ML19308C585

Deposition of J Chwastyk (Met Ed) on 791011 in Middletown, Pa.Pp 1-88

ML19308C585
Person / Time
Site:	Crane
Issue date:	10/11/1979
From:	Allison D, Chawastyk J METROPOLITAN EDISON CO., NRC - NRC THREE MILE ISLAND TASK FORCE
To:
References
TASK-TF, TASK-TMR NUDOCS 8001280615
Download: ML19308C585 (89)

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{{#Wiki_filter:. ~d. Q. NUCLE AR REGULATORY COMMISSION Ob d 1, P IN THE MATTER OF: THREE MILE ISLAND SPECIAL INQUIRY' DEPOSITIONS i DEPOSITION OF JOSEPH CHWASTYK o f / Place - Middletowt, Pennsylvania Date - Thursday, October 11, 1979 Pages 1 --88 I-l Eo-Ti DRESIA ~, (202)347 3700 ACE. FEDERAL REPORTERS,INC. J0 OffiaalReponers. 280Q q 444 North Capitol Street -Weshington, D.C 20001 .~ . NATIONWIDE COVERAGE-DAILY s F

1 UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 1-NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION 7-( )

--____-.______x In the Matter of:- 3 (y - \\m/ 4-THREELMILE ISLAND i 'SPECIAL INQUIRY DEPOSITIONS 5 ____._________.--X 6 DEPOSITION ~OF JOSEPH CHWASTYK-7 Trailer #203 8 Three Mile Island Middletown, Pennsylvania 9 Thursday, October 11, 1979 10 12:10 p.m. 11 BEFORE : 12 For the Nuclear Regulatory Commission: ',f. ? 4 13 ^ /- DENNIS ALLISON, Special Inquiry Group BARRY HORVICK, Special Inquiry Group 34 DR. W. JOHNSTON, Special Inquiry Group 15 RONALD HAYNES, Special Inquiry Group '16 m 17 18 19 20 21 ((_) - 22 '23 24 ha Feaer3 Coporters, Inc. 25 ~.

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.'CR 7624~ 3 s lDAR i # 1' ~ Litf.1 ,14R. ALLISON: -This is'an-interview of Joseph J.~ .1 i L 2 Chwastyk of the Metropolitan. Edison' Company,'being conducted 3 by the-NRC special; inquiry group ~into the accident at Three ' ~ 4 Mile Island at-trailer 203'at the Three Mile Island site on' L.D 5 October-11, 1979.- 6 liy. name is Dennis Allison. Also present from the special 7 inquiry _ group are William Johnston and Barry.Horvick and Ron 8 -Haynes will come in later and ask some questions. 9 Whereupon, 10 JOSEPH J. CHWASTYK 11 was called as a witness and was exsmined and testified L 12 as follows: l-I 'h ( ((~,) 13 BY MR. ALLISON:- t 14 G Er. Chwastyk, before you went on the record,.I showed 15 you our standard witness notification, which is on a July 30 16 memo from George Frampton to the special inquiry group. Have 17 you had a chance to read that notification? E 18 A Yes, I have. 19 G RDo you have any questions about it? 20 A No, I' don't. 21 G-Okay. Have you been previously interviewed with t .jf (): 22 respect to the-accident at Three Mile Island? 23 A Yes, I havelbeen. >24 G.. How many times? ! Am-rederal Reporters, Inc. 25 A. Once with I&E, I guess it was. - r U

4 f 1. .G lAll right. We-have read the transcript of that i )jtf'2-2 interview and we-have it with us~today to refer to if need be. .-3 Okay, just to set the background a little bit, as I recall 4 from your I&E-interview, you came into the~ unit 2-control room about~11:00'a.m. to 12:00 noon;on Wednesday, March 28th, looked 5 around to see.what was going:on and then you relieved Bill Zewe' 6 -7 on the makeup panel, is that correct? 8 L No, I relieved Bill Zewe~on the full conso e, not 9 just'the. makeup.. 10 G And what does the full console mean?- 11 A That means the control room controls of both primary . nd secondary plants. 12 a 13 G So you were in charge of all the operators 14 manipulating controls in the control room? 15 A That's right. 16 G I'm glad you cleared that up, because there were'two 17 different impressions I got from rtading the I&E interview. 18 A Well, most of the operations were' going on, were in 19 the makeup reactor coolant systems. 20 G Okay. Now -- and I-believe what you noticed according 21 to your I&E. interview at that time was that the plant was O 'd 22 floating on the core flood tanks with them maintaining _a -23 pressure of about 550 PSI.' That the power operated relief A. p) 24 ~ valve, block valve, was being cycled or else possibly ~ n

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- 25 pressurizer vent valve was being cycled and the hot leg-

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5 jtf 3 -I temperature indicator was pegged'high. s l' 2 Does that sound right? ~ '3 A .That sounds about right, yes.

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is 4 'O And you understood that the cooling path was high 5 pressure injection water. flowing in through the core out the c 6 .PORV or the pressurizer-vent and that'the core flood tanks -7 were holding'the pressure.up about-550 PSI? 8 A Yes. 9 G Okay,umy first question is simply to confirm that 10 this was your understanding of the way the core was being cooled 11 the high pressure injection water going in and discharging steam 12 from the top of the pressurizer and the water would flow through (o_) 13 the core and provide cooling? 14 A That's correct. 15 0 Okay. At that time when you came in, did you think -16 that that method was working effectively in keeping the core 17 cooled? 1 18 A .I'didn't have any indication to show that it wasn't. 19 G_ Did anybody that you recall question that? Did 20 anybody'say that I don't think it's working? Or words to J1 that effect? - (.-/ 22 A No, I don't remember anybody saying that possibly s. 23 except myself. /llI. 124 GL Do you think you might'have said that? Ace-Federal Reporters, Inc. 25 .A

I didn't'like that means of control, but you know, 1

7 J' i 6-fjtfi45 ~1 the pe'ople"at that. time - told me.that it. was our primary.means : 2 ofLcooling:and they: told me'it'was w'orking and I didn't'have-

3 any? indication-t'o say thatlit.wasn't.

4 -G. iokay. :.Why 'didn't you :like' that method? - 5 A.1 I'didn'.t like'..it primarily because it's so alien: ~ 4 f6 to operating the; plant. -And ILpersonally felt'that it.was' 7 just adding'-- it wasn't giving us:enough information ofnwhat we'hadJin the plant,.and.it was.just addin'g confusion;,to~the c 8 (9 operators because-it was such;an abnormal way to_ operate. -10 Now-remember'now, I just came in here and a lot of things '11- 'had-transpired prior to my getting there, so I sas sort' of 1 ~12 coming in cold to'everything and I didn't know --~I'm.still l 13 not sure if I know how they got in'that-position, but what I 14 was seeing I didn't like of course, because it was so abnormal. t t 15 g You'didn't like it, but because there was.already !~ 16 an 8-hour history of how.it go't hhere, I guess you weren't prepared to say I: don't like this, let's go into something 17

18 I like more.

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No,!that's not true.- I did -- until the hydrogen 'j' detonation'or combustion.or whatever you'would like to call it,

20 121 I was prepared!to -

I was, in fact,~ operating further.directionsL i22 ,givenito maintain the. temperature. (1) [- ~23 When the; hydrogen; explosion occurred, it was -- it occurred ~ 24 simultaneously;with.an operation of.the valve, and I'm not sure -na.x (25 !which'one it"is nowfI!think it was the block valve for the PORV ~ g J, b [ g A =- ~ ~

h I ori heiPORV itself, I'm not sure which. :That~1ed me to believe jtf 5 1 t F]- Lthatlwe--had'some kind of a problem in'the solenoid operator'on 2 ~ he valve. And 'that's.when I essentially ' thought 'I knew enough 3 t juq Q 4 about~what1was going on to1suggest to Gary-Miller to -- well, '5 I' asked' permission to re-establish the bubble in the pressurizez h 6 and that's what we eventually did. do.. 7 . G' -And.that was after the. detonation? 8 A 'Yes,-I think it was, yes, it was, I'm sure it'was. -9 G And that would put:it about 14007 10 A Right, somewhere in that area. 11 G The hydrogen detonation occurred shortly before 1400. 12 Okay. Back to when you came in and prior to the accident, it's - () ~ 13

true, is it not, that you had really two qualified analyzed 14 ways of circulating coolant through the core that was supposed 15 tio work? 'One, run the reactor coolant pumps and two, turn them 16 off!and use natural. circulation, is that correct?

17-A . That'.s correct ~. '18 G' Did you. consider this; third method, discharging from ,19 Lthe pressurizer and usingfHPR water, did you consider that to

20 be'a fully qualified way of' cooling the core, that you had i

J21 . confidence that itLwould' work if you:ever needed to use it? i -22 1 Ai, =You meanfprior to this' happening? p /23 G: Prior ~to'the accident. o.. ) 24 A I don't know if I ever thought about'that' method of weasers noo,mes, Inc. l- - 25 coolingTpriorito the accident.- J 9 Y s A ; a

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1-G. l2 using that method? p h LU A No. l [ "_ I. t u 4 4. 1I suppose then, you weren't aware of an analysis done 5 by-B&W that indicated.that.that method could cool the core? 6 'A .No,-I wasn't. -7 'O Let:me mention -- I haven't read the analysis e'ither, '8 I just-heard that it exists, so I don't'want you to think that 9 .that is a fact. - 10 A I know of no analysis prior to the accident. Il g In any case, the point here is that you hadn't 12 ' thought about it and you didn't -- so you were not.by any means 13 sure that it would work prior to the accident? 14 A Mo. 15 g or when you came iT? 16 A No, s 17 g Did you realize that when you tried that and you 18 opened the vent valve, that the pressure. ar hang up on you 7 19 ~due_to ? oiling in the ' core, a certain flow rate of-HPR water ~ 20 going An in'a certain vent area at the top of the pressurizer 21 . and that. vent valve may not be big -enough to completely blow i{ ~ I- ( ) A 22 1the~. system 'down? - c '23 AL . Ye s.. l24 .g2 .Did you realize.that there when you came-in the ~

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- + 9 ) 7 -jtff7? 1 .'A" -I realized tihatt at one time when.they, wanted to go

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>3 ~ wanted to g'oEdown in pressure to go on'K-heat. system,-that -- . p_ x)" 4 because no matter 'wh'at they tried-to do, they could' not get ~ '5 the pressure.down and that's when I assumed that the' reason they couldn't get the' pressure down'was because our-mode' of '6 7 pressure relief was-not enough-to decrease the pressure that t .' 8 was being held up by-the wa'ter: converting to steam. ~ '9 So'although~you hadn't-thought about the method ~ ~ '10 .before, when you experienced that morning.you couldn't get-- 11 the. pressure down, you' inferred that that was the reason, the l 12

pressure was hanging up due to steam generation in the core?

{- ~13 A Well, steam generation'now not necessarily in the core 14 0, - All right, good. x -15 Al - And remember, I also had-the high TH in'dications and' 16 at: that time of' course I didn' t know how much water was in the - 17 system, but I-assume because of the high TH indications, that c ' s. - 18 .I was' flashing in the hot' lines. 19

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. 'Okay. : That is'a good point to pursue for a minute. 20 'I think?you stated in yourII&E interview when you initially-i ~

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came[in'you saw the TH was peg'ged high?- How high would that-bd

~ 22' AL s700idegrees, I:think..s the; max. l 23 {G. Did you:later' find out what the' actual'TH reading was x. L -24 ..other/ han; greater than,.700_' degrees? t Ase Femvol Reporters, Inc, 25 "A' No~, I:didn't..

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' 10 -jtf-8 'l G. You didn't?L So yo'ur understanding of TH 1s that ~2 it was' greater than 700 degrees? - 3 A .Yes. b: fm i 4 G Didn't know how much' greater? 5 A No, not how much greater, no. .6 G; 4nd that was. pretty much your understanding for what 7 -comes several hours?. 8 A 'Yes. .9 g-That we're talking'about here? 10 A Yes. -11 MR. JOHNSTON: Could I ask just a clarifying question? 12 BY MR. JOHNSTON: O i3 a Some time grior to ehae time from other eeseimonr, 14 Ivan Porter instrumentation engineer said'he had put on a fluke 6 15 ' meter, so you would have had a direct readout somewhere in the - 16 control room of the A hot leg temperature directly. You know, 17 did.you observe anything of that sort when you took over as 18 -part'of the: transfer over procedure -- you were never made 19 aware of the existence that they had actually put a meter in = '20 the room..that in principle at least could read-the exact-

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. temperatures? Laterlon they put one on the Beehive also. '22 - A I don't remember everlseeing'it. Whether I was aware ( 23 it:was there or not, I'm not certain, simply because the 700 [() 24 -degrees -- greater than'700 degrees-was enough for me; ~ Ass.18ederal Reporters, Inc. 25 MR. ALLISON:, Well, as it turns out, greater than \\ yls w e v,-

' ll N jtf 9, 1 700. degrees:wasn't that'far off. V(G. .M R.-- J O H N S T O N :. Actually,'it was on scale on one of 2 -3 youritrip charts. ) .,.[ ?N BY MR. ALLISON: 4 ~5 l-G It-sometimes got.up as high as 800 degrees,-usually' i 6 it was between 700 and 800. 7 A ThEt's'where'we started to inject. 8 BY MR. JOHNSTON: 9 'S You came in about here, I guess, in time. 10 A-This is where we started. 11 MR. ALLISON: For the record, we are indicating to i.. 12 about 10 hours on the chart, I guess. I'3 MR. JOHNSTON: 14 0-This was on a stripped chart that was located in 15 the control room, so.this in pencil was directly readable by 16 you. folks without the computer telling you it was above 7007 e 17 A-Yes. 18 4 Apparently on. scale. 19 A Well, it was very high up.on scale and it was so high 20 Sup, whether it was pegged or-~not at.that time, was not very .21 .important. _3g if -22 -BY MR. ALLISON:. 23

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-for the record. This is'an unlabeled chart of Ivan Porter 2 plantiparamaters versus time, and it was prepared by Mr. '3 Picklesimer of the.special inquiry group and it runs from J O'. 4 zero hours to 17 hours. ~' 5 Off the record. 6 (Discussion off the record.) 7 BY MR..ALLISON:- ~8 G So you saw that the TH was 700-degrees or greater 9 or thereabouts. : Did that tell you immediately that there was 10 -steam in the hot legs? 11 A Yes, it did.- 12 g There is no question'in your mind that that was 1()- 13 above the saturation temperature for the temperature you had? 14 A Yes, you're right. I knew we'had steam in the hot .15 leg. At that time I was not considering saturation temperatures 16 and pressures, I just~ knew we had had steam and therefore, we 17 had allowed steam to generate itself in the hot leg. -18 G And th'e reason you knew'that was the temperature 19 -indication, is that right? 20 A Temperature indication. - 21 . G' ' So there wasn't any question, then, in your mind at - 22 -the time that 700 degrees meant steam in the hot leg? 23 A. That'sjright.. ~ h~ 4 700 degrees-in the hot-leg. Did you make any further 24 ~ Ase-Pederal Reporters, Inc.

25 l inference, namely-that that.was a certain amount of superheat --

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13 .jtf 11' .1 A.. No, I didn't. 2 0' Some degrees of -- 100 degrees of superheat? ('). .3 ' A. No, I didn't. g 4 0 Did you infer that that temperature meant that.there 5 was a lot of. boiling'in the core? 6 A No. Again, I was -- I did not know what happened, 7 what transpired before I had gotten there and I did not have 8' time to.take Bill Zewe or anyone' else and get an update of 9 what had happened up to that point. 10 Bill was kind of busy trying to do other things and I, after 11 some time in the control room, I'. noticed that essentially at 12 the time, there was not anybody up there directing the operator, -13 so I felt the one thing I could do to help would be to take 14 that over fcr Bill, simply because Bil.1 was doing a. lot of 15 meeting with Gary Miller and Mike Ross and a few other people. 16 He was being tied up in a lot of other things and I felt

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~because of the seriousness of what seened to be happening, 18 that we needed someone at the console at'all times. And that 1 . as hen I told Bill, after I looked around and got'what I -19 w w '20 could.out'of the operator, at:least I knew where we stood. 21 I~ didn' t know' how we had gotten there. So.I was told that the - 22 core, : cooling through 80. gallons' a. ninute through the core 23 was: sufficient to keep the core cool. . h_. ~24 1 I assumed-that was correct.

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125 MR. JOHNSTON:' One--question. Was that 80 gallons A f~. A

14 j -l -jtf.12 1 .per minute through the core, would that, you would be taking 1 (~ \\> lt 80 gallons a minute, at the same time you were putting 80 3 gallons in, so you were keeping a constant amount in, or were I 't 4 -you trying to-increase -- .l 5 A At that time we were not making any attempt to change 6 anything other than maintaining 80 gallons a minute per flow. 7 G So your let-down would also be running? 8 A No, not necessarily. 9 G Where might it have been going? i. 10 A out the pressurizer relief valve. It was cycling back. 11 G In the form of steam or liquid? 12 A Well, it was liquid in the pressurizer period. ( ). 13 4 I meant out the valve. 14 A Out the valve, of course it would turn to steam 15 because of the breakdown in pressure. 16 G Well,.okay. C 17 BY MR. ALLISON: '18 G To get back to the TH then, and I want to make sure 19 I' understand you correctly, this 700 degree TH told you clearly ~20 Lkere was. steam in the hot leg? 21 A That's right. ,G (_). 22 G-But you.did not make the inference that that was 23 telling you there was a lot of steam being produced in the core? llh. 124 A That's right. j Ace-Federsi Reporters, Inc. 25 G Looking back at it now, do you think that that's what E =

i 15 - j tf'13 1 the 700 degree TH indicates? L/ 2 A No. 3 G Have you looked at that? ku 4 A I haven't looked at it, but I don't think it does '5 indicate that simply because.it depends on the water volume O 6 -in the core and'the pressure of the core. There is no flow 7 in there if the water volume was such that the water levels 8 above the core, you know, it wouldn't matter -- I couldn't 9 tell. from that temperature what the water volume was in the ~ 10 reactor coolant systems. l 11 G That temperature does not tell you then whether or; 12 not the core is covered, if I understand you correctly? l ([] 13 A That's correct. 14 MR. ALLISON: Off the record. l 15 (Discussion off the record.) l 16 BY MR. ALLISON: 17 G A little more about -this ' method of cooling by 5 18 charging HPI water and discharging the steam space of the 19 pressurizer. 20 Did you appreciate at the time-that there's a bypass path 21 when you charge _ water into the cold legs, it can go down the ~[^'). -22 bottom of the core barrel and through the core and out the ~ v 23 pressurizer that way? It can also go back through another L 24 -steam generator and wind up in the pressurizer that way? Ace-of Reporters, Inc. 25 'A .Yes, it was. u.*-- --u-.. e

16 .jtf 14 1 0 .And'so you appreciated this bypass flow going on t ) ' 'd 2 in the system where there could be? 3 . A. Yes, that was primarily o'ne of the reasons I didn't , _s i ') 4 particularly care for that mode of cooling. 5 G _One of its' primary drawbacks is you don't know 6 whether it is bypassing or going through the core? 7 A. That's right. 8 g Were you aware of the core thermocouple readings 9 during this time? ' 10 ' A. I was aware that they were high, but I did not put II maybe the attention on them I should have, simply because 12 again, I go back to the T Hot that was enough indication to g/ \\ -13 me to indicate that.we had the problem and I had a fairly good 14 idea what the problem was and that was we were steaming in the 15 hot leg. 16 0 And so you are aware that the core thermocouple 17 readings were high, but not -- 5 18 A. Not specifica11y how high, what the temperatures were. 19 4 Did you think at that time that you m2.ght have a 20 better chance with this method of cooling, if_you followed 21 some'different strategy than the one you were following? j 73 ) Q 22 .Some different' strategies that come to.my mind are pump j 23 the pressure up high and only open the vent valve as need be (. 24

to prevent lifting the code safeties.

Another strategy is t'o ' Ace-el Reporters, Inc. 25 leave.the vent valve and. vent as much as you can to open the ~

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k-[ '2 fas you-can.: And aEthird one that can go with either one, is' 3 the. max the HPI flow.- 7 4 Did you think at: the. time - that you would have a better ',I JS chance of cooling - the icore with some combination of those .l 1 -6 ' strategies? 7 A' Yes, IJdid. My. initial reaction was of course to .8 -let the reactor coolant system. fill and that was what I 9 suggested, notilong after I took the console and then getting -- -). 10 it was'some time after the hydrogen explosion that I insisted 9' 11 'to Gary Miller on what I wanted to do and I requested permission 12 to do it.. -.([ .13 Remember at this time I could not do anything on that 14 console without prior approval from Gary Miller. .15 'O, So what was it that~you kanted to do then? 16 A I wanted to fill the system going.to at-some higher c 17 flow rate;than we were going whether it was 80 gallons a minute 5 18 or not, E don't remember. But close up the pressurizer, 19 continue with the'let-down and increase makeup flow, which 20 ..we'did do eventually. 21 g -So this was your recommendation shortly after you irm. ()- ,22' .took charge of the control room? 23 A: I think it:was shortly after,.but again, time during 24 that:timeLfhame had no meaning because it:could have been an 1 Ace-el Reporters, Inc. 25 hour, fit could'have.been five hours, I don't remember. u.- _ ~ L

s 18-1 ijtf~16 --I h1 .Dotyou think you d finitely had made this-recommen- .y 9%) 2 dation-.toLGary Miller by the time we-reached shortly'after the 3' ' hydrogen ~ detonation? ~ ^3 {\\^ 14 -A. Yes,.I had made the recommendation earlier. I had -- ~ f5 the recommendation to allow me to fill the system - 'at that 'l 6 time I didn't say.tonfill the system, to inject and draw a -l 7 -bubble-in the pressurizer. -And I' assume that was under- -8 advisement of Gary. Miller and Jack Herbein, who was.at the 9 observation center at that time.- It was right after the 10 hydrogen explosion and'I mentioned that I correlated the 11 openin3 of the valve with the detonation period that I again i 12 went to Gary MillerLand explained what I thought had happened .l( ) 13 as far as the hydrogen detonation and-the simultaneous opening 14 of the valve, and it was shortly af ter that, Gary Millar got 15 back to-me and said go ahead and draw the bubble. 16 BY MR. JOHNSTON: C 17 G What was it that you thought had happened that you 18 communicated to Gary? 19 MR. ALLISON: I have a line of questions. '20 MR. JOHNSTON: Okay, I understand. 21 MR..ALLISON:, Well, go ahead. [) 22 BY MR. JOHNSTON: 23 ~G: Okay. I was'just going to ask you, you just stated 24 - th'at1when. you' were aware of the = pressure spiked, 'you went to ' Ace-el Reporters, Inc. '25 Gary and said something.to:him.about what you thought itLwas? \\

19- [j tf 1' A. No,-no, no. It was after the' detonation. Now I ~ ~ 17'l- ~ L'. -2 .didn't' realize it was hydrogen. detonation-immediately. ~ 3 .G

What did you say.to Gary?

'4-A. At this time the pressure. spiked -- at that time, '~' a. 5 I didn't know what it=was.- But it was1some time later when 6 someone mentioned an explosion that they had heard that I put-7 . two and two - together on-the pressure spike and the ' noise that - we had actually had _ some kind of explosion in tdum building. 8 u 9. G. That was some time during the same shift? 10 A Yes. 11 G Then what did you say -- that's when you went to - 12 Gary Miller and what did you say? ([ 13 A I related that to Gary that I thought that what we 14 'had seen out there was an explosion of some kind in the buildinc 15 and it correlated with the opening -- one of the valves, and 16 I'm still not sure which one it was, I told Gary that I didn't ~ 17 advise :him operating that valve any longer. And I requested 18 again, permission to inject and'get a bubble in the pressurizer. 19 MR. JOHNSTON: Okay. 20 BY MR. ALLISON: 21 4 Okay. On that point, I just want to point out that p- ~ L). ' 22 on: - reading yourEI&E. interview, it doesn't appear consistent. .23

On pageJ12, you said.that despite_the fact that the spike

'24 istartled you._at first, when.it came out, then you looked at

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.. m I-never dismissed.it simply f h^ N~ -2 A. - No,'no,.I did~not. 13 because my building spray pump s_ tarted. f f} b '4 Okay. Did you' dismiss'it --

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Did'I say:that'in the I&E.. report? 6 G .Let me finish the. question. 1 7 A. - Okay. 8 OnLpage 12, it startled you, you were concerned.

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.. Spray pumps.came-on. You looked-things.over.and then dismissed ~ 10 it.' Later on -- 11-

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_ Well, maybe -in my initial -- I didn't dismiss it,. 12 I couldn't' explain it. . m: )- 13 G .Okay. 14 A. So therefore, maybe in that sense, I did dismiss it. 15 The pressure stayed down so therefore there was nothing more 16 I could do. O 17 G The pressure was down? ~ 'c.t.

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Yes. -19 20 21 22 -23 "24 Ace. Federal Reporters, Inc. 25

?CR7624.02L 21' i DAR I !rmg:1" 1 4. ..Then-later1on'on page 18 o'f.your I&E interview you _n ' talked'.abouttsuggesting to Gary:.~ Miller that you don't open the ~ 2

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. valve 0any'more because it had caused =some kind of an explosion? ~

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A Yes. i

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G' And that's.thelinconsistency'that I wanted te clear

6 up. - The-first statement that it was. dismissed and then.

-7 suggesting'that.you don't~do:it again because it causedLan 8 explosion. 9 A Well, there was some time period between those-two. 10 g You already answered, and that it was some time 11 later-that you put the--noise together with the pressure spik.e, 12 is that correct? 13 A. Right,fand also the final thing is opening of that-114 ' valve and how-much longer that was after the spike, I don't-15 'know. Again', I would have to -- it would be not much -- my 16 realization.ofvwhat had happened would not be too long prior '17

to our increasing the flow rate to above one that d

18 logged-on that log I mentioned earlier somewhere. 1 19 Now, are you pretty sure that you told Gary you h' '20 thought opening that valve had caused an explosion? 21 A.. 'Yes7 I am pretty sure, but whether or not I could ~ T22 iswear to that,-I-don't know. 'l ['); s- '23 0 -Are you quite sure that that is what you thought? j 24 . A. - That's what I: thought. Most definitely I did think Ace-si Reporters, Inc. 25 that..Now,~whether or-not I related that to Gary then, now i l i G i

22 rmg'2J iI ithat :I Jthink labout. it, I: don't really: remember.=.I may have. - ~ , ~.; ?f 1 -U 2 ~just1goneIbacksto Gary and' asked 1. permission'againfto-redraw; 3' theJbubble.- ~ I.just._can't rememberLif'I related-to him my_ f' el bt n/ 4 , thoughts at the timefof'the correlation;of pressure spikeLin. 5 the operation ofLthe valve. on'the180 gallon per_ minute flow 6 .O~ 'Okay..That's;okay. c c -7 your I&E: interview indicates-that when,you came in and took '8

over the' panels, that the instructions were.to -mal' tain an n

9 80' gallon per' minute injection-flow.

10 A' And the 80 gallons per-minute -- and I think I said II that in my-I&E'we put, I was;not sure of_that number. That-12 1may.just be a number.thatzis associated with the.make-up '13 system,that I kept'in my mind, but at the~ time'of the I&E 14 report, 80 gallons a minute came to my mind. So it's possible ~ 15 that'I mixed those up.. 16 G It's possible.the instruction was for some other 1 j 7 L17 flow rate? ] 18 A Yes.. 19 If it had been for 80 gallons per minute, would'you 20 be happy with that instruction, would you think that is plenty ~ 21 of flow? - 22' ~ A Partcof the instruction was ---and I remember this distinctly --'was whether or not it was actually 80 gallons a 23 a ]l iminute. j 24 a _. 25 lThe_second part of that is that it was enough to maintain

/ .23-i.

• th'Jcore cool.

Now,0that's the! word I got. 'Now,;how;that was, ~ rmg:3: e n rh A) J'2 ' determined, I am.not even_sure because,'again,'I.didn't.have 3 ..timeLto~go back:and' recheck and'. recheck what peopleiwere telling ^DN 1:- o (L l4 me.. 5 LG .But as you~ recall.your instructions, however'much '6 . flow you~were told to: maintain, you were also told'that was. ~ 7 sufficient;,is _that correct?- 8 . A. ; That's correct.- 19

4' Did you think that whatever it was -- did you think

.10-at the time that you would have a better chance of cooling .11 the core if the flow rate were. higher?

12 A

Then, I~will restate what I said earlier. I did [( [ 13 not like that method of. cooling, okay? I.did not like it 14 . initially when I-was told ~what it was and while I-was at the ~ 15 console and' I was carrying out those _ instructions, simply 16 because it.just did not give me enough confidence-in any way 17

because I had no means of telling whether or not I was in 18

. fact keeping the core cool. 1 19 There.were-other people-who were looking at.the thermocouple 20 . temperatures and-things like that that were,-I assume, and f21 JI[ don't remember specifically: anybody._ telling me that the f 22. ' core temperatures were coming;down or._anything'to that'effect. ~ ~ 23 'G. .Were you' aware that while you didn't know the exact '24

core thermocouple' readings, no'one was_ reporting to

you that s

Ace-al Reporters, Inc. 25

the'_ core-was being cooled; is'that correct?-

1 'l'

~. l ' -} ~24 [rmg}4l' l' iAl -No,lno one!was reporting to melthat the core wasn't ,e m M '2 'being; cooled.. 'Itwas' told;thatLthe' core was being cooled, 3 -that's<all. j 9em;;_ 4 G. . Do' you remember..who gave'. you: those L instructions.to .5 maintain whatever flow' rate itEwas?- 6 A -- Mike ~Ross, I~-remember stating those. -Now,-I'think 7 also when I talked t'o1 Bill Zewe, as far'as my taki~ng over the 8 1 console, I think he'also mentioned. -9 G- .Although you are not'certain of what the_ number was, ~ 10 you are'quite certain that there was a flow rate specified at 'll .that time?. 12 A Yes. .,.x ) '13

G When_you took over?

14 A-Yes. I'm quite certhin there was a flow rate. .15 .O Could it have been 4-to 500 GPM? ~ 16 A. No, no,.I don't think so. .e 17 -- G .You don't think~it was that'high? 18 MR. ALLISON: Off the record for a second.

19 (Discussion off the record.)

20 MR. ALLISON: Back on the record.- ' 21 BY MR. ALLISONt -s (,1 22 G- ~ When ldid you leave the ~ plant 3nt March. 28th? l 123 . A '- Once I got there, I didn't leave until the' morning m of Marchx29th. I think.I left the-plant somewhere around 124 h inopo,wn ine.

25 f 6:00 --o' clock that morning and then went over to the observation r-

= A:: s -25

rmg.5-1 centerJfor_a while.:

13 ^) -2 jG- .. hen you wentlhome, did you.think that the-plant was W ~ '3 iunderTcontrol?

<~.

~(. V) 4'

Ai Yes, Ildid.- I thought the' plant was under control-

~ 5

when we-started the ~ reactor ~ coolant pwnp around 5:00 or 6:00 6

o' clock in the evening._ 7 G And why waszit that.you thought things were under 48 ' control atLthat point? 9 A: Simply because we had-core cooling, definite core ~ .10 cooling. We had a means or removing the heat from the core Il iwhich was the steam generator. That was it. That's under. 12 control. ([ '13 G~ 'Do-you remember what you knew'at that time when you 14 zwent home about the radiation readings, either off-site or in 15 the plant? -16 A I' knew-in the plant they were high.- That was related '17 to some water:from the' reactor' building pumped in the aux 5 18 building off-site.- Yes, we of course had our off-site ~19 monitors out'and'.we were getting' reports back. I don't remember

20

anything.very' outstanding as far as off-site. doses on that day.

21 .G Does that mean you don't remember any large )_ 22 readings? i 23 A 'Large readings,-right. ~ 24 G In terms of.off-site doses, is it fair to say that Ace-el Reporters, Inc. - 25 Jthe<off-site'releasesfweren't alarming you?

,Vf .. ~ 4 4 3 ll - x *,l ~' E 4 4,> m y_ ^ s 226. mi g _ 33rmgf6$ N1: L.I IIe s, t A T(y o .p:: a

2 LG'..

"1 'Infanyiway?- i3- ~ ( AJ3 'Yesk it-is.i n t-l J4 /Gi Were. the iin-plant readings': alarming you?. ' p '

g 1

5 A.;

IIEwas-concernedfabout-.the.-in-plant-readings,; simply [ ~ k' 6 jbecause.. th'eyrwereihigh' enoughito keepf us-out cf: there, -out iJ

7-of some 'of those Tareas.

And'that^ concerned'me. ~ ~

8 1As1far as their: hazards of:these1 doses, no,'I wasn't 19 concernedkoverly. concerned, because I. assumed that we would

.10 takejthe. proper precautions in, one,' bringing the levels down, ~

11 Jand two, limiti personn'el'. access.

~

12

g EIt sounds..like the basis of your concern-for the

[ 13 .in-plant' readingsiwas in the auxiliary ~ building anyway. _ Was 14 ' t:"an :operationali problera? i i h., /15 .AJ That's right. 116 10' .You didn't : infer from those readings core damage? i - What' kind 1of core damag'e you might have~, did you? ~ 17 ~ t ^

18 l A.i Yes, -I~ did that essentially when I got in. the control

~? 19 1 room.3 Ifwas,.you know,-essentially.asking-what happened up t stoithat' time, and all'the-radiation-monitors.in the reactor

20 7-

building #andfof. course'in theLauxiliary fuel builing were high.

p 121' . n + $22

Inassume:weidid:have some core damage.-

~ 2 gf 23 fat theitime.ILwasn't of course sure'how much. It looked ~ u [h{ ; J24: ~ bad,fI'[llisay7that,. but,7you _.know, and again, I didn'.t really Ase.caseres nepo,w,, Inc. c , =- (25 Ehave TheltimeEto-think--about it, you know, how much core' damage , ': ' i p .,e N [. 30 g l y q yl 1 ~ e w.. -

'= 7 27' ~ irmgi7-- il l there was' and-what _ the? ef fectssi of that were as far as what- ~ 3O c2 w'as1 happening.. '3 'My main. concern was, Eof course, to get things back.to y p*) t 4 normal status, L I gue'ss in -the way I would :like to say that. L 5 4 .Were you aware of the. readings inside the react'or ~ 16 -. building, namely,.how'many rem per hour the meters'were

7

. indicating?D 8 A. ILknow they were high, what numbers they were I 9 ' don't' remember..'I still don't know what they were. 10-G -Did'you know at that time? II . A. I kn'ew at that time they were high in the building, 12 yes. h 13 L G But'you didn't"know what the specifi, readings 14 were? 15 A.. JNo, I didn't. I'm sure.someone' mentioned them to, 16 'but"-- 17 G Did'you connect those readings, the readings inside 118 the-reactor building.with something specific set as a level ] 19 'of core: damage.or'a Part 100-type release design basis 20 accident or anything of that nature, make any specific

21

' inferences-fromIthem? p. () - 22 >A. No,.other thanlwe had had some. core damage and we: - \\ 23 had some radioactivity out'in.that. aux building that we'had 124

to maintain-some control,'on.

i Ace-Report m,inc. 25 G But you'didn'_t'know from:the radiation readings that s .J ex ~

28 ~ . rmg : 8., 'l Lyou1had coreidamage? U /- 2 A. -Ye s.. 3 LG You-knew-the levels were~high inside the containment? yy k

4 A:

Yes.Therc.was.no. doubt in my mind'we were'undern c 'Y 5 - a general emergency. ~6 'O But you felt the; core <was being~ cooled? 17 -A Yes. 8 G' And that the operational problems-in the auxilia.ry. ~ 19 building 'could be handled; is that right? 10 .A .Yes. ~ 11 G i.And that the high levels were being contained within 12 the_ reactor buidling; is that correct? [f~j 13 A That's correct. v 14 G When.were you on watch again in Unit ~27 15 A I don't remember. It was the next day or that 16 Thursday, and I dor.'t remember if I came out -- I had been 17 scheduled to work the 3:00 to 11:00 shift all that week, and 18 I_think-I must have come in again on Thursday, somewhere around 19 3:00 o' clock, what time I'm not sure. ~ 20 0 -You were on watch in-the Unit 2 control room on 21 Thursday? l .22 A. ' Yes. 23 10' Do you~ remember what happened while'you were on 24

watch there?

j ' Me-Reorms, lm. l 25 AL No. There were an awful lot-of_problens that we had, ~ c t: ,i

p 29 s rmg.: 9 ; 11- .and without my-looking at'some: sort of:logior'something to .p l' ~ ~ 'v 2

spark my-' memory -

I remember:. now, and '.I.< am not sure again 3 when. this was, ' but it must have been: Thursday, the gas problems JE% 4 Ein the reactor coolant system -- now that was a big. problem- -5 to:hs in that, you know, we had the. gases.there'and~we were- ~ ~6 getting. rid of themLby venting the~make-up tank,-but unfortun- '. 7 -ately we-had'a leak in that-system'that'was puffing' radioactive 8 gases to.the' building-and then from-the building, of course, 9 to the ventilation system -to ' the atmosphere, and. that was 10 a continuing. problem. 11 And I-am not sure when it started or.when we -- well, I'm 12 sure_it started right~after we started the reactor coolant j ) 13 pump. 14 -3' You are not sure if you.became aware of the problem 15 on Thursday or Friday? 16 A No, I'm sure that the gas problem was there Thursday- '_17 and-at.that time we were venting the make-up tank to.get rid ~18 of gases. And of course that was':the big bubble in the-19 core. time,1too., 20 .G Okay, well that will. square because other people 21 .. started worrying.'about the gas bubble and'if you came in on ) 22 Thursday evening at'3:00 and stayed'until-midnight'-- 123 A-lThere is_one thing I want to say.- This bubble in l. the~ reactor coolant system, in my mind was never.under any 24 r Ace-of Reporters, Inc, 25 problem.. We-knew exact 3y what it--was doing at all times.

w ~ 30, ,.? rmg/101 ;1: ~ Now',iI know I rea'liz~e that.a' lot lof other people-didn't-j( v AA 2

c. understand,7:but theEoperator on-the console was able to.

'3 .distingu.tshiwhat the bubb'le was doing,just'by spraying the . p.- -.. A) 4 l pressurizer-periodically. We could tell-when we :had. a lot of ~ 'S 1.gasesiin solut' ion in the water, therefore we hadEto vent it ~ i

6 simply:by.the. action!in-the pressurizer and spraying it down,

.7 G ~How did.you tell,that?' 8 A. ~

Well, what we were getting was noncondensable. gases-,

9 pressurizer,~byfspraying-itLin there and the length-of time 10 .tha't you would spray to get it to fill the pressurizer with -11 noncondensable, determine how much gas you had in-the solution, '12 you know, I know again-this was.a great big thing as far as 13 the-press ~and everybody else was concerned, but I had no 14 ' concern on the consold, because we~ knew exactly when we had to 15 vent, based On' how;- lonn it would take us to spray to get a 16

noncondensable gaa out of the; solution and into the pressurizer,

-17 G~ And by venting you mean open the valve or the PORV ~ 18 vent valve?. 19 A. ' -Ye s ~. - 20 1 And venting those gases out? ~ 21 A.. --And of course, simply by the duration of spray, time l.

(~+

N)

22 to'get the.noncondensable gases or to! fill the pressurizer

~ 23 ' determine howlmuch gases we had'in the solution and we could p f' ~ q j; 24 say that time 5 lengthening, according to the more-venting we c hewww n.po,=, ;ine. s.25 'did. 4-y J ~ w --e-e

31 ~ T rmgf-lli 1. LG' How could.you tellJwhen you were spraying that you Ayy 2 had, filled the. pressurizer 1with noncondensable_ gases? 3 -A If you had a steam bubbleJin there, your pressure 4"y ^'~/

4 wouldLtend to. decrease because your..are collapsing the steam 5

. bubble, where if'you have noncondensable gases'in there and 6 .you spray,LihJdoesn't ----as'a matterlof fact, the only thing 7 ,it_doesLdo isLincrease the. pressurizing level. It doesn't 8 . change your1 pressure at.all. -9 So depending on when you s' prayed, what the rate of pressure 10 was, determined how many -- II G In the pressurizer gas base? 12 A Yes. ( ): 13 ' g.- And how much spraying you could do before you reached 14 that condition' told.you F nuch? 15 A That was dissolved gases were still in the system. .16. G So'didTyou commence Thursday then to degas the system .17-by the method we just talked about? 118 A I believe so. Again, I would have to look. We did 19 it for qu!te a number of days there. 20 Okay, so'when it-actually started, I don't evea remember. The'e.was another method of degasing the system 21 G.. r m. ..( ) ~ 22 going on, too, and that's.with the let-down gases would come L23 -out'of solut' ion in the make-up-tank;fis that right? 24 A That was not a means of degasing.. There was nothing , Ace-Reportees, Inc. 5 -we..could doiabout'that,.as you-decreased in the pressure in 2 g r

^ l .1 " rmg 12?.

1-thel. reactor coolant = system of course, the; gases would come, n

- (_,/;

2

out of solut' ion'.

'3

G I:mean'that was --

_fx- '1 1 '~ ^

4 A.

-It was-not the preferred method of getting rid of 5 the gases, butithere was no-choice. ~ 'G 6 G' .It wasn't bad, it wasn't that getting-rid of some-1 L7 .of the. gas?- 18 1L - Yes, but if1we could have stopped it without' securing 9 the let-down, we would have. 10 0-Why couldn't:you secure the let-down?- 11 A-We-had had problems with-let-down. We ~.id not -. 12 well, first-of all, we were putting water in the system I'F 13 through the fuel injection lines, so you have to get rid of

ss 14 that water somehow or else you would go solid, and with the 15 make-up pump running solid position, it a very tenuous position 16 to be in.

17 So'we had tx) maintain let-down-to get rid of this water, l 18' 'and of course, the let-down, because of the gases coming out 19 of solution, was giving us gas problems. 20 JSo we were sortlof-strapped in that position rather than 21 Loperating it. solid, using the discharge to the make-up pump, b 22 ~ which is about 2700 pounds..We decided ~not to do.that, v.- '23 -O 'Can you remember anything.else about Thursday and L 24 ~ Friday? Ace-el Reporters, Inc. 25 A- -Therelwas something'else about the make-up tank, now s I {. k

y t ~ m' ' 3 3 '- .;e ermg-jl3! J1' !I'.m.not3sure:ifHit'wasiThursday or Friday. We were, because-f [s. i ofithe l'eakagelin.'the-systemi'we_had a set pattern 1that'we; i ~ c

2

3

'were~- using preventing,: and 'it ' was; again, itu was kindfof

j h,

It -4

shaky _in.thatythe pressureLjust kept mounting on..us in'that

~ ~ . "5 {make-upl tank.. .6 And I~think it.was Friday night,-wasn't it, where they/ ~ 17-lifted az relief-' valve? ~

8 G-I don't know.

9 A., That was the. day.we got -- S Friday morning.was the 1200' millirem-reading at ig 11 the-stack. l 12 1 A. .'And that was due to our lifting.the make-up tank h-fl3 _.and blowing the hot water and gases' out into _ the,' tiilding. b '14 Okay. ,15 G Were you also on' duty on Friday?- '16 1 A. Yes, I was. 'l 17 G Probably would-that be'about the same, 3:00 o' clock q '18 Lto' midnight or so? I 'Yes,.ILthink;it.was. I think I stayed on that type il9 ~A. L20

of'all -- well,-at'least that. area of' schedule for'a while.

11 Pardon me. Do you. remember what happened Friday. Q ~22. Lwhen you'were on watch?~ '23

A. 4 No,II dod't.

Aga'in, I-.would have;to have-some kind- ,7 3 24 of reference material 1to spark my. memory. l: Aonseeeres neporters,Inc.

25

!.Gj

Inithose'later. days therelwe're GPU engineers on.

v s 1

3

M. ;

^ m e ,o f %: ~.- 4, .f 3, i ' cs

34'

~ - ~ .m [umgi14; [1

watchiwith'you'inE heEcontrol? room?L T

t y lf s . 2' A;I . Ye s. : gi- -[ 'N3 3G[ ? t iI.'think".I'mJ--OI'm not positive:-- but in'later

]

AJ ~ 4' [ days?-- ) IR (5. 1 AJ: Lyes. e Theyfwere./thereLan'.they: represented,;.I think,z the. ns,. -6 Gi d [3 .7 technical; support groups. E 8 f A. - 7echnical support groups,1they-were involved quite ~9 'a' bit'with the bubble. I. remember that.:. [ .10 G; Can you' describe to me what their1 function and' role- ~ 'l1

wasi whati kind' of things ~ they ~did?

g 712 A. I think their-function was to help.us-to=get-out of 4 J13 .the position'we.were-in and also, they were doing some-14 engineering help coming up with a means' to'increaseLlet-down 15 slow,-calculationlof bubbles, things.like that, things that r. 16 ~we:did'not-have the' time.to do.- e .17 They were. making ' suggestions'on various things,' writing-18 test procedures,;and.they1were'doing different. functions from ~ 19 then until:now,.as_a matter ofifact. 20 ,Gl Were :they.directly1 involved in: operations in the - s h 21'~ , sense of;being in'the-chain of' command, or-did,you feel.you. w.: ; 122 1had5to check'with them before:doing certain. things? ~23 . 1 A. 'Yes, they were.. They were doing a lottof the ~- [. $4 !studyin(?of prdblemsffor;us; and you know, for instance, the l Ase-reseres naso,ie,s,Inc. ~

q; 225 blet -down} low problem.

p in ", ' c

~

p . J:( y+ c .-+..-.s

.35

rmg:15 ~~ JAnd-I knowithat I was told that, you know,<of course I had

.r~x 1 ) 2 ithe: complete charge, but I should check with them before s. 3 -changing-anything in the.let-down or anythingLof.that type.. 77 jvT Would influential advisers be a good term for:them? L4' O_ 5 A.- Lyes,. advisers'would be a good: term. 6 G~ Did'you feel you were in charge of operation? .: 7 A-For the most part. 8 G Okay, do you remember: anythingl else noteworthy that 9 happened while you were cn1 duty Friday, Saturday, Sunday, 10 other than the degasing evolution? 11 JL The degasing evolution -- and.of course, sometime. 12 during-that period we put the hydrogen recombiners in service. j() 13 Now, that was the time I was nervous. 14 G-And why were you nervous? 15 A Well, simply because the past history of the hydrogen 16 recombiners that'I was aware of, as far as I. knew, they did e 17 not have-a good reputation.

• Put them on the'line and'they-18 wou d blow up, and that type of thing.

19 .So'if there.was any time during that whole thing over there 20 in~the:first couple of hours that I.didd't have time to be 21 ' scared, that was the one Ethme that I was rather apprehensive I~)1 22 =with putting the hydrogen recombiners on line. 's ~ Were you aware of-the plans for. diluting the incoming 23 G-1 i:. M. '24 gas (with. nitrogen?1 rm-Mai neponen. Inc. 25 A -Yes.

^ 36-e rmgfl6-' -1 G: To: prevent'~an explosion?- ~ j~. bU 2 .: A. :

Yes,-I was.

We also -- 3 G ~ LI1take-it you we're all in favor of'that? .[ l' 4 -A ,Yes, I was. ~ ~ 5 I will-be'quite frank with-you,-I am not:that well. '6 acquainted with hydrogen or.any other gases for that$ matter, '. 7 and I was a,little' nervous when Iacame to hydrogen gases. It 8 could be because I was there and saw the' initial spike. 9 G. Okay. You don' t remember -when -those were put in ~ '10 service? II A No. No, I don't. I know we put those in service. 12 We had done a'few things like, well, hook up some lines to pump ..()' 113 the waste gas tanks into the reactor building.. We tried to 14 ho<>k up a line directly from the make-up tar.k to the reactor - 15 hailding, things of that nature. 16 G You weren't successful-in hooking the make-up tank 17 directly to the reactor building? 18 LA No, we weren't, and I'm not sure why now. -19 GL Any;other noteworthy evolutions that you recall, 20 -say, in_the'first week? 1!1 A-No,.not without some reference. .im. ( J- ~ 22 MR._ALLISON: Okay, why don't.we go-back to the 123 ~first day, Bill, and ask some quescions. 24 -BY-MR. JOliNSTON: Ace-et toponen. tne. '. 25 G Okay, we might want to refer to this chart while I ~'

9 c. -~. Q < 4, 37' H 1. we::do1some talking. - i(rmg : 17 -: - : I

2 If. I understand what'isigoing on here,.you starting..taking 13

charge;inithe(c'ontrol room'at about somewhere-here around

, L4 ~

the:10th hour afte'r the thing started, at least that would be

~ _l 5 .just before:the: hydrogen spike, the plant;was already down 6 'at'its__ low pressure,,so that'was completed. - 7. And the plant was -- let's see,.was it_ steaming? '8 -. A.

No.-

.9 G There_was nothing coming out the secondar'y, both 10 _ atmospherics'ere secured and there was no vacuum yet? w 11 A. That's right. 12 G :l So it would be roughly in here? 13' L A. That's right. '14 G-Now,. actions that you recommended began to take place. 15 it looks'like;in no-_ longer than about an hour.after you got -16 there, at least if I see-it right, they were already beginning. 17 about that time.. O 18 We are'already beginning to see the hot-leg drop. There is. j 19 hydrogen: spark because'it turned on the EEC at that time, ^20 ESfor whatever. l:

Sofwe do ' ave' kind'of_a time period here,.and it wasonot.

21 E h l }y - 22 .tooLlong;after that that we began to.see the effect. ~ y uf 23 iSorwhy don't youLjust kind of start here, if you would, ~

,9 t

h(ems.re n.oonen, spe. ) Joe,fand go through with the kin'ds of things that you were 1 24 ~ 1 -25 } trying tof do,: and perliaps' you' could refer a -little bit to-this, '{, . h' - s

38 .~rmg?l8' '1 and:if welhave some errorstin some. things here-like someone gsg- " * /- l2 - indicatedfflows or'something, point out if you.think;we have- ~ ,? 3 something. y9 N'? ~4 ' A. '- Well, as far'as ndicated-flows,'again, I don't recall whatsthe flow rates were, and I.would.have to refer-to'- .5 ~6 the logLI had'at the1 time.. 7 But=somewhere'in this time frame when.I got permission 8 . from' Gary Miller,-we turned-the pressurizer heaters on.

Now,

-9 -it'todk some time to develop heat in the pressurizer'to start cnd;#2 10 to. turn the water _to steam. - 11. ~ 12 .- ("I. 13 %/. 14 .15 s 16 c. 17 18 -19 20 .21 d. ~. 77 v ~ 23 . 24 Ace-el Repo,ters,' inc. ( [25 W g 't; ~, ,W l?g' ^

I Ri7624. ~ C 39 -l DAR1#3 "jtf?l'L1 .G: ' We 'have : an indication down here. that presumably s -j. 'c v 2 indicates-which bankstare-on and:myLmemory is that these lines.- 3 are'the on periods. So this talks-about banks 5 being turned ./ x j <(* the other ones are apparentlyf on most of the. time-4 off and on, 5 'at-least'.the ones that are" working. 6

Does this make.any' sense:to you to see things on and~then p

nothing'for a period? 8 A-No, it doesn't, because it should correlate with 9 some period of time prior to the lith hour'here to somewhere .10 at'between lith ~and 12th' hour when those heaters came'off. 11 G I think we have that.: That's tied in. Well, you 12 go ahead. ~.-) 13 A .Somewhere, and I would say it was probably 15 or 20 14 minutes prior to 1100 hours, where.when we turned on the' fuel .15 heaters tc Jtart raising the. temperature in the pressurizer 16 .to bring.it to saturation-for the pressure, we were at. C 17 We.did find the : reset temperature - and when we started to 118 produce steam, the steam pushed'the water out of the pressurizer 19 into:the' loops.- Now~some2 time.in here, and it doesn't show on 20' the drawing, but around 150 in pressurizer increase,.the 21 injection.' flow to what number again,.I don't know, but.I know i l b )~ 22 I'did have' it' logged because-I made a point to insure-that I i 23 ' logged the' flow rates.- 1 y24 .(L Well, you have done this-by. starting up-another pump i Ace-Pederd Reporters, Inc. ~ 125 or'by changing;the flow on'an existing one?

k..

4 40 gq -jtfL2 1_ A ILthink I started by.the existing flow. Now there-p) _~ ~C '2 -was'a time,when I did>have to start the second pump, but I'm "3 .not'sure when that was.or'what the sequence was. But'I had ~ O 'V' 4 'been, got.150, because the. rate had dropped in the pressurizer 5 .it'seemed to.me that.we would not have enough water in the-6 pressurizer.to fill the loops,xso I increased the flow-rate- ~ '7 -at about 100 inches'to drop in, the pressurizer level stayed. 8 Prett'y constant. That is when I had the heaters, 80 and 100

9 inches.

I ha'dJthe-heaters turned off again-to.give me some 10 . time ' to inject some more. water into the reactor coolant systems 11 -and that is when we see here,-the level going back up. I'm 12 not sure that that slope is' correct though, is seems it went O is =9 e =*er- .14 0 It.is a recorded parameter? 4 15 A. .Yes, and once we got the pressurizer essentially 16 full again, and of course you remember this whole time I was 17 injecting atisome greater rate than we had been, we again tried 1 '18 the same thing..We turned the heaters on and draw out the i. 19 bubble and it was some time in this time frame, around 1300 L l 20 hours that we actually saw the T Hot loops coming down. I'm 21 not sure what-this is.. indicating here. n 22 Q. It. indicates that it went back up again. 23 - A. - And wefdid~see that, we saw, as we -- as the l -24 . pressurized level.would come down, the T Hot would come down

Ae.-

.: n.pon.n,inc.

25 on - A loop ~ only, not B -loop, but then when we had to shut the s

b . c. x. ~,- '/' I ~* i.

41 1 ~ 9 'j tf l-3 il -heaters off,!we allowed the: water. level to gofback to the (v 2 pressurizer, the T Hot started going'back up:again and.that ' 3 may be what we are seeing here. ~ p( V . WereLyou~ interpreting'any of~this? We: e you looking L4 0-5 . at' activities in' the steam generator and interpreting your .6 temperature changes __here,,the. cold legs for exa ple are heating ~

7 up.- Did.you. infer'anything about flowothrough the steam

.8 generators? 9

A.

-Well,.there'was-~some point there where it'was brought 10 to-my' attention, the TCs'were-changing, it was changing and. 11 it indicated-to'me that we' were getting_some flow through the .12 ' generator,--okay?. But I don't remember at what point'that was. _,n }gedng back to ne hawing of Ge' ale, it seems to 13 14 - me that this happened.-- we turned the heaters on and off more 15 .than is-indicated here unless this is the time frame. 16 - I' remember it did take us quite a long time to actually inject C 17 - water and draw a-bubble, and now this doesn't show che bubble-C ~ 18 ' for some reason. 19 4' It shows a full pressure. -20

A.

bd that's not correct because there was some time ' 2'1 Priorsto-this.'increasesin pressure and this is where-we went

l(

22 . on; full:high pressure injection, but there was some time prior 23' to that -- wait a minute,.let me-think on that a minute. g 24 -I don't remember what'that pressurizing.did, but I-do know i Ace-Federet Reporters. Inc. 25 that welhad:had at.some. time;in.this. point here, had positive ~ a 4 x .. h n 4

k [ 42 1 I ' ndication that. we had'. water in the A loor. andi that _ was tj tf [4'- ;1 i [U'T: 2

-indicated by-the T; Hots.and the TCs in that loop.

3' 0~ 'Right here they'are'es'sentiallyfthe same. R' w'1 ^ ~Right. Now this is about the-time I received. 4 . A. a 5 finstructions'.to go full high. pressure injection..'Now-based 6 fon what I had'seen'up to,this-point'with.the T Hots coming i 17 down A loop and'if I remember right, we:had pumped in,fI think- ~ ~8 it was 20- or 30,000 gallons of water to this point.' 9 'G Yes,'I wanted to ask you about those flows. You did. 10 . mention in the I&F interviews'that first-you put in something E ike 20,000^ gallons and began to see.the A loop refill and l 11 -12 then laterLon you added some more and you said that it seemed like'30,000 additional gallons? 13 -14 A Right. 15 G Now-I don't recall the exact volume of the primary _ 16 . system, but 50,000 gallons is fairly -- like 50 percent or 17 .something? 4 18 A.. .It 1s 88,000 gallons. 19

G If you put 50, though,-in on a system thac holds 20 80,000, what'would_that lead you to conclude about how much 21 water must'have.been-in the system?

n U.- !22. ' A. ' '.Until we went into the high-pressure injection, when 23 <we putithe firs't 20,000 gallons-in,_weesaw the volume coming , g ~24 down. I' thought we were prett'y close to a full _ system and I i Aa r.o r.i n.porten. Inc. 25 'did.not think'at that-time of the difference in the gasses in H ^ 4 c . ~.

e-' 1 / I g 7 .43.' . f L tf c5' 11 .the:B71oop that-was preventing me from~ filling that loop. /. ' * ^ '2 ItthoughtLbecause the.A loop wasifull, the B loop was-right -3

behind it

-An'd'a's a-matter _of fact I remember resisting. going ~ .j ): ~ 7-

4 Lto..fullEhigh-pressure rinjection simply he'cause we had the A'_ loop

,i5 full and?again,'becausefof-that I' thought the B loop-was f /directly/behind it, but-I received direct orders'from Jack '6

7 Herbein to.go.to-full high-pressure-injection.: That is when'-

8 Lwefdid~thisJand saw the pressure starting to come up. 'When:we 19 -got-the pressure up and I noticed we_put in--- I know it.was ~ 10 .a_ tot'al_of:about_50,000 gallons of water that was when I -11 realized that we really~had a big = problem-in the fact that we ~ 12

had-very little water left in the RC system and based on 88,000

@/A8 ' k -13 gallons, we had:about 38 gallons of water left'and'that's when_I personally knew-that we had.a lot bigger problem than 14 - 15 L I originally thought about. 16 0 Of$ course, I think at.the point that you' realized t 17 that you1also~ solved it. I mean, you also effectively _ refilled .g .18 it;byL the time ~ you realized that you had it. ~ 19 . A. l Right. And there-were no-other means of determining. - 20 -;what we'ha'd-~~in the. system except-to_go' ahead like we.did'. ' 21 4 ' Was'the 20,000 or 30,000-somewhere=in the log book x jQ 22 somewhere?- (23 'A.' That's.righti.: r. QL : JOn.what'is thelbasis of your recollection? 24

Ame Feews n9erim._ inc.

~ ' J25 A.

• The" basis ~ofLmy recollection was that I-had them, m

-ka. ~ ~ ['..kr

f eV-p 4 g '44.: jtf 6;c:1

priorftoLstarting,Lmarked BWST levels-and logged it'when'we r(,l

/2 .were. completed and based on those calculations --7and'it'seemed .3 to:me:it;was.-20,000;for'.the A-loop'and:30,000.for-the B loop. ~ l 4 I inay 'have : thosef backwards. <5 g Were you.doing.anythingIby'way'ofl changing valve ~ L6 .lineupsLor anything in;the.periodsThere'so-'that -- is it in: 7 iany way conceivable.that-perhaps.all this water was in fact: -8 11eaving the BWST?' Was perhapsileaving itEbut not'necessarily. ~ 9 igoing,,all of it, into the' core? - Or the primary system, let's 10 put it.that way. . 11 A.- 'No, the DHP-5s--were open and we were suctioningL 12 right off the BWST. Now it's possible,-I. guess, that it was ~ M(%l 13 going-'somewhere else, but I.wouldn't know where. 14 Q. -There is a valve lineup if you want to feed from - 15 the C makeup line ov'er.into the A -.well, let me'see how.it' 16 goes. If you want to put in a different set of cold legs:than C -17 when-you were at, you would have to open some valves ~somewhere ? '18 xand close some other valves.in order to, so to speak, cross-19 feed.- Do;you'have any. idea of whether that-kind of' valve 20 arrangement was attempted? q ^I 21. ' A. l Yes. 1 h

Changeoverrto feed two different legs?

O I22 '1 L23 ^ A..

Some. time dtiring this thing I was told that the high-

~

[

%.pn[erm nepormes;inc. -pressure [ injection pumps'were-all cross-connected and that's 524 Jl 4 125 Lwhere' common suction and common discharge.. points.-- now-I'm not f n .;,:L "A

45 [ jtf 7 1 s' ire when I was told that'. /g k/ 2 0 - Let me say for the record thAt this-is a piece of 3 paper showing the high-pressure injection flow arrangement with 4 the valves. 5 A Okay. One thing it does not show is two valves here -6 and two valves here. 7 G On the inlets? 8' A On'the' inlets. 9 MR. JOHNSTON: ' Dennis, do you want to -- 10 BY MR. JOHNSTON: 11 G Now, is this A, B and C, as you put the thing, the 12 A pump was secured? h.

( )

-13 A And it would be C, A and B. 14 G And these were being used later on in the event and 15 if you wanted to put feed up into this part of the plant and 16 .I think - this is the A side -- e 17 A A side, right. 18 G. And you were using this pump as your driving-force, 19 now you've got to move it through several valves. 20 A. That's~right. ~ 21 G. Normally it goes like.this?- ,-(f 22. A.' .Yes, and-these two valves would be closed. 23 lG: Those-are manual valves? .h-24 A '- ~ Yes. I was' told that these valves along.with these A F.e r : n porters, Inc. 25 ~.other groups:of-two were all open. So,that.you could feed the I i

46 jtf;8: 1 C' pump into the A loop ~or B loop. ~ 2' G. This would have been done some time to your arrival? L3 A Yes. [) 4 G Nothing that was done under your direction? 5 A No, No.'. 6 G ' Knowing what you know about'the radioactivity in 7 the-auxiliary building, would you have suspected there would '8 be'any difficulty in getting anyone in to make those kinds of 9 ~ changes,.obviously after there was activity around? 10 A Yes, I would assume -- and depending when during the 11 accident had happened, I say that because that -- 12 G You say the C valves were not really begun to be .13 used until four hours into the accident and that was when the 14 A was secured. So some time after this period, say five hours, 15 if you can give us some feeling about'the levels of activities 16 that might have been in there in this time period, is-that a 1 17 feasible thing for someone to have done? q (- 18 A Yes, that is feasible. As far as giving you an idea, 19. I'm:not sure.what the activities would have been at that time. '20 Q. Okay. Thanks'very much. [ 21 ~

Okay, so_we have moved along now'to the repressurization.

i ) 22 Off the record. m 23 (Discussion off the record.) 24 MR.:HAYNES: Back on the record. ' Ace-Federal Reporters, Inc. 25 I '~ ~ 3.

1 2.g- }{; e '43 ~ ,,,O v l ~ ~ *' fjtff9; il BY:. MR.T JOHNSTON':' n y. .Back in thb;repressurization' mode'and doing it with M'

• 2

' f i - i ..3 a? full?HPCI on, you're repressurizing',,were there anyievents-p-Q' 4 ( that took place' 41n: this. time zone. that. were - other' than stiraight-U "5 forward. activities'that y'ou would take place in;orderito make ~ '6 Preparations;to bring it up and start the pump, which-.was'done '7 ~at this :tiime iperiod?.- T8 A. - l Well,. let'. me: explain.. Again, I mentioned earlier 9 thatf I. vasi notf all: that hot to go' ah'ead with the high-pressure zio 5.njectioni ~ SotI was.' ordered to go with the high-pressure 11-injection at-125. gallons-per minute per leg, which would come t- ~ I. started off doing that, okay. But as Ie ? 12

out to:500'. gallons.-

Ih 13 the ' pressure started to come up, I decreased that flow rate - ~ 14 -quiteia bit-until we got up to 2300 pounds and that was' fairly a {15 low'by'.that time. Okay. Now somewhere also in here we got 16 ' vacuum ~back4on a condenser and'we' started to steam a. generator, 17 right'here. And'that was just'about the time we-started the-18 . high-pres's'ure injection. That was one of my' considerations a 19 when"I decreased thisiflow rate,ithat we were steaming the L 20 generator. atf that time.. + - 21 So Ifdidn't': feel we -needed to go fully solid. My indication 7;.. 222 Lof(thej2300 pounds-and7the-temperatures be'ing down were enough 23 !indicAti$n to me;that1we^h'ad core ' cooling throughout the~ steam; (24 (ghnerator.-.. Ase.peseres noorwee,inc. ~ Okay,poneLfinal thing;onfthat'and that is,-you ~

25

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48 jtf 1 mentioned. earlier'in'the interview about the fact that you were _(/. A-2 venting to remove gas and that the period of time between when 3' you had.the. vent, it gradually got longer and longer as-you , :(,, ) ' ~ ' ' 4 -were gradually moving the gas from the primary system. Did' 5 that1 venting operation start very shortly after.you got the 6 pumps going or was it a number of hours later or was it almost . 7. immediately that you were doing this venting operation? 8 A I don't remember. 9 G Okay. 10 Do you remember when the concerns about bubbles and so forth 11 began? You say you weren't particularly concerned, but -- 12 A When I came back the next day, of course that was . () .13 .the big thing, the bubble in the reactor vessel itself. And 14 like I mentioned earlier, based on what we could see at the 15 console, I had no concern at all. The bubble -- other than 16 rapid pressure decrease, of course, any rapid pressure decrease l 17 would have forced the gas bubble and would have made it' bigger. 18 G .You had that same problem while you were on until 19 6:00 o' clock the following. morning and this was-something like 20 '6:00 o' clock in the evening, so you had another 12 hours of 21 this sort of thing while you were in charge, and was it ,m 'Js_):. 22. essentially the same-kind of operation that was going on when J23 you came.back? l24 A

Yes,-it<was.

L Ace-el Reporters,Inc. l25 g: Did you sort of initiate -.you had to do some ventinc M N

49 jtf 11 1 or something along during that period and I had the sense of. \\-< 2 a soft system. 3 A Yes, as a matter.of fact, and I mentioned this 4 earlier, but this point here when we started the.RC pump, 5 I' figured.the emergency essentially over and the cleanup 6 portion of it beginning and we did get.into the gas problems 7 ~ and I'm not sure when and how we determined -- I know we were '8 getting the gasses in the makeup tar.%, the wholc while because 9 of the letdown. The venting of the pressurizer, I don't 10 remember when we started that to get rid of the gasses. I do .11 remember though, my lack of concern about the bubble in the - 12 RC system based on what we could see at the console. \\( ). 13 You did feel though, that the venting started while 14 you were.still on this first period and while you were as part 15 of this continuation rather than when you came in on your next 16 shift? 17 A

Boy, I, don't remember.

I really don't. I would have 18 to look to see if we were actually venting there or not. You

19.. must remember that I came in somewhere around 11:00 or 12:00 20

-o' clock-that morning. - I didn't leave until 6:00 and I was back 21-at 2:00 or 3:00 and:we were working kind of crazy hours there ~ 7s d 22 and everything was sort of all together. 123 G-Could you give us a-little bit of discussion on the 24 letdown line problems? When -- did you have them in this

Aes-el Reporters, Inc.

25 periodLhere? t 4

50-U l ~ . j tf.- 12 1 ~A Yes. 7. A/ 2 G And what was the nature'and what did you feel was 3 wrong? 4 A The_ problem-was when I came in, they.had the problem 5 with the letdown. The problem was we did not have any 6 indication of letdown flow. We would see a periodic spike 7 in the indication of flow, which led me to believe that we-8 ~had a relief valve somewhere lifting and there are a number 9 of relief valves in that system. We did try to_go to concen-10 trated effort to determine which relief valve was leaking and 11 isolate it. We ran into some problems. One of them that I. 12 remember was on certainty as to.whether or not we had isolated -( ) 13 the. letdown demineralizer and bypassed them. There was some 14 question on -- it was originally reported that the demineralizers 15 were isolated and : bypassed, but then there were some problems 16 later on, some conflicting reports came back on that. So I'm 4 '17 not sure:that I ever had it straight in my mind where the 18 -problem was, based on_the conflicting information that I was 19 getting. But we were going through somewhat of an orderly 20 . checking system to determine what the problem was in that 21 system. And:I. don't think we ever did' find out why, for - n -_ i_)

22.

' instance, we didn't get any' flow indication'which relief valve 23 was lifting. And I feel 1certain there was one lifting somewhere.. 24 0 Now you must-have been getting flow or you wouldn't h o.rm n.ponm, inc. 25 have been filling;up the makeup tank. Do you know what measures

J 54 ~ jtf'l'6 'I -Ad'entified at' the time: - - I think that the number you quoted ,o()2 2 is based'on new calculations that were done on our method of-3 calculating leak. rate. 7 12 4 _ 0, - Were'you -- was;the flow -- did you have a normal 5 _ procedure of emptying the drain tank? a 6 .A -Yes. .e 7

0..

How often'did you do it?' Was it once-a shift or 8 every couple of shifts or> roughly? 9 A Roughly it was once a shift,-but then it had been o.t. #3 10 increasing which indicated-that our leakage had increased. 11 12 13 14 15 16 -17 18 19 -20 " 2I D ~. 22 v 123 ~ 24 Ace-et Reporters. Inc. -l 25 p

CR7624.04? 55

DAR:

Lrmgil . 1. .G. I' see. Jere.you paying any. attention to the l ,/^Y (f .2

temperatures-on those thermocouples-on the'down?.

-3 A. We were-trying to use those to.ide'ntify which valve _(m3 M _4 'was leaking, but unfortunately we couldn't. They tie into 5 a common exhaust line, and apparently the. steam flow was such '6 that it.was heating all three equally,-or just about equally, 7 so we.'couldn't determine.. 8 G Is there a record somewhere that would show-that -9 the three temperatures were almost the same? 10 A I?m sure -- Lil G. .As part of the standard reporting?. 12 JL No, there is no place that that is recorded, but .( J 13 'if we went back and looked on.the computer printout, you .14 'know, prior to the accident, I am sure that you will find 15 them there. ^ .16 .(i Okay. .This was kind of standard for this particular 17 plant to have something-like that going on~, these values give .18 you trouble before this in group? ~ 19 A. Yes,'we'had.some trouble with Unit 1 on one of the l

20

. release' valves and almost the same type of problem where the ?21 leakage, we hadftoLcontinue'to pump down-the' drain tank and J-Q [ Q 22 of course.make.up-to compensate for the leakage. '23 .Ourfbiggest concernLand our biggest aid in determining-l. l24 the11eak :-- that! the ' leak rate was getting worse was the boron W-n pon m,inc.

2.5

' concentration incthe pressurizer, because'the steam leaking

+

I .1 '

.T.~ 56 = ' rmg d 2

1-

and the boron staying in the pressurizer, you:get.'a concentrated i

Wewouldequalizebyestablishing[' lx,j 2 mechanism ~in-the pressurizer. 3 a constant spray.and' recirculation. ~ p: -t 4 And onelof the' things'we were getting into p'rior.to the 'V( -5 . accident was the amount'of'. time that'you had to resert, O 6 was increasing to maintain equalized borons which again 7 ~ indicated that our leak rate was increasing out ofi,the 8 pressurizer.- 9 Q. Okay.. From an operational point of-view, was this ~ 10 the kind'of a thing that would lead to a plant shut-down? - Il A. Yes. 12 G. Essentially? ..,q '13 A. Yes. .D 1 14 G. .And the other thing I wanted to.ask was with concern 15 to the resin process that was going on, was that started on .16 this shift or_was that. started on a shift before yours? c ' 17 A; I don't rememLer. I don't remember any problem on ~ 18 my shift. Whether or not.they were in the process of regen- ~ 19 eration, I don't'. remember. - Again, I would have to look back 20 fin the' logbooks., 21 0.-. Lokay. Our information.seems.to suggest-that'this

fT

.22 /was-a' carryover'from the prior' shift. x_/t L23 'A. --It would' take.us normally two or three days or 24 . longer-to' regenerate:a polisher, so-it is very.possible that Ace. .: n porma,-inc. 25 lit-was-!in: fact aMcarryover. J 4 ~ ?', y ..e , f4 : 2 ^' (,-

\\ m '57 ~ rmg 3? I

G

~Howlaboutsthe' actual' process;of transferring.the

. g V

-2 resin!from.a. fluffing.and moving it to another' tank? How long -3 -has'that particular. process.gone on?; ,-~g ~ V 4 A. 'fNormally it is not that long,-unless you run into ~ 5 problems where it closes up, which it did quite often. It would' 6 .take an: hour or so to transfer it. 7 ,G Had'you had'any experience with problems before the 8 _ waterobacking up into~the airline to the check valve?- I mean, 9 apparently it'had-happened once before, but was it part of 10 your. experience, or.was that somebody else's shift? 11 L I don't - well, the problem with that is I can't. 12 say-it was ever. initiated while I was on. I don't know, ' (]} 13 simply'because of the long-process it takes to do.a polisher, ~ 14 it could very well have started one day when I had the shift - 15

and of course not come to light until sometime later.

16 MR. JOHNSTON:.Okay,'I think I won't pursue that e 17 any further,'then. So, really, Dennis, that covers the items. - 18 I.think'I wanted to ask. l 19 MR. - ALLISON: I have two more questions and then we 20 <canlget Ron back. 21-BY MR.-ALLISON:: g_' <~ [Ml 22 G Back toIthe~ method o~f cooling. That.was in'effect -23 'when you'came on-watch, you really didn't like that method, ' 24 (if?that method hadibeen' qualified'by an analysis, then to A ..n poren, inc. 25 support a' procedure thathwould. tell you_ how much -flow rate, u . m _1 ~ s j * *- A +

r '58. h -rmgK4-11 how'much'let-down, howLto-handle the,/ ent-valve-and somebody L/ '); ~ tk / 2 1said,f"I.have done'all this analysis and it will work if you-3 do?it:this way," or'maybe by. testing:a prototype plant as well, ,4 i 1 4 then would you have-felt comfortable with that method if you 5 .had that' sort of'a thing'in hand? -6 A-As a last resort, but only as a last-resort.. 7-G But all-of-this work wasn't.done beforehand and. 8 that's why you.didn't'like it, basically? 9 JL Basically,-:I had-nothing to indicate to me that it 10 was satisfactory.- 11 G ' Strictly intuitive approach? 12 A It was. intuitive, but let me say this: I had seen h-- 13 loss of bubble before', so when?I saw what was happening there, 14 it indicated to me'immediately that we had done the same 15 thing. Because we had lost the bubble in the pressurizer 16 .and transferred the bubble to the hot legs. C -17 Now other-than~.the radiation monitors going off, that's ~ 18 - the problem I saw, and.it immediately was that we had lost the ~ =19 ~ b'bblefand transferred the-bubble to the hot _ legs and of course u 20 Ic assume there must have been something. covering the core, 21 becausefthe' radiation level we.saw, but ILhad no means of ~ W ,,j -122 ' determining how bad that.was even-with, you.know, the radiation ~ 23 monitors -- i 3

24 LThare is no way'to'readily correlate radiation monitor I

wMw n conm,1ne. r25 . reading withicore damage,Tas far as I~know. Anyway, I am sure ~ 5

.j " 59 rm'?S 1 there'prbbablyTis if you go through a long. calculated method g / s ofssome' sort, but for.melas an operator in that control room, 1 S- ' 2 ~ 3 I'had'no'means.to correlate those-two. M )' . 4 (L Second. question./.When you came in, is it-fair for 5 me to' assume'that nobody,-neither you nor anyone else, thought' 6 nathral circulation was working at that time? E7 'Does that coincide with your picture of the control r oom? ~ 8 A. -I knew that natural ci'rcula' tion wasn't working. 9 -Whether or not anybody else. thought it was or not, I don't ID know. I don't know that I ever addressed the question because Il there was never'any question in my mind that we did not'have 12 natural circulation. ): 13 MR.. ALLISON: Let's go off the record. 14 (Discussion off - the record.)- 15 -MR. JOHNSTON: Let me--just stay on the record for 16' a second. .I have just thought.of a ques't' ion. You kind of-17 -answered'it anyway' but I am kind of interested in the .) 'different folks' perception of how bad the accident was and 18 19 .when people began to think, you know, we really have something 20 -that is much worse than.the ordinary, anything that we have 21' - ever had'before. .l d,I .22 po you feelLthat anybody'was in-that mode at' the time you 23 cameLin?: '24 ~ A A' 'Yes,.there were rumors, there-were conjectures of as n.poe m,inc. 225 total; core?damageito.veryil'ittle core damage. That-is one of 4.. .~.? ~

k 60 ') rmg.6T 11 the' reasons I personally did not evenLwant to get involved in

yM 2

how-much core damage there was, or if in fact the e was anj. -3 was. .-w .I_had enough to.do-to get.the plant in what I would feeA f N)' a stable condition.- I really didn't have the time to s'it' ~

(

J4 ^ L5 down and det' ermine'or talk over what kind-of core damage. 6 'there was, d .7

G But-itfis reasonable that the other folks-in there

-8 at_the time you came in really felt that something-rather' 9 unusual'and serious.had-happened? '10 A. I think'the consensus was that there.. s core 11 damage.- I think just the magnitude was under discussion. 12 g But there seems to be an equally strong feeling 13 that they had done.something or.other-that stopped it from 14 having further damage?' s 4 15 . A. I.am.not sure I understand. 16 G Did they:also feel though.that the problem was.over e '.17 as far as.-continuing damage'to the core? I mean, I think they .t -18 for example told you the. core'is covered. Was that a statement '19 of faith? -20 ~ A. When I.took the watch, I'was under the impression 21 that something had happened,.but right now we1were in a )} f22 low - and. very inappropriate: position.. At least-the core 23 .'was covered and we were providing cooling'to it. ~That's what ._ 24 II'was-told. ' Ace-es Reporters, Inc. 25 .MR.(JOHNSTON: Off'the-record-for a'second. +, + p

.}V-61. rmg;7~ l' -(Discussion off:the record.)- .M 2 .MR. HAYNES: Back on:the record.~ 3 BY MR. HAYNES:- . (') T 4 'O I would like,to speak'a little bit about the. training 5_ program, lLf I may, and ask some questions along:that line. 6 I understand you were in the' nuclear Navy for five years, -7 the nuclear' program in the Navy for five years; is that correct? 8 -A Yes. 9 G And then you c.ame to work for the Metropolitan Edison 10

station at Crawford station which is a coal-firing station?

11 A Yes. 12 0 .And in'1969-you came to Three Mile Island and entered -( '13 into-the reactor' operator training nrogram at that time? -14 That was a 42-week training program? '15 A That's correct. s 16 G In-1972, you made shift foreman, according to your 17 information I had from the I&E interview;about that time? 9 18 A It was about thatLtime. 19 G At the -- during this training period of 42 weeks, L 210 what did that training comprise of?- Pretty much like;the' Navy program in that we had X ' 221 AJ . m), ( f 22- 'amountLofUweeks.that -- well, we started off with basic 23 mathematics-'as.a matter-of fact, and took it right up to the -24

reactor kinetics, plus interspersed in'there were system

'Aco-el' Reporters. Inc. 25

training-where~we,would go over the description of the-t

+

s 62 d -rmg 8-21: ' system and its design criteria and how it operates,-that type 7[ k '2 of. thing. 3 And-part of.that was -- remember now, this was'early on in ~ -( h 4 the construct 3an, the'part of that was if the systen was 5 somewhere'n2ar completion, you would go out and walk it through 6~ and traca it through,.that type of thing. '7 G System training. Did this include how that system 8 responded 1to plant transients or was it more how the system 19 itself-was put into operation, taken out of operation, the ~ 10 different evolutions that they could perform? 11 A HNo, it was how the system operated on plant transients 12 like, for instance, the high pressure injectionoof the make-up l() 13

system, that type of thing.

But that was included. 14 .G The training was conducted by whom? 15 A There'were various instructors we had like for a 16 reactive theory we had a fellow by'the name of Zechman, C 17 Z-e-c-h-m-a-n, who~had just come from Penn State where he was 18 assistant instructor there,-I think at their reactor facility. 19 Most of the system training was done by the shift' foremen, 20 people that were' designated shift foremen at-the time. - 21 ' G' .They were~ Metropolitan: Edison employees? () 22 A.: Yes. 23 0 -Did;you receive any training from Babcock & Wilcox? 24 A Oh, yes, we: attended their-simulator training,.I

Ace-Reconen. Inc.

.25 think it was a:2-week session,-and again, I um.ld have to look. ~ .m s .. <. ~

v 63 lang ' 9 1 It was quite a number of~ years ago for the initial training. ~ r-. 2 2 O The simulator-training, that includes,fas I recollect 3 'from my[ testimony, work ~in the simulator:itself,-simulating (h \\ -4 plant. start-up, shut-down, casualties, and also electromagnetic 5 theories,~is that. correct?. 6 A-That's correct. 7 g-At the end of.that training program, did you take 8 the AEC examination? 9 A - No, we didn't take the examination until 1973, 10 I think it was, when we finally took the examination. Three or '11 four -- 12 G And how long -- (f 13 A It must have been '74, yes, because I was shift ~ 'Id supervisor. Sometime after 1972.and before 1974, how's that? ~ 15 A: That's fine. Was it prior to the Unit 1 fuel 16 ' loading?- C 17 A Yes, it was. 5 -18 g Okay.- Fine.- Did you notice that the simulator 19 control room appears to be_ quite a bit different than Three 20 ' Mile Island Unit 2. control room? 21 A. De' finitely. p 22 - G:- How do you' feel;about that, how-it differs in the-Q 23 shnulator control room. layout, equipment and sofforth, with

24

-respect' of the quality of 'tlur training younget in the simulator Ae> el Reporters, Inc. 25

because'it is'so,different.from the.Three Mile Island Unit 2 i

67 ~ 'rmg 13 1- - A. : The problem ~ with plant solid is that you are h' . d e s.y/A9' possibly, going to exceed the assigned rating which is 20-some '2

3 hundred pounds or 2750.

That is one of the reasons-why we 7yU 4 shy away from going solid. 15 Your make-up pumps do pump.out~about that pressure, 2800 pounds, that t'pe.of thing. 'As a matter of fact, it will 6 y 7 even go. higher. 8 (p .Is:not, though,-overpressure protection provided for 9 'the primary ~ system? 10 A. By way of relief valve, yes. 11 G

In the' coolant safeties?

-12 M. Do you know, or is it your belief, that the code T ). 13 safeties'are adequate to avoid overpressurization of primary s 14 system in the reactor ~ system?- 15 A As far as I know, they are adequate. One of the 16 problems you get into, though, of course is you know the code 17 safety's lift 1at essentially the same pressure. Of course, -18 very little bit lower, but at one time they were 2500 pounds. 19 That was'thel maximum range of pressure indication that 3m 20 -had, f21 'So thatfif the pressure reli f valve lifted, there was (~ ( )9 22 no way.t'o determine whether'or not-theylin fact prevented-the i.'23 1 pressure from, going any higher. 24 L g ;. - As I understand ~it, nowhere'in the control room'did l Ace reeww n.ponen, Inc. '25 you.have a. reactor pressure' instrument that-_went beyond 2500 ~ 1 y .k_, ) g M w

68 rmg 14

l psi?

a x. ~ if '2 ' A. No, nothin~g.that was recorded. 3 4 So'.that1if~you -.how about indicators?' 1( >y/'. 4 A I am not sure. I.would have.to-look. But I think 5 - maybe:in the RPF cabinets -- no, they only_go up to 2500, too. I 6 - No,Lthere is nothing greater.than: 2500. ,7 G Well, how'would you know if you exceeded it if you 8 didn't have an instrument to monitor it? 9 A.' ' You would have to do.an engineering evaluation ~. 10 G Is that'one'of the' reasons why there was concern-

11 Jabout. going solid here?

12 A No,'I think it was more of a concern that a solid 13 system is very difficult-to control,'and of course you get [} ~14 into'-- well, you-M those safety reliefs and after some 15 time, they are going to fail one way or tMe other. 116 G F&il how? j Well, who-knows. They could fail open or closed. 17 A ~ 18 And in any case, you ha.e a problem and you are compounding it. 19 10 All right. .Y MR. JOHNSTON: B 20 1 21 G~. I-wohld likeLto ask a; question. 1!2 iYou said'there_was nothing_in>the-small. break to. indicate '(][ 23

an increase'in the pressurizer level ~, but I.mm trying to recall,

24 isn't:there;a~ procedure-though'for:a stuck-open PORV? N el Reporters,'inc. 1!5 A-Yes. - A { f m d 2e-+# m e-

69 frmg115 .1 0 Or.something of that sort. 'And under the diagnostics 2 .for that, would that include an increase in pressurizer level 3 as one'of'the diagnoses?' .,s; l Y~ L4 A .Somehow, I don't think so. I would'have to look, but ~ 5 .I don't think it-was'ever picked up_at, that the level in 6 fact increased. 7 BY MR.'ALLISON: ' 8 4 Despite that, do-you think that a. stuck-open PORV, 9 taken.by itself without a turbine trip, without the auxiliary 10 fee'dwater valve shut and the other things that went along with 'll this accident, do you think that the operator can respond to 12 a stuck-open or relief valve very' reliably if it occurs as a I ). ~13 single event during operation? 14 A Yes, if he has some indication that that has.in 15 fact happened. 16 BY MR. JOHNSTON: ) 17 0 Well, what would the indication be? g L18 - MR. ALLISON:' Pardon me, Bill, I~am speaking about j 1 19 the indications that he would have in the plant. j l 20 THE WITNESS: ~That ha-will have or that he had? i 21 MR. ALLISON: That he had. .m. . f(_); 122 THE WITNESS: 'The' indication that he had was very l + 23 ~ difficult.for that operator to know'that he had a stuck-open 24 -relief valve. 'He 'di d'not have any' position indication. He ' Aco-el Reporters,'inc. 25 did'not'haveLthe temperature indication. It:was unreliable. H L e

70 Ermg 16 -1 The only, thing that he had to indicate that there-was a A s/ .2 leak was the decrease:in rea'ctor coolant pressure, and he had 3 no means.of. determining where that leak was,Jother than the 4 -. pressurized evel, possibly. .5 BY MR.-ALLISON: 6 G Givenfthe decrease in pressure during operation, ^ 7 do-you think you can handle that? .8 A - Yes. 9 0 Did he do the right thing? Did 'ho d6 'ne right-thing? 19 A w 11 0 That the' operator would reliably do the right thing? 12 A Well, I think that would depend on the operator. L A) ( 13 .I would imagine just like at any. time any transient of any l -14 kind would happen, be'it in the plant or a blowout on the car 15 . going home, depending on the driver and'how he can react and 16 how he has been trained, you know, there are a lot of variables C '17 that come into effect. 18 I-don't think I can answer.. I would like to think if I was 19 the' operator, yes, I would react the proper way, but I don't 20 know that for a. fact. 21 LG ^okay.. ~,.. ( ). 22 BY MR.:HAYNEE: -23 0 - You mentioned on'that stuck-open relief valve as-l - 24

a singleievent'that the temperature indication was unreliable?

~ Ase-e nopo,wn, Inc. 25 LA' ~ Yes. .sh A 4

65 ' rmg'll .1 Now,.of' course, controls are not-exactly at the same . r \\. t / '~'- -2 11ocation,fthat type of thing, but the design of the system and

3 how it functions.is primarilyntha same of that of Unit 2.

~%). 4 G. -While at the-simulator training center at Lynchburg, 5 Lyou alsoi underwent.what they call" casualty training; is that -b 6 correct?. ~7 A Yes. -8 G That's where plant' transients are -- 9 A Yes. 10 0 During'the transient' training, was the leak in the ~ 11 steam space of the pressurizer one of the transients covered? 12 A Not prior to the accident, that I remember. ) 13 0 Well, let's say pressurizer safety valve or 14. pressurizer relief valve failed.g$5open. 15 A I would think that there would have been -- I 16 don't remember specifically,but.if was, I think the results 17 'were a' lot different from what we had. y 18 G Really, what I am trying to get at in the training 19 that you-took here at the site and also at B&W, was iticovered -- 20 the plant response to aLleak in the steam space'wherein the 21 -pressurizer, wherein as you: tend to depressurizet the direction

r ySlW

~ v 22 you_gettis anLincrease of water rather than a falling cd 3 b l N water)fromthattype-of;1oss? 23 lll 24 A: No,.not that I know-of.either-here on-site or at 'l

Am-FaWW Rgomes. lm:.

.25 the simulator that it' was covered. \\ w

• Ns.

rmg 12

'l - G Did_you know that.if there was a loss of coolant D,. ,2 Iin the steam' space.of the pressurizer, that there would be ' n insurge of water into the~ pressurizer? 3 i s: f4") 4 A. 'I don't-know that-I ever' thought about what would 5 happen to the pressurizer, you know, of course, you know, 6 and I don't know:if I am thinking about this postaccident or

7

preaccident, but'it'seems. logical that if you.have a big

1. lI enoughwaterkatthe' top,itisgoingtoreplacethewaterfrom 8

9 the. reactor coolant systems and that could be based on what 10 I know of now, March 28, too. 11 Now,-if I-would have thought of that prior to March 28, 12 .I don't know. (h ~13 G' Do you recollect any emergency procedures at this ~14 . facility, whether one of theisymptoms for a loss of coolant 15 accident is an increase of the water level as opposed to a ~ ~ .. 16 decrease in the water level? e 17 A. No, I don't. l# ~ Generally, -the symptom that is ' listed [3 a decrease 18 ~4 19 in water level? -20 A . Decrease in water. level and of course a decrease 21

of~ pressure.

sel k /t & ~ , ~-j m)~ ' ~ -22 - G - With' respect (to taking the' primary systems fellowedy g ~ '23 what:was your. understanding of the problems associated with fg. 24 (the'.taking of primary system solid at any time during plant w M e neponen,Jnc. -25 operation o.r plant; shut-down? e . -.e -- 4

64 rmg 10 .'1 contirolLroom? 1 kL 2

A Well, the quality was based ~on,'you know', we used

.g. . whatiwe call the integrated control, or control ~of the 3 '~ E4 . plant, and that was the basis behind the simulator training. 5 It was how do you operate that plant and do the integrated 6 control' system,-and based on that. fact I don't see any problem 7 .with it, because it was mainly designed to control the-primary '8 plant using this integrated control system which is essentia.'.ly 9 very little different at all between the unit and simulator. 10 G The integrated control system itself, what equipment 11 or systems are involved in that system? 12 A Well, what essentially -- just about all of it, () 13 as far as the main line of the primary system and secondary 14 system. I.mean, in the secondary side it controls things.like w 15 feedwater punps, feedwater regulation valves, the steam-valves, 16 -the steam-dump valves, the turbine. C 17 On the primary side it controls things like temperature, 18 -control rod drive position, essentially that type of thing. 19 G But it does have no control, if I understand then, 50 if I understand you correctly,.with respect to_the high m.td A q 21 . pressure injection system or the insurf t_' afeguards system, %) '22 ,this type ofc system?- .'y l!3_ No, it'doesn't.- And again, there-is very little A. 1!4 difference in.the basic. design of, say, the make-up system ! Ace. Reponm,'ine. ?!S 'at th'eishnulator and.the make-up system at Unit 2. ~ E w, - S

51 jtf~131 1 if.any,.were taken?.Did.they change temperatures of inter- /'T ~ \\J 2 mediate coolers or do you know of anything? 3 A Yes,lthere was something that happened. We cycl'ed -- (' '4 it seems to me-we did something. We cycled a valve and that 5 'gave us a positive' indication of letdown flow. And when I say 6 positive, I'm talking about an increased value of letdown flow. 7 g You have a flow ~ indicator in the line somewhere? 8 'A Yes, but other than periodic spikes that were fairly 9 -regular, it sits at zero for awhile and then it would spike 10 and then sit at zero for awhile, that indicated a relief. valve 11 lifting. That was all that I saw. 12 G-Even after this valve was cycled? . (-).. 13 A Yes. (_ 14 g How about during later on in the period when you were -15 using the makeup tank' and say on Thursday, Friday you still 16 didn't see flow indication? C 17 A No, we still did not see flow, and we still didn't 9 -18 have flow indication. 19 But you -- 20 A Yes. 21 4. So it may be the' indicator?

,n i).

22

A

.Yes, we. feel it.is.the indicator now, but I think t, .23 again it was a combination of problems and with the letdown, 24 -for one, the indicator didn't indicate and two, we did.have Ace speral Reporters, Inc. 25 .some kind of blockage,.because we, at one point, we did =. =

1 52~ ' j tf L1_4 l L1 .~something and~I.think it was cycling one of'the valves some-- 2 'where'that-increased'our letdown flow, but it'did not of course

3 change ouriindicator. letdown. flow.

4 g-I!have justltwo other_ things and they.are'just a;biti ~ 5 diffarent. -DoLyou have a. question? BY MR. HATNES: '6 7

g; Do you-recalliif the restricting orifice'in the 8

letdown' flow line;was bypassed? 9 A - I remember we bypassed just about everything we

10 could in there.

I assume we did,-bu't I_cant say for sure 11 that we'in.~ fact did because we were at that time, because of -12 the lack of indication, we were bypassing everything we could 13 to try and get the flow indication. ~ ~ 14 . G . There is a log. room entry -- log book entry to that 15 effect in the control room operator's log on the 29th. '16 A Okay. j i 17 g With.a time. So I would assume.that that would be l .18

correct.

a L 19 A- - What time was-that, do you' remember? L ' MR..HAYNES: Off the' record'.

20

\\ .c 21 . (Discussion-off the. record.) j '22 - MR. HAYNES :.At'0121. hours.on 3/29 there isa p

3._) '

23 statement:that'MUV-100.is open, which I understand is the no s .. ~

24

. bypass around the: blocked ~ orifice.in the letdown line?.- 5 b nepoems.w. b} ' E

25 A

Yes.,'And like I{said earlier,iI-do remember that j 6 k t' d e a,.

i l 53 ijtf lb.- I we bypassed just about everything in that system we could'. bL 2 We never did get any indication of flow although there was x_/ 3 one time we did get an increase in letdown flow, although (,)' -4 not indicated. 5 BY MR. JOHNSTON: ~ 6 0 Can you get-an indication of the. flow by making '7 a change in the makeup tank? 8 A Well,1you can, but you have to do a couple of things. 9 .One for instance, you would have to stop taking suction out of 10 the makeup tank. Your other alternative would be, of course, 11 to swap the suction from the makeup tank to the BWST and' 12 isolate and watch your level go up. But that in itself is "3 13 shaky because you are taking a chance of wiping out your -- J 14 g I wanted to ask you a couple of questions prior to 15 the accident. I believe you had the shift just before the 16 accident? 17 'A Yes, I did. 18 G There was a fair amount of leakage apparently from 19 either the relief or the PORV beforehand, I guess it was some 20 tbne around five, six gallons per minute. 21 Did you have a routine in your shift of emptying the T 22 reactor. coolant drain tank periodically or -- I understand - (J - '23 this. vapor had'been going on'for perhaps some time before this. 24 A We'had a leak in the one relief valve. We knew that 8,, n.,on.,,, inc. ~ ' 25

the'five or six gallons a minute -- I don't believe that was

~ CR 7624-DAR(#4, 71 j e. -1. I Q .Are'you speaking of the temperature in the tail pipe? ~ (;)' ~ 2 'A ,yes. '3 Q Why'do you say it'is unreliable? l-4 A -Simply'because it did indicate all three temperatures 5 about equalLa'nd not very high. 26 Q Well, what would you expect a tail pipe temperature 7 - to be with the relief stuck open? 600' degrees F? .8 A Well, I would think it would approach somewhere 9 around'60'O degrees. 'Of course, there would be some difference, 10 b'ut it would' approach somewhere near that temperature. II Q Do you'still believe that?' 12 A Yes', I believe -- and I haven't looked at it, just ,13 based on"what I have seen and, you-know, some of the -14 discussions that I have heard', it seems to me that the 15 temperature' elements on the exhaust manifolds are too close '16 .to-the. common line and, therefore,.they all indicated about 17

the~same because it was right at the point where the steam j

18 expanded into the common discharge.line'.- 19 Now I~ don't.know whether that's true, that's my opinion. 20 DR.'JOHNSTON: Can we go off.the record?- '21 iBYl MR; HAYNES: ~ 22 Q' ?Do yeu recollectLin-your training whether.it was-23 ever covered ~what-you would' expect to see in the tail pipe l24

temperature'with a stuck open reliefIvalve?

Ase-Feowse neponen sne. '25 'AL ~ JYes. s .S ~ 1

• ~

-~ f R-+- 4 6 -,

'c.2 j 72 -I

Q Do you recollect that was covered in your training?

( 2 g .Yes. 3 Q To'your recollection what were you told to expect? .g I 't 4 A I think we were told to expect a high temperature 5 in-the ranges of, you know,. greater than 200 or 230 or 240 6 degrees on the one that happened to be leaking or lifting. 7 I know that's not true, simply because normally those 8 temperatures run in the area of 190 to 210 without leakage. 9 So, you know, based on that, you know, I would expect the 10 temperatures to go up a lot higher with a leaking valve. II .Q -Okay. I want to talk about minimum shift crew 12 complement, if I may. )' - 13 DR. JOHNSTON: Off the record. Id (Discussion off the record.) 15 BY DR. JOHNSTON: 16 Q There was some discussion several months ago in O 17 connection with this. Apparently there is some kind of a 18 procedure existing that does describe an open PORV and what I9 to do about it. And it does give a list of diagnostics that 20 ..you are supposed to look for and one of them is something to ^ 21 do with the pressure, with the temperature indicated above /3 22 13'O degrees F or some number of that sort. _y .23 A-That~is probably true. 9w n. con.n,Inc. 24 -Q 'So and'one of them is pressure dropping and I'm not A .F 25 positive whether.it says increase, but are you familiar.with

gsg r. tg A E '.l ~ yQ + Q' -J' , gc /E } ' j 73 3 ]E. T ~ c ,, y' : ]'.

fi

@Q,s c1:

that7 procedure $ *

-{w}ap%',2

JA ?

fYes,nI2am. c ~ ~ 23 LQ

Well, that1being the' case, I am'a'little interested-

^ 34 [iniyourfresponseia couple:minuteslago-that you expecte'd;to. ~ $5 ~ . see --Twell,pyou.said expecte'dh tb 'see very high' temperatures. i6-LIf 'that is the case',91tf would > seem..like the procedure woul'd E.7 ~ appedr do you"thenitosbelan' incorrect,; erroneous procedure.. EAndfIithink Lthe ' procedure ; stat'es: temperatures.at .A'4 '8

9 L 180 J degrees, ? no t? l30. -

10 Q L Okay.[ 'II 5 And'evenethat is low,.because.on what wethad seen,- - #v~ - 12 you-know, prior to.thefaccident -- c. '13 "Q - Of. course you had'somefleakage already. If you ~ 14 didn' tt have' leakage though,. you wouldn' tT have> temperatures 15 as:.high'as you are seeing and then the.' diagnosis;would have (16 been'made easily. - ' 17- 'A

I'am not sure that's'true without the. leakage you.

5 still.see the.h'igh temperatures,--ndw I'm? basing that on {18 ~ d' , ' 19- ' Unit l.l. It had power operations without any leakage by :this, y W 3 r. L ([ 20 the temperatures were'still-up around 200. degrees, simply. 21- .because theyfare close to'the' pressurizer and the pressurizer ~ l :: 422

1s awfullyEwarm.

i: 123 5I'm-trying / to $ think --'. Unit' 2, I don ' t ; know. the t I -- without s +. ' d k'_ j24~ - llooking',1 Iidon' t :know -if vI. could. determine what thef emperatures-t en . x f-M _ l25 Jare ithoutEleaking,rbut I whuld'assumelit.would be up.in the ~ ' ? h '[' t r je, v

• 14 Y, e

a ~

jc :4 -74 ~ ,l' 180"to'200-degree range. 1) 2 'Q~ ~ It sounds ~~1ike that' procedure then should probably 2 ~

3 have'beenl updated?

[f ~ 4 'A-You're probably. correct.- ES -DR. JOHNSTON: That's all. 6 'BY MR. HAYNES: 7 Q', I would 'like to go'into now about the minimum 8 shift crew complement. My_ reading _of the technical ~ 9 specification for Three' Mile Island Unit 2, the requirements .l 10 from the NRC'are that there be one senior reactor operator 11-licensed personnel.on shift and two reacter operator-12 licensed personnel on shift and two others as a minimum ) 13 number. Is that your understanding of the technical 14 specification? 15 A That's.right.' 16 Q Also, on technical specification that fo periods C of up to two hours, the number of reactor foperatorsllicEnsedl 17 //W i u L -18 ~available can be. reduced by one. Is that your recollection? 19 A That was in there at one time, but that was taken 20 -out. '21 Q Well, do you know if you have ever operated with just

. 22

two' licensed operators?

.23 -A I' don't know. I.know -- well, at.least.to my knowledge we have never~ operated.with less.than the required 24 ~ MF el Reporters, Inc. .25 . tech. ~ spec ~ number.

~ 75 3jcL5 L .Q Okay.- I'm saying.the tech. spec requires'two. L - '( ); 2. .g .Okay. v 3 g .For periods of upito two' hours.. Also reading the' 7 s. 3 \\ ' technical specification', is:that'during periods'of equilibrium, '~' ' 1 5 there'is'oneEl'icensed-reactor-operator required to be in the -6 - control room and only one. Is that correct?- 7 A-That's righs.- '8 Q To you' knowledge, have you ever operated that1way 9-withljust one manLin the control room? 10 A Yes. .I'm sure I have. II Q Why would that be, under what circumstances? 12 A Woll, under the circumstances when the two of them [(._] ' i3 were in the control room and one goes to the bathroom. You Id know,.you are down to-one, you know, something in that order IS .where the one nan goes out of the plant for some reason or 16 another.. 1 ' 17 Q' And normally you also have a shift foreman that is y on duty? .18 a 1 19 .A .That's right.. 20 Q' And he has a senior reactor operator's license? 21 A Yes.. f^( A_/ . 22 Q

And he would' also be out of the control room at the

- 23 same time. s 24 L A ~It is'possible. 'Now since.then we have instituted-d Ace-oderst Reporters, Inc.. .'25 a -two-man rule in the control room, always at least two: peo'ple ^ i -k.

1 J (je}i6 ~ c ,76: c..

1 Iin'the control 7 room.at'all. times.

3,3 '2 Q: Why!was that: rule-. instituted? I -3

A -.

That'was institutedfon,: Ilthink'it.was based on.an x f~ bc "4 'IE~ bulletin that-just4came out.-

5

.Q ,That other man in the control room, he m.rs3 nat be -- ~ ~; 6' A-He-need not be a licensed-. operator. On'your shift here, you also have'. auxiliary 7 .Q' Okay.

8

. operators as I: understand? ~ 9 -A. Yes. 10 Q And-normally about four auxiliary operators on each 11 shift, is-that correct?~ ~ 12

A

.A minimum-of four,.usually more than that. .13 'O And these'are auxiliary operators classed as A, B, C auxiliary. operators with thej\\ auxiliary operator being the -j 14 sq a 15 -more.ticensed is that correct? 16 A-That's correct. 17 'O Based upon.your experience-here, and also'd*1 ring the .18 accident, is-this' minimum shift crew complement adequate to 19 respond ~to plant transients? -< 20 A Probably not.in the' auxiliary operators' rooms, two 7 21: -people --- there :is no way that they could really control- .22 1everything that.has,been happening. It needs to be taken care , 23' Jof.outside of the control room.- y y Are these n 24.. What type of manipulations are necessary?j Af.. Q-. Ace-Fooeret Reporters, Inc. ~25 ipeople1outside1th'e control room do'ingi is it mostly secondary? A: .g e

k. '

a ,M.;j c 17i -77; G ~ >I . A' > ~ Yes,Emostlyftaking'of': fuel pumps that are no~ longer .g V [2 needed;oriputting'on. steam heating that is required, that type -: 3 of thing. .Q-)~: 4 i0 LWhat-would happen [if'those types of-operations were' ~ 5 not' performed by the auxiliary operators? ?6 .A Well,Twe-would'probably.-- you mean what-first effect-

7 would it have?-

8 Q .With respect to plant safety, if any. 9 A I'm not sure that it would-have any adverse effect 10 to plant' safety. - It-is more'o'f a requirement to -- probably, II if anything, just - :'well, at the most it would be to protect some equipment that is no longer required, that has been taken ' 12 ~ 13 .off, but even that is -- I'm not sure that's true. 14 Q. Some of the operator manipulations during the "15 -accident on 3/28-that took place outside the control room L-- 16 included manipulations with switch gear and also manipulations l 17 with the' diesel generators,_is that correct?- '18 A~~ I assume so,-yes. 19 Q-Who would perform those types of manipulations?

20 Would they be; licensed-operators or auxiliary operators?

- 21

A Auxiliary operato'rs.

~; 'Do[ auxiliary operators also perform valving.on 22 g 23 engineering safeguard systems? n 24 .?, f '- A '- cyes.

Ace Federd Reporters, Inc.

25 'Q High pressure 4 cooling injection? g .g g.a 6 e,.m-les e y p.-e,. g -w w - r-e ea w c wy= ' 'T^

.M j fjci8 78. i .1 A '.

Yes.

(y 2- 'O. I also understand that.during the accident' that the L 1121. valves on'_.the auxiliary' feed. waters system were found 3 ~ .v-4 Closed., 5 -'A: 'Oh, cyes, EFE 12.-- When you.said 12' valves, I thought-

6

--you-meant?l2 as a number.: 7 0 _This misvalving'or valve being..out of the expected 8

position,- have you run Lacross this before in Unit 27-9 A

Not that I'can remember, no, not that I could remember.' .10 LI'm sure there.were some valves that.were out'of position at ~ II some. time:or other. 12 Q .But'in your view it is certainly not a very common 13 event?. "I4 A No,'it is not a very common event at all. As a -15 matter'of fact,,I will take this opportunity to point out now ~ -16 th'at-tho'se valves would probably not have been out of position, 17 that is the only reason they were'out of position. 18~ Q-JWhy.is that?- 19 - Well, we have to, of course, comply with the new

A

~in-service inspection requirements. Those requirements are 20 21 to~ verify the.c.S.ck valves'do not' allow flow in the opposite A,f 22 . direction that they:are supposed'to and that is.the only reason 23 'those_ valves had to.be closed, was to verify that those check h. 24 7.ralves' hold. They'do not have-to be closed-to verify whether

Ace-Federst Reporters, Irc.

"25 an emergency' feed syst'em will--function as an emergency system. 1 2

~ ~ s m y4 ~ - - ^= .ll l$c i9; ~ -y 4 '*.. ~... ~.- T w_ ^ 79 p -:Q" fThis? checking'~ofithe? check ~ valves,.is1this doneEvia - I: i c l

i I p~r'oc'edure?

~~ 2 O-- 1' ^ .3 AL .Yes,~it is.; .4 Q: .It is.'what is:~normally called surveillance' procedure? a ..q I1 Yes.= j 2 . ?. 5 A v T 6 -1 - The' surveillance procedure,'does this include valving ~ g 7 checklists?'

A The' surveillance procedur'es dolinvolve things like 8

19 . checking check valves,;yes.- Q-Well, I believe you said'in_ order to-verify that the , 10 II - check valves were' tight, that these valves had-to be operated? ~ 12 ~ A That's right.- - l'3 Q .Now that procedure-that specified'that test,1would Id Ethat-say.to open these' valves and close the' valves?. 15 A Yes, it would. -Qz When a surveillance test.like that is run at the I6 17

site, who performs lthat test?

18 - go - well,.various people.. A control room operator will 19 -operate required' equipment'from within the control room and, L20 of course,-the auxiliary. operator from outside the control ^ + 521 iroom.-LSolitJwould be a' combination. ~ ~ 22

Q

When'the aux operators operating'these valves, safety 123

'related valves:outside;thes-control roomi is'there:-a licensed ~ 124 foperator'inrattendance? 1- [ Ace Feneral Reporters, inc. l 25 , - :A Noi ~ f T J. A-C- =. .,..,_ :.t; J'

jc-10, 80- ~ q -( 1

Q -

-Should-there be?' ~ In'your view? -r [- c/~5 (j - 2 .AL Not unless we,are going 1.to want.to license everybody' J3 ' that: works in a nuclear: station.

(n

_I j Q. .What's your view on that, should they? 'A1 _ Licensing everyone? My view?on that'is if.we .: 3

required something:like that,we'will probably kill the industry 6

=7 quite: frankly.. .Q

See now, you were in'the Navy,-four-five years in-

~ -8 the' Navy nuclear program?. _9 -10 A Right. 11 Q-I haven't been, but I understand that in the Navy program the personnel are qualified for the specific' job 12 13 they are perfoning, is that correct? ja A~ That's correct. 15 Q Which includes some sort of training ciJd, certification? Y 16 A '. Well -- ~ .Q Training and-testing. 17 .18 A Training and testing, yes, but that's true also of 19 our auxiliary operators. -20 0 There is a-training program, a testing provided for them?- 21 22 A Sure..

23

.Q To qualify them for the duties that they would perforn,7 24 A' That'.s right.. ' Ace-3 Hoporters, Inc.

25 Q-

'Like'the surveillance-test?

Lj cf l'11 81 l' 'AL They go.through very much the same type-of training ( M -2 as'a control'. room operator does'except, of course, that i3 concentrates more on.the-in-plant' type operations. 'At the k" i '4 end of their training program, which includes on-the-job 5 training, they are-tested.both_ written and orally before they l 6 .are allowed to become, aux' operators. 7 QL --Now when-a man'first come on board as an aux 8 operator,_is~he classified as a C operator?. 1 9. A That's correct. 10 O So there is no prior training itself involved to-be 11 classified as a C aux operator, is that true? 12 A That's true.

no yo h

• operators perform valving manipulations?

13 g 14 A Yes,-they do, but let me explain how that works. 115 When a person comes to work at Three Mile Island as an aux 16 operator C, he goes through a three-or four-month training [. 17 program, then he goes on shift, and then he works strictly 18 .on secondary equipment. He;is'not involved, for instance, with l SYdpfps ,19 a Ci component. He works on the secondary plant,-turbine, '~ 20 generator, type thing'and he_gets some experience there for 21-about'a' year.and then.he goes to what we call.the aux operator yrm. (f 22 LB..And'then'he becomes a trainee on'the primary. side of the 23 - plantLand'again he goes through certain schooling that prepares 24 ~ And he essentially -- him to:take-the aux operator A test... Ace. el Reporters,~ Inc. 25 h'e is the aux operator B'for at least a year. And_then at the

qs t 3jcil2x 182 H 1-end?of;whichfhe ttk'es'a written an'. oral test, and if he l' ~ d fr^v - 'l 2

passes those, he'will-be' qualified:as an aux operator.A.

~ 3 kg -Q. .So'the progression from C.to B is' automatic,.but ..(,) 4-fromL the B to'A - - ~ .5 A No,Eno,:maybe I misled you there. Before he goes 6 Tfrom C-to-B,.he,must take a. written and' oral. examination

7-there~also.

8 Q -So there is a -- 9 A But'there~is-a' time frame that he must be an aux 10 operator C for at least a year and receive the proper training 11 that is outlined:in job classification. Then at the end of-12 l .that year, he gets a test, both written'and oral. If he passes 13 those, then he progresses to B and then B is the same type 14 65 thing. He has certain training that he goes through plus 15 on-the-job training. And at the end of the year, he takes 16 a written and oral' test and if he passes.that, then he becomes '17 an. A.. And the next move would be to the control room-operator, 18 but:that aux operator A must be qualified as an operator A' 19 for at-least two. years before he-can' bid on a control room 20 operator's job.- 21 Q .When-we were talking aboutfthe minimum shift' crew c22 manning;a moment ago and we got over to the auxiliary operator-23 ~ training,,1f you were limited to two, would that affect your 9of R'eporters,'Inc. -ability to: respond to transients with respect to licensed .24 Ace'-F 25 operators,.the;three required licensed operators?. Is that an 1- - L.

8 32 ~yjc 13, 1adequatelnumber-to respond to transients.and accidents,'in I ~ ~ -2 your1 view, in'the control'~ room? c3 Al My view, yes,: simply because=you-only.need, essentialiy,, y-<y. .(gs-4 two' operators, one-to~ operate the primary plant and'one to- -5 operate l the -secondary plant and one-.to control or look over. 6 'the operation of both.- That's what'that manual essentially

7-

~says, you'have~two control room operators that do;the ~ !8 actualLmanipulation and a' senior license that directs that-e -9 manipulation. 10 Q- .Now on the' day of the-accident here, of course, ~ 'II -they had more licensed operators than that in the control- - '12 ~ room. In' fact, if memory serves me at least during the'first 13 hour they' essentially-had three senior reactor operators at Id .one time or other in the control room and at least two licensed -15 reactor operators for a total of five. I0 A In the firct hour. I7 Q During.the first hour. 5 18 - A --_ r'only know of -- well, there would be three - 19 licensed'on-site. I: don't know where the other two.would f f-L 20 have came from. l-l- 21 g well,-I believe Mr. Bryan came over from Unit 1 to ~ 22 assist and then:there was a~Mr. Schiemann and Mr. Zewe, so 23 .those are'the three senior. operators. 24 'g:: I. thought you said there were'five, I'm sorry. Ace-Federal Reporters, Inc. 25 g g tdtal.of five,-perhaps I misspoke, five licensed e -m

A e-jcf14 84-N toperators, threeLsenior and~.two others.' It seemed like ~ fY =2-they were 'all busy. - How'does that' reconcile with your- ~ .3

account that three would.be adequate to respond to an t

's / M 4 . accident? ' l5 A-Well',~let-me-just say this, first of all,~Mr. Zewe, 6 Mr. Schiemann, and'Mr.' Bryan were all doing the'same. function. 7 .The only two people that were operating the controls were-the ~8 two' reactor operators. And I'm sure there probably was one 9 of;those three people probably~did do some of the controls, 10 -but you essentially have three seniors there who-were doing II-one function and I would have to be there'to know what they 2 12 .were doing. 13 7 m not going to make any comment on what they were Id doing. 0 But from your own experience and your view is tihat 15 16 the three licensed people are-adequate,for the primary system, oneforsecondarysystemand[seniorlicensedguytostand 17 18 backland take a look over-thd' shoulder? '19 g .In most cases. Let me just say that would be'the L 20 minimum number that you_would need in there, maybe that is I 21 more correct, but three can do it, I think. ~ 22 -g-Are there any cases that you know of where they [' 23 - cannot do:it? i: 24 A No. W-Federal Reporters, Inc.

25

~ Okay. You have heard.this idea put forth about a~ g

_~ _ T $c 15 85 shiftlengineerror-a shibt safety officer, is that correct? 1-m., hI. 2 j A.- lYes. ~

3

Q'

I: understand that's in effect now.

7 Q' ~~ ~.4 'A 'It's.in Unit 1'now,-they have-a unit engineer that is -5 -on shift'now. ~ S Q h u,r h 6 0

Youtre the shift supervisor and this shift s eenviser 7-is'~ going ' to be ~ reporting. to -you, is ' that correct?

~8 .A: I don't think.that has.been defined as yet. 9 ~ Q. What.is yourl viewpoint.of this, do'you. feel -- is. 10 that going to be.-a help or a hindrance'to you as a shift II supervisor?- -12 A My view is, of course, that the more people you put 13 on shift, the better.or the easier and'better my job is, 14 simply because we can delegate some more work, but whether 15 it benefits anything other than the day-to-day work, that- - 16' -has to be done, whether-it contributes anything to safety, b ' 17-I would say probably not. { 18 And the reason I say-that is in any situation that happens ~ 19 in a nuclear power station, there has got to be one individual 20 that makes the decisions on what to do-and when to do it and ' 21 ' how to do it.. ~And iflyou-start putting in people or more 22 people and'you: lose.that definition,-you are only. creating ~ ~ I. l 23 ' problems, because then no one knows.who is giving the- ! [- ): .24 i direction -and ' therefore what ' direction to tako. Aco Federal Reporters, Inc. ~25 . And 'I have seen 'that-any number of. times just in the last te n

~ ' ijcl16:~ 86 '1 yearsfatithis' island, something happens in the1 control room y-- _ il 2 and'you geta50 people; flocking there'and it only complicates-

3~

matters,

.It is more difficult for.you as a shift supervisor i

4 0

25 J o control the situation, isn't that correct? t 6 A~ -That is"right. 7 'BY-MR. ALLISON: 8

Q-Did you think it would-enhance safety.if this shift 9

engineer!were in charge so that there is a clear line of '10 ' command?= Ell A I think a clear line'of command, yeah. 2 12 g So-he is another backstop.. Okay, but you would - g-q j 13 need a pretty highly qualified engineer to put him in that ) _) -14 position, would you not? 15 A Yes, you would, 16 jg' Supervise.the existing structure. 17 A Yes, you would,-you would'need a really highly 18 -qualifiediengineer. 19 .MR. HAYNES: I really-don'tThave any further questions j 20 along this line. 21 MR. ALLISON: I-just~have one last.one. 22 BY MR.-ALLISON:. .23 Q-Were;you aware of the press reports ~on this accident .d h 24 'when you wentlhome on Thursday and Friday? Ace-Fooecol Reporters,-Inc. 25 !I did.not really get too-involved with what the press 1 o l ^ 1

p Ijc.17 ~ 87 'l

was ;saying.untili about: Thursday; night,..I guess, ' Wednesday and f)

V 2 LWednesday-and Thursday. I. guess either:here'at'the11sland'or ~l ~ 3

-at-homeein.bedi

.I think Friday'is when I became'more aware. .4 of what'the news mediafwas saying and:then Sunday is.when:I 'S squit reading'the accounts and listening to them altogether. 6 .Q. I.think~you'were aware on Friday during the day 7 before you came into work on Friday?' ~ -8' !Ai Yes,.I would say. 9 ^ Q- .Did you think at that time that things were worse 10' than was being-reported by, let's say, Jack Herbein to I ~11 the press? [ 12 Were you aware of what he was saying?- l 13' A No, I'm not sure I was aware of what Jack was saying 14 to the press,'because I think when'I started to pay attention .15 L to'what the press 'was saying, he had already been relieved 16

of that responsibility.

I was aware, though, that when I 17 was away from the island, I would listen to the news'or read 18 lthe papers and-things seemed to be a lot blacker than when I '19 was'actually here. ['

20 Q

So you perceived it the other way around. You thought '21 the press reports sounded blacker than the situation? 22 A Ohst. definitely, definitely.: As a matter of fact, there t '23 werelsome times when I would read the press accounts and- ~ h

24 ras'a matter of fact-one time-I actually did call.in because I Ace Federal Reporters, Inc.

25' heard.something.on the radio or television that was utterly Lc

.88 jd18; I 'different'from~when'I had left the plant a:few; hours' earlier ~ L2 and-Ilhad called back in to find out-.what had happened.because -- ~3- ' and I'm :notL even ~sure of-what the actual subject was, -what - r. FY "O 4

was related'to, but I did call back in to find out what the

^ ~ 5 ' hell; happened,- what changed. - ^ 6' _And I;was' told nothing, it is essentially =the'same as' v -7 when-ISleft'it. 8 -Q. You don't remember _what report it was that caused-9 you~to. call _back-in? 10 A No, but'I think it had something to do with the' 11 hydrogen.. 12 Q ! Hydrogen bubble? '.f 1. -13 A Yes, I think that's what it was. What'the actual 14 news report was, I'm not certain. I think that's about when 15 - I.gave up looking at newa reports and reading newspapers about ~16 Three Mile Island. O ( ~17 MR. ALLISON:.Okay,'I think that is all we have. a t L 18 I thank you very much, Mr. Ciwastyk, for your cooperation. l' H 19 ,We think:we are done. We might come back with a few more 20 = questions, b'ut thanks an awful lot,.you have been~very helpful. 21 '(Whereupon, at 2:56 p.m., the interview was 1 1 4: 22 adjourned.)- 23 \\-I' 24 Ace-3 Reporters, Inc. -25 w-e v y -e, a}}