ML19308C570
| ML19308C570 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Crane  |
| Issue date: | 10/29/1979 |
| From: | Frampton G, Geoffrey Miller METROPOLITAN EDISON CO., NRC - NRC THREE MILE ISLAND TASK FORCE |
| To: | |
| References | |
| TASK-TF, TASK-TMR NUDOCS 8001280599 | |
| Download: ML19308C570 (56) | |
Text
{{#Wiki_filter:[)! j ai di- / 2 NUCLEAR REGUL ATORY COMMISSION O o IN THE MATTER OF: THREE MILE ISLAND SPECIAL INQUIRY DEPOSITION OF GARY P. MILLER O. Place - Middletown, Pennsylvania Date. Monday, 29 October 1979 Pages 1 - 55 m Telephone: (202)347-3700 ACE FEDERALREPORTERS,INC. OfficialReporters 444 North Capitol Street Woshington D.C. 20001 NATIONWIDE COVERAGE DAILY8001280Nf ..T..
1 CR7975 1 UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 2 NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION 3
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Q 4 In the Matter of: 5 THREE MILE ISLAND 6 SPEGIAL INQUIRY 7
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DEPOSITION OF GARY P. MILLER 9 TMI 10 Trailer No. 11 Middletown, Pennsylvania j 11 Monday, 29 October 1979 13 APPEARANCES: 14 For NRC Special Inquiry Group on TMI: 15 GEORGE T. FRAMPTON, JR., ESQ. RON HAYNES 16 DENNIS ALLISON 17 For Metropolitan Edison: 18 JOHN F. WILSON 1 Shaw, Pittman, Potts & Trowbridge 19 1800 M Street, N. W. Washington, D. C. 20036 20 21 72 ye~g \\v' 23 24 ~ .: Ace Federst Reporters, Inc. 25
2 j ri 1 1 PROCEEDINGS cs 7975
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-2 'MR. FRAMPTON: This is a deposition being conducted 3 by the USNRC's Special Inquiry Group on TMI, Pennsylvania, of 4 _Gaqr Miller on October 29, 1979. Present in addition to the 5 witness, Mr. Miller, are Mr. John Wilson, representing Metro-6 Pokitan Edison, and Ron Haynes, Dennis Allison, Carla'Darista 7 and Gcorge Frampton, all of the Special Inquiry Group. 8 Ron, would you swear Mr. Miller? 9 Whereupon, 10 GARY P. MILLER 11 was called as a uitness and, having been first duly swarn, 12 was examined and testified as follows: 13 MR. HAYNES: Please state your' full name for the {} 14 record? 15 THE WITNESS: Gary Paul Miller. 16 BY MR. FRAMPTON: 17 O Mr. Miller, I have shown you our witness notification 18 form that you have seen before at a previous deposition we did 19 with you. Have you read that and do you understand it? 20 L I read and I understand it. 21 O As I said before we went on the record this evening, 22 ~the purpose of this deposition is to follow up on two or three 23 specific points relating to information being generated on the 24 first day of the accident, March 28, 1979. Our intention is ' Ace-Federet Reporters, Inc. 25 to' probe those specific areas,to ask you some questions that i
3 jeri 1 .perhaps we hadn't covered before and to try to resolve if it's 2 possible to do so the recollections that other people have told 3 us they have and your recollection to try to develop the best -([ ) 4 possible picture of the facts. 5 I would like to start by asking you to tell us what you 6 rec,all about the conversation or conversations you had with M 7 Mr. Porter, Ivan Porter, when he reported back to you the 8 results of his readings of in-core thermocouple temperatures. 9 on the morning of March 28. 10 A The best recall that I could hope for I think would 11 have been obtained in the earlier deposition. The one thing 12 I may not have stressed earlier was that I don't believe the 13 duration of that conversation was very long plus at the time O. 14 .of that conversation the focus of my effort would have been 15 towards the emergency plan, which would have caused me at that 16 moment to focus on its implementation. 17 So I don't know how long the conversation with Mr. Porter 18 would have been but it could have been very short. So I am 19 trying to remember that in the context of an awful lot of other 20 things as best I can. The best thing I can come out of it 21 with at this point in time is the unreliability aspect of the 22 indication. p 1 ~ 23 A lot of. the technical details that had been involved 24 -since have probably clouded my mind, frankly. It's very hard Dce Federal Coporters, Inc. 25 to separate that. i
4 jsri 4 1 0 In previous statements and interviews, you have said 2 in substance that what you recall is Mr. Porter telling you thatl 3 there were sorae readings that were zero or not reading, some () 4 readings around 200 degrees and some around 2400 degrees. Do 5 you recall that? 6 A I recall conversations to that effect but I don't 7 believe there were many more than four or five readings and 8 the wide range of them was what I was really trying to allude 9 to. 10 0 Do you recall more than one conversation with 11 Mr. Porter on this subject? 12 A Not as of today, I don't, on the 28th. In-core was 13 a subjcet discussed an awful lot following that up there in the , O 14 control room on the 29th and 30th when they were being used 15 as an indicator. That makes it harder to remember the number 16 of conversations. I don't remember now more than one. 17 On the 28th, 18 A That's right. ~ 19 Okay. Now let's just talk about March 28. You had 20 instructed or asked Mr. Porter to see if he could get reliable 21 readings with an instrument off the wires, is that right? 22 A I think I remember asking for the in-cores. I think .O -23 I remember being told they weren't reading out on the computer. 24 4 He may have undertaken on his own to get more Ace Federd Reporters, Inc. 25 accurate readings?
5 j ri 1 A He could have done'that on his own. I quite honestly 2 evidently today can't remember. That would have been my next 3 thought, though, going to the penetration.
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4 0 You remember that he reported back to you a number of 5 readings but you only remember him having done that once. 6 4L That is true. I only remember a very limited number 7 of readings and I only remember once. That is reinforced in 8 my own mind by the fact I never really discovered the number 9 of readings taken until like I said I believe Mr. Bennett came 10 back from vacation, at which time the computer sheets were 11 found. I didn't know many people knew they existed before. 12 that. That was two weeks after the accident or'so,.I believe. 13 0 Are you saying that at no time during March 28 did 14 you realize that somebody was down there generating additional 15 readings other than the ones Mr. Porter reported to you? 16 A That's right, and what I am saying is I think that 17 is even reinforced by the fact that I don't believe those 18 computer sheets were available to anybody until Bennett came 19 up with them. I don't believe that was until a couple of 20 weeks after the accident. A week or two. I subsequently 21 at least had been-shown testimony where there were separate f-22 sets of readings taken with separate instruments on more than b five of these. I had no idea there were 52 readings or what-23 24 ever number there were that I can remember. l iwFa.48 Rgeners, Inc. j 25 g What do you remember about any conversation that you i
6 si 1 _had with Mr. Porter as to the meeting of these readings that 2 he told you about? 3 A I have said in previous testimony the best I can () 4 remember. Like I say, if I asked myself today what I remember, 5 it was the fact that I accepted their unreliability without 6 reg 11y pursuing and questioning further. Then I also said I 7 didn't come back to the item during thatperiod of time or that 8 four or five hour period in the morning. 9 G Let me get to that for a moment. Let me try to see 10 if I can't focus on the conversation with Mr. Porter by just 11 reading you from the statement that you developed for 12 congressional hearings in April 1979 and see if this helps 13 refresh your recollection. In that statement you say "The O 14 technical explanation that I was given indicated that they 15 were probably hot. There could be melting of the thermocouples 16 and different junctions would have been formed and therefore 17 the temperature indication was not considered reliable on a 18 technical basis. But to me personally it indicated we had 19 high temperature readings within the core." 20 That is just a partial quotation. Do you remember having 21 discussion about that with Mr. Porter? 22 A That is the reduction of the testimony from the /~T U 23 group that I had sat and talked to within a couple of weeks 24 of the' accident. That is as good as I could have remembered. j "A*FmWd Remnen, Inc. 25 I don't remember discussing that in much detail. It's.possible r i l
7 jari 1 You know, that is the best I can remember. 2 G That is consistent with your recollection of that 3 conversation. {} 4 A I don't remember that conversation today is my real 5 problem. I honestly don't remember it. I have also said the 6 in-cores were an awful wide area of discussion, not just be-7 cause of ' chose readings but because in the in the days after, 8 those readings became a very wanted and desired thing by every-9 body that was involved. It's very hard to separate exactly 10 _ what was said on the 28th. 11 O Okay. Just so the record is clear you said that was 12 a wide topic of discussion but you are not referring to 13 March 28 I take it. 14 A No. I am saying that at the time I wrote that, 15 that would have been the best recollection I had. You know, 16 I would have to stand on that. I don't remember any more or 17 any less than that day. 18 Q Do you recall today that you didn't have conversa-i 19 tions abbut the in-core thermocouples with other people on 20 March 28? That once you talked about it with Mr. Porter, the 21 subject was finished as far as you were concerned that day? 22 A I think other people were aware of those discussions 23 -because if I remember right when I asked for the in-cores I 24 was still out in'the control room getting, at the end of the Ace Federal Reporters, Inc. 25 briefing people gave me in these various areas, between that
8 j0ri I time in my memory I remember asking for those in-cores rather 2 quickly after being briefed. 3 At the same time we were discussing things like the general () 4 cmcrgency declaration. That is what is making it hard for 5 me to separate. I would think, for instance, that some of the 6 oth,er members of my group there, Seelinger and Ross, might 7 have heard some of that discussion but I don't know that. 8 MR. WILSON: Was the question whether he had conver-9 sations with other people or other people overheard that 10 conversation that he may have had with Porter? 11 MR. FRAMPTON: I was asking whether you remember 12 having other discussions with other people other than the o1 13 discussion you had with Ivan Porter. 14 BY MR. FRAMPTON: 15 G In other words, do you have a recollection of talking ] 16 about what the meaning of the in-core thermocouples was with 17 other people after your conversation with Mr. Porter? 18 A I can't specifically remember but I do believe we 19 discussed the kind of temperature indications we were going 20 to have. The hooking up of the meter to the RTD which I think 21 was occurring in the same time frame. I think all that 22 conversation could have been had with some of those people 23 but I can't specifically remember. See, when he came back to 24 me and said whatever he did to me, I believe there were other Ace-Federal fleporters, Inc. 25 people standing there and at the same time we were hooking up I
9 jori. I the other instrumentation we ended up using which was hooked 2 onto the RTD. I can't be sure there weren't other people that 3 participated.in that conversation even. I just can't remember.
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4 That could have been like Ross or Seelinger or -- probably not 5 Bill Zewe, though he could have been out there. 6 fly guess is it could have been discussed amongst that group 7 and I wouldn't remember it. 8 0 When you say the other instrumentation, are you talk-9 ing about the ometer or potentiometer or resistance bridge or 10 whatever it was that was put on the hot leg? 11 A He put a digital voltmeter on the hot leg and I think t 12 he.did that in the same time frame in the morning, because we I 13 were still looking at the fact TH was off scale high and I i } 14 think that conversation ran together to some degree. At least 15 at the same time. 16 g Other than that more or less coincident conversation [ 17 you don't remember then discussing the in-core thermocouple 18 temperatures with anyone else later on March 28? 19 A I don't remember today and I don't know that I asked 20 myself that question back in that time frame. 21 g Do you. remember any inquiries being made from GPU or 22 ' NRC for that 'information at ' any time during the day on March O. 23 287 j 24 A I personally don't but I think you have to remember Oce Federd Reporters, Inc. 25 the inquiry could have ~ come in on that phone that was open and 4
10 jsri 1 .I would not have known it. I would not have restricted it. 2 It could have occurred, been discussed without my knowledge. 3 0 Right. I am just asking whether you remember any ()- 4 inquiry made? 5 A I don't personally remember any. The further in the 6 day we got the more I stayed away from getting tied on to a 7 phone with data processing. I was aware people were asking 8 for things and I was aware it was being passed. Me, no, I am 9 not saying that doesn't mean there wasn't a discussion though. 10 g What do you remember about your own interpretation 11 of what those temperatures meant? Your own reaction to that 12 information, r-13 A My own reaction to it was based on I think my pre- \\_)g 14 conditioned thoughts about it. I asked for it. I asked for 15 it more out of my past experience than out of anything I have 16 even seen in these reactors plants. As I said previously in 17 Unit 1 they are not even ',a/ailable to ask for. I knew they 18 were available in Unit 2. I asked for them. And I didn't Jo 19 back and ask a lot of questions about them. The only reason 20 I can come up with that is that it just didn't come up again 21 in my mind. f-22 In other words, the unreliability part of it, my lack of L)J 23 usage or training in them didn't make them something that I 24 needed. They weren't recognized anywhere other than in my l Acs Federal Reporters, Inc. 25 mind from past experience. I just think that all came 1 i l 1
11 jari 1 together in my mind to cause me not to go back and ask a lot of 2 questions that I could ask today quite honestly. I think that 3 combined with the number of events I was involved in in that (~x. (_) 4 next three to four hours caused me not to go back and ask some 5 more questions and put a different emphasis on the readings. j 6 ,That plus the knowledge that I had at TH and TC indications 7 later in the morning didn't cause me to go back and look at 8 temperatures in the core. I was convinced from an action 9 standpoint that I would have known of very little else I 10 could have done. It ink that is the way I was thinking. 11 I was looking for information to base the action we were 12 taking on. 13 O At the time you learned the information about the %.) 14 in-core thermocouple temperatures, was there any other possible 15 explanation for the range of readings that Mr. Porter gave you 16 other than that the core in some areas was very much hotter 17 than normal? 18 A I thought -- I am trying to go back today -- there 19 might have been some discussion about the qualfication of 20 other instruments. By that I mean the fact that I don't 21 believe they were safety grade and there were conditions in the 22 building we recognized that could have caused them to be in %-) 23 errur. That would have all just helped convince me not'to use 24 them. Ace-Federal Reporters, Inc. 25 g Would the lack of qualification, though, apply to i i
12 jori 1 normal. operating temperatures? If they were installed there 2 presumably they wouldn't be destroyed o rmade dysfunctional 3 if the temperatures were near the normal temperatures. () 4 A That is true. I just think we might have discussed 5 their reliability versus the reliability of another safety 6 grgde instrument within the system. It's hard to remember. 7 That would be the only other thing I could vaguely remember 8 we might have talked about. 9 G At approximately the same time I think you had 10 available to.you hot let temperature readings, is that right? 11 A To the best I can remember, at roughly the same 12 time we had an indicator on one of those instruments and I 13 think the scale of that instrument was like zero to 800. We O 14 were on that scale as opposed to being off of the actual meter 15 scale on the panel which was 620 degrees. So we had like a 16 720 I believe. 17 g During the morning when you were getting various 0 18 indications of hot leg temperature did you ever regard those 19 indications as inaccurate or unreliable? 20 A We discussed those indications as far as I believe 21 the fact thatthe instrument was in a steam environment and 22 therefore their accuracies could be questioned. I think we had, O 23 seen some response on those instruments at various points. 24 It's hard to recollect when we saw that. I think we had some-Ace Federal Reporters, Inc. 25 thing we could look at from a trend ctandpoint. I think we did i
13 jari i doubt the absolute accuracy. I think we might have talked 2 about that within the group. 3 g Of the in-core -- of the hot leg temperature? h)s 4 A Yes, because of the environment of the steam space 5 around the RTD and so forth. 6 4 Did anybody suggest why an RTD which measures heat 7 would react in a different way measuring the heat of steam than 8 it would measuring the heat of liquid? Did they advance any 9 reason why one might expect that would happen? 10 A It 's hard to remember. I am almost sure there was l 11 discussions on the accuracy. Those RTDs are installed in a 12 well with known response types and that kind of design 13 characteristic. I guess that would have' caused an instrument es is_ > 14 engineer to discuss them accuracywise but only gross versus -- l 15 gross accuracy. In other words, that RTD is a one-to two-16 second RTD. Its response time to a change is very quick. It's 17 designed that way. It might not have thatkind of response time 18 to change in a steam environment where it wasn't qualified to. 19 That is the context of the kind of discussion. I would have 20 had no doubt about its indication of hot versus cold or trend 21 but to say that if there was a change in there that it would 22 g~) see it within a few seconds, which is the way an instrument \\J 23 engineer would look at its design, it would be inaccurate i 24 from that. viewpoint. That is what a guy like Mr. Porter Ace Federal Reporters, Inc. 25 would have been thinking about. All the qualifications that I
14 ) jsri I go with tha t instrument. 2 So I don't know that I could have discussed it being 3 inaccurate from the standpoint of whether it was 700 versus O 4 () 600 degrees. I think we knew it was close. I don't think it 5 was per its design specification which is somewhat complicated. 6 4 Regardless of how precisely accurate you may have 7 thought the various instruments were, what I am getting at is 8 when the combination of hot; leg temperature indications and the 9 in-core thermocouple temperature indications together would l 10 have given you any impression of the situation other than that II the core was pretty hot, quite a bit hotter than normal. 12 A. And I am trying to look back at that a'nd I am trying 13 not to converse with that with what I know today. That is very v Id hard to do. I think if I look at it and try to remember, when 15 I first got to the control room there was no temperature 16 indication. None. TC was offscale low almost. I7 _ We were pumping water in,so that made sense to me. TL, 1 18 there wasn't any. It was offscale high. You have to look 19 that I was coming from a place where I didn't have anything 20 other than that and I think we had steam generator downcomer 21 temperature. I think what we were looking at throughout the 22 early hours was a way of bounding that situation. ) 23 I don't think we thor.ght about the exact temperature of 24 the core as much as getting some indication so we could see &c ~ Federal Reporters, Inc. 25 where we were going with that indication. So I don't remember i
15 - jori _ 1 discussing the in-core for a very long period of time after the 2 initial discussion. 3 g Thinking back about what was in your own mind or what 'T 4 was - discussed by you and the other people in the control room (V 5 to whom you were talking, was there ever any indication about 6 the, conditions that you were seeing possibly having been caused 7 by the core having been uncovered for a period in the past or 8 did you yourself think that possibly in some way the core 9 could have been uncovered and then recovered and stayed hot? 10 Was that something that was in your own mind or was that 11 discussed at any time during the day? 12 A As I go back and think about that, it's 6:15 in the 13 morning or whatever time the conference call was, when we O-14 asked the question: Is the block valve closed? Because of 15 our lack of understanding of the conditions. Andthe answer 16 came back yes. When I got there at 7:00 in the morning, 17 I still had no understanding that we had had a loss of coolant 18 accident. Okay? 19 Very rapidly thereafter, when we tried to start the pumps 20 and get flow going and get heat removal going we knew there was 21 a void in the system. Then our concern became what do we do 22 with these conditions in the plant? Which I or anyone in that O' l 23 group had never envisioned. I don't think we thought about it 1 l 24 from the hours of 4:00 to 7:00 how they got to that point. ! Ac> Federal Reporters, Inc. l 25 In other words, I can easily think about that today. But I i l - - - "-~
16 -j;ri i think my thrust was more to keep water going across the core 2 until-wo were able to go towards another condition of 3 stability. I didn't have any questic about the fact we had () 4 high radiation. I wasn't thinking so much of the core 5 coverage before I got there as much as what do we do with the 6 hea,t now? I just think that I never had any doubt that the 7 reactor building and the gap activity had been released. 8 Dick Dubiel was one of the guys on the phones with the state 9 and he was aware of that, very much aware of the fact we had-10 released that type of thing. I don't think I thought about 11 damage to the core in terms of percent as much as I knew we 12 had had it. I knew it had been beyond anything that I would 13 have envisioned before that. I would have never thought of O. 14 a general emergency before that other than as a drill. 15 I didn't go back and question the exact temperature the 16 core had been to at that time.as much as I looked at what 17 action should I be taking now to approach any instability 18 from the condition that we analyzed and figured we were within 19 in that first hour. Which was no water in various parts of o2 20 the system. 21 ( 23 24 ! Ace Federal Reporters, Inc. 25 l mz
17 7975 03 01 bwlRW I O You said that you can't recall any f urther 2. discussions-that 'first day aDout in-core thermocouples. Let 3 me ask about hot leg temperatures. Do you remember requests (_')\\ 4 for hot leg temperatures from outside the control room, the 5 observation center or GPU or NRC or B&W? 6-A I think George Kunder passed those temperatures to I most of those groups. I am almost sure he passed them to 8 both our Reading engineering and 3PU people. Those are 9 the kind vf things that were very eligible. I don't 10 remember exact requests, but I know that data was passed. Il 0 It appears from the documentation, I gather, that 12 people in Lynchburg at the B&W headquarters didn't get any 13 hot leg temperatures until af ter 1800 o' clock in' the 14 aftarnoon. h'-- 15 Do you know why that might have oeen?- 16 A inat is hard for me to believe from the aspect il that one of the people who was there very early was Lee 13 Rogers, and one of his people was there on the panel. I 19 guess I was depending on his passing that information more
- D than I would have worried -- I would have assumed they had 21 that, anJ I would have also a ssumed that Jim Floyd, being 22 down there and calling in -- I just thought there were two 23 sources at least of that information.
24 I just assumed'they had it. 2a La ter on. in the day, when we actually started the
18 69/5 03 02' bwlRd I reactor coolant pumps, we came within a degree or two of 2 their calculations. Maybe they made all that calcula tions 3 after 1800 out it doesn't fit togetner that they didn't have 4 it. 5 But I didn't personally pass it. but I tasked their man 6 pot to place a burden on him, but I tasked him as that I kind of responsioility and I just would have assumed they 8 got it. 9 0 Okay,- let me go on to the pressure spike in the 10 containment ouilding. About it00 to I:30 p.m. 11 A Isn't that closer to 2:00 o' clock? 12 MR. HAYNES: 1:50. 13 BY MR. FRAMPTON: 14 0 That occurred f airly_ soon before you lef t for the 13 S ta te House t is that r10ht? 16 A My memory is I left at 2:30. that means I was in la preparation to leave much earlier tnan that, probably 2:00 18 to 2:15. 19 0 Did you became aware that there had ben a pressure 20 spike or that the sodium hydroxide spray had gone on at any 21 tima on '4 arch 28? 22 A Can we go off the record? I 23 MR. FRAMPTON: Off the record. 24 (Discussion of f the record. ) 25 Md. FRAMPTON: Bec k on the record. While we were
19 @75 03 03 ibwlRW .I
- off the record, we were reviewing yout previous testimony 2
and statements aoout -this subject given closer to the 3 ovents and pointed out that you had testified in a . f') s-4 deposition before the president's Commission on page 51, in 6 substance that you weren't aware, or didn't recollect being 6 aware of the pressure spikes or the spray actuation at 2:00 s p.m., March 28. We also read - quota tion.from page 24 of 8 your written statement and cited to pages 31 and 32 of our 9 deposition with you on September 20. 10 On those pages you said in substance that you don't il recall that you learned anything on March 28 other than 12 nearing a noise and some conversation about it possibly 'l 3 being the ventilation system and that you didn't think you rm 14 found out aoout the actuation of the sprey pumps until \\_) 15 subsequently. 16 So af ter all of that, my question to you, again, is 1. whether you rememoer learning on the 28, either before or '13 after you came back from the State House, whether there-was 19 actually a pre ssure excursion, an indicated pressure 20 excursion, and whetner the spray pumps came on. 21 A I don't believe I personally know until after the 22 day o f the a cc ident ' that there was a hydrogen burn. I 23 f urther don' t believe I really realized the spray pumps were -) turn 3d on tnat day at the time they were. In my own memory 24 25 that is somewhat reinforced oy the f act that when I
20 /975.03.04 bwlRW l one o f our consultants,14r. Bill Lowe, was the first guy to 2 tell me of a hydrogen burn, and then thet same day I 3 believe Ivan Porter showed me the chart of the reactor p) (_ 4 building, and I am saying that that was my realization for 5 the first time of a hydrogen burn. I think also on the 28, 6 Mr.,Lowe might have told me -- I could oe confusing the day / on this one -- a sample in the reactor ouilding that showed 8 an oxygen d3ficiency. 9 In my own mind those thoughts reenforce the f act to me 10 that I had no knowledge even that I might not have 11 rememberad of the hydrogen ourn. I also didn't know, and I 12 subs 3 q uen tly, I believe, read Bill Zewe saw this spike when i3 he cycled the valve. I don't believe I had any knowledge of 14 that until af ter this set of events. O 15 So I aidn't put together those separate things to what I 16 know today. la O Do you think now that you may have acutally known la there was a pressure spike on the 28th? 19 A I don't believe I knew there was a pressure spike 23 until the 30th, when Ivan Porter personally showed me the 21 chart, and I think I remember him doing that. 22 0 Okay. Let me read you from the deposition we did 23 with Mike Ross on September 18. Page 2, asking him about 21 this subject. He said "What was reported to us is that the 25 ES system had indicated pressure of 30 pounds in the
21 h975 03 06 bdLRN i building and that the building spray pumps had started and 2 that we had actually got spray flow and the cuilding 3 actually sprayed. de, being Miller, I and the group, loo ked () 4 Dack and said, 'Yes, the spike was on the recorder. It did 3 start." I guess we just felt that it was either one, 6 sompthing we just didn't understand, ana we didn't associate it with anything else, and we just went on. And afterwards 4-8 we asked him when tnis was, and he indicated that it was 9 reported to him af ter I came back f rom the State House." 10 Does that refresh your recollection as to whether you may li have been in a ' group at some point _ and learned of the actual 12 pressure spike? 13 A Looking at Mike Ross's tstimony, he discussed the 14 f act he remembers reporting that to me af ter I got oack f orm ,s) 15 the s tate. I 100% at the next page, he discussed the actual 15 conversation that occurred at the time of this. I just la don't think I was aware of that, because I passed by it, was ' 18 on the way to Unit l's control room before I went to the 19 state, and I don't personally believe tha t I was aware of 20 that. 21 0 So as you sit here today, your best recollection 22 is that you didn't know of the pressure spike itself until 23 after March 28? 24 A That is my best recollection, and I reenforce that ( 23 in my own mind with the f act that I ao remember coming in in i
22 ')975 03 06 bwLRW l subsequent days and learning of it, and I think I rememoer 2- 'Ivan. Porter oeing the man to show me the chart. And that is 3 to the best of my recollection. (~)w ( 4 0 Do you recall any conversation with either Brian. 5 Mehler or Joe Chwastyk on March 28 aoout the subject of the 6 noise, the pressure spike or an explosion or possible I e xplo sion ? 8 A Not'to the best of my memory. 9 0 Do you recall anyh conversation on March 28 10 about an instruction not to start electrical equipment or Il electrically operated equipment in the containment building 12 on account of its spark potential? 13 A 9 I don't recall any discussion of that Ontil af ter 14 the 28th. I do remember th3 fact that we were trying to (") / 15 start oil pumps for the reac tor coolant pumns, af ter I got 16 back from the state. 1, 0 This is on the 28th? 18 A Yes. I do remember we eventually went to the DC-19 pumps, because of the problems we were having with the 20 switch gear on the AC pumps, and I do rememoer asking Bl.1 21 through Lee Rogers, who was on the phone with them, 22 . permission to start the pumps with just the DC pumps. I 23 con't rememoer anf concern aoout starting those DC pumps. I 24 believe I p3rsonally asked the question of Lee Rogers, "Can Ok/ 2a I use the DQ pumps," and I don't remember he or I or anyone L
.e i 23 4975 03 07 owlRW -1 else discussing a prohibition basea on spark potential. 2 -Q You don't recall giving any instructions yourself, 3 and you don't recall anyone else expressing concern about ()' 4 that on the 28th? 5 A I don't. 6 0 Do you recall any such concern being discussed or any instructions ceing given on the 29th or 30th? e 8 A I think on the 30th there were some precautions 9 taken, but it's hard to remember. I think those precautions 10 would have related to some of these pumps. They do turn 11 off, I believe, when the reactor coolant pump starts. There 12 was discussion of spark potential then, I think, relative to 13 valves and equipment in the building, but not on the, 28th 14 that I rememoer. O \\"' la 0 0.<ay. It appears that the operations' log from 16 the control room for March 29th has an entry for 2114 which 17 would be -- 18 A 9:14 p.m. 19 0 "Placed RCP lif t pumps in off (minus sparking 20 potential in reactor building)." Were you in the control 21 roomn at that time on Thursday evening, do you recall? 22 That is Thursday, March 29th. 23 A I don't believe I was there. I believe I had .24 taken either the 7 to 7 or the 8 to 8. I oelieve, though. 2a .the next morning, as a follow-on to that, when Mr. P:orter
24 't9 75' 03 08 bwlRW I . relieved Mr. Dick Bensel, is where I picked this up for the. 2 first time. I think someone had started to talk about this 3 during that shif t, and I think the electrical people, the .( ) 4 two electrical engineers I am talking aoout, I think are 3 Dick Bensel and Ivan Porter, bec aus e Ivan picked up on me 6 on the morning I came in on Friday. That is the best I I could recollect. In fact. I think he showed me the charts 8 for the first time. 9 0 Let me see if I can get get your reaction to 10 information given to us by mr. Chwastyk in an unsworn but 11 transcribed interview that our group had with him on October 12 lith of this year. At page 18 of tne transcript, which we 13 have made available to Met Ed, Mr. Chwas tyk said,' "It was 14 right after the hydrogen explosion, and I mentioned that I 15 correlated the opening of the valve with the detonation 16 period. That I again went to Gary Miller and explained what i4 I thought had happened, as f ar as the hydrogen detonation la and the simultaneous opening of the valve, and it was 19 shortly af ter that Gary Miller got oack to me and said go 23 ahead and draw the oubble." 21 dow that is on page 18 of that transcript. On page 21 of 22 the transcript, Mr. Chwastyk asked again whether he is sure 23 that he told you that he thought the opening of the valve 24 caused an explosion. His answer was as follows: "fe s, I am ("% \\_) 25 pretty sure, but whether or not I could swear to that, I
9975 03 09 25 bwlRW l' don't know. 2 -" Question. Are you quite sure tnat that is what you 3 thought?' r (_) 4 " A ns we r. That is what I thought. Most definitely, I did 5 think that. Now whether or not I related that to Gary then, 6 now, that I think about it, I don't really remember. I may just ' one back to Gary and asked pe'rmission again to i have g 8 redraw the oubble. I just can't remember if I related to 9 him my thoughts at the time of the correlation of the 10 pressure spike in the operation of the valve." 11 I would like to ask you whether you remember any 12 conversations with dr. Chwastyk about either a pressure 13 spike or about the subject of ge tting the bubble back or fg 14 about the opening and closing of the valve. V 13 Does that refresh your mamory? 16 A I don't remember that conversaon. I would think I, he would have a hard time in October also. I also expected 13 him to go back to Mi'<e Ross more than myself. I pretty much l> that day stayed away from dealing Jirectly with the shif t 20 s up a r vi so rs. At the same time, I don't believe I was in the 21 control room very much after 1:50. My concentration was on 22 the data I f elt needed to go to Harrisburg. I don't think 23 that conversation occurred at that time. 24 Q Do you remember any conversation with him aoout 7-23 getting the-oubble back'on the pressurizer or his desire to
26 79'/5'03! i0' bwlRW' I use 'that method of pressure control rather than cycling or 2-some other method? 3 A .I don't remember that. In my. mind, I don't beliee ()' 4 I was operating' with the bucole in the pressurizer. 5 0 At any time? 6 A Tnat whole day. I don't have any doubt in my mind / about that. From the time we got the 100 amp reading on the 8 pumps. 9 Again,-Mr. Frampton, what I am saying is f rom my 10 recollection, thinking back to other people, I come back to 11 who I did talk to on the 29th and 30th, one of tne two,.and 12-mainly the 30th, is keying me for the first time and trying 4, d 13' to be accurate in my memory. 14 3 ) 13 15 1/ 18 19 2J 21 l 22 23 21 k 25 4 +
27 1975704 01_ .rc LRW. l- -Q You understand I am not challenging.your recollection. You recollection is what it is and you have 3 go give it to us as you remember it. You understand that _4 .you are under. oath. 5 W3, on the other hand, have to go through this process. 6 Thap is our duty and our obligation. Ano try as best we can t to test everybody's recollection with everybody else's. 3 That is the reason that we have to do this and I am trying ~ 9 to b3 fair by giving the the best, clearest information we 10 have from other people and le tting you react to that and 11-seeing if it refreshes your recollection. Or whether your 12 recollection doesn't agree with their recollection. 13 A I appreciate that. i 14 3 7-In the same vein, Mr. Brian Mehler has given us t '> 15 information in a transcribed but unsworn deposition on 16 Octooer 11 that he also recalled an instruction either from Il you or from someone on the 28th -- he believes on the -18 28th - not to start electrical or electrically operated 19 equipment because of the spark potential. 20 Let me read to you from page 16 of the transcript of that 21 interview in which ne said, "I do know, sometime after the 22 pressure spike happened, we were told not to start equipment 23 .becaue they assumed that it could happen again and they 24 probably put it that there das hydrogen in there, but that IK l' 2a was sometime af ter 18 50. Now, how far past that, I don't 1
28 79/5 114 02
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know. 2 "And I. don't, I s a~ i d -- w e l l, to Gary Miller I said -- h3 3 said don' t s tart' any more oil pumps, and I said we con't ox/ 4 have to. I already tested them because they were 5 concerned -- out how far into the afternoon at that time, I J don / t know whether it was 4:00, 2:00 or what, but it was / sometime after." 8 Do you remember any such conversation with Mr. Mehler on this subject on March 18? 10 A No, sir. And especially in the time-frame you are .11 talking aoout, realizing evarybody's times are 12 questionable. I was not in there. right af terward for a 13 period of a couple hours. 14 In my own mind I also remember tna t at 5:00 o' clock when ( )' 15 I got back or so anJ we began to charge the system, one of 16 our goals was to start the reacto'r coolant pump and at that 1 1, time we were trying to troubleshoot the AC pumps and I, at l 19 that tims, was looking for starting those pumps without any l 1/ oil pumps or with tne minimum number of them and, in fact, I 2) think, discussed that with Lee Rogers and he was talking to i 21 Lynchburg. l 2d So I don't rememoer any prohibition discussion such as I 1 23 rem 3mber trying to get an oil pump on. In f act, I rememoer 24 going out on the panel, I believe, and looking at the pump () 23 setup ana asking-Les Rogers then could I use just tne DC \\
29 WIS 04 03; rc LRd 1 - pumps ? - 'I ~ don't think-that conversation occurred with me. 2 0~ Is it possible that this is a conversation that 3 might have occurred at a diff erent time between you and q- - 4- 'Mr. Mahler? Is there any other occasion on the 29th or 39th a when this conversation could have occurred? 6 A It is very possible it could have occurred on the /
- 30th, for instance, af ter it was known there was hydrogen 8
and when we were taking those kinds of precautions. 9 0 Was there any occasion in which a main reactor 10 coolant pump had to be started or restarted on the 29th or il 30th? 12 A I believe on the 30th a pump tripped. I also 13 believe that when you start these pumps, the oil pumps turn 14 off on a speed switch. In other words, as the main u(ap 15 comes up to speed, you turn off the oil pumps on an ~15 automatic switch that is driven off the speed of the' big Il pump, the reactor coolant. pump. IS There was probsoly a desire to test those pumps because 19 of' the possibility of loss of the one we had operating. 2J And, therefore, the ability to start a cackup pump. 21 In fact, I think on Friday, later in the day or sometime 22 in those first four days, one of the pumps tripped and we 23 started the backup. 24 0 Jo you recall any particular concern at that time \\ 25 acout spark potential involved with starting up the pump?
-30 S9/5104 04. rc LRa i A-I think by. that time we had gotten the ability to d' run the AC pumps which would not have had that potential. 3 0 So' you are saying it is unlikely that this () 4 conve rsation would have taken place on the 30th. According 5 to your reconstruction of what equipment was availaole, o A It is possible on the night of the 29th. it took / place or the early part of.the 30th, cecause the electrical 8 people, Ivan or Bensel, wers working, I think, after the 9 hydrogen was discovered and getting away from the lift 10 pumps. 11 And I am just saying it is possible that there was 12 discussion on this type of thing that occurred af ter the 13 28th because of those kind of considerations once it. was 14 discovered. .O ~ 13 dirst, a osckup pump, so the ability to start an oil pump 15 would have been something the electrical people would have II ocen trying to assure. We knew we only had one running and !8 you could lose that ene. We were doing things like seal 19-injection ad justments to be able to start a occkup reactor 20 coolant pump. So I think it is very likely af ter the 28th. ' 21 - I Jus t don't think i t occurred on the 29th. I am basing 22 that on my memory.of how we started that pump. 23. d Did you ever tell anyone in the control room on 24 March -28 not to make any information availaole to the NRC or (s 1 N/ 23 your own management or GPU management? l 1 1
31 7975 04105' rc LRW I A 'I don't want to sound self-serving and not answer, 2 but 'I' rememoer my thrust was to provide unrestricted 3 -availability _ of that information, because my method of ~ ~N / 3,; 4 running the event on the 28th was to get as much help as I 5 Could. ,I didn't at all ever give guidance to restict 4 information. I might have given guidance to restict access 8 f rom a safety standpoint to the actual panels in the control-9 room, co make sure Bill Zewa had the freedom to operate. 10 There were a number of people there. 11 At one time during the morning, we had to move the 12 amargency control station up there oecause we had to 13 evacuate 'it out of Unit 1. Thet required 10 or 12 more 14 people to come to the control room. If there was any ('#) 15 restriction, it would have been on location to assure that 15 we didn't get out of hand as f ar as the operator's aoility 11 to see the console. 13 3 Is your answer "No" to the question of whether you 1/ ever told anyone not to relate information they knew to 23 someone elsa ? 21 A The answer is no, and in f act, I invited people 22 into the meatings that were there, for instance, from the 23 NRC, had direct dialogue in those meetings. 24 0 did anyone ever instruct you to withhold any . f' (. 2a information f rom anyone?
(9/5 04 06 rc LRn i A No, sir. 2 0 Did you ever yourself withhold any information 3-that you regarded as significant from the NaC people in the 1( ) 4 control room or from NRC people outside the control room? 5 A: I never did. .5 0 Do you know of anyone who did? / A Not personally. By that, I mean, I wasn't at 8 every place -- for instance, there were NRC people in tha 9 Unit I control roam. I was not physically there. But we IJ assured anyoody's access that needea to oe there and assured 11 their access to information. 12 There wire times when the time priorities were such that 13 _it wa s very hard to deal with all the people that wanted to 14 be de alt with. That, I don't consider a restriction. la a From your own personal knowledge, have you heard 16-that anyone who was an employee of Met Ed withheld I, consc iously, intentionally withheld any information from an 18 NRC inspector or f rom the NRC during.the first three days of 19 the acciJent? 2J A I have not. ~21 T4. FRAMPTON: Off the record. 22 (Discussion off the record.) 23 MR. ALLISON: On the record. 24 Bf MR. ALLI3ON: p) \\- 26 0 Mr. Miller. I would like to ask.you to try to
i 33 n/5 04 07 rc LRd I recall. some of your phone conversations with Jack Herbein on 2 March 28. -I have three specific ques tions.acout that. I 3 will tell you what they are and we can take them one at a '\\ > 4 tima. 6 Did you aver tell !4r. Heroein when.you were oriefing him o what the hot ' leg temperatures were, what the core / thermocouple readings were. or about the containment 3 pressure spike? 9-So let's start with the hot leg temperatures. Do you 10 recall telling Mr. Herbein aoout the hot leg temperatures? 11-A I personally don't recall. I think it is also fir 12 to say I, at various times, had other people talk to him 13 because I didn't let myself get tiec up in passing that 14 information, just passing data. I purposely didn't. I_had (} 13 Lee Rogers talk to him. I had George Kunder talk to him at 16 various tima s. le I had George actually_ assemble the information prior to 13 going to Harrisburg for me so I wou1Jn't have to go out and 19 assemble it. I can't rememoer what he was given anymore. I 23 don't think I discussed the hydrogen, as we know it now, 21 spi ke in containment. I don' t believe I had at that tima 22 knowledge as to what it was. I think I had passed over it, 23 .as I said. The in-cores. I don't oelieve he was ever aware 21' of that on tas 28th. (~} -t 23 0 Fine. Let's. toss out the hydrogen since you
[975 04 08 34 rc LRN 1 'already testified this evening a lot about that. 2 Do you think Jack was never aware of the in-core 3 thermocouple readings that days is that correct? n(,) ~ 4 A I didn't tell him, that I remember. I also told 5 you that I aidn't pass him that much specific data.
- Also, 5
'it is hard to rememoer. e O Do you remember anything of what you discussed on 8 the ride to the Governor's of fice? Can you remember if any 9 of these were discussed, either the hot leg temperatures or 10 in-cores during that automobile trip? 11 A I think the plant temperatures might have been 12 discussea, because I think George assemoled them. I don't 13 believe the in-cores were. I think the other part of the 14 discussion was the monitorina we had done. Radiation ^ 15 monitoring. 15 George went along and did most of the briefing of both of 1/ _ us. George Kunder, that is. 19 0 If I understand your answer, then, you would 19 expec t that Mr. Xunder told you and Mr. Hercein _what the hot 20 leg temperatures were during your ride to Harrisburg1 is 21 that right? 22 A I would expect he would have passed the TC, TH and 23 possible steam generator downcomer, steam generator 4 24 pressure, sa:ne-of the stuf f we discussed in the group. \\-)- \\ 2; I don't~oelieve the core would have oeen part of that,
35 2975 :04.09 rc LRW - I .though. I also think there might have been some passing of 2 that same information, at least' part of it, over the line to 3 the Bureau of Radiation Protection by bath Kunder and Duoiel () 4 ~that morning. There is a possibility -- I am not trying to 6 .put you down another road, out there was continuous con;/ersation on those parts. I thint some of that m' ghi 6 s have been passed. But I can't personally testify to that. 6 MR.' WILSON: What do you mean by same information? k V THE WITNESS: Soma of the information on the plant 10 conditions, the radiation conditions, would have been passed .l i over those lines.- 12 MR. WILSods By same information, you don't 13 necessarily mean in-core -- 14 THE WITNESS: Not in-core thermocouples, no. 3ome O' 15 of the same infornation George used to orief us with is what la I alluded to. 1/ MR. WILSON: Not the same information referred to 13 in his three questions. l> THE WITNESS: That is true. 23 21 ~22 23 21 } 2a
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1 BY MR. ALLISON: cr'7975 LRW 5 2 g There were several meetings of your management group 3 that day. Do you think the hot-leg temperatures were discussed { 4 during those meetings? 5 A In the group meetings I discussed? 6 ,G Right. 7 A Yes, sir.. I think these were discussed along with 8 the void in the system and I think they were discussed 9 especially when we came down towards core flood and later on 10 in the afternoon I believe we even shifted the amount of water 11 going in various high pressure injection legs because of the 12 response of the high temperature instrument. 13 G What did the hot leg temperatures mean to you? What 14 did you interpret them to mean? 1 15 A I think people in the group discussed those through-16 out the morning. I think they were -- initially I don't think 17 they indicated that much until we analyzed them very closely 18 -because we also started to pump and were convinced there was 19 a void in the hot legs. Somewhere in the morning, maybe based 20 on Lee Rogers 's thrust, there must have been discussion of a 21 superheated condition but as of today I can't remember that. 22 .I do know we charged the loops all morning and we went -- we ("2 h \\~ 23 discussed coolant valves as opposed to throttling with block 24 valves and that kind of discussion. 'Ac$ Federal Reporters, Inc. 25 And were continuously discharging water to the floor to l \\; l I i U
37 @Cri 2 1 maintain the flow rate. The pressure was just steady. 2 O Is it fair to say the hot leg temperatures meant 3 steam:in the loops to you? d'T) 4 A -It meant steam in the loops and confirmatory with 5 the reactor coolant pump start and the 100 amp indication and 6 that sort of thing. I think sometime later in the morning we 7 may have discussed steam conditions when we got into the core 8 flood type discussion because we were aware we weren't getting 9 anywhere by charging the plant. 10 0 So you think perhaps later in the morning the steam 11 conditions were discussed. 12 A I think that's true and I base that on the fact that I 13 think Lee Rogers and his people may have' brought that up. I ( 14 don't think that made much difference from an action standpoint. 15 I think we talked about going against the coolant reliefs but 16 that is very hard to specifically remember. 17 The biggest driving reason to go down in the pressure I 18 believe was a step down towards more stability and also the 19 water discharge, the possibility of the electromatic failing -- 20 not that but the block valve for the electromatic which has a i 21 valve that fails when you open and close and we were cycling 22 it, that is when I think that discussion would have occurred. j-) \\_ 23 That plus I'had a concern for the amount of water because we 24 weree not short of water but we were discharging a significant ' Ace Federal Reporters, Inc. 25 amount of borated water storage tank. 1 I i
38 jari 3 1 A O Do you recall on the 28th that hot leg temperature 2 led some people to suspect thatthe core had been uncovered? 3 1 I don't recall discussion of that. I am taking that -{]) 4 the core had been previously uncovered that morning before 5 we arrived. 6 ,0 No. The question could be -- it could be 2:00. You 7 could be looking at the hot leg temperature which was 7-800 8 degrees. Somebody could say if it's that hot in the hot leg, 9 the core is uncovered now. That is what I am getting at. It 10 doesn ' t have to be 2 :00. It could be any time during the day. 11 A I don't think we discussed that relative to the core 12 itself. I do think we discussed whether the high pressure 13 injection was all going on to the core. I do think there were O 14 people in the group that could hypothesize paths of bypass. 15 But some of it was obviously going in because of the physical 16 location plus we knew we were pumping water in at low tempera-17 ture by looking at TC but that is not in the core. 18 I don't think we look at that and related it to uncovery 19 at that time. I think when I talked about core coverage, I 20 talked about it from the standpoint arc we sure all the water 21 that is being put in is going on the core since it was just 22 discharging it to the floor and there could be bypass paths 23 postulated anyway by some members of that group. 24 G So you remember concerns about bypass paths and Ace-Federal Reporters, Inc. 25 whether the flow path was through the core or around some other i I
39 ~jOri 4 1 path. You don't remember a concern that said, hey, the TL 2 is telling me the core is dry. 3 A No. In fact, one of the -- at least our reasoning t'y (_j 4 factors for going towards core flood was the discussion that 5 if we could get enough Delta pressure between the core flood 6 and the reactor we could convince ourselves there wasn't a 7 void occurring in the core throughout the morning, I think. 8 I don't think we thought back that it has been voided. 9 MR. FRAMPTON: Let's take a short break. 10 (Recess.) 11 MR. FRAMPTON: On the record. 12 BY MR. ALLISON: 13 0 Mr. Miller, on the day of the 28th, were there ever 14 times when you thought that you and your group didn't really 15 have a good understanding of what was happening in the plant? 16 Didn't have it figured out yet? 17 A I think we had figured out from very early in the 18 morning the fact that there were major voids i-the plant. 19 I don't think we had figured out how to get out of the situation 20 we were.in. I personally remember being very strong early in 21 the morning about putting high pressure injection water on the 22 core until we understood it better. I think I might even have 23 used those words to Mike Ross. 24 I think I did it in a very strong fashion. I think they i Ace Federal Reporters, Inc. 25 even questioned whether he was doing it. That was strictly I 1 l
40 -jari 5 1 based on not being totally sure of how to come out of the 2 situation. I think we had elevation diagrams and we started 3 pumps. I think we knew there was a void in that system. I l( ) 4 just don't think we knew a recognized way out. We talked heat 5 removal. We knew we were getting very little heat removal 6 from the steam generators because of the pressures. We were 7 getting some. 8 If you look at the downcomer temperature. The only other 9 way would have been water flow. From that aspect I think wo 10 understood a lot about the plant condition. I don't think we 11 understood the way out of it. 12 O I remember in your previous testimony you said in 13 your management meetings you invited the'NRC inspectors in. O 14 You said if you got any ideas, let me know what they are. The 15 attitude I got from your previous answers was if somebody can 16 figure out what to dn. let me know. Is that a fair character-17 ization of your attitude fath the NPC guys? 18 A I think that's a fair characterization. I have not 19 ' stressed any of that relationship other than the fact that I 20 am sure I was very strong on their being in the meetings. I am -21
- lso sure that I asked if there was anything else they could 22 tell me.
Because they were technical people that I knew. Not 23 because they were NRC. Because they were people I knew had 24 been around. l Ace-Federd Reporters, Inc. 25 I also think that it was made clear to me at various times L L' I I
41 Dri 6 1 that I was the licensee and that I accepted that responsibility 2 and. thought it had to be that way. That was the relationship 3 that existed. m) 4 'O Now here is the real point of my question. Did you 5 ever think of calling Lynchburg or Mountain Lakes or Reading 6 with the same kind of question? If you can figure out what to 7 do, let me know. 8 A I would have to come back and say I depended on the 9 B&W people in the control room to contact Lynchburg for me. 10 That is where I stood that day. That is what I stand on. That 11 is now how I might do it today. I talked to Reading I think 12 carly in the morning. At least the engineering' manager. And 13 I don't believe that there was any more they could advise me ) 14 on what to do. I was aware Jack was coming to the site, or 15 at least to the observationccenter. I was aware at sometime in 16 the afternoon that Arnold or the people in GPU were involved. 17 Because I know they were involved in the decision at 5:00. 18 I didn't at 8:00 in the morning know who I would call to ask 19 those questions. 20 In other words, I am saying as the day developed the groups i 21 'that were involved were I think representative of those~ groups. r'~ 22 4 Any follow-up on that question? 23 A I personally have one follow-up. I attempted to 24 minimize the amount of my own time drain because a lot of Acs Federal Reporters, Inc. l 25 people externally felt they had to talk to the guy in charge, l l i I ~
42 jari 7, I whereas inside the plant I was tyring to run the plant and 2 trying to run the emergency plan and in each hour there were 3 probably very few minutes allowed or available for thought. l3 (/ 4 I was trying to preserve those few minutes for the meetings 5 I was holding to get away, to think, and I attempted to get 6 people to talk to one of those five people as opposed to me 7 personally describing information because I was involved in 8 other decisions that I had to make. Minute by minute 9 decisions on respirator, watering times, that type of thing. 10 My time was consumed. 11 0 You said you relied on Lee Rogers and the other 12 B&W man, Shaddel. 13 A Also John Flint was there. {} 14 Q And John Flint, to comInunicate with Lynchburg. 15 By.the same token, did you assume that the NRC inspectors were 16 communicating with the NRC and whatever help they could come 17 up with would be fed to you by that path? 18 A I pretty directly assumed B&W would be represented 19 by Lee. I think further evidence of that is by the time we got 20 to the point of starting the reactor coolant pump, Lee was on 21 the phone with Lynchburg. I assumed that communication. 22 The NRC communication that had been set up at 7:30 in the 23 morning with Region I, an open line, I would have assumed any 24 helped I could have gotten would have been funneled through Acs Feder.1 Reporters, Inc. 25 that. That is what I am trying to remember, what I thought
43 jdri 8 1 that day. Not what-I thin)-today. 2 7 I might say for the record we now know that there 3 were some communication problems. There were >:ple in . () 4 Bethesda who wanted to talk to you and relay cr.tcerns but it 5 didn't. come through that path. I don't knot why. I am just 6 saying that to make the record clear. 7 A In my own mind I was trying to deal with one person 8 from each organization in order not to become diluted o where 9 I could not make decisions that had to be made. I would depend 10 on the paths I had open. o5 11 As long as I knew there was a path open to that organization,
- 6 12 Would you say that is an important lesson for future 13 emergency planning or for',:let's'say, the.NRC or the NSSS vendor g
14 to get ;their messages through that single path to the plant 15 manager? 16 A It's hard to point out the most important lesson, 17 or the lesson, but one of the lessons has to be that communi-18 cations within each organization that are practiced will work 19 in an emergency. If they are not practiced and planned before 20 hand, the man who is the emergency director shouldn't depend 21 on something he doesn't know exists or he will end up diluted. 22 More ~ important than that is the ability of have communi-O 23 cators that are knowledgeable on both ends so thatin fact it 124 doesn't. depend on the guy in charge to pass the specifi'c ~ Aca-Federet Reporters, Inc. 25 . data. It has to depend on a knowledgeable communicator with
J 44 L
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1 preacticed communications to the other organizations with ~ 2 response on the other end that' has been practiced. In other 4 3 words, you can't _ just talk ~ to every engineering manager in any G(_/.. 4 organization or you will lose focus. 5 Because wha't I found that d was-a lot of people that got 6 information wanted more. If I hadn't been at the site looking l~ C 7 ~ at the meters, I would have wanted more. It's just nature to l =8 want more to confirm someth3 g that is very hard to analyze 9 ' into being. 10 The most important lesson to me is communications and the Il practicing of'those communications and the fact that those 12 communications are not -- that the communicators are not the 13 decision persons. 14 ~BY MR. HAYNES: 15 D Mr. Miller, with respect to this getting help from t-16 others, do you believe or did you believe-there was anyone in l 17 the Reading office who could give you help and advise you with .18 ' respect to what.to do with the plant-to place it in a more 19 stable condition? 20 A I didn't believe there.was anyone-in the-Reading -21 office in the early morning that could have_ understood the
- r g 22 plant conditions and -specified action better than 'the five b J.
23 senior people I had with me.- I think I talked to Dick'Clinga-i [ man'and some of'the Reading people early in the morning. Had. 24
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25 -they: offered any suggestions I would have taken. them and l
f 45 'icri 10 ,1 evaluated them. I think I was more worried that they had 2 information early in the morning from a communication standpoint 3 with the external world than actual engineering help. () 4 I am basin g that on the fact that there were very few peopic 5 there as well-qualified on these two units as some of the people 6 I had. Especially when you look at the seniority and the 7 qualification of the group I had available at that time in the 8 morning.. GPU would have been a different matter. 9 0 In what way? 10 A In'that there were more senior people in GPU tra-II ditionally. Most of the project people were more experienced 12 engineers. But those paths weren't normal paths to me from a r3 13 technical standpoint. They were more of'an exception. Later V 14 ' n the day they became more effective and we did utilize their i 15 advice, say, at 5:00 in the afternoon after discussions with i 16 'them, d 17 So as you looked at it, the people in GPU Service 18 Corpse at Mountain Lakes had more knowledge of plan operation 19 and plant characteristics and systems. 20 A-I think the GPU arm had a much bigger organization 21 and that is why I think the possibility existed of more 22' expe rtise. They had a very large organization, at least what I 23 knew of them, compared to our Reading organization at that time. 24 ~Also I think their experience level was a little higher. I
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25
- might say, though,- that your first question was did I.think d
I
46 1 jOri 11 1 there was anybody that could help. I didn't think of that on 2 the morning of the 28, was there capability there. If there 3 was someone there, that was special to the plant I would have () 4 asked for them. I did bring certain people here during the 5 incident that I knew had talent. '6 Hr. Ron Tool, I bought in. Mr. Lex Segaris. People I 7 knew that had specific expertise. I brought Jim Seelinger to 8 Unit 2 because of his qualifications. Had there been somebody 9 who stuck out in Reading I would have gone for them. Other 10 than that they were an engineering organization and they were 11 somewhat less experienced than the GPU staff which was bigger 12 and was gearing up for a much bigger project type. -13 G O.. As I recall your previous testimony, you contacted 14 Jack Herbein for two reasons. One, he had plant operating 15 experience. Secondly, he~was your boss. 16 A And he wa's the arm to GPU that I normally experienced, 17 That wouldn't have taken that drive to call him. I called him 18 and Lee Rogers for the two reasons or three reasons I have 19 given. One was expertise. 20 BY MR. ALLISON: 21 g Did you ever believe on March 28 that natural 22 circulation was working? Talk about after you came into the .O 23 plant. Not prior to that. .24 A After I got to the plant we evaluated heat removal. ' Ace FMeet Rgorters, inc. 25 We thought there was some natural circulation. I think we
47 )ri 12 1 based that on downcomer temperature, which was like 510 or so i 2 as I remember early in the morning and based on the fact 3 there was steaming to some degree, though the steam generator 4 pressure was low. That kind of indication told us we had some 5 heat removal. 6 <We knew it wasn't to the degree that you would expect with 7 natural circulation because of the steam generator indication 8 I believe side of it. As we would expect a higher pressure 9 which would have indicated a higher heat removal. 10 0 Okay, given that, did you ever tell anybody you 11 thought natural circulation was working effectively? 12 A We might have told someone there was some natural /~T 13 circulation. I don't believe we thought'we had total natural V 14 circulation. I base that on the. fact I still remember dis-15 cussions on the pressure and conditions in the steam 16 generator. It's possible I said some natural circulation. 17 I wouldn't have been specific enough to say we didn't'have it 18 in the traditional 11ow pattern maybe. 19 BY MR. HAYNES: 20 Q. When you say downcomer temperature of 510 degrees, 21 is this the primary side water or secondary side water? . /~}' 22 A That is an RTD installed in the downcomer section v -23 of the steam generator side ~as opposed to the reactor side. 24 G So it would be on the secondary water side? Ace Federal Reporters, Inc. 25 A Yes. I
48 jari 13 1 g-That temperature would have to match the saturation 2 pressure if you are steaming off. 3 A If you were steaming ideally, yes. I remember that I) 4 temperature like 510, 520 and I didn't have 500 pounds or so in 5 the steam generator. I had like 100. 6 40 So it's hard to envision that being 510 degrees. 7 A I remember it-being 510 in the early morning. 8 I think there may be other people that can attest to that. 9 G That is why I questioned it. If you are steaming 10 off the steam generator, it's a boiling process so you would 11 be on the saturation curve. 510 degrees, this would be some 12 pressure I would assume from'the steam tables.of 6-700 pounds 13 gg approximately. Is that your estimate now? But I think the V 14 pressure was quite low, about 100 psi. 15 A I think we recognized and discussed the fact there 16 was only some heat removal occurring. 17 BY MR. ALLISON: 18 4-There is a question that relates to the 2400 degree 19 core thermocouple reading. The highest one. 20 A. One thing I would like to say. I think I said that -21 in.the President's testimony before. If I am wrong on the 22 number, I am wrong from Day One. But I think that I-said 23 there were -- I said that Reading occurred in the morning 24 hours, in the early hours. I think other people, where I got - ActFederd Reporters, Inc. 25 that reading was'from like Ross or Zewe types.
49 jOri 14 1 BY MR. ALLISON: 2 O With respect to those core thermocouple readings, 3 were you aware of the 2200 degree limit in the ECCS regula- ,~ k_) 4 tions on calculated peak clad temperature? 5 A I might have at sometime been aware of the interim 6 criteria of like 23-or 2400. I don 't remember thinking of f 7 that number at that time in the morning. I would not have been 8 unaware of that number in some reading I had donc previously;. 9 0 You were aware of that kind df limit. I think you 10 just quoted the interim acceptance critoria, which were a 11 little higher. The final number was 2200. But you didn't 12 connect that with the 2400 degree freading on,that morning, p' 13 is that right? v 14 A I didn't connect that with the ero to 200 or -- 15 I didn't connect that with the series of readings. I think if 16 someone came back and.said to me 2400 degrees, 2300, if I got 17 4 or 5 consistent readings or 50 readings, it.would have made 18 a difference in my discussion of that. I didn't at the time 19 go much beyond reliability discussion of the instrument. I 20 didn't'believe it. 21 MR. WILSON: I believe in your question you improperly (^S 22 stated his response. You said he was aware of it whereas he \\~J 23 said he might have been aware of it. Am I correctly stating 24 your response to his question?- Am FWwd Rgorters, lm. 25 .TIIE WITNESS : I was aware at one time in my life of i U
9 50 -jori i the interim acceptance criteria. That was not a discussion 2 point or point that came to my mind that morning. 3 MR. ALLISON: Thank you, Mr. Wilson. () 14 BY MR. ALLISON: 5 0 What was your impression of the reason for that 6 limit? That temperature limit in the ECCS criteria. 7 A I believe my impression at one time was that it was 8 related to the cladding. it could also be related to the -- le': 9 me think a second -- my memory of that day is that that was 10 the temperature you should not exceed in the ECCS analysis on 11 the fuel. I don't know that I could ren.cmber what that relates 12 to directly as far as fuel melt versus reection of the cladding 13 and so forth. But I do remember that was the criterion from f]- 14 the ECCS standpoint that you couldn't see on accident analysis, c6 15 MR. ALLISON: Okay. I am done. 16 BY MR. FRAMPTON: 17 G Just a couple more questions. At about 11:30 in 18 the morning March 28 a decision was made to depressurize the 19 system. What was the primary purpose of that decision? Was it 20 to try to get on the decay heat removal rystem? - 21 A I testified to that in the President's Commission. 22 A comprehensive document. I believe that there were a number 23 of factors. I believe I was concerned about the amount of 24 water we were actually using and where we would actually go . Acs Federd Reporters, Inc. 25 with that. In fact, I think I had the maintenance supervisor i
51 jari-1 look for backup methods or means to obtain backup water from 2 Unit 1. I think there was discussion relative to the assurancei 3 that all the water being pumped was going on the core and that ,r.. 4 one of our groups discussions we decided if we got enough in \\ 5 the Delta pressure that we would be able to at least get some 6 gross indications. In other words, if the core flood tanks 7 discharged to a major extent, that would have told us that we 8 were voiding the core and weren't pumping all the water on 9 the core. 10 I think we also looked at it as a step down towards ulti-11 mately decay heat or reactor coolant pump but I don't think 12 we thought of decay heat as very imminent. I. don't.think we 13 thought we would get to decay heat very rapidly. I think we 14 looked at the pressure decrease as being a way to the low 15 pressure system at that time. 16 0 Once you got the pressure down, was there an attempt. 17 to get it low enough to start using the decay heat system or 18 was the pressure intentionally kept up a little bit and a 19 conscious decision made to not go on decay heat? 20 A I don't think it was a-conscious decision made not 21 to be on decay heat. I don't think the pressure was going any 22 lower. x) 23 You just couldn't get it any lower. 24 A I don't believe with the valves, I believe we' opened Am-FWwd Rmorters, lm. 25 all tha openings we had, I don't believe it got lower and I i
52 l jari I don't believe we had any other'way of venting it. 2 G Given the amount of water that you had to keep 3 putting in the system, the valve space that was available to (~b (,) 4 steam out just wasn't bed,ng enough. 5 A. I would not allow HPI, high pressure injection, to 6 be ' secured during the maneuver. I didn 't want that stopped. 7 I think under those bonditions we got it as low as you could. 8 On Friday morning the 30th -- 9 A. I'also want to say that I think we saw some response 10 on some of the temperature indications in that train and I think II that encouraged us that we were getting some cool, which was 12 another reason for spraying the water directly over the core. 13 We recognized the core flood nozzles were directly in the 14 vessel. That combination. 15 B On Friday morning the 30th, do you remember discussing 16 the 1200 MR per hour reading from the helicopter with Jack I7 Herbein before his 11:00 a.m. press briefing? 18 A. I can't remember today. I9 Q Do you know whether he was aware of that number 20 during the morning? Can you remember that? 2I A. I can't remember if I was aware of that number. I 22 was aware of some high numbers from the helicopters when I 23 first arrived but I was not' aware those numbers had come back 24 down shortly after when the pressure of that tank was then Ace Federd Reporters. Inc. 25 maintained low, i
53 jori' 1 O You are not sure you yourself as of 11:00 a.m. on 2 the morning of the 30th heard of a 1200 MR number. 3 A I am not sure. I am only sure the readings we had in ' _) .4 consistently after the initial crisis had occurred were not ( 5 out of the range we were seeing. That doesn't met they were 6 low but they weren't at the magnitude of 1200. 7 G Since Mr. Haynes and Mr. Allison interviewed Brian 8 Mehler and Joe Chwastyk on October 11, have you had conversa-9 tions with either one of them about their testimony or about 10 the subject of this pressure spike? 11 A I have not talked to Joe Chwastyk.about anything I 12 can remember. Brian Mehler was in the Unit 1.pl' ant. one day ? 13 about a week ago. He mentioned to me his memory of the 28th 14 in a brief conversation of less than two minutes. I told 15 Brian Mehler' he should remember and say to whoever asked him 16 to the best of his recollection and that I would not discuss l 17 that. 18 0 You wouldn't discuss it with him. 19 A No, sir. 20 g Was what he told you about his recollection more ~21 or less consistent with what we quoted to you? em 22 A In very brief detail he told me what you told me in d 23 more detail. I purposefully didn't discuss it with him or 24 anyone else. I may have talked to Mike Ross to tell him, ~ Ace Federal Reporters, Inc. 25 since he is Mehler's boss, that I would have no problem if
54 i j0ri 1 Brian Mehler testified to what he remembered at all. A lot of d 2 the shift supervisors have a pretty good rapport with me 3 personally. I only wanted them to tell what they remembered (~) \\/ 4 without any prohibition or inhibition from me. 4 5 0 When you say you may have told Mike Ross that, is 6 that in the last couple of weeks' 7 A Since then I might have gone back and said to Mike 8 Ross, hey, Brian is worried. Okay? He shouldn 't worry. Say 9 what you remember. 10 0 Have you had any substantive conversation with Mike II Ross about this pressure spike business in the last three.or 12 four weeks? .13 A Only that he and I were scheduied to come here and (} 4 discuss this as a subject. We did discuss the hydrogen spike -15 some weeks ago when I believe the question was asked by the 16 Udall Committee in writing, and I think there was an answer 17 put together that he had some involvement with, and in fact I 18 think there was a letter written out of our company by the 19 president to the New York Times article that quoted Jim Floyd. 20 I think Mike' Ross ha d something to do with that letter which 21 talked about the spike and the electrical noise type of thing. 22 MR. FRAMPTON: Thank you very much. We appreciate } 23 your'timerand your cooperation. 24 MR. WILSON: If I may, I have one point I would like
- Ace Federal Reporters. Inc.
25 to clarify. When you asked the questions concerning a possible 1
55 i jari i conversation between Mr. Miller and Mr. Chwastyk and another 2 conversation between Mr. Miller-and Mr. Mehler, his responses 3 were that he doesn't remember that conversation or he doesn't I~ 't 4 think it occurred. I have a question to Mr. Miller. V 5 If such a conversation would have taken place on March 6 28,,1979, do you believe you would have recalled it sufficiently 7 to answer that question positively that you would have recalled 8 it rather than saying that you didn't think it occurred or 9 took place? 10 THE WITNESS: I believe I would have recalled it. 11 MR. WILSON: That is all. 12 MR. FRAMPTON: Thank you. 07 13 (Whereupon, the deposition was concluded at 9:00 p.m.) 9 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 V 23 24 Am FMeref Reporters,1=. 25 i}}