ML19308C520
| ML19308C520 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Crane  |
| Issue date: | 10/16/1979 |
| From: | Hebdon F, Stone J NRC - NRC THREE MILE ISLAND TASK FORCE, NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE) |
| To: | |
| References | |
| TASK-TF, TASK-TMR NUDOCS 8001280519 | |
| Download: ML19308C520 (31) | |
Text
._
- M
,e,-
jkt I
O N U C L E A R R E G U 8. A T O R Y C O M M I S S ! O N f
l i
l l
l l
lN THE MATTER OF:
THREE MILE ISLAND SPECIAL INQUIRY DEPOSITION i
l DEPOSITION OF:
I JAMES CLINTON STONE t
i 4
s Place -
SETHESDA, MD.
Date -
Tuesday, October 16, 1979 Pages 1 - 30 l
I Teleonone:
(202) 347 37CO ACE -FEDERAL REPORTERS,INC.
wa~
m m c,. -
!ww-Nb3 IDUd L
b' a M North Capitol Street 8 0 oy M80g I
Washington, D.C. 20001
. _ NATIONWIDE COVERAGE. DAILY l
(
f
g l
1 UNITED STATESJOF AMERICA O
2 NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION 3
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -X 4
In the Matter of:
5 THREE MILE ISLAND SPECIAL INQUIRY DEPOSITIONS 6
X 7
8 DEPOSITION OF JAMES CLINTON STONE 9
Room 405 10 6935 Arlington Road Bethesda, Maryland 11 Tuesday, October 16, 1979 12 9:30 a.m.
BEFORE:
34 For the Nuclear Regulatory Commission:
H ON, Special Inquiry Group 15 FRED FOLSOM, ESQ., Special Inquiry Group 16 17 18 19 20 21
()
23 24 2ce-el Reporters, Inc.
25 i
2 1
CONTENTS
~~~~~~~~
O 2
WITNESS:
EXAMINATION 3
James Clinton Stone 3
O 5
6 7
8 9
10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 O
23 24 ca.
I neporters, Inc.
25 l
l
- 756 01 01 3
mgebil4 i
P 12 0 C E E D I N G S 2
(9: 30 a.m.)
O l
3
?!hereupon, 4
JAt4ES CLINf0N STONE O
1 5
was called as a witness and, having first been duly sworn, o
was examined and testifled as follows:
7 EXAMINATION u
13Y Mll. IIEDDTl t
Y 0
Could you please state your full name for the 10 record?
.11 A
James Clinton S tone.
l 12 0
For the record, I have a copy here of a form 13 le tter that has been sent to all the witne sses tha t we have 14 taken ceposi tions f roa.
Thi s particulor one is not a copy O
15 f the letter that's addressed to you, although we will
]
lo provide you later with a copy that says essentially the same j
17 things but is addressed to you specifically.
16 Have you read this document in full?
)
IV A
Yes.
20
'O Do you understand the information set forth in 21 this letter including the general nature of the NRC T14I 22 special inquiry., your right to have an a ttorney present here 23 today as your representative, and the f act that the 24 information you provide here may eventually be^come public?
25 A
Yes, I understand that.
ly's l
-p~-
e o9-
-w
1756 01 02 4
mgcM4 1
0 Are you represented by counsel tocay?
' {}
2 A
No, I am not.
3 0
I would like to note for the record that the
{}
witness is not represented by counsel.
If at any tima 4
5 during the course of this interview, you feel that you would 1
o like to be represented by counsel and have counsel pr e sen t, 7
please advise me, and we will adjourn this proceeding to e
af f ord you the opportunity to make the nece ssary a
V arrangements.
10 Is this procedure agreeable to you?
II A
Yes.
12 0
You should be aware that the testimony you give 13 has the same force and ofrect as if you were testifying in a 14 court of law.
My questions and your responses are being
()
IS taken down, and they will be later transcribed.
You will be lo given the o pportuni ty to look at that transcript and make 17 changes that you deem necessary.
i 18 However, to the extent tha t your subsequent changes are
't l
IV significant, these changes may be viewed as affecting your 20 credibility, so please be as complete and accurate as you 21 can in responding to.ay question now.
22 If you at any point during the deposition do not 23 understand the question, please f eel f ree to stop and 24 indicate that fact, and we will try to clarify the question
()
25 for you.
O
(
- 756 01 03 S
mge t.iM i
Do you have any questions before we proceed?
2 A
No.
3 0
Wha t is your current position?
4 A
Currently, I am a Reactor Inspection Specialist.
l b
o Okay.
Could you briefly describe what that o
particu,lar posi tion invol ve s.
7 A
The organization I'm in is responsible for d
preparing the reactor operations inspection program and in 9
k ee ping tha t program up to date.
That's our main function.
10 In addition, I'm in the Field Coordination Group.
We 11 interf ace quite a lot with the Regional Offices, handle any 12 questions tha t the Regions have concerning technical 13 specifications, other licensee commitments that they may 14 have, and disposition of a lot of the se matters.
I()
15 0
What was your position in March of 1979?
Io A
Essentially the same.
17 0
For whom did you work?
i 10 A
At that time, my immediate supervisor was Sam lY Bryan.
i 20
'O What was his posi tion?
21 A
He's the Assistant Director for Field Coordination 22 in the Division of Reactor Operations Inw 'ction.
l 23 0
Okay.
Would you describe your educational 24 backgrouna?
f'T 25 A
I have a Bachelor of Science degree from Kansas i
V
()
'756 01 04 6
mgcMl4 i
Sta te University in nuclear engineering.
I obtained that in
(~g 2
IV61.
From graduation. I went to work for the Navy a t Mare V
3 Island 14aval Shipyard a s a te st engineer.
I worked in the 4
4 Navy nuclear program for some seven and a half years, most S
or the time in the test program.
o In 'o9, I left the Navy and went to work f or the A tomic 7
Energy Conmission in the Albuquerque operations Office as a i
u criticality anu reactor saf ety engineer.
I worked ou t there v
for a little over five years.
In that capacity, we did to really an auait f unction of AEC contractors in their reactor i
11 operations, in their operations with fissile ma terial.
We 12 also were involved with the certification of packages for 13 shipping of radioac tive and fissile material for the AEC at 14 the time.
(])
16 In '74, I 1cf t Albuquerque and came to AEC Head;iuarters l
16 and worked for the Division of Reactor Saf ety Research.
I 17 was employed there as a systems engineer primarily, worked o
16 on LOF1 and PBF f or the most part.
j 19 In '78 20 MR. FOLSOM:
Would you explain what that is?
You 21 worked on LOFT?
22 THE HITNESS:
Oh, LOFT.
LOFT is the loss of fluid 23 test which is the major f acility that-research has in I da ho.
24 MR. FOLSOM:
All right.
And the second item?
(])
29 THE WITNESS:
PBF, that's a power burst facility,
(:)
_ ~ - -
r-17bo 01 Ob 7
mycl4M i
is also another experimental machine that's at Ida ho 2
11ational Engineering Labora toryt.
3 Mit. FOLSOM:
Thank you.
4 TEIE WI'ItiESS:
In '78, I let t flesearch and went to b
worx for Inspection & Enforcement as an Inspection o
Specialist, in essentially the po si tion I'u in now.
7 BY i4ff. HEBDON:
o 0
Okay.
For the record, I have hare a memo from 9
Mr. Mosciey of I&E to Mr. Thompson of IKE, dated March 28, 10 197V, and the subject is " Notification of Licensing Boards."
11 This particular memo includes an evaluation of six items 12 concerning B&W designed nuclear power plants, and I would 13 like you to take a look a t a copy of this document now.
14 Are you f amiliar with that documen t?
lb A
Ye s, I am.
16 0
Did you pre pare i t?
17 A
Yes.
Well, I a sse.abled i t.
Le t's pu t it that Ic way.
I did write the cover letter.
IV O
bid you perform the technical evaluations that are 20 contained in that memo?
21 A
No.
22 0
Who ctid?
23 A
This was -- the evaluations were prepared in all 24 1: ems but one by, I believe, Don Kirk patrick.
I take that 2b back.
Don prepared four of the six.
Vince Thomas
)
O
77bo 01 06 8
mycMi4 I
prepared one of the six, and I wrote one of them.
(}
2 0
Which one.did you wri te?
3 A
I wrote the one, the last one, the one that talks (V"T 4
a bou t t he transient at Rancho Seco.
b 0
Were you involved in collecting the inf orma tion o
for the response to Question Number 3?
7 A
Question Number 37 o
0 Or Item Number 3.
Y A
In collec ting the basic information that went in.
10 No, I wasn't.
11 0
Okay.
How did you come to be involved with the 12 preparation of this material?
13 A
Well, we get things f rom -- requests f rom the 14 Regional Of fices to proviae them various information, or to
()
lb request thin'js like tech spec revisions and these thi ng s.
16 And they are assigned then by the supervisor through what we 17 call our Action Item Tracking Sys tem.
Io Why I was a ssigned this, I don't know.
I was just 19 assignea it by the supervisor.
20 0
When were you assigned it?
21 A
Well, I can't give you on exact date.
It was in 22 the latter part of Feoruary, though.
23 0
What wero you told to do?
24 A
Told to rev ew those and prepare the' re sponse to t
()
25 this request from Region III.
O e
u-
f/b6 01 0 '/
9 mgc.YM i
0 Okay.
Were you given any indication of wne ther 2
anyone else considered these concerns to be significant?
O 3
A This particular thing had been originally assigned-4 to the l'echnical Programs people, whi ch is ano ther branch in O
b our uivision, and they, then, had sent it down to my 6
supervisor for the action.
7 As f ar as your question -- what was the question again?
b Would you re peat the question for me please?
Y 0
What were you told t.o do?
'3ere you given any sort 10 of an indication in advance as to who ther or not this was 11 f c1 c to be a problem, or was it a matter of find ou t, figure 12 out a response to this - we don' t think it's any big deal?
13 Were you given any sort of a perspec tive on how this 14 particular ua tter was viewed by the management?
IS Bf MR. FOLSO.'4 :
Io 0
Excuse me, let's break tha t up into a couple of 17 questions, if you will, because you've got a number in I
lo there.
IV First, did you ge t any instructions at the outset?
20 A'
As I recall now, and I don't have any notes on 21 this, t ha t I was given it as an action item and told to 22 review it in view of preparing a response to these things 23 and to see if indeed those were significant ite.as that we i
24 should be no tif ying the Boards about, the si tting Licensing 25 Boards.
(
l
' O i
L
'T7b6 01 06 10 mgcMM I
O All right.
rias the assignment submitted to you 2
with any indication from your superior as to how he viewed 3
the validity of the concerns?
i (Pause.)
O 5
A I'm not sure.
I really don't remember on that 6
par ticular point whether there were _any coma.ents made at the 7
time of the a ssignmen t, a
dow later on there was.
There was some indication tha t v
the people diun't f eel tha t these were new i tems or that 10 they gave us any significantly new information on the ll items.
Now this wasn' t a t the time of the initial 12 assignment though.
13 BY MR. HEBuoN:
14 0
Ws tha t indication given to you af ter you 15 preparco your report or before?
16 A
It was before.
17 0
Okay.
Did you have any perception in your own 16 mind about whether or not these concerns were new or whether IV they presented any new information?
20 A
In my own mind at the time --
21 (Pause.)
22 tiell af ter looking into them, and again I had to depend 23 upon the Technical Programs people for some of this 24 information because they had been primarily involved with 2S some of these things for quite a number of years even.
So O
7756 01 09 11 mgcMM i
initially -- you know I can't say that I have any feelings 2
one way or the other about them.
3 0
Was it a normal f unction of your job to review a 4
matter such as this?
S A
Yes.
o 0
'lhen you obtained the support of the Technical 7
Programs people to tha extent that you needed it.
I s t ha t 6
correct?
Y A
Yes.
Yes.
10 0
Wi th re spect to Item flumber 3, could you describe il what actions were followed in preparing that response?
12 A
Well, as f or as my ac tion were, I sat down with 13 the Technical Programs people and kind of divided this 14 package up.
()
15 0
All right.
10 A
And this -- well, I think i t was -- well, at least 17 I tem 3 -- it was Items I, 2, 3, and 5 were assigned the same 16 indivicual up in Technical Programs.
lY O
Who was that?
20 A
That was Don kirkpatrick.
21 0
Okay.
And he pre pared the material in response to 22 those three i tems?
23 A
Tha t's right.
And then gave -- well, I think his-24 supervisor reviewed those and gave them to me, and I had
(])
25 them typed and put in final form.
O L
87b6 01 10 12 myc14M i
0 Who was his supervisor?
2 A
Ed Jordan.
O 3
0 Did you review the material that he pre pa red.
Did 4
you discuss i t wi th him a t all?
(
5 A
I read through i t and looked for more or less o
editoria.1 type. comments rather than any technical comments 7
on the inf orma tion.
8 O
Did you notice 'any technical issues that raised V
any concerns in your mind with respec t to that item?
10 A
11 0, I didn't, and I'll tell you why.
In the il package that we received from llegion III, there was 12 included in that an analysis of this event, of the Davis 13 Be sse event, and the question --
l4 BY Mll. FOLSO.4 :
- {}
15 0
Which Davis Besse event?
10 A
Okay.
Which one was it?
I'll have to go back and 17 look.
I don't remember whether it was a September event or 18 the November event.
And I don' t know -- well maybe I 19 shouldn't say it was an analysis of the event.
It was an 20 analysis of loss of offsite power and an analysis of 21 complete loss of f eodwater and what the pressurizer level 22 response would be under those conditions, so i t really 1
23 wasn't -- tha t may have been the wrong thing to say, that it i
24 was an analysis of tha t e ven t.
25 It was an analysis of what the pre ssurizer level response
)
I O
i
+-
7/S6 01 11 13 mge t.ild I
would be under loss of offsite power and loss of f eedwater.
2 IW MR. IlEBDON :
3 0
Wha t wa s the conclusion of that analysis?
4 A
lhat conclusion was that the loss of f eedwater was Ov S
the worst -- the more serious of the two events, that they o
could indeed -- the pressurizer could -- could pu t 7
something, if I remember the numbers right, like 400 cubic 6
f eet of gas vapo:
.tn the pric ary system.
They said, as y
long as we keep the reu tor coolant pumps running tha t the 10 voids. will be di spersed.
I'!e won't get any collec tions in ll the high points, and before we get into any serious 12 problems, our high pressure in jec tion cones on and 13 repre ssurizes the plan t, and we don't have any problems.
14 That's essentially their conclusion.
There was no safety
()
15 problem in this particular event.
lo O
Did you review that analysis in any detail?
17 A
I read through i t so that I f elt I had somewhat of 16 an understancing of wha t, at least, they were talking IV about.
I didn't go through any of the calculati6ns.
20 0
Did you rind any problems with the com;nents and 21 the conclusions tha t were reached by the report?
22 A
Well, I guess I didn't have any particular 23 proolems wi th it.
24 0
Did you consider void formation in the reactor
()
25 coolant system to be an unreviewed saf ety iten?
t CE)
{
i l
L
h/b601 12 14 myct/.M i
.A Well, at the tima, I didn't.
I'm not sure 2
tha t -- well, at the time I really didn't.
O
)
3 0
W hy ' wa s t ha t?
Did you focus on that issue, or was 4
it a matter that just didn't come to mind?
b A
Well, no, because they took this analysis f ar o
enough and said -- and with the automatic initia tions which 7
they are allowed to take credit for in a lot of these e
situations, wnile the voids f orm there, and i t sounds like a 9
large number, if they are indeed dispersed, their 10 repressuriza tion time was f airly soon and would have il collapsed those voids.
12 And you have to look at their assumptions, t oo, that they 13 were -- tha t they made in that analysis.
And one of them 14 was that I guess they didn' t have any of their normal makeup
()
15 systems on the line, so they were very conservative in their lo calculations.
~
17 0
Okay.
Did you make any determination as to IU Whether or not loss of pressurizer level indication was an 19 unreviewed saf ety issue?
20 A
I didn't.
21 0
Do you know if anyone. did?
22 A
I don't know.
23 0
Okay.
Did you discuss this analysis when you 24 receivea it bacK f rom t.f r. Kirk pa tri ck ?
(}
25 A
I don't believe.I did.
4
~
o lj756 01_13 IS
{ raycMM i
0 You don't recall discussing it wi th him?
l.
2 A
I don't.
3 0
Okay.
Did you review the analysis that he i
4 prepared?
i g
! U i
b A
only as I indicated before that I read through o
it.
I didn't really do any of the calculations or that kind 7
of a review of it.
6 0
Did you have any problems with any of the f
9 conclusions tha t were reached in that analysis?
i 10 A
Well, I gue ss -- no, I don't think I did.
ll
?
12 I
C' 13 14 I#
f
!D l
17 I
Id I.
i ly 1
j 20 21 22 23 24 2*
i i.
i @
i
17b6 02 01 16 mgcv.M I
O So then would it be fair to say tha t you were
[}
f airly in agrecuent with the conclusions that were recched, 2
3 to the extent that you reviewed the material?
4 A
Yes.
5 0
- Okay, o
MR. HEBOON:
Do you have anything
.se to add?
7 MR. FOLSOM:
No, no t on tha t.
o BY MR. HEBDON:
9 0
Do you know of any precursor events that are 10 relevant to the a ccident a t TMI, in your opinion?
II A
Precursor events?
12 0
Let me define precursor events.
I t's basically 13 any event, or really in a broader way, any issue that might 14 have indicated that an accident such as TMI might have
()
lb occurred at some point in the future?
Io A
Well, in retrospect, when you get to looking at 17 the histories of B&,l plants, there were a number of 10 transients that I think a lot of tho se plants wen t through IV tha t might have been an indication.
20 0
IVere those transients significantly dif f erent than 21 transients on other plants, o ther PWRs?
22 A
I really don't know.
23 Bf MR. FOLSOM:
24 0
Do those transients have a common th' read of things
({}
25 going wrong?
O
[
lb6-02 02 17 mgci4M i
A I have very little inforaation on most of them.
2 I L a ppears tha t the pre ssurizer level problem, though,-is 3
one of the common things tha t did occur.
4 0
In what regard now?
Let's see what the b
pressurizer level problems were.
6 A
Apparently they would get very low levels in the 7
pressur.izer on these types of transients. Rancho Seco had 6
the one.
There are some indications that Three !411e Y
I sland-2 had a - we ll, I guess they had a transien t about a 10 year before the a cciden t.
Arkansa s a pparently had a 11 transient.
I say apparently because I don't have the 12 details on i t.
13 BY I4R. IIEBOON:
14 0
l>o you consider tluse transients and that problem iS with loss of pre scurizer level to be a particularly 16 significant saf ety concern?
17 (Pause.)
lo A
That's a dif ficult question.
I guess in my own IV o pinion, if those ty pe s o f events occurred very f requently, 20 I think it would be significant.
It would be a saf ety 21 problem.
22 0
For wha t reasons.
23 A
Simply because normally your pressurizer is the 24 indication that the system is f ull of wa ter.
2b 0
Okay.
Do you have any additional information that O
c f/bo 02 03 18 agel.tM i
you f eel might be relevant to our inquiry into the even ts 2
surrounding the acciden t at TMI?
3 A
Well, I don' t know.
I'm sure you've got all the 4
inf orma tion I have, because all I have is readily available b
to the public.
I don't have anything other than that.
6 0
Okay.
Have we failed to elicit any information in 7
areas that you believe to be importan t?
6 A
You mean concerning Three Mile Island or the Davis V
Besse or any --
10 0
Well, either, really, particularly with respect to il this memo and the review of these i ssues.
For example, do 12 you consider any of the other issues, particularly some of 13 the ones you were more extensively involved with, to have 14 any particular relevance to Lne accident at Three Mile
(])
in Island?
16 A
I don't think these -- let me refresh my memory a j
2 17 little bit.
I don't think these really have that much 16 relevance to the Three Mile Island accident actually.
IV d
Okay.
20 MR. HEBUON:
Le t's go of f the record for a second.
?
21 (Discussion off the record.)
22 MR. HEBOON:
Let's go back on the record.
]
23 BY MR. HEBUON:
i 24 0
While we have been talking, we completed 25 preparation of this letter to you.
It's basically-the same
(}
i 4
0 v
-r y
7bo 02 04 iV mg c!.li.i i
text as ti,e le tter I.showed you earlier, exce pt this 2
particular one i s addre ssed to you by name.
3 I woulu like to have thi s included in the record at this 4
point, and I'll provide you with a copy of it after we b
f in i s h he re.
o
('1he complete docu:aen t f ollows. )
7 0
y 10 ll 12 13 14 O
iu 16 17 16 IV 20 21 22 23 24 l
O 23 O
h/
E(pa arc o
g UNITED STATES q
g NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION (J r,,
WASW NGTON, D. C. 20555 October 16, 1979 In Reply Refer to:
/'
NTFTM 791016-02 Q
Mr. James C. Stone Reactor Inspection Specialist Fields Coordination, DROI office of Inspection & Enforcement U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, D. C.
20555
Dear Mr. Stone:
I am writing to confirm that your deposition under oath in connection with the accident at Three Mile Island is scheduled for October 16, 1979 at the Arlington Road Of fice, Bethesda, Md.
This will also confirm my request for you to have your resume and any documents in your possession or control regarding TMI-2, the accident or precursor events which you have reason to believe may not be in of ficial NRC files, including any diary or personal working file.
The deposition will be conducted by members of the NRC's Special Inquiry Group on Three Mile Island. This Group is being directed independently of the NRC by the law firm of Rogovin, Stern and Huge.
It includes both NRC personnel who have been detailed to the Special Inquiry Staff, and outside staff and attorneys. Through a delegation of authority from the NRC under Section 161(c) of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended, the Special Inquiry Group has a broad mandate to inquire into the causes of the accident at Three Mile Island, to identify major problem areas and to make recommenda-tions for change. At the conclusion of its investigation, the Group will issue a detailed public report setting forth its findings and recommendations.
Unless you have been served with a subpoena, your participation in the depo-sition is voluntary and there will be no ef fect on you if yoc decline to answer some or all of the questions asked you. However, the Special Inquiry has been given the power to subpoena witnesses to appear and testify under oath, or to appear and produce documents, or both, at any designated place.
Any person deposed may have an attorney present or any other person he wishes accompany him at the deposition as his representative. The Office of the General Counsel of NRC has advised us that it is willing to send an NRC attorney to all depositions of NRC employees who will represent you as an individual rather than represent NRC.
Since the NRC attorney may attend only p
at your affirmative request, you should notify Richard Mallory (634-3224) in V
the Office of the General Counsel as soon as practicable if you wish to have an NRC attorney present.
You should realize that while we will try to respect any requests for con-
/9 fidentiality in connection with the publication of our report, we can make no C/
guarantees. Names of witnesses and the information they provide may even-
a
+-M A
m
-_e4m a
44 4
2 Mr. James C. Stone October 15, 1979 0
tuaIlybecomepublic,inasmuchastheentirerecordoftheSpecialInquiry
-
- Group's investigation will be made available to the NRC for whatever uses it may deem appropriate.
In time, this information may be made available to the public voluntarily, or become available to the public through the Freedom of Information Act.
Moreover, other departments and agencies of government may request access to this information pursuant to the Privacy Act of 1974. The information may also be made available in whole or in part to committees or i
subcommittees of the U.S. Congress.
If you have testified previously with respect to the Three Mile Island acci-dent, it would be useful if you could review any transcripts of your previous statement (s) prior to the deposition.
Thank you for your cooperation.
Sincerely,
/
/6
/
~
Mitchell Rogovin, Director NRC/TMI Special Inquiry Group O
4 4
)
)
O 4
- 7b6 02 05 20 m y c.'.i!.i i
13Y i.tl?. FOLS0!.i t 4
2 0
1.et me follow this just a little more and be the 3
devil's aavocate for a moment.
4 You didn(t review in depth the answer prepared to b
Question 3.
I s tha t correct?
o A
That's right.
7 0
liave you any way of judging whe ther this is a pro 6
forma answer or whether it is valid?
v (Pause.)
10 A
I guess -- I'm not sure I really understand the ll question.
12 0
Well, you prepared the package?
13 A
Yes.
14 0
And you f armed out the pre paration of the answers t
(])
IS to several question, including Question 3.
Mr. K irk pa trick i
16 made the analysis and prepared the portion of this package 17 which deals with Question 3?
Io A
111g h t.
iv 0
When you put it toge ther, did you have any 20 responsiblity for seeing that that was accurate?
21 A
Well, since it was being prepared by the Division 22 for the signature of the Division Director, I assembled the 23 package,-I guess -- normally, at least the way I operate, 24 when I ask a technical person to give me assis'tance on these
(}
29 things and without having the knowledge that he has since he
%)
1750 02 00 21 mgc.'.lM i
has been involvea in really the B&W plants for some -- I
(
2 don't know -- four or five years, I really had no reason to 3
believe that his answer was not technically correct.
/~Y 4
0 So you passed it on to your superior as a package (sv 5
that is complete wi th solid def ensible answers?
6 A
As f ar as I knew without going into -- going back 7
and covering completely the ground of all of those other o
answers.
Y 0
Well, I'm as. king questions f rom the standpoint of 10 an old bureaucrat, because that's wha t my career has been, 11 in many respec ts.
Hou would your boss know this was a 12 corre ct answer?
13 A
I guess the same way --
14 0
Tha t you would know?
()
15 A
Tha t I would know that the people who prepared the 16 response were techni~cally ca pable individuals.
17 0
Do you credit yourself with having an ear for lo correc tne ss.
You obviously have f ar more background than I 19 have.
When you get a response from your technical advisors, 20 can you sense that it's right??
.21 A
Well I will' admit that this particular 22 question -- you know we don't get very many questions like 23 this in the course of -- well in the period of time I've 24 been over in Inspections & Enforcement, i t -- 'I'm not
()
25 sure -- I guess I would like to say yes, but if you're O
1790 02 07 22 myct4M i
asking f or proor, I'm not sure I can give it to you.
\\_)/
r 2
0 As I say,.I'm being the devil's advocate here, 3
Looking back on i t f rom the s tandpoin t of TMI, does this
(]
have anythinj wha tever to do with TMI?
4 G
S A
Mell I puzzled over that question a good number of 6
times, and I really have problems.
I really do.
7 0
Wiet are those problems?
u A
The pre ssurizer -- for instance, the pressurizer v
level problem, I'm not sure was ever really a " problem" at 10 TMI.
T hi s write-up didn't even rai se the question about the li relief valve that lif ted at Davis Besse and stuck open, 12 which to me is a lo t more significant than that pressurizer 13 level pro bl em.
14 You know, this is a rapid cooldown transient -- is the (m}
15 basis f or tha t thing.
TM1 wa sn't a rapid cooldown 16 transient.
They had their auxiliary f eedwater blocked.
17 Davis Besse, in chat particular one there, did to, o r --
lu well they had some f eedwater problems, let's put it that IV way.
It wasn't comple tely blocked.
20 MR. FOLSOM:
For the record, I'd like to no te that 21 you're referring to a graph that was prepared by Mr Leon 22 Enole of the NHC staff and is a grapi of some of the reactor 23 system aata during the September, 1977, incident at Davis 24 Besse.
h 25 THE WITNESS:
Could I go off the record?
I
};
\\
J
/756 02 06 23 myct.!M i
BY MR. FOLSolis 2
O Before we go off the record, please, may I add to 3
t ha t tha t Ouestion 3 relates to the November, lv77, 4
transient entirely.
It has nothing to do with the episode iq S
at Davis Hesse on September 24, '77?
o flow,.you want to go o f f the record?
7 MR. HEHOON:
Let's go off the record.
6 (Discu ssion of f the record.)
Y MR. HEUDON:
Back on the record now.
10 While we have been off the record, we have been 11 discussing some of the details of a review that you prepared 12 prior to preparing this evaluation.
13 BY MR. HEBUON:
14 0
I wonder if you could summarize for us some of the
(~ )
15 things we have been discussing with respect to what sort of x.,
16 things you did with 'this evaluation?
17 A
Okay.
Prior to the preparation of the re sponses 18 to those six items, one thing we did was, through telephone lv contact with the Region III personnel, discussed each one of 20 the se i tems to see if indeed they had additional information 21 t ha t wa sn' t submi tted wi th their transmi tta'l that we were 22 not aware of.
The resul t of that telephone conversation was 23 that they didn't -- they indica ted tha t they did no t have 24 any additional information.
25 In addition, the individual that had prepared the six N
e
//96 02 09 24 mycMM i
items had indicated tha t we hadn't provided him any 2
additional information, and he f el t tha t those items should 3
be transmi tted to the 130a rd s.
(D 4
tiow the Inspec tion & Enforcement procedures require us to LA S
forward these to the Boards a t the insistence of the o
preparer, which we did.
Af ter pre paring thi s re por t, 7
some Line af ter -- as a matter of f act as I recollect it was u
in August -- I found ou t in the middle of February there was y
an investigation conoucted by Region III into the Item 3 10 concern which is the pressurizer level where they spen t, I
11 believe, two days a t Babcock & Wilcox.
12 During our telephone conversations, this was not 13 discussed wi th the people on the telephone wi th Region III.
14 In addi tion, none of the items were pointed out as being 15 more significant than any o thers.
They were all given the 16 same weight.
fio concern was expre ssed for pressurizer level 17 versus the breaker problem versus Rancho Seco's cooldown 18 transient.
IV I guess that's -- well I've been a little concerned that 20 now since Three Mile Island that Item 3 has been focused on 21 so heavily when, indeed, it wasn't ever pointed out t ha t --
22 by anyboay from Region III or Headquarters that this was the 23 most ir:.portan t i tem in here.
24 0
You mentioned that no additional inf'orma tion wa s t{ }
25 provided, particularly wi th respect to the investigation, em N,Y
7756 02 10 25 mgcMM i
but I guess also in a more general sense.
n r' }
2 Who to your mind should have provided tha t additional
\\_1 3
information?
(~a 4
A Well, if the information was available, and Lal b
certainly Region III was aware of the investigation, it o
sinuld have come out of Region III.
They were the ones that 7
had the most ready access to the information.
6 0
Do you feel tha t Region III management should have Y
provided that information, or the individual who prepared 10 the request f or Board notification?
II A
Well, tha t should have come out of the Region III 12 management.
You can't say for sure whether the guy that 13 pre pa red the response was aware of all the inf orma tion.
I'm 14 sure he was aware of the inve s tiga tion, for instance.
l 15 0
If addi tional information had been provided, how to might that have affected the conclusions that you reached?
17 A
That's kind of hard to say, because I nave read IU the investigation reports, and they essentially conclude tY that there wasn't any problem either.
20 0
Would that have changed the conclusions with 21 respect to I tem 3?
22 A
Right now, I can't see tha t i t would.
23 0
Okay.
Is there any additional information that 24 you can think of that might have been provided tha t might
/~N
(
)
25 have changed your conclusion with respect to these items?
v
%J L
7756 02 11 26 mgcMM i
A Well, i t wa s -- no thing I can think of that would gh, 2
have changed the conclusion on particularly 3.
There was Q) 3 some addi tional information that I found a li ttle later t ha t (7
4 indeed in December of
'76, I believe it was, there was a L.)
S conf erence telephone conversa tion be tween the people in o
Licensing, Davis Besse people, and Region III people where 7
they discussed these tran s i en t s. -
8 And, in f act, their conclusion was that there was no V
unresolved safety ques. tion.
10 0
Would it be f air to say that the inf orma tion t ha t 11 you've described that you've subsequently become aware of 12 would have subs tan ti a ted the conclusion reached in the 13 e valuation -- tha t there was not a problen?
14 A
Tha t's abou t the only way I can view it would be 15 that.
16 0
Have you seen any informa tion that might have 17 argued against the conclusion that it's not a problem?
lu (Pause.)
IV A
No, I haven't.
20 0
Okay.
Wi th the benefit of the 20-20 hindsight 21 associated with Three Mile Island and all the evaluation and 22 the thought that's been given to this issue af ter Three Mile 23 Island, do you feel that if you had t he o ppor tuni ty to go 24 back and redo thi s evalua tion, any of your conclusion would
/'
(N) 25 change?
o/
m 1756 02 12 27 mgcMM i
(Pause.)
2 A
That's kind of hard to say.
I'm very tempted to g
3 say yes.
But you know that, then, has to play a lo t on the 4
hindsight part.
q
' ~ ~ '
5 0
Well recognizing that this is entirely based on 6
the idea of a lot of hindsight, what conclusions would have 7
changed?
6 (Pause.)
V A
Well, I think we might have been -- well, I 10 don't -- it's hard for me to say since I didn't do that
.I l analysis.
I'm no t su re.
I really don't think I can answer 12 t ha t que stion.
13 G
With the benefit of that hindsight, w ha t 14 significance do you now a ssign or what relevance do you f eel g
15 there is with respect to the concern raised, particularly in lo Item Number 3 and the accident at TMI?
17 A
Well, I tem 3 still focuses on pressurizer level, 18 and the pressurizer level indication for short duration 19 tran sien t s.
I'm still not totally convinced that that was a 20 major problem or a major contributor to Three Mile Island.
21 I think there are two f acts out of Three Mile Island that 22 gave me a lot more grief, cause for concern and review, than 23 the pressurizer level problem.
24 One was the fact t ha t the relief valve lif ted before the
(
25 plant SCR AM'd f rom high pre ssure and that -- when I found l
l
/^N
_,/
1756 02 13 28 mgcidi l
out about it, I couldn' t qui te frankly hardly believe that.
2 i.ty background in training says you don't do things like 3
t ha t, and then of course the relief valve sticking open and
(]
4 not being able to recognize t ha t f a c t, I think was far more v
5 significent than the pressurizer level indica tion.
o B Y 1.iR. FOLSOM:
7 0
Which way did pre ssurizer 1cvel go at TMI?
6 A
Well, i t ini tia'll y dropped, but then it recovered 9
ra ther quickly.
10 0
}{ow abou t the indication of pressure level?
11 A
The indica tion -- tha t i s the indication.
12 O
Did it go off scale high?
13 A
Well, le t's see.
As I recall, it did go offscale 14 high at one point, maybe even a t two different times in t[{}
~
15 there, and there were a lot of questions about whether or lo not they were go tting f alse level indications.
I personally 17 never f el t they were, and I think most -- or at least I 18 believe the I&E investiga tion indicates that while there was J
19 water in the pressurizer, there were voids in other parts of 20 the plan t, bu t i t wa s a true level in the pressurizer.
21 0
Well, I don' t wan t to get in over my head, but 22 w ha t happened with the pressurizer lovel indication at Davis 23 Be sse on tiovember, '777 24 A
Well, as I reca ll tha t transient now', i t went 25 down.
l
(
7756 02 14 29 mgc Cl 1
0 Nont off scale low?
2 A
Off scale low.
3 0
S b
7 6
Y IO I1 12
/
C/
I3 14 1S lo I7 16 19 20
.21 22 23 24 25 o
I n-,
h7560301 30 mgcMM i
U.R. FOLSOM:
Okay.
2 MR. HEB00il:
Okay.
Do you have any other 3
questions?
4 MR. FOLSOM:
tio.
5 lA R. HEHLON:
Do you have any other questions you o
want to add?
7 okay.
Tha t comple tes the interview.
Thank you very 6
much.
Y (Whereupon at 10:15 p.m.
the interview was concluded.)
10 11 t7 12
/
O 13 14 15 t
to 17 18 IV 20 21 22 23 24 h
25
.!O 1