ML19309B544
| ML19309B544 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Crane  |
| Issue date: | 01/25/1980 |
| From: | Rathkopf C ENERGY, DEPT. OF |
| To: | NRC COMMISSION (OCM) |
| Shared Package | |
| ML19309B511 | List: |
| References | |
| NUDOCS 8004040263 | |
| Download: ML19309B544 (6) | |
Text
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v
- n Department of Energy Washington, D.C. 20585 JAN 251980 MEMORANDUM FOR: Nuclear Regulat ry Commission f
]
I f
f l
FROM:
yC3 is Ina L. Rathkopf E;cecutive Secretary i
SUBJECT:
Correspondence Referral The attached correspondence has been misdirected to this Department for reply.
Inasmuch as it appears to fall within the purview of your agency, we are referring this communication herewith for your reply.
We have informed the writer of this action.
Thank you for your attention.
~
1 i
Mr. Earl M.
Page 2662 Cheswick Drive Troy, Michigan 48084' i
F e
6 0 04 040 M.3 1
~ ~ ~ - - - -.
I THE WHITE HOUSE WAS HIN G TO N C O.
0 l'P MEMORANDUM:
The attached letter (s) addressed to the President is referred to your office for suitable acknowledgment or other appropriate handling at the earliest opportunity.
Should you receive mail that has been misdirected, please forward to the appropriate agency.
I would also l
appreciate knowing when you are i
forwarding such mail.
My phone number is 456-2717.
Thank you.
is/
. ry Martha Seal Director Correspondence Agency Liaison t
l t
l O
e-l
0 /
2662 Cheswick Drive e
Troy, Michigan 48084 November 21, 1979 The President The White House Washington, D. C.
20500
Dear Mr. President:
I am deeply disturbed _oy,er the apparent.open-ended nature of the j!gclear _ReLula--
tary Commission (NRC) pastpcaament of nuclear plant licensing and with the con-sideration by Congress of bills chas would impose similar delays by law. We seem to be viewing nuclear safety with blinders, completely ignoring the grave world energy situation that worsens each day.
Of course nuclear safety is im-po ttant, and__ the Three Mile Island accident revealea a number of shortcomings in design, training, and licensing philosophy and practice.
Improvements are s
)
needed and significant strider have been made by both industry and the NRC to k'
improve safety during the eir.nt months since the accident.
Ye t, we must have Y
g been doing something right tince the cold statistics of experience (Three N11e Island included) still pla.e nuclear as the safest method to date of generatirg electricity.
As the needed NRC, reemendatigs, al_ ready. ma3eare carried,_through,,there will o
be M acto licensing j lgys. The-imposition of additional arbitrary. delays by either NRd'6f~C3Efress are unnecessary and appetr to be born of political motivation.
But the greater threat is the likelihood that the moratorium will be extended indefinitely as politics play an increasing role.
The fears of our citizens do need some response, but at some point we must have the courage to pay attention to the things that are truly dangerous, and I would put the international competition for what is lef t of the world's oil supply near the top of that list.
Perhaps there should be a national referendum on the use of commercial nuclear power either directly or through the Congress to give 'ndustry a clearer picture than it now has of what people really want.
But we h-
')est be very clear as to the consequences of the alternatives if we vote no m auclear, and further realize that the nuclear option cannot be shut off and then conveniently turned back on at a moments notice because we later change our minds.
'You will find an enclosure to help provide a bit of perspective on the safety issue itself and hopefully a little humor through the use of a skillfully Jwritten paper by R. L. Murray and R. F. Saxe. While there is a bit of 3 ougue-in-creek, note that all of the technical descriptions and statistics of t
that enclosure are factual.
Very truly yours,
.f f Earl M. Page i
I
2662 Cheswick Drive Troy, Michigan 48084 November 26, 1979 o
Dear Sir:
Recently passed to me from a source best left undisclosed is a safety study that deserves the immediate attention of the appropriate govern-ment officials.
It obviously is quite old, but more importantly, it f
represents well founded grave warnings concerning the mass use of automobiles and related motor vehicles that were obviously suppressed by parties unknown.
What is worse, the startling predictions contained therein have come to i
pass, and continue practically unabated.
Simple statistics have shown that over a million Americans have been killed outright by these machines and the carnage continues at almost 50,000 per year. Add to this the untold delayed fatalities that result from disabling injuries now occurring at almost 2,000,000 per year. The accompanying primary economic loss is measured at $30,000,000,000 per year so that the accumulated loss must be near $600,000,000,000 (1979 World AlmanacF.
i Perhaps this is the first time that we have had the opportunity to confirm technical predictions of large scale disaster with the realities of cold statistics. Now we must act.
I propose the following:
An investigation by the Justice Department as to who was e
responsible for suppression of the safety report.
I am afraid the passage of time may have obscurred the trail.
Congressional Hearings to discuss the basic role of the auto-e mobile industry in our future.*
Do we impose a moratorium on new cars?
se Do we curtail the operation of existing automobiles?
ee Do we allow or encourage the industry to expand under i
ee tougher regulation?
Do people really want automobiles?
ee e Establishment of a Presidential CommisJion to ecnduct a comprehensive study of motor vehicle safety that should include:*.
a technical assessment of the consequences and causes ee of motor vehicle accidents.
an analysis of the manufacturers capability to produce se safe vehicles.
an assessment of the emergency prepardness and response ee of federal, state and local authorities to catastrophic accidents involving motor vehicle transport of such hazardous materials as gasoline, chlorine, ammonia, propane, etc.
an assessment of the public's right to information both ee as to the safety margins of their own vehicles and the potential consequences of transport of hazardous materials.
I feel certain that the public risk unveiled by such inquiries would make the recent investigations of the Three Mile Island accident pale by comparison.
Very truly yours, I * !ku,-
l Earl M. Page Any similarity between these recommendations and the charge to the Kemeny Commission on Three Mile Island or to the directives for Senator Udall's Subcommittee on Energy and the Environment are purely coincidental.
e e
e
' Personal transportation safety:
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an evaluation of the evidence D
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e M d jl
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by P. Lnch and J. Udy The natiin faces a growing transoortaten enori.
Malfunction due to component failure thrust ratto. but tms must be emansed oaer in age wnome tots lie in an ever-increasing per capita These may be listed under the headings of:
88"lunction witn operation of foot lever (3) aDove.
demand foe personal transportation to support out (1) suspension system failure A hand operated key gives on off control of tae noing stone ord of liveg and in a Durgeoneng poou-(2) Control system fadure Nebeurneg system.
i insion whos e size is espected to grow ey 50 percent (3) shut-down system fanure Other hand operated coatrois are usuaily 0 o-
+
in tPe next 30 years. Our personal tra'ssortation (a) Emergency snut-down system failure vided to switen direchoa amaunciators alarm sigaat.
a problems are aggravated Dy an increasmf reiuc*
environenental dluminators, comiuaical.cas s,s'e-t
{
tance on ene part of :Pe puenc to permit the (1) suspens4en system fadure (usuaety one-way), asturar-soray re=ove cavices.
proHferation of enwronmentally damageng geolog.
In most devices at present licensed or building, emergency spray pumpieg system. ocerator enverom-icany-propcied transportahon.
me suspension system cons.ats essenttedy of a sys-mentas efficiency controis, aad rectness ignition To help asieviate mis persona 6 transoonation tem of springs secaratmg tne mam contamment system.
I probiem. the nation is tuming inefassegfy to vessel frorn four friction-reducing devtCes. or Finady tRe ernergeecy sys'em Comsist1 of a Paad.
i sadoLMe + h eeied cow.ces, known vanous'y as whWs. a pa't of me perichery of eacn wneel tein0 operated or foot operates 'ever.
I horseiess carriages. cars or automoceses. Wideiy In contact with tPe surface of tne tracs or road. in The control system. cens. sting of an X Y coo d-hersided as c,on i,ansponaison.uause as it order =,eeuce nction and on, is accept.
i,iate cont,ol wnee, a d --Pa*,.
a s, mn moves along the road it procuces httle or none of values, each wheet is covered Dy an inflatacle torus.
control lever, and tee ' cot-and Maad ocera'ed I
the visible en9aust so much in evidence from made usuaaty of a synteetic matenal. This focus is power tPrust ratio levers enm Dets ao redsad4*cy 1
Declogically-propelled transportation, et has come, known as e tyre. The tyre is koot in position upon Eaca part of the system coasists of only ces cas.
to its proponents say. Just in time to augreent and the wneel by tPe pressure of air witmin tne tyre. In net, fass re in any cee part of wnica rencers t*e t
u uittenstefy dommate as the national transportellen, the eveftt tMat this air is allowed to escape from tne
- ncio chaenet inocera%e. The conseQue*Ces Cf e
Recent tests, however, nave inc.cated that emer.
torue. not on*y is tme metal of tee *Reet likely to fadure of tne control system may De easiyted as r
gency systems incorporated in presently operatteg come into contact **th tRe road. Dut tMe forus has follows:
and planned devices enignt not function property a consideraD8e proceedity of eeCommg detacPed (1) Fasture of tre X.Y coordienie controt *di 'esd d
in the event tmat one of the emany emergency situ.
from the wheel completely. The consecueates of to insedity to follow tae etuired traiectory eit9 a allons envisaged in Malards pecorts sPould anse.
suCn an IRC3 dent are that not only wdl Considera?ie very hign procaodify fo 31 ea ercementai-interact ta v
The resuthng Catastroone and loss of hfe from (Pese weet De eEpertenCed $y the wneed and tag road, ingtggfil emergency sduahons migret weil e Ceed SpytPing Dut the increased penetrabon of the enetai
- Meet (2) Failure of the Nei su; pay control mechantsm thee nation has seen m time of war. The nation can.
into the road wins cause a e ).
F force to De set :ound lead to edPer:
40 wn re F is trie escess force causmg tPe feetal (as a reduction 'in fuve flow with consecuent not move to dependence on gasoline oropeded e
trtasportafson uptal me poss Ossity of suCR accidents wheel to penetrate tBe road surfaCS. This torts will
. reduction in stored energy-s e.. a faal sa'e sys-le totally neghgit's
- cause the device to assurne a c+rcular pam with tem, or Our deep concem over mis situahcn mas led us the Msgn procandety of environenental mteraction.
(b) en increase in fuel flow with consecueat to study the teCMfucal feature of trte various sstua.
In no dence at present hCensed of Dueldmg is increase in stored energy which. el not forama'et tioffs whfCh may arise and to evaluate me possible any emergency system provided to correct' auto.
rnay rapidly lead to unstatie te9avior and a d.sa consequences of accidents likely to occur to these mahcany the tendency to asaume a circular path.
astrous environmental-interaction secadent devices. In the follO*mg sections, we discuss firstly hiesther is any device incorporated to monitor the the types of emergency sstuatsons Ilkely to be en.
air pressure withan (Pe tyres when the device is in (3) Shht-down system fadure Countered by these devsCes and tre emergency operahon.
Fa41ure Cf the shut down rpeChanrsm is liksty j
Systerrie prowded Dy the manufacturer to termmate AS stated 3 Dove. the connection between the In that a single system is used. This system is e@er l
and to render such emergency situohons harmiesa; friction-reducing oevlCee. or wheels, and the maan actuated by meCManical bnkage-and, as a result.
secondly, we discusa our urgent recommendahons containmerit vessed consists essenhady of four failure of 39y one of several ecmoonents would seed l
lo replace or modify inadequate safeguards.
sonngs witn budt-in damping deveCas to prevent to fadure of the whoie system==or ty a f'uld sys-I Sustaaned osCallabon, la me event that one or more tem, in wnsCn any Componeat fadure leading to less W mne sonngs should super fadum. me contain-W fluid was cause faaure e me whom system. No TYPES OF EMERGENCY SITUATION AND EMERGENCY SYSTEMS PROVIDED THEREFORE ment of the system s center of granty wdt cause a Failure of the snut-down system. of course, wouse in mes sectiun, we distinguisa mroe types of dowation from the programmed course. No auto-lead to loabdefy to reduce tne device's stored en-emergency situahon:
matic emergency system is prowded to correct med orgy when needed and would constitute an unac.
(a) An emergency sduation arising from a mal.
dewation ecore dewterious ennronenental inter-copianse hazard.
funcuan of the device itself wem me svenucings of.
action occurs.
3 (a.1) Maifunction due to component faisure.
(4) Emergency shut-down system failure (ad) Mattuncuan due to eesign error.
(2) Ceneres system Failures Fadure of tRe emergency snut-down system is (b) An emergency situation artsmg from incorrect la d*nces' at ornent licensed or budding. no also ilkety since me system is usustir a siriste-operation of the dence.
form of autornahc control system is prowded. resi-mechacical 4itikage system. in ene everit that tfie (c) An emergency situation ansing from interec.
ence demg concentrated on operator contros. Tne sn t down mecnanism fads, tne emergency snut.
u tien between dewces, or berwnn a dewCe and me operator controis me device ey means of a hand-down meenanism is me oney way to reouce raordry envtronment.
operated wneet tre rotahon of wnien directs tne toe dewce s stored energy and ava.d very protae e it will be seen trat me first two of the above. (a) traiectory of me device in me x. Y sinne (Z eemg disaster.
and (bl. are concerned essenheity with tne Onica me vertical ams, reerred to tme earth's suetsce.
and operation of a singre device. wnde me inst. (ej.
here considered to ** *ppros.rnatcy piane and Emergency situation arising is eencerned witn me madunchons of me transpo,.
nonzonian, ey mrw foot-opersied severs, con.
from incorrect operation of the device temen synsom as a wnose.
troanng (1) me foes now. (2) the snut oown mech-Operation of me device resicos soiety in tne entem, and (3) tne (anaiog) power-thrust ratio hands and feet of an operator, and no ai.tomatic respectiveey. [Some models have only two foot-systems for contros are provideo. For saccessful operated levers. the therd above being operated by operation of the deveCo. me operator is required to p* k an automatic dence. Thst is more in keepong with observe the prog ess of TPe dev,Ce !"lroujm a for-W g&b
- m. nummer ce fut usuai.ny found on me average ward-facmg window and to contret ds p,c,,eu e, s
WQ operator l la addition, a hand-operated lever is pro-sriestis of the foot and nand controis outhned aeove.
b vened to ghe an incremental vanation of the power-The operator la aaded Dy a meter met Indacates N
t e
e-
. the seted C wnica 194 dowc3 is preceeding and llele injured. Thle casva4ry rite lo greatly in es(ess stending the effects of the fJgnest wirw) recorded j*
4Pe* total distanC3 C3vered. Vanous s6gna are (3-of etat wNc3 me country mas susta eed in its most on tend (l.C, tnose occurnng in n rncanes an3 tor.
pieved son, me road ind,com, sare speeds ser rec==e war and on cn nas i d to great concern sad nadose wimous esmer como caused to cesart from u
- everage" devices.
evein oteruouve riots. W3 foresee tnat a casuairy tne road or nemq turPed ever. fne -
si tia-stung The operator is reovered to sudge onstanc3, direc.
rtte suc3s as that predicted cas64 wed lead to sirn-masses tf concrete. wnicn could et lowered sa tha tion, rat;s of turn. accecratoes, and cocesoranons siae askaructive stots and evsn a creaudown of civd-rood surface to act as ansnors. snovad es consid.
enue at tne sarne tiene manipulanag tne various izamen as we know it.
i controis (see above).
ered.
We co not neuevo it possiale enerefore mat the (0 The instenation of a cevice to reessure the Coeraior training is very heded. esing restrteted coumery couid contemoiare tne wicesoread acochen frictionaJ cearactensnca of tne ry e-road interrace d
i almost entirey to a 'est et cevice onoranon under of temese oevices nimout me meroduchon and so-wnne coersting tne dowce and to signas approach optimum or near oonmum oserateg conditions. No chCamon of strict. mandatory, Feceral Restrictions to toe limstmg inCttonal force avadacie.
trainerg of teshng are given under taunt conoitions. on me cesign and operation of teese dev.ces. we traergency situatioes ewe to encorrect operapon suggest that inese pestnctions snouid ce cased on.
(2) Cperating 8equirements may inerefore ce enoecad to ar se treguena, De-put not enctusively restricted to. me followeg:
(A) Tne acoction of a traming program for all cause of:
operators, sucn traming to ectado at least (t) incorrect sudgaaeat or deceeeranon and dis-
- 0) Dees et Deeliteniente s
(1) Traineng in norman operahon of tae cevice tance avadacie toe er re..its consecuent coussion (Al The adoonon of a r.om of.mroe or two-under ad conostions heeiy to ne encounteres. (Note:
o rist.
otheMour ondosopny for all vitas parts. These trie nign moounty of tne oevice maaes it poss.ble j
m incorrect svogment of trtetsonae forces ee-wouse incluce:
tor 6: to to coerswd anyonere on ine tano masses twun the device and tre surface on ensen 't (a) Air parts of tne suspension systems tachd-of tne eartn.1 moves. Tnis misiudgment.s very hnery in !?iat no ing wneeas and tyres.
(2) Trainmg in ait tyoes of emergency situauen to anernet is mace to monitor tre forces evoaved nor (h6 A2a parts et too c.ntros systern.
weien this oevice can conceivacay te si.oiect to predict the masimum force tnar can sate #y se (cl AH parts of tne s tut down system.
Q) The adoption of a maximum permiss t:e
+
asphed under es snag sur ace cone hons. Tne re-(d) All parts of the vuergericy snut down sys-speed for a aevice cased on tnat for amicn no un-s suits of suCn a mesiudgment edl ce inat the dev.Ce tein.
i; acceptapfe Carnage eda occur on contact witn an-eeer win not dece.orare residiy enougn estn con.
(B) The adoption of certain autornatic systems to otner cavice moving at tee same sceed a tne j
seovent nsk of coitsion or aaernanweiy was not ne assist tne coerator in controthng trw cevice.
oooesite cirection. tapenmentaa evicence sug;ests j
acie to negehate a tend sahsfactoney enn conse-A The adoption of autornaue systems for snut-mat consicertote structurai careage may occur *dS l
event danger of an envirenrpentalinteraction acca dowsu in ene case of failure of any two cnannels of relatsve veeocihas as ice as 5 seen aita consecuent j
]
dent.
those systems incorporating redundancy as desig-procaodify of ruorure of tPe fues system resu. ting m (3) tecerrect c;eration curmq the t e es. Pen me nated in (A) aoove.
l operator nas n s atreation f.ned on me speed.inds-(D) The adeonon of a douele contammeet system fore tnat a maximum speed per cov4e of 2".
enom posano.e hre and/or esplosion We conc:vce teore-j categ eneter or on advisory signs. or anon ene co-for trie fues storage and fues supply system. in view snovie te erricoseo.
i erstar s fieid of v.e is restricted by rain sa nas of tne known negmy fiammaoie nature of too fuel; las TPe accohon of a min.rpum d. stance of so-f weewing window cy earneess. or ey coaque media tnis amoucle containment sys:em would include an oroacts of devices so toat tee rainimum castance sucn sa fog.
}
Inert gas blanaat in tne sosce cetween contain-specif.e4 m it) aoove was not viciated vis.a vis tne Emergency situations arising from in acostion, a monitonng system for aiarm fusi sys:em of one cevice and tne passenger con-rnensaL 1
j interactions between devices and wetti on fuse sean into ine inert gas sosce snovid me pro-tamment vessee of another cevice.
c ine environment viced and should be switcPed on and operahvo at
($) A $afety Anaivses Recort snould ce suomitted ad ee. wnen tre eevice is unatteneed. m. wm
,o, oen =ce y ine.ntena.ng coe,a
.no,nay So far an this pacer. e nave restncted our al-snound be rencored vrs rae or audicte to a tua-time draw en the esserience of tre constructor of tne f
i tenten to the naaards at eaaant on a singie device attenssent so snat immeciate remecian action could cevice. snowing tnat tee oevice 's saae for asi situa.
[
and its sole operat.on. Moaever. a large numcer of and wouse ce taaen.
t ons up to asic inctedmg tre manemum crediate devices wul to snanng rne same roads, witn ap-(E) Tne adochon of a minimum datance netween 1
acticent. Tths SAR sr.ould.ncruce deta s of tre promenate'y 50 percent fra.e.ng m eac't of two fusa storage arid suopty and tee passenger contam-training prog >am to se uncertamen ey tne ptead.ag l
directions. At present, many socn roads are devided ment vessee so that, in the event of fire andror et-coerator, escoc;4dy edn regard to tra.nmg For Into two ecual parts oy ca.pted hnes. so mar co-prosion of tne fuel. no passenger semin, entennq es emergency s.tuabons 6
vices travelmg e eacn of tPe two direenoes may De leaving, nor near tee cassengef corttamment vessel
- 16) An E.9 irontrental tenoact Aerort *spou:4 ce separated. Howe.or, movdacty maaarcous situations nou e suffer any harmtus effec:s from esat, radiant submitted Dy tne meending c erator of any device s
)"
will anse from; energy or blast (1) Misivagment ey osera ors of me speed and f) Tne adophon of a requirement for cos.*inuous. dotading the espec:e4 environmentas effects to me created ty trie operation of tne cevice.
l l
acceieration of devices tra e..ng in too same direc-morusoring of the state of tnose items menhorad in (7) An analysis snovid be si. emitted regaramg 3
tion witn consecuent nign rise of codisen.
(A) ageve witn annunciators to signal fadure M %ny the effects, on generations as yet uncorn, of tne j
l2) Fadure et operators ta keep cecces witne ites These would mctude monitors for.
acceserations inat may be encountered and of tre the prescribed hin.ts. eitner because of operator (a) The peessure in a.12 or to tyres.
ettects of me raced chmanc cnanges tnat can te miseudgment from any of tne causes hated aseve (b) The stresses in an 12 or 16 suspension
(
j or by reason of any of tne component fadures hsted spnngs estn tne added oossibdsty. upon deveiop-hsre is msulhCefnt evicence at tne moment on tne encountered ey the miroduct.on of sucn cevices.
aoove. This fadute ads less to a nign procandity ment, of an on-une fangue and/or craca monitor long-term genene and nicacgical effects of these a
d of interaction wem devices traveiwig a tne opposite for eacn sprmg.
cirectiorL two parameters. We are concerred parucularry tnat k
(3) Misiudgment by c:erators of the intanced contros systems, including stress morutors, bear-tions over and aoove mose normady associa:ed wim (c) The state et as parts of tee mree or four me populahon s ouid not be suciect to accelera-L n
traiectories of otner devices at road intersect ons.
j Ing wear and fnetion monitors fuencahon fadure careful hung.
'),
annunciators. and, on ceve6oome9f. on-line fa-These aDove-suggested reovirements are not. we CONCWSIONS AND
-gue anWor crack mecm on ad pass
%s. an eciusive. coud. we are sure mat mem RECOMMENDATIONS M*'"'***'"'8"'
""d#
cracks and lubricat on in au parts of tne' tnree or
*** '" ""' ""'* ""o we ce coniatered as d
The grave wesenesses asparent in tee design of four snut down systems for rneenanicanty oper-empenence witn inese oevices accumuta'es. How-ever, we feet assured tnat, in too hgnt of the grave these devices and also in tne metnod of controe Dy ated systems; tne ftuid tevet and rates of lean of design and operating cefects of taese cevices
{
unsaulted operators ano are provided wim a de-nuid, including posnen of lessage, for mit fluid-wn.cn our study nas reveated, we can reasonaciy piorably insuffiC.ent amount of informahon regard-operated systems. In addite, for fluid systems, recommend tftst;
)
j ing me state os me cevice being operated, manes monstonag systems snould be included to mea-
)
at c! ear mat, in the event of a large-scale introduc-(1) A totas nait be mace to toe issuance of als sure the temperature, enemical state. and pres-operanng necenses for cevices at present under con-tion of mese devices, a conhnumg entenced caras-sure of tne fluid at all times.
struction until safeguarcs of assured performance s
trophe of a scale exceecing anymeg tms nauon (e) Ass certs of tne emergency snut down sys-can be proveced.
naa known is atmost certa n to occur.
~
?
We neve stud.ed me soeve-eentioned tausts, and tems in the same way as for me snuddown sys-(2) A morougn tecenical and engineenng review
{
tems.
be mace my a cuaiified, edeceneent graus, as-wnde it is not poss+e to provice enact certainty.
(G) The adoouon of earmdusae recuirements.
{
we conclude mat the large scale adochon of these These snound inctuce:
pointed at tne mgnest seves, to cetermine enetner M
these devices now conshtute an unacceptaose naz-devices, to tne entent of onc or more per famdy on (a) The aoshry to witnstand the hegnest known are to the population, i
h the average, win toad to a toss et hfe of many tens 4
of enousands of persons ser year.
earthquase snocit wanout saataineng carnage suf-We easieve mat, wim sum ient requ!ation and l
c fielens to render sey of me systems inoperahve.
wim sumcient reennical emonssis. tpose devices 9
in addition, we eshmare mat ene numoer of cor-(b) N aniary to surmount, at manirnum cer.
can ne mace sete so snar tne uooviacon can erioy
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sons insured. Out not kiired. wde esceed me numeer mtssante speed. the largest known vertican step the tenehrs of transoortation witnout senaace on lulled ey a cons.cersoie factor and tnat tnis wi88 dispiacement caused by an eartncuane without biological metnoes witn toeir unacceptanty song v
piece an intolersoie strain on the med. cal servtces of the country.
imposeg an acceieranon on the cevice surticient breeding time, it'eir unacceptanie waste disposas 4
to render any of tne ststems moperanve. to cause prootems, and tne ravagmg of sne landscace to
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At the casualty rate esemated above--via say damage to passengers. or to cause even a tem-grow fuel.
j 50.000/ year kdied and 250.000 per year infureka porary toss of controt.
We are confident. in snort. mat good sense and
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20 year pened of pesco would give rise to total.
(M The adoption of measures to comeat the of-a concern for the safety of our fenow man was casweities of sorpe one mahon kuted and five md-tects of wed. Ais es, ices r%st to casante of wim-triumon.
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