ML19308C515
| ML19308C515 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Crane  |
| Issue date: | 10/12/1979 |
| From: | Chin R, Critchlow P, Waldman J NRC - NRC THREE MILE ISLAND TASK FORCE, PENNSYLVANIA, COMMONWEALTH OF |
| To: | |
| References | |
| TASK-TF, TASK-TMR NUDOCS 8001280513 | |
| Download: ML19308C515 (46) | |
Text
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N U CLE A R R E'G U L ATO R Y COMMIS SION l
l esU IN THE MATTER OF:
1 THREE MILE ISLAND SPECIAL INQUIRY DEPOSITION O
e Place - Hattsse uRG, Penns3 vsdg
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a Fnh,cuas.,12 1974 pa..
1 _ 45 Date -
(THIS TRANSCRIPT WAS PREPARED FROM A TAPE RECORDING.)
Telephone:
i (202)347 3700 ACE - FEDERAL REPORTERS,INC.
OfficialReporters 444 North Capitol Street Washington, D.C. 20001 NATIONWIDE COVERAGE DAILY m. m.- -
8 0 0128D5/ 3 f
1
1 CR7804 1
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 2
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION 3
_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _x 4
In the Matter of:
5 THREE MILE ISLAND 6
SPECIAL INQUIRY DEPOSITION i
7
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SE FORE 15 Robed G '" s 6 51' l
M.l..nm Eend 16 E.vne Miller 17 18 i
I 19 (THIS TRANSCRIPT WAS PREPARED FROM A TAPE RECORDING.)
i 20 i
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21 l
g 22 23 24 aere neponers, inc.
25 I
I 2
ByJoy wawn jeri 1 1
crisis, if not of a TMI nature.
2 So my recollection is far from perfect at this 3
point.
Certainly as to specifics it would be incomplete.
And O
k#
4 I trust more the testimony I gave before the Kemeny Commission l l
5 which was more contemporaneous with the event.
Or the notes i
i 6
that Mr. Seif has made available to that Commission which were i i
7 even more contemporaneous with that event than I would trust l
8 my memory today as to any particulars.
9 I guess the best way to ancwer your specific ques-10 tion is to say that I saw my role in that ten-day period pretty' 11 much as I would see my role at any time.
As the Governor's 12 chief of staff, you rarely get involved in substance.
You are
()
13 generally consumed by process.
And what you are generally, 14 trying to do on any particular problem is to identify the people 15 who are necessary, supplying whatever infornation you need to 16 understand the problem, you are trying to work with the 17 relevant people, quickly develop options and quickly frame the 18 issues for decision.
And get them, those issues for decision, 19 with the accompanying options and the relevant people it might 20 be necessary to help one understand those into the Governor's 21 of' ice so the Governor can then make the appropriate decision.
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22 And I think I functioned and ourSsystem here 23 functioned pretty much during the crisis period in that fashion!
t 24 and that's really the fashion that we always function.
Ace.Fedirot Reportets, Inc.
0 6mh (hu'A VOICE:
In this particular accident,back in March, 25 3
L
3 Iffd. ult eri 2 1
did you face a particularl problem in gaining the kind of I
2 information and analysis that you needed to make a decision?
3 Anything peculiar to this accident than other crises you might
-~
- 1 4
have faced in your particular job?
l 5
- Na*9 INTERVIEWEE :
Well, the hardest thing to know at 6
any given time is what you don't know.
So you are asking 7
questions and getting information which may be incomplete but l
8 you are not often in a situation to understand that it's 9
incomplete until some weeks or months later when you look back 10 at the situation.
Il So answering that question today, I would say yes, 12 I think that we probably would have liked more information o
13 and we have liked to have had it available more quickly.
But u
14 I feel that we were certainly able to move very quickly to 15 define the problem and to ask the right questions.
And where 16 the answers to those questions were highly technical, to 17 develop a style and a process of forcing the relevant people 18 to give those answers in terminology that we could understand 19 and the public might understand.
20 0)P. (.hin VOICE:
Let me get into a specific question involved' 21 with TMI's sort of background.
Who do you think in the first n(,)
22 instance should be providing the co?.laction, collation, 23 analysis and dissemination of radiological information.
24 e Feerd Rnmrters, Inc.
% p, U.\\h,M INTERVIEWEE :
I'm not sure I follow you.
Do you 25 I
4 jeri 3 Il mean in the normal course of events?
In other words, who 2
should have disseminators and who should be monitoring them 3
everyday?
Or in the case of a crisis?
l
- h. ND
]
VOICE:
Not specifically that.
What I have in mind 4
I 5
is someone were to debate whether or not the responsibility l
l 6
for providing this information should be the Licensee, in 7
this case Metropolitan Edison, or should it be exclusively 3
within the state, or whether the Federal Government, it should,
i 9
be placed in the NRC or EPA or Department of Management?
Have i
10 you had a chance to reflect back on the information you have i
II been getting on the levels of radiation around you and what it meant, whether or not you feel in the future that they shouldhEvt.
12 13 some other way of dealing with this kind of information and I4 process?
15 (Y)c,W\\gmanINTERVIEWEE:
Yes, well, I think that we were able 16 to move relatively quickly to find the people needed with the 17 information that we needed to understand what the radiological 18 readings in the area were and what that meant.
And then I9 to move reasonably quickly to ascertain what the relevant 20 standards the NRC had set were and what that meant in terms of 21 what was going on at Three Mile Island.
22 q
In many cases, we had to do that over the first 36 j
u 23 hours2.662037e-4 days <br />0.00639 hours <br />3.80291e-5 weeks <br />8.7515e-6 months <br /> particularly by identifying and locating sources of our 24 In some cases these were private individuals with own.
m Federd Reporters, Inc.
expertise in radiologic medicine who were not necessarily l
25
5 jori 4 I
attached to the utility or the NRC.
2 It would be my feeling that it doesn't really make 3
a whole lot of difference who is charged with responsibility to 4
assess the situation, provide relevant information, or to make 5
the necessary decisions institutionally.
I think what is vital 6
and critical is that whoever is selected has people on-site 7
or immediately available to go on-site with the expertise to 8
address those matters.
I 9
VOICE:
You are talking from the federal point of 10 view?
II
- b. *bm INTERVIEWEE:
I'm talking from any point of view.
12 In other words, I don't really care whether it's the utility Q
13 or the NRC or a state agency, r anybody else,who immediately v
Id goes into a plant site, assesses the situation and quickly l
15 provides relevant information about what's going on there.
I 16 don't think it matters who you select institutionally.
I think 17 what matters is that you ensure whoever is selected institu-18 tionally has people charged with that responsibilityy 19 with 9he : sufficient knowledge, training and expertise 4
20 to perform it effectively.
Nc, bin VOICE:
You would feel comfortable if this 21
)
22 responsibility was on the utility.
j 23
- b. k nINTERVIEWEE:
Well, I wouldn't feel necessarily i
24 comfortable or uncomfortable if it were imposed on the NRC
>Feder:1 Reporters, Inc.
25 or the utility or anybody else.
I would only feel comfortablejl l
l
6 jeri 5 1
no matter where you placed it, when I receive credible assurances 2
that the persons with responsibility for performing this 3
function, whether they got their paycheck from the utility or l
4 the NRC or some third party, had the necessary skill, training 5
and expertise to handle it.
Nr, b[n VOICE:
Another area where information was a problem 6
7 during this accident was just what was going on in the reactor,j l
8 plant status information.
Again I have same sort of question.
9 Do you feel comfortable with a utility basically providing i
e i
10 that information to the state, in the first instance, who must-t 11 make a decision to take protective action, evacuation, and some=
12 other protective measures?
l p,he,(dna,n INTERVIEWEE:
Well, if they have somebody who is 13 14 competent and capable of doing that.
So that in a sense I am 15 giving you the same answer.
In other words, if there were 16 reason to believe that the NRC would consistently be utilizing 17 people with greater skill :and training and expertise than the i
18 average utility, then I would say why not put it in the NRC.
19 But I have no reason independently to believe that, one way or ;
20 another.
i 21 It appeared during tha* Orisis that.:some people i
()
22 with the NRC concluded that the '
ant that was in fact 23 available and in place at this pt ;icular site, that particular l
1 1
24 utility, left something to be desired.
I don't know whether
- A&Fdwo Remrters, lrm.
i 25 that's true or not.
I don't have the expertise to know that.
i i
i
l 7
s 1 If it's true, I don't think the answer is to say jeri So 2
let us lodge responsibility for the things you are mentioning 3
somewhere other than the utility.
I mean the answer is to say b
\\s 4
let's find people who do have expertise and let's keep them 5
on-site or make t hem readily available to go on site and let's 1
1 6
ensure such people are available.
And once you do that, I 7
don't think it makes much difference who they work for.
8
$r, bin VOICE:
I think what I am getting at, Mr m. -.+
XXX 9
is a philosophical question; t s appropriate with an l
10 industry such as nuclear generation to place the health and 11 safety responsibility on the utility and lodge it on the l
12 utility.
And generally, I'm trying to get some idea of how
()
13 you feel because you lived through the situation.
The
., %'in;;fiil;.
14 credibility of a utility person eek or so 2,
(Itlbhalsoafeelingyouhavethathealthand J
15 16 safety is, by god, a responsibility of the utility and you are going to stick them with itT I think that's essentially what 17 18 you are getting at.
19 b hINTERVIEWEE:
No, I'm really not.
I'm just saying 20 that whenever there's a problem we tend to address it 21 institutionally.
We tend to feel that if we change something
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22 institutional, we will have moved to correct the problem.
t-i l
23 It's perhaps a very personal thing.
This just isn't my l
24 approach.
That is not my style of management or government.
- Ace Federd Reporters, Inc.
25 I think people are the key.
c 8
?
jeri 6 I
If you have an agency that isn't working properly, 2
based on my experience in government, the answer is rarely to 3
redesign it, reorganize it, the answer is usually to get rid
)
4 of whoever is there and get some better people in there.
5 So I don't think that you can that in every case 6
the NRC is going to do a better job of reporting the relevant 7
facts, in every case the utility is going to do a better or 8
worse job of reporting the relevant facts.
I think you want i
i 9
to design a system which insures that capable, competent 10 people are made readily available to provide relevant informa-II tion to the decisionmaker on people's health and safety.
1 12 That could be done in numerous ways.
One would be f
(]
designating the utility, one would be design & ting NRC, but 13 V
14 whoever you designated, you would want a system to insure that 15 the peolle selected were in fact capable.
Maybe the best way 16 is some combination.
Perhaps the utility should be charged 17 with having that capacity and the NRC should be in there t
18 licensing the people, the people who are selected to perform I9 that task, I don't know.
h,bn VOICE:
I'll leave that Ytrea at this point.
I was l
20 21 just trying to get a feel for the role that were playing in l
(]
getting this information for decisionmaking.Noude W N b' 22 23 m
aempe a M,
n terms of 24 communication of information out there at this time to the Ac). Federal Reporters, Inc.
i public -- well, give us just a few hints as to how you addressed l
25
9 jeri 7 1
it.
(Inaudible.)
b b bbMowINTERVIEWEE:
Well, again, my role as the 2
j i
3 Governor's press secretary also encompasses the role of --
4 (inaudible )
for the administration.
And really my role was 5
to ensure that the relevant, various people in the state 6
government were, in fact, communicating, you know, when it was 7
necessary to bring them together either in subgroups or with 8
the Governor or with Jay.
That was done.
9 In other words, I might, in order to get a fix i
10 on the facts thatwwere needed I might call up somebody in l
11 the Department of Environmental Resources, somebody in Health 12 and say, come on over, we need to talk about whether this l
()
13 will effect thyroids in children, or something like that.
I 14 And then it was to make sure that as quickly as 15 possible that whatever decisions were arrived at by the l
l 16 Governor, with Jay's advice, were communicated to the public 17 quickly.
That really went through two channels:
One through l
18 the governmental structure of the Emergency Preparedness 19 system, meaning it had to be gotten roughly simultaneously to 20 the Civil Defense organizations and also to get it out to the 21 mass media, which is really even quicker, especially in a j
i
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22 crisis of this magnitude where you had live coverage of i
23 everything that the Governor said about what his decisions l
24 were, what his recommendations were.
l l Am Fulerst Reprters, inc.
25 My role was to make sure that we moved as quickly l
l
10 jeri 8 1
as possible to come up with a concise statement and to get 2
the Governor out there or ge ut to the media as quickly as 3
possible.
4 f-
- VOICE:
Did you find the multiple source of 5
information on what was happening in the accident particular-6 ly troublesome?
T b b b INTERVIEWEE:
Yeah, I think in many cases it was 7
8 very troublesome, especially in the early days because you 9
would have different sources, sometimes unnamed, sometimes 10 named;at the NRC in Besthest.a, the Commission headquarters 11 in Washington, and sometimes here, people who were here; 12 saying different things about the same apparent event.
13 Then you have, you know, you have a host of 14 self-appointed experts out there who will come in.
Some of 15 your anti-Nuke people.
And even Ralph Nader would be making 16 statements that further complicated the planning process for 17 dealing with, say, an evacuation if it had to be undertaken.
18 One of our -- I guess one of my key jobs really on 19 behalf of the Governor and Jay was-:to try to reconcile as 20 quickly as possible conflicting reports.
In that role I sort 21 of served as a reporter to the Governor.
If you get one 22 news story that said this or you hear some radio report that 23 said that or we got a piece of information even from an i
24 official which contradicted that, my job was to try to work
' Ace Federd Reporters, Inc.
25 with all the relevant people to get a resolution of what i
i
11 jeri 9 1
exactly was the facts in that case for his use and Jay's use 2
in determining waat policy the Governor would follow.
3 It was very diff.' cult early on.
There were too many r
different voices speaking. We eventually arrived at a solution
(.
4 5
where Jay and myself working in conjunction with White House peoP e, NRC people, such that we finally got Denton designated l
6 7
as the principal source of information regarding technical 8
conditions at the plant.
The Governor serving as the principal 9
voice on decisions that affected the population.
And the White I
i 10 House as the principal clearing house or the principal voice l
11 for all of the federal agencies that were pourina into town.
IOP.(SEA One 84 the pbviously through Friday and Saturday, j
12 l
('S 13 and particularly on Sunday, Monday, bbe4 this thing worked L) 14 very well.
And I don't have any quarrel with that solution 15 but we have heard the press, at least some of the press saying j I
16 this was news canagement.
That you were cutting off sources 17 of information.
Clearly that wasn't the intention but that was, 18 the effect.
19 In hindsight.
The utility did stop talking, stop t
20 having press conferences, after 11:00 Saturday.
They pretty 21 much shut down their news center at the Hershey Motor Lodge.
22 But looking at the accident, you know, six months
(~)'T w
23 later, there is some evidence, and we are not ready to come 24 out or report on it as yet, but the utility's view of the Ac3 Federci R.,mrters, Inc.
25 and its potential explosiveness and the size and content 1
n
jeri 10 1
of the was closer to the truth than NRC's version of 2
the problem on Friday and Saturday.
3 191bE$f iNcw clearly the perception of.the danger represented O
V 4
by that bubble did effect the people in this part of Pennsyl-5 vania.
6 With that sort of a scenario, how do you feel about 7
in effect, being very candid, telling 1.he utility to shut up?
bf.
- n INTERVIEWEE:
That didn't h tppen.
We never told 8
9 them to shut up, tb :the best of my knowledge.
I do believe, j
10 and you probably should ask the lieutenant governor about this, !
l 11 that there were one, possible two instances in the early i
I 12 Period where he felt that they had perhaps made statements j
(v) 13 that were mistaken, that were partially incorrect.
And as a i
14 result of that, he was very reluctant to appear or have other 15 administration officials appear with utility officials at l
I 16 joint press conferences.
17 But I don't recall anybody here telling them to l
18 shut up.
I think that we tended, each person tends to look 19 at things in terms of his own responsibilities and obligations.3 20 A good reporter, for instance, will be looking at things in 21 terms of trying to maximize sources of informatio ill not 22 necessarily always have to care which source is accurate or 23 inaccurate.
It can be news in and of itsel ource 1 is 24 making this statemen ource 2 is saying something AcFF:derci Reporters, Inc.
25 drastically different.
And that's understandable.
k
13 jeri 11 1
From our point of view, I think we felt, and I am 2
sure we would feel this way again, that our primary respons-3 ibility and obligation was for the health and safety of the A(-)
4 affected population.
By and large, we felt, and I think 5
wtuld again feel, that consistent with that is letting the 6
public know as precisely and as timely as possible what's realI b, to the best of one's ability to discern that.
7 8
I think also consistent with that obligatien and 1
9 responsibility is the desire to minimize the risk for panic 10 and possible physical harm to people which in fact has 11 happened before and since Three Mile Island during crises 12 type evacuations.
So thht I am not sure had we been aware j
13 of a statement which the best experts available to us, like
(}
la Harold Denton, said was false, we would have put it out any-15
$beifitweregoingtoalarmpeople.
But I don't know.
16 You're right, it's a philosophical question.
I 17 think in the midst of a situation like perhaps possible j
l 18 serious nuclear accident where great amounts of' nuclear l
19 material could escape into the atmosphere, somepeoplebelieve,f 1
i 1
i 20 I think in the case of a possible or actual nuclear attack on i
I 21 our country by a foreign.ipower, you start talking about this
+
/'T 22 kind of thing, I think that public officials have a respons-(_/
i 23 ibility to get the best available information out.
But I l
24 don't think that's necessarily inconsistent with not putting
- AaFdad Reporters, lm.
25 out statements believed to be false which almost certainly i
i 14 jori 12 1
would be highly alarming and might lead to actual physical 2
panic and harm.
3 hr. Ch VOICE:
I see what you mean.
n 4
The thrust of my question is that there is this 5
sense that a utility has a responsibility, duty and respons-6 ibility, and they shouldn't make statements that, I : agree, are 7
incomplete and maybe they should be denied the opportunity to 8
speak out on a plant situation which from their point of view 9
is actually more complete than someone else's.
I br. b h d INTERVIEWEE:
There was an operational problem l
10 i
11 on the first day that affectea our perceptions of the I
l 12 utility's credibility.
And that is that they released radio-l i
13 active steam in the air for two hours without telling anybody,
()
14 public or the government.
And that had a profound impact, youf 15 know, from day one -- I mean it's been written about -- had i
16 a profound impact on all how we related to them.
j hlr. CkEA VOICE:
Was that the basis for the lieutenant 17 18 governor's statement at the press conference about --
i VOICE:
Cor.flicting information.
l bf. ( N*d 19 l
VOICE:
- Yes, f
[ p()dn 20 1
(hr.,fYb 54 INTERVIEWEE:
Yes.
And I think as a practical j
21 22 matter as a result of sort of that kind of pattern of behavior j
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on the part of the utility in the early days 0$h henceforth, 23 24 you know, whatever theories you may want to develop that said i
Acs-Federal Reporters, Inc.
25 the utility had the basic responsibility to inform the public I
15 jeri 13 1
accurately what was going on -- as a practical matter I don't 2
believe anybody's ever going to believe a utility again.
At 3
least now, you know, in the immediate future.
O
)P. bbdn VOICE:
Beyond the kind of responsibility to keep
~'
4 5
the public and state informed of possible releases, just to 6
fill out a record, was there a specific commitment that day 7
made by any member of the utility to the state that they make 8
no releases without first informing the Governor?
9
)r.h adk"*w INTERVIEWEE:
I don't recall any.
I don't personally 10 recall, do you?
bP.k5hddWVOICE:
I was at the meeting with the lieutenant Il 12 governor and I can't precisely recall and I think that they O
13 were asked by the lieutenant governor, please keep us informed,
(_j 14 you know.
15 Olp. C.Wm VOICE:
That was the 2:00 meeting of the tenth on --
16 br.bdb\\od VOICE:
Yeah.
they did not show any 17
$ggEEE I'm not sure 18 signs of planning to talk to the lieutenant governor about 19 the : release but we had found out about it from our own monitor-20 ing system.
And only in fact discussed it after it was 21 brought to their -- after they were asked about it.
O()
22 And I think at that point the lieutenant governor 23 did say, you know, you must let us know if you are going to 24 do anything further like this.
And they may have said, well,
' Ace Fedora Reporters, Inc.
25 we will; but I don't precisely recall any firm, hard commitment.
I
16 he,bNC VOICE: During those first two days of the accident, jeri 14 I
2 the NRC had very little information;as distinguished from 3
Friday, Saturday and Sunday (
we had hordes of people D
4 around this area.
And we are very interested in what the 5
utility was presenting as the situation.
Do you have a 6
recording or any transcript of a meeting that Jack Herbein 7
and Gary M ller ha'd with the lieutenant governor that afternoon?
br.(NtN*J VOICE:
No, it was not recorded.
It was not 8
9 transcribed.
I think some people may have kept some loose 10 notes but there was nothing put down on paper anywhere I don't 11 believe.
12 fig,(h6 VOICE:
In our depositions of utility people, there O
i3 wes some sueee tion on their vert, end ther cou1dn't ein 14 down anyone, there was signs of the fact that during that first 15 morning dumping of steam, as you just referred to, and the 16 shutdown of the ventilation system in the control room was 17 being done on the insistence of the state government.
c.CNtNW VOICE:
This is totally false.
18 19 No, be VOICE:
I just wanted to pin that down.
l fr,NadewAVOICE:
Even at that meeting, our guy most directly 20 21 responsible for radiological protection,
- usky, who o) 22 was at that first meeting, and I can just guarantee that --.
q 23 he's the one who detected that radiation was being released, 24 the one who brought us -- the governor and lieutenant governor Ace Feder:A Reporters, Inc.
25 the information.
I
17
- r. b ^
VOICE:
There was a slight -- I'm just jumping to 1
jeri 15 specific questions.
You know, I don't want to suggest this 2
VWin aby 3
is an interrogation but I know you _.5 L,y and if you don't O
4 mind I will just do it this way.
5 There was a problem of coordination between NFC, 6
the utility and the government of Commonwealth of Pennsylvania 7
on release and discharge of industrial waste water into the 8
Susquehanna on Thursday night.
Apparently the Governor was 9
upset because he was not informed in advance of that.
Was 10 that the problem?
Because we have some indication that Maggie of BRP early that day had discussed the water 12 discharge with the utility.
fp, C M egVOICE:
I can't remember the exact time sequences 13 Id anymore but for about 4 0,000 gallons of water supposedly 15 released, slightly contaminated industrial waste water;was MM released before e e r/ new about it.
Maggie works 16 k
I7 for Apparently Maggie i
said something to the 18 the utility, which led them to believe they had the
- company, permission of DER to go ahead and release the water.
20 As soon as found out about it, you know, he, 21 I believe, he said no you must stop.
We then entered a pro +,racted period where\\9"_VS'.'Y/ wanted to go down and they O'
22 j
v 23 did halt.
The utility did halt.
They still had another 24 360,000 gallons of water to put out that night.
Ace.Federti Reporters, Inc.
Qeusk We then entered a protracted period where _- _- - 'yj 25 I
18 jeri 16 I
was trying to determine on behalf of the state whether that 2
water was safe to dump.
There was then a -- this went on 3
you know, late into the night.
And there was a period -- there O
4 was a point at which NRC --
(b Cb NRC, was there a problem with NRC in this?
5 VOICE:
hp, hMoulVOICE:
Yes.
There was a point at which NRC was 6
7 trying to then tell us that only that the governor had the 8
final authority on whether to release that water.
We went 9
back and forth really through r1 Abraham, who was working y
10 directly in my office, finally determined after much back 11 and forth that, no, the NRC had the final authorityzas the 12 present federal regulator.
It was really only a courtesy to O
13 1et the sover=or heve, you *now, en oevortunity to ser 14 whether he agreed or disagreed with the discharge of that water.
15 Nr M'** VOICE:
Apparently they have a right to discharge 16 if they are within the limits set by the NRC.
hp, (,kh VOICE:
That's right.
17 18
- b. b *" VOICE:
Otherwise they don't have a right.
19
'b' VOICE:
Right.
b M m*h VOICE:
Looking to us as simple as that but the 20 j
y 21 issue is a technical one, whether they were within the limits ehinx eur reine ef vie w trvine te ineure thee if O
2 er net.
23 they were going to dump, they were within the limits.
And Iim 24 sure that we were going around, you know, prodding people to
- Ace Fed,vd Reporters, Inc.
25 make sure that was the case.
l 1
i
19 bf bb.
. No. 3., su w/
jeri 17 1
VOICE:
.. __ m 2
appropriate that the NRC as the federal regulator should make you knowY,when%e.)is 3
the judgment, or wh=.t.her or not the state 5, water C'
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4 flowing)*in the future, kitag more of a commanding role in 5
something like this.
6 b b *hVOICE:
Well, the NRC has the expertise in theory j
7 at least.
I wouldn' t know, for instance, how many units of 8
radiation per picacurie of milk or water was dangerous or 9
wasn' t dangerous.
The only way I would know is by having 10 somebody get me the relevant federal regulations and showing 11 me what the NRC, presumably after hearings and study, had 12 determined was the threshold.
b-VOICE:
Do you think the NRC, before they are allowed 13 14 to discharge, should inform the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania 15 this is happening?
MnC4hav 01CE:
abs 01utely.
v 17
- b. M **% VOICE:
Yes, for the very reason we have been talking 18 about because if your primary obligation and responsibility 19 is to provide accurate information to protect the health and 20 safety of the people and avoid possible panic, that's the kind 5
21 of thing you certainly want to be apprised beforehand)rather
)
22 than have some mayor of a town ten miles downstream find out 23 that it's on its way, have no what's involved because the j
24 officials he 's used to communicating with have not been told
- Ace-Federet Reporters, Inc.
l i
themselves, ghat'showyougetapanic.
25
20 jeri 18 1
N r. O th VOICE:
So, Paul, what you are really saing is that 2
the NRC should have made a decision, made the statement, 3
including in your statement that the state has been informed --
4 Dr. CMIod VOICE:
Yes.
Me Ch 4,it @
- e /o u t ht VOICE:
Rather than 1 Secretary 5
6 Jones issue W A 7
Nr.CbO'**WVOICE:
Giving the state -- the state needs to have 8
an opportunity, I think, to cross-check whether that water:is 9
safe, assuming the state has the ability to crosscheck it.
10 And it's very limited ht this stage of the game,but we 11 did have some, you know, we have some capability to see 12 whether what the NRC is saying is correct or not.
had keen (q
g I think what we felt was happening, as Vowee said 13 14 before publicly, what we felt was happening 3 was that it looked 15 to us like the NRC, I speak institutionally, I mean are 16 people involved here, were trying to put the Governor, appearing 17 to have made this decision,when in fact it was not his decision l 18 to make.
19 de, b$n VOICE:
I see what you mean.
That' clears it up for 20 me.
21 f.
8d VOICE:
And that was troublesome.
22 br.@^
VOICE:
And also on the philosophical question.
In 23 the crisis that we had at TMI,through the 30th and the 31st of 24 March, this is addressed to you, Paul, since you are in the
- Ace Federst Reporters, Inc.
25 public information field, how much do we really w ant to talk I
21 jeri 19 1
about?
Everytning and let them make up their own mind or give 2
them, you think, what the best-informed judgment of what's 3
happening and the best advice and what it means?
4 bf-N VOICE:
I think Jay sort of answered that question.
5 I think what the public needs to be told is the best available, 3
6 most accurate, and best assessed facts about the situation.
7 And then whatever decisions affect that.
But I think, you know c you could hav $
situation where the Governor would go out 8
9 every 15 minutes and give a press briefing and he could have 10 said, here's what I have heard from X, Y, Z different sourcesj II and it might have been incredibly confusing.
12 What this Governor chose to do was to go out only
()
13 when he had something new and solid and firm to say.
And his 14 goal was to preserve his credibility so that when he did have 15 to make, if and when he had to make a decision or an announce-16 ment to evacuate, he'would be believed and heeded.
17 he, (,kdo VOICE:
And that certainly wasn't the case for the 18 first few days, was it?
19 NP NAM VOICE:
It was with this suj G*vsener.
(DC Ckb4 I mean in terms of information that was 20 VOICE:
21 available to the people around TMI.
22 he
(/
VOICE:
From Day One as far as we were concerned, s-23 as far as our responsibilities were concerned and in terms of 24 presenting, you know, such facts that were as accurate as Ace.Feders Reporters, Inc.
25 possibly could be, we followed that path, that principle from l
l
22 jori 20 1
Day One.
I'm not sure others did, but --
2 hr.M VOICE:
But that was a problem of multiple sources 3
again.
O 4
bf N "** VOICE:
What you are really saying, I think, is 5
that the process is relatively simple,get somebody with 6
expertise into the site through examination or cross-examination, 7
get out of that person or persons all the relevant information 8
you need to know, have it ext.. lined to you so that you can 9
make judgments and decisions. I think Paul's right, I think 10 that worked from Day One.
II What didn't work -- maybe I shouldn't say what 12 didn' t work -- but what changed in the first 36 to 4 8 hours9.259259e-5 days <br />0.00222 hours <br />1.322751e-5 weeks <br />3.044e-6 months <br /> 13 is the level of credibility of some of these sources.
I4 Frankly, I -- once Dr. Denton arrived I think j
15 rightly or wronglyjand to this day I have every reason to 16 still believe it was rightly, that we had found somebody who 17 was terribly credible technically that could provide this.
18 And s N tarted to look to him almost exclusively.
The other I9 thing that strikes me is that when you are putting out 20 information about a highly technical subject that many people 21 in the population are unfamiliar with, you have additional l
22 risks and responsibilities.
It has to be interpreted properly I
23 for people.
24 In the case of familiar dangers like flooding, it is
- Ace Feder') Reporters, Inc.
I 25 enough to tell the people that at 3:00 the river will be up i
23 jeri 21 1
7 feet: and by 9:00, it will be up 11 feet.
People understand 2
what that means.
3 When you are dealing with something that the public O
4 has received virtually no education about, and which is per-5 ceived as a kind of dangerous and invisible threat, to wit, 6
radiation, I think you have to be particularly careful in 7
the way you are presenting the facts to the public.
And I 8
think we made some effort to hat.
But the only way you can 9
do that -- not being nuclear scientists ourselves -- is to 10 consult experts and to rely upon the ones that you feel are Il credible for those interpretations.
VOICE:
What I am getting at -- are you familiar 12 O
is with the Mountein Weet Reseerch erosece which heeice117 was 14 a survey of the -- came out with --i.this is a draft.
Have you 15 seen it.
16 br,W M WVOICE:
Yes.
17 br.bMn VOICE:
Most of the people that did leave left 18 because they perceived a danger.
They were confused.
The I9 fea forced evacuations.
So I think what this report tends to 20 do is to support the idea that there was a need for a credible 21 voice of some sort.
22 N VOICE:
But that report also showed that the people 23 believed -- I'm simplifying figures here -- but the people 24 placed most of their confidence in the Governor first, the NRC Ace-Federet Reporters. Inc.
25 second, in terms of information they felt they could trust.
l l
24 bebtO VOICE:
That's right.
jori 21 1
2 be @ Mow VOICE:
I mean like -- if you lum o do you believe 3
category, it was 84 per rcent for NRC, I think NRC O
4 meant Harold Denton;and not the other range of sources that were 5
out there.
And the utility, I think, was almout at about zero 6
or four, something like that.
It was very low.
And that is 7
what we set out to achieve and I think that's what the NRC 8
achieved when Denton finally arrived.
be bt" VOICE:
You mentioned earlier that the main vehicle 9
10 of communication was through radio and TV through press 11 conferences.
You also mentioned there was a sort of a parallel 12 channel for getting information to the counties and lower levels
(]
13 civil defense.
How did that work?
14 br'.bdMeVVOICE:
Well, it was -- it was'a little -- it was, 15 I think as we went along it worked better.
It was a little, 16 because of the incredible press of time and the desire to get I 17 out there as quickly as possible to keep telling the people as 18 soon as we would get something.
We tried to keep, you know, 19 our state emergency agency -- we tried to get them the statements 20 as quickly as possible.
s a matter of practicality, you know, 21 the Governor would hold his press conferences and press brief-(O) 22 ings right out here in the reception room cr upstairs in the 23 media center; 24 sometimes we would finish making -- you know, the Ace.Federsi Reporters, Inc.
25 decision would be completed.
We would try to draft a quick
25 jeri 22 I
statement.
And as soon as it was in his hands, whoosh, out 2
he would go.
Sometimes -- in the early days anyway, the 3
information -- there was a little bit of lag of the actual 4
formal word from the Governor going out over Civil Defense; 5
it was actually quicker to go directly to the ' mass media.
I 6
think we corrected that within a day or two.
And they were 7
getting the information simultaneously.
bP.bhb VOICE:
LetFme move quickly to evacuation decision-8 9
making, which I think is a very important area.
The subject 10 was a difficult thing for all of you.
And certainly would be 11 in'the future.
And I would kind of be interested in, yos 12 know, some lessons learned.
()
13 Before we get to that, beyond the advisories, such
%._/
14 as pregnant women and preschool children staying indoors, 15 were there other measures short of evacuation considered, 16 like potassium iodide, or limiting access to the area?
br.Mmav\\ VOICE:
Well, let me say two things.
One, I think 17 18 that we were constantly reevaluating the question of evacuation, 19 weighing present and potential risk from the accident against 20 the proven hazards of a mass evacuation, particularly against 21 an unseen, unknown danger, which was causing people to panic.
()
22 We considered every kind of measuremmat short of that 23 as well.
We even adopted some.
One you have just indicated.
24 There was discussion about the distribution of potassium iodide.
)
Ace Feder;4 Reporters, Inc.
25 I talked to some people about that, including some people that l
l
26 jeri 23 I
are knowledgeable in nuclear medicine.
I had some people 2
research and bring to me some of the relevant NRC regulations 3
and the rulemaking behind them.
And reached a decision that O
4 it was totally inappropriate to distribute potassium iodide 5
to the population although it was prudent to obtain a stockpile l
6 of potassium iodide in places where it could be readily 7
distributed.
That's in fact what we did.
be b'"
Were there any discussion about making it 8
VOICE:
end 1 9
available -- (gap in tape between side one and side two.)
% Q4ld M My recollection, and again, as you indicate, we a2;e side 2 10 Il trying to recall events that are half a year old.
I2 be. O$h
. VOICE:
Yes.
To the best of your recollection.
13
%, Md**an VOICE:
My recollection, the only discussion --
14 there was general discussion about potassium iodide.
I think 15 the question that the workers at the site might hase come up 16 I have a recollection, and all I can do is say I hope once.
17 it's correct, that somebody checked and found out that the 18 utility had a physician and that in fact they maintained the l9 stuff.
20
% G i6 VOICE:
Oh, they had their own supply.
21 VOICE:
Yes.
And that if they thought iti was 22 appropriate -- I guess the feeling was that they were aware 23 of the danger, they had their own supply, they had their own physician, and obviously that was between them and their 24
! Ace Federd Reporters, Inc.
25 employees.
I think, I have a recollection of that.
I
27 jeri 24 1
Most of my recollection though is about the pros and 2
cons of distributing potassium iodide to the population.
there _Q_ W T**"Y' from the state in NG MI.(kih VOICE:
3 Was OLJ 4
terms of hospital reductions, closing and moving people in 5
nursing homes?
Or was that something all done spontaneously, 6
or was there some involvement by the state, encouraging and 7
assisting --
8 be. N8ddma% VOICE : Oh, yes.
Well, we were -- at all times what 9
we were really trying to do is ascertain what the situation 10 at the plant was and what that meant.
We were constantly II asking what are the worst possible things that can happen and 12 what are the probabilities that they will happen.
And what l
A'q) 13 kind of time lead would there be as to each such eventuality.
14 And then at the same time ensuring that we were 15 prepared to evacuate the relevant area within that time limit, 16 even if the probability of needing to do that was extremelyu 17
- low, 18 So, yes, in-the course of that we had activated a 19 lot of state people, I think it included the lieutenant 20 governor's operation, he is in charge of emergency management 21 in this state.
It included the health people.
In included some (Q'
22 federal people.
Dr. Wilburn, who had some military background, 23 got called.
And we were constantly -- it was kind of an 24 ongoing effort to free up doctors, nurses, supplies, make i AesJeder:I Reporters, Inc.
25 ! arrangements to move people who were ill, and also to take 1
1
28 Qd.htedt= g #4j jeri 25 1
people who were nohrr-but people who were in hospitals and 2
could be sent home, to try to encourage that happen quickly, 3
in the effected areas so we could free up beds, doctors and fT 4
nurses.
P- )
- VOICE:
Let me take you to Sunday afternoon --
5 6
Sunday evening 3when Chairman Hendrie and Denton visited with 7
the Governor at least.
And they brought this type of scenario 8
you are talking about.
Unplanned, in the event the pump breaks 9
down, loss of off-site power.
In a decision dummb, in the 10 event of a real problem, Mr. Denton on the site would make a 11 recommendation to the Governor to evacuate, how much, how far, 12 time to go back to Washington so the Commission
()
13 could worry about it.
14 Now do you remember that?
That evening?
Do you 15 recall that?
16
($0.kleddmagVOICE:
Yeah, I think Sunday -- that was the 17 afternoon that President Carter I think was here.
18 P-VOICE:
That's right.
19 mmVOICE:
And I feel like we went through -- that's the 20 day we went through the plant, isn't it?
21 1EEMER And that meeting would have been that night,
[D 22 I think, in the Governor's office.
And Hendrie did have Mc C.b m, ',
3 b
23 something, I recall, along the lines you described. ? And the 24 remark he made was that in discussing that or such a scenario y
Ace Federal Reporters, Inc.
25 with the group of people in the Governor's office, he had said I
29 jeri 26 1
that the scenario in terms of evacuation didn't fit the state 2
machinery.
Do you have any idea what that might have meant?
3 f.
mh VOICE:
Say that one more time.
O VOICE:
That the evacuation scenario --
4 5
f.
'"'9 VOICE :
Who was saying this?
6 b f.
- VOICE:
This was Chairman Hendrie.
7 f.
- 9 VOICE :
Oh.
8 I.
9 VOICE:
-- didn't fit the machinery that the state 9
put together for evacuation purposes.
- f. b am VOICE:
Yes, I recall that.
The reason is because 10 11 the state emergency management plat. was geared toward NRC 12 requirements.
And Chairman Hendrie's schedule did not comply O
is with NaC reeuiremente.
1e wee somethine new ena unheera or 14 before he announced it Sunday night.
15 We a five-mile plan which was required by the 16 NRC.
We had a ten-mile plan which while not required by the 17 NRC was in a pr oposed regulation of the NRC.
So while not g
18 adopted, we s*.ill moved to a ten-mile plan.
This is all --
19 this is my best recollection, that Chairman Hendrie showed up f
20 with a plan that spoke in terms of 2, 15 and 20 miles.
l 21 And people were just sitting there scratching their 1
22 heads.
23
- b. b h VOICE:
I see.
So it was the radius of evacuation --
fp,h M nVOICE:
24 Correct.
Ace Federd Reporters, Inc.
ht.hnhe@OICE:
That poses enormous problems for planning and 25 i
30 jcri 27 I
carrying out evacuation until you have -- I mean, logistically 2
alone, when you understand how that would foul up the existing 3
plans.
4 VOICE:
On Saturday morning apparently Dr. Wilburn 7
5 was asked by the Governor to revi'ew plans.
What 6
triggered that?
Was he still concerned about the preparedness 7
or was this a crosscheck?
8 bf.NaNm% VOICE:
Mostly the latter.
The Governor had been 9
in office 69 days at the time of the accident at Three Mile 10 Island.
Obviously we had begun to undertake reviews of many thatincludedPENAto II of the agencies of state government; 12 some extent.
But obviously within that period, which was g
13 g
basically a period in which you are organizing and starting up Id a government, you are not going to see too many of these 15 reviews through to conclusion.
16 I think that what the Governor did is as soon as the crisis developed obviously accentuated, intensified the 17 3
18 review of emergency management.
He excluded everything else 19 for the relevant period.
And Dr. Wilburn 's involvement came 20 because of his background, strong management background, 21 military background in the Defense Department.
It was felt (g
that he would serve, as you put it, as a good additional 22 23 crosscheck on what was being done.
24 So he went down and reviewed the plan and visited
- Ace-Federal Reporters. Inc.
the, I guess the people that were involved in implementing 25 i
31 jori 28 1
the plan and came away with a few constructive suggestions 2
which were adopted.
3 Nr.CWM VOICE:
I also understand on Saturday evening the 4
White House was reviewing through Gene denberg some aspects 5
of the evacuation plan.
Was the plan actually sent to the 6
White House or was that sort of based in telephone conversation?
7 f N m VOICE:
Well, we had -- I just can't remember this 8
fellow's name.
One -- early on I had asked Jack Watson I 9
think to send us someone like Harold Denton in the area of 10 logistics.
M cJo you mean, McConnell See Od&NM-Il b f. b^
VOICE:
%r,Mm% VOICE:
My recollection is that it was Adam 12 13 somebody who could speak with one voice and with some authority 14 as to all of these various federal support and logistical 15 units that were as paul said kind of floodin At one 16 point I think we counted 47 different agencies present in some 17 fashion or other.
He designated Adame who arrived with 18 cither McConnell or Connell, I'm not sure which --
19 VOICES:
McConnell.
20 Nr. M =nVOICE:
Mr. McConnell.
And again, I mean I think it 21 was part of what you would refer to as crosschecking, we wanted l
O 22 the Feds to come in.
Here were two people with expertise, at V
23 least one, Mr. McConnell, with expertise in emergency manage -
24 ment, planning and execution.
We asked them to come in and Aco-Fedrect Reporters, Inc.
25 review the plans.
And my recollection is having a conversation
32 jeri 29 1
later with either Jack Watson or Gene idenberg or maybe both; 2
they might have both been on the phone, in which they were 3
relating to me, I thought, that Mr. McConnel and Mr. Adame nU 4
had found the plans to be in good order.
bf.ble VOICE:
That 's correct.
5 6
Ilf.N*Nmem VOICE :
But I don't think -- but I could be wrong --
7 that they were stating they had made their own personal 8
independent review in the White House.
th VOICE:
All right.
I guess maybe that's how it came 9
10 out.
11 m
And I gather that was the same, sort of 12 similar act on Sunday when the Governor asked Bob Adam f
O 13 to g over the plans again 4:30 Sunday afternoon.
14 bf.
WVOICE:
Well, what happened again is, phase one was 15 looking at the five miles,which was required.
And for which 16 there was a very strong plan.
17 The second phase was the ten-mile plan, which was 18 not required for the NRC but which we had begun to go to be-19 cause of a proposed regulation.
So there was a second phase, 20 if you will.
b e, b in VOICE:
I see.
21 22 f.
b eVOICE: -- of checking and crosschecking.
And then O
v 23 I think at one point a 20-mile figure was thrown out. And people 24 actually did a little talking and thinking and work on that
- Aca Fed;tal Reporters, Inc.
25 until the experts seemed to conclude, the medical experts
3;3 jeri 30 1
particularly, that that -- it just didn 't make sense to try 2
and go to 20 miles.
k
'b VOICE:
Mr.
, did you -- was the ten-mile 3
4 plan started after the crisis or had that been worked on --
PE,M$ worked on a ten-mile plan previous to, 5
had
- say, c, _:
6 Governor Thornburgh's administration?
bCNMa*qVOICE:
I don't know the answer to that but I think 7
8 it's the latter.
I think that they had begun to put together 9
a ten-mile program because of the proposed regulation.
10 be,(No VOICE:
You mentioned in your appearance before 11 the President's Commission that one thing you would like to see 12 done was some standardization of preparedness plans.
Could 13 you elaborate a bit on what you meant by that?
br.N M % VOICE:
I'm not sure I remember what I was referring to 14 15 or what the question was.
br,b$n 16 VOICE:
-- regarding standardization, in terms of 17 site to site or from local jurisdiction to local jurisdiction.
18 For example, Goldsboro's plan.
bfkmg 19 VOICE:
I'm honestly not sure.
I honestly don't 20 recall, but it is possible that what I was referring to -- I'd 21 have to reread the thing and get it in context -- but it's 22 possible I was referring to the point you made five or ten
'V 23 minur.es ago which is getting some definitive standards so that 24 we can 't have an NRC regulation calling for a five-mile plan l Ace Federst Reporters, Inc.
25 and then the Chairman'of the NRC calling for a 2-or 15-mile l
l l
34 jeri 31 1
in the middle of a crisis.
I think maybe that's what I was 2
s aying.
Let's find out what the devil you need and what's 3
appropriate and let's get it clearly understood and implemented,
')
4 That may well have been what I was referring to.
5
- b. km VOICE:
I see.
During Saturday and Sunday and on a 6
Monday, what was your perception of how quickly they could 7
evacuate five miles and ten miles?
What were you hearing from 8
your preparedness people?
be. M man VOICE:
My recollection is -- well --
9 10 I have an absolute firm recollection that at the time 11 it was very clear in my mind what the time frames were and 12 we were within them.
I dorD't really remember now what they O) 13 were.
My best recollection is a five hour figure.
At one 14 point was given to us.
But that's just a vague recollection.
15 F.
VOICE:
This was five-mile radius.
16 br. *Nmm VOICE:
I believe that's right.
But that's a vague 17 recollection now.
18 bC.
m VOICE:
Yes, it's a long time ago.
19 bal hnd VOICE:
This was PEMA's statements to you were --
br.NaNm% VOICE:
It was more than PEMA.
Usually at the 20 21 conferences on logistics and evacuation, we had Mr. Adame
(
22 Mr. McConnell, Lt. Governor and some of the PEMA people with 23 him.
I can't remember who all elce but 'there were a number of j
24 people that would be in on that thing.
They included people
' Ace FederLf Reporters, Inc.
25 who had actually visited the local teams who would be involved I
i L
35 jori 32 1
and witnesses for themselves what the state of readiness was.
2 I think Mr. McConnell was one of the people who did that.
l'. kMSI VOICE:
The time frame they were within is the time 3
4 frame that Chairman Hendrie or Mr. Denton were talking about 5
as the time available to you?
6 l'. M a*WVOICE:
Mr. Denton, yes.
P. d Hi VOICE:
Let me quickly move on to actuate evacuation 7
8 decisions.
Now obviously in a fast-moving situation a 9
recommendation will come out of the plant as it did Wednesday 10 morning, but it's over a long kind of a thing like we had here 11 in March, who would you expect to hear from in the federal side?
12 Would you expect to hear from the NRC man on the site or would
()
13 you be more comfortable with a recommendation from the 14 Commission --
15 bf'NaNmVOICE:
Hear from as to what?
Their recommendation 16 or advice on evacuation?
17 Uf. C.hin VOICE:
One of the problems obviouslynTriday morning C.ll;ws 18 was who the hell is Dr. IRSHmge$
$f. d4
- % VOICE :
He said he was one of the questions.
19 END jeri 20 MTE fols 21 I) 22 s_/
23 l
24
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25 i
CR 7804 36 opsn miko TMI/SIG I
be. Chia VOICE:
I mean, what level would you expect to hear mto 1 2
from, do you feel more comfortable with?
Of course, also, 3
you know, in our deposition of Jack Watson, there was some 4
feeling on his part that if.there was time, that he would like 5
to get heard from.
So we have the situation where we would l
6 like to be able to make some recommendation as to how the 7
state feels.
Do you want to hear from Hendrie, Denton, 8
from the White House?
9 f.
b n VOICE:
Let's say, you know, clearly who you don't 10 want to be making that kind of recommendation,to you is j
11 someone you never heard of before, someone who has no credi-i 12 bility with you, someone who has never been involved, to your 13 knowledge, in the incident, but walks in in the middle of it, y
l' with a recommendation.
That's certainly who you don't want 15 to make it.
16 I think you want somebody who is known to you and I7 somebody of high credibility.
That could be either a 18 Harold Denton, because of his being the most knowledgeable 19 ranking expert on the scene, or I would think it would be 20 the Chairman of the Commission, or perhaps someone with 21 responsibility from the White House.
22 But certainly someone known to you, known to have l
23 been involved in the problem from its inception, somebody with 24 obvious authority.
If I heard such a recommendation, for Aca Federst Reporters, Inc.
instance, from the Chairman of the NRC, I would have to I
mto 2 37 I
conclude that that recommendation reflected all of the thinking, 2
debate, pros and cons of anybody and everybody throughout the 3
And that's why a recommendation from him would be agency.
3 (O
4 particularly credible.
5 To have somebody at some lower echelon in the agency 6
make a recommendation about moving possibly hundreds of 7
thousands of people doesn't make a lot of sense to me.
8 be.(bNo4 VOICE:
We've got two tracks here:
One, as a prac-9 tical matter, I think if Harold Denton made such a recommenda-10 tion, I suspect N would have listened to that.
II br.No. Man VOICE:
I think we would have.
I think if 12 Chairman Hendrie did.
My recollection is that the Governor 13 called Chairman Hendrie to ask about the Collins matter, and Id Chairman Hendrie was not knowledgeable about that recommenda-15 tion and was expressly not recommending that we evacuate.
@p, Gyg,Q4wVOICE:
He acted like he'd never heard of Collins.
16 I7 But in theory, you know, such an order ought to 18 come from the highest authority, I would think.
br. M VOICE:
From the utility point of view, you know, 19 20 obviously we had a call from the shift supervisor 21 that sa There's some, you know, inconsistencies in 22 the testimony about exactly what he said.
Nonetheless, here 23 was the man from the plant.
Would you -- if the plant was 24 making a recommendation and there was time, would you expect Acefederd Reporters, Inc.
hear from Miller or&*N 0* S *l}
25 J n_liLl_
or Bob Arnold?
to I
mte 3 38 I
I mean, one of the problems was not having a man of authority 2
in the plant.
3
@p, WaMmenVOICE:
I agree wi'th that statement, and I guess I (2) 4 go further and say a man with authority and also a man with 5
the requisite technological expertise.
You know, the first 6
question I'm going to ask when somebody makes a recommendation 7
to do anything, either monumental like evacuating hundreds of 8
is who's thousands of people,or relatively inconsequential, 9
making the recommendation?
Who is this guy?
What special 10 training or expertise or knowledge does he have that qualifies 11 him to make this recommendation?
And then you'll weigh and 12 evaluate it.
I suppose anybody of known or established or
()
14 verified or appropriately vouched for expertise and authority 15 could make that recommendation.
f),,, (bd%
16 VOICE:
I guess my next question, obviously, is known 17 to who?
bCO b wVOICE:
Known to the person to whom he was making 19 the recommendation, which means that you could do at least 20 two things:
Design a system so that such a person was desig-21 nated and his existence made known to the relevant civil 22
()
authorities before a crisis occurred; or rely on the highest 23 ranking authority in the field, and that might be the Chairman 24 of the NRC, or I guess in theory it could be the president of Ace Federal Reporters, Inc.
25 the utility.
1 b
mte 4 39 br. b N VOICE:
Given that we recognize that there was a 1
2 problem of identity about who was making a recommendation, that 3
in any future emergency plan you should take that into consi-4 deration.
P. M mnVOICE:
I believe so.
5 6
UP. b m VOICE:
I've got one small item here someone snuck 7
in, that needs to be kind of clarified for the record.
On 8
Friday morning there was stay-indoors advisory, and that was 9
officially lifted by the Governor at midnight; is that 10 correct?
Mr. V ldvwm! M.
11 Mr. % l I also understand there was some kind of notice l
12 that went out through the civil defense sort of lifting it at 13 noon.
Was that just'a slip-up?
MC,b M eVVOICE:
No, I think it may have been;what happened 14 15 was the Governor received a recommendation from Hendrie, a 16 telephone call about 11:15 -- no, about 11:03 -- that he ought 17 to tell people to stay indoors within a five-mile radius.
N VOICE:
I think it was less than that.
I think it 18 19 was right in site.
bf.
N N VOICE:
Whatever.
I can't --
20 21 P.
MWVOICE:
I think it was less than that.
N. bf' OWVOICE:
The transcript shows something -- the N
22 (Q
23 transcript shows something different than what any of us 24 recollected.
Ace Fecterd Reporters, Inc.
25 W
But there was a recommendation that people I
i
mto 5 40 1
stay indoors.
We communicated that to the newsroom and said) 2 asung Hendrie's recommendation was that they should stay indoors 3
at least until noon or until further notice.
There was a 4
little bit of confusionp%eeg, bO. M mnVOICE:
But it was linked to an event, as I recall; 5
6 wasn't it?
Wasn't that the --
7 br.(. kid VOICE:
The release.
8 b f. M m 9 VOICE:
-- the unexpected release, yeah.
9 br.
" VOICE:
The unexpected release.
hr. h M VOICE:
The Governor decided to -- then I think the 10 Il Govern;r held a press conference around 12:30, at which he f
12 said, my advisory to stay indoors is off as of midnight.
I l
(l 13 lose track of what happened there.
x) 14 D VOICE:
One final item, the whole question of whether 15 or not to declare an emergency.
And I'm familiar with the 16 record on the subject, but I did want to ask.
A number of 17 orders or proclamations or reports were prepared at the 18 request, I guess, of someone in the Governor's office, in the I
19 event that it needed to be done, like the turnpike, gasoline 20 stations --
21
- f. M MWVOICE:
Correct.
i 22 bh bin R.=h.Ws VOICE:
And I called Steve N office and he 9 (4eee!hMe)4 4 yeo W c. 4 edK+ % /
l l
23 was going to send them over to you to make those 24 available to us so we can see the kinds of preparations the Ace Federd Reporters, Inc, 25 state made,in the event the evacuation was declared.
l l
l
mte 6 41 Nr. bfbkhwVOICE:
They're probably buried in my in basket 1
2 somewhere.
3 Nr.brNoM VOICE:
'Nuesseetssemass -- let me ask a question:
Do O
4 you want to see those before we release them to these 5
gentlemen, assuming they're up there?
6 N r. M waa n V O I C E : I have a vague recollection (Inaudible).
(o, n ha. pbone)m Why don't you see if I can get back to him 7
8 in about five minutes, and we can just wrap it up, all right?
9 bn(hn VOICE:
I believe I've got one final question 10 (Inaudible).
All this business of emergency declaration.
Apparently,underthehEMAlegislation, the declaration of 11 12 the emergency would relieve Government employees of some O
ia e1ements of 11ehi11tv in the gursuit of emereency services.
14 Do you feel that the failure to declare an emergency -- not 15 the failure, but the decision not to declare an emergency in 16 any event impeded the state from doing its business?
"N"9 VOICE:
I don't believe so.
I sought and obtained 17 T-18 assurance from Jack Watson that that would not be the case.
19 They requested that we not declare a state -- well, my under-20 standing is the Governor can request the President to declare 21 a stat mergency, which then affects some of the things you've 22 mentioned.
I received a request that we not do that, kmlted, ring /
l 23 24 somewhat to the concern over the fact that it would cause a Ace Federd Reporters, Inc.
25 serious panic.
And I felt that the argument made some sense.
I
mte 7 42 I
I first sought and obtained, howe wr, an assurance that we 2
were receiving the exact same quantity and quality of assis-3 tance that we would with the formal declaration.
And I took
/
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4 Mr. Watson's word for that.
5 It was also clearly understood that in the event 6
the Governo:- thought a full-scale evacuation was necessary, 7
that we would request the President to declare a state of 8
emergency, and he seemed to agree with that.
9 M VOICE:
So it was your feeling that if the evacuation 10 was declared, you would likely declare an emergency?
II W'NmnVOICE:
We would have -- I'm sure we would have 12 done that.
)
13 br.
m VOICE:
Looking back, did you get everything from Id the Federal Government that you thought you needed?
The 15 commitment that Jack Watson made to you that you would get 16 what you needed without the state of emergency; do you feel I7 that you did get everything you needed?
18 fir, dOa*% VOICE :
I have no reason to say we did not.
On the I9 other hand, I am not -- you know, I'm really not an expert.
20 I don't --
21 in VOICE:
But nothing came up during the accident 22 indicating there was something you were having trouble with?
Nr,dWM3 VOICE:
23 No.
I mean, it seemed to me that, mostly 24 through Mr. Adam and his people, they were moving to l Ace-Federet Reporters, Inc.
25 l
provide, or at least on a standby basis, provide the necessary I
mte 8 43 1
aircraft, equipment, tents, blankets, doctors. nurses and so 2
forth, logistical support of other types.
But I'm probably 3
not the best person to answer that -- probab13 are the line (3
(_)
4 people, frankly, are in a better position.
5 h kin VOICE:
Nothing came to your attention during the 6
course of the accident?
7 br.
dmgVOICE:
No.
C (. m VOICE:
What about the state agencies?
Did you 8
det.kehoin.
9 sense there was any difficulty to them without such a meeem-10
':--?
11 VOICE:
Of my personal knowledge, no.
I was made 12 aware of some -- the only thing I'm aware of was some discus-1 O
13 sion among bureaucrats about who was going to pay for things.
O 14 I'
O VOICE:
That happened in Washington, too.
($r,k/s)dmenVOICE:
Yes, which seemed, you know, a little bit 15 16 secondary to me at the time.
And that's about all I recall on 17 that.
VOICE:
That ends these specific questions. Eb, (h t,(,hhn 18 19 do yot have any areas, any questions that you would like to 20 ask?
(90.hrnSi~ VOICE:
I don't think so.
I'm sure you're pressed 21 c'~')
22 for time.
\\J i
h I f. C M VOICE:
I do want to ask you, however, though, if 23 24 you have any general comment or observation that you think we Ace Feder;I Reporters, Inc.
25 cught to consider in our report that we may not have thought 1
mto 9 44 1
of, from your perspective?
2 b f. M m a n V O I C E :
Nothing that can't be found in matters that 3
are already of record.
Basically, recommendations that I O
4 euees 1 mede in mv testimenz hefore the xement Commissie=.
S that the Governor made in his testimony before the 6
Hart Subcommittee, I think.
You might want to take a look at 7
those.
They really have to do with feeings about -- we've 8
covered a lot of this -- feelings that there ought to be 9
licensed expert personnel at these sites; that everybody ought 10 to agree for once and for all what the standards for emergency 11 preparedness ought to be; and that perhaps the NRC, if that's 12 the appropriate agency, should give some thought to public 13 education.
I think that would alleviate a great deal of the 14 potential for panic.
If people understood what the variou.e 15 exposure levels really meant, they would be less inclined to 16 panic in the cases where you had a relatively low exposure.
17 And I'm sure we might have made other such recommen-18 dations.
But I think they're all of record in those two pieces l
19 of testimony.
20
- b. bn VOICE:
I want to thank you for taking time --
bf. N %A VOICE:
21
- Sure, p
22
- b. bh M VOICE:
-- out of a busy week to --
\\d
- b. N h4M VOICE:
It's important.
23 24 Ut. (km VOICE:
And I also wanted to express our appreciation Ace Federd Reporters, Inc.
25 from our group to you for your fine cooperation and the support I
mte 10 45 I
we've had from the state and county employees over the past 2
month or so.
And hopefully we can turn out a report that you 3
will find useful.
4 P'
- % VOICE:
I hope so.
5 be. Oln VOICE:
Thank you very much.
6 VOICE:
Thank you.
7 IEnd of recording.)
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