ML19309C153
| ML19309C153 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Issue date: | 03/06/1980 |
| From: | Ahearne J NRC COMMISSION (OCM) |
| To: | Hart G SENATE, ENVIRONMENT & PUBLIC WORKS |
| Shared Package | |
| ML19309C154 | List: |
| References | |
| NUDOCS 8004080243 | |
| Download: ML19309C153 (7) | |
Text
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UNITED STATES y
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NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
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March 6, 1980 CHAIRMAN i
The Honorable Gary Hart, Chairman
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Subcommittee on Nuclear Regulation e~
Coninittee on Environment and Public Works
' United States Senate Washington, D.C. 20510
Dear Mr. Chairman:
We are pleased to submit answers to the questions contained in your letter of February 13.
You will note that there are different
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opinions expressed by the Commissioners on several of these issues.
I hope that you find these answers adequate for your purposes.
If you need clarification or additional information, please let me know.
Sincerely, Y
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John F. Ahearne
Enclosure:
As stated 8004080 2 h
Question 1:
In your written responses for the hearing record to question 2, you recommend that states that are not hosts to a Federal repository should receive the same participatory status as host states, "so long as they can show that they will indeed be directly affected by a proposed repository."
a.
How would you define "directly affected"?
I b.
Does this statement suggest that such a "directly affected" state could suspend further progress *97 q repository pending Presidential or Congressional action upon its objections?
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[ Answer:
n a.
The Commission would define as "directly affected" any state which could demonstrate that the proposed siting, design, and operation of a repository in a host state would subject citizens of the affected state to many of the same impacts to which citizens of the host state would be subjected.
In most cases, a directly affected state would be an adjacent state.
For example, we would consider a state directly affected if there were an underground aquifer system capable of transporting radionuclides from the proposed repository into water supplies in the affected state. However, the NRC would not consider a state directly affected solely because it contains an alternative to the proposed site.
b.
The affected state would have the same participatory rights as the host state, including suspension rights if the host state has them. The par-ticipatory rights of the host state have not yet been determined.
If legislation specified that the Congress and/or the President should resolve objections of participatory states, they would need to act upon a suspension by either a di'rectly affected state or the host state or both.
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Question 2:
In your written responses for the hearing record to questien 1(c) on grounds for a state's exercise of its veto power, you suggest that a state could veto a proposed repository if it conflicts with that state's comprehensive land use plan.
Please explain this ground for a state veto.
Answer:
The Co= mission had no specific land use confligt in-migd when recommending that the state veto be allowed in event of an "unresolvable conflict with a comprehensive state land use plan."
The general concern was to recognize legitimate state interest by recognizing traditional land planning authority.
This comment was not intended to provide a mechanism for states to prevent, in an irresponsible manner, siting of a waste repository.
It would normally apply to a state designation of a specific use for a site which was made before that site was under consideration as a waste repository.
This veto should also be exercised after the conclusion of an NRC licensing authori-zation proceeding so that a record of the site suitability would be available to those who would consider whether or not the state veto should be overturned.
With regard to questions 1 and 2, Commissioner Hendrie still holds the view he expressed on June 27, 1979 in testimony before the Senate Subcommittee on Energy and Power:
"While the state should have every opportunity and should participate in the process of selection, reviewing the design, and licensing proceedings and so on, and their difficulties, objections, and interests should be fully considered and resolved in the best technical fashion, it is my view that ultimately a decision for Federal preemption of the construction decision may be necessary."
Question 3: Why should the NRC not have authority to license disposal of low-level defense wastes?
Answer:
In NUREG-0527, " Regulation of Federal Radioactive Waste Activities," the Commission concurred in the IRG's recommendation that NfC licensing authority should be extended to new, non-defense DOE low-level waste, but not to either existing or new defense low-level waste.
In the case gr defense wastes, there may_be an information link between handling the wastes and classified
,( infoimation concerninglits generation, particularly in the case of a formal licensing procedure in which public hearings must be held.
Temporary storage severs this link for high-level waste, spent fuel, and transuranic waste but there is no such intermediate step for low-level waste.
Further, there has not yet been an adequate determination of either the benefits or the costs, including any national security impacts, of extending NRC regulatory authority.
Therefore, NRC believes it is premature to make a blanket extension of NRC regulatory authority to low-level waste until it can be established that:
(a) benefits would result which outweigh the costs; (b) workable procedures acceptable to both DOE and NRC can be developed for further NRC regulatory authority which both allow the public to be fully informed and effectively sever any link between the regulation of the disposal of the low-level wasr<.
and any classified information about its generation; and (c) there will ref t:lt no undue delay of sensitive defense-related production programs.
Commissioners Gilinsky and Bradford favor licensing any major new DOE low level waste sites unless such oversight can be shown to be incompatible with the national security.
They believe that principal existing low level waste sites should be subject to NRC oversight.
N Question 4:
Amendment 646 to S. 1521 would give the NRC regulatory authority, but not direct licensing authority, over new DOE facilities for short-term storage of military wastes and all existing DOE facilities.
Under this provision, DOE would present NRC with its proposal for construction of or remedial measures for these facilities.
NRC would modify, approve, or disapprove the pro-posal.
If DOE disagrees with NRC's recommendation and refuses to comply, Congress would then decide to what extent DOE must implement NRC's recommendation.
Your staf f analysis of Amendment 646 did not specifically comment on this p,rovision.
4, Would you support this form of NRC regulatory authority over a.
new DOE facilities for the short-term storage of military wastes and all existing DOE facilities?
b.
Does this mechanism avoid undue interference with national security interests?
Answer:
a.
The Commission continues to believe that a pilot program should be estab-lished to test the feasibility of extending NRC's regulatory authority on a consultative basis to DOE's waste management activities not now covered by NRC's licensing authority or those extensions of it recommended by the IRG.
The Commission believes that the pilot program should precede any extension of NRC's regulatory authority over new DOE facilities for storage of military wastes or over existing DOE facilities.
One objective of the pilot program would be to make an assessment of DOE's environmental, health and safety programs in order to establish the benefits and costs to the public of such extension of NRC's authority and to develop a mechanism for NRC review of DOE activities that does not offer the probability of compromising national security.
Commissioners Gilinsky and Bradford support extending NRC regulatory authority to the existing high-level waste tanks.
As for all other existing DOE facilities for storage or disposal of waste, their view is that it is difficult to make a general statement since there could be a large number and variety of such facilities.
It would be desirable to have independent oversight over principal existing waste facilities.
They believe this could be done without impeding national security programs.
b.
This mechanism, which would have NRC reviewing the DOE proposal, could lead to undue interference with national security interests.
It is for this reason that the Commission recommended a pilot program focused on non-defense activities.
Question 5:
In your report on " Regulation of Federal Radioactive Waste Activities," you recommended establishment of a pilot program to test the feasibility of extending NRC regulatory authority on a consultative basis to DOE waste management activities not currently licensed or recommended for licensing.
a.
What specific results must this program produce for the NRC to determine whether an extension of its regulatory authority is " feasible"?
b.
In testimony presented to the-Sub(b=m?cte'e on June 14, 1978,
-d' then Chairman Joseph Hendrie described a method of regulatory oversight of DOE high-level waste by NRC that he described as "a sensible and realistic alternative for protecting public health and safety." The Hart waste bill appears to track Hendrie's proposal, which given NRC authority to " require DOE to supply all information requested; review the health and safety aspects of existing facilities; make recommendations for resolving any identified problems, and concur in any DOE plans for remedial action concerning problems identified by the NRC."
Why did the Commission subsequently. eject this proposal in favor of a pilot program?
Answer:
a.
The pilot program should produce information which allows NRC and DOE to answer the following questions:
1.
Can a workable procedure for regulatory oversight, satisfactory to both NRC and DOE, be established which both allows the public to be fully informed about the regulatory process and provides an effective severing of any link between regulation of the storage or disposal of waste and any classified information about its generation?
2.
Will regulatory oversight result in'significant delay of, or other negative impact on, sensitive defense related production programs?
3.
Will benefits of such oversight outweigh costs?
If questions 1 and 3 can be answered affirmatively and question 2 negatively, we would consider the procedure for extension of NRC regulatory oversight to be-feasible.
b.
The Commission did not reject the proposal; it decided' that any extension of authority, whether via the mechanism described on June 14 or through some other procedure, should be preceded by a pilot program. As noted in NUREG-0527, "In the previously cited June, 1978 Commission testimony, it is not apparent to what extent the Commissioners considered the potential national security hazard in reaching their position."
In discussions between DOE and NRC subsequent to June 14, 1978, DOE voiced strong concerns
Question 5 about potential national security impacts resulting from the extension of NRC regulatory authority to DOE defense-related waste management activities beyond those extensions recommended by the IRG.
As described above in the response to question 5.a, the Commission believes that any extension of its regulatory authority must be based on a workable procedure, acceptable to both NRC and DOE, which resolves these concerns.; The pilot program should determine if such a procedure can be developed.
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, In supporting the pilot program in NUREG-0527, Chairman Ahearne stated, in'an opinion concurred in by Commissioners Kennedy and Hendrie, "Therefore, I conclude that in order to demonstrate whether or nor NRC and DOE can develop a procedure of consultation that would provide the regulatory oversight that some of my fellow Commissioners see as the overriding concern, and which I agree is a major concern, while at the same time providing adequate protection to national security, which I believe is also a significant concern, it is appropriate to develop a pilot program that need not cover the high-level waste tanks, but which should demonstrate whether or not a workable procedure can be developed that would provide adequate protection for the national security.
If such a procedure can be developed and if the proposed pilot program clearly demonstrates the benefits of extending NRC regulatory authority over DOE activities beyond those included in Recommendation 1* of this report, then we could extend it to include high-level waste storage tanks and perhaps other defense related wastes.
I then would definitely yote for that extension.
If a workable procedure cannot be developed, the issue of NRC regulatory authority over defense related wastes could then be addressed in terms of potential benefits for public health and safety versus a more explicit hazard of damage to national security.
At least on that basis one could have a more reasoned discussion and reach a balanced judgment.
In the absence of the staff (or the IRG) finding a demonstrable need for the extension, I do not believe it is neccessary to reach that decision at the present time."
Commissioners Gilinsky and Bradford continue to hold the view they expressed in NUREG-0527:
"Our view is that the public safety would be sufficiently enhanced by NRC oversight as described in the Commission's June 14 statement to be worth the effort. As an absolute minimum, the pilot program should include one of the facilities (preferably Hanford or Savannah River) that is the source of the greatest risk to the public health and safety.
So far as we can tell there is no serious possibility that the national security would thereby be affected.
It should be recalled that if the government's waste program had moved at a faster pace, the material in question would already be in a waste repository under firm NRC regulatory control."
- Extension of NRC licensing authority, as recommended by the.IRG, to cover all new DOE f acilities for the disposal of TRU waste and non-defnese low-level waste.