ML19309D544
| ML19309D544 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Trojan File:Portland General Electric icon.png |
| Issue date: | 04/03/1980 |
| From: | Goodwin C PORTLAND GENERAL ELECTRIC CO. |
| To: | Schwencer A Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation |
| References | |
| NUDOCS 8004100459 | |
| Download: ML19309D544 (7) | |
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C April 3, 1980 Trojan Nuclear Plant Docket 50-344 License NPF-1 Director of Nuclear Reactor Regulation ATTN:
Mr. A. Schwencer, Chief Operating Reactors Branch #1 Division of Operating Reactors U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, D. C.
20555
Dear Sir:
Pursuant to the telephone conversations of March 18 and 24, 1980 between Portland General Electric Company (PCE) and members of your staff con-cerning the potential for degraded grid voltage, attached (Attachment 1) 4 is a marked-up copy of proposed Technical Specifications with regard to the second level undervoltage protection. This marked-up draft is to be considered preliminary and should not be construed as a request for a license amendment at this time. The attached copy of proposed Technical Specifications is being transmitted in order for your staff to expedite completion of the Trojan Safety Evaluation Report on degraded grid voltage.
It should be noted that the relay and time delay setpoints, in Table 3.3-4 in particular, are preliminary and subject to change as the design is finalized during the next 4 months. However, in any case, neither the setpoints for initiation of second level protection including the toler-ance range will be less than 3.85 kV, nor will the time delay before initiation of second level pr,otection be greater than 60 sec. The License Change Application containing the final Technical Specification changes will be submitted to you in approximately 4 =onths upon completion of.the final design.
S
/!/
P 800_4100 yQ
.hr.' tid C.5N.T} EdC CCTT.pi"f Mr. 'A.
Schwencer April 3,-1980 Page 2 Additiorially, it was agreed during the teleptone calls that the last sentence in the PGE response to NRC Position 2 (Page 7 in the PGE letter of January 11, 1980) should be deleted in order to avoid misinterpreta-tion of the context. A corrected page (Attachment 2) is attached to replace the original one.
Sincerely, f
/
C. Goodwin, Jr.
Assistant Vice President Thermal Plant Operation and Maintenance CG/KM/4sa5A12 Attachments c:
Mr. Lynn Frank, Director State of Oregon Department of Energy F
e
n TABLE 3.3-3 (Continued)
ENGINEERED SAFETY FEATURE ACTUATl0N SYSTEM INSTRUMENTATION HINIMUM TOTAL NO.
CllANNELS CllANNELS APPLICABLE FUNCTIONAL UNIT _
0F CilANNELS 10 11tIP OPERABLE _ OPERATING MODES ** ACTION ***
LOSS OF POWER a.
4.16 kv Energency Bus Undervoltage (Loss of Voltage) 4
/ Bus 2/ Bus 3%/ Bus 1, 2, 3 AW g
?
b.
4.16 kv Energency Bus E
Undervoltage (Degraded Voltage) 4%/ Bus 2/ Bus
/ Bus 1, 2, 3 AK E
R R
R B
n
~
5 9
E w
[
n par re applicable for e logic) 2 k
- Required when ESF equipment is c
required to be operable
- Action A for 2 out of 4 logic
- dhMNorW
^
I
Paga 2 of 4 TABLE 3.3-3 (Continued)
ACTION STATEMENTS ACTION A
- With the number of OPERABLE channels one less than the i
Total Number of Channels operation may proceed provided both of the following conditions are satisfied:
a.
The inoperable channel is placed in the tripped condition within one hour, b.
The Minimum Channels OPERABLE requirement is met; however, one additional channel may be bypassed for up to 2 hours2.314815e-5 days <br />5.555556e-4 hours <br />3.306878e-6 weeks <br />7.61e-7 months <br /> for surveillance testing per Specification (4.3.2.1.1).
+
ACTION B
"+ *he nur.ber of OPERABLE Channels one less +.
e Total ~i.
hannels o ae **.m.
r eed until performance of *
'aa" ired CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL TE
. the inoperable
...a placed in the 1pped condition within 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br />.
e e
o
(~
TABLE 3.3-4 (Continued)
EllGirlEERED SAFETY FEATURE ACTUATION SYSTEM IriSTRUMEllTATION TRIP VALUES ALLOWABLE FUitCTI0flAL UllIT TRIP VALUE VALUES LOSS OF POWER (2%O)voth g)Mly (3;&>t31o)vd{3,o; g,
n Nss'or'?2tEc'5 ""' ""# " '
( l' ) ***J *ia* dda9
( 1.1 t o.1h.-a t;= a.b, b.
4.16 kv Emergency Bus Undervoltage (393o)voHs mA a.
( 3";3ot t) voHs wA. &
(Degraded Voltage)
{ tE) Sud time ddag
( 'i5 5 ) semJ l'% 4%
9 w
TABLE 4.3-2 (Continued)
ENGINEERED SAFETY FEATURE ACTUATION SYSTEM INSTRUMENTATION SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS OFERATING CilANNEL MODES IN WilICH CilANNEL CilANNEL FUtiCTIONAL SURVEILLANCE FUI:CTI0flAl UNIT CllECK CALIBRATION TEST REQUIRED LO5S OF POWER a.
4.16 kv Emergency Bus Undervoltage (Loss of Voltage)
S R
M 1, 2, 3 b.
4.16 kv Emargency Bus Undervoltage (Degraded Voltage)
S R
H 1, 2, 3 S = at least once per 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br /> R = at least once per 18 months 1
o M = at least once per 31 days 4
1; I
. a
~
ATTACHMENT 2 Corrected page in PGE response of January 11, 1980 to the NRC.
motors and therefore, these relays will not operate. Since the under-voltage protection is still connected to the 4.16-kV ESF buses,.degrada-tion of the of fsite power source with the onsite source supplying the emergency loads will have no ef fect on the undervoltage protection scheme. Once fully loaded, only diesel generator mechanical or elec-trical component failures will cause the 4.16-kV ESF bus voltage to degrade to the setpoint of either level of undervoltage protection for the required time period. Assuming a single failure, only one of the two redundant s'afety trains will be affected; safe plant shutdown will still proceed using the redundant train.
NRC POSITION 3 - Onsite Power Source Testing We require that'the Technical Specifications include a test requirement to demonstrate the full functional operability and independence of the onsite power sources at least once per 18 months during shutdown. The Technical Specifications shall include a requirement for tests:
(1) simulating loss of of fsite power in conjuction with a safety injection actuation signal; and (2) simulating interruption and subsequent recon-nection of onsite power sources to their respective buses.
Proper-operation shall be determined by:
a.
Verifying that on loss of of fsite power the emergency buses have been deenergized and that the loads have been shed from the emergency buses in accordance with design requirements.
b.
Verifying that on loss of of fsite power the diesel genera-tors start from ambient condition on the autostart signal, the emergency buses are energized with permanently connected loads, the auto-connected emergency loads are energized through the load sequencer, and the system operates for 5 min while the generators are loaded with the emergency loads.
c.
Verifying that on interruption of the onsite sources the loads are shed from the emergency buses in accordance with design requirements and that subsequent loading of the onsite sources is through the load sequencer.
GDC 17. requires that provisions be included to minimize the probability of losing electric power from any one of the remaining supplies as a result of or coincident with the loss of power generated by the reactor power unit, the loss of power generated by the nuclear power unit, the loss of power from the transmission network, or the loss of power from the onsite electric power supplies.
The testing requirements identified in Position 3 will demonstrate the capability of the onsite power system to perform its required function.
The tests will also identify undesirable interaction between the offsite and onsite emergency power systems. -