ML19308C563
| ML19308C563 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Arkansas Nuclear, Crane |
| Issue date: | 11/27/1979 |
| From: | Creswell J, Lane R ARKANSAS POWER & LIGHT CO., NRC - NRC THREE MILE ISLAND TASK FORCE |
| To: | |
| References | |
| TASK-TF, TASK-TMR NUDOCS 8001280592 | |
| Download: ML19308C563 (14) | |
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Transcript of Proceedings NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION TMI SPECIAL INQUIRY GROUP INTERVIEW 0F RICK LANE O
Little Rock, Arkansas PLACE:
DATE:
Tuesday, November 27, 1979 (THIS TRANSCRIPT WAS PREPARED FROM A TAPE RECORDING.)
" ACE-FEDERAL REPORTERS,INC.
OffidelReponers 444 North Capitol Street Washington, D.C. 20001 NATIONWIDE COVERAGE. DAILY N **hoa * :
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TMI SPECIAL IN00IRY GROUP 2
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7 Little Rock, Arkansas-1 8
Tuesday, November 27, 1979 l
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8M88 VOICE:
Okay.
Tcday is November 27, 1979, and it 2
i s 12:23.
We're in the conference room on the eighth floor 3
of the Arkansas Power & Light of fices in Li ttic Rock, 4
5 This is an interview of Rick Lane, Manager of o
Mechanical Engineering for Arkansas Power & Light.
Also 7
pre sent is Stephen Riggs of the law firm of House, Holmes, 6
and Jewell, representing Arkansas Power & Light.
Present 9
for the NRC TMI Special Inquiry Group are James Creswell and 10 Frederick Hur.
(h Mr. Lane, we've given you a copy of a document 11 12 entitled "NRC Special Inquiry Group Wi tness Notif ication."
13 Have you read the document?
14 Lana VOICE:
Yes, I have.
15
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VOICE:
Do you understand the information m-16 contained in it?
17 L a na VOICE:
Yes.
(p VOICE:
Okay.
Would you start off maybe just 16 19 giving us a brief history of your nuclear-related education 20 and work ex perience, for the record?
21
[.ct na VOICE:
Okay.
I began employment with AP&L back 22 in May of 1972, and on coming on board about that time was 23 involved initially in the nuclear program, mainly involved 24 with review of the design of the Unit 2 plant at that time, k
25 which was proceeding along.
So that was my major
8632 01-02 3
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. involvement at that-time.
2 Increasing. involvement with Unit i began as we got 3
= more into startup on the unit.
And so I went through the
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startup on-Unit 1, and involvement on up through Unit 2 and 5
its-startup. which we're currently involved.with up to the 6
present day, and (Inaudible) Arkansas (Inaudible), and I 7
' guess tha t's abou t i t.
8 4
VOI CE:
Okay.
Jim?
9
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VOICE:
Okay.
Rick, could you briefly describe
- 10 what your responsibilities are at present?
II IA4#
VOI CE:
presently I'm responsible for -- in the 12 generation engineering de partment, for providing mechanical 13 engineering support for existing operating units, and also l4 plants under construction.
And for the matrix organization,
' \\J 15 I assign people out to the proj.?c t management area, where 16 they are involved in various phases of project review work, 17 startup, field engineering, or whatever.
That mainly is 18 fossil at the present time.
19 In the home office here day to day, I'm working on 20l design-rela ted problems or retrofits that may be occurring 21 in any, say nuclear or fossil plant that we have that's 22' existing and 'is operating in the field.
So we'r6 involved 23 in the nuclear very heavily, as well as the fossil end-of.
-24 the business.
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VOICE:
Okay, Rack.
I'd like to go back in time i
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- to the ~ period around. September 1974.
Wh'at were your
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. responsibilities at tha t time?
3 d444 VOICE:
September '74.
It. was earlier in the year
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4 of '74 when I was promoted to - I believe it was assistant 5
production pro' ject supervisor, mechanical.
I believe-that 6
was the L title at that time.
And the basic responsibilities 7
were responsible' for the mechanical support for ANO-l and 2, 8
the two nuclear units.
And.that was probably in early '74
~
V when I-~ was assigned those duties.
So during this time 10 f rame, I'was the assistant production project su pervi sor,
11
-mechanical.
12 My counterpart would be the assistant product 13
. project supervisor, electrical.
And we were charged with 14 responsibility f or providing total support, pro ject su pport
-(~h xJ 15 for.the plants under construction.
(h VOICE:
Okay.
Who did you report to in tha t 16 17 posi tion?
18 ai44#
VOIr :-
I reported directly to Bill Cavanaugh at-e 19; that time.- He was the manager of nuclear services, I 20-b'elieve, at that time.
21'
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VOICE:
We're aware of an event that occurred back-22.
.in September of:1974 that involved a failure of the power 23-'
operated relief valve on the pressurizer, and we further
.24 understand-from. talking to Mr. Cavanaugh'that you're 7%
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f amilier with that evont, certain aspects of it.
Let me O
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.NRCmte' l-asklyou to describe how you first became aware of that 2
event, and what were your perceptions 1,f what went on during
.3 the event?
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'4' 4 #M VOICE: ' Wha t I recall, basically by going back and l5 trying to dredge fout some things f rom the project files or 6
design change package file, there was a design change that 7
was made backothen to the power operated relief valve, and 8-it was related to the - event on the pilot actuator.
And our 9
involvement back then was related to -- there was a back 10 pressure problem on the bellows and our involvement was to il l solve that particular problem.
And the net result was to 12 vent that pilot, that back set of bellows, to the
~ 13 containment a tmosphere.
And that was pretty much our 14
. involvements that was, to review that particular retrofit.
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5 J' 15 I think, if I recall, by looking at the 16-documentation on that, it was initially initiatad as an 17 interim field design change, which the follow-up, then, 18
'because it was a 0, a safety-related fix, that we became
-19 involved in Ea final review and resolution on it. -So it was 20' more of a follow-up and review of the fix that'was being 12 1
' proposed and was eve'ntually ' implemented.
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12 2 So that's -- primarily, ours was just a follow-up 23, review of Dwha t took place.and certif ying that, yes, that is 35
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a proper fix to d' o, before it was done.
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. VO ICE: - What.were-some of _ the - was there any
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, equi pment ' damage : sustained.during tha t event?
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[#4 VOICE:
You know, the whole I was just trying
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if to' recall?back -- I-don't' know if you want to talk about
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-this'-. wha't were the eventsLthat led up to this and what 5
exactly were the circumstances. that took pl$ce.
I know that 6
they had a ~ problem wi th the. bellows and the. operation of the 7
electromatic.
But I ' don't recall any equipment damage or 6
any thing, becaUse the thing, you know, was all V
self-contained, and if it was. venting it would be venting to
- l CF a quench tank or it would be venting to, you know, the.
.11
' primary system itself.
12 I mean, I don't recall any damage or anything.
(f VOICE:
Were 'there any problems with the snubbers 13 14-on the associated piping?
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~15 d arts VOICE:
That was another problem that was
-16 associated with the pressurizer back in those early days.
I 17 don't recall these two particular problems being associated 18
'with each other.
But we had some problems.
And this was --
19 within the startup testing, part of the test program was to 20 look at~ the relief lines that come of f.
You have the two 21_
code relief s and you have - the -electromatic. relief t ha t 22 headeritogether as a single line, and then goes over to the
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- 23 Lquench tank.
.24 And that line wasupart of our ciynamic testing?that 7%
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result: of :that testing and monitoring, we found tha t there t.
- 2 was some greater displacements than there should have been.
~3 And as~a. net result, there were some damaged rods and some 3
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'4 su pports. or some thing.
I don't recall all the different v
5 particulars.
6 VOICES.LFrom-(Inaudible) forces?-
'7
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' VOICE:
Yeah, f rom -the - you know, you have -
8 tra t pipe snakes down the side of1the pre ssurizer, because 9
lthere's a very severe thermal expansion that it goes
-10 through, you know, during when'you ~ have a full relief of a
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And as a result, they had some 12-problems on that.
And the net result was to go back in and
~13 reanalyze it, re su ppor t i t.
14' And if -I recall, some -additional snubbers and so t-}
iS forth.were added, 'trying to take out-the acceleration forces 16; that~you had.
So tha t there was -- yeah, there was some on 17
.that main relief line that _ goes :f rom the top of the 18 -
pre ssurizer -down to the quench tank, there -was some 191 resupporting that was done back then.
20 And I guess'-- as I recall, it was in that
!21 pre-commercial-time frame, somewhere in the '74 time frame, 22 if I recall.
23'
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VOI CE s:.To.your-knowledge. how is the~ capacity.
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determined ~on their'elief valve and the safety valves?
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- VO ICE: - How is the capaci tyide termined?
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Pounds per hour discharged.
Is that NRCmte t
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. steam-type of flow ra tes?
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VOICE ' Well, all the relief valves -- and this is
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4 one of' the-things that we're going through today as f ar as
- S TMI-related, Jand this is the f act -- and that's the reason 6-t ha t EPRI's initia ting an. industry eff ort now, to try to
'7 :
- look at 'these valves relative to two-phase and water-solid 8
conditions.
9-To my knowledge, it's like any other valves in the 10 industry.
I mean, we wouldn't be in this if we had valves
.11 that were certified to pa ss two-phase or water-solid 12 condi tion s.
They were qualified as steam relief valves, and 13 tha t's the reason that the industry right now, in a joint
- 14 effort with. EPRI, is going through this overal1~ test program
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.IS for all these valves.
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VOICE:
To your knowledge, have the relief or 16 17-safety valves at ANO-1 ever passed two-phase or liquid, 18 water?
19
/U AA4 VOI' E:
To my knowledg aey never have.
You'd C
20 have to go into' a water solid condition, and to my knowledge 21-
- we've never been in that circumstance, except unless you go 22
. through' a hydro or something like that, and tha t's very
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. VOICE:
So that this snubber problem that was 1(_)
- L25 experienced probably was ~ a result of the reaction forces-s i -
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Yes.- That was, you wouldn' t - tha t
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particular' thing, you know, i t's a tough piping design i
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4 problem, when you have that much -- that much force and that
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much thermal expansion, and that's the reason the piping 6
snakesaround.
And to me, that was,just a' result -- and 7
that's the reason that you do startup testing, is that you 8
substantiate that f rom the standpoint of -- that's the 9-reason we monitor the steam line.
10 You want to see tha t piping undergo the dynamic 11
-event that it's designed for.
That's the reason we had the 12 accelerometers, pressure transmitters and everything, to
- 13 measure the line and look and see how it responded and if 14 it didn't respond properly, -i t has to be fixed, and that's IS-what we developed in startup testing.
(h)
. VOICE:
How.did you first become aware of this lo 17 power operated relief valve, or the PORV, problem?
Did 18 somebody call you up or did you get some piece of 19 correspondence someplace? -
- 20 Ant.
VOICE:
It being five years;ago or Im ger, I can't 21 remember'anybody. called.- The thing that does exist that I 22 was able to -find before this session was-that there was an 23 interim design' change request by the p. ant, and that request r
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then, as all O ' documents then back-then -- that we get
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for this.fix.- And that would probably be the initial. thing
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()b VO I C'E What's an interim design change request?
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^a 1ater1= de toa chea9e reavest is waere 4
5 the plant staf f can make a retrafit in the field.
Usually 6
it's -initiated for something that is needed in a very rapid 7~
fashion.
I t's some thing tha t they need to'make a change in 8
the -f ield, ' and i f i t is rela ted to -- if I recall the 9
procedures back then, as even they are today, that required 10 some review by the general of fice since it was a 0-related
.I l effect.
And therefore, there is a design change package 12 which illustrates that review that was done back then.
13
()
VOICE:
Is there a diff erence in the review that 14
~ you have for. an interim design change request and the formal 15 full-blown' design change?
16-
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VOICE:
Same documentation, same pa perwork.
T' e only diff erence there
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17 You're using the same documen ts.
h 18 i s, instead of being'jnitiated on a normal front page, page 19_
l of the procedure, tt ey use the interim form.
The 20 following. two pages remain exactly the same as we'd use on 21 any design.page, and theref ore the depth and the overall 22 documentation and 'everything's the same between whether it's
- 23
-- what do you-call' it' -- the interim design change or. the 24-
-- you know.
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you. send : it down, and l t's.the. pa th that would - take some y
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If1they need something 'in roughly short order,- they
'3-would take this mode, usually.
jQ I4 VOICE:
Okay.
Do you remember who you talked to 5
at the plant about' this event?
[ary!
VOICE:
The people back in charge at that time --
o
- 7-it probably;would have been Harvey Miller, probably, would
- 6 be the individual we would be working with.
Harvey was in 9
charge of' the technical related activities back, then.
so he 10
- would probably-be the individual that would have been most 11
. heavily involved f rom the _ plant staff's end of it.
([)
-VOICE:
Did you discuss with anybody how the plant 12 13 had responded to that pressurizer level pressure, anything 14 of that sort?
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L Al VOICE:
Related to the bellows failure?
No.
L 15 (h)
VOICE:
That was ( Inaudible') or just (Inaudible)?
16 17 L,qfur-.
. VOICE: JAgain, I was trying to recall just exactly 18 what the failure mode was,-what exactly.
I know'there was a
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'19 diff erentia1' pressure problem.
The. existing connection on 20, the vent of f of the PORV actuator was tied into the 21 discharge piping, and there was a back pressure problem 22-there.-
'23:
But I haven't -- I'mean, I'll have to dredge, out 12 4 some more files to findL out what -the exact event was or r 3.-
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-events! that'may have taken place.
I-don't.ecall those.
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I VOICE:
All-right.
Was the plant repaired before 2;
it was. brought back up to power?
'3 b" -
VOICE:
Was the plant repaired before it was e
(_m) 4 brought back up to power?
5
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VOICE:
Was the problem corrected?
6 A. Ant VOICE:
I would -- I have no personal knowledge of 7
t ha t, but I would think so.
I wouldn't think you'd be 8
starting thenplant up with the thing down.
But as with that 9
valve, that valve is not a valve that's required for -- you 10 know, at tha t timas and it's still not today -- required for 11 opera tion of the pl an t, to my knowledge.
12
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VOICE:
I t's a non-nuclear saf e ty --
13
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VOICE:
It's a non-nuclear. saf e ty connec tion.
And 14 you have the two code r lief valves and those are the valves m
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15
.per code that you're required to have operable.
They're 16 (Inaudible), and those are your overpressure protection.
17 The power operated relief valve gives you more operational 18 flexibility.
19' So I'm not -- really, to my. knowledge, I don't
~20
.know-whether it was or not.-
I think that possibly some
-21
- plant l records could reveal that.
But to my knowledge I 22 don't.know.
23L J))
VOICE:
As'I understand'it, your view poin t on this e
24 valve Lis' that even. today it's a non-nuclear saf ety type of lK 25 piece. of.: equi pmen t, although it figured very prominently in
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the accident at Three Mile Island?
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VOICE:
I view the power operated relief valve as 3
not a valve that is needed for protection of the primary 4
system.
The power operated relief valve, due to the f act 5
due to recent TMI-rela ted adjustments, the valve has been o
se t up at a higher set point closer to the code relief, such 7
that it's only a f ew PSI away f rom the code relief s.
Its 6
overall flexibility tha t it gives you as originally designed Y
is not there anymore.
Bu t the desire to eliminate it is 10 such that people are concerned about overpressure pro tec tion 11 these days and they just don't want to -- they want to --
12 for you to keep that valve operable.
13 h)
VOICE:
Okay.
That's all the questions I have.
14 Fred, if you have any further questions?
15 Mex<
VOI CE:
I have no -- excuse me.
I have no lo specific questions.
Rick, if you have any comments you'd 17 care to make, we'd appreciate --
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[ fg a4 VOICE:
I don't really have any particular 19 comments to make.
20 VOICE:
Okay.
It's now 12: 40, and with that, we 21 will thank you very much for your time --
22 VOICE:
Okay.
23 VOICE:
-- and terminate the interview.
24 (End of recording. )
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