ML19309D891

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Insp Rept 50-313/73-06 on 730509-11.Noncompliance Noted: Improper Documentation of Significant Deficiency Evaluation Re Control Rod Trip Breaker & of Mechanical Interlock Nonconformance
ML19309D891
Person / Time
Site: Arkansas Nuclear Entergy icon.png
Issue date: 06/01/1973
From: Brownlee V, Crossman W
NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II)
To:
Shared Package
ML19309D855 List:
References
50-313-73-06, 50-313-73-6, NUDOCS 8004110726
Download: ML19309D891 (11)


See also: IR 05000313/1973006

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UNITED STATES

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ATOMIC ENERGY COMMISSION

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DIRECTORATE OF REGULATORY OPERATIONS

REGION 11 - Suet E 818

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RO Inspection Report No. 50-313/73-6.

Licensee: Arkansas Power and Light Company

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Sixth and Pine Streets

Pine Bluff, Arkansas

71601

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Facility Name:

Arkansas Nuclear One, Unit 1

Docket No.:

50-313

License No.:

CPPR-57

Category:

A3/B1

Location: Russellville, Arkansas

Type of Licensee: B&W, PWR-2568 Mwt, 880 Mwe

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Type of Inspection: Routine, Unannounced

Dates of Inspection: May 9-11, 1973

Dates of Previous Inspection: March 6-9, 1973, and March 20-21, 1973

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Principal Inspector:

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V. L. Brownlee, Reactor inspector

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Facilities Section

Facilities Construction Branch

Accompanying Inspectors: None

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Other Accompanying Personnel: None

Reviewed By:

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W. A. Crossman, Senior Inspector

Facilities Section

Facilities Construction Branch

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R0 Report No. 50-313/73-6

SIDefARY OF FINDINGS

I.

Enfore.ement Action

A.

Violations

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Certain items appear to be in violation of 10 CFR 50,

Appendix B, " Quality Assurance Criteria for Nuclear Power

Plants," as indicated below:

73-6-Al Lack of Documentation and Effecting Followup of Corrective

Action Regarding Possible Nonconforming Mate-ials, Parts or

Components

Contrary to Criteria XV and XVI, the inspection revealed

that AP&L's program for handling of significant construction

deficiencies failed to document and effect followup evalua-

tion of an apparent significant construction deficiency re-

garding the control rod drive trip breaker undervoltage trip

assembly problem identified at the Oconee nuclear facility.

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(Details I, paragraph 4)

73-6-A2 Documentation of Nonconforming Materials, Parts or Components

Contrary to Criterion XV, the inspection revealed that AP&L's

constructor, Bechtel, has been lax in implementing in a timely

manner nonconformance reports for the purpose of reporting,

controlling, processing and documenting resolution of noncon-

formances identified during inspection. This was evidenced

by the several months sr in between identifying the mechanical

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interlock problems associated with the Allis-Chalmers motor

control centers and initiating the nonconformance report.

(Details I, paragraph 5)

B.

Safety Items

None

II.

Licensee Action on Previously Identified Enforcement Matters

A.

Violations

None

B.

Safety Items

None

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III. New Unresolved Items

None

IV.

Status of Previously Reported Unresolved Items

72-4/2 Cable Routing (Region II Letter, July 27, 1972, Item 2)

The routing of cables under the control room removable

floor may not meer safeguards and reactor protection systems

separations and loading criteria.

It is our understanding

that the licensee will evaluate this item and corrective

measures will be initiated as may become necessary. This

item remains open.

72-4/3 Cable Routing (Region II Letter, July 27, 1972, Item 2)

The separation of safety channel wiring inside the B&W

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supplied panels may not meet the requirements of the

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safeguarG1 and reactor protection systems separations

and loading requirements. It is our underscanding that

the licensee will evaluate this item and corrective

meascres will be initiated as may become necessary.

This item remains open.

72-4/4 Control Rod Drive Motor Tube Defect Analysis (Region II

Letter, July 27, 1972, Item 3)

Upon arrival of documentation onsite, AP&L will audit the

NDT records to verify that tubes meet acceptance criteria

of BAW 10047, Rev. 1, and identify physical location of

installed minimum wall tubes.

AP&L has documented acceptable tubes by serial number and

physical location. This item is closed.

(Details I,

paragraph 3)

72-7/1 Pressurizer Safety and Relief Valve Mounting and Connecting

Piping (Region II Letter, August 21, 1972, Item 1)

It is our understanding that the licensee will evaluate the

pressurizer safety and relief valve mountings and connecting

piping to assure that these have been analyzed for dynamic

reaction forces during blowdown. This item remains open.

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72-11/1 Paddle-Type Flow Switches (Region II f atter, December 19,

1972 Item 1)

AP&L has determined that those paddle type flow switches

to be used do not' represent a safety problem. This item

is closed.- (Details I, paragraph 6)

72-11/2 B&W Safety cabinets - Internal Panel Wiring (Region II

Letter. December 19, 1972, Item 2) (See Item 72-4/3.)

It is our understanding that the licensee will require that

B&W perform an engineering evaluation of all safety cabinets

regarding conformance to the separations criteria for internal

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cabinet wiring. This item remains open.

72-11/3 Cable Installation in control Room and Computer Room False

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Floor and Floor of Main Control Panels (Region II Letter,

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December 19, 1972, Item 3) (See Item 72-4/2.)

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It is our understanding that the licensee will require

Bechtel to evaluate cable installation under the control

room and computer room false floor regarding separations,

loading and quality workmanship criteria. This item

remains open.

72-12/2 Valve Wall Thickness Verification (Region II Imtter,

_ June 30,1972)

It is our understanding that AP&L will develop and implement

a verifiertion program when AEC defines the requirements

regarding their letter of exception, July 28, 1972. This

item remains open.

73-2/2 Lack of Material Control Weld Filler Material (RO Inquiry

Report No. 50-313/73-lQ/CDR)

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This item is being evaluated by Headquarters staff. This

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item remaina open.

73-4/1 Faulty Overcurrent Trip Delay Device on Circuit Breakers

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For Engineered Safety Systems (RO Bulletin 73-1. RO:II

Letter, Dated February 12, 1973)

B&W and Bechtel report that no circuit Breakers of the

type identified in the R0 Bulletin are used. This item

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is closed.

(Details I, paragraph 7)

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73-4/2 Limitorque Valve Operators (Region II Letter,

December 4, 1972)

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AP&L has identified the defective units and are in the

process of changing out the torque switches. This

item-is closed.

(Details I, partgraph 8)

73-6/1 Motor Control Center - Reversing Starters (R0 Inquiry Report

No. 50-313/73-20)

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AP&L has identified the defective units and are in the process

of changing out the units. This item is closed.

(Details I,

paragraph 5)

V.

Design Changes

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Core Flood Modifications. .(Details I, paragraph 2)

VI. Unusual Occurrences

None

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VII. Other Significant Findf_ags

A.

Project Status

See Details I, paragraph 2, " General."

B.

Personnel or Organizational Changes

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None

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C.

Inquiry Reports

None

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VIII. Management Interview

. Arkansas Power and Light Company (AP&L)

N. A. Moore - Chief QA Coordinator

A. C. Bland - QA Engineer (Civil)

C. L. Bean - QA Engineer (Mechanical)

E. Quattlebaum - QA Engineer (Electrical)

L. W. Humphrey - QA Engineer (General)

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Bechtel Engineering Corporation (Bechtel)

C. G. Beckham - Lead QA Engineer (Mechanical)

P. W. Sly - QC Engineer (Records)

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The inspectors apprised the attendees of the general areas of

inspection and findings.

The enforcement action items identified above were discussed.

The licensee was informed that RO:II had no further questions

regarding previously identified unresolved items 72-4/4, 72-11/1,

73-4/1, 73-4/2 and 73-6/1.

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R0 Report No. 50-313/73-6

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DETAILS I

Prepared By: ' L-

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V. L. Brownlee, Reactor

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Inspector, Facilities

Section, Facilities

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Construction Branch

Dates of Inspection: May 9-11, 1973,,

Reviewed By: hd

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W. A. Crossman, Senior

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Inspector, Facilities

Section, Facilities

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Construction Branch

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1.

Individuals Contacted

a.

Arkansas Power and Light Company -(AP&L)

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N. A. Moore - Chief QA Coordinator

A. C. Bland - QC Inspector (Civil)

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C. L. Bean - QC Inspector (Mechanical)

E. Quattlebaum - QC Inspector (Electrical)

L. Humphrey - QC Inspector (General)

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H. G. Petty - Senior Plant Electrician

b.

Contractor Organizations

Bechtel Engineering Corporation (Bechtel)

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W. T. Stubblefield - Project Superintendent

C. G. Beckham - Lead QA Engineer

P. W. Sly - QC Engineer

F. Plutchak - QA Supervisor (San Francisco)

G. Richey - Electrical Engineer

2.

General

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Progress of Construction: Physical construction is estimated to be

97% complete. Piping systems installation is considered 99% complete.

Electrical systems installation is estimated to be 98% complete.

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Bechtel personnel onsite for Unit 1 is 296. AP&L personnel is 92

including 5 QA. Labor problems, none.

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R0 Report No. 50-313/73-6

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Work Summary and Schedule

All systems have been released to operations for startup and

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testing except the reactor coolant loop. Bechtel is reported

to have completed original scope of work and have remaining some

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work on scope changes and rework. The ECCS modification is not

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completed; however, the system has been turned over to operations

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and will be released back to construction for piping modification

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later.

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3.

Control Rod Drive Motor Tube Defect Analysis

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AP&L has qualified the inspection results with regard to the

acceptance limits as prescribed in Topical Report BAW-10047.

AP&L has received thrity-five units that were qualified to meet

the minimal wall thickness acceptance limits. These units are

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identified by serial number and physical installation is mapped.

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Region II has no further questions regarding this item.

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4.

Control Rod Drive Trip Breakers

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AP&L was questioned regarding the undervoltage trip assembly

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problems identified at the Oconee facilitics. It became

apparent that AP&L personnel were aware of the problem as

indicated by correspondence (onsite), dated April 11, 1973.

There appeared to be a lack of management awareness of the

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problea, a lack of documenting and initiating investigative

action to determine if ANO-1 equipment was defective, and failure

to instigate evaluation procedures in accordance with AP&L's

QAP-8, " Handling of Significant Construction Deficiencies,"

to determine if the problem has safety significance and is

an AEC reportable item.

This lack of management knowledge and timely attention to a

known apparent significant deficiency of safety related equipment

is considered a violation of Criteria XV and XVI.

5.

Motor Control Center - Reversing Starters (Inquiry Report No.

50-313/73-2Q, April 23, 1973)

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The reversing starters are required to be equipped with mechanical

interlocks which prevent the simultaneous closure of both sets of

contacts. During routine werk bench tests by field forces, it

became apparent that because of excessive manufacturing tolerances

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RO Report No. 50-313/73-6

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of the mecbanical interlocks, it would be possible to move both

contact assemblies into the closed position. Corrective action

was worked out with Bechtel and Allis-Chalmers. Discussion with

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both AP&L and 'Bect ' .1 personnel and review of records indicate

that all affected

.ts will be corrected by changing out modi-

fled assemblies. L 2/Bechtel reports that there were no problems

found in the electrical interlocks of tbs starters during checkout.

Onsite documentation (October 13, 1972 - April 17, 1973) was

reviewed. The deficiency description and corrective actions were

documented on NCR E-604 dated February 8, 1973. This late date

of the NCR appears to indicate a laxness on the part of Bechtel's

engineers / inspectors to properly inrplement in a timely manner

documentation of inspection findings and rework activities in

accordance with Bechtel's Field Inspection Procedure G-3,

" Processing of Nonconforming Items."

6.

Paddle-Type Flow Switches

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Bechtel has researched the use of paddle-type flow switches

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within the scope of their supply. Their research identified

two items used in the dirty waste filter drains. Analysis of

- their. use (high flow alarm) indicates that the advantages

of having them is offset by the problems they may create and

concluded that deletion of the items is the best solution.

Three vendor supplied items were found in the decay heat

removal coolers and control room emergency unit air filter for

which replacement work is being initiated. Several flow switches

were identified for the penetration room; however, no vendor

information was available at this time and Bechtel proposed to

AP&L that their use would be rejected. Three flow switches were

identified in the fire water systems and evaluation of their use

is not complete. Bechtel identified several flow switches supplied

by B&W associated with auxiliary systems of the reactor coolant

pumps. Bechtel initiated an inquiry to B&W. B&W questioned

Allis-Chalmers regarding the use of padale-type flow switches in

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' the oil systems of the reactor coolant pump motors and their

service esperience. Allis-Chalmers states that they have used

these flow switches on all the reactor coolant pump' motors they

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have manufactured and have not experienced any failures of this

type switch to date. Two switches are used to indicate that the

backstop lube pumps are pumping. These pumps are operated only

for startup and coastdown of the pumps. Capacity of the back-

stop lube pumps is 4.5 gpm at 10 psi. Two switches are in the

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RO Report No. 50-313/73-6

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oil lines which circulate oil through the upper bearing oil coolers

in the event of reverse rotation by the pump motors. Two switches

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are in lines which' carry the flow of oil from the coolers back to

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the oil reservoir. These switches are in continuous service.

Allis-Chalmers analysis is that use of these switches will not

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affect plant safety or availability since the switches are not

in critical services. Since Allis-Chalmers has not previously

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experienced failure and report that secondary indications of

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oil system performance are available and that safety is not a

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factor, they have recommended continued use of these particular

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switches. AF&L concurs.

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7.

Faulty Overcurrent Trip Delay Device on Circuit Breakers for

Engineered Safety Systems (R0 Bulletin 73-1)

B&W's scope of supply does not include any circuit breakers of the

stated type or design. B&W does supply circuit breakers that are

located in the control rod drive central system which are used to

interrupt power to its load. These are General Electric circuit

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breakers and are used in the undervoltage mode. No time delay

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overcurrent trip feature is provided in this design.

Bechtel has surveyed all safety related circuit breakers in their

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scope of supply and report that no circuit breakers referred to in

AEC RO Bulletin 73-1 are being used.

Region II has no further questions regarding this item.

8.

Limitorque Valve Operators

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AP&L has identified seventy-five operators (AP&L letter dated

March 14, 1973) that may contain defective torque switches.

AP&L's electrical personnel and Bechtel construction are in.

the process of changing switches on these identified units.

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Discussion with AP&L and Bechtel personnel and review of work

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lists-and documentation records indicate that this matter is

being resolved in a satisfactory _anner.

Region II has no

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further questions regarding this item.

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Ltr to Arkansas Power and Light Company

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. D. Thornburg, RO

RO:HQ (4)

Directorate of Licensing (4)

DR Central Files

  • PDR
  • NSIC
  • State
  • To be dispatched with licensee response.

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