ML19309B412
| ML19309B412 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Issue date: | 01/30/1980 |
| From: | Hunter V, Whitesell D NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION IV) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML19309B399 | List: |
| References | |
| REF-QA-99900048 NUDOCS 8004040122 | |
| Download: ML19309B412 (9) | |
Text
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U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COTfISSION
. (
OFFICE OF INSPECTION AND ENFORCEMENT REGION IV Report No. 99900048/79-01 Program No. 51300 Company: Anchor / Darling Valve Company 24747 Clawiter Road Hayward, California 94545 Inspection Conducted: December 10-13, 1979 Inspectors,:
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6 8C (V. H. Hunter, Coiltractor Ipspector
' Date' ComponentsSection I Vendor Inspection Branch Approved by:
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D. E. Whitesell, CIrief (j
Date ComponentsSection I Vendor Inspection Branch Summarv Inspection on December 10-13, 1979 (99900048/79-01)
Areas Inspected:
Implementation of 10 CFR 50, Appendix B criteria and applicable codes and standards, including a review of Corrective actions for reported deficiencies under 10 CFR 21, and other reported defects. The inspection involved thirty-six (36) inspector hours on site.
Results:
In the two (2) areas inspected there were no apparent deviations identified. Two (2) unresolved items were identified as follows:
Unresolved Items:
1.
Further review of alleged NDE inequities will be conducted during the next inspection of the ADW Williamsport facility and reported via Docket No. 99900053.
(Details paragraph E.3.b.)
l 2.
AVD's continuing order review, and design analysis, to determine the safety significance, and reportability under 10 CFR 21.
(Details paragraph D.4.b.)
8004040 I2 2
2 DETAILS SECTION A.
Principal Persons Contacted J. W. Marlatt, Plant Manager F. L. Porter, Quality Assurance Manager D. P. Gilbert, Manufacturing Manager L. Battaglia, Engineering Manager E. P. Storman, Contract Manager J. T. Rose, Materials Manager J. Carroll, Authorized Nuclear Inspector All principal persons contacted, attended exit interview.
B.
General Information Messrs. J. W. Marlatt and F. L. Porter, Plant Manager and Quality Assurance Managers respectively~, are to be promoted and trans-ferred to positions at other facilities.
These positions will be filled by D. L. Gilbert and R. W. Swayne effective January,1980.
C.
Action on Previously Identified Items (Closed) Unresolved Item (Report No. 99900048/79-01) It - sistent interpretation of ce rtain radiographic film and reader sheets were noted.
It was ver<iied that:
1.
Anchor / Darling, Valve Company (ADV) personnel had sent for and reviewed qualt.fication records for the individual interpreter.
2.
Provided detailed instructions to the interpreter.
3.
Dispositioned the radiographic film in question.
The inspector has no further questions relating to this matter.
D.
Follow-up of Reported Potential Construction Deficiencies 1.
Report Data Background On May 16, 1979, Nebraska Public Power personnel at the Cooper Nuclear Station reported that an ADV twenty (20) inch 300 pound Flex Wedge Gate Valve would not open, indicating that:
{
3 a.
The stem was broken, and/or b.
The T-Head was broken.
The disc, upon disassembly of the valve, was found to have both
" ears" of the T-Head broken.
2.
ADV Corrective Actions a.
ADV replaced the failed disc with one that was identical to the original, both ADV and its customer, suspects that excessive handwheel torque stress was the probable cause of the T-Head failure. The customer was requested to check, and evaluate the T-Head area during the plants next scheduled outage.
ADV reported that it had experienced one other failure, similar to the one reported by Nebraska Public Power. This failure, however, was a twelve (12). inch 900 pound Flex Wedge Gate Valve in Commercial (non nuclear) service, and had occurred in May, 1978. ADV did not know whether the service conditions of the two valves were similar.
b.
However, due to the similarity of the two (2) failures described abcVe, ADV initiated action on June 8, 1979 to recheck the stress analysis to verify the accuracy of the predicted stresses used in the design of the T-Head. The results of this analysis indicated that stresses across the critical section of the T-Head, maybe higher than the ASME Code allows the T-Head material at elevated temperatures.
c.
ADV then initiated a recheck of the stress analysis of its current " Standardized" valve line, to ascertain whether there was any part of the T-Heads which may be underdesigned.
ADV has determined that the following " Standardized" valve designs are suspected of being underdesigned in certain T-Head areas, and the suspected valves are identifies as follows:
SIZE (IN.)
CLASS SIZE CLASS l
8 1500 16 900 10 900 16 1500 12 600 18 300 12 900 18 600 14 900 18 900 14 1500 18 1500 16 600 20 300 20 1500 22 300 d.
ADV has also reviewed its manufacturing backlog to determine whether any of the above listed valves were currently being pro-cessed. This review identified that fourteen (14) of the above
4 valves were still in-house, and these valves were repaired by reinforcing the underdesigned areas with weld metal.
It was further determined that fourteen (14) of the suspected valves had been shipped to the Tennessee Valley Authority (TVA) for use at the Hartsville site, units Al and Bl.
TVA was notified by ADV, of the potential T-Head problem on September 25, 1979, and was requested to return the referenced valves to ADV shop for appropriate repairs. TVA returneo the valves, and reported the problem to the NRC as a potential construction deficiency on October 22, 1979.
3.
Current Status a.
ADV is currently reviewing its prior shipments of ASME III nuclear valves, to ascertain whether any of the suspected
" standardized" valves were included.
b.
At the time of this inspection, ADV had identified fifty-two (52) unique order items, involving one-hundred-thirty-six (136) valves. Of these items, the pre'ssure temperature data necessary for the stress analysis was available for only forty-five (45) items.
ADV personnel are continuing research their files to retrieve the specification data sheets necessary to perform a stress analysis of tha remaining seven (7) unique order items. ADV personnel indicated their re-view and the analysis check should be completed by March 1, 1980.
Should it be determined that nuclear customers have received valves with underdesigned T-Head discs, those customers will be notified and determination as to the reportability under part 21 will be made. Appropriate correc-tive actions will be initiated.
c.
It was also noted that ADV had revised the design of the T-Heads, and had issued instructions for the disc patterns to be modified to provide additional metal in the T-Head area of the disc castings.
4.
Inspection Findings l
a.
Deviations l
None were identified.
b.
Unresolved Item ADV is to continue its order research and design evaluation l
to determine its safety significance and reportability under 10 CFR 21.
l
..._ -, -. l
5 E.
Reported Check Valve Failure 1.
Background Data The Brunswick Facility reported by letter dated 11-30-76, that during cold shutdown and local leak rate testing of Unit 2 drywell pene-trations, it was discovered that HPCI steam line exhaust 20" 300# check valve, EH1-F049, disc was missing. The disc was found lodged at the HPCI exhaust line stop check valve E41-F021.
The retaining stud on the disc was broken off. While locating a replacement disc, Unit 1 HPCI steam exhaust check valve, E41-R049, was inspected and the disc was discovered to have failed in an identical manner. However, the disc was still in place. These failures appeared to have been caused by the retaining nut backing off, allowing the stud to carry the disc weight. The referenced valves were manufactured by.
ADV.
2.
ADV Corrective Action ADV provided field assistance and temporary repairs were made a.
by attaching screwed-in-and pinned stud to the disc. The valve was returned to service and operated satisfactorily.
b.
ADV shipped replacement parts to the Brunswick site on 10-5-77 which provided a permanent fix consisting of a strengthened disc and hinge assembly.
c.
ADV also initiated design changes to their " Standardized Valve Line" to incorporate positive stops for the hinges in swing check valves.
3.
Generic Considerations It was ADV and the utility's position that the referenced valve failures were caused by " operations induced chatter" which created unusal velocity and stress fluctuations. This position is based primarily on two (2) years service history with no further failures reported.
4.
Inspection Findings No deviations or unresolved items were identified.
1 6
F.
Reported Allegations 1.
Background Data During this inspection the inspector was advised that IE:RI had received an anonymous telephone call alleging certain improprieties on the part of the Anchor / Darling Valve Company (ADVC).
The sub-stance of the telephone conversation consisted basically of two (2) allegations described as follows:
a.
Unrepaired Crack Indications:
(1) During approximately the third week of July, 1979, ADVC shipped a fourteen (14) inch 300 pound globe valve to a TVA site.
(2) The valve consisted of an upgraded casting with handling lugs welded on.
(3) ADVC, after removing the lugs, performed a magnetic particle test (MT) of the luS area.
(4) The MT disclosed an indication of a seven (7) inch crack.
(5) During excavation and repair of the seven (7) inch indi-cation, MT disclosed sixteen other indications which were not in the lug removal area.
(6) ADVC Supervisor brushed the magnetic particle indications from the casting and performed a visual inspection.
l (7) Two (2) inspectors on the 2nd shift refused to sign in-spection No. R-3690 to release the valve for shipment.
(8) The 2nd shift supervisor signed the inspection report No. R-3690 in lieu of the inspectors and released the valve for shipment without repairing the sixteen (16) MT j
indications.
)
b.
Failure to Perform MT After Heat Treating It is common practice for ADVC not to YT all valve castings after heat treating.
(Such was the case with the valve cast-ing referenced in item A. above).
7 2.
Preliminary Investigation Results ADVC consists of two separate facilities, one in Hayward, California (ADV), and the other one in Williamsport, Pennsylvania (ADW) assigned Docket No. 99900053. As both facilities share a com-mon computer data system relative to all valves manufactured and shipped, the computer was queried regarding inspection report R-3690.
The following information was received:
a.
On April 19, 1979, ADW shipped an 18" 300 LB. Class II globe valve with motor operator to TVA. -ADW job No. was E-6318 with inspection report No. R-3690.
b.
The TVA purchase order is 77K52-87381-3 with referenced valve intended for use at Hartsville plant B, unit #1.
Inspection report No. R-3690 was signed by an inspector and c.
not by a supervisor, d.
All inspection reports issued 30 days prior to and 30 days subsequent to April 19, 1979, were found to be signed by inspectors.
Further investigation into ASME Code and the customer's purchase order requirements fadicated that MT of castings is required after heat treatment for Class I materials only. MT is not a requirement for Class II and III castings unless welding is performed. Since the lugs were welded on, then later removed, MT then is required for what was the lug area only, and a visual examination for the balance of the casting.
3.
Inspection Findings a.
Deviations None were identified N.
Unresolved Item As the physical data and personnel referenced in paragraph 2 above were not directly available to the inspector, this item remains unresolved and will be resolved during a future in-spection of ADW and reported in IE Report No. 99900053/
80-1.
8 G.
Exit Interview The inspector met with management representatives (denoted in para-graph A.) at the conclusion of the inspection en December 13, 1979.
The inspector summarized the scope and findings identified duung the inspection which included two (2) unresolved items. Management repre-sentatives acknowledged the inspectors findings with no further com-ments.
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