ML19308C485

Forwards Memo Re 791025 Interview W/Adamcik.Memo Reviewed & Signed

ML19308C485
Person / Time
Site:	Crane
Issue date:	11/01/1979
From:	Danni Smith NRC - NRC THREE MILE ISLAND TASK FORCE
To:	Adamcik R Federal Emergency Management Agency
References
TASK-TF, TASK-TMR NUDOCS 8001240644
Download: ML19308C485 (23)

Text

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WASHINGTON,0. C. 20SSS 3 '% *'. g November 1, 1979 Mr. Robert J. Adancik Director, Region 3 Office of Disaster Response and Recovery, Federal Emergency Management Agency 6th and Walnut Streets Philadelphia, Pa. 19106

Dear Mr. Adamcik:

Enclosed are two copies of the file memorandum which we prepared based upon our interview with you on October 25, 1979. If you believe there are any substantial inaccuracies or omissions in the enclosed memorandum that require correction, or if there is important matter with which you would like to supplement the recent interview, please inform me in writing within ten days and we will include your response in our files together with the enclosed memorandum. If you do not have specific additions or corrections, please sign and return une copy of the memorandum to indicate that you have received and reviewed it. We appreciate your help and cooperation in the Special Inquiry. Sincerely, km

h. g.. _ N--

Donovan A. Smith NRC/TMI Specfal Taquiry Group

Enclosure:

As stated j L 2

MEMORANDUM OF INTERVIEW On October 25, 1979, Lawrence Crocker and Donovan Smith, NRC/TMI Special Inquiry Group, interviewed Mr. Robert J. Adamcik, Director of Region 3, Office of Disaster Response and Recovery, FEMA (Telephone 8-597-9416). At the time of the TMI incident the group now identified as the Office of Disaster Response and Recovery under FEMA was then identified as the Federal Disaster Assistance Administration (FDAA) and was part of the Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD). Mr. Adam:ik's title during TMI was " Lead Federal Official." the interview took place in Mr. Adancik's office in Philadelphia, Pa., beginning at approxinately 11:05 a.m. and lasted about 50 minutes. Following a brief discussion of the purpose of the special inquiry and furnishing to Mr. Adamcik a copy of the sheet titled "NRC SPECIAL INQUIRY GROUP: WITNESS NOTIFICATION," the interview was recorded with Mr. Adamcik's approval. The below was transcribed from the tape of the interview. The tape began during Mr. Adancik's response to a question by Smith as to what previous interviews Mr. Adamcik had given with respect to TMI. Mr. Adamcik had commented that he had appeared with Mr. Wilcox, FDAA Administrator, before the President's Commission. The tape and transcription continues: Adancik ... I gave a deposition to the Legal Task Force and that was under oath, before a court reporter. The other report to the Public Information Task Force was only a tape recorded in,terview. Numerous phone calls from various people over the past six or seven months,

s Smith You nention the Legal Task Force. Is this Legal 7ask Force of the Commission? Adamcik Of the Commission, yes. U 'UM / 63 L was the name of the staff person that interviewed me along with the court reporter. Smith We've made a practice of requesting copies of depositions that were given to the President's Commission. There've been two instances that I'm aware of where, in our initial request, they have been... preference has been expressed not to give them to us or we've been turned down. About the other three dozen they have been turned over to us. Your's is one which you expressed a prefer-ence not to give it to us. So we'll proceed on that basis. Adancik Okay, the only reason for that was, and there was nothing intended by it, but I just was not sure of the jurisdiction that this Commission has and I gave it under oath to the Commission and I thought, well, now that the Commission has it they can share it with others. But I didn't know if I was out of line by on my own taking this and sharing copies of it with other people, I or not, just didn't know. So I had nothing to hide. As a matter of fact I gave a copy of it to my supervisor, Bill Wilcox in Washington. He has an information copy and I have the only other copy here that I know of. But the Commission has a copy. So I just didn't know. At the time the request came in I said no and I didn't get around to checking out whether I was abic to do that on my own or u

. + not, I never followed through to the Conmission. And I still haven't. So I just as soon say if you want it go to tie Comnission, but if you really need it that badly I guess I can follow through myself with the Commission and find out if its all right for you all to hav( it. It all depends. 1 Crocker We can check with the Commission. Adancik Maybe you can check with the Commission. There's been a number of depositions that were taken. Several peopic in our Washington Office. Smith The way the White House has handled it... we ran across some correspondence which responds to a request, a formal request made to the White House to turn over depositions. They in effect, are telling us that they don't really object to our getting it, but go over to the Commission for it. Adancik Go to the Commission to get them. Okay. Smith And I believe you were telling me just about the same thing. l Adamcik Go to the Commission. Sure. By all means. I would think that would be the l way to go.

.. Crocker I'm sure everything they've got will eventually be public record. Smith So what you were just telling me is consistent with this position. Mr. Adamcik, what we would like to get into a littic bit now is if you'd tell us briefly your background before THI and tell us of your appointment as Lead Federal Official and just a little bit about what you perceived your respon-sibilities to be in that role. Adamcik 4 I l How far back do you want me to go in terms of background? Well, there was August 14, 1940... no I won't go back that far. I'm being f acetious. As far as my professional career goes, I'm a graduate engineer from the University of Cincinatti. I've spent two years on active duty as an Of ficer with the Corp of Engineers, military duty, I've worked professionaly with the State of Cali-fornia, with consulting engineering firms, I came with the Office of Emergency Preparedness which was the predecessor agency to Federal Disaster Assistance Administration, in 1972 during topical storm Agnes in Pennylvania, and my position at that time was Office Manager of one of five Field Offices in the State of Pennsylvania. Thereafter I received a permanent position in Washington with the Office of Emergency Preparedness in Headquarters, and I worked as a staff person in the Office of Public Assistance. When the agency was abolished and the FDAA was created, I transferred to the new agency in a similar capacity working at the staff level in Washington and also doing a considerable amount of technical assistance to. regional directors throughout the country who were

e _3_ administering disaster response activities. I guess looking back I probably traveled more, and was on the road more than I was in the Office while I was in Washington. In 1978 I was appointed the Regional Director of FDAA in Region Three here in Philadelphia. In that role I was responsible to coordinate all the disaster relief activities under Public Law No. 93-288 in Region Three, and since that time I have had responsible positions as the Federal Coordinating Officer in five Presidentially declared major disasters and I was also appointed as the Lead Federal Official during the Three Mile Island incident. Now that appointment was made by the White House, namely Jack Watson. And that informa-tion was conveyed to me through Mr. Bill Wilcox, who was the administrator of l FDAA in Washington, as a result of a meeting that he attended with others and with Jack Watson in the White House on bbrch 30th I believe. It was Friday the 30th. Along with that appointment I was told by telephone what my responsibilities would be. Since this was a unique situation =: far as the FDAA was concerned, because it involved incidents at a fixed nuclear facility, the direction that I was given was that the response and recovery activities would be handled in a fashion similar to the response-recovery of any disasterous situation. I agree I with that charge and that opinion because I feel that no matter what causes the event, natural and nuclear, environmentally, the response-recovery can be administered in a very similar manner. Primarily the way we operate in FDAA is that we coor-dinate the activities and resources of all federal agencies in any disaster situation to provide that relief effort in a timely manner to the Governor who would request that kind of assistance. So I took on the responsibility as Lead Federal Official and assumed that I was acting really in a de facto declaration condition. And acted and coordinated the Federal agencies in a manner similar to which I would under any tatural disaster response as the Feder al Coordinating I r

Officer. And there were a number of specific assignments which I was given in addition to that general charge which was in a memo which you probably have seen a copy of. So my perception of how... I knew basically then what I was supposed to do and what I had to do was to develop the means and the procedure for just how I was going to do it. And the first thing naturally I felt had to be done was for me to get on scene onsite as soon as possible with the staff and establish liaison and relationships both with the Governor's office and with representatives of other Federal agencies that were also dispatched to the scene by the White House, namely Harold Denton from the NRC and also John McConnell from the Defense civil Preparedness Agency who was... Each of those people were dispatched for different purposes. One to coordinate the technical aspects of what was happening at the plant, and one was to provide assistance, both to the local civil defense coordinators and to the State Emergency Management Agency with the evacuation planning. So I proceeded then on the night of March 30th to go to Harrisburg and set up those contacts. Crocker Do you know about when you arrived? Adamcik 11:00 p.m. roughly,the night of the 30th. Does that answer the general back-ground and so forth? Crocker It certainly does. Smith You mentioned making contact with Denton and with McConnell. How did you go about making contact with the other federal agencies? Roughly how many federal agencies would you say were up there onsite?

Adancik We had, and the number varied, but initially, we contacted between 25 and 30 Federal agencies. And I used the Acting Regional Director of the Federal Preparedness Agency here in Philadelphia, Tom Hardy, because of his involvement with Regional Preparedness Committee and Regional Advisory Committee and so forth. He was a member of the NRC Regional Advisory Committee and had routine contacts with Federal agencies that could get involved and might possibly provide assis-tance. At the time, we wanted to be sure that we at least contacted as many as we could that could provide any assistance because we weren't really sure specifically what would be required. So we contacted between 25 and 30 and arranged to have them come to Harrisburg to attend a coordination meeting which I convened and I don't recall if it was Saturday or Sunday. It was my first coordination meeting with all these Federal agencies in Harrisburg. Smith Were there more than one such meetings? Adancik Yes. I had meetings daily during that following week. The last formal meeting I believe was the following Friday and we had ad hoc meetings with smaller groups such as folks with NRC and DREW and the State officials on the scene, and John McConnell and his people from DCPA and the Military liaison, the Red Cross liaison and so forth. I maintained a staff throughout the entire operation, the nucleus of a staff which I continued to meet with. But the last formal coordination meeting I believe was that following Friday with all these Federal agencies. l

-3 Smith Were there minutes taken of these or menos written up of these coordination meetings? Adancik We did not have minutes of any of these meetings. We had one or two... what I would do is make reports daily to Washington, to Bill Wilcox primarily, written reports and also telephone conversations that I had with them and I would bring them up to date on what transpired. We were not at that point in the... in a position,I didn't feek to set up a procedure for taking accurate minutes and detailed notes of everything that went on because it was a general coordination meeting, a planning meeting, bringing everyone up to date and the situation was changing so rapidly. From hour to hour it was changing. So we did not really keep accurate or any... no one really kept minutes. Crocker i We have been in the process of reconstructing events from the best memories from people. Particularly the first few days there were no real minutes of anything. Smith You mentioned a little earlier about the responsibility with respect to technical aspects offsite. Did your responsibilities cover the... did you feel it covered the coordination of the environmental monitoring effort also. For example, those of FDA and of EPA and Department of Energy? Adamcik No, I did not. And it was made clear to me really when I arrived on the scene and I met with Colonel Hen'derson that evening end with John McConnell and I talked to Harold Denton the next day by telephone that there was something that

l had been developed in the way of two teams. Team A and Team B. And Team (would be headed up by Harold Denton involved with the nuclear aspects, uhat was going on in the plant and around the plant, monitoring the air and water, the environment around the plant and that was all being handled under Team A's TON,0> responsibilities and Harold Denton's. And what I was involved with wasjthe emergency management in the event that we would have had a catastrophe there to organize that group of agencies that could provide assistance for evacuation and any other recovery efforts that had to take place. Crocker You also got involved I think in helping to prcride support in the technical side of the house, didn't you? Adamcik Yes, we had... and we have in FDAA a mechanism and a procedure where we can direct Federal agencies to do a variety of things in any emergency situation so we have contacts that we have established with these people. And as I understand it there was an offer made at the National level from our agency to either directly to NRC or to the Departmenu of Energy or someone that in the event that they would need technical support such as any equipment or materials that they needed to get in there quickly, we had those contacts in the military for instance, that we can arrange for transportation, we can get materials that they may need quickly and deliver those to the scene. So it was that type of a relationship that any request for assistance like that... now some came through our Office. Some came through our Office in Harrisburg. But many also came through at the National Operation Center. There was liaison estab-lished up there at that. level. So we did get involved to that extent. We i i

• really had no control or didn't seek to gain any control or authority over any of those agencies out there onsite. We were just there to help out if they needed it.

It was a supplemental assistance type of an offer that we made. Smith Then your group did no screening of these requests for assistance. t Adamcik In other words I didn't feel that it was within my capability or field of expertise to even question any request that we received like that for assis-If they wanted lead bricks or they wanted... whatever they wanted you tance. know it was not within my area of responsibility to question that at all. So we just forwarded them right on through. And what we would do is forward those t off to our National Operations Center, and they at that level would make the contact and facilitate the delivery of that assistance. Smith The fact that the President did not declare an emergency or major disaster, did that hinder in any way your operation? Adamcik Well, it caused me some concern initially, because with the declaration by the President yei automatically have that authority and by law, to direct I agencies to perform with or without reimbursement. And I knew I did not have i i that officially by law. But I had that verbally directly from the White l l House, that I had all the authority that I needed in order to react to provide l l assistance or to direct Federal agencies to provide assistance or to gain information. I had the support of the White House to do it. Now when I received that kind of backing and personal support, I felt confident and I

proceeded as if I had a major disaster declaration. So looking back on it I don't think anything else would have happened other than uhat happened then. I don't think we could have done anything quicker or nothing else would have really been facilitated by the declaration. The only thing looking back in retrospect is that perhaps some of the expenses incurred by Federal agencies could have been reimbursed by the President's disaster fund. And I say could 1 have, because I'm not really sure legally what the rules of eligibility would be as related to the various expenses that were incurred. But I think that was really the only... the financial accounting of it may have came out of a different coffer than it's coming out of. But in terms of the assistance at the time I don't think that there was anything that could have been done that wasn't done. Crocker You didn't feel any agencies were balking? Adamcik l Well, initially I did feel that the agencies... I never really experienced any open resistance, but I did have some questions that were raised by agencies. And here again it is part of our job as Federal Coordinating Officers not only to direct and to manage, but really to coordinate and to encourage and to persuade in a tactful way to gain results. And I think all of us !.1 that posi-tion who have been at least once or more, have that ability. And I think through that approach I was able to gain the results that I wanted without... and it's... at times we have to negotiate, at time we have to be reasonable with each other. But there was some... there were some questions raised initially about what my authority was and who woul'd pay for this, and whether that information should have been made available or not. And that came mostly from the Military.

~ Crocker During my interview with the D0D people, they mentioned the Military Airlift Command, and their concern was who was to pay for all these flights they were running. And I guess they had a really valid concern of operating on f i a budget that io a reimbursable or rotating funds sort of thing. They have to spend money. You've got to get some back in and put it back in the pot again and they were a little concerned as to who was going to pay for it and they still are. .sdamcik It's unfortunate because during the heat of battle, and we see this with every disaster, people... there's a sociological change in the behavior of people from t J being very helpful and not even concerned about their own interest, but willing to help others who are in danger and to help alleviate any threats to the other individuals health and safety. They'll go out of their way to help. And then as the emphasis begins to change... it changes you know as time goes by and to becoming very concerned about oneself again and they become selfish and to wonder about who's going to pay and it's sad, but it's true. Crocker: That's when the comptrollers get in the act. Adamcik That's right. Smith Well along that line if some of these agencies now have what they call a bad l l l cxperience with respect to. financial arrangements on this one, if there were a similar situation in the future, do you think it would be even more important l

to have a Federal Coordinating Officer than let's say have a Lead Federal Officer? Adancik Well, I think that's hard to say. But I would hate to be in the position of responsibility in any Federal agency in a similar situation in the future when directed by the White House to do something through the appointed official, whether it's by law or by appointment, and I hate to be in the position of that individual who would refuse. That's my opinion. And I think each case has to be judged by its own circumstances that surround it, and the timing and everything else that's so important. But I can forsee situations in the future where it may be advisable to make that declaration. I don't think we can say across the board that it's necessary. Crocker You didn't get involved in any discussions as to whether this should or should not have been declared as a disaster or an emergency? Adamcik Well, I was consulted and I was advised, both. And initially one of my charges i was to help the Governor get that formal request prepared in writing ready in the event that he chose to submit it or felt that it was'necessary. So one of my staff people did that immediately. In a day we had him work with his staff and we had a letter prepared and he had that ready to go, ready to sign in the event that he felt it was necessary. In the event that he felt he wasn't getting the assistance that he needed otherwise, I think he would have probably submitted it. l l t I l l

Crocker I guess there is still a question in my mind after the folks we've talked to and the papers we've read as to where the decision ultimately came from that we were not going to declare a disaster. The Governor seemed to be leaning in this direction, but indications were that the White House also was leaning this way. I wonder whether it was mutual agreement sort of thing or if one of them was adamant that the only way we could go is by not declaring a disaster? Adamcik Here again I wasn't involved at that level. But I understand it was a mutual agreement between thu Governor and the White House directly that Federal assistance would be provided, and that a formal declaration was not necessary. And it was that agreement and that arrangement that was made at that level. So I reacted accordingly and immediately once I provided that request to the Governor I told him I was ready to help him and submit that and do everything I could to expedite it if he made the request, but I certainly did not push or try to influence him in any way because I felt that it was out of my hands at that point. s Smith Mr. Adancik, we're talking about how things might be a little different in the future. Do you have any general observations that you could offer as to how the agencies might be able to work a little better together. I'm not saying they did not work together properly at this time, but looking to the future would you have any recommendations that you suggest? Adamcik Well, looking... I think we did work well together based on the circumstances and the speed within which we all hac to come together, very quickly, to respond

to a situation that was very dynamic and was changing every day. I think we did well. However, for the future I really think there's a need to have a prior arrcngement either by formal plan or agreement or through some preparednesa activity uith all these kinds of agencies that could get involved next time. So that we can all come together and we can all see each other and understand who we are, what we do individually, and what we can do for each other. I think there was a real need to foster that type of relationship which I don't believe really existed. We didn't really have the best relationship, the most optimum working relationship that we could have had. But I think for the future I think that's very important, I think prior to the incident there is the need for planning and during the incident there should be a very clear definition of who is responsible for what, and how the folks on the technical side, Team A if you would, can communicate and translate the data that's coming... that they're using,into information that Team B needs to make effective management decisions affecting health and safety of the people. I think there's a real need in my opinion a real deficiency in that gap between those two teams which is defined perhaps as a transletor or an interpretor or some mechanism by which we can get that information based on the conditions at the plant at any given time and the worst possible situation that could occur as a result which may involve evacua-tion out to 20 miles, or sector evacuation or information that we need. I J think the Governor felt and I think I felt that initially... and I think that we can really improve on that relationship. I think it's possible to do it. I think we did,under the circumstances we did well, but I think in the future there's a real need to do more of it. Smith For many years there's been a group called IRAP, Interagency Radiological Assistance Plan, however in the response to the TMI I've heard very little mention of IRAP as such. Did you encounter IRAP as an organization?

Adancik Well, to be perfectly honest with you, we have through the Regional Advisory Committee, which FDAA was .a member, participated with ::RC and others in reviewing plans, nuclear emergency response plans, radiological emergency response plans, I guess. But I was not familiar with IRAP. And personally, now I'm even willing to say maybe it's something I should have known about and didn't, but I certainly didn't have any knowledge at all of that. And appsrently many others didn't either because it wasn't followed. Smith Uhat you're telling us confirms some of the other reports we received also, so don't feel you're alone in this group. One other particular question I'd like to ask is that having a memorandum in front of you to Mr. Wilcox dated April 5 in which you mention an item to the possibility that Federal agencies were not completely together at least at one time. And this may have been causing some concern for the Governor, I think with respect to potassium iodide, but I'm not 100% sure. Could you elaborate a little on that. Adamcik Okay, well generally in any case where I'm out there as the Federal Coordinating Officer, I am very sensitive to the image that the Federal government creates in the eyes of the J tate people or the local people that we try to help. And its very important that we are together and it's even more important to look like we're together. So I'm very sensitive to that and immediately I'll react to it if there's any hint at all of poor coordination or communication between the agencies. So in this case... and I had attended meetings daily and I was l

17_ invited to attend all the meetings that Harold Denton had with the Governor when he briefed him on the status of the plant so I participated in =cny meetings as an observer. And in this case, the issue of the potassium iodide came up in a meeting that was held. And it was SecretaryMacLeod, the State Secretary of Health that mentioned to the Governor that Secretary Califano was directing the Governor to issue potassium iodide to the workers and the people around the plant. And the Governor became very upset and I can't auite remember how he said it but it was along the lines of he cannot direct me to do anything in this regard. And he became very upset about it. And it was either at that meeting or a subsequent meeting when Harold Denton was there when Harold Denton advised the Governor that he felt that it was not necessary to distribute the potassium iodide. So here you had two Federal agencies both advising the Governor to do two different things. And an issue that was very sensitive because the Governor was cor crned that if we would begin passing this out without adequate orienta-tion and instructions, first of all it may cause people to become very concerned that there was a real need for it. Secondly, that without adequate instruction, some people might take an overdose or something and you may end up with more problems on your hands. So he was very, very sensitive to this and he was l assured by people all along that potassium iodide is effective within 4 to 12 hours after exposure. So he felt that if the potassium iodide was strategically placed near the plant or in the plant that there would be adequate time if there was a sudden release to give it out, to distribute it. And he felt comfortable with that but he was getting this pressure apparently from the Federal level and Secretary Califano I understand NO}SH was involved because fid[ISH is interested in the safety on the workers onsite. So at that point I felt it was very important for me at least to convey that information to Washington and I did it bV calling Jack Watson directly and it was a late I

evening meeting and I probably would have called Bill Wilcox first and told him about it but I felt that it was important to get to the White House quickly on it and then I followed up the next morning with a call to Bill Wilcox. And the response I got from the White House was we appreciate the call and we'll take action here at our level to try to resolve that. And as I understand it the next day Secretary Califano rethought his position because he didn't have all the information and he wasn't aware as I understand it, and here again this is only heresay that the potassium iodide was readily available and consequently there was not a need to actually distribute it. Smith Larry, do you have any particular points... Crocker I can't think of anything, I believe it is pretty well covered... Smith You mentioned earlier that you considered and you contacted 25 or 30 Federal agencies. I believe I noted in one of the files where you were requested to estimate the number of Federal agencies that were up there in-the field and a rough l idea of how many people there might have been in the Federal government. Adancik It was rough. And I had Tom Hardy from FPA again do a check and I don't know, I can't remember. There were just a tremendous number of agencies in the area and the number of people, of employees just was staggering. Initially I was supposed to go up and talk _to all the Federal employees and tell them what was going on, but I decided against that and I reported back that it was just I

-19_ physically, logisticalli impossible. So rather than doing it that way I felt that I ought to get at least the heads of the agencies or a representative of the agency there,at least of those key agencies that can also help. And I wasn't trying to give them information or be their public information officer or anything else. I just wanted to bring them in and see if they can help and tell them what I knew about it. So we never invited all the agencies. I think there were 80 or 90 or something. I don't recall how many there were, but... Crocker There were lots of folks involved. Smith As the Lead Federal Official, you still have that title, or has that been officially terminated? Adancik Well, you know it's never been withdrawn and the title of Federal Coordinating Officer is never withdrawn either. There's a formal appointment made and as long as there is some activity ongoing with that disaster situation, which there is. We have at the present time here in Region 3 about 20 open disasters dated back to 1971, so those that I was appointed FC0 on I would still be respon-sible in case of any situation that developed. If something comes up I'm still the FCO. I'm an FC0 in perpetuity. Without actually being told that we assume i that's the way it is and after a while there's no longer a need to be involved. But in this case I think, at least in my opinion, I envision my role as lead Federal Official to be basically complcce and now we're in the stage of long term recovery and planning for the future and the Federal Regional Council here in b -

~ Philadelphia is very active in providing assistance for long term recovery and the White House cane out with a paper which appointed I believe three different people or three different agencies to continue to do certain things it. the future and it seemed to be that after I saw all those things that were being done it pretty much took all the activity out of my hands. The long term economic recovery, the NRC with the monitoring, and the technical and decontamination of the plant, and so forth, and I guess EPA and HEW and those agencies responsible for monitoring and the health aspects of it. So it pretty much took it out of my hands without actually being told. Smith I I believe that covers all the points that I was... We appreciate your time very much. Adamcik Ucil I'm happy to be of help. / / / i i i $s l

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