ML19308C516
| ML19308C516 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Crane  |
| Issue date: | 10/11/1979 |
| From: | Allison D, Mehler B METROPOLITAN EDISON CO., NRC - NRC THREE MILE ISLAND TASK FORCE |
| To: | |
| References | |
| TASK-TF, TASK-TMR NUDOCS 8001280515 | |
| Download: ML19308C516 (60) | |
Text
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i N U C L E A R R E G U L AT O R '( COMMISSION O
1 IN THE MATTER OF:
j TilREE MILE ISLAND SPECIAL INQUIRY DEPOSITIONS i
DEPOSITION OF BRIAN A.
MEIILER iA
!U Place -
Middictown, Pennsylvania i
j Date -
Thursday, October 11, 1979 Pages 1 - 59 1
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(202)347 3700 ACE FEDERALREPORTERS,1NC.
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NATIONWIDE COVERAGE DAILY
1 1
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 2
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION 3
________________x 4
In the Matter of:
5 THREE MILE ISLAND SPECIAL INQUIRY DEPOSITIONS 6
x 7
8 DEPOSITION OF BRIAN A. MEHLER 9
Trailer #203 10 Three Mile Island Middletown, Pennsylvania Thursday, October 11, 19 79 ~
12 3:30 p.m.
)
13 BEFORE:
I4 For the Nuclear Regulatory Commission:
15 DENNIS ALLISON, Special Inquiry Group BARRY HORWICK, Special Inquiry Group 16 RONALD HAYNES, Special Inquiry Group DR. W. JOHNSTON, Special Inquiry Group 17 18 19 20 21 C) 22 23 24 AaFMmI Reporters. lm.
25
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2 1
_C.O _N _T _E _N _T
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2 WITNESS:
EXAMINATION 3
Brian A. Mehler 3
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CR 7626 3
DAR nw l PROCEEDINGS MR. ALLISON:
This is an interview of Brian A.
3 Mehler of the Metropolitan Edison Company conducted by the 4
{)
NRC Special Inquiry Group into the accident at Three Mile 5
Island.
The interview is being conducted at Trailer 203 at 6
Three Mile Island site on October 11, 1979.
7 My name is Dennis Allison.
Also present from the Special 8
Inquiry Group are William Johnston, Ronald Haynes and Barry 9
Horwick.
10 Whereupon, 11 BRIAN A. MEHLER 12 was called as a witness and was examined and testified as 13 follows:
14 BY MR. ALLISON:
15 Q
Mr. Mehler, before we went on the record I showed 16 you a copy of our standard witness notification on a memo 17 dated July 30, from George Frampton.
Have you had a chance to 18 read that?
19 A
Yes.
20 Q
Do you have any questions about it?
21 A
No.
l 22 Q
Regarding your previous interviews,ywe'have read.and CE) l 23 we have transcripts here today cf an interview with the Office 24 of Inspection and Enforcement investigation _on May 17, an inter-25 view with Mr.
O' Conner from the'GPU investigation, the date is cAce-9edeta[ CAepotlets, Snc.
444 NORTH CAPITot. STREET WASHINGTON. D4 SMOS (202) 347 3700
4 nw 2 1
unknown to us, but we have a transcript of the interview and ---
2 pardon me, we have a transcript of your president's commission 3
deposition on July 26, 1979.
4 Have you interviewed at any other times?
5 A
I was interviewed by the Hart committee.
6 Q
Do you remember the date of that?
7 A
No, I don't.
8 Q
Are there any others that you recall?
9 A
I talked to the Udall committee, too,.but that was to over the telephone to, I think, a lawyer, his last name was 11 Meyers.
12 Q
Did the Hart committee keep a transcript of your 13 interview with them?
O
\\d 14 A
Yes, they did.
15 Q
Did you get a copy of that transcript?
16 A
Yes, I did.
17 Q
And does Met Ed have a copy of it?
18 A
I don't believe so -- well, I couldn't tell you that, 19 I don't really know.
The lawyers could have got one.
20 Q
I'm going to ask you what subject the Hart committee interview was.'
l 21 l
A Basically what'I did on March 28 about the hydrogen 22
()
23 spike, the involvement with the NRC and the day of the accident.
24 Q
Would you have any objection to bringing that to 25 work and giving it to Met Ed lawyers to make a copy for us?
cAce-9ederal cAeporten, $nc 444 NORTH CAPITOL STREET WASHINGTON. D.C.
20001 (act) 347-3700
5 nw 3 A
No.
2 Q
All right, I ask you to do that then sometimes next 3
week.
4
(}
A Sure thing.
5 Q
Because that is the subject area we are interested 6
in.
We are not here to talk about background today.
If you 7
want to refer to any of these transcripts that we do have, feel 8
free and any time you would like to go off the record just 9
say so, just say off the record and we can talk.
All right.
10 Mr. Mehler, when you came in on the morning of March 28, 11 according to your I & E interview, I believe one of the first 12 things you did was to tell somebody to close the PROV block 13 valve, is thuc correct?
14 A
That was roughly 20 minutes after I got here.
15 0
About 20 minutes after.
And I think, I don't have 16 it in my notes here, but your I & E interview covered what you 17 looked at and why you told them to do that.
Our data indicate 18 that the block valve was closed at 6:18 a.m. and at that time 19 there was a conference call going on with George Kunder in the 20 control room talking to Gary Miller, Jack Herbein and Lee 21 Rodgers all off site.
And during that phone call Lee Rodgers 22 asked the question is the PROV block valve shut.
George said O
23 I will have somebody check it.
It was checked and the answer 24 came back the block valve was closed.
25 Now at that time it must have been closed very recently.
cAce-9ederaf cAeporters, Snc.
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A I'm not aware of that conversation.
2 O
You're not aware of that telephone call, the tele-3 phone call was going on at that time?
4 A
That's correct.
5 Q
Are you aware of how the report was given back to 6
them that the block valve was closed?
Do you have any knowledge 7
of that?
8 A
No, no.
9 Q
Is there any possibility that their question 10 triggered the closing of the block valve?
11 A
I didn't even know the conversation -- I didn't 12 even know of the question and that has nothing to do with me is closing the block valve.
14 Q
Okay.
15 A
I didn't physically close it.
16 Q
Correct.
Your I & E interview also indicated that 17 you recognized there were steam bubbles in the hot legs and 18 you discussed making a containment entry and venting the steam 19 bubbles through the manual valves at the top of the hot legs.
A Yes.
20 Q
And you knew that temperatures, TH temperatures were 21 ff scale and high?.
22
(~h
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A Yes.
23 Q
Did you ever infer from the information you had, the 24 temperatures and knowledge of the steam bubbles in the hot leg:i, 25 cAce. Jedera[ cReporten,.Onc 444 NORTH CAPITOL STREET WASHINGTON. D.C.
20001 (202) 347-3704
7 nw 5 did you ever infer that there was also a bubble in the core 2
from what you saw that morning?
3 A
No.
4
()
Q How much do you know about the hot leg temperatures 5
at that time? ~Did you only know that they were off scale and 6
high?
7 A
I only knew that they were off scale high.
I didn't 8
ge.t any other input other than looking at the gauges on the 9
panel, which 620 is the maximum and they were up there.
10 Q
620 degrees?
11 A
Yes.
12 Q
So that was telling you that the hot leg. temperature 13 was 620 degrees or higher?
, ()
14 A
Right.
15 Q
Is it the information that told you there was a 16 steam bubble'in the hot leg?
17 A
No, I based the steam bubble in the hot leg because 18 the pressurizer was solid and the pressure was low so that 19 means there had to be a steam bubble somewhere else, forcing 20 the water up into the pressurizer.
21 Q
That was the basic information.you used to diagnose 1 22 A
Yes, just glancing at it.
()
23 Q
Did you infer anything spe.cific from the hot leg 24 temperatures?
25 A
No.
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nw 6 Q
Did you consider how much superheat there might be 2
in the hot legs given those temperatures?
3 A
No, not at that time.
My main concern was to get 4
the pressure restored and get the pressure control back to the 5
pressurizer.
6 Q
Now at that time when you came in, let's say from 7
6 a.m. to 6:30, the initial look at the plant, did you give 8
any consideration to whether or not natural circulation was 9
working effectively for you?
10 A
No, I didn't look at that.
I made an assumption 11 that Bill and Mike were looking at that and I didn't look at 12 it.
13 Q
Did you assume that it was working or they would 14 have done something about it?
15 A
When I arrived they told me that they were attemptirtg 16 to go natural circulation.
They never told me they had 17 achieved it or not.
I just assumed we did achieve it and I 18 didn't confer it or not.
19 Q
Did you hear anybody discuss or question whether it 20 was working or not at that time?
21 A
No.
22 Q
They simply told you they were trying to get a 23 natural circulation?
24 A
When I arrived it was roughly ten of six and at that.
25 Period of time they just told me they secured the reactor c:Oce-9ederal cReporters, Dnc 444 NORTH C APITOL STREET 1
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coolant pump, I believe in B loop at that time which woro tho 2
last ones.
Also that they isolated B steam generator.
I 3
could be wrong which loops, it might have been A, but at that g-time they were attempting to go into natural circulation and I 4
V 5
was more concerned with the primary side of the plant, looking 6
at the parameter: over there and from what I seen when I arrived,
7 that the steam bubble was in the hot leg and the pressurizer a
was solid and that indicated two things, either the heaters 9
weren't working or you had a leak.
10 Q
And you found the leak and isolated it?
11 A
That was after I went to the computer and punched 12 out the temperatures on both the code relief valves and 13 electromatic and based on that I assumed the electromatic was 14 leaking.
15 0
And when that valve was shut, were you able to con-10 firm that that was the case?
l 17 A
The pressure recovered -- well, started to go up l
18 right away.
In the meantime, I had people out checking the 19 heaters.
In fact, Carl Guthrie just arrived a few minutes later and I sent him down to confirm and I closed the block 20 21 valve prior to him coming back to confirm that the heaters were 22 working and pressure,was recovering at that time, and that's
()
p when I turned and seen Bubba Marshcll come in and get an RWP ---
24 you and I will have to go in and vent the hot legs.
25 Q
Okay, back to natural circulation.
You weren't cAce. ]cdcra( cReportcu, Dnc.
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10 nw 8 considering it and you assumed that the other people were?
2 A
I wasn't looking for it, no, I wasn't.
3 0
You knew at the time, did you not, that you needed
({)
for that to work.
The reactor coolant pumps were off?
5 A
Yes.
6 Q
Pressures started increasing after you isolated the 7
relief valve.
What general plan did you have in mind then for 8
recovering pressure?
Controlling the primary system.
8 A
Basically I was looking at to relieve the system 10 void in the hot leg and bring the pressurizer level into the hot leg and make up the system.
12 Q
So your plan early was to vent the hot legs?
l3 A
Yes, I didn't realize how much of a void we did g(-)
y have.
15 0
That would refill the system?
16 A
Yes, but it took a lot.
17 Q
And if you could have done that, would your next 18 step have been to start reactor coolant pump back on?
19 A
Yes, in fact I believe at this time they were making 20 arrangements to get a reactor coolant pump back on and if I'm 21 not mistaken, they did start one within the next hour or hour 22 and a half.
s 23 Q
Now a little bit later, let's say 6:40 a.m. for~the 24 sake of argument, radiation alarms. started coming in and you l
25 knew you couldn't go in and vent the hot legs.
1 1
cAce-]cdcra[ cRej:orters, Onc 444 NORTH CAPITOL STREET WASHINGTON. D.C.
2CC05 (202) 347-3700
11 nw 9 A
Quarter of seven, yes.
2 Q
What did you think and what plan did you have in mind?
A At that particular time I got involved with setting 5
up the communications for the -- we declared a site emergency l
6 j
and we got involved in setting up the ECS and communications j
7 between the control room and making off-site notifications.
8 Q
So you got out of the business of operating the 8
primary plant at that time?
10 A
Yes, we had enough bodies up there.
11 Q
Did you ever, during the morning or early afternoon 12 of March 28, know about the core thermocouple readings?
13 A
No, I didn't.
O 14 Q
Do you recall when you did find out about those?
15 A
It wasn't that particular day, it was sometime after 16 March 28, what day after that, I don't know.
17 And then I heard that from Ivan Porter.
18 0
can you tell me what your understanding was of 39 radiation level readings either in the plant or off-site on 20 March 28 and your interpretation of that in terms of either 21 core damage, public health and safety or operational problems 22 in the aux building?
That's a long question, take it piece by O
23 piece.
l 24 A
Well, that particular morning when everything 25 happened, the RMS system more or less stepped in.
Every cAce 9edeta( cAeportets, $nc 444 NORTH CAPITOL STREET WASHINGTON. D.C.
a0005 (aoa) 347.noo
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nw'10 m nit r between quarter of seven and 7:00, they moved right in, 2
every one through the, you know, started in through the primary 3
building and gone up and they slowly progressed right into 4
U<s max scale and at that particular time we were setting up with 5
the off-site teams.
We went into a general emergency I think 6
roughly around 7:00 and the off-site dose readings -- I wasn't 7
getting them.
They were being transferred, I believe, to 8
unit one where we established the thing.
I didn't know we had 9
problems in the aux building and, you know, they said we have 10 water all over the floor, etc.
Our main concern then was to, 11 you know, to limit the off-site dose and find a source and 12 eliminate it.
l 13 And we kept trying to do that plus at the same time get b
'/
14 the reactor in a safe condition.
And if I'm not mistaken, 15 roughly -- wha'c was it, around 7:00, between 7:00 and 7:30, we 16 did put a RC pump on it and it ran about 15 minutes roughly.
17 I shouldn't even say that because I didn't even know they did l
18 it.
l 19 Q
Yeah, but they did.
20 A
Yes, I know they did, that's my problem here, 21 trying to relate what I knew at that time from what I have 22 heard since then.
("'l s
23 Q
That is right, because that's what I'm really 24 interested in, what you knew at that time.
25 A
I didn't know they rar$ that pump at that time.
I c:Oce-9ederal cReporters, Dnc.
444 NORTH CAPITot. STREET WASHINGTON. D.C.
20001 (202) 347-3700
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11 know it was the cause of all the alarms to come in and that s nw 2
when Bubba and I couldn't go in the b'tilding.
3 Q
Were you aware specifically of what the containment 4
^3 dome monitor was reading or the other monitors in the contain-
-)
5 ment building?
6 A
They were pegged.
7 Q
Did you in your mind make any interpretation to that?
8 A
Well, we realized we did have core damage at that 9
time.
We realized most of it came from the inventory out of to the electromatic to the floor, how much core damage we didn't Il realize at that time.
It was hard to determine.
12 Q
So you didn't relate to it a specific level of core 13 damage?
'TJ 14 A
No, I think it would have been hard for any
- 15 individual at that time to do that.
1G Q
Did it mean anything to you in terms of design 17 basis accident or a Part 100 release or anything of that 18 nature?
19 A
No, not at that particular moment, no.
20 Q
Okay, I think in your I & E interview you said that 21 you thought initially that the pressure spike in the containmer,t,
22 when you saw it, was probably due to somebody fooling around 23 with the transmitter.
21 A
Yes, I said that.
But then I also said it couldn't 25 have been possible because building spray pumps started.
cAce-9edera{ cReporters..One.
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Q Which meant that there had been a pressure signal 2
that went through and started the building spray pumps?
3 A
Right.
4 0
Then I think in your I & E interview you said later O
5 you told Gary Miller --
6 A
No, I don't believe I did say that.
I did say that 7
I told an NRC man standing right along side of me and I 8
pointed out the pressure spike to him and told him that it 9
happened and why the building spray pumps came on because he 10 wanted to know.
11 Now you're going to ask me his name.
12 Q
Nd, I'm not interested in that strangely enough.
13 A
Well, I don't know it.
()
14 MR. ALLISON:
Give me just a second to look at my 15 notes.
16 (Discussion off the record.)
17 BY MR. ALLISON:
18 Q
Now, after looking at it in that initial dismissal, 19 did you later realize that there had been pressure in the 20 containment that caused that spike on the instrument?
l 21 A
Yes.
22 0
Do you have any idea what could cause that kind of
()
23 a rapid pressure spike?
24 A
I know Joe and I talked about it later on that day, 25 about what could have caused in and I don't think hydrogen cAce 9edera( cAeporten, $nc.
444 NORTH CAPITOL STREET WASHINGTOlN. DA SMOS (202) 347-3700
15 nw 13 entered into it.
We thought maybe some kind of chemical 2
reaction or something happened because it was up and down so i
3 quick.
()
4 0
That is Joe Chwastyk?
5 A
Yes.
6 Q
So you really didn't have a good diagnosis?
7 A
I personally didn't think hydrogen could form that a
quick in the building to that concentration to cause it in 9
that period of time.
10 0
Did you connect the spike with the fact that it 11 just happened after the vent valve had been opened?
12 A
No, later on, yes.
Two days later when everyone 13 became concerned, yes.
O 14 Q
But not on the 28th?
15 A
We were told, someone must have connected it, 16 because we were told not to start any pumps, not to do anythinc 17 that could give an ignition.
18 0
Were you told that on the 28th?
19 A
Yes, in a supervisor's office.
I forget who told 20 us that, so it was someone who was honed in on something.
21 Q
It sounded like somebody made a connection with 22 hydrogen?
\\_/
23 A
Who, I don't know.
I would have to make an assump-24 tion and I don't want to do that.
25 Q
Did you make any recommendations to Gary Miller --
c0cc-9ederal cReputen, Dna 444 NORTH CAPITOL STREET WASHINGTON D.C.
20000 (202) 347 3700
I t
I nw 14 with regard to that pressure spot either immediately after it 2
happened or later on on the 28th?
3 A
No.
It's very hard.
I would like to put the time together, but I can't.
I can't.
I do know sometime after the 6
pressure spike happened we were told not to start equipment 6
because they assumed that it could happen again and they 7
probably put it that there was hydrogen in there, but that was 8
sometime after 1:50.
Now how far past.that, I. don't know.
8 And I do not, I said -- well, to Gary Miller I said -- he said 10 don't start any more oil pumps and I said we don't have to, I 11 already tested them all, because they were concerned -- but hou 12 far into the afternoon at that time, I don't know whether it 13 was 4:00, 2:00 or what, but it was sometime after.
14 Q
Now basically this was a site involvement in the 15 plant operation when you went out to see what happened, was it 16 not?
When the radiation alarms came in, did you become 17 involved in emergency plan businessi 18 A
Basically I became involved in setting up -- I sent 19 somebody downstairs to the control room down there to establish 20 communications and we were making notifications immediately.
21 I went through the procedures to make sure we were doing them 22 all and sometime in that medium -- oh boy, Jim Schielinger V
23 showed up and took control of that.
I then, sometime along the 24 line that day, we broke vacuum and we were going through the 25 atmospherics and the State of Pennsylvania said no and I got cOce-9edeta( cReporten, $nc 444 NORTH C APITOL STREET WASHINGTON. D.C. 20001 (202) 347-3700
17 I
nw 15 involved in re-establishing vacuum.
And I think we re-estab-2 lished vacuum -- I don't know, 4:00 in the afternoon or two to 3
three.
4 Q
It was about then, about 4:00, I think?
5 A
I wasn't watching the clock too closely.
6 Q
Do you remember who told you that the state said no?
7 A
No, I don't, but it came in on the telephone call 8
that the state said some one seen the flume going out the air 9
and they said you can't do that, you have to go to the con-10 denser.
11 0
Dut you have no direct knowledge of who said that, 12 is that correct?
13 A
No, I don't.
O
\\_-
14 0
All right, so you were involved in re-establishing 15 vacuum.
What was the basic cause of the loss of vacuum?
16 A
Oh boy, I'm trying to think.
17 Q
By basic, I mean --
18 A
I'm trying to think.
I think we lost-sealing some-19 time, I can' t be certain, yes, we actually -- I would have to 20 confirm this, but I'm quite sure we were losing sealing steam 21 and rather than ruin the seal on the turbine there was a 22 decision made to go through the atmosphere.
And after that
()
decision was made, we broke vacuums and the state informed us 23 24 that we're not allowed to do that.
That it is a no-no and ther, 25 we had to re-establish seals, re-establish the whole bit and cAce 9edeta( cReportets, $nc 444 NORTH CAPITOL STREET WASHINGTON. D.C. 20000 (202) 347 3700 a
18 i
I nw 16 go back to the condenser.-
2 And why we -- if you're going to ask me why we lost sealing 3
steam that morning, I couldn't tell you.
The steam pressure 4
was going down and we were losing the seals which ultimately 5
the atmospheric would have opened anyhow.
6 Q
Were you pretty much consumed until you re-established 7
vacuum, with that job?
You weren't involved with other plant 8
operations during that time?
9 A
I was getting bits and pieces.
I was notified that to we were planning to de-pressurize and drop the floor.
They 11 asked me did I see any reason why we couldn't and at that poin1.
12 I said no.
13 Q
JLt that moment had you actually studied the plant 14 to know a lot about what was happening?
15 A
I never really had the big overall picture.
is Q
What did you do after condenser reacting was 17 established?
18 A
I was also, some period of time, I was also involvec.
19 in trying to get what we refer to as K-3 jumpered out so we 1
20 could start the reactor coolant pumps.
And what time frame in 21 that evolution, I don' t know if that was af ter vacuum or before.
22 Q
Were you.ever again on the 28th involved in the O'
23 control room in a way that you understood what was being done?
i l
24 Cou,1d speak to the reasons why the major plant evolutions came l
25 about?
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nw 17 A
No, I was kind of hanging back and assisting what-2 ever evolutions they were trying to get accomplished by 3
directing people outside the control room or the Aos or a
()
maintenance organization trying to coordinate the efforts with 5
them.
I d6 know that they wanted to drop the pressure and 6
another time trying to indicate heat and that would have 7
required a spray valve to be open and I was trying.
And that 8
was one of the times where one of the men got over exposed.
9 tape 2 Q
But you were pretty much involved in that kind of to activity for the rest of the 28th rather than as a centrally 11 involved person in the control room?
l 12 A
I periodically went up to the panel, but I was also 13 flooded with a lot of phone calls and I was on the phone, not O
14 continuously but, you know, everybody was calling, NRC, asking 15 for data.
And I would say that out of that day I must have 10 spent three hours trying to give people data, you know, which I 17 don' t know what they did with it.
They probably wrote it down 18 and filed it.
You know, that being involved in the big 19 picture, no.
20 0
What time did you leave on the 28th?
21 A
I think it was roughly around 10:00 that night.
It 1
22 was after we had the reactor coolant pump running and I think
)
23 we seen temperatures coming back on scale and that would have 24 been after we started the high pressure pumps and filled up 25 the system and it wasn't until a few days later I found out cAce-9edera{ cRepodcu, Snc.
444 NORTH CAPITOL STREET WASHINGTON. D.C. 20003 (202) 347-3700
20 nw 18 how much water we put in.
That was when I found out how much 2
void there was.
I never could have vented it.
3 Q
Well, it wasn't that big when you were thinking 4
(}
about venting it?
It got bigger as the day went on?
5 A
Yes, right.
6 Q
Now when was the next time that you were on watch 7
in Unit 2 control room?
8 A
I don't know, I don't know if it was the 29th or 9
the 30th, honestly.
10 Q
Did you come back to work on the 29th?
11 A
I don' t know -- I believe I came back -- I really 12 don't know the next time I showed up.
I know I left at 10:00 13 that night and I did come back to work, but I think the next O
14 time it might have been three to eleven on the 29th, because 15 we made a new schedule right off the top because most of us 16 were there for the better part of 16-17 hours.
17 0
So you think you came back on the 29th, but you're 18 not sure what shift?
19 A
I'm not even sure I came back on the 29th.
20 Q
When you came back down, were you on watch in the 21 control room?
22 A
Yes.
(')
23 Q
Can you recall anything about what was happening l
24 when you came back and stood the next watch in the control roon?
25 A
I can't be specific on it.
No, I do know we had cAce-9edeta( cReporters, Snc.
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21 I
nw 19 the pumps running, we were establishing cooling and we were 2
receiving heat with the generator, but saying that was the 3
29th or that was the 30th, I don't remember.
4 Q
That particular evolution could have been either 5
day?
6 A
Yes.
7 Q
Were you de-gassing through the --
8 A
They were trying to de-gas through the pressurizer 9
and relieve the containment.
to Q
I believe that could have been the evening of the 11 29th?
12 A
I'm not sure, I don't know.
I don't remember what 13 day it was when we left the -- opened the make-up tank relief.
(
14 That would have been the 30th.
I wasn't there for that, 15 thank God.
16 Q
You actually started around midnight, but the big 17 relief came about seven in the morning on the 30th.
Now okay, so the next time you came back you were running reactor cooling 18 19 pumps, removing heat from the A steam generator to and de-l 20 gassing through the generator and venting it into the contain-21 ment.
Anything you remember about your next watch?
22 A
No.
(
23 Q
For the first week, any other significant operational 24 occurrences that you recall when you were in the control room?
l 25 A
Well, no, becau-e the only other thing of significan ce cAce3ederaf cReporten, Sac 444 NORTH CAPITOL SfMEET WASHINGTON. D.C. 20001 (202) 347-3700
1 22 I
nw 20 I wasn't there for, that was when the one reactor coolant pump 2
tripped off and they had to start the other one and for next 3
week -- significant events?
I can't really, you know, if there 4
were any, I can't remember them other than, you know, periodi-
{
cally we were getting a release from the gas system and that 5
6 was related to make up tank pressure.
7 Q
Did that continue?
8 A
For weeks.
9 MR. ALLISON:
Okay, that's all the questions I have 10 right now.
11 BY MR. HAYNES:
12 Q
I have some clarifying questions, stuff that you 13 discussed.
As I recall Mr. Zewe was shift supervisor in charge 14 of the control room on 3/28, is that right?
15 A
He was on 11 to 7 shift on the 28th.
16 Q
And then he continued on the day shift in that 17 function, at least for a while?
18 A
For a while.
I arrived there roughly at ten of six.
~
19 Mike Ross was there a few seconds before me and all three of 20 us were there at the same time.
I think Joe.Chwastyk arrived 21 somewhere in the neighborhood of 11:00 that morning and some-22 where during the day I '.hink it was roughly 6:00 that evening 23 we told Bill to go home.
24 Q
Who was in charge of the control room during that l
25 day say from 7:00 on in the morning, of telling the operators l
c0ce-9edera( cReporten, $nc 444 NORTH CAPITOL STREET WASHINGTON. D.C.
20001 (101) 347-3700
HeUer - Abynes.
@k 1
[#
- 7 nw 21 what to do, which valve to manipulate, what operations?
2 A
I only ever to.1d them to do one thing, but that is 3
beyond the point.
Roughly it was most of the decisions was between seven and what?
Eleven?
Most of the decisions were 5
being made by a group and that was being made in a shift 6
supervisor's office.
Q That is Mr. Miller?
8 A
That would be Miller, B & W rep and Mike Ross, myself 8
and Zowe.
Q Then you said at 7:00 a.m. that it was at that time when we realized we had core damage, right?
12 A
We realized we had some kind of damage, you know, 13 as soon as we declared a site emergency, as soon as all the 14 radiation monitors started coming up, but we didn't know to 15 what extent.
16 Q
When you say we, who are you speaking of?
17 A
I would say everyone in the control room and that 18 would be from Mike Ross, Zewe, myself, all the CROs on duty, 19 the foremen that were there.
1 20 0
Was there initially perhaps by some that there might 21 have been a crud burst?
22 A
I don't believe that.
We figured we popped some.
]
L 23 pins.
You wouldn't have got them kit $d of radia*. ion levels with 24 a crud burst.
4 25 Q
I understand that on the 28th someone advised the cAce. 9etl eta [ cAeportets, Snc 444 NORTH C APITOL STREET WASHINGTON. D.C. a0005 (aca) 347-3700
24' I
nw 22 people in the control room not to operate electrical equipment i
2 in the reactor building, is that correct?
3 A
Yes, that was after the hydrogen burn or whatever 4
you want to say.
We were told that was sometime in the after-I 5
noon, after that, what specific time, I don't know.
But we were told not to operate anything electrical because they fore-6 7
see something else happening and up till that point we were 8
operating -- the only lift pumps, back stop pumps for the pumps, 9
trying to get one of them geared up to run.
10 Q
And when they said not to operate anything, did you
\\
11 do something with the reactor lif t pumps at that time?
12 A
We'd already tested most of the pumps and were 13 ready to go an'yhow.
14 0
What I'm trying to do is key in to some events on 15 3/28.
16 A
Yes, you are trying to figure out if they told us 17 not to operate them why we did.
18 Q
Not really, I'm trying to figure out if someone 19 told you not to operate ' electrical equipment in the containment.,
was that on 3/28 or 3/29?
20 21 A
That was 3/28.
22 Q
Why are you so sure?
()
23 A
Because it was prior to the reactor cooling pump 24 starting and we started that at 3/28 in the evening.
25 Q
So that was contrary to the instruction that was cAce 9eclcta{ cAlpotters, $nc.
444 NORTH CAPITOL STREET W A S HI N GTO N. D.C. accol (zoa) 347.a700
25 nw 23 issued?
A It was after the hydrogen burn and we had to get 3
some kind of pump running, you know, you had the lesser of two 4
evils.
Q Okay, well, I admit it has been six months ago sinCE 6
this occurred, but the last question on this is, is that in the 7
control room log, it was on the three to eleven shift on the 8
29th, on swing shift around 2114 when the entry was made to 9
place the pumps in the off position (minimize spark potential 10 at reactor building).
And as I understood, that in your 11 memory, that is about when that instruction was given to you.
12 So do you see why I have the question?
13 A
I understand and I can say for a fact and I will go t' '
\\-)
14 under oath and I will take a lie detector test, prior to running 15 the reactor core pumps, someone did tell us not to start cny-16 thing and I remember telling Gary, it's too late now I have 17 already started them.
And that was after the hydrogen spike.
18 Q
Now the reason why you were not to start anything --
19 A
Was a spark in case we did have hydrogen in there.
20 Q
Okay.
And yon did not know who advised you of that?
21 A
No, I don't.
22 Q
Where did they think the hydrogen came from at that O
x/
23 point'in time?
24 A
I don't know.
t l
25 c0ce-9ecleral cReporters, Dnc.
l 444 NORTH CAPITOL STREET W A S H I N G TO N. D.C.
20006 (202) 347 3700
26
..nw 24 BY DR. JOHNSTON:
2 Q
If I could follow up on that, what you are saying 3
is that sometime after the spike then somebody realized there 4
]
was something flammable in there and it was advised then be-5 cause at that point there may be flammable things, don't start s
any electrical stuff?
7 A
Right.
8 Q
And do you have any estimate as to how long after 9
the spike that conclusion might have been drawn or that order
~
10 issued?
11 A
I could only make an assumption.
12 Q
Anyway, sometime before the reactor coolant pump was m
13 started?
O 14 A
That's right.
It was sometime between 1:50 and 8:0C
~
15 that night.
It was 8:00 that night when we started.
I know 16 we started them in the evening..
17 Q
16 hours1.851852e-4 days <br />0.00444 hours <br />2.645503e-5 weeks <br />6.088e-6 months <br /> after 4:00 in the morning, whatever that is.
18 A
It is 8:00.
19 Q
8:00, right.
20 DR. JOHNSTON:
Do you have any more, Ron, on.this 21 topic?
Okay, I will take a couple.when you get finished.
l i
22 BY MR. HAYNES:
23 Q
The information that there was a pressure spike in 24 the af ternoon of the 28th, 28 PSI, did not appear to be common 25 knowledge at this facility until sometime on Friday, do you cOce-9edeza{ cReporten, Snc 444 NORTH C APITOL STREET WASHINGTON. D.C.
20001 (aoa) 347-3700
27 nw 25 know why that is?
2 A
I don't knew why it wasn't common knowledge, everyone 3
in the control room including the NRC man knew it happened.
4 (7g Q
Now looking at the control room operator's log s/
5 entries and shift foreman log entries --
6 A
It didn't say it.
7 Q
On the 28th it says that the pressure spike goes to 8
four PSI.
Was there any reason why that would say four PSI 9
rather than --
10 A
No, I don't know who put that log entry in there.
11 Q
It is Mr. Berry.
12 A
Berry, I know who Mr. Berry is and he's not a CRO 13 and he's not a licensed operator.
Iq s_ '
14 Q
Do you know what Mr. Berry's function was in the 15 control room that night?
16 A
He is an operation engineer and I don't know what 17 his function was that day.
18 0
Are you familiar --
19 A
He may have been assisting the CRO in his log at 20 that time, maybe he didn't remember.
I don't know why he put 21 four down there because definitely I looked at it and I saw it i
l l
l 22 actually went up to 30 myself.
1
(
23 Q
Well, I think it is a fact that it went to 28.
24 A
Well, if it went only to 28, we wouldn't have had 25 to spray pumps.
cAce-9eAl era ( cAeporters, Sac 444 NCRTH CAPITOL STREET W A S HI N GTO N, D.C. 20000 (202) 347 3700
i 28 I
nw 26 Q
Why is that?
2 A
Because spray pumps are set for two out of three i
3
- logic, 0
Well, I think they have to come on by the time the 4
l
(}
5 pressure reaches 30 PSI?
6 A
Yes.
7 Q
So they could have been set slightly below that.
8 A
Right, but if you ever see a recorded response, if 9
it went to 28 it had to get some point higher if it came down.
~
10 Q
It very well could have, especially a rapid ;
11 transient, is that correct?
12 A
Yes.
13 Q
Because of the light time in the instrumentation?
O 14 A
I have seen a reactor trip where I could have sworn 15 we never got that high, but we were down and I have a recorder 16 to prove to me that we did.
17 Q
That had to do with instrument response rate?
i 18 A
Sure.
19 Q
Do you know of any other: discussion that took place 20 in the control room at 1350 hours0.0156 days <br />0.375 hours <br />0.00223 weeks <br />5.13675e-4 months <br /> or shortly thereafter by any 21 others as to what the cause of the. spike may have been?
22 A
The only discussion I knew that took place was 23 between me and Joe, that was Joe Chwastyk and we did realize' l
24 that something happened in there.
Between us, we didn't know 25 what we were trying to figure out, both of us were quite c0ce-9edeta{ cReporters, Snc.
444 NORTH CAPITOL STREET WASHINGTON, D.C. 20001 (102) 347 3700
29 I
nw 27 scared.
2 Q
Did you express that fright to anyone?
3 A
Joe and I, yes.
4 3
'O Did you inform Mr. Miller?
u.J 5
i Mr. Miller knew about it, knew about the spike.
6 Q
Did he allude that to --
7 A
Hydrogen, no, I don't know if he did or didn't.
8 Q
But it appears that someone must have because they 9
issued an order later on that afternoon not to operate
~
10 electrical equipment in the reactor building, _is that correct?
11 A
That is correct.
I know Gary knew about it because 12 he made a comment about hearing the ncise at the same time and 13 I specifically -- I said I didn't hear no noise.
s/
14 Q
Those instructions that were given to not operate 15 any electrical equipment, that would have also been given to 16 the -- I assume, all shift personnel in the control room, is 17 that correct?
18 A
It came out of the office.
It was given to the 19 people that were in the office and in turn it should have been 20 translated to the CROs.
I personally didn't walk up and tell 21 each CRO you don' t operate this, you know, though they were 22 informed.
)
l 23 O
So it should have been a common knowledge by the --
l 24 people that were on?
25 A
But I did make the statement when it was made in the cAce-9e$cta[ cNejrotters, Snc.
444 NORTH CAPITOt., STREET WASHINGTON. D.C.
20003 (202) 347-3700
m
[30) vs 1
nw 28 office that it is a little late now.
I have already operated 2
all the lift pumps and back pumps.
That if it was going to go 3
it would have already went.
4 MR. HAYNES:
Now, I think that's all I have on that 5
subject right there.
Do you have any follow-up, Bill?
6 DR. JOHNSTON: Well, I wanted to finish what I was 7
questioning, but you finished it up.
But I would like to go 8
back to the period right after the valve was shut and the 9
period right after that, if it is okay to take that up right to now.
11 ME. ALLISON:
Just for the record though, let's say 12 that we are talking about the Picklesimer chart which is an 13 unabelled chart showing the number of key plant parameters for
(~h
'/
14 a period of zero to 17 hours1.967593e-4 days <br />0.00472 hours <br />2.810847e-5 weeks <br />6.4685e-6 months <br /> after the turbine tripped, prepared 15 by William Picklesimer of the SIG group and it is a common 16 working tool in the group.
17 BY DR. JOHNSTON:
l 18 Q
Okay.
First thing, Brian, you got into the plant i
l 19 at about --
20 A
Ten of six.
2:
Q Which is about two hours into the thing.
22 A
Yes.
23 0
You were involved almost immediately or within 20 24 minutes in shutting off the valve.
Would you give a little bit 25 of an account -
you went off and had to do other things as cAce 9edera{ cAeporters, $nc 444 NORTH CAPITot. STREET WASHINGTON. D.C. 20001 (202) 347-3700
31 nw 29 soon as the alarm was sounded, but I get the feeling now that 2
at various times during the day you came back and were sort of 3
involved with what was going on at the panels.
So in other 4
words, technical things rather than just the handling of the 5
accident from an advisor's end and other types of things, 6
could you indicate the time periods that you were probably back 7
more actively following what was going on in the control room?
8 A
I arrived roughly at ten of six and when I looked at 9
the panel I thought the temperature was roughly in the 900 10 range.
It looked like it was a little lower, but anyhow, what 11 I did then was I directed Carl Guthrie -- I talked to Zewe 12 when I first got there.
I talked to Mike, I talked to everyono 13 to find out what was g3ing on.
They basically at that time Os V
14 told me that they just secured B steam generator and knocked 15 off the reactor coolant pumps and you corrected me, it was A 16 loop.
And we were trying to establish natural circulation.
17 I looked over Fred Schlemann's shoulder, who was standing 18 in front of the. panel in front of the pressurizer level and 19 pressure and I saw pressurizer solid and pressure still decaying 20 off and to me that told me, you know, you had steam bubbles in 21 the hot leg plus you weren't either putting no heat in the 22 pressurizers or you had a leak.
I turned around and Carl 23 Guthrie happened to be coming in the control room.
I previously 1
24 had asked did anybody check the heaters and he said an AO did 25 and so I said Carl, you go down, check the heaters, make sure cAce-9edeta( cAeposten, Snc 444 NORTH C APITOL. STREET WASHINGTON. D.C.
20001 (202) 347 3700
32 nw 30 1
they're working.
While he was doing that, I punched out the
-2 computer.and based on the. temperatures on the computer, made an 3
assumption that the electromatic was leaking by and I turned 4
around and I said Fred, close the block valve.
And as soon as 5
he cic e.d the block valve, I could see pressure increasing.
I 6
assumed at that point we were going to recover pressure and we 7
started to go up and I seen Bubba come in and I said Bubba, it 8
looks like somebody has to go in to Vent the hot legs, why don' t
9 you go out and make an RWP and it will probably be you and I.
~
to And he disappeared.
I assumed he went down to make out an RWP ti and in that period of time it looked like everything was being 12 recovered, right.
We were trying to get another reactor 13 coolant pump running, trying to, you know, get the interlock
(
14 established.
15 Roughly quarter of seven, the RMS panel lit up like a 16 Christmas tree.
There was no way we were going to get me in 17 the reactor building.
From there we declared on-site emergency is and I started establishing communications and checking the ig procedures to make sure we were going by them.
20 Some time after that Jim Schielinger arrived and he took 21 over and then we went into -- George Kunder was involved with that also.
Then we went into, let's see, I don't know where 22 I got in there, but I do know I discussed this here looks like 23 24 the period of time, and I can only guess here we'were trying to relieve --
25 l
cace- %Ieral cRepiteu, Dnc 444 NORTH CAPITOL STREET WASHINGTON D.C.
2000t (202) 347-3700
33 nw 31 Q
For the record, this is between the sixth hour and 2
the eighth hour into the thing, so it is eight in the morning 3
to noon.
()
A And it looks to me we were openi.ng the block valve 5
during this period of time and I don't know why we were doing 6
that.
I do know why we dropped pressure.
We dropped pressure 7
with the intention of dropping the core to make sure the core 8
was covered.
9 Q
I gather they were unsuccessful in whatever they 10 were trying to do.
There was the objective to get the hot legn 11 rewet?
12 A
I really don't know, you know, it's been a long 13 time, too.
O 14 Q
Okay, then I would like to go back a little bit 15 carlier period.
Ivan Porter came in about 6:30 and was asked 16 to check instruments to find out if some of the temperatures 17 were real and thermocouples and things like that.
Now he was 18 reporting some of this to Mr. Miller and I gather that you were 19 perhaps part of the same group that he was reporting some of 20 this stuff to.
21 A
I got involved with that.
That group, I think it 22 was Mr. Miller, I can't even think, Lee Rodgers, Mike Ross, 23 some engineers and periodically Bill Zewe and myself would be 24 in the room.
25 Q
Okay.
Now he apparently reported some of the --
l cAce-9edeta( cReporten, $nc.
444 NORTH CAPITOL. STREET W ASHINGMN. D4 aMot (zoa) 347 3700 l
34 nw 32 A
I never heard them temperatures that day.
2 Q
Which ones?
3 A
The RTD temperatures from the core.
()
4 Q
Well, those are two separate types of temperatures, 5
the RTDs run the hot leg?
6 A
I never heard them either.
7 Q
You didn't hear what he reported out?
8 A
No, I didn't.
9 Q
And you didn't hear him apparently come in and dis-10 cuss his initial in-core temperature readings?
11 A
No, I didn't know that particular day.
A couple 12 days later, I heard him.
13 Q
A couple days later.
Could you give me -- what I 7-V 14 was really interested in this littic series of questions was 15 to get some feeling of what the group thought the extent of 16 damage was to the core and if they had their high temperatures 17 available to them, you know, just some feeling of what they 18 said.
Did they say, oh my God, we are uncovered or in good 19 shape or bad shape.
What was the feeling of the management 20 group -- well, I guess I have to ask you, did you get anything 21 out of Ivan Porter that night?
22 A
I didn't know Ivan Porter was taking the temperaturcs 23 that day.
24 Q
But this was the period of time there when it was
[
25 sort of a group running things because Joe hadn't come in yet?
cAce 9edera{ cReportcu, Sac 444 NORTH CAPITOL STREET W A J HI N G TO N. D.C. 20006 (202) 347-3700
35 nw 33 A
Well, it was a group effort from, I would say 7:00 2
on.
3 Q
Okay.
4 rN A
You can't point your finger and say Joe was calling Q,I 5
the shots or someone else was, because every decision made was 6
through that office in there.
7 Q
Okay.
You may have done this already, what was 8
your -- did you make any assessment of what the amount of 9
liquid might ha in the system in the -- you discovered the 10 valve was open or at least when it was closed it made a Il difference.
It had been open for some time.
Did anyone, to 12 your knowledge, draw any clue that gee, we must have not got a 13 fair amount of water out or anything at all to that nature?
14 A
Well, I took up -.what happened prior to this, the 15 only knowledge that I had was when I walked in, the pumps were 16 off, B steam generator was isolated.
We are trying to go 17 natural circulation.
I would say that the T hot and T cold 18 were pegged opposite.
I knew we had steam bubble in the hot 19 legs.
No, I did not know how long we were blowing water out l
20 of the vessel and I couldn't believe that -- well, you know, 21 in retrospect looking back, that they didn't discover it.
l tape 3 22 0
All right.
Can you give me any more feeling about 23 what people thought about the status of the plant?
You men-t 24 tioned radiation alarms and everything else.
25 A
Well, we knew we had core damage.
cAce-9edera{ cReportets, $na 444 NORTH CAPITOL STREET WASHINGTON. D.C.
20003 (202) 347 3700
36 nw 34 Q
That was common understanding?
2 A
But to what extent, no, we didn't know.
Even up to 3
this point here, we weren't sure whether we had the core
()
completely covered and --
4 5
Q Okay.
There was a period of time after a --
6 A
The make-up pump, the A pump, was secured after a 7
while and then we began to use only the C and the B.
There are 8
some valves that would need to be changed in order to make a 9
cross connect or something between the various pumps, the C 10 pump is normally lined up for a particular set of cold legs and 11 if you want to feed"it to another set you would have to make 12 some valve changes.
13 0
We have a piece of paper here that shows that maybe
,.()
14 that will explain it better.
15 A
If you have the C pump and want to make suction on 16 the A tank --
17 Q
No, the C pump, to say the A loop instead of where 18 it usually goes.
19 A
Okay.
20 Q
These valves here, these are manual valves.
l 21 A
That's correct.
22 O
We are referring -- we are referring to a chart of
_s
%.]
23 IIPI valving.
24 A
This is A pump.
Normally these two valves and these 25 two valves and these two valves are closed.
The make-up tank l
cAce-9edera[ cAeporters, $nc.
444 NORTH CAPITOL STREET WASHINGTON. D.C. 20004 (202) 347 3700
37 nw 35 normally comes in right here.
And it can take suction off the 2
make-up tank under an ECS, which we had.
BWST would need the 3
A pump or B pump with these valves open and the C, from the 4
BWST, if you wanted to use C pump, open the make-up tank, it 5
would require these two valves and that would work to these 6
two lines, but if you wanted to come up this way, you would 7
have to open them, them two lines and valves and I don't know-a what they were trying to do.
And if you are trying to say, it 9
would be possible by opening these two valves at that time.
10 BY MR. ALLISON:
11 Q
Which is the A, B and C pumps?
12 A
This would A, this would be B and this would be C.
l 13 BY DR. JOHNSTON:
14 Q
Now in order to accomplish this, that means this is 15 a manual valve that is locked down inside somewhere.
In order 16 to do that, someone would have to go in and get suited up to dc 17 it?
18 A
These valves are down in the aux building in 218 19 elevation.
20 0
Well, how was the access during say this period l
21 here?
l l
22 A
The access to the aux building after the radiation 23 alarm was --
24 Q
Was so it would be very difficult to assume -- you l
25 weren't involved in having anybody suited up to do anything cAce-9ederal cReporters,.Onc.
444 NORTH CAPITOL, STREET WASHINGTON. D.C.
20001 (302) 347 3700
1 38 nw 36 of that nature?
Off the record.
2 (Discussion off the record.)
BY MR. ALLISON:
{
Q So if I can, let me just summarize this.
If you 5
were to try to feed the C leg using the A or the B pump, by 6
closing off the flow to the other legs, you would have to open 7
those manual cross connect valves?
8 A
That's correct.
9 Q
Which are in the aux building?
10 A
Yes.
Il Q
An;l you probably didn't have access to?
12 A
I'm not saying someone couldn't have gone in with 13 a Scot air pack full and-opened them or they could have been 14 opened earlier in the morning before I got there, but to my 15. knowledge they were never opened.
16 BY DR. JOHNSTON:
17 Q
Okay.
And would you have been in a position to knov 18 what people would have been sent in to the aux building in thit 19 time period because you were functioning, if I understood 20 correctly, as the person who was kind of responsible for seeinc 21 what the AOs were doing?
22 A
At that particular time the only people I know were O
\\J 23 in the aux building was Greg Hicks, Carl Meyers and Ron 24 Fontaine and there was another AO went in and I can't think of l
25 his name, cAce 9e era [ cAeporters, $nc.
444 NORTH CAPITOL STREET WASHINCMN. D4 2MOS (202) 347 3700
39 1
nw 37 Q
All right.
Do we have testimony that -- from Joe 2
that says that he was given to understand that some valves 3
were cross connected?
Now this is much later in the time 4
period and he was given to understand, I believe, he stated 5
that those valves were, you know, more in a different position 6
and the question is, could they have really been put into that 7
condition.
Okay.
All right.
8 Were you involved in the activities that were going on in 9
the decision to try and get a bubble back into the pressurizer
^
10 that was in between?
11 A
I think this is what we were trying to do here.
12 O
Well, okay.
I understood that you were trying to dc 13 it back in this time period, so that is one possible explanaticn.
14 This pressurizer level that we are looking at here -- it was 15 full most of the time, but it dips in this time period and I 16 wondered if you knew anything about operations in that time 17 period.
18 A
No.
19 Q
When some of these things were being changed and 20 also there was some evidence that the A side hot leg was cooling l
21 down and getting onto scale again and going off a little bit.
i 22 A
A did come on scale a couple times.
What time frame,
23 I don't know.
24 0-I'm just wondering if you were personally involved i
25 in any of the decisions or obligations that caused some of these cAce-9eileza( cAeporters, $nc 444 NORTH CAPITOL STREET W A S HI N GTO N. D.C. 10000 (1C2) 347 3700 ot
40 I
nw 38 things to occur.
2 A
Ncs, not that I know of.
3 0
Okay.
How long were you at the plant that day on 4
through?
5 A
Until 10:00 that night.
That would have been --
6
, does it start at four in the morning?
7 g
- yes, 8
A Four to 12.
9 MR. ALLISON:
That is 18 hours2.083333e-4 days <br />0.005 hours <br />2.97619e-5 weeks <br />6.849e-6 months <br />.
10 THE WITNESS:
It was somewhere around there.
That's 11 right.
12 DR. JOHNSTON:
I guess that's all I have.
13 MR. ALLISON:
Ron?
14 BY MR. HAYNES:
15 Q
I want to cover one of the items you stated too, 16 that you said you came in the control room on the tiorning of 17 the 28th, that you noticed that you had a full pressurizer and 18 under the conditions existing at that time, if I understood 19 correctly, is that you recognized you had to have one of two 20 things, either the pressurizer heaters were off or there's 21 perhaps an opening in the steam space of the pressurizer, is 22 that correct?
(D l
23 A
Right.
Well, I based that -- being the full steam 24 pressurizer didn't give me that, pressurizer decaying game me 25 that, having the void in the hot leg told me that the full 1
c0ce-9edera[cAeporten,.Onc 444 NORTH C APITOL miTREET WASHINGTON. D.C.
20001 (202) 347-3700
41 nw 39 1
pressurizer told me we had --
2 0
Was this knowledge that you had prior to the 3
accident that you got through a training program where you 4
{}
deduced it yourself or what?
How did you happen to know that?
5 That if you would have an opening in the steam space of the 6
pressurizer that you would get a void form in the hot leg and 7
that you would push water into the pressurizer and that the 8
reactor pressure would be low?
9 A
I never made the assumption that morning that wo 10 had a hole in the pressurizer.
I did know for a fact that the 11 hot legs were higher than the pressurizer and if you do form 12 any steam, it should migrate to the hot legs.
And with steam 13 void in the hot leg, that would displace the water and force O
14 it into the pressurizer.
I made the assumption -- I knew that 15 we weren't recovering the pressure in the pressurizers.
That 16 means something had to be hotter and the only reason the 17 pressurizer couldn't be hot is the heaters weren't working or 18 you had a hole in it.
19 O
But this knowledge that you had that was based upon 20 deductions from the training that you had understanding and 21 donc and your experience as opposed to being taught that in a 22 class or at the simulator?
/-)
23 A
I'm not quite getting your question really.
l 24 Q
Well, I'm really asking you how come you knew that 25 and no one else in the station knew it?
cAce-9cdcra( c. Reporters, $nc.
444 NORTH CAPITOL. STREET WASHINGTON. D4 2 Mot (202) 347 3700
42 nw 40 A
I don't know.
I figured everyone in the station 2
knew that if you dropped pressure in the pressurizer, even 3
when you cool down, you drop pressure below 32 pounds, the hot 4
legs automatically go into the pressurizer and the pressure 5
goes up.
So to get rid of that, when you pressurize, when you 6
heat up, you have to vent the hot legs, you know, it's common 7
knowledge.
8 Q
Fine.
Run that one by me again a little bit slower <
9 A
Whenever you cool down the plant and depressurize, 10 roughly 32 pounds,.I.think naturally if you want to get the Il numbers, it's 22: pounds, when you get to that pressure, because 12 of the heat of the hot leg, the candy canes we referred to, 13 to the pressurizer, the weight of the water is more than the O
14 pressure, so the water will come like this and put the water 15 up.
Vice versa, when you start the heaters and you start 16 pressure going up in the pressurizer, it will have -- your 17 Space will over'here'in the hot legs, to get rid of that void, 18 you have to open something over here.
And it's very simple to 19 See that is what you had to do that morning.
I didn't realize 20 that the voids were so extensive.
21 Q
I appreciate that.
i 22 A
And that's the only reason why they had to have O
23 steam in the hot legs with the pressurizer full.
That was 24 your pressure at that time, the hot legs.
And for some reason l
l-25 they were hotter than the pressurizer.
The simple reason.was cAce 9ederal cReporters, Dnc.-
444 NORTH CAPITOL STREET WASHINGTON. O.C. 20001 i
(302) 347 3700
43 nw 41 because we cooled it down because we were flowing water 2
through it.
3 Q
Okay.
You have attended the training courses at
()
B & W, Lynchburg facilities, correct?
5 A
Yes.
6 Q
And they have what they call casualties or 7
transients that they run through there.
Is an open relief 8
valve over the pressurizer one of the transients that run?
8 A
Prior to March 28?
10 Q
Yes.
To your recollection.
11 A
Well, let me think.
I can't recollect them failing 12 the electromatic on me.
They normally fail the spray open 13 which is another means of killing the pressure.
I'm not saying O
14 they never -- I have been to the simulators so many times they 15 may have thrown that in on me, you know, closing the block on 16 the electromatic or the spray valve accomplishes the same thing.
17 0
What is the plant response in that case when you 18 failed the pressurizers spray valve open?
19 A
Close the block valve.
20 Q
I mean, what is the plant response, what happenc?
l l
21 A
Well, you get it before it does anything.
Your 22 pressure starts decaying because you are spraying cold water in O
23 it.
You I6ok at your light which indicates it's open.
Immedi-24 ately you would take manual control, spray level, attempt to 25 close it.
If it doesn' t close, if you don't do it soon enough, cAce-9edera{ cReporters, $nc.
444 NOMTH CAPITot. STREET WASHIP4GTON, D.C. 20001 (202) 347 3700
44 I
nw 42 you get a little pressure trip.
2 Prior to March 28, we never got low pressure trips.
3 Q
Do you know what the plant response would have been 4
(}
as modeled on simulator?
If they would have failed to open the 5
relief valve, what that would have shown other than the 6
reactor pressure decrease?
7 A
That's what it would have shown.
8 0
You think, to your knowledge, it would not have 8
shown an increase in the water level in the pressurizer?
10 A
Prior to March 28, I believe not.
11 Q
It would have shown what, a decrease?
12 A
A decrease in pressure, that's all.
It would show 13 a decrease in pressure, that's all.
Until you absorb all the O
14 l heat out of the pressurizer, which in time, you would have 15 caught the casualty and terminated it.
16 Normally the casualties they put on you, was terminated 17 after you found the source and you corrected it' You never 18 basically said okay, now if you don't do nothing, well, wait 19 two hours and see what happens.
I'm quite sure we would have 20 worked it this way, this would have dawned on us.
21 Q
In the training that you took for your licenses, 22 the tail pipe temperature from an open pressurizer relief valve O
23 was that covered in the training sessions with respect to what
\\
24 temperature you would expect to see?
25 A
There is an EP on the high temperature over the cAce. 9ederal cReporteu, Dnc 444 NORTH CAPITOL STREET WASHINGTCN. D.C. 20006 (202) 347-3700
45 nw 43 electromatic.
I think it says 130 degrees, you close the 2
block valve.
Basically we found 130 degrees is -- () -- off 3
to the side.
But normally that temperature element seems 4
higher than 130 degrees.
Normally it's in the neighborhood of 5
100 and -- I'm gue.' sing, 50.
Just because of ambient losses 6
and so did we ever have any specific training on looking at 7
temperature and saying yeah, closing the block valve, it's an 8
EP and we have that training on EP in this plant.
9 Q
Yet the EP said to close it at 130.
10 A
Right.
11 Q
And the time of the accident it was 180, 190 and it 12 was normally at 150.
13 A
Yes, normally 150.
I would have to get out past 14 data to say that that is what it is.
15 Q
Did any of your senior reactor operators ever bring 16 that to the attention that you were operating outside of your 17 EP?
18 A
I never noticed it prior to the accident, you know.
19 It's very obvious now.
20 MR. HAYNES:
I really want to go now into the mini-21 mum shift group composition unless someone else has a question.
22 MR. ALLISON:
Just one quick one.
O' 23 BY MR. ALLISON:
24 Q
What would you expect the tail pipe temperature to 25 be if the valve is leaking substantially?
i c0cc-9ecletal cReporters, Dnc 444 NORTH C APITOL. STREET r
WASHINGTON. D.C.
20000 (202) 34747C4 J
a
46 nw 44 1
A It would go close to -- you get an alarm at 200.
2 Once you get the alarm, it could go up to -- well, you have 3
water, you have steam in there, so it has to be 640, 648.
I 4
would say up in the 300 range possibly, even higher.
5 0
300 and higher is what you would conclude that you 6
have a lot of steam?
7 A
Yes, a weeper.
It may be 200, 202, somewhere arounc, 8
there, but you know, if you put steam through there it has to 9
go to whatever temperature the pressurizer is within a couple 10 degrees of course.
11 MR. HAYNES:
Okay.
12 THE WITNESS:
That I think the highest it went that 13 morning was 187.
/~N
(_).
14 DR. JOHNSTON:
287.
15 THE WITNESS:
I never seen that.
I won't argue the 16 point.
I thought it was 187.
17 MR. HAYNES:
Fine.
Okay.
18 BY MR. HAVNES:
19 Q
I have been asking this question to each of the 20 shift supervisors because you're the guys that run the plant out here.
It has to do with the minimum shift crew compositior.
21 22 in technical specifications for this facility.
It states that
()
the minimum shift crew shall be one senior reactor oportot 23 l
l who's licensed by the NRC, two reactor operators who are 24 l
25 licensed by the NRC and tuo others.
cAce - 9edera( cAepotten, $nc.
444 NORTH CAPITOL STREET W A S HI N GTO N. D.C.
20001 (202) 347 3700
47 I
nw 45 A
That's correct.
2 0
And that there is an exemption to that for a period 3
of up to two hours.
There can be one fewer licensed reactor
/~^
4 operators on duty.
d 5
A Yes.
6 Q
And that also during steady state operations, the 7
mininum shift crew in the control room can be one licensed 8
reactor operator, is that correct?
9 A
Yes, reactivity changes are going critical.
10 0
That's steady state operation?
11 A
Yes, down to one.
12 Q
To your knowledge, have you ever operated steady 13 state with just one licensed operator in the control room?
s 14 A
No -- in the control room?
There were, there is 15 always two on shift.
If a guy went to the bathroom, there to might have been a period of time where there might have been 17 one guy standing at the panel, but there is always two CROs 18 on shift, minimum of two.
l 19.
O But the CRO -- excuse me, stop all that.
20 Have there ever been occasions where the CPOs that were l
21 assigned to the control room, when they have gone out to the l
P ant to take a look or to do a patrol or some.particular opera-22 1
r~r 23 tion?
~
24 A
Normally with just two, they don't normally get 25 involved in out in the plant evolutions.
With three, yes.
Now cAce-9edera( cRepctiets, One 444 NORTH CAPITOL STREET W ASHINGTON. D.C.
20001 (102) 21747C@
48 nw 46 let me make another statement.
There are periods of time wheret 2
we may have one licensed CRO and a trainee on shift with him 3
functioning as the other CRO, not licensed, but doing, you know, 4
not with the panel, but doing switching the tanks, but he is 5
in a training period.
Q Is this a result of the two man rule that's come 6
7 into effect here at the facility?
8 A
No.
9 Q
It was prior to that?
10 A
No, we have always had two CROs on shift at all 11 times.- If we go down to one, we call somebody up.
12 l
0 And since' day one, has it always been a policy to l
13 have two control room operators or two operators in the control 14 room?
15 A
That is correct, two operators.
I don't want to 16 get stuck up on two licensed operators, because I'm quite sure 17 you are going to find periods of time where there may have been 18 only one licensed person there at the time.
But two people, l
I 19 one of which is licensed.
That's correct.
20 Q
To your knowledge of your shift.
It could have l
21 been different on other shifts?
22 A
I would say no.
And along with that, we always O
23 have one senior operator licensed, the foreman.
And since the 24 concept of Unit 2, we always had a supervisor or two so that 25 would be two senior AOs with two. control room operators, one cOce-9edera[ cAeportets, $nc.
444 NCMTH CAPITOL STREET WASHINGTON. D.C.
20000 (303) 347 3700
49 nw 47 of which also would be licensed, the other one may be.
Very 2
seldom do we get in that situation.
3 Q
Really, what I am testing is the regulatory requirer 4
ment for the minimum shift crew, not necessarily your practice, 5
A You are trying to say it is not sufficient.
6 Q
I am trying to get your view, that if you went down 7
to the minimum shift crew as permitted by the technical specifj.-
8 cation, whether nor not that manning level is adequate for the 9
safe operation of the facility, which would have to include 10 responses to transients as well as to accidents.
11 A
If you're talking about two licensed CROs, one 12 senior license, to me, that would be adequate to take any 13 transient as long as, you know, with the plant, but if you want.
O 14 to take all the extra garbage with it, you know, assuming the 15 accident would happen, make an off site notification and 16 according to the big hassle, three people couldn't possibly do 17 it.
18 At that point you're going to have to make a determination 19 of what is important.
And the most important thing is to get 20 that plant shut down and make it safe.
You know, whether Joe 21 Shmoe gets notified one hour after it happened or one minute, 12 it is -- if the guy stops to make that phone call one minute 23 after it happens and he is not in the panel, I will break his - -
24 Q
I would imagine that upon the plant tripping, that 25 your phone starts ringing pretty.quickly in the control room?
cOce-9edera[ cReporters, Snc.
444 NORTH CAPITOR. STREET W A S HIN GTO N. O.C 2MO S (202) 347 3700
50 nw 48 A
On day, yes.
On back shift, no.
On the day shift, 2
whenever it does you make an announcement.
On the day shift, 3
the control room site sees quite a few people materialize in' 4
the control room.
On back shift in the control room, the trip
[
5 goes real nice.
6 Q
I would expect there to be at least one call from 7
the dispatcher.
8 A
Oh, definitely.
9 Q
Pretty quick.
10 A
Yes, but you ignore that.
You pick up the phone ancl.
11 bang.
And that ends him, because those phones continuously 12 ring until you pick it up.
13 0
And what did you say when you picked it up?
14 A
Pick it up and say hey we have problems and that's 15 the end of it.
And he won't bother us any more.
But'you have 16 to realize also, although the minimum manning says two others, 17 our policy here in this plant is four and we have always went 18 with four.
Normally they'll be taking care of -- on a trip, 19 they will take care of the secondary plant, which the primary 20 plant basically takes care of itself, assnming no accident 21 conditions and the secondary plant is a primary function of 22 getting things checked in, sealing steam back on, the aux 0
23 boiler, normally you can call one of those in to cover the 24 phone calls and cover the peripheral bullshit -- don't put 25 that down -- but now if you're asking --
c0cc 9edeta{ cRepotten, $nc 444 NORTH CAPITOL STREET W ASHINGTON. D.C.
20000 (aoa) 347-3700
51 nw 49 Q
Well, actually the technical specification says two 2
others, it doesn't say two auxiliary operators.
3 A
We always have four auxiliary operators, two of 4
(]}
which will always be auxiliary operators, A, which are the 5
highest classification.
The other two could be a B or a C or 6
some combination of that.
tape 4 7
Q I understand that the auxiliary operators progress 8
to the B grade and the A grade by undergoing instruction and 9
passing tests to show that they're qualified to perform the 10 functions.
11 A
They will start out as a C operator,-have some formal 12 type of training and move from C to B.
They have to take a 13 written test plus a walk around oral test and basically from 14 C to B it is a secondary side of the plant.
Once they become 15 a B, they are moved over to the primary side of the plant, at 16 that point they have another year of training, some in the 17 plant documented and another test and an oral before they 18 become an A.
After they become an A, I think there is a two 19 and a half year wait before they can bid on a CRO job which l
20 can be waived, but basically it's not.
21 Q
The duties of an auxiliary operator on your shift 22 include such things as doing the shifting and. tagging, I O
23 assume?
l 24 A
That's correct.
l 25 Q
For maintenance.
c0ce-9edeta[ cAejrottets, $nc.
444 NORTH CAPITOL STREET WASHINGTON. D.C. 20001 (aoa) 347-3700
52 I
nw 50 A
Yes.
2 Q
They also perform.the operations aspects for 3
surveillance tests, is that correct?
4 A
That's correct.
(')S
\\_
5 Q
So they are involved in valving in and out of 6
safety related equipment and systems?
7 A
That's correct.
8 Q
On the day of the accident, are you familiar that --
9 it has been alleged that the diesel generator automatic start to system was disabled in that the fuel racks were tripped and not 11 reset?
12 A
No, I wasn't.
13 Q
Have you heard of that since that time?
(3
'/
14 A
No, I haven't.
15 Q
This is the first time you're hearing of it?
16 A
Yes.
17 Q
Do you recollect any conversations in the control 18 room that morning of the accident with respect to the diesel 19 generators?
f 20 A
No.
21 Q
Because they come on every time you get an ES?
22 A
Yes.
(~
\\>
23 0
Which stands for engineering safeguard?
l A
That's correct.
24 l
l 25 0
And of course they will just come up and run and -
cAce 9edera[ cRepc: leu, Onc 444 NORTH CAPITOL STREET W ASHINGTON. D.C.
20001 (202) 347 3700
53 nw 51 not load on because you didn't have a loss of off site power?
2 A
No, I was not aware that the fuel racks were tripped..
3 Q
Okay, it is the first time you're hearing of it?
A Yes.
5 Q
I said alleged, I read it in the I & E investigatior, 6
report.
7 A
I also heard one where the outlet valves in the core 8
flood tanks were closed.
8 Q
That has been established as a fact.
Because the 10 man who said he closed them, closed them.
11 A
Well, a 'few" people. asked me: addTI.still don'.t'.know.
t 12 MR. HAYNES:
Off the record.
13 (Discussion off the record.)
0 14 MR. HAYNES:
Back on the record.
15 BY MR. HAYNES:
16 Q
While we were off the record there, we had a dis-17 cussion about some of the philosophy of operation and with 18 respect to solid pressurizer, it appeared, Mr. Meyler, that 19 during this accident, that people had a concern about going 20 solid in the pressurizer in the primary system.
Could you give i
21 me any enlightenment on that as to.why they would have that 22 concern or what is the concern with the solid. system?
OO 23 A
well, it has always been taught to us since day one 24 that you should never take the pressurizer solid with the make 25 up pump running and I think if you look at B & W literature
~
cAce. 9ed:a( cAeporten. Onc 444 NORTH CAPITOL STREET WASHINGTON. D.C. 20001 (202) 347-3700
54 nw 52 1
they have statements to such effect.
2 The philosophy there was if you did take it solid you would 3
hydro the system.
But you physically couldn't because the 4
r w,.
electromatic would open and etc., but there would be the
(/
5 possibility, taking it up to the discharge head and you just 6
don't do that.
7 Q
And the discharge head of the make up is higher 8
than the --
9 A
Yes, it is 3125 and electromatic at that particular 10 time was set for 2255 and the codes on Unit 2 are set for 2500 11 But they would have lifted.
But ycu don't do stuff like that.
12 0
If you do go solid, the concern is not only high 13 pressure, but also that you have the possibility of hydraulic
(
14 instability perhaps in the primary system?
15 A
I guess, yes, but I have never seen it go solid 16 Prior to March 28 on any of the simulators or anything.
17 Q
And of course on March 28, the pressurizer may have 18 been full, but the primary system itself was not solid?
19 A
That's correct.
20 Q
As far as being able to hydro the system, it was not 21 in the cards.
22 A
It wasn't possible.
23 BY MR. ALLISON:
24 Q
On the philosophy of overriding the engineering 25 safety features turning over the high pressure injection pump, c0ce-9edera( cReporters, Snc 444 NORTH CAPITOt. STREET WASHINGTON. D.C.
20001 (202) 347-3700
55 nw 53 what's your view of the good operating practice with regard to 2
things like that?
3 A
You never -- my view and what I preach is you never
()
defeat an ES function unless it is in a procedure and if an ECli 5
does occur, you can go to the bypass position on them, but 6
you don't knock the pumps off until you are above the point at 7
which it actuated.
8 Q
And in the case of the HPI point, that would be 8
above 1600 PSI?
10 A
Yes, that's my philosophy.
11 Q
Have you seen a tendency among other operators at 12 Three Mile Island, by-passing safety features?
13 A
No.
In fact, on Unit 1 we have never had ES while 14 we were operating.
15 Q
On Unit 2 it has occurred several times, is that 16 not correct?
17 A
That is correct.
18 Q
In each of those several times, the operator 19 eventually ended up --
20 A
By-passing it and securing the pumps.
But every 21 time pressurizer level was recovered and pressure was recovered Q
So in each case the action was corr,ect in that he 22 s
O 23 waited until he had the pressure up high enough?
24 A
It would have been above 100 in which pressure would 25 have been in the neighborhood of greater than 1600.
Normally cAce-9ederaf cReposten, Snc 444 NORTH C APITOL STREET WASHINGTON. D.C.
20000 (zoa) 347-3700
56 I
nw 54 it doesn't get that low, well, it has, but we recovered above 2
almost immediately.
And you know, they tend to throttle back 3
when we get in the neighborhood of 1700 pounds and up.
4 U<'T Q
Could that be a harmful precedent though in that --
S let's say four or five times in a row that that has ended up 6
as the proper alternate thing to do, is to by-pass it?
Could 7
that plan conceived ih man's mind that the end goal is going 8
to be by-pass and cut off the pumps?
9 A
I really don't think it sets precedents.
If they 10 are watching their pressures and their levels, they can always 11 re-initiate it with a manual button.
12 O
You don't think it is the practice at this'. station 13 to quickly by-pass the safety features?
O' s-14 A
No, and I don't know what time that morning they did..
15 Q
Okay, that's all I had on that.
16 MR. HAYNES:
I don't have any further questions.
17 Do you have any further questions?
18 DR. JOHNSTON:
I don't think I do either.
19 BY MR. HAYNES:
20 Q
Then that looks like it will be about it for the 21 interview.
We may get back to you again, Mr. Mehler, so please 22 bear with us.
If we need to get back to you, we will contact
( ~)
k-23 you through your company.
24 A
Okay.
25 Q
Before we break up, is there -- you've testified and l
cOce-9ederal cReporteu, Dae
'444 NORTH CAPITOL STREET W A S HI N G TO N. D.C. 20001 (202) 347 3700
57 nw 55 apoken with several investigative groups, but is there anythincr 2
on your mind that you haven't been asked or you haven't said 3
that you think would be important for us to know or consider in trying to evaluate some of the lessons learned out of this 5
event and why it occurred and what we can do to prevent its 6
reoccurrence?
7 A
That was a big question.
I think most of the actior,s 8
are already being taken.
You know, to prevent the reoccurrence, 8
you know, like they're putting out -- they're putting sub-cool 10 limitations on us.
They are putting sub-cool' recorders, which II will tell the operator something.
Also a wider range tempera-12 ture, indication we are putting in core temperature monitors 13 on the computer so you can punch them out.
A lot of informa-14 tion that should have been readily available to the operator 15 that morning, is being installed.
16 Also,TI believe, computers are being updated to be faster, 17 because the backlog is so bad.
One of the sore spots -- and 18 this has nothing to do with that, that keeps getting me, is 19 that the NRC keeps coming out with -- if the operators would 20 have done this and if the operators would have done that, the 21 NRC was here that morning roughly, 9, 10:00 and they never had 22 no suggestions until March 30, you know.
If they knew so much 23 that morning why weren't they coming up with it.
24 We have enough Monday morning quarterbacks, there was none 25 there that day.
ckce-Sederaf cReporten. Dnc 444 NORTH C APITOL STREET WASHINGTON. D.C. 2000t (202) 347 3700
58 I
nw 56 Q
So the actions which are being taken, you feel, are 2
adequate to prevent a reoccurrence of the type of accident that 3
was experienced on 3/28.
How about the overall enhancement of 4
safety for plant operations?
One of the actions being taken 5
is putting on the shift engineer and you are a shift supervisor.
6 How do you picture this interface with you and your job
~
7 responsibility?
8 A
With the shift engineer?
He's there to assist 9
in technical aspects.
I honestly don't see the need for one, 10 in my opinion, because there is very little he could have done 11 that morning with what was available.
And I just think it is 12 another man with another opinion.
13 Q
Do you think that the additional man could be s
14 detrimental?
15 A
No, I wouldn't say he would be detrimental.
In the 16 case of an accident you can always use an extra hand, you know 17 but normal operations which may progress.for years and you wil:
18 never see another accident of this sort, you are just going to 19 have another man up there sitting.
20 Q
And it's presently envisioned, who is unlicens'ed?
21 A
He is supposed to be licensed.
Well, maybe I ain't 22 supposed to know that.
The way I understand, he is going to i
23 be licensed in the future or at least they are tending to go 24 that way.
25 Q
Okay.
Anything else?
cAce-9edera( cAepotters, Snc 444 NORTH CAPITOL STREET WASHINGTON. D.C.
aoo01 (aoa) s47 moo
59 nw 57 A
Well, another thing I might as well bring up and ge1 :
2 off my chest, I think there is over-emphasis in training right 3
now, especially in the B & W simulator taking the pressurizer 4
[}
solid and cooling it down through the code relief or the 5
electromatic.
I think the next accident we are going to see in 6
someone doing that when there would be no need to, because I 7
have never seen pressure going solid until after 28.
Now every 8
transient you get it goes solid.
I don't know what to say.
8 (Laughter) to Q
And the concern is that then that the prescriptive 11 actions placed upon the operator may in fact cause an accident?
12 A
Definitely.
I think we are going to fill up a lot 13 of containments.
You'll save the core and safe the plant, but O
14 in three years it won't operate.
15 Q
All right.
Anything else?
16 A
No, that's about it.
17 MR. HAYNES:
Well, we certainly thank you for your 18 candidness and appreciate your coming in and on your own time 18 here and talking with us and answering our questions.
20 MR. MEYLER:
I just wish I could have been more 21 helpful, but it's been a long time.
22 MR. HAYNES:
That's fine.
Thank you very much.
O-23 MR. MEHLER:
Thank you.
I (Whereupon at 5:15 p.m. the interview was adjourned. )
24 l
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