ML19308C478
| ML19308C478 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Crane  |
| Issue date: | 10/01/1979 |
| From: | Chin R, Shapar H NRC - NRC THREE MILE ISLAND TASK FORCE, NRC COMMISSION (OCM) |
| To: | |
| References | |
| TASK-TF, TASK-TMR NUDOCS 8001240636 | |
| Download: ML19308C478 (66) | |
Text
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N U CLE A R R E G U L ATO R't COMMIS SIO N l
O IN THE MATTER OF:
THREE MILE ISLAND l
SPECIAL DEPOSITION DEPOSITION OF HOWARD K.
SHAPAR 3
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Place - Bethesda, Maryland Date - Monday, 1 October 1979 Pages 1-66 9
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Telephone:
(202)347 3700 ACE - FEDERAL REPORTERS,INC.
OffiaalReponers hf 444 North Capitol Street 3[,[33iMiN IIjuuW3Udd b. washington, D.C. 20001 8 0 01240 f 36 NATIONWIDE COVERAGE DAILY T
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CR 7414 1
JWBeach UNITED STATES OF AMERICA l
all 1
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION l
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________________x 3
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l In the Matter of:
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THREE MILE ISLAND SPECIAL DEPOSITION 6
________________x 7
DEPOSITION OF HOWARD K.
SHAPAR 8
Room 6211 9
Maryland National Bank Building 7735 Old Georgetown Road 10 Bethesda, Maryland 11 Monday, October 1, 1979 12 APPEARANCES.
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i 13 For the Nuclear Regulatory Commission:
14 ROBERT CHIN, Esq.
15 Principal Interviewer:
16 ROBERT M. BERNERO 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 p,. c _....
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2 WITNESS:
PAGE 3
Howard K.
Shapar 3
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.I 10 EXHIBITS:
IDENTIFIED 11 Shapar Exhibit No. 1 3
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Shapar Exhibit No. 2 4
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CR 7414 JWBeach 3
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2 (2:05 p.m.)
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Whereupon, 4
HOWARD K.
SHAPAR 5
was called as a witness and, having been first duly sworn, 6
was examined and testified as follows:
7 EXAMINATION 8
BY
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CHIN:
9 Mr. Shapar, I show you what has been marked for l
10 identification as Exhibit 1.
Is this a copy of a letter 1I sent to you by the NRC Special Inquiry Group concerning your 12 deposition hare under cath today?
O 13 A
Yes.
14 G
Have you read this document in full?
15 A
I have.
16 4
Do you understand the information included in 17 the letter, including the purpose of the Special Inquiry 18 Group, your right to have an attorney present today, and 19 the fact that the information you provide today may eventually 20 become public?
21 A.
I do.
O 22 G
Mr. Shapar, is counsel representing you personally 23 today?
24 A.
No.
DFederd Coporters, Inc.
25 G
I would like to note for the record the witness
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is not represented by counsel.
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2 Mr. Shapar, if any time during this interview -- of this j
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deposition, you should feel the need for an attorney, or to 4
have an attorney present, please advise and we'll adjourn 5
this proceeding and allow you to make the arrangements 6
necessary.
7 Is this procedure agreeable with you?
8 A
Yes.
9 G
Did you bring a copy of your resume today?
10 A
Yes.
11 G
Is this document marked Exhibit 2 that resume?
12 A
It is.
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13 G
Does this document accurately reflect your 14 educational and em:!avment background?
15 A
There 's not much employment background there 16 except for my present position.
17 G
All right.
18 MR. CHIN:
Mr. Bernero?
19 BY MR. BERNERO:
20 0
Mr. Shapar, there are going to be two lines of 21 questioning today.
22 First, there will be some questioning of modest length 23 about the TMI incident itself.
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24 And then I will go into a line of generic questions AeFews noomn. w.
25 that are being put to you because of your position as one i.
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1 of the senior staff officers of the NRC, and these will go l
O 2
far beyond the TMI event itself into the very functioning of 3
the Agency.
O 4
Now when I'm in the generic questioning, it is recognized 5
that as we go from one person to the~next we might encounter 6
areas where your expertise or knowledge is not as complete 7
as it might be for some other party.
As a result, we fully 8
expect that there may be situations where you are disinclined 9
to volunteer an opinion, or to give an answer to the question.
10 So if that be the case, so be it.
However, I request 11 and exhort you that on those areas that speak to the 12 functioning of this Agency, wherever you can help by giving 13 us your insight, your personal insight, you will help a 14 great deal to enhance the effectiveness of this inquiry into 15 the NRC and the TMI response.
16 So first of all, for the event itself, when did you 17 first hear of the TMI accident?
18 A.
On the morning of the day on which it occurred.
I 19 G
Wednesday, that would be March 28th.
Do you 20 recall at approximtely what time?
Was it quite early?
Or 21 middle --
22 A.
Middle of the morning.
I 23 G
Middle of the morning.
24 Were you called officially to participate in any way in l Am Federal Reporters, Inc.
25 the action?
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1 A
No.
2 G
Did you delegate --
3 A
Excuse me.
Do you mean at that time?
j 4
0 Yes, at that time.
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A On the morning of the --
6 0
-- of the 28th.
7 A
No.
8 4
Was there a later time at which you were asked 9
to provide professional service, or formal, official service i
10 in the response?
11 A
I did appear at the East-West Towers on Saturday 12 at the Control Center there.
I don't recall any specific 13 requests to be there, but I did go there and spend approxi-l 14 mately an hour-and-a-half, two hours there.
j 15 g
Did you --
1 16 A
But I did not contribute anything.
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17 B
Did you ask any of your Licensing Staff to go 18 over there, or to stand by, or to provide counsel?
1 19 A
I may have requested Scinto to go over there.
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20 knew he was over there on a more-or-less continuing basis, 21 or was there frequently, and I either requested it or 22 sanctioned it; I don't recall which.
l 23 g
Okay, so that on as "as needed" basis; you had
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no specific or formal role in the emergency response 24 Am-FWwd Recrurs, lx, 25 procedures?
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A.
No.
Oh, I may have been a member of the team, as O
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a general emergency response team; I don't know whether that l
3 accounted for my showing up on a Saturday morning or not, I i
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don't recall.
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G Okay, and thus, aside from what one might i
6 characterize as your " normal appearances" or involvement with 7
post-TMI events, you and your office had no particular role 8
in the emergency response itself; is that correct?
9 A
Except we were available to respond --
10 0
Yes.
11 A
-- to questions, or to provide services as needed.
12 G
Okay, I think that suffices for the TMI accident 13 itself -- you know, the chronology of the events.
Now I'd 14 like to go into the generic questions.
15 Now I will try to tell you, in each case, where I'm 16 changing subject.
We've set up generic questions, and we're 17 trying to tailor them to the individual to whom we're 18 speaking, because of the differences of expertise, but we're 19 covering areas -- topical areas -- and I'll try to tell you 20 what the area is.
21 The first one is the safety review approach.
Would you 22 agree that it is the NRC procedure or policy to review a 23 license applicant's plant design against a specific set of
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24 postulated accidents -- a so-called " design basis accident" Ace-Federd Reporters, Inc.
25 set?
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1 A
I know that they do in fact review applications j
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2 against a number of postulated accidents.
3 G
Do you know what basis the NRC -- what legal j
4 basis the NRC uses for doing this review in this fashion?
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5 A
Well, staff has been delegated authority by the l,
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Commission to make a safety review of applications that are 7
submitted, and they're not constrained to any specific 8
method of review that I know of, except that which is reflected 9
in the Commission's regulations -- most particularly, in 10 Part 100 and Part 2 -- I mean, Part 100 and Part 50.
11 The methodology of their review is -- unless otherwise 12 prescribed by the Commission -- up to the staff.
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13 G
In other words, you're saying the method used is 14 open to the discretion of the staff, as far as the scope. and j
15 content of the review?
16 A
As long as it's in compliance with the Commission's l
17 regulations, or any other instructions which the Commission j
18 may have specifically communicated to the staff.
4 19 G
Quite sometime ago, in fact before the NRC was a 4
j 20 separate body, the staff indeed proposed to codify the ii 21 design-basis accident approach in a proposed annex to the s
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22 regulations.
And this annex was published for comment, but 4j 23 to my knowledge I believe, has never gone beyond that stage.
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24 And the' staff, instead, elected to clarify its approach to Q Am-Fded Reormrs, lm.
25 design-basis accident review through the use of Regulatory 6
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1 Guides, which delineate what accidents are reviewed.
O 2
A Are you referring to the 1971 annex -- I mean the 1
3 annex reviewing accidents, Classes 1 through 9?
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4 G
Yes, or --
5 A
Proposed --
6 G
-- excluding Class 9.
7 A
Excluding Class 9, right.
8 G
Yes, reviewing 1 through 8.
Yes, that is what 9
I'm referring to.
10 A
Of course that is a NEPA review, rather than a 11 safety review, under,the Atomic Energy Act.
12 G
Is this the reason that that never became part 13 of the regulation?
14 A
No, it's certainly not the reason why it did not 15 become part of the regulation.
16 0
Can you indicate to your knowledge why that never 17 became formally stated in the regulations?
18 A
I cannot.
19 G
Do you know how long the staff has used the 20 design-basis accident approach?
21 A
I do not.
22 G
In 1975, there was a fire at the Browns Ferry 23 Plant, and this led to a detailed review or evaluation under
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24 the direction of Dr. Hanauer after t?.e accident.
Ace Federal Reporters, Inc.
25 It appears to us that that accident was not a design-basis i
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1 accident, and that following it there was an extensive effort r'
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by the NRC staff to fold that particular type of accident --
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a major fire -- into the design basis.
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To your knowledge, was there any review or evaluation of l
5 the fundamental approach as a result of that?
6 A
I have no recollection of it.
7 G
Do you have any idea why the NRC did not review 8
its approach, rather than merely add another design-basis 9
accident to the set?
10 A
I do not.
11 G
The accident at Three Mile Island does not appear 12 to have been a design-basis accident.
Would you agree with 13 that?
14 A
I can only refer you to a staff position which we 15 took in a pending proceeding, the name of which I don't 16 recall offhand, in which the staff took the position in a 17 pleading filed by the staff that TMI was a Class 9 accident.
18 G
The staff took the position that it was a Class 9 19 accident?
20 A
That it was a Class 9 accident.
21 G
And this is not a TMI proceeding?
It's a proceeding 22 in some other licensing case?
23 A
Correct.
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24 G
Do you think that. the NRC's present reliance on
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25 design-basis accident analysis, using the formulated set of
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accidents, needs to be changed?
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A I have not developed an opinion on that.
2 3
G Consequently, it would be fair to say that you O
4 wouldn't have an opinion on the pros and cons of changes?
5 A
Not at this time.
6 G
Do you know of plans afoot or underway for NRC to 7
assess the need to change that philosophy?
Have you been 8
involved in any such discussions?
9 A
Not to my recollection, but I would assume that 10 that would be a natural matter to examine post-TMI.
11 G
In the safety review, the staff doing the work 12 considers or reviews what is called " safety grade equipment."
13 In general, is it your understanding that the licensing and 14 inspection procedures are essentially confined to what is 15 called " safety grade equipment"?
16 A
I'd say it certainly focused on it; I don't know 17 whether I could say " confine" or not.
la G
In other words, are you saying that you believe 19 there are instances where the staff reviews nonsafety grade 20 equipment as part of its safety review?
21 A
I'm just saying I don't know.
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Do you think, in light of the TMI accident 23 experience, that the staff should review nonsafety grade 24 equipment as well as safety grade equipment, in some fashion?
Ace Federd Reporters, Inc.
25 A
I have not developed an opinion on that at this
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2 G
Now I want to turn to a few questions about the l
3 Standard Review Plan which is used in reactor licensing.
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Is it correct that since about 1975 the NRC staff in 5
Nuclear Reactor Regulation has used the so-called " Standard 6
Review Plan" for their reactor safety review?
7 A
I cannot specifically of my own knowledge tie it 8
to a specific year, but they have been using it in recent 9
years, and 1975 sounds about right.
10 0
Do you have an opinion as to whether TMI has 11 exposed deficiencies in the Ftandard Review Plan?
12 A
I don't have an optiion on that at thia time.
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13 G
Was the Standard Review Plan implemented by the 14 NRR staff essentially on its own authority, to your recollec-15 tion?
16 A
I would have the feeling that it was at least 17 discussed with the Commission, but I have no specific 1
18 recollection of it having been.
19 G
Would it be your opinion that it would be 20 appropriate for the Commission to act in some positive way 21 on a step so major as the adoption of a Standard Review Plan r(y) 22 for reactor licensing review?
23 A
I think that depends on what the -- on what
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overall role the Commission envisages for itself on the a.?oderd Reporters, Inc.
25 general subject of its health and safety responsibilities.
13 f
But considering the problem from its largest dimensions, I j
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2 would expect tuat the Commission should at least be aware of 3
the fact that a standard review plan approach is being used.
O 4
I don't have an opinion as to whether or not they should j
5 specifically authorize it, 'but I would :,hink that at a minimum 6
they should have been aware of it.
7 G
Well, I think it's reasonable to say that they a
were periodically informed of the development, and later the 9
implementation, of the Standard Review Plan.
10 What I would -- What I am seeking is an opinion on 11 whether the staff should present to the Commission such 12 information, or information of such a development, and await 13 Commission pleasure or consciously seek Commission authority 14 for the adoption of such a plan.
15 Do you have an opinion on that?
i 16 A
I do not.
17 G
In the entire area of review -- safety review --
18 the NRC staff usually speaks of the audit review.
This is I
19 both for safet'y review and for safety inspection.
That the 20 licensee is primarily and continuingly responsible, and that l
l 21 the NRC staff is evaluating a design, or inspecting perfor-22 mance only insofar as to verify that the licensee is satisfying 23 its responsibility.
24 Is it your understanding that this is the regulatory m Feder"J Reporters, Inc.
25 approach to the safety review and inspection?
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A.
I think we have to define terminology a bit.
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have considerable trouble with bald statements that someone f
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statements in the past, and I have criticized them.
4 5
G These are statements from the staff?
6 A.
From various people in the staff, or even outside the staff, in terms of saying that either the licensee is 7
primarily responsible for safety, or the NRC is primarily 8
9 responsible for safety.
I don't think words like that, or 10 terminology like that, contributes much to an understanding 11 of the process.
There are certain actions which a licensee or an appli-12 O
i3 cene muse texe, end e cereein review responsib111er on the 14 part of the Commission.
The Commission has to assure itself 15 that the statutory standards are met.
The licensae obviously has the day-to-day responsibility 16 17 for operating the reactor.
Now where that leaves you in terms of "primarily," I'm 18 19 not precisely sure -- at least from a theoretical standpoint.
Now with that preface, I don't see anything intrinsically 20 21 wrong with an audit review, in my opinion.
As I see it, there would have to be an enormous increase on the part of 22 l
the staff and a duplication of actions were the staff to do 23 24 everything that the applicant or licensee does.
pFederd Reporters, Inc.
I think it's not so much a question of "either/or" you I
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1 have an audit or you don't, but what kind of an audit, and j
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what kind of depth you get into in performing the audit, l
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and what kind of independent verification you do on a spot-l
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check basis.
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I don't see it as a question of "either/or."
i 6
G Resources aside -- presuming that whatever is l
7 chosen is matched by appropriate recources -- is it your a
opinion that the existing statutes permit the NRC to follow 9
what one usually thinks of as an audit review, or if it chose 10 in its prudence to do so, to follow an extremely thorough 11 review that essentially duplicated everything the licensee 12 did?
13 A
Yes, I believe the NRC as a legal matter has that 14 discretion under statute.
15 G
So there would be a matter of choice to determine 16 the wisdom of doing one or the other?
17 A
In my opinion, yes.
18 G
Now in the safety review of existing plants, we 19 come across the word "backfitting," the concept of going to 20 a previously approved design and deciding to change it, and 21 enforcing a change at some expense to the owner.
Would you p'd agree that this is one of NRC's more difficult problems in 22 i
23 deciding when safety warrants a backfitted change?
24 A
It is an important problem and a difficult Feder3 Reporters. Inc.
25 problem.
I don't know what peg on a priority list I'd place
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Are you aware of written criteria or policies 3
set for making backfitting decisions?
I 4
A Yes, there's a regulation on backfitting.
5 0
Are you referring to 10 CFR 50.1097 6
A It's in Part 50.
I can't recall whether it's 7
109 or not.
8 G
It's the rather terse paragraph --
9 A
Very short.
10 G
-- which in essence says that if the improvement 11 in safety is justified by the cost, that the backfitted 12 change should be made?
O 13 Would you agree with that characterization of it?
14 A
If it's -- I think the word " substantial" is in 15 there -- substantial improvements in health and safety, 16 something like that.
I think your characterization is 17 generally correct.
18 G
This criterion or basis for backfitting, is it 19 regularly used in the review process and cited in the review 20 process as the basis for action?
21 A
I don't know.
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Does it, in your view, have a different force 23 in reactor cases for a reactor which has received a construc-(
24 tion permit only, as against a reactor which has received an l
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Let me try to answer that question in this way:
O 2
There have been many arguments about whether or not back-3 fitting is being applied in connection with an operating O
4 license review.
And part of the difficulty is that at the 5
construction permit stage, the only thing the applicant has 6
submitted essentially is the preliminary design.
7 When the final design is submitted during the operating 8
license review, then there have been arguments between the 9
staff and the license applicant as to whether or not back-10 fitting is occurring or not.
11 I think it's largely attributable to the imprecision of 12 the backfitting language, and it's a matter about which
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13 reasonable men can differ -- although my general impression 14 has been that in many cases, that the applicant has alleged 15 backfitting, it really was not "backfitting"; but it was a 16 disagreement about whether or not the final design require-17 ment that the staff was seeking to impose went beyond the 18 preliminary design that was submitted and approved at the 19 construction permit stag *.
20 4
That line seems to be characterizing a situation 21 where the staff and the applicant differ on the legitimate l ()
22 implementation of a commitment at the construction permit 23 stage.
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24 Do you think that there is argument also about the
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25 clarity of the commitment at the construction permit stage?
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18 I have in mind the principal architectural features, 1
O which is a much-debated term.
1 2
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A.
Yes.
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G You think this is unclear?
a A
Yes.
5 O
And a source ci. controversy?
6 A.
I do.
7 G
Is it your opinion that the regulations which 8
spell out the construction permit and operating license 9
characteristics or points of judgment should be changed or 10 clarified?
11 A.
I m not sure I understand that question.
12 13 G
Well, let me put it this way:
If we have a difficulty in putting an accurate -- or in obtaining accurate ja 15 understanding of what the commitments are for a construction 16 permit and later to be implemented in an operating license application, is there a need for us to clarify this situation j7 through regulation change, or perhaps if necessary even 18 j9 through legislative changes?
A.
I don't think a legislative change is required to 20 achieve that cbjective.
Where I could see some progress being 21 made is in a better definition of what the " principal 22 architectural engineering criteria" are.
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w r the -nstruce1-permit c - 1ement --
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That's correct.
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-- to eliminate that part of the argument.
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2 A
Yes.
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G The Regulation 10 CFR 50.109 seems to give a clear 4
basis to consider cost, dollar cost, in the judgment of i
5 whether or not a change. to improve safety is necessary.
4 6
Is this consistent with our practice in the NRC?
Does j
7 the NRC regularly and methodically consider cost in the 8
backfitting decision, in your view?
l 9
A I think you've staced several questions, and I l
10 disagree with the premise of your major question.
I don't 11 think that the backfitting criterion provides a clear basis, 12 in your words, to consider cost.
13 G
In what are you -- Are you distinguishing dollar 1
j 14 costs from all costs in this?
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15 A
No.
16 G
Are you just --
i 17 A
Not at this point.
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i 18 G
Well, does not the Regulation 50.109 clearly link li j
19 changed to improve safety to their ettendant costs?
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I 20 A
I think not.
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21 G
Oh, you think it does not?
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22 A
Nothing on its face says " cost."
Now that may have 1l 23 been an underlying motive in the adoption of the backfitting I O l Ac. Feders n.pon.n, inc.
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24 criterion, and I'm quite sure it entered heavily into the l
j 25 decision to adopt it, but I don't think the words, as written, i
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clearly link it with cost, as you stated.
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G Do you think the NRC should adopt much more 3
explicit standards and procedures for analyzing the cost of 4
backfitting?
5 A
I haven't developed an opinion on that at this I
6 time.
7 G
Do you have an opinion on where the decision for 8
backfitting -- this judgment, weighing cost against safety 9
improvements -- do you have an opinion on where that decision 10 should lie?
That is, with the Licensing office?
Or with 11 the Commission?
12 A
I think I have to understand your question better.
O 13 Are you talking in terms of implementing it in an individual i
14 licensing care and applying it to a given reactor?
15 G
At the first, yes, to a specific instance of a 1
16 single reactor case.
l 17 And secondly, where a single decision such as a require-i 18 ment in the Standard Review Plan would apply to a whole class l
19 of reactors.
20 A
I think that relates to the basic question of how 21 deeply involved the Commission should be in day-to-day safety h
22 reviews, and I don't have an opinion on that overall question
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23 at this. time, b[
N' 24 G
Let me turn now to an area a lot closer to your j Ace-Federal Reporters, Inc.
j 25 normal work:
the legal process of licensing.
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y u believe, in your personal view, that the 1
2 licensing hearing process contributes nearly as much to the 3
health and safety of the public as the staff safety review a
with ACRS oversight?
5 A.
I do not.
6 0
Do you believe that public participation in the 7
licensing process through intervenors delays the licensing 8
of plants, but does not make the process safer?
9 A.
I think it makes the process safer -- and you have 10 to define your term by " delay."
Any time you provide for l-public participation, you by definition almost provide for 11 12
" delay."
O 33 I think the real question is whether it's an unjustified l
14 delay or not, weighing in the balance the. contribution that i
15 public participation can e.nd does contribute.
i 16 G
Should participation of the public --
17 A.
Excuse me, I want to -- the answer that I gave to L
18 the two questions may seem in conflict.
You asked me one 19 question:
Did I t' 4.nk that public participation contributed 20 "as much" as the staff and ACRS review?
I do not.
q U
Your second question was:
Does it make a contribution?
21 22 The answer to that question is "yes."
.i j-23 G
Yes, I appreciated that distinction.
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24 A.
I wanted to make sure that that point got across.
Ace 4ederd Reporters, Inc.
25 G
Should participation of the public in the licensing i
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1 process be improved?
Do you have any opinions on tha?.?
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On how it might be improved, for instance?
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3 A
I think it should be changed in some way.
I can't O
4 give you a precise blueprint as to how, except to provide for 5
earlier public participation in the process; and, that once 6
dacisions have been reached with some undefined escape valves, 7
those decisions should stick as the process progresses.
8 G
Some have suggested that the NRC,' distinct from 9
its existing function, set up an independent legal and/or 10 technical staff to assist interrentrs; others seek the'equiva-11 lent by proposing direct funding to intervenors so that they 12 might seek their own legal or technical assistance.
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13 Do you think that either of these approaches would
- . a 14 constructive improvement of the licensing process?
15 A
I view the problem as somewhat larger.
I see it 16 beyond the dimension of just NRC licensing.
It see it as an 17 across-the government approach.
18 We' re talking about the expenditure of taxpayers ' money, 19 and I think it's a basic policy choice on the part of the 20 Congress, essentially, as to whether or not taxpayers' funds 21 can be best spent here, as contrasted with other competing
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22 demands for public monies.
f 23 And on that basic question, I have not reached an
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24 opinion.
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So you would consider either one of these i
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alternatives which involve government resources going into t
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Assuming that one makes a decision that one o.-
5 the other should be adopted, I think my own preference wc uld 6
be for the grant of money.
7 But a.,
in, I view it as not just an NRC problem; it's cropped up repear.dly in other agencies; various approaches 8
9 have been taken; I think it's time that the Congress, in my 10 opinion, confronted the question generically.
And there have 11 been bills recently -- the Ribicoff bill, after extensive 12 hearing, that has been introduced in the Congress.
()
ja G
To that effect.
14 A
Yes.
15 G
Now this next question I ask out of some personal 16 experience in the reactor licensing and other facility 17 licensing process.
Doesn't your office of the Executive 18 Legal Director now do some things to assist intervenors in 19 the hearing process?
20 A
Yes, we do.
21 G
Could you describe what you do, and how the i
(-)s intervenors might know that such service is available?
22 23 A
Particularly in cases where intervenors are k
24 unrepresented by counsel and have a marked unfamiliarity I Am FWed Mmonus, W.
l 25 vlth NRC rules, my staff attorneys will frequently explain i
24 the Commission's rules to the intervenor or intervenors' i
O 2
counsel.
In addition, during the process of negotiating i
1 3
contentions, on occasion staff counsel -- once he's sure he O
understands the contention that the intervenor wants to 4
5 raise -- will help him to formulate his contention, on 6
occasion, to make it clearer than was originally submitted.
This has raised objection s on the part of some applicant's 7
counsel who feel that staff counsel should not be providing 8
9 this kind of assistance to irtervenors, but we nonetheless 10 do it.
11 G
Is this widely known to the public that you do 12 this?
()
13 A
I believe it is.
There have been many -- or 14 several meetings.
I recall one specifically, sort of a 15 training session with the -- for the hearing boards that took 16 place last year, where intervenor counsel like Roisman, 17 Anthony Roisman, were present, and this was discussed.
jg There have been other public meetings that I have 19 attended -- one with Commissioner Gilinsky in the earlier 20 part of this year, or last year, where this matter has come 21 up.
Many people are well aware of it, and they automatically
()
have come to the staff either of their own volition, on 22 23 occasion, or were referred to the staff by the board.
()
24 0
Would you consider this, then, a well-established
$Feded Doorters, Inc.
I 25 and constructive custom, and not something thst needs to be 1
i
25 I
I put into regulatory rigidity, regulatory commitment, formal l
j y
()
2 in any way?
A I don't consider whether you put it into a formal 3
O regulatory: rule or a commitment as a major question.
I think 4
it's known about; I think the real question is:
Is it a good 5
1 idea?
And I think it is, at least at this stage.
And how 6
it's implemented.
7 Obviously the staff shouldn't be in a role, or staff 8
counsel shouldn't be in a role of trying to direct somebody 9
10 else's case.
The intervenor has his own case.
And staff 11 counsel should not attempt to develop the intervenor's case 12 for him.
This is rather limited assistance the way it works
()
at the present time.
13 Now reasonable men can argue about where that line ought ja 15 to be drawn.
I consider that a more significant question than whether or not it's inculcated in the regulation.
16 17 G
In that context, to your knowledge does the technical staff ever join with the legal staff in this sort 18 19 of constructive assistance?
A I think that they do, but I'm not sure of that 20 answer.
21
()
C In the hearing process that NRC holds or conducts 22 23 for licensing, the staff is a party and stands substantially
()
on its safety evaluation as written up in the safety evalua-24 Iha-Federd Reporters, Inc.
25 tion report.
Do you think that-the present process wherein i
26 l
1 the staff is a party and defending its evaluation report, l
l 2
tends to drive the technical staff to being limited in what l
3 they say in the safety evaluation report?
4 A.
I wenidn't think substantially, in view of the 5
Commission's t.trong and enunciated policy that -- regarding 6
whistleblowing, or expressing dissenting views.
7 They feel, if they disagree -- if a member of the staff 8
feels he disagrees with the staff position, he is now 9
perfectly free under existing procedures to speak up on his 10 own position.
11 g
Do you think that as the staff conducts licensing 12 reviews, that the Commission is excessively isolated from the 13 license review process by what people frequently call "the 14 ex parte need"?
15 A.
The Commission is supposed to decide the case on 16 the record.
This is a requirement of law.
On a contested 17 case, the Commission cannot consult with the staff.
It is l
18 supposed under the law to reach its decision squarely on that 19 record.
20 To that extent, the Commission is isolated, as any judge 21 would be isolated, or as the adjudicatory process works in i
22 any other agency.
23 G
Do you think this then tends to isolate the b
24 Commission, even before the case is contested, as say when co-Federd Reporters, Inc.
25 the application is first reviewed before some party argues I
27 i
i l
1 the case?
2 A
Well, until the case has been noted for hearing, 3
the Commission can legally speak to the staff and vice versa.
O'.
4 But the staff, at that point in time -- at an early point in time before the case is noticed -- hasn't performed its own 5
6 review substantially, so there isn't much to discuss with the 7
Commission.
8 G
But as ycu see it, once the staff is into a 9
substant.al part of its review, the case has long since been 10 noticed for hearing, and you see a barrier then for explicit 11 participation between --
12 A
The barrier is the Commission's ex parte rules
()
13 which preclude a substantive discussion of the merits of the 14 case between the Commission and any party within the staff.
15 Now what you have here is a balancing of public policy 16 considerations.
If the norm is correct, that it should be 17 an adjudicatory proceeding and on the record, then one result 18 just naturally follows the other.
19 One of the down sides of that kind of a situation is 20 the isolation of the Commission.
21 On the other hand, if you were to relax the ex parte
()
22 rule and allow communications between the staff and the 23 Commission on contested issues, the Commission of course l ()
24 would have access to information at an earlier point in time.
wese.e rs. con.n inc.
25 As to what the Commission would do about that in an N
l l
I
28 l
1 adjudi.catory process is another question.
Also, in terms of l
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public credibility, I think that one would want to look at i
3 the repercussions of allowing one party to the proceeding to O
4 discuss the matters with the judges, while the other parties 5
are precluded from doing so.
6 So there's a certain balance here of competing public 7
policy considerations:
The " isolation of the Commission," as 1
8 you would have it; as contrasted with public credibility and 9
way that the adjudicatory process normally works.
10 G
I'd like to pursue another matter in this safety 11 responsibility as we review the case.
The staff frequently 12 saying that the licensee or applicant for the license is
()
13 responsible for all of the work of itself and of its principal i
14 contractors and lesser contractors as well.
)
15 Wouldn't you say
.t's a fair characterization that in j
16 fact the true responsibility for important technical work is 17 now fragmented among various parties -- che utilities, their 18 contractors, the NRC, and others?
i i
19 A
I think that there's a different role in the l
20 process for different parties.
The Commission is responsible --
)
21 by "the Commission," I mean the NRC -- is responsible for
()
22 seeing that its regulations are af 3 red to, and reviewing 23 the application to see whether or not the Commission's
()
24 regulations are met.
p.Fewa nwora,s. ix.
25 If the Commission's regulations are not met, then a I
i 29 l
1 license should not issue.
I have considerable difficulty, as O
2 I answered in response to a previous question, with generali-3 zations, to say that one party has the primary responsibility O
4 as contrasted with another party.
5 I don't find that very productive in terms of any 6
analytical approach to the problem.
The Commission's 7
regulations are a matter of record.
A utility who wants to 8
get a license knows that it has to meet these regulations to 9
get that license.
10 If the NRC doesn't believe that the application as 11 submitted meets the regulations, then it is the duty of the 12 staff to communicate that conclusion to the' applicant -- who
()
13 will usually, under the present process, change its approach 14 in order to meet the regulations.
15 Now who has primary responsibility for safety under those 16 circumstances, I think it is very difficult to say and not a-17 particularly rewarding line of analysis, in my opinion.
18 G
Well, I was thinking more in the line that we are 19 holding tile applicant responsible for the work of the 20 architect-engineer, and the nuclear steam supplier, and 21 other contractors, and as a practical matter I question the 22 realism of holding a small utility responsible for the work i
23 of Bechtel or B&W.
()
24 Do you have an opinion in this regard?
Is it practical Am Federst Reporters, Inc.
25 for us to base a regulatory system on this?
i I
30 i
i i
1 A
I think it's practical to do so, yes; whether or j
O 2
not there are not better approaches, I think is another 3
question.
4 The licensee must demonstrate his technical qualifications,.
l l
5 and if he doesn't have all of those in-house he has to go out l
6 and contract for them.
7 I see nothing intrinsically wrong with that kind of a 8
general system.
I think the real question perhaps is whether 9
or not some of the smaller utilities, once they have the 10 license, are perhaps as well equipped as larger utilities to 11 meet their ongoing obligations.
And I don't have an informed 12 opinion about that.
It's just been a question in my mind.
13 But I see nothing intrinsically wrong in the development of 14 the application, and in the ear 1r stages of the process --
15 and, for that matter, the later stages of the process -- for 16 the utility to get the competence which it needs out-house as 17 well as in-house, as long as the competence is available when 18 needed.
19 G
The NRC in reviewing the licensee or the appli-l 20 cant and the principal contractors to that entity has 21 extensive quality assurance criteria for the conduct of I
Ca s/
22 safety-related work.
l 23 Who is responsible for analyzing the quality of NRC's 24 own safety-related work, in your opinion?
! Ace Federd Reporters, Inc.
25 A
Do you mean how well the NRC d as its jobo
31 I
G No -- Wall, who should evaluate how the NRC staff l
2 does it job, for instance?
L Well, in the first instance, I guess the staff
}
e' 4
itself and the Commissioners.
There are the oversight S
committees of the Congress, and the public.
6 G
Well, turning to the NRC --
7 A
Excuse me -- I mean, it's the same way that any 8
goverrtent agency is evaluated.
There are in-house methods 9
of determining how various segments of the organization do 10 their job and, at the highest level within the Commission, at I'
the Commission level itself.
12 And as I indicated, there are the oversight committees of 13 the Congress; there's an Office of Inspector & Auditor.
Now 14 whether or not additional mechanisms or checks and balance systems ought to be set up, I don't have a firm opinion about at this time.
7 I
17 end bul G
Just one point:
In the self-scrutiny or internal 4
18 evaluation of that by NRC itself, do you know of an instance, 19 or even a discussion of the possibility of NRC ever inspecting j
20 itself against its own criteria for quality assurance?
4 21 i
A There may have been such discussions, but I have 22 1
not been privy to them.
I G
Okay, I'd like to turn to the subject of " operating 24 cxperience" and what can be gained from evaluating it.
u.pm p a
25
)
Do you think that NRC has had a satisfactory record of r
i l
l l
32 1
evaluating operating experience for matters of safety
!O 2
significance?
3 A
I don't think I'm qualified to answer that.
4 4
The NRC is just now establishing an Operations 5
Evaluation Group under the EDO in a recent action, do you 6
think that this group will have the authority and resources i
7 to do a satisfactory job of evaluating operating experience?
8 A
I do not know.
9 4
Let me turn to the ACRS.
10 The NRC has an Advisory Committee on Reactor Safeguards 11 which is very well known, and in some lesser areas -- or li
" narrower," I should say, areas uses advisory committees.
13 In your view, should the present role of the ACRS in I
14 reviewing safety issues be changed?
15 A
Yes.
]
16 G
In what way?
I i
17 A
That they only ought to be required to review i
18 those applications for a construction permit or an operating 19 license which either they themselves want to review, or i
20 which the Commission asks them to review.
The review ought 21 not to be mandatory.
22 G
Not every case mandatory, but by selection, in 1
)
23 other words.
24 A. -
Well, " selection" by one of two parties.
t-Am-Feder-J Reporters, Inc.
j 25 G
Yes.
l I
33 I
A.
Either by the Commission asking them, or they on O
!j y
their own should have full authority to review, if they want l,
2 to review.
If they don't want to review and we don 't ask 3
O them to review, then in my opinion they shouldn't be 3
i compelled to review.
5 g
How do you feel about the ACRS review being 6
broadened into other safety areas beyond the scope of reactor 7
safety, such as safety in transportation of nuclear materials, 8
or in safeguards?
9 A.
I haven't developed an opinion on that at this time.
10 jj g
In the area of standardization of reactor plants, 12 l do you believe that the NRC should require greater use of standardized plant design?
f 13 A.
I don't feel qualified to answer that question.
ja g
Do you feel qualified to pursue questions of i
15 control room design?
i 16 A.
No.
j7 G
Let me turn to NRC's role in an emergency.
I am 18 39 postulating, by describing it as an " emergency," that we're speaking of a situation of major -- a major accident or 20 incident at a nuclear reactor, for the sake of simplicity.
21 In the case of a major accident at a nuclear facility, 1
22 i
i-do you think that NRC now has the legal authority to order 23 24 the licensee to change what he's doing -- either to stop some
Ace-Federd Reporters, Inc.
peration, or to initiate some operation?
25 1
1 a
34 i
I 1
A.
I do.
2 O
Is it, do you believe, sufficiently clear where 3
that authority rests?
And I have in mind, whether the 4
Chairman has to tell them, or Harold Denton would tell them, 5
or someone who is clearly Harold Denton's surrogate, such as 6
say Victor -- Well, not anymore, but now it would be, say, 7
Roger Mattson.
l 8
A.
I think the delegations are clear.
The relevant 9
parts of the regulations are 10 CFR Part 2.202 and 2.204, l
10 the authority to issue, or take enforcement action.
And they II have been delegated to NMSS, NRR, and I&E, and some of them 12 have been subdelegated.
I think the delegations are clear as 13 now written, or at least the last time I looked at them.
Id I think the real question.is the extent to which the 15 Commission itself, the Commissioners, wish to get into the l
16 process.
They certainly have that authority, if they wish i
I 17 to exercise it themselves, since they have delegated the 1
18 authority to the staff.
l 1
19 I think the real question is the extent to which the i
j 20 Commissioners themselves, at the time of a real emergency, 21 wish to exercise the authority that they themselves have 22 delegated.
s 23 G
At least as a theoretical question, do you think 24 the NRC could literally take over the plant if it needed to?
! Am Federd Reporters, Inc.
f 25 A..
I'm not sure that the -- that I understand what you 4
35
\\
I mean by "take over. "
I think they have authority now to 2
place somebody at the reactor, and to order the reactor i
3 operator to take this action, and not to take this action.
4 If that's "taking over" --
5 G
No.
No, I intended by "take over," that marshalling 6
some SWAT Team, or group of reactor operators from the 7
Department of Energy, or from the NRC who -- and ordering the 8
licensee out of the control room in order to have other 9
operators manipulate the controls and bring the plant to a 10 safe shutdown, or whatever was required.
i II A.
I think that's questionable.
12 G
You think that is questionable?
- O
,2 A.
Yes.
Id G
Presuming for the moment that the legislation and i
15 the resources and all of the other factors permitted, do you 16 think that might be an intelligent or desirable approach?
17 A.
I see disadvantages to it, without reaching the 18 ultimate question as to whether or not those disadvantages 19 would on balance outweigh the advantages.
I haven't reached 20 a conclusion on that.
21 The disadvantages that I adverted to are the following:
O 22 j
That the -- under the present situation, NRC personnel l
l 23 are not as familiar with the guts of that reactor as are the 24 people who are licensed to operate it, and I'm not sure that Ace-Feder:s neponen, anc.
j 25 there wouldn't be disadvantages if people who were not as j.
36 l
1 intimately familiar with the reactor as the people who are
()
I 2
licensed to operate it were to be in charge -- whether that 3
would be a net gain for safety or a detriment to safety.
l
()
4 This is not to mention the resource problem.
You would 5
have to duplicate resources for 70-plus operating reactors, 2
6 and eventually -- if there's no change in the present status --!
7' a number of those that are under construction permit, et l
1 8
cetera, et cetera.
9 So I see a big difference between continuing to have the 10 authority which I think the NRC needs to direct operations 11 at the site -- which it can delegate to somebody who is 12 actually put on the site; in contrast with a " takeover" --
)
13 using your definition of " takeover."
14 A
Yes.
15 -
G Which is, to order the operating --
16 A
Literally replacing the operating crew.
17 0
First, you would have to assume a demonstrated 18 competence on the part of the NRC personnel, and enough of 19 them to go around.
20 A
Yes.
21 Going back to the " normal" or present context, without
)
22 takeovers, given a major nuclear accident in the present 23 circumstances, do you think NRC should be the principal
)
24 authority making decisions on measures to protect the public?
Ace Feder:2 Reporters, Inc.
l 25 Decisions such as taking shelter, evacuation, the use of l
37 j
l' 1
iodine blocking tablets, this sort of thing?
O 2
A As contrasted with other federal agencies?
Or l
i 3
state agencies?
(
4 G
or deferring to state agencies.
1' 5
A I haven't reached an opinion on that.
That's one 6
of the areas that I want to follow most closely as your 7
report and the other reports are developed and published.
I 8
don't think my data base is good enough to have reached any l
9 firm opinion on that.
10 0
With our present structure -- and just looking at 11 the TMI experience -- and let's assume that, for the sake 12 of argument or consideration, let's assume that the NRC is
()
13 making a firm recommendation -- not an order, or' anything --
14 but a firm recommendation with regard to a public protective 15 measure.
At what level of the NRC would you perceive it 16 necessary to make that recommendation?
17 A
I would like to see it at the Commission level.
18 G
It would be at the Commission level.
19 Now in the TMI accident, we have what you previously 20 said the staff has characterized as a Class 9 accident, with 21 off-site consequences, at least radiological consequences,
()
that wete lower than a typical Class 8 analysis.
And this 22 23 has raised many questions about the Price-Anderson Act 24 coverage.
n _.. ~.
25 The questions about potential Price-Anderson implications
l l
38 j
t i
1 raises in our mind a question of the next accident, andwhetherl 2
the staff in considering what to do, what to recommend, might l
t I
3 be affected by a Price-Anderson liability question.
i
()
4 I'd like to ask your opinion on the clarity of Price-5 Anderson legislation as it exists now, regarding the 6
responsibility for payment for several alternative situations 7
that are suggested by Three Mile Island.
8 In the case of a genuine accident with substantial 9
radiological impacts, is the legislation clear about the 10 responsibility for payment of nonradiological injuries 11 suffered in the evacuation?
12 A
Well, I think you have to have an initial under-()
13 standing of what Price-Anderson attempts to do and what it does 14 not attempt to do.
15 Generally speaking, the Price-Anderson system is a system 16 for assuring that money is available.
It does not change the 17 law of the state, essentially.
Now there's an exception to 18 that.
And that is, for extraordinary nuclear occurrences.
19 Now the only two essential differences between the 20 situation where you have an ENO and where you don't have an
~
21 ENO is, number one, there are certain provisions for
()
22 consolidating an ENO case in one federal district court.
23 The major one is for the waiver of certain defenses, now --
()
i 24 in effect, creating strict liability, which the state may p4meccooonen,Inc.
25 have anyway.
But the multitudinous problems about causation h
i J
l 39 1
and proof, and as to what damages should be compensated, you s-]
2 have whether you had Price-Anderson or not, because Price-3 Anderson doesn't change, except for the waiver provisions that
-s t
)
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4 I mentioned and the provision for removal to the federal 5
district court, doesn't change the underlying structure of 6
the state's tort law.
It's simply a system for making sure 7
the money is available.
8 So whether or not you had Price-Anderson in effect or 9
you didn't have Price-Anderson in effect, you would still be 10 confronted today in the case of TMI with a future accident 11 as to what are compensable damages.
And there, the state 12 laws across the country are not clear, and they vary from 13 state to state.
14 G
Well, this -- your answer seems to lead me to my 15 other two examples where I would consider not an accident 16 with substantial radiological impacts, but one that turned 17 out to be without substantial radiological impacts as Three 18 Mile Island did, but an accident which out of uncertainty 19 about the destiny of the plant, either the state alone, or the 20 state with NRC advice, elects to call an evacuation and, as it 21 turns out, the accident is not so severe as to have warranted O) the evacuation in retrospect -- but the uncertainty at the
(_
22 23 time may indeed have warranted it.
n
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24 This I believe would not be an ENO, and this is the co Federd Coporters, Inc.
25 other pair of alternatives that I wonder about:
Does that i
I l
40 I
have a clear basis in Price-Anderson coverage?
(
2 A
If I understand your question, the determination of j
I 3
whether or not there's been an ENO or not has only the O
4 consequences that I described.
Okay?
5 G
Just -- yes.
6 A
Whether or not certain defenses are waived, and I
whether or not there's a mandatory -- or the possibility of 7
consolidation in a federal court.
8 But now under the present regulations of the Commission as 9
10 to what is an ENO, you need two things:
You need substantial 11 off-site contamination as one criterion; and substantial 12 off-site damages, ms the other criterion.
()
Now those criteria are the exercise of considerable 13 14 discretion which the Congress wrote into the Price-Anderson 15 Act.
In fact, they set petition for rulemaking before the 16 Commission emanating from TMI asking the Commission to change its regulations as to what constitutes a TMI.
17 I
18 The starting point --
19 G
You mean an "ENO"?
20 A
21 So the starting point is, there's discretion under the (m
statute as to what an ENO is, and that discretion has been
(
22 reflected in regulations which are now in existence.
The 23 24 Commission has discretion to change those regolations if the eFased Reponen, Inc.
25 facts and circumstances and experience indicate it.
}
41 1
l I
Beyond that, I want to get back to a point that I first 2
mentioned.
That is, the rather limited consequences of a 3
declaration of an ENO.
It adds up to strict liability, and 4
there may be strict liability anyway within the state by 5
virtue of the tort law of the state in which the accident 6
occurs.
7 Now if your question is broader-than that and what you're 8
really asking is:
Could the NRC itself be held liable for 9
having incorrectly advised people to leave -- Is that your 10 question?
I don't want to answer any questions that haven't Il been asked.
I2 G
That's one element that underlies it.
O 13 A.
I assume that, under the Federal Tort Claims Act, Id anything that an NRC employee does in the line of duty, that 15 it constitutes an act of negligence and doesn't fall within 16 some of the exceptions -- or exemptions in the Federal Tort 17 Claims Act, like the discretionary exemption, would possibly 18 subject the agency to paying out funds.
l9 G
Charges for a false alarm.
20 A.
Yes.
The possibility exists.
21 G
One last question about emergency response.
, O 22 In the case of a major emergency such as a Three Mile 23 Island accident, do you think the NRC should act as a O
24 spokesman, and perhaps the sole spokesman to local authorities Federot Reporters, Inc.
25 and to the public?
1 l
i 42 1
And of course I'm comparing here to the licensee.
j O
2 A
I don't know that I have developed an opinion on l
l 3
that.
I can see certain advantages in terms of public l
(
i 4
acceptance of the authoritative statements of government l
5 agencies contrasted with a utility that has a certain stake 1
6 in the outcome of the accident.
l 7
On the other hand, I don't know whether you're suggesting l
6 8
that we muzzle by statute or some other means the free 9
expression of views by a utility chairman of the board of 10 directors if he wants to speak out and express his views to 11 the public.
I don't see a realistic statute that would say 12 that, notwithstanding the First Amendment, you can't say what O
i3 vou went suh11c1v.
14 So I guess what I'm saying is that, whatever is decided, 15 I don't see it in terms of statutory redress, but more in 16 terms of a practical accommodation.
17 But to the point of view of not confusing the public, it 18 would seem to me that a single spokesman would have obvious 19 advantages.
l l
20 0
Okay, I'd like to turn to some questions of staff i
l 21 operating efficiency and effectiveness of administration.
()
22 Right now, as an aftermath of the Three Mile Island event, 23 we're expecting to see the report of the Presidential
()
24 Commission on Three Mile Island, the report of the NRC's l Ace Federsl Reporters, Inc.
25 own Special Inquiry, we have a variety of Lessons Learned Task i
43 l
f i
Forces in the Agency, we have congressional oversight i
)
2 committees doing investigations, EPRI doing an investigation, j
3 a whole host of lessons are being learned by a lot of people.
O v
4 The question arises as to how realistically we might 5
expect the NRC to focus on these lessons learned and implement l
6 them.
7 Do you believe that with the present structure of the 8
NRC, the five-man Commission, that the NRC is in a position 9
to efficiently review these recommendations and make prompt 10 decisions?
11 (Pause.)
12 A
I'd have to say that they have the potential for
()
13 doing so, yes.
14 G
Are you hopeful?
Do you believe that they are 15 likely to do it?
16 A
I don't think I'm in a position to speculate as 17 to how severe any disagreements might be, or whether there 18 will be disagreements among the Commissioners.
I think your 19 question was basically directed at the system, whether the 20 system could -- would permit a reasoned and relevantly 21 expeditious reaction.
I think that the system does.
'(
22 Now that's not the same thing as saying that there 23 could not be improvements in the system.
()
24 G
Well, in 1971, the President's Council on Ace Federd Reporters, Inc.
25 Executive Organization issued the so-called "Ashe Report. "
i
44 1
Have you ever heard of that?
l
(
2 A
Yes, I have.
}
}
3 This report involved the study of independent O
4 regulatory commissions and made several generic observations 5
about them.
The following questions -- I'm going to give you 6
some of the observations that the Ashe Report made about 7
commission-form of regulation, and I'd like to ask your 8
opinions on whether you agree or disagree, or compare these 9
to NRC's situation.
10 The first area of comment was " policy formulation."
11 They made three judgments of note, the first being:
"Colle-12 gial bodies are inefficient mechanisms for formulating and
()
13 implementing policy in a timely manner."
i 1
14 A second judgment was:
"The usual procedure is to i
15 formulate policy in the context of individual cases brought i
16 before the commission. Policies thus made are narrow, after-e 17 the-fact, and fail to provide sufficient, timely, or 18 constructive guidance for interested parties. "
19 Lastly, they said:
"Co-equal commissioners too often 20 have difficulty agreeing on major policy statements and tend i
21 to wait for suitabi cases to come along and force the issue. "
. ()
22 Do you feel thi.
these comments characterize problems at J
i 23 NRC?
I
)
24 A
I don';. think I can answer the question in that Ace Feder-J Reporters, Inc.
i 25 manner.
Let me respond in this way:
(
I
45 i
i 1
There have been many commissions in addition to the Ashe i
(
i 2
Report, and the criticisms and -- both ways, of collegial I
3 bodies and single administrators are as timeworn as Plymouth O
I 1
4 Rock.
They're well known; they've been bandied about and 5
reiterated for at least the last 20 years.
6 Inately an administrator is a more efficient way of 7
getting a job done than a collegial body.
I don't think that 8
any sensible man would quarrel with that observation.
It 9
takes a shorter time for one man to make a decision than it 10 does five.
11 But that's not the real question in my mind.
The real i
l 12 question is that there are certain advantages to a collegial 13 forum.
And the ultimate question is whether or not the i
14 advantages of collegiality outweigh uhe efficiencies that 15 are obviously present in a single administrator type of 16 agency.
l 17 And in the present context, I have not reached an opinion i
i 18 on daat point.
19 0
You presumed my next question.
So you have no 20 opinion at this time --
21 A
No.
22 G
-- as to whether we should abolish the NRC and l
l 23 seek a single administrator?
24 A
No, I would certainly want to see the various Aco Feder:;I Reporters, Inc.
I 25 reports that are coming out, but at this time I've heard l
I
~
S 46 i
nothing that would make me decide that the balance that's O
2 been. demonstrated up to now, from the limited I know about l<
3 TMI, would cause me to reach an opinion that the collegial form of administration should be changed to a single 4
4 administrator.
5 But I'm reserving judgment until I see the reports on 6
f TMI.
7 G
Let me go to --
8 A
By the way, it's not an "all or nothing" 9
jo proposition, again.
There is the emergency situatica, which 11 is a discrete question within the framework of your quection.
12 In other words, assuming there's another option, that let'
()
say you're going to retain the collegial form of administra-13 ja tion within the agency; that does not mean that a single 15 person can't be delegated authority to cope wit h an emergency.
16 So I break down the question in two ways.
Number one, 17 the overall form of organization -- whether it ought to be 18 a single administrator or a collegial body.
19 And, number two, whether or not in a predefined emergency, l
i l
20 whether or not there ought to be a delegation from the l
21 collegial body to a single individual.
And I view those
()
questions, even though they're interlocked, as being somewhat 22 i
k 23 discrete.
24 G
Let's turn to some of the more particular adminis-l Am FWw2 Roorurs, lm.
25 trative questions.
It is correct that NRC is located in 10 i
47 l
buildings, in 6 different locations.
Do you have'an opinion j
O on whether there is a strong need to consolidate NRC 2
Personnel in a single location?
l 3
O A.
I think there's a strong and demonstrated need to 4
do that.
But I must add that, whether or not that had any 5
contribution, however minor, to the TMI situation is something 6
on which I express no opinion.
7 G
No, I'm not entirely limiting the question of TMI 8
response, or to emergency response.
9 A.
I think it's clear that that dispersion of 10 l
facilities is a strong minus in terms of efficiency.
ij G
Do you have an opinion on why this agency, which 12 O
1e now eggroximate1r five veers e1d, is se111 dispersed es i3 it is?
14 A.
Oh, I think it has something to do with decisions 15 16 as to where the agency ought to.be; the situation with the General Services Administration at the present time; th'e j7 committees of the Congress; think there are a lot of 7
jg different factors, and which of those factors is dominant, j9 20 I don't know.
G In the recent past, NRC has had at least two 21 instances where the job of director for a major office was 22 unfilled and was filled by an acting director for a period of 23 1
24 more than a year.
I refer to the time before Vic Stello Ace Federal Reporters, Inc.
25 took the offico, when John Davis was Acting Director of IE, 1
i 48
{-
i l
j and the time for more than a year before Harold Denton took
)
O A/
his office when -Ed Case was Acting Director of NRR.
2 3
Do you have an opinion on why it takes so long for NRC
()
4 to select an office director, a permanent director?
l 5
A I do not.
6 G
The NRC staff is organized into a number of major 7
offices, and you head one of them.
Each office operates 8
relatively independently, and the Executive Director for 9
Operations is designed, or intended in part, to help 10 coordinate the work of these offices.
11 Do you believe that there is adequate coordination of 12 the work between offices by the EDO?
()
13 A
I think it's adequate, but I think it could be 14 improved.
15 G
In what ways do you think it might be improved?
16 (Pause.)
l'7 A
I can't give you a specific recipe for the 18 improvements; I just have nt_ad, or I think I can -- I have 19 a feeling that there have been certain matters where the 20 coordination could have been better, but I can't say that 21 that coordination is inadequate.
()
22 O
At the present time, each major office is required 23 to do what we call a PAR for the EDO.
Is this not the case?
i ()
24 That's "P-A-R," all capitals.
Am Fned Reorwrs, lm.
25 A
Yes, that is the case.
i
l 49 1
l 1
G This is a program review, a review by which the i
O 2
EDO reviews the program of that office.
Does the Commission l
3 participate in the PAR in any way that you know of?
O 4
A I do not usually see the Commissioners at the 5
PAR meetings.
I can't recall -- they may have been present, 6
but I have no recollection of it at the present time.
Whether or not there's any participation beyond that, I don't 7
know.
There is material that is handed out at the PAR g
9 meetings which summarizes the presentation, and I would 10 assume that those are made available to the Commissioners, 11 but I don't know.
12 G
Do you consider the PAR mechanism an effective
()
one, both for monitoring individual office performance, and 13 14 for coordinating the work between offices?
15 A
I consider the PAR presentations to be useful.
I 16 guess your premise is that that is the only mechanism for 17 coordinating the work of offices, and that is certainly not 18 the case.
19 The major decision papers are submitted to the 20 Commission, as you know, and they're distributed generally 21 to the other offices.
The other offices have the opportunity
()
22 to comment, and if they disagree with the recommendations, to 23 have their individual positions stated in the paper.
And
()
24 there are frequently meetings with the EDO to discuss hm-Federd Reporters snc.
25 different points of view on the recommendations contained in e
L t
50
}
1 the paper.
(~
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There may be other management techniques used in the EDO's l 2
l 3
office with respect to the major programmatic offices.
I, O
of course, head the legal office, and my participation in 4
5 programmatic matters is largely confined to PAR, and in negotiating positions on major recommendations going to the 6
Commission where my own office or several other offices.
7 may have a differing viewpoint.
8 9
g In this coord.'. nation of offices, the question arises that the NRC has wha'. amounts to two legal offices --
10 11 an Office of General Counsel, and an Office of the Executive 12 Legal Director which you head.
()
Could you give us your understanding of the split in 13 ja responsibility between these two offices?
And, if you would, 15 comment on the pluses and minuses, advantages and 16 disadvantages, of the split?
j7 A
Yes.
I think that there were two main reasons why the Commission decided to have two legal offices.
18 19 Number one, it believed that public credibility in the adjudicatory process would be enhanced by having two legal 20 offices.
21
()
In other words, the staff attorneys who report to me 22 represent the staff at adjudicatory hearings on license 23 l
24 applications.
hFederd Reporters,Inc.
l 25 Now we have the ex parte rule.
There's no way,.under t
i l
1
I 51 that rule, that those attorneys who represent the staff can j
O advise the Commission when the Commission is deciding the 2
case itself.
So the Commission would have to get legal 3
advice from someplace when it reaches the point where it has 4
t reach a decision on a given case that comes up before it.
5 The public credibility aspects would not be good if 6
the attorneys who are representing the staff at a hearing 7
tn report to and be promoted by the attorney who is wr 8
advising the Commission and were all in the same office.
9 S
ne of the main considerations that the Commission 10 had in splitting the two offices was this matter of the ij public credibility which could be severely diminished if the 12 same legal office were both to represent the staff and 13 provide advice to the Commission.
It would be very difficult ja f r the public to understand that there was in fact a bar 15 between the staff attorneys who worked on the case and the 16 attorneys who advised the Commission when they both belonged 37 t
the same office.
18 The AEC of course had a single office, and they had that j9 kind of a different system where you had the staff attorneys
~
20 who were all part of the General Counsel's Office and were 21 OQ promoted by the General Counsel; but on a contested case, 22 they could not discuss the case with the General Counsel --
23 O
hne who he1ieved thee on the oetside,
'm not sere, end 2,
ha Federd Reporters, Inc.
that's a common reason in other government agencies why the 25 I
l 52 i
legal offices are split.
It goes both ways, i
g,g
(_)
l 2
The other reason is that the Commission wanted the j
i 3
advantage of differing legal views so that they could get l
t 4
all points expressed.
In other words, they didn't want a 5
monolithic legal advice.
And it's quite akin to the OPE f
6 se :up.
They have a staff, policy, et cetera, but they also j
i 7
have an OPE that advises the Commission directly.
l 8
A third question could be raised; If there's a need for 9
that in policy evaluation, isn't there a similar need for it 10 in legal advice?
11 Those, I think, are the main reasons.
12 G
This appears to put the ELD into the role of the 13 staff's attorney.
14 A
Well, the role of the ELD is to provide advice to 15 the EDO and all offices that report to the EDO.
16 G
Yes, the " staff," as distinguished from the 17
" Commission" itself and its own personal staff.
18 A
Yes, although I'm free to submit papers, and I 19 do, to the Ccmmission making recommendations, the same as 20 any other programmatic office does.
21 G
Yes.
I'd like to go through the work of some of 22 the individual offices which you serve, and to see if we 23 can amplify what role ELD provides or serves in these 24 instances, as against what the Office of General Counsel kee-Feder:J T.eporters, Inc.
25 provides for the Commission.
53 j
A Sure.
j h
2 G
Starting first of all, let's confine -- by j
3
" licensing cases," I mean reactor licensing cases, for
()
i 4
simplicity of discussion.
5 At the first stage where the staff is doing the safety evaluation and development of license conditions -- the 6
technical specifications -- what role does the ELD provide 7
in this?
8 9
A Well, they review the chief documents -- which are 10 not only the safety evaluation and the EIS, but those 11 documents, beyond serving as the safety evaluation and the 12 EIS, are evidence-in-chief of the case; so they serve a
()
13 dual purpose.
They serve as the major technical conclusion 14 of the staff, but they're also the staff's evidence.
So the 15 attorneys work with the programmatic office in the development 16 of these documents, which serve a dual function.
17 Does the Office of ELD confine itself to legal 18 advice as an advocate for the staff?
Or does the Office of 19 ELD provide a test of the completeness or the quality, for 20 that matter, of the documer.t?
- j A
I don't think I'd put it in either of those
()
22 te rms.
Let me expand.
23 The attorneys understand that they are to provide legal
, ()
24 advice, and I make it clear to the client-offices that they preser-; neoorte,s, inc.
25 are providing legal advice; and that any policy advice i
54 1
they get from the attorney they're free to reject at will, because the attorneys are supposed to be providing legal 2
I 3
advice.
iO' #
The attutides of the client differ.
There are some 4
5 clients that feel they want policy input from the attorneys, and when they're asked for policy input the attorneys will 6
7 give them policy input.
The minimum is the legal advice.
And I've asked my attorneys to differentiate between the 8
9
" legal advice" and the " policy advice."
They're there 10 primarily as lawyers to give legal advice.
11 So they work with the -- to answer your question more 12 specifically -- they work with the office in developing
()
13 these documents, provide comments on it from the standpoint 14 of legal requirements, from the standpoint of clarity, from 15 the standpoint of recognizing that these documents will be 16 introduced into the record as evidence in the hearing.
17 G
I would draw on my own personal experience here 18 and ask for a modest clarification.
I have had the 19 experience where one of your attorneys will say, "Your 20 arguments on this particular issue in a safety evaluation 21 just don't sound good; they don't seem to be effective or l
l ()
22 persuasive arguments."
And, in effect, the attorney is l
23 testing the validity of my judgment.
()
24 A
Well, one of the criteria that they apply is, Ace Federd Reporters, Inc.
25 since the document is going to be entered into the record-l I
I 55 I
as evidence, is whether or not the ultimate conclusion is y
O buttressed on subsidiary conclusions, and whether the 2
3 subsidiary conclusion are buttressed by the facts.
O If they don't, the evidence will be shot down.
4 5
G And you would noc consider this policy, but legal advice to do that?
6 A.
I would.
7 G
Now when a case goes into hearing -- and this is, 8
again, a reactor licensing case -- how, if at all, does the 9
role of the staff attorney change?
10 A.
It changes.
The role of the staff attorney is jj the same as the role of the staff attorney in most other 12 Washington agencies who conduct hearings.
They represent, 13 ja as legal counsel, the staff at the hearing.
They introduce i
evidence; they cross-examine the witnesses; the traditional 15 16 role of the lawyer at a hearing in a government agency that j7 conducts adjudicatory hearings.
18 G
S the appearance of the technical staff and the j9 legal staff is as a single entity, then, with the --
A.
The staff puts on a -- has its own position 20 which is reflected in the safety evaluation and the EIS.
21 O
Thet is the eteff s ce e-in-chief, end the eteff ineroduces 22 it as the staff position, the same way that the intervenor 23 24 counsel introduces the intervenor's position, and the Ace foder"J Reporters, Inc.
l 25 applicant's counsel introduces the applicant's position --
l
[
56 I
with the caveat that, if we're aware of any dissent, we make 2
it possible to have the dissenter appear at the hearing and 3
present his own individual views in accordance with the new
,O g
4 procedures for dissent.
5 G
Presented as a " staff minority view."
6 A
Correct.
7 G
We haven't said it up to this point, but am I 8
crrect that you intend that, at this stage in the licensing 9
review and in the hearing, the initial hearing, the Office 10 of General Counsel has no part, no role?
11 A
No role, yes.
i 12 G
Now when a licensing case is appealed, is there a
()
13 change in the role of the ELD?
j 14 A
Not essentially.
The staff attorney will represent i
15 the staff before the Hearing Board, and if there's an appeal s
16 to the Commission, the staff will represent the -
'.he i
17 staff counsel will represent the staff before the Commission l
18 representing the staff's position.
?
19 The OGC attorneys will advise the Commissioners.
20 G
And this is the first instance where the OGC 1
4 a
21 will come in, then.
1 ()
22 A
Well, unless there are interlocutory appeals 1
l 23 or matters that get thrust before the Commission during the 1 ()
24 case, which may very well happen -- OGC essentially being the Ace Federal Reporters, Inc.
j f
25 judges' legal counsel; and the ELD representing the staff as i
57 ll i
a party to the proceeding.
r'
(_e I
2 G
Okay, let's turn to a case where there is an j
3 operating license and an enforcement action is appropriate, j
{
4 some occurrence that the Inspection and Enforcement Office 5
turned up.
What would be ELD's role here in an enforecment l
6, action?
7 A
Well, if the person taking the action is I&E, 8
let's say, or NRR, they would provide all the legal advice, 9
review the order or prepare the order, after they heard what to NRR or I&E wanted to do, make sure the Commission's regula-i 11 tions were met and that the order was legally sustainable.
12 Now if the Commission itself got involved in the issuance
()
13 of an enforcement order, as it does on occasion, then OGC i'
14 would be advising the Commission.
15 G
And there would be a congruence of action here, i
16 then.
I L
17 A
Well, I'd be advising the staff and the General l
US Counsel would be advising the Commission, and at the meeting i
i.
19 we'd both be speaking up.
I
]
20 0
Now the staff develops regulations and standards --
4 21 and of course I'm sure you realize the regulations are
- ()
prepared for Commission action; the standards are prepared 22 i
23 essentially,with Commission knowledge but are actions of the i
24 s ta f f --
Am Federal Reporters, Inc.
25 A
I'm not sure I follow that.
j i
l j
l 58 i
1 G
The Regulatory Guides, I'm thinking of.
O 2
A All right.
, l 3
G Things of that nature.
O A
Okay.
i, 4
j 5
O What is the role of the Office of Executive Legal 6
Director in those developments?
And I present them together 7
to you for comparison.
I 8
A All right, with respect to Guides, documents which 9
don't have the force of law, my staff reviews the documents
{
10 to make sure they're consistent with the regulations.
If 11 they weren' t consistent with the regulations, they wouldn't 12 be I guess " legal" in the broad sense of the word.
We review j ()
13 it for clarity, understandability, and any other comments l
14 they may have in terms of improving the product as an overall ij 15 staff product.
I 16 With respect to regulations, the role is essentially the 17 same.
If we had a different position, we would state it in 18 the staff paper and go up to the Commission with a disagree-j l
19 ment, the same as there might be a disagreement between any J,
20 two Commission offices.
So again, it's essentially legal 21 advice on the document, primarily for compliance with legal
()
requirements and that sort of thing.
22 3
l 23 G
In the case of the former, the Regulatory Guide
()
24 development, would your legal review -- when you said Ace Feder:;$ Reporters, Inc.
25
" consistent with the regulations" -- would your legal review l;
li
's I
59 l
l 1
cover whether there is even a basis in regulation for having 2
guidance in that area?
l 3
A.
I think implicitly, but that's not a very likely 4
situation, that a Guide -- there wouldn't be some general 5
authority for a safety Guide.
That's not a recurring 6
problem.
7 G
Well, I was just mentally going back to one of 8
our earlier questions where the staff never prepared the 9
design-basis accident set as a regulation, but has prepared 10 a host of Regulatory Guides for the purpose.
11 A.
Yes.
12 G
And the -- it suggests to me that there was no O
13 basis in regulation for all those Regulatory Guides.
14 A.
Well, the staff has a delegation of authority 15 from the Commission which covers everything, with two main I
16 exceptions:
issuing regulations, and deciding a case that's 17 under adjudication.
So the Commission has delegated all of 18 that authority, with two exceptions, to the staff.
19 Now the problem in the real world that arises in 20 connection with these Guides, the Commission has issued 21 regulations, and since the Guides don't have the force of 22 law, they have to be at least consistent with the regulations.
23 They can't be contrary to a regulation, and in large part f
24 they're ways of meeting the regulations.
I think that's the f Am-Feder# Reporters. Inc.
25 real contrast.
i
60 1
g In the matter of the staff developing new regula-u-)
l 2
tions, it would appear then that as the new regulation comes i
3 to the Commission for action, one would once again have the x /
4 ELD advising the staff and the OGC advising the Commission.
5 A
Well, the paper gets up to the Commission, the 6
Commission reviews it, and then principally the two staff 7
offices of the Commission -- OPE and OELD -- will review the 8
staff work product.
9 Now of course it's not quite as simple as that, because 10 there's a f air amount of interaction between the various 11 offices.
There are many occasions when the Office of the 12 General Counsel is preparing a paper for the Commission, he 13 will ask for my advice on it.
In fact, we may send it up as 14 a joint paper.
On frequent occasions, I may want the General 15 Counsel to look at it -- if I'm preparing the paper, or if 16 I have a legal question about it, I will get him involved in 17 it at an early stage.
So there's a certain amount of 18 interaction and coalescence.
t 19 G
In the case of the Standard Review Plan, would i
20 you put that in the same category as a Regulatory Guide, 21 as far as the role of ELD?
()
I
' ~ '
22 A
I would think that our role -- I'm not sure of 23 this, because I haven't worked, myself, in detail with the l
(") _
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24 Standard Review Plans.
But there, the -- it's highly f Am-Fedevel Reporters, Inc.
25 technical, perhaps to a much greater extent; whereas, the
61 i
l 1
Guides are more akin to filling in the gaps in the Regula-l
(>
h 2
tions.
I'm only guessing on this one, because I don't have i
t 3
a firm answer.
The role is essentially the same, but I think i
O 4
that perhaps the staff gets less involved in the Standard 5
Review Plans -- which are purportedly a description of how 6
the staff goes about its business in reviewing applications.
7 G
Do I presume correctly that ELD routinely reviews sections of the Standard Review Plan as they're promulgated?
8 9
A I'm not sure of that.
I don't know the answer to 10 that question.
11 G
How about the staff's development of policy and 12 statements of policy for the Commission?
13 A
The same thing as Regulations.
14 G
It would be the same role?
i 15 A
The same kind of review by ELD.
16 G
Overall, in looking at the present system, and of l
17 course presuming that the NRC remains with a Commission form 18 of structure, do you see any need for a change in the Office 19 of Executive Legal Director, as against the Office of General l
1 20 Counsel -- a structural change?
21 A
I do not.
()
22 G
One last question here:
The Commissioners, and l
23 for that matter the principal offices, have an open-door
()
24 policy that permits NRC staff members to dissent or question, Ace Feder::d Reporters, Inc.
25 to come in at a very high level and speak directly to either a 1
\\
i 62 I
1 Commissioner or office director or senior manager.
Do you 1
2 think that this is a workable system and an effective system?
l 3
A Well, without knowing who's been up there, it's 4
very hard for me to say.
The word has certainly gotten out 5
that members of the staff are free to go up there.
How many 6
of the members of the staff have done this, I can't say; and 7
I suppose part of the litmus paper of effectiveness is the 8
extent to which the available system has been resorted to, 9
and I don ' t know.
10 g
In general, what is your personal judgment of the 11 NRC,'s record on handling dissent?
Would you judge it to be 12 good?
Or bad?
Or indifferent?
(
13 A
I haven't developed an opinion on that.
14 MR. BERNERO:
Did you have anything else?
15 MR. CHIN:
I did have one or two clarifying 16 questions.
17 BY MR. CHIN:
18 G
During TMI, or any time thereafter, were you 19 asked to give advice on the legal consequences of an 20 evacuation recommendation by NRC Commissioners or the staff?
21 A
I was not.
Whether or not any member of my
(
22 staff was, I don't know.
I did have somebody there at the 23 control room -- I mean, in the Command Center and he might 24 have been asked.
That would be Joe Scinto, essentially.
Lce Federst Coporters, Inc.
25 G
Beyond what you have testified on this matter, do i
I 63 1
you have any advice on this particular subject?
2 A
I do no;.
3 You also mentioned the advantages of a collegial O
4 forum.
Could you tell us some of the advantages, in your 5
opinion?
I 6
A You get contrasting points of view on major policy 7
decisions which can affect an awful lot of people.
You get 8
the clash of differing views, the balancing out of different 9
insights that are not usually centered in one individual.
10 You have a decisional process that accommodates different 11 points of view, again on decisions whicu can affect the 12 property and perhaps lives of many different people.
So it's
()
13 a deliberative process that has a way of accommodating 14 dif ferent points of view.
15 Therefore I'd say, in a nutshell, more careful decision-16 making, albeit less efficient decision-making, and that's 17 essentially where the balance needs to be struck:
How you 18 weigh the efficiency aspect against the more careful 19 radaeostentive (phonetic) process.
20 0
One other question, perhaps two:
You've mentioned 21 in a predefined situation involving an emergency, it might
()
22 be a good idea to delegate authority to a single person.
23 A
Yes.
T y,)
24 G
Do you favor such a course of action?
- Federal Reporters, Inc.
25 A
If the premise is a genuine emergency -- and I l
64 l
i I
f6 1
think we all understand what we mean by that -- where instant j
(I 2
decisions need to be made, I would favor that.
l 3
Now where it should be, I haven't developed an opinion.
It could be the Chairman of the Commission; it could be the 4
5 EDO; it could be the Director of NRR.
I 6
Another question related to that is :
Would the Commissioners as a body have the right to overrule any action 7
8 taken by that individual, if that individual were delegated 9
the authority?
And I haven't reached an opinion on that one.
10 I don't know the answer to that in my own mind, yet.
11 But I think if you're presuming a genuine crisis, yes, 12 I think that someone needs to take decisions in that kind of 13 a situation more quickly than a collegial body will provide.
14 That 's my personal opinion.
15 MR. CHIN:
Did you have a follow-up question?
16 MR. BERNERO:
If I could just interject on that 17 issue.
18 BY MR. BERNERO:
19 0
You stopped when you recounted, the Chairman, the 20 EDO, the Director of NRR --
21 A
I was thinking of another Commissioner.
22 4
Would you find it possibly conceivable, or 23 conceivable, realistic, to consider a director of a division,
- b) the appropriate division director in NRR as the delegated ss 24 DFederd Reporters, Inc.
25 person on the site?
Do you think that is going too low, J
65 i
1 perhaps?
A")
A I wouldn' t rule it ot t but -- and in f act, if the 2
3 Director of NPR isn't available, assuming that you like that
(
4 kind of an approach, you may not have much of a choice.
But I
5 I must say that I have a certain reluctance to delegate it too far down because of the monumental importance of the decisions 6
that would have to be made in terms of potential impact on 7
8 public health and safety.
It's a serious and very weighty 9
responsibility.
p)
BY MR. CHIN:
11 G
We have heard that it might be angood idea to 12 separate Inspection and Enforcement into two different 13 functions in the agency.
Do you have any thoughts on that ja subject?
15 A
I hadn 't heard that one.
I -- therefore, I really 16 don't have an opinion, but I must say my reaction is negative.
17 I think my reaction is negative because, on the basis of my 18 own experience,-- and I think in most agencies the functions 19 are combined -- and in terms of efficiency, I can see an 20 awful lot of advantages to having them combined.
21 I don't see any great advantage to splitting them up.
()
22 MR. CHIN:
I'think that concludes our specific 23 questioning.
Is there anything in your mind, or anything
()
24 you can think of, that would assist us in our inquiry?
m-Federd Reporters, Inc.
25 THE WITNESS:
Over a field this broad?
No, I I
i
66 1
don't have anything else.
(^s
\\3 2
MR. CHIN:
Well, in conclusion let me say, this 3
is an ongoing investigation and, although we've completed 4
our questions for today, we may need to bring you back for 5
further deposition.
6 We will, however, try to make every effort to avoid having 7
to do so.
8 THE WITNESS:
I would be happy to come back.
9 MR. CHIN:
I will now recess this deposition, 10 rather than terminate it.
I wish to thank you for your time 11 in being here with us today.
12 THE WITNESS:
It was a pleasure.
()
13 MR. BERNERO:
Thank you, Howard.
14 THE WITNESS:
Thank you.
15 (Whereupon, at 4:50 p.m.,
the deposition was 16 adjourned.)
17 18 19 l
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Shapar Depo. Exhibit 1
- " "' 49 UNITED STATES
,A 4,g/
3 NUCLEAR REGULATOnY COMMISSION
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wassinoTos, o. c. 20sss MfL f September 13, 1979 e
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- ..e pV Mr. H. K. Shapar U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, D.C.
20555
Dear Mr. Shapar:
I am writing to confirm that your deposition under oath in connection with the accident at Three Mile Island is scheduled for October 1, 1979 at 2:00 a.m., at Room 6717 Maryland National Bank Building, Bethesda, Maryland.
This will also confirm my request for you to bring with you a copy of your resume and any documents in your possession or control regarding TMI-2, the accident or precursor events which you have reason to believe may not be in official NRC files, including any diary or personal working file.
e The deposition will be conducted by members of the NRC's Special Inquiry Group on Three Mile Island. This Group is being directed independently of the NRC by the law f rm of Rogovin, Stern and Huge.
It includes both NRC personnel who have been detailed to the Special Inquiry Staff, and outside staff and attorneys.
Through a delegation of authority from the NRC under Section 161(c) of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended, the Special (V
Inquiry Group has a broad mandate to inquire into the causes of the accident T
at Three Mile Island, to identify major problem areas and to make recommenda-tions for change. At the conclusion of its investigation, the Group will issue a detailed public report setting forth its findings and recommendations.
Unless you have been served with a subpoena, your participation in the deposi-tion is voluntary and there will be no effect on you if you decline to answer some or all of the questions asked you. However, the Special Inquiry has been given the power to subpoena witnesses to appear and testify under oath, or to appear and produce documents, or both, at any designated place. Any person deposed may have an attorney present or any other person he wishes accompany him at t! e deposition as his representative.
The Office of the General Counsel ot.JC has advised us that it is willing to send an NRC attorney to all depositions of NRC employees who will represent you as an individual rather than represent NRC.
Since the NRC attorney may attend only l
at your affirmative request, you should notify Richard Mallory (634-3224) in the Office of the General Counsel as soon as practicable if you wish to have l
an NRC attorney present.
l You should realize that while we will try to respect any requests for con-
/~N fidentiality in connection with the publication of our report, we can make no l V guarantees. Names of witnesses and the information they provide may eventually become public, inasmuch as the entire record of the Special Inquiry Group's l
investigation will be made available to the NRC for whatever uses it may deem g
appropriate.
In time, this information may be made available to the public U
m-
2 voluntarily, or become available to the public through the Freedom of Information Act.
Moreover, other departments and agencies of government may The request access to this information pursuant to the Privacy Act of 1974.
{'
information may also be made available in whole or in part to committees or subcommittees of the U.S. Congress.
If you have testified previously with respect to the Three Mile Island accident, it would be useful if you could review any transcripts of your previous statement (s) prior to the deposition.
Thank you for your cooperation.
Sincerely, Mitchell Rogovi,
irector NRC/TMI Special Inquiry Group
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Shapar Depo. Exhibit 2 '
C BIOGRAPHICAL OUTLINE (l
~
1, HOWARD K. SHAPAR, B.A., Amherst College, J.D., Yale Law School; i
Executive Legal Director, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission; member of, bars of State of New Mexico, Court of Appeals for District of Columbia Circui t, and U.S. Supreme Court; past president, Los Alamos County (New Mexico) bar association; vice-president, International Nuclear Law Association, past chairman, atomic energy law committee, World Peace Through Law Center; past chairman, Committee on International Uses of Atomic 1
Energy (International Law Section), American Bar Association; past vice-chairman, Committee on Energy (Administrative Law Section), American Bar Association; past chairman, atomic energy l
law committee, Federal Bar Association; author of numerous articles in the field of nuclear law.
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