ML19309D166
| ML19309D166 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Indian Point  |
| Issue date: | 02/19/1980 |
| From: | Weiss E SHELDON, HARMON & WEISS |
| To: | NRC COMMISSION (OCM) |
| Shared Package | |
| ML19309D167 | List: |
| References | |
| FRN-44FR75167, RULE-PR-50 NUDOCS 8004100100 | |
| Download: ML19309D166 (5) | |
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[t essac s-FEB 19 8 " b Stttth4 7f, St"Ch r1&IEU UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
.f NUCLEAR REGULATORY COM!!ISSION s s Docket No. PR-50 (44 FR 75167)
UNION OF CONCERNED SCIENTISTS COMMENTS ON PROPOSED RULEMAKING ON EMERGENCY PLANNING NRC has invited public comment on croposed amendments to 10 CFR Part 50 which would change NRC rules on emergency plan-ning and require como11ance with the new regulations as a ore-requisite to issuance of operating licenses and to continuing operation of existing plants.
UCS oreviously filed comments in response to the NRC 's advance notice of croposed rulemakiner on this subject.
(44 Fed. Reg. 41483, July 17, 1979)
A copy is attached.
As a general matter, UCS strongly supports the concept of a direct link between licensing and emergency olanning.
How-ever, we find serious shortcomings in both alternatives croposed by NR C.
A 10-Mile Emergency Planning Zone for Plume Exposure is Clearly Insufficient The proposed change to S50.33 accepts without technical jus tification a 10 mile EPZ for olume exposure.
The Commission has adopted this position without scrutiny of the validity of its underlying bases, nor indeed without disclosure of its underlying technical bases.
A major reactor accident such as
'9 the mos t serious analyzed in 14 ASH-1400, the Reactor Safety
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i, Study, could cause death and illness significantly beyond ten miles from the reactor site; there is little discute over this.
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. Attached is a statement presented to the New York City Council on June 11, 1979, by Dr. Jan Beyea of Princeton University.
Using the "PNR-2" failure sequence from WASH-14 00 and typical meterological conditions, Dr. Beyea calcula-ted the major health ef fects from an accident at Indian Point at.35 miles from release.
(See pages 9-10 and table VIB)
If the wind is blowing towards Manhattan, between 1800 and 18,000 people could die from cancer.
Virtually all children and most adults exposed would develop thyroid nodules, a large fraction of which would require surgical treatment and lifetime medica-tion thereaf ter.
This analysis demonstrates that evacuation may well be required far beyond a 10 mile radius and that, for purposes of emergency planning, a 10 mile EPZ for plume exposure is clearly inadequate.
NRC must answer certain fundamental questions before it can determine an appropriate " generic" plume exposure planning zone for planning purposes:
1).
What is the appropriate design basis accident for emergency planning?
2).
What would the consequences ~ be of this accident in terms of short and long-term health effects and property damage?
Based upon the answers to the above, NRC can proceed to determine appropriate zones for mitigating measures,. including.
evacuation, sheltering and administration of potassium iodide.'
As yet, however, NRC has never permitted these basic questions t
t
. to be publicly ventilated in an open forum.
Although a 10-mile EPZ for plume exposure is an improvement over the previous NRC position, it is still essentially arbitrary and does not represent anything approaching a worst case.
With Respect to 5550.47 and 50.54, Alternative "B"
is Preferable to Alternative "A",
But Both Lack Suf ficiently Specific Standards for Exemptions In UCS 's view, Alternative A is totally unacceptable.
While establishing theoretical deadlines for NRC concurrence in emer-gency plans, it would require the Commission to make additional findings in order to enforce its provisions, after the deadline had cassed, with regard to the " significance" of the deficien-cies, the presence of compensating measures, or the presence of other, wholly unspecified " compelling reasons" which would
-jus tify operation.
Thu s, the deadline is toothless, particularly considering the amount of time which it would certainly take the Commission to make the post-deadline findings.
In addition, the provision permitting plants to continue operating on the basis of some " compelling reasons" is completely open-ended and without definition.
Utilities would certainly argue that economic factors, such as the cost of replacement power, constitute compelling reasons.
In UCS 's view, such considerations are outside the scope of the Atomic Energy Act.
The Commission is not authorized to permit plants to operate which f ail to meet. minimum requirements necessary for the prot'ec-tion of public safety on the grounds that replacement power is expensive.
To permit exemptions to be granted on-these grounds is 'to emasculate the rule at the outset, since some economic cost
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- t is always. associated with shut-downs.
The utilities have known for many months that they would be required to bring emergency plans around reactor sites uo to current standards.
The time for tenoorizing is past.
Alternative "B"
is an improvement over Alternative " A,"
at least to the extent that the deadlines would operate auto-matically to require shutdown of non-complying olants in the
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absence of an exemption.
However, the grounds for such an exemption are precisely the same as those for Alternative "B".
UCS believes that the grounds for exemption should be very narrowly drawn.
Only if the plan's deficiencies are de minimus (i.e. insignificant) AND compensating measures have been taken AND appropriate protection actions, including evacua-tion, can be taken for persons within the plume EPZ should exemptions be permitted both for operating licenses and presently operating plants.
Appendix E Does Not Clarify the Relationship Between Emergency Planning and Site Evaluaction The proposed amendments to Appendix E do not clarify the relationship between emergency planning and site evaluation, although the two are closely connected.
The assumption implicit in the emergency planning rules is that all sites can comoly..
This results at least partially from the lack of an objective performance standard by which to judge the feasibility of protective measures, particularly evacuation.
Thus, although "it is expected" that all persons within the EPZ shall be " alerted" of the need for protectiva action a
within 15 minutes of notification by the licensee of state and local officials, no standards are provided for the overall-time for evacuation, which is the most critical parameter of all.
Under the proposed rule, emergency olans could oresuma-bly be approved for a site even if the plume EPZ could not be evacuated for 20 hours2.314815e-4 days <br />0.00556 hours <br />3.306878e-5 weeks <br />7.61e-6 months <br /> or more, while other sites would require l
substantially less ti me.
Theunderlyingchilosopbyofthe rule would appear to be that it is acceptable to make the best of a bad site.
This would not only oermit plants to continue to operate in areas of very high pooulation density (such as Indian Point and Zion ),
but i t would allow new plants to be sited in locations which are, as a practical matter, not eva-cuable within a reasonable period of time.
In order to provide genuine assurance that meaningful protective measures could be taken in the event of a serious accident, NRC must establish some objective criterion for the maximum permissible time to accomplish evacuation,of the plume EPZ.
In the absence of such a criterion, the evacuation plan-ning regulations exalt form over substance.
Submitted by:
h I
Elfyx'R., Weiss
.SHELDON, HARMON & WEISS 1725 I Street,
N.W.
. Suite 506 Washington, D.C.'20006 (202) 833-9070 General Counsel, Union of Concerned Scientists DATED:
February 19, 1980 J
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