ML19308C811
| ML19308C811 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Crane  |
| Issue date: | 07/19/1979 |
| From: | Fraley R Advisory Committee on Reactor Safeguards |
| To: | Harold Denton Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation |
| References | |
| TASK-TF, TASK-TMR NUDOCS 8002070557 | |
| Download: ML19308C811 (3) | |
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O ME.'CRANDUM FOR: LH.-Denton, Director,'NRR
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R. F. Fraley, Executive Director, ACRS SU3 JECT:
~ACRS SUBCOMMITTEE MEETING TO DISCUSS UNDERLYING CAUSES CONTRIBUTING'TO THE;TMI-2 ACCIDENT The attached is-forwarded in accordance with our discussion regarding
. the =ACRS: Subcommittee meeting on August 8,1979.
Please let me know how much time you or Ed will need to cover the topics noted.
You
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may want some help from I&E regarding item I.(d) so I.have sent a copyito Vic Stello also.
Since the meetina will be. scheduled'from 1:00 P.M. to 6:30 P.M., we
' would like you'to limit your presentation so that some' time-is left
-forJdiscussion - about 2-235 hours looks appropriate.
If you can't
--cover all;of the. items-noted within that. length of time we can sched-ule-another treting' to_ finish up the incomplete items.
R. F.
aley Execut ve Director
Attachment:
Outline for Discussion - Mtg. of ACRS Subcte. to Discuss Underlying,Causes Contr_ibuting_-to the TMI-E-Accident--
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' V. _ Stello, If.E/ w.att.
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..x f ;z OUTLIttE' FOR DISCUSS 10tl k
Ix SMEETING OF ACRS J"
SUBCOMITTEE'TO DISCUSS ~UNDERLYIf?G:CAUSES-CONTRIBUTIfiG TO THE.TMI-2 ACCIDENT-
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1 August 8,1979
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liOO PM --6:30 PM-11717 H Street, Wash.,.DC Rm.-.1046-.
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NRC'.Reaulatoryl Review (R. Mattson/V. Stello)'
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- a.'
- Scope of NRC' review; I:
. l.
How~ detailed is the !!RR review in the areas of. design,.
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Loperations, operations procedures, in maintenance, etc.
For exampl_e,- does the' staff review the significance of measuring. pressure vesselflevel by pressure gages?
E.,
.~22 LWhat' design areas are not looked at?
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Is the scope'of-;this review too broad or'too' narrow?
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IsTth~e depth:too extreme or.too' shallow?
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If the review is: considered?ina~dequate because of.
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_. breadth oridepth; what are the deficiencias;- how.
serious.~are:they;- what should bet done to' correct P
them;.what would the cost be,:etc.?
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Philosophically, is the system of placing reliance for
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safety on the user a' good one?' Is it adequate? How-
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- does it =ccmpare with other nations?
-c.
Thereihas been a series of errors in seismic design re-
-cently.
Does this mean that the system has broken down
.in this area? If-so, why? In'what other areas may there
- be deficiencies'and.What other areas'may be receiving in-
. adequate attention?
d;; What'is:the role.of the NRC Inspector?
Is he effective?
,, f LCan' his effectiveness be increased?.-
-e, JUhat ' depth of knowledge should-the ?!RC Staff have in such
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g 1 areas as construction, hardware, plant' behavior, operations, maintenance.
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2 II. Technical Ouclifications and Panagement Etructure of User Organi:a-tichs le y :: 3nfg, Legg.
c.
'..' hat is the latest thinking regarding rcactor c;er'. tor training and oualifications including the role ar.c cualifications of the shift supervisor and tne shift safety engir.cer?
b.
What kind of technical support grcups are neede: by user organi-zations for normal and abnormal operations? 'lhere should they be located? fica large should they be?
In what broad technical areas should they have competence, etc? How mach should a utility rely u;cn a reactor vcndor or architect engineer for technical support in abnormal situations?
c.
What are the role, authority and responsibility of people above the shift supervisor in providing technical direction for the handling er recovery of a reactor in the case cf a serious ac-cident? What cualifications should these pecpie (plant super-in encen, site manager, vice-presicent icr pou.. procuction) m have?
d.
E ve studies been nade to correlate plant nerfercance with management capabilities (however, they might be defined)?
Would such studies merit consideration, if they have not al-ready been made?
e.
What is the current thinking of industrial groups on the cbove topics?
II!.
What is NRC's Role Regarding Item II above? (R. Mattson)
Unat shculd *;RC's role be regarding the training and testing of utility oerscnnel?
b.
What is the NRC role and what capability shcuid the NRC have to respond to accident situations?
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":s icill this role ce meshed with th t of utilit; and ir.dustrial gcoups?
c.
Are nc.. laus/ rules needed to provide for suitable coordination?
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2:30 F" - General Discussion
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