ML19309C432

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Memorandum & Order Re Spent Fuel Expansion Proceeding. Directs Parties to Address Questions Raised in Safety Assessment Encl W/Hr Denton ,Re Valve Operation & Loss of Feedwater Event,Which Will Be Part of Discovery
ML19309C432
Person / Time
Site: Big Rock Point File:Consumers Energy icon.png
Issue date: 03/27/1980
From: Grossman H
Atomic Safety and Licensing Board Panel
To:
References
NUDOCS 8004080591
Download: ML19309C432 (3)


Text

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Docket No. 50-155

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(Big Rock Point Nuclear Plant

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(Spent Fuel Pcol Enpansion)

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER REGARDING TWO ADDITIONAL BOARD OUESTIONS (March 27, 1980)

The document entitled " Safety Assessment, Officer of Nuclear Reactor Regulation, Big Rock Point Plant Safety Issues Identified by Ms. Bier and Ms. Johns" (Safety Assessment) attached to Harold R. Denton's letter of March 5, 1980 to Ms. Bier and Ms. Johns raises two areas of question in the Board's mind.

The first area of of question concerns items 5 and 6 on page 4 of the Safety Assessment.

These two items involve valves in the containment isolation system which have malfunctioned in the past.

The Board directs all parties who may have informa-tion on the subj ect to address these additional Board Questions:

ABQ l.

Has the proper operation of any of the valves mentioned in items 5 and 6 on page 4 of the y

Safety Assessment (viz. valves CV/4096, CV/4097, CV/4027, CV/4105, and M0/7050) been relied upon 8 0 04 0 80!sil

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to mitigate the results of an accident in the n r.: fuel pcci?

If cc, hcw <cu'd a 1111ure

,f the yea mmerie=eu zi;? :aase valves affect the results of such an acciden:?

The second aren of question concerns the seemingly indirect answer to the matter raised as concern number 4 on page 7 of the Safety Assessment.

It is not clear to the Board whether the steps taken to preclude a severe loss-of-feedwater accident were those the Staff originally believed were required or were some lesser steps negotiated with the Licensee.

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appears to the Board that a loss-of-feedwater accident which results in core uncovery could lead to a contamination of the con-tainment sufficiently severe to impede proper care and maintenance i

of the spent fuel pool.

We therefore ask the parties to address l

the questions:

i ABQ. 2 Did the facts learned from the loss-of-feedwater i

event at Oyster Creek on May 2, 1979, suggest any t

measures, other than those included in Amendment 30 to the Big Rock Point technical specifications, which would be important in preventing a severe loss-of-feedwater accident?

Could an accident which might occur from this cause threaten the Licensee's ability to maintain the spent fuel pool in a safe condition?-

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. These Board Ouestions are to be accor=odated within the di3co'rer: s: hat 'a 21r:

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.s rw Herbert Grossman, Chainaan Dated at Bethesda, Maryland this 27th Day of March, 1980.

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