ML19308C536
| ML19308C536 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Crane  |
| Issue date: | 11/28/1979 |
| From: | Fulsom F, Mcadoo J NRC - NRC THREE MILE ISLAND TASK FORCE, WESTINGHOUSE ELECTRIC COMPANY, DIV OF CBS CORP. |
| To: | |
| References | |
| TASK-TF, TASK-TMR NUDOCS 8001280545 | |
| Download: ML19308C536 (19) | |
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NUCLE AR REGUL ATORY COMMISSION O
i IN THE MATTER OF:
TIIREE MILE ISLAND SPECIAL INQUIRY DEPOSITIONS DEPOSITION OF JOIIN DARE MC ADOO, JR.
Place -
Bethesda, Maryland Date -
Wednesday, November 28, 1979 Pages 1 - 18 l
l Telephone:
(202)347 3700 ACE - FEDERAL REPORTERS,INC.
OfficialReporters l
,444 North Ccpitol Street Washington, D.C. 20001 l
0012gogyg NATIONWIDE COVERAGE DAll
f 1
CR 8397 1
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION cmm 3
X b,s 4
In the Matter of:
TilREE MILE ISLAND 6
SPECIAL INQUIRY DEPOSITIONS 7
_________________x 8
DEPOSITION OF JOllN DARE MC ADOO, JR.
9 10 Room 405 Arlington Road Building 6935 Arlington Road Bethesda, Maryland 12
(~x Wednesday, tbvadxr 28, 1979 k-11:05 a.m.
14 BEFORE:
15 For the Nuclear Regulatory Commission:
16 i
FRED FULSOM, ESO., TMi/NRC Special Inquiry Group FRED llEBDON 37 18 19 20 21
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22 L
23 rw 24 t
t Acekjal fleporters, Inc.
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2 0397 01 01 kap /MM I
PROCEEDINGS 2
Whereupon,
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3 JOHN DARE MC AD00, JR.
4 was called as a witness and, having been first duly sworn, O
5 was examined and testified as follows:
6 EXAMINATION 7
BY MR. HEBDON:
8 0
Would you please state your full name for the 9
record?
10 A
My name is John Dare McAdoo, Jr.
11 O
For the record, this is a copy of a letter dated 12 November 15, 1979, to Mr. McAdoo from Mr. Rogovin of the 13 NRC TMI Special Inquiry Group.
Have you had an opportunity 14 to read that letter (handing document to witness)?
({}
15 A
Ye s, I have.
16 0
Do you understand the information set forth in 17 this letter, including the general nature of the NRC TMI 18 Special Inquiry, your right to have an attorney present here 19 today as your representative, and the fact that the 20 information you provide here may eventually become public?
21 A
Yes.
22 0
Are you represented by counsel?
23 A
Yes, I am.
24 MR. HEBDON:
Would you state your name, please.
(])
25 for the record?
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M397 01 02 3
kap /MM i
MR. DAUGHERTY:
John M. Daugherty.
I am counsel
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2 for Westinghouse Electric Corporation and I am accompanying 3
Mr. McAdoo to the deposition this morning.
4 BY MR. HEBDON:
O 5
0 Okay.
You should be aware that the testimony you 6
give has the same force and effect as if you were testifying 7
in a court of law.
My questions and your responses are 8
being taken down and they will later be transcribed.
You 9
will be given the opportunity to look at that transcript to to make changes that you deem necessary.
However, to the 11 extent that your subsequent changes are significant, those 12 changes may be viewed as affecting the credibility, so 13 please be as complete and accurate as you can in responding 14 to my questions.
(])
15 If you at any point during the deposition do not 16 understand a question, please f eel free to stop and we'll 17 try to clarify the question for you.
18 Do you have any questions before we proceed?
19 A
No.
20 0
Okay.
Would you describe your educational 21 background?
22 A
I recieved a Bachelor of Science and Chemical 23 Engineering from the Carnegie Institute of Technology in 24 Pittsburgh, 1951, and subsequently had several post graduate
(])
25 courses in chemical engineering and nuclear engineering at O
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4 8397 01 03 kap /l/M i
both Carnegie Institute of Technology and New York
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2 University.
3 O
Do you have an advanced degree in those areas?
4 A
No, I do not.
O S
O Would you describe your employment background?
6 A
I have been employed with Nestinghouse in the 7
nuclear field since 1956.
During those years, I have held 8
various positions in engineering and management, including 9
fluid systems engineering, safety and licensing, strategic 10 planning -- currently as assistant manager of nuclear safety 11 department in the nuclear technology division.
12 Prior to my employment with Westinghouse I was with the 13 Vitro Corporation in New Jersey where I did research and 14 development in the chemical engineering field, including
([)
15 some work in nuclear fuels.
16 0
Okay.
What was your position in early 197l?
17 A
In early 1971, I was manager of the safety and 18 licensing group with the PWR systems division.
19 0
Okay. And what was your position in August of 20 1974?
21 A
At that time I was manager of fluid systems 22 engineering in the same division.
23 0
Okay.
I'd like to ask you some questions about an 24 incident that occurred at the NOK nuclear power plant in
(])
25 Switzerland in August of 1974.
I am initially interested in l
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5 0397 01 04 kap /MM i
trying to get at the knowledge or understanding that you had
)
of that incident prior to the accident that occurred at 2
3 TMI.
Specifically, prior to March 28, 1979, what knowledge 4
did you have concerning an incident that occurred at the NOK O
5 nuclear power plant in Beznau, Switzerland, on August 20, 6
1974?
7 A
At the time of the incident or shortly thereafter, 8
I was aware of the shutdown of the NOK plant and the general 9
nature of the malfunction which occurred, and subsequent to 10 that I was in receipt of a technical report prepared by a 11 team of investigators from our Brussels office, who visited 12 the NOK site.
i 13 0
Was it a normal function of your job to recieve
!?
that report?
(])
15 A
I believe I received the report as an information 16 copy, sent to me by Mr. Cordalic, who had a position similar 17 to mine in Brussels organization.
There was no particular 18 action expected as a result of transmittal of that report to 19 me.
20 0
Do you know if it was sent to anyone else in the 21 Westinghouse domestic nuclear area?
22 A
I have seen the distribution list on the report, 23 and it included several names of managers in the domestic 24 operation.
(])
25 0
Okay.
What was done with the report?
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6 397 01 05 kap /MM i
A With the report copy which I received?
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2 0
Ye s.
3 A
I reviewed it, and, to the best of my
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rccc11ection, circulated it for information in my department 4
l 5
at that time.
6 0
What was your assessment of the incident?
What 7
significance did you attribute to it?
8 A
I was particularly interested in the fluid systems 9
design implications of the response of the safeguard 10 systems, and that was the thrust of my review at the time.
11 My conclusion based on that review was that the systems had 12 responded as they were designed to respond.
The group in 13 Brussels had done some analysis to verify that the hydraulic 14 performance of the saf ety injection system was within the
()
15 design specifications, and I noted that.
16 We also were concerned about the evidence of pipe 17 displacement, in particular as to whether the possibility of 18 condensate residing in che line between the pressurizer and 19 the relief valve could have contributed to that pipe 20 displacement.
21 I, believe the conclusions in the report were negative in 22 that regard, and that was also of interest to us.
23 0
In the course of reviewing the report, did you 24 notice that the pressurizer level had increased during the
()
25 event?
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8397 01 06 7
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kap /MM i
A It's difficult to recall how important that was to 2
me at that time.
I have since reviewed the report, and of 3
course I have taken note of that fact in my subsequent 4
re-review, in view of the Three Mile Island situation.
O 5
0 Was it your understanding that the pressurizer 6
level increased because of void formation in the reactor 7
coolant system?
8 A
Yes.
9 0
Would you have found that surprising or unusual?
10 A
No.
11 0
Would you have expec'.e?! that result during an 12 incident such as that?
4 13 A
Given the size of the -- the size of the discharge 14 path through the power-operated relief valve, I believe that
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15 was an expected result based on studies that we did for an 16 earlier --
17 0
Were you aware of any studies that had been 18 performed that indicated the pressurizer level would 19 increase during an event such as that?
20 A
Yes.
21 0
So you were at that time aware of those studies?
22 A
Yes.
23 0
So it was your understanding '-hat the performance 24 of the plant was consistent with the analyses that had been
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25 performed by Westinghouse?
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8397 01 07 8
kap /MM i
A Yes.
2 MR. DAUGHERTY:
When you say the plant, you mean 3
NOK-l ?
4 MR. HE290N:
Yes.
s 5
BY MR. HEBDON:
6 0
Now, as I understand it, the safety injection 7
system on that particular design of a plant requires both a 8
low pressui and a low pressurizer level to initiatet is 9
that correct?
10 A
At the time of the incident, yes.
11 O
And as a result of the fact that pressurizer IcVel 12 didn't decrease as much as would be -- as much as it might 13 have during the event, the safety injection did not initiate 14 initially during the event; is that correct?
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15 A
It initiated after the relief valve had been 16 isolated.
17 0
Okay.
Was it any concern to you that safety 18 injection had been delayed because of the fact that the 10 pressurizer level stayed up?
20 A
I would not say it was of concern, since it was 21 exhibiting behavior that we had predicted.
22 0
If the operator had not found the stuck-open power 23 operated relief valve as quickly as he had, and had left it 24 open for much longer period of time, what would have
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25 eventually initiated safety injection?
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A That's a little bit outside my area of expertise.
2 But to my understanding, based on reading reports of others,
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3 there would have been no uncovering of the core for at least 4
45 or 50 minutes, which we consider a very long time for O
1 5
manual action.
I'm not sure whether -- I would like to stop 6
there.
7 0
Okay.
Do you know if the report was provided to 8
the NRC or the AEC at that time ?
9 A
Not to my knowledge.
10 0
Do you know if there was any particular reason why 11 it wasn't provided?
12 A
It was not -- you are referring to the 13 Westinghouse internal report?
14 0
Ye s.
())
15 A
It was not required that we provide information to 16 the NRC on matters that did not represent to us unreviewed 17 safety questions and potential safety hazards.
And I 18 presume that's the reason it was not shared with the NRC.
1 19 0
Okay, during your review of this particule-event, 20 did you give any consideration to the possibility that the 21 operators might be confused by the fact that the pressurizer 22 level remained high during a small loss of coolant accident 23 such as this?
24 A
No.
I think the control room indications of that
(])
25 situation were reasonably unambiguous and that was
()
l l
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1 1.0 397 01-09 kap /MW demonstrated by the f act that the operator in the NOK gx 2
incident correctly diagnosed the situation in the time d
3 period of two to four minutes.
4 0
Do you know what caused him to realize that the O'
5 PORV was open?
6 A
No, I don't know direc tly.
There are a number of 7
signals that were available to him, but there is no 8
testimony that I have seen as to what he specifically 9
observed that would cause him to take the action.
10 0
What sort of indication would have indicated that 11 to him?
12 A
Position indicator on the valve, directly linked 13 to the valve stemt indications of temperature downstream of 14 the valvet pressure and temperature in the pressurizer
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15 relief tank.
16 0
Okay.
You mentioned that the report was 17 distributed to a number of other people.
Did you know if 18 anyone else reviewed the report?
19 A
Anyone else under my supervision?
20 0
Well, either under your supervision or within 21 other groups within Westinghouse.
22 A
I presume that there were others who reviewed the 23 report.
But I can't testify to that.
24 0
Within the way that Westinghouse was organized at
(}
25 the time, who would have had the primary responsibility for O
11 0397 01 10 kap /MM i
reviewing a report such as that, and deciding if it had any 2
applicability to domestic Westinghouse designs?
3 A
Well, since the report covered a number of 4
technical areas, I would have to say myself and other O
5 managers in the corresponding functional areas would have 6
had that opportunity, as well as management in the operating 7
plants service group of the nuclear service division, who 8
routinely received reports from operating units and identify 9
potential reliability or safety matters.
10 0
Who would have been reponsible for the issue 11 associated with the response of pressurizer level?
12 A
That would have been a group whose name is 13 functional analysis, and I can't recall who was managing 14 that group at the time.
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15 0
Okay, but that would not have been in your 16 particular area?
17 A
No, it would not.
18 0
Okay.
19 BY MR. FULSOM:
20 0
Do you recall what caused the p0RV to fail?
21 A
The conclusion in that report was that the yoke of 22 the valve had failed.
23 0
That's the cast iron framework?
24 A
Yes, allowing the stem to become misaligned,
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25 presumably interfering with its reclosing.
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12 039? 01 11 kcp/MM I
O Was that design generic to all Westinghouse 3
2 plants?
(d 3
A The valve is similar in design to valves in other 4
Westinghouse plantst however, the material of the yoke was
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5 typical of only a few plants.
6 Q
I see.
Was any action taken with respect to those 7
rew that had the same metal, the same metalurgy in the yoke?
8 A
I understand that some action was taken, yes, to 9
either ver!.fy that no flaw existed or to investigate the 10 possibilif,y of changing to a material that was less 11 suspect.
12 BY MR. HEBDON:
13 O
Based on your understanding of the B&W 14 organization, who is reponsible for reviewing operating lf 15 experience from foreign plants and incorporating them into 16 the dcsign of the --
17 MR. FULSO'd:
Excuse me, you misspoke yourself.
18 You said B&W.
Didn't you mean Westinghouse?
19 MR. liEBDON:
From foreign plants.
20 MR. DAUGHERTY:
You said " based on your 21 understanding of the B&W organization."
I think you meant 22 Westinghouse.
23 BY MR. liEBDON:
24 0
Based on your understanding of the Westinghouse
()
25 organization, how has the operating experience from foreign LJ
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8397 01 42 13 kap /MM i
plants been incorporated in the design of Westinghouse 2
plants?
3 A
Are you referring to the prr.sent organization?
4 0
The organization that existed at that time.
5 MR. DAUGHERTY:
In 1974 ?
6 BY MR. HEBDON:
7 0
In 1974.
8 A
The Brussels office had a charter responsibility 9
for monitoring the performance of plants in the European 10 area, and for doing sys: ems engineering and services in ll support of those plants.
As such, they were in direct 12 contact, as f ar as Westinghouse is concerned, with those 13 plants and their technical performance.
Matters of generic 14 significance, of course, would be fed back to the 15 headquarters in Pittsburgh for consideration.
16 0
Would those matters be fed to groups such as 17 yours, within the organization?
18 A
Yes.
19 0
I would like to go on, and ask you some questions
)
i 20 about a matter that has come up somewhat recently, relating 21 to some letters that were prepared by Mr. Dopchie of Belgium 22 and were forwarded to the AEC for review, approximately i
23
- 1971, 24 There is some indication that these letters were referred 25 to Westinghouse for consideration.
Do you have any O
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3397 01 13 14 kap /MM i
knowledge of these particular matters and the letters
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2 prepared by Mr. Dopchie?
They related to a concern similar 3
to what happened at the NOK plant, about the fact that 4
pressurizer level might increase during a leak from the 5
steam space.
6 A
I was aware at the time of Mr. Dopchie's contact 7
with AEC.
I have not, and did not, and have not since, seen 8
the letters that you refer to.
9 O
Why were you aware of his contact with the AEC?
10 A
I believe that the AEC contacted my department, 11 which was involved at that time as the AEC interf ace of our 12 domestic nuclear division, to ask some questions of a 13 general nature with regard to Mr. Dopchie's concerns.
And I 14 probably put the party in touch with the appropriate
)
15 technical person at Westinghouse to answer those questions.
16 0
What were the questions?
Do you recall?
17 A
No, I don't know the specific questions, other 4:l 18 than that they didn't related to the phenomenon that you 19 described.
20 21 22 23 24
()
25
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15 CR8397 1
Q Prior to this contact, do you know if Westinghouse hd-l 2
was aware of this phenomenon, pressurizer level increasing 3
during a leak from the top of the steam space?
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A Could you tell me again the specific date?
5 Q
It was 1971, April.
6 A
I believe at that time Westinghouse was involved l
7 in development of computer codes which had the capability of I
8 representing that phenomenon, and we were in the process of 9
applying those to the licensing basis of our kind of plants.
10 So yes, I believe we were working in that area at the 11 time.
12 Q
Do you know if any specific analyses of events such 13 as leaks from the top of the pressurizer were conducted as a 14 result of Mr. Dopchie's concerns:
15 A
They were conducted about that time, but I can't i
16 testify as to whether they were conducted as a result of his 17 concerns, or in parallel with his concerns.
18 0
But there was an analysis performed of the leak 19 at the top of the pressurizer?
20 A
Yes.
21 Q
Did that analysis predict pressurizer level would
(,,)
22 increase during such an event?
v 23 A
For certain size-ranges of breaks, yes.
I 24 gx Q
So then Westinghouse was aware then that pressurizer A
ferd Heporters. l c.
25 level would increase during such an event?
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A Yes.
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Q Okay.
Was any consideration given to possibly i
3 revising the requirement for low-pressure and low pressurizer
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level for safety injection, as a result of that analysis?
5 A
At a subsequent time, yes.
6 Q
At what subsequent -- when was that?
7 A
That became a feature of our RESAR design in 1972, 8
and I believe there are licensing documents describing the 9
fact that even though adequate time existed for manual inter-I i
10 vention, that that standard design was changed to involve only '
11 low pressure as the initiating signal for high-pressure --
12 for safety injection without the coincidencc of low level.
13 Q
Was this the result of the fact that pressurizer 14 level could increase during an event such as this?
15 A
It was more directly a result of operating experi-Il ence, which gave us confidence that spurious actuation of 17 safety injection would not be a problem, given the lack of 18 coincident low-level signal.
I9 Q
Was any consideration given to changing older 20 designs to remove the coincident requirement?
21 A
The adequacy of the older designs was reassessed, (cm_)
and it was concluded that there was no need to do that, on the '
22 i
23 same basis that it was found to be acceptable prior to' those 1
24 fx studies.
A nro neporim, ene.
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25 Q
This is in a 1972 time-frame?
17 I
whd-3 1
A Yes.
2 Q
Okay.
3 MR. HEBDON:
Do you have any other questions?
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4 MR. FULSOM:
No, I don't.
5 BY MR. HEBDON:
6 0
Do you know of any precursor events that, in your l
7 opinion, are relevant to the accident at TMI?
8' MR. DAUGHERTY:
Are you going to define " precursor"'
9 the way you want it defined?
10 MR. HEBDON:
Yes.
The definition we have been i
II using is basically any sort of event or really any issue that.,'
i 12 migh.have indicated that an accident such as TMI might l
I3 occur at some point in the future.
Id THE WITNESS:
Well, in retrospect, and based an 15 our review since March 28th, of events involving challenges 16 to the PORV or any other steam space loss-of-coolant accident, 17 the NOK incident was the only one of any relevance.
l 18 MR. DAUGHERTY:
For Westinghouse designs.
l i
19 THE WITNESS:
For Westinghouse designs, and that 20 was the extent of our review.
l i
2I BY MR. HEBDON:
()
22 Q
Okay.
Do you have any additional information that 1
23 you consider to be relevant to our inquiry into the events 24 rg surrounding the accident at TMI?
A(
eral Reporters, Inc.
25 A
No, I believe not.
I I
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1 18 i
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Q Have we failed to elicit any information in areas 2
that you believe to be important?
f 3
A No.
4 O
Do you have anything else to add?
1 5
A No, I don't.
l 6
MR. HEBDON:
Okay, that completes the deposition.
+
7 Thank you very much.,
1 l
8
( Whereupon, at 11:35 AM, the deposition was con-9 cluded.)
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