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3 16 COMMISSIONER AHEARNE

And I guess just a couple of the questions in trying to think through what, 1

l I would hope that that might cover would be -- is the i

plan acceptable as a planning document?

19 20 As you know, I think what we hope to do is 'to i

21 l

now blend it into the ongoing action, agency plan --

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U try'to transition to that.

I think that you have been U

given a briefing on what elements; how we've gone through ;

24 prioritizing it; and what elements, at least, the Staff l

is proposing are ones that get deferred.

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i So if there are say specific changes of a i

technical nature that yc u would like to see, I think 2

would be the time to mention it.

Do you think that the l

Staff has drawn this line in prioritization at about i

e the right level?

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In other words, are there specific things in 7

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the present plan that shouldn't be deferred in your i

3 opinion that we -- that the Staff, at least, at the point 9

I planning to defer?

10 And then are there any items that you don't think 11 I

are being given a high enough priority?

And our final 12 l

point would be that what the Staff is proposing now l

r 12 as we blend this into the agency plan is that some of the' -

14 actions will be implemented over a longer time scaedula.

13 i

l They will develop such a criteria for that i

to implementation.

And does that seem to be a reasonable j

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thing or reasonable way to go.

l CHAIRMAN PLESSET:

I think, as you know, the

9 Committee hesitates to speak individually.

j 20 COMMISSIONER AHEARNE:

I have now been recently 21 l

i 22 reminded by my colleagues that I should share the same 22 feeling.

24 CHAIRMAN PLESSET:

No, no.

I would say that l

25 they're a little unpredictable at times; always recalcitrant.

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COMMISSIONER AHEARNE:

Thank you.

Yes, j

i DR. SIESS:

When we discussed the Action Plan 3

last week, it was explained that once the Action Plan is 4

l approved by the Commission, then essentially all of the 3

i special task forces and so forth related to TMI are a 6

thing of the past.

The Action Plan is then integrated i

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into the agency's program and it becomes, let's say, the I

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plan together with the ongoing efforts.

9 i

Because one thing we haven't seen is an integrated 10 program that includes the Action Plan items and the ongoing 11 l

l efforts.

We've seen some indication of which of the on-12 going efforts might have to be taken up.

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c Will that result from the long-range program 14 l

that's being developed?

Will that then be a complete, integrated program of effort for the next two years with 14 i

all the Action Plan items and all the ongoing activities l

integrated into it?

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39 i

COMMISSIONER AHEARNE:

Well, I would hope so.

I 20 I qualify it by -- that obviously that there would be 21 l

the possibility of other changes as time goes on.

But i

22 the idea is that this last draf t, then, is the last that I

23 the Action Plan itself remains as.:a planning document.

24 So far the agency's programs, for the large i

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that c.he Ccznission hasn't agreed with many of those f

2 items in the Action plan and said yes, put them into the i

3 agency program.

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And this final stage process as we will be i

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addressing this third draft is at the point where the j

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Commission will decide yes or no on incorporation.

And 7

once they get incorporated, and because of finite l

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i resources that will mean some of the items that the I

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staff is proposing would have to then be deferred.

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to There will just be on agency program.

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DR. SIESS:

It will become a reference docu-i ment in preparing the programs for the various 13 l

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COMMISSIONER AHEARNE :

Yes.

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.t DR. SIESS:

It's cno thing they'll have.to i

16 consider.

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COMMISSIONER AHEARNE:

Yes.

18 i'

CHAIRMAN PLESSET:

Any other -- Dave, question?.

g MR. OKRENT:

I'll mention something that in 0

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my mind relates to the general topic you've opened up.

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We had a half-day Subcommittee meeting Wedensday with i

n a group headed by Denny Ross that are trying to look e

24 at what are called near-term CP's.

I suppose somebody U

will soon have an acronym, and the acronym.is tIie only i

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existing CP as I understand.

At the moment, they were going at the task by looking at the Action Plan and trying i

3 to see how those items apply to near-term CP's.

A There were a couple of general kinds of con-siderations that were raised durina the discussion.

The 1

4 I

representatives of the utilities invcived indicated that I

7 in their opinion there was a need for some kind of fairly 3

i meaningful policy guidance in a half-dozen general areas 9

that they identified like siting; like what's called 10 degraded or core conditions and some others -- emergency 11 l

planning.

I guess what they would call probablistic 12 methodology as applied to design and so forth.in order

!3 for them to know where they stood it.

i 1.L In other words, in fact, the way they put it --- j 13 r

l should they proceed?

I think that kind of policy guidance !

td won't come from just looking at what's now in the Action Plan because it was really prepared with operating i

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reactors and near terminal OL's in mind.

The other kind of question that was raised, i

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and probably by me primarily, was one not unrelated to theirs, but it's the extent to which they should try to i

n incorporate safety improvements in because they have some

• 4 flexibility at this time.

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3 It's not the same as a plant yet to be designed. :

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On the other hand, it's not the same as a plant existent, 2

and how does one go at that.

It's somewhat related to r

2 the questions they raised.

I'm not sure where the answers to these questions 3

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come from, but if the Commiss.on could help provide those I

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6 answers, that would be useful.

Or if they expect the 4

7 staff to come.in with recommendations, I think the staff 3

i should know that this is what the Commissioners want or j

9 so forth.

10 But at the' moment, it seemed to me that the 11 j

approach underway while relevant was incomplete, and in 12 fact, it wasn't addressing these fairly major considera-i is i

tions.

14 i

COMMISSIONER AHEARNE:

As a. Commission we have i

13 i

not yet met to provide guidance on the CP's.

I'm sure i

l 14 Harold has, on the other hand, tasked his people to I,,

becin thinking about that because at one of the Action I

19 Plan discussions, draft one or draft two, I think it was, l

it was mentioned that af ter -- clearly af ter the operating i 3

license issues were resolved that we were going to have 21 to turn to the CP issue,

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But I take -- see if we can't get some 24 commission guidance to the staff on that.

But at the i

J same time, that doesn't mean that you people -- I don't i

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l think you ever feel a reluctance to provide guidance.

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COMMISSIONER GILINSKY:

Dave, could you give some '

3 examples of the kinds of things you're talking about?

MR. OKRENT:

You mean in a general way -- well, e

let's just take the question of degraded core conditions.

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j I guess they would like to know is there any chance that i

they're going to have to include inerting of the contain-3

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ment at some future time.

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or is there any chance that they'll need to I

to include a core ladle?

There are some things that are it l

very hard to do; maybe impractical from an operational 1:

point of view or --

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COMMISSIONER GILINSKY:

Well, the inerting is la i

1 being considered now separately.

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MR. OKRENTr But -- yes, but when you lay'out 14 a plant --

COMMISSIONER GILINSKY:

And the degraded cores.

MR. OKRENT:

-- you may envision that you're 19 going in -- for example, if you have a plant of one i

i particular type, you may be assuming you will have 21

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access every week or every two weeks for whatever it is i

n that's to be done inside the containment, and you may I

24 consider that practical -- and then a containment that's l

a not in their data'and not very practici.1 if it is in their 3 larTWunaftesmas. VWeasT9ae AgrouTgua, [4 es Saffts C.48rT4It, ffWW7. L s. SHTW ter

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data.

You also -- as I say, there are some questions that l

I are fundamental this way.

3 From the siting point of view, once they put it l

there, then if they can't have a city of 6,000 within two I

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miles, and it's -- again, it becomes difficult for them to chance that.

So, they -- I think they have relevant questions, and I myself -- and I told them.

I would not I

assume if I were the executive vice-president that eight

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i years from now or whenever such a plant might be done i

to

- - --i that yesterday's requirements were those I'd be expected i

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to meet.

12 I mean I think that would be naive.

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j MR. MOELLER:

Are there concerns or safety Is I

issues that you're thinking about mostly containment i

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related?

id MR. OKRENT:

No.

No, that's just an example.

MR. MOELLER:

And site selection was one of 18

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them.

19 MR. OKRENT :

No.

This morning we were talking i

3 to the staff about changes that they're thinking about 21 in connection with control systems for B&W plants that j

t 23 happen to be this morning; but there are generic questions l

4 here.

And it would be better to have some idea of where f

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They mentioned, in fact, control room, as one I

of their considerations.

They'd like to have some kind 2

of guidance to know what they're going to need to do in control rooms because in their mind it affects a 4

3 variety of things in addition to the control room.

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So it's not strictly containment.

Containment is one that'comes to mind as posing some complex problems, I

l not all of which are easily reversible once you've poured

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concrete.

10 But you run into similar difficulties if one-11 later needs, you know, a four train auxiliary feed water 12 system, and you've really only left room for two train.

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l It may not be all that easy.

I'm inventing some numbers 14 l

just for purposes of discussion.

It may not be all that IJ easy to do it.

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CHAIRMAN PLESSET:

Yes, Dave.

I 17 MR. MOELLER:

Each of us, of course, looks at is the Action Plan from a different perspective.

There were several things that I have already mentioned to the

,0 staff which concern me.

For example, you talk about g

counter-measure actions including, say, the use of j

7 potassium iodine pills.

But I'm not sure that the NRC g

l 24 has the medical competence to evaluate this.

n And I think, indeed, you should have available i - = v

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to you a independent group of people to help you.

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The plan calls for a number of actions on the I

i part of state and local governmental agencies.

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you want to be careful that the plan includes caveats 3

to expressing the point of view that you have not yet 6

or that the state and local governments have not read l

I the plan.

i 3

j They have not taken part in its formulation so 9

I'm not convinced they will do everything you say.

A to I

l third example would be on manpower.

You -- or Action Plan calls in several places for better trained and 12 educated people particularly in the field of radiation l

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i protection; but there are really no concrete actions 14 i

from my perspective to correct the current deficiency

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15 of rad protection people.

Fundamentally meaning better to I.

college educational programs for such people.

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COMMISSIONER AHEARNE:

Oneach of those -- on l

the first, for example, on the potassium iodide protection, I would be interested in any suggestions you might have.on

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specific outside review group.That has been a point I

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of some contention that between the NRC and outside 1

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groups, and even within the NRC, there are strong 4

opinions on either side.

And we have, as you probably 3

know, a SANDEA study under way to try to provide some i

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advice and address that issue.

At least at the moment,

• s where we are tending to come out is to -- I think the staff 1

i will end up recommending,- and I think that I would second i

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guess that we would end probably agreeing to require 3

i potassium iodide in plants and in perhaps other highly 4

i clustered -- like hospitals and such.

j 7

l But it has not yet been decided.

There have been t

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l a number of requests for us to do it much more extensively, i

9 and there have been suggestions that we shouldn't even do-that.

But any --

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MR. MOELLER:

Well, again, here I would urge 1:

i that you consider the NCRP because it is chartered by 13 l

Congress, and it does have on its membership a number of l

i physicians and radiation biologists who, I think, could 3

provide the type of consultation which you need.

y MR. MARK:

On that same point, sir, I think g7 i

i there are unanswered questions as to the healthy effects tg i

19 of such pills on young children, and if you distribute l~

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them wholesale, and one of them swallows one, then you're i

21 really in a position you'd rather not be in.

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I think that belongs in this rush towards having l t

D them on every bathroom shelf.

Also, they have a shelf 24 life which I'm not sure how much data there is on it, but if the shelf-life is not infinite unless they're kept Isresumampana. Vapenftne 4sperfest im

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I COMMISSIONER AHEARNE:

Currently, I think our I

assumption is on the shelf-life has tended to be somewhere 4

i in between the five to ten year period.

As far as the 3

effect on young children, yes, that has been raised as l

l one of the issues.

So far, we have really been relying 6

f on FDA certification in addressing that question.

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MR. MARK:

That shelf-life is, I believe, pro-i' 7

viding you control -- keep them out of the sun and con-I to trol the temperature.

11 COMMISSIONER AHEARNE:

That could well be.

I 12 l

i do not know.

And on the state and local government l'

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actions, we have a number of efforts underway with state 14 1

and local governments primarily with regard to emergency l

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i planning, and the linkage that we have at the moment is f4 l

jointly with FEMA, the Emergency Management Agency.

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i There's a lot of concern in the state and local is governments.

Are they going to be able to meet the I

requirements we're putting down.

I think at the stage

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,f we're at now is that most of those governments have 21 f

f been exposed to the requirements.

We in FEMA have had 22 discussions with them, and many discussions in a number I2

4 of cases.

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whether (a) they're correct to take; (b) whether they're l

2 feasible to be done in their areas; and then (c) primarily 2

where is the money going to come from?

I That's been a major issue.

On the manpower, I 4

3 think that's a concern that we probably have across, not i

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6 just the radiation protection side.

At the moment, though,!

I I think we're faced with the situation of trying to reach j

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a conclusion as what should be the requirement, and then 9

if where necessary and appropriate to modify the scheduling tg of meeting those requirements.

11 A case in point, not in a radiation field, but 1:

in the operator control rooms, and we reach the conclusion 13-1 of what kind of requirements we would want.

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But then had to face the practical fact that 13 there weren't that many people, and they weren't --didn't 14 have that training.

But I think the point you would make l

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.I is quite a valid on.

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I'm not sure how to solve that.

You have many 19 i

colleagues in the institutional world that perhaps might i

40 assist in that.

21 1

DR. SIESS:

Is the potassium iodide question j

g I

i 6

73 something that the FEMA will take over, or is that i

24 NRC's responsibility?

i

3 COMMISSIONER AHEARNE:

Well, as long as the l

i

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me se caema. frisarr. E e, surft is, I

l

2. C. m

,o e

19

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raos.wo.

i I

-- to the extent that it's within the plant, for the i

plant personnel, that's NRC's responsibility.

For the actions outside the plant, we are still having discussions l

4 l

with FEMA as to what are the relative roles of each I

agency and who is responsible for it.

l 6

DR. SIESS:

Well, I know that NRC thought it i

l i

7 l

still had a role in some of the things because FEMA wouldn't t

i 3

l have enough expertise.

But if Dr. Moeller is right that NRC doesn't have the expertise in the medical field, 10 3

that wouldn't make much of an argument.

11 i

COMMISSIONER AHEARNE:

Well,'as I say, we're l

I 12 t

still discussing with them.

And I wouldn't say.that.it's j

been in any way-a tug on each side trying to grab.

It 14 i

I l

has been more trying to figure out how to get the t

adequate staffing of people to handle these problems.

l

{

g MR. MOELLER:

Just to comment on the manpower l

7 t

thing, in the years gone by -- of course, Oak Ridge used is to run the ORSORT, one year program for nuclear people, 39 it could be that reinstitution of something like that 20 21 would help meet some of the manpower needs.

i 22 Again, maybe it could be utility and other 22 groups jointly sponsoring it, i

24 COMMISSIONER AHEARNE:

Well, our own training i

people are looking at several ways of trying to solve our "d

8 l

isetsumerunnes. Vasenfine Musanersus la r.

ame SSWI9e CAMMM. STIEWT. E e. marrt ?st

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I l

n a

20 esas no.

t i

i j

own manpower needs.

As we look ahead, we can see that i

are going to have to do much more of training our own peopld j

j and so we establish that as one of the options they are 4

i l

looking at.

I I've read that INPO is going around to various 6

l universities attempting to see if they can establish 7

l programs to assist in some of INPO's needs.

3 I

l CHAIRMAN PLESSET:

Al?'

9 MR. LEWIS:

I wonder if, John,just to go back to the Action Plan for a minute and to look ahead to 11 i

the next accident, if you'll forgive the term, because 12 I'

we are trying to think of the way that the agency has is.

i responded to accidents after the fact instead gf perhaps I

i before the fact which might bear some thinking j.

i l

The big accidents -- the case of Brgwns Ferry j

as near as I could tell had very little impact on the l

7, ta l

way the Commission does business.

.It was an accident g9 which was recognized.

One understood it; a New Reg I

o guide on fire prevention went out.

But there was no 21 l

massive -- there were no massive public investigation.

22 There was a pretty good inhouse investigation of the l

l 22 causes of the fire and the results were implemented.

24 Three Mile Island provided sort of massive U

national orgasm or whatever you like of looking at the m= v m.

i,.c

,,m :n

_ s c.-a

21 l

c 2

%g I

i way NRC does business, and it's only in that context that l

2 I can understand why an accident that had two or thr9e I

causes generated an action plan with two or 300 items i

4 on it.

It provided an excuse for people to look back l

3 at everything else that they thought was wrong with the 4

agency.and with the way the one does business and that.

.I.

I And in that sense, it is a kind of -- it sort 8

f of legitimizes the disproportionate ratio there between-i f

responses and causes.

Crystal River is an accident which I

10 in my view has implications at least as serious as the l

11 implications of the Three Mile Island accident because 12 it has to do with the response of the control systems.

r i

of reactors to other peripherally-related malfunctions.

la i

And in the case of Crystal River, it's my _

l 1.!

personal view that the lessons necessary to prevent it j

Id I

should have been learned an RANCHO-SECO.

It's easy to 17 l

I look back and say this sort of thing, and I know per-la j

fectly well that so much goes through our hands that 19 it's easy in retrosoect to look back.

Now, there's no gr~ reponse to Crystal River, 21

?

I and as nearly as I can tell ACRS is going to consider j

2 hearing about it at the May meeting, and now the accident happened in February.

Have you, as a Commission, given 3

3 any thought to sort of getting a more evenly balanced i

l me

w i

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ruar.9e.

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response to accidents because there will be other accidents i 2

I perhaps like Crystal River unless we do something about r

i 2

i that problem.

I 4

COMMISSIONER AHEARNE:

The specific question 3

you asked -- have we focused on it -- the answer would I

I be no.

But let me say that what we did in Crystal River l

I is at least'getting more towards a more even approach.

I l

That is they did form a group of people who then con l

centrated on what did go wrong at Crystal River and i

i 1

IQ j

what conclusions were to be drawn.

11 And that is now working its way through the 12 i

I process of asking the operators of like plants, in this l

13 l

j particular case, why didn't you respond to a request.

la i

for information that we sent several months ago?

Tnat 13 t

if we had known the answers, we might have been able to l

14 I

tell you how to avoid this kind of a particular problem.

j But it wasn't the catharsis response of Three i

18 i

Mile Island.

It still isn't at the stage that we can 19 i

say if another accident were to happen next month --

,o s

21 tomorrow that we have a procedure in place that this i

g group of people get together, look at the problem and j

23 find what changes or what are the cause, and what I

i 24 solutions are being made.

I

s The Crystal River response is much more like i=

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I that.

I think they -- probably we hope that once Michael-son's effort gets underway, we will have a better l

f mechanism to do a quick review of where else those 2

l problems come up and what other integrated collection of data apply to that specific thing so we can much more i

i rapidly understand is it a unique situation which, as you 7

point out, was the Browns Ferry approach at the time.

3 Or is it a much more general situation identifying j

)

a lot of other problems which is the way we answered the 10 Three Mile Island.

We 've begun to recognize the problem 11 l

you pointed out, but we haven't yet reached an approach.

12 l

MR. LEWIS:

Well, you know in certain sense 13 I'

l just to follow up for one year, you are if you are between 14 i

~

~ ~

i a rock and a hard place in the sense that the Action 1.

Plan -- draft Action Plan -- draft four is it now or 14 whatever --

le i

o i

COMMISSIONER AHEARNE:

Three.

18 i

MR. LEWIS:

Well, I Icse track, you know.

Four l

l g,

I is the first large number, and I can't count that high.

20 But it now more than a year since Three Mile Island, 21 and that is beginning to take shaps, and yet there are j

23 contained within it things which we will be fighting about 24 which some of us think were done hurriedly and wrong, l

~5 and haven't had the benefit of reasonable analysis.

lerienne. Vemmartes *EP4WrWWEL 14

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I t

Yet, in a certain sense in Crystal River, it's 2

my personal view -- probably not shared by anybody -- that 2

i there were some obvious lessons on9hich action needed i

4 l

to be taken immediately, and now we're considering moving I

rather slowly along the way.

I 3

And I don't think Crystal River will generate 7

a list of co'uple of hundred items that need to be done, I

but I'll be t on 50 if you're willing to put two bits on 9

the subject a little later.

COMMISSIONER AHEARNE :

No, because you might t

11

-- both of us might be able to influence the number, l

12 i

and we don't want a conflict of interests on that.

13 l

MR. LEWIS:

If you can influence the outcome, 14 i

you influence the outcorte.

But I guess what I'm concerned.

13 i

about is that maybe at a time when we don't have a major i

Id accident staring us in the face, it might be a good time 17 i

to think through how the hell you do respond to an acci-la I

i dent because there will be another.

That's probablistic i

risk assessment.

20 4

COMMISSIONER AHEARNE:

If I could respond, I l

21

\\

think, though you're focusing on how you learn quickly j

i l

what the accidents are trying to tell you.

j g3 l

24 MR. LEWIS:

Isolate the things that cause the n

accident.

Fix them and then learn the long-term lessons.

l i

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a rsas no.

Don't mix them up.

j f

2 CHAIPAAN PLESSET:

You don't want them to rush to judgment, though, do you?

i l

MR. LEWIS:

If a car is coming at me, I'd A

3 jump out of the way, and then I get the license number.

I 4

CHAIRMAN PLESSET:

Well, I think Hal also gets a little bit excited about some of the Bulletin and Orders I

l 3

i that came out early in the game.

I COMMISSIONER AHEARNE:

You're trying to prod him.

11 MR. LEWIS:

I've decided to be kind and docile.

I t

12 CHAIRMAN PLESSET:

Oh, okay.

I won't prod you any further.

That was one of the things that was in our 14 NTOL letter.

13 i

COMMISSIONER AHEARNE:

Yes, I remember it was.

j j

14 MR. LEWIS:

Well, we'll be talking about those i

is i

specifics unquestionably but not on your time.

COMMISSIONER GILINSKY:

I wonder if we could 19 get back to the TMI containment.

I wonder if I could get the judgment of people of what they think about the need of being able to get into that containment soon; the importance of that.

7 CHAIRMAN PLESSET:

Let's see. Harold was the

4 chairman of that TMI-2.

And then Dave was also chairman i

3 i

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of a related committee.

Why don't you, in turn, respond?

I t

2 You're on the spot.

2 I

MR. ETHERINGTON:

I see no reason for not getting i

4 inside soon.

And I think we should.

3 MR. LEWIS:

Can I make a provocative comment

-l 5

on that, assuming that's the end of your comment?

I MR'. ETHERINGTON:

It's the end of mfcomment.

3 MR. LEWIS:

I thought it was. It was very incisive t

9 i

and a good example.

The argument against venting it is I

10 very weak.

That is to say the demonstrated damage to 11 j

human health is very, very small.

Is there a reason 1:

j that the NRC can't take incisive leadership on this and 13 i

~

1 say that?

I re. cognize that there are forces on both 14 side.

l 13 l

COMMISSIONER AHEARNE:

We have said --

[I id CHAIRMAN PLESSET:

They have said that.

17 COMMISSIONER AHEARNE:

Well, that is what, at i

least, the Environmental Assessment does say.

19 CHAIRMAN PLESSET:

It said that.

I COMMISSIONER GILINSKY:

What I'm trying to get g

at is we're taking a certain amount of time to think j

3

=

about the question, and how urgent is the need to get i

24 into that containment?

2 MR. LEWIS:

I'm raising a separate question.

i 1

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.C 9

27 raw se COM'tISSINER GILINSKY:

I know that.

2 DR. LEWIS:

Harold said it doesn't matter how 2

I urgent it is.

It's a good thing to do it.

And I'm adding 4

l that the argument against it is in large measure irrational i

3 although there is a great deal of it, and I personally 0

j had the feeling people would have more respect for NRC 7

if it could forthrightly say thee and do what is good

'for the public health and safe.ty.

9 COMMISSIONER GILIESKY:

Can we just stick to the--

10 MR. LEWIS:

It's my personal view.

11 COMMISSIONER BRADFORD:

That sounds exactly like 12 the stater. ants that the NRC would have made about on the l

I3 l

proposition of whether or not TMI-2 should have been 14 I

licensed if you'd asked us to take leadership on that i

13 i

question in March of 1977.

i to l

The difficulty is that the people who live i

17 around that plant have heard the rhetoric from the NRC i

about the proposition associated with building the two 19 i

units.

And now it looks to them like a certain amount 21 fo spinach.

And there -- a lot of them are saying to j

n hell with it.

The point is to pass that assessment, t

4 I think, through some sort of a process that enables a i

n lot of the people around the plant who are understandably A

terequonsmanan. Venenfree Muresreque., im l

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28 racz.ec.

1 l

worried about assurances coming from the same people who I

2 assured them that the plant itself was foolproof in a way l

l 2

l that they come out in the form that at inast a substantial majority of the public feels that they can put their 4

3 faith in.

I l

j And I just don't think it's enough for the

' ~ ~

7 NRC tc put $.t3 fd11 Pvestige behind the proposition and 3

l say trust us because we're the experts.

9 DR. SIESS:

Are you proposing a referendum?

I 10 CfIAIRMAN PLESSET:

I think -- let's put Victor's it j

question in a different words.

12 COMMISSIONER BRADFORD:

My point is that isn' t -

[

13 j

i enough for the five of us just to say as a matter of is i

l leadership we will say it's fine, and then everyone will j

12 r

fall in line.

Because the accident itself cost us i

14 i

a lot in that area.

II l

i DR. SIESS:

It isn't trough in what respect?

18 i

In the -- meaning acceptance c. protecting the health 19 and safety of the public?

g i

COMMISSIONER BRADFORD:

It isn't enough in 21 j

=

terms of expecting the people around the site, then, j

23 simply to sit back and say, okay, the experts have 24 l

spoken.

It isn't as though one could vent the krypton, 05 and then because no one could show a demonstrable injury I

i-oi v

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I 29

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a-or two later, we could sit back and say, okay, i

2 that problem is solved.

As it turned out the NRC was right.

2 The kinds of doubts inherent in the proposition in terms i

of the minds of the general public who can't be blamed 3

for not all being health physicists are that this has I

effects years and years later.

7 There are in the midst of the time when the S

l l

effects of the weapons tests' that you're showing when 7

the same agency assured people that those were safe.

10 l

DR. SIESS:

So you're trying to minimize the j

psychological effects as well as the physical effects?

1:

COMMISSIONER BRADFORD:

I'm trying to minimize l

i 13 the stress associated with the decision, yeah.-

14 i

1 CHAIRMAN PLESSET:

Let's put Victor's question 13

?

this way.

Are there reasonable technical based for wantingl Id to get into the containment sooner rather than later?

17 I

I think that's what you had in mind.

I COMMISSIONER GILINSKY:

That was my question.

DR. SIESS:

It is sooner rather than later if 20 21 you adopt the proposal --

i 2:

CHAIRMAN PLESSET:

No, no.

But this is a first i

l 23 step toward going into the containment.

The question is i

24 are there good technical reasons for dcing that sooner l

13 rather than later?

Well, Jerry and mayae Jessie i===ne v

moi.w. sic.

,n. <-nm.,, arr. s... m =

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I 30 l

o e

gasz.we.

I i

would like to talk to that?

I MR. EBERSOLE:

Well, what was running through 2

my mind is -- I don't know -- the conditions -- I don't 4

know what governs the rate of two peg, but the system 3

is evaporating.

Let's see.

No, it's on a mini-system.

now.

Or is it evaporating to the condensors?

I think -

l 6

I it's doing b'th, I think.

o l

MR. SIESS:

It's stacking to the steam generator.

~

i 9

COMMISSIONER GILINSKY:

It's steaming. -

l' 10 MR. EBERSOLE:

Well, in due course, I guess

~

you might imagine that you're going to get a tube --

1 I:

Paul Shewmm could say more about that than I.

And then-

!3 you'll be coupled over to the secondary circuit.

is MR. SHEWMON:

My only concern would be the 13 r

humidity in there is someplace between 90 and 100 percent, !

T4 I guess, and things just weren't designed to live in 17 j

that environment.

It CHAIRMAN PLESSET:

Yeah.

Okay.

1 MR. SHEWMON:

And I have not made any study i

of it, but that's the way things rust and corrode.

g DR. SIESS:

I don't think anybody has made a

u study of all the things that could go wrong in the cone l

3 l

tainment.

They talk about the losing the fan coolers, 4

3 and then losing their sub-atmospheric.

I'm not sure i

=v.s= % e de sen,fte CAMME pruseET, & m. surTE ter 1

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31 l

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csas sc.

i I

r I

l that --

e 2

COMMISSIONER GILINSKY:

Lot me ask you.

If one 3

had access now, what is it that you would be doing?

Or i

r is it simply desirable to be able to get in there quickly if you have to and be able to stay there longer than i

i 6

you would otherwise?

l 7

I guess all I can say is that you l

DR. SIESS:

3 l

will avoid the things thatmight happen if you don't have 9

i access now.

And we don't know what they are.

I to MR. LEWIS:

I agree with Chet on that.

You're 11 matching something that is demonstrably safe against I2 l

i something with which there are real uncertainties.- -

1' 13 l

COMMISSIONER GILINSKY:

I'm trying to get a la i

i better idea of what those uncertainties are.

a c-I3 e

DR. SIESS:

You're using equipment that was not:

i to designed to act in that environment.

And this naturally t,,

is going to worry an engineer.

CHAIRMAN PLESSET:

Right.

g DR. SIESS:

It's working.

He doesn't know how i

i 20 i

21 long it's going to work.

Now, I haven't seen erosion i

i n

effects study that would show me all the things that i

i n

could happen if various things went bad.

If it's the,

24 heat removal system, maybe it will just sit there and i

i 3

boil.

I don't know.

i l N MWeed.'/ N TTee h IM

{*]

me sawree c.wmm. sTaus?. s, s. marTu te, i

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But why let the thing sit there if you can get in there with minimum damage and find out what's there 2

i and be able to fix it.

4 l

CHAIRMAN PLESSET:

Jerry -- Jerry wanted to say I

ssmething.

6 i

i MR. RAY:

Whateverelectrical components are in 7

I there that are useful now and will be for the period S

l f

up to and including core repairs and so on, very definitely might be useful in monitoring and informative sense pro-10

.t viding information so that the operators know really what is going on in there and what it's state is.

12 They definitely were not -- the sensors ~and is so on were definitely not designed for the kind of alien gg

3 environment they're in.

And you're going to need this i

14 kind of information to keep it under control, or at least I.

l 4

knowwhattodothenexttime,orwhenthere'sadeviationl

7 t

18 from the present status.

I 19 And how long that will last is anybody's guess, 20 and I would myself hazard a guess it isn't going to be 21 l

too long.

So certainly if you could get in there --

I U

if you can make the environment suitable for people to U

go in and examine those and replace the elements, that they can see that be tests or observation are not in i

~

reliable state, you then preserve the integrity of that larTWHenfunnae, Vguenfras h lesq=,

amt mafThe GaMMM. fMBW7, & e. astTt !st 1

A & C. anE

33

.o e

caos.we.

i I

whole assembly beyond what it is now for whatever period i

I is necessary to get it to the point of repairs or 2

demolition.

So that-- and I would think that these are e

I sensing devices that really tell the doctor, if. you will, i

6 l

what your pulse rate is and what your blood pressure is 7

and so on thht could be critical.

3 l

MR. MARK:

This doesn't say anything new, but 9

'l i

I think it might help put a slightly different light on 10 it.

It has been said in some of the statements that 11 there's a great anxiety and impatience to get in.

12 l~

l I think that's the wrong emphasis.

People know

, is l'_

j what they might do if they could get in.

And there's 14 i

-- Jerry's pointing out -- there are indeed reasons why 13 it would be attractive.

But in one very simplistic sense l

to t

-- you have the option now of having the small effect 1,,

i i

that Hal is referring to -- certainly unmeasurable.and la

- g l

demonstrably small -- you have the option of doing this j

19 i

l when you choose and under favorable circumstances.

3 l

And if anything goes wrong with this equipment, 21 g:

it is not designed nor guaranteed or nor guaranteeable n

to keep working, then you will not have that option any-24 more.

3 MR. RAY:

You may lose a desirable element of U

i===. = v en.rm muroerem i e

-I sewem ewmm. rrmer, s... m,r e

_- _ _ a a c==

34 C

=

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i control.

g 2

CHAIRMAN PLESSET:

Bill Kerr.

TAPE 2 i

MR. KERR:

It would be desirable to have radio-VM 4

active water from where it is with the uncertainty of that 3

it's being contained on a continuous basis to somewhere i

I 4

where you'd know much more about your ability, at least, j

7 to store it for the time being.

That is a possible leakage f

that could take place that has to be considered essentially 8

7 in balance against the gaseous leakage.

to I don't disagree with anything that my colleagues, 1

II have said except I certainly sympathize with your concern I:

about the psychological ' trauma associated with the 13 i

i local residents.

I think it's very real, and I do not I.4 i

think any of us can ignore that.

V 1

i 15

~

And I can understand your wrestling with the j

T4 i~

problem.

It seems to me it's a very real problem and 17 important one.

We can see that they are irrational, 18 and they are irrational in a sense; but irrational things 19 l

can be very real so I don't see how you can ignore that 20 problem, and I don't think you are.

21 COMMISSIONER BRADFORD:

Does anyone have a fix I:

l on how long an individual can work in that environment I

with -- if it's fully vented on the one hand, or i#

4 4

it isn't vented at all on the other?

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35 f

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1 I

MR. EBERSOLE :

With the water in it?

I e

I COMMISSIONE3 BRADFORD:

With the water still in 3

it?

h MR. KERR:

Is there an order of events set up 4

i now as to whether the water goes out first or the gas goes out first, or should there be one?

6 7

j COMMISSIONER BRADFORD:

The proposition is that 3

the gas would go.

7 1

MR. KERR:

The example that I f.aw was 10 f

something like a rem per hour due to the krypton whole II l

body and something like 150 rands skin dose, but that was, l

12 I presume, just due to the krypton and was based on a 13 1

I measurement of.the krypton, and one doesn't really know i

14 i

what sort of gamma dose would accrue if water were still l

15 I

l there, I expect, or have you made estimates of that?

l CHAIRMAN PLESSET:

Have you got an estimate?

I.

s MR. VOLLMER:

A couple hundre millirands full 14 i

19 body if the -- near the containment entry point into i

t 79 the krypton --

21 CHAIRMAN PLESSET:

And prepared with --

22 MR. VOLLMER:

1.2 rands --

l t

2:

CHAIRMAN PLESSET:

So that's a big reduction.

~

24 Okay.

05 MR. VOLLMER:

-- full body.

t lmftWest. V4 Mffee h lfuC me m GMusT44.191W7. & e. EffM SF

-_..&LM

36 l

o e

rasz se.

i I

I DR. SIESS:

That's beta?

2 i

MR. VOLLMER:

That's gamma.

Beta would be I

several hundred rads with the krypton in it.

4 l

DR. SIESS:

But you can -- protective equipment 3

you could get that down.

But you couldn't do much lower.

l 0

MR. VOLLMER:

Right.

i I

CHAIRMAN PLESSET:

That's very risky, too.

I

.f DR. SIESS:

So after venting before you do 9

i any cleaning up, you would have 200 millirand per hour?

10 MR. VOLLMER:

Yes.

11 DR. SIESS:

You think.

You really don't know i

12 till you get in there.

13 i

MR. VOLLMER:

We're pretty sure because of 14 i

measurements that were. made right at the air locks over 12 r

through a window.

Ar.d also instruments have been inserted ;

id i

through another penetration.

17 l

DR. SIESS:

And the cleanup would have to be f

18 sort of progressive to rate of steams to get it down --

-l 19 i

where we could really get in there and do any hands on

,0

-- clutch hands-on work.

MR. KERR:

Well, if the -- if I understand j

7 your question, I think the answer perhaps is hours as f

g i

24 compared to minutes.

Just how long you can work or 3

if it were vented compared to how long one could work I

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CHAIRMAN PLESSET:

Is that what you were 3

i asking, Victor?

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COMMISSIONER BRADFORD:

That's right.

That's what I was I

l 6

I CHAIRMAN PLESSET:

Oh, Peter.

I'm sorry.

7 CO'MMISSIONER BRADFORD:

Yeah.

But does it, l

3 in fact, work out to minutes?

DR. SIESS:

Unvented it's zero.

l 10 l

l MR. KERR:

It' depends on the assumptions you il 1

i make about skin dose that one is likely to accrue and the 1:

protective clothing and what you can do in the protective 13 i

j clothing, I think.

14 MR. EBERSOLE:

There was a time, not long agot 13 when there was a fairly substantial rate of venting from l

Id i

the old waters.

I don't know at this moment how much 17 l

that's been cleaned out, but it was quite a bit that used to come out of the stacks.

It almost sounds like there r

19 l

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l might be a base standard about curies per second.

.O MR. KERR:

But Jess, I think it has been g

estimated that the total population dose would be less j

i l

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3 than one would get in a year's operation of a BWR.

But l

l 24 you are using logic now, and that -- I'm not being 3

facetious.

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It isn't altogether a logical question.

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MR. EBERSOLE:

We can talk about pipelines to 2

i the ocean and balloons to go in the sky and all sorts of l

4 things.

3 l

MR. MARK:

There's a thing that I I

i wanted to mention.

I think it almost fits here.

We I

have seen a New Reg 0673 which are answers to questions I

about removing krypton.

I 9

COMMISSIONER GILINSKY:

It should be draft, 10 I hope.

i 11 MR. MARK:

Draft, if you like.

12 It gives the expected radiation units in millirand.

13 j

It recognizes that people don't know -- since they're la i

i not pure physicists -- what a millirand means anymore i.

13 than a nuclear physicist does in the biological sense.

I 16 l

Obviously, it is felt that that isn't a meaningful --

3 17 f

doesn't convey a meaning.

18 i

I In order to help with that, there's a comparison 19 to how much you might get if you had a dental X ray which

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of course, raises painful questions of its own, and seems 3

21 like a somewhat unfortunate choice of trying to bring it j

7 down to earth.

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And so I don't criticize the numbers of the l

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3 statements, but there's a problem which it would be nice N

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if one could somehow break through and solve of trying to 2

i convey the meaning that is there which allows us to say 2

this is a very small amount of radiation and make that i

l felt.

4 3

And I don't think what is here really makes it 1

4 seem to me that it has solved the problem.

There is a i

I suggestion I've heard, and I will just mention it; and l

8 I

whether it's a good one would have -- one would have:to l

l walk around with it for a week or so and find out.

10 l

And that was the invention of the new and 11 current -- rendering current a new unit which was in 12 i

this converstion named the NAT, not to use the "g". -

I3 It's the natural radiation unit.

It's the amount-of 14 i

radiation you get in a day whether there's any Three

- l 13 Mile Island or not.

I l

id And putting things on that scale would 17 probably come through a little better than the dental 18 X ray.

And if one could persuade people to use things in I

19 l

I j

those terms, it would -- now, often it is said that af ter 20 you've gone through the rems and millirands and krypton 21 85 and so forth that this is after all you get -- whether l

you like it or not -- 130 millirands a year, but again, g

i it's back in back in millirands and nobody knows what 74 l

u it means.

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2 one could do something like this, and I don't know how l

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to do it, and yet it would have a very useful effect.

MR. LEWIS:

That would be a thousand milli-nats 4

3 and thousands of big numbers.

8 COMMISSIONER AHEARNE:

Let me just -- the i

I attempt this document you have -- there is an attempt, i

+

3 l

and I think they're still working on it -- is to try to I

9 answer questions that -- to try to get something other t

10 j

than the more formal, very technical environmental 11 assessment that people could try to work with and perhaps i

12 get a better understanding because there's a large 13 I

l problem getting understanding.

14 i

But there still exists two problems.

.One problem; 13 r

is the one that came up here when you people were talking to about potassium iodide.

And the general thrust was i

17 how does the NRC know about health effects in potassium 1a l

iodide?

19 l

Well, the same kind of a question rises.

How

,0 4

does the NRC know about health effects with respect to g

i these radiation releases?

That's problem one.

And problem g

tw is the one that as Peter described: even if we go 22 24 through as crystal clear an explanation as possible, a

there are still a large number of people who just won't i

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believe us.

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2 MR. LEWIS:

Well, that doesn't mean you shouldn't 2

I do it.

i COMMISSIONER AHEARNE:

No, no.

I'm just 3

trying to answer so there really is a limit on how much i

explanation.

You shouldn't believe that just because you I

put it very' clearly that people will now say, "Ah-ha, I 3

i now see."

9 MR. LEWIS:

I agree with you.

i 10 l

l MR. MARK:

Don't think I was being critical.

11 COMMISSIONER AHEARNE:

No, I understand.

1:

MR. MARK:

I'm appreciative of the effort.

13 l

I wish it could be done so that one could then expect ts that it would be accepted in the sense meant, and this 13

- is a good effort, and it seems to me that it still didn't l

14 l

get away from somewhat incomprehensible terms.

COMMISSIONER AHEARNE:

Yeah.

18 DR. SIESS:

But you want to be both. credible and comforting.

i 0

21 l

COMMISSIONER AHEARNE:

I'm not sure about the~

comforting.

We want to be understandable.

And we would-g r

like to be credible.

I sure will get that.

n 24 COMMISSIONER BRADFORD:

I think the point is i

2 for the information to come across credibly regardless of i

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c. g 3e, i

t whether it's -- you believe we convey it or not.

I think 2

for example, Governor Thornburg may have done something quite useful in enlisting the assistance of people who i

are basically skeptical about nuclear power depending 4

3 on what conclusions they come to.

i 3

But they may be, in fact, able to get the I

3 I

point with the krypton across for other as well or better I

l than we'll be able to do to those parts of the community 7

that are just determined that in the short run, at least, 10 l

the NRC is not a credible source to them.

i 11 DR. SIESS:

I think for understandable reasons i

1:

there hasn't been a great deal of publicity given or 13 i

emphasis placed on the risk people are at as long as 14 i

there is all that water and all of that krypton in the l

13 containment.

We don't want to scare them further.

14 I

l And it's an uncertain risk.

It's uncertain 17 l

in the probabilities; uncertain in its consequences.

It But it's still there.

And I think -- I would be much 19 more concerned about that uncertain consequence; un-t j

,0 certain probability of that risk than I would about the g

fairly certain maximum ten millirands from the venting j

or purging.

And I'm not health physicist either, but n

y I know something about what ten millirands means 3

I've made five trips to Washington each year

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that's just this year.

l CHAIRMAN PLESSET:

This chairman is not popular 4

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with his colleagues, but I have to make another unpopular e

I l

decision, and recess this session.

Thank you, i

6 (Whereupon, the meeting was adjourned.)

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