ML19308C469
| ML19308C469 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Crane |
| Issue date: | 09/28/1979 |
| From: | Crowe C, Ernst M Federal Emergency Management Agency, NRC - NRC THREE MILE ISLAND TASK FORCE |
| To: | |
| References | |
| TASK-TF, TASK-TMR NUDOCS 8001240627 | |
| Download: ML19308C469 (31) | |
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O NUCLE AR REGUL ATO RY COMMISSION i
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IN THE MATTER OF:
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THREE MILE ISLAND SPECIAL INTERVIEWS I
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DEPOSITION OF CHARLES A.
CROWE i
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Place - Harrisburg, Pennsylvania Date - Friday, September 28, 1979 Pages 1 - 30 t
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i menon.:
(202)347 3700 ACE - FEDERAL REPORTERS INC.
OffiaalReponers ut North Ccpitol Street Woshington, D.C 20001 NATIONWIDE COVERAGE DAILY G27 8001240
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1 UNITED STATES OF AMERICA f
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION 2
3 O
x In the Matter of:
5 THREE MILE ISLAND 6
SPECIAL INTERVIEWS I
8 DEPOSITION OF CHARLES A. CROWE 9
10 Holiday Inn Town Motel 2nd and Chestnut Streets ij Harrisburg, Pennsylvania 12 Friday, Septenber 28, 1979 1:00 p.m.
13 BEFORE:
34 For the Nuclear Regulatory Commission:
15 MALCOLM ERNST g
FREDERICK HERR PETER SICILIA, JR.
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O 24 Ace-Federat Reporte,s, Inc.
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_C _O _N _T _E N _T _S l
2 WITNESS:
EXAMINATION l
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Charles A. Crowe 2
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EEElEllE l
6 EXHIBIT NUMBER:
IDENTIFIED 7
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PR0CEEDINGS U
2 (1800 p.m.)
3 MR. ERNST:
Let's go on the record.
4 Whereupon, 5
CHARLES A. CROWE 5
was called as a witness and, having been first duly sworn, I
was examined and testified as follows:
8 EX AMIN ATION 9
BY MR. ERNST 10 0
Please state your full name and title for the il record.
12 A
I am Charles A. Crowe, nuclear civil protection 13 officer, Pennsylvania Emergency Management.
14 0
I want to put on the record the fact that you have
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15 received this letter from us earlier asking you to attend 16 this deposition.
le A
Ye s.
19 MR. ERNST I will mark that Exhioit 1.
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( Exhibit 1 identified.)
23 B( MR. ERNST:
21 0
I will note that inadvertently this said, " Dear 22 Mr. Williamson," even thougn Mr. Crowe was identified as the 23 earlier addressee.
This was a clerical error.
24 Mr. Crowe, this Exhibit 1,
this le tter, i s a photocopy of O
23 a letter sent to you by us confirming your deposition.
Have O
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you read this document in full?
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2 A
I have.
3 0
Do you understand the information set forth in the
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4 letter including the general nature of the inquiry, your 5
right to have an attorney present as your representative, 6
and the f act that inf ormation you provide here may eventually oecome public?
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A I do.
9 0
Is counsel representing you personally today?
10 A
No.
11 0
I would like to note for the record the witness is 12 not represented by counsel.
If you f eel like you would like 13 to be represented by counsel at any time during this 14 deposition, please advise me and we will adjourn and giva O
15 you time to have counsel.
15 Is this procedure agreeable?
II A
Aosolutely.
13 3
Mr. Crowe, is this a copy of your resume that you 19 crought to us today?
20 A
Ya!.
21 MR. ERNST I will mark this Exhioit 2.
22 (Exhioit 2 identified.)
23 Bf MR. ERNST:
[
24 O
Does this resume accurately summarize your 25 educational and employment background?
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A Yes, generally it does.
f)plRa
'2 0
The first question I have today is:
I wonder if 3
you would describe your routine assigned duties at PEMA?
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4 A
Routinely, I am assigned as the nuclear civil 5
protection o fficer.
That particular position involves 6
planning concerning crisis relocation and the in place 7
shelter program of the State of Pennsylvania.
8 0
When you say nuclear, is that just fixed facility 9
or is that any --
10 A
Tne title has to do with the civil def ense aspects 11 of Pennsylvania's emergency management agency.
The nuclear 12 civil protection program is a specific program which DCPA 13 has sponsore d.
OCPA, of course, FEMA now.
I am on a 14 contract through DCPA for the state.
That essentia11y is 15 one of the nuclear civil protection offier.
It does not 16 involved itself specifically with fixed f acilities but le rather with the war potentiality, having to do with nuclear id war.
19 0
In PEMA, is there a difference between what you 23 would do in the event of an emergency that might involve 21 evacuation of people from a nuclear occurrence as opposed to 22 somathing like a flood or chemical spill or something like 23 that?
Is there a difference in your responsibilities there?
24 A
Goviously, in a time of emergency, the
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25 prof essional expertise available in PEMA is utilized in the
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most appropriate role.
Since there are a variety of
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2 circumstances wnich might involve evacuation, I could be 3
involved or not depending on the situation.
A hazardous
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4 spill, for instance, a tornado potentiality, a flood, one 5
thing or another, all have some evacuation aspects, whereas 6
the crisis relocation plan, which I am working on, is a long range program involving the possible evacuation of e
8 two-thirds of the citizens of Pennsylvania.
0 With regard to TMI, I wonder if you might now 10 describe your assigned duties during the first week or two 11 of the TMI accident and how these might be different from 12 your routine duties.
13 A
Very well.
I was in Pittsburgh on March 28 I4 orefifing Allegheny County civil defense personnel on the 15 crisi s rele:ation program and associated matters.
I 15 returned to PEMA in Harrisburg around midday on Thursday, 17 which was essentially the second day of the incident.
At 18 that time we had no indication of a requirement for 19 evacuation radii greater than five miles.
We did not 20 receive an indication this would be required in the 21 following day.
22 In the late af ternoon or early evening, there was an 23 indication that a 23-mile evacuation plan snould be-24 prepared.
At that time I had the people who worked for me O
25 in the nuclear civil protection section prepare a rough O
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recommendation thjat would take into account population T
2 densities and appropriate routes for evacuation of such a
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3 radius.
4 Obviously, since the counties prepare the real 5
implementing plans for such an eventuality, this was a guide 5
in the event the counties had nothing better to start with.
A position f rom which coordination and other considerations 8
having to do with possible evacuation, this might be a 9
starting point for such considerations.
This is the item 10 which I considered background information which will explain 11 how this was done.
It's merely a recitation of 1970 census 12 track data oy township, borough, et cetera.
Then a:4 13 analysis of roadmaps to take into account what density we 14 believe the roads could handle expeditiously and which
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la routes people from these townships might follow.
15 With this information in the hands of the county planne 1,
and the coordination efforts of the Pennsylvania state 13 police, Pennysylvania Department of Transportation and 11 National Guard, a detailed plan by county could be worked 20 out.
The problem is to assue that with some 600,000 plus 21 population to be moved, that there were no ambiguous 22 assignments of routes, no duplication, no failure to take 23 into account best availaole routes.
Yet this remains a 24 recommendation only.
f-V) 25 VR. ERNST:
I would like to note for the record O
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Mr. Crowe has given us a document of some 2/ pages which O
apparently consists of puplation centers around TMU' and a 2
3 map o f the area.
I will mark this Exhibit 3.
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4 (Exhibit 3 identified.)
5 MR. ERNST:
I would also like to note for the 6
record that Exhibit 2 consisted of two pages.
t BY MR. ERNST:
3 0
You mentioned that this was a guide to the 9
counties.
dere these routes that you provided as guidance 10 worked out just within PEMA or were they worked out in 11 conjunction with the state police before they went to the 12 counties or what was the interaction before the information 13 was sent to the counties?
14 A
.Tnis information was handcarried to the counties 15 by county representatives of.PEMA who were assigned to 16 assis t the counties.
It as made known by me to each one of 17 those who had a copy of this the f act that it was an initial 13 position from which planning could proceed f urther, that 11 Penn DOT ano state police plus the National Guard as 20 appropriate would work with the counties in coordination.
21 dow, af ter the county plan had oeen analyzed, if this was 22 to be helpful, fine.
If the county plan was adequate 23 witnout that, fine.
But it was a matter for coordination 2;
and the result is in the additiorcl map which we can discuss O
25 later, which was a confirmation of a coordinated position I
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oetween the six counties involved, PEMA, Penn DOT, and the 2
state polica as to what would be the best routes for an 3
orderly movement of the risk area.
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4 0
And this larger map you ref erred to, this was 5
generated aoout when?
5 A
Tnis was worked on from the time the document which you have called Exhibit 3 was distributed.
We e
S continued to work with the counties and sdtate police and 9
Penn DOT in correlating the information and we came up with 10 a final position which was printed on April 4.
This 11 reflects for particularly state agencies what the plans of 12 the various counties were.
Obviously, they already 13 confirmed their plans along before this but we wanted a 14 coordinated document so particularly the state police, when 13 assigned to do tra ffic control work, would have a copy of 16 this ana would understand what population densities to 17 exp3ct on wnich specific routes.
18 100 copies of this were made available to the state 19 police.
Additional copies were made availaole to counties 23 for planning purpose.
Much more information could oe 21 included but f rom a state view, this was a position which i
22 was a basis from which other agency and department 23 activities could be developed.
Whatever inf orma tion they 24 wanted to put on, they could put on.
Traffic control O
25 points, location of any type of vehicle, or any other OV
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consideration that a planner might want.to have.
2 So the distrioution was sufficient that we had a piece of
.1 paper which was a common tool for those working directly 4
with the problem.
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Q On April 4th, I believe you stated was the time this
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2 document was prepared.
About what kind of time frame would you 3
say that the route decision had been made, the decision that
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4 fed into their document?
5 A
The decisions had been made from the time the 6
counties were apprised of the fact that we were going on a 7
20-mile route.
They were refined.
This is a representation 8
of a refined position; not a first position, but a refined 9
position and a coordinated position.
10 Q
As I remember, there was a document sent to the 11 counties with recommended routes -- guidance, I believe it was 12
-- that subsequently some problems were identified regarding 13 one-way traffic and things of that nature.
Could you describe
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14 this particular document,' when it went out, and what some of 15 the interactive kinds of problems it uncovered, and what their 16 resolution was?
17 A
Well, we developed some initial positions, and the 18 specific instance you are referring to, I believe, has to do 19 with the use of the pattern pick by Dauphin County and 20 Cumberland County in their planning.
It was done somewhat 21 independently.
There did develop a mater of ambiguous utiliza-22 tion of the highway.
It was exactly the purpose for which we
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23 sent people down to coordinate the matter and exactly what we lll 24 wanted to preclude should the event take place.
Ace Federol Reporters, Inc.
25 I look at this as a positive product of the coordination i
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process rather than a glitch in the guidance.
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2 Q
About what kind of time frame was this sent out, and 3
this glitch discovered?
4 A
I believe you are still talking about this document 5
right here, Exhibit 3, and. the ongoing planning the county 6
was doing independently, each of the six counties, on the use 7
of their own routes.
So I am not sure that we are talking 8
about the same document.
You refer to one.
There could easily 9
have been another one that you are referring to, but I-am 10 not quite sure what it might be.
11 O
Having not studied this document, I am not at all 12 sure I can resolve that point either.at this time.
You also
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13 worked on a simulated evacuation time.
14 A
Yes.
15 Q
Could you describe to me the process of simulating 16 the time required to evacuate the 20-mile area and what the 17 results were?
18 A
Again, we get back to a detailed technical analysis 19 of the population in the risk area, the routes avalable, and 20 the pressure on what might be called traffic choke points.
21 Their analysis was done for us by Pennsylvania Department of
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22 Transportation.
23 With that information and the judgment of myself and other
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24 people, a representative's signature,together with Penn DOT, Aca Federst Reporters. Inc.
1 25 a time frame for evacuation was developed.
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The time frame was based on a total population within the
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2 area to be evacuated.
Further, it was based on the assumption 3
that there would be adequate prior warning time to appropriate 4
county and state officials that a precautionary evacuation e 5
might be recommended.
6 The reason I pu the assumption in is this:
Evacuation 7
times under most ordinary condition will require that we 8
mobilize the functional forces throughout the state necessary 9
to assist in the evacuation; that is, call in State Police, 10 National Guard perhaps, for security; getting school buses or 11 other transportation available for those without personal 12 transportation; provide for ambulances and other facilities 13 for hospitals and nursing homes where nonambulatory patients
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14 will be moved; all these things considered and time enough to 15 start.
16 Then we, using those assumptions, developed time frames 17 that would be under relatively good conditions.
18 Now, with less time, we would not have as orderly an 19 evacuation.
On the other hand, at certain stages in the TMI 20 incident, a large percentage of the population close in to the 21 installation had spontaneously evacuated; so this, too, is 22 considered a judgment thing that is time oriented as far as
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23 situation development.
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24 So specific times are related to specific situations.
At Aes FcdertA Reporters, Inc.
25 the time these figures were developed, there was obviously a l
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sense of urgency in the community.
The functional staffs of 2
counties and state will be mobilized to a great degree in the 3
sense of organizationally ready.
They still have to move to O
4 positions, et cetera.
But at that time, with the sense of 5
urgency that we had, we believed it could be accomplished with 6
minimum disorder.
7 Q
And what times did you come up with in this evalua-8 tion?
9 A
We came up with seven hours for the 10-mile radius 10 and 10 hours1.157407e-4 days <br />0.00278 hours <br />1.653439e-5 weeks <br />3.805e-6 months <br /> for the 20-mile radius; again, the assumption 11 being that there was sufficient time to mobilize, et cetera, 12 prior to this event, not just out of-the-blue recommendation
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13 or order to evacuate.
14 Obviously, it would take longer under those circumstances.
15 Q
What assumptions, other than the state of readiness, 16 were used in simulating this evacuation and arriving at the 17 7-and 10-hour figure?
18 A
What other assumptions?
I think we might call some 19 of the thing assumptions and some f acts bearing on the problem, 20 population density by township, assumption that vehicles would 21 more at 35 miles an hour, with a total population, three per
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22 vehicle, moving over the routes, Penn DOT's professional know-23 ledge or road capacity, State Police professional knowledge of t%
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24 traffic control problems, all contributed to the findings
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25 having to ' do with movement.
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Now, an assumption of three~ persons per vehicle does not 2
take into account vehicles'like school buses which would take 3
more people.
Again, I said we knew that there was at onentime 4
a rather large percentage of spontaneous' evacuees.
There 5
were a large number of spontaneous evacuees.
All these pulled 6
together, we still thought it was a pretty good estimate to 7
hold the total population because other considerations:
A, 8
sense of tension and urgency, perhaps a few wrong turns and 9
cracked fenders, stopping by to get Aunt Millie who might be 10 in another direction from the direction we would prefer to go.
II All these contributed to an overview that still at that time 12 would be a good planning basis to go on.
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1f you hed to mexe e eeetement of the time geriod Id for 10-mile and 20-mile evacuation as of midnight Friday night, 15 as opposed to the assumption that everything was ready to go 16 for this magnitude of an evacuation, what times do you think I7 would be reasonable and more appropriate?
I8 A
Well, for Friday night for 10-miles, if we had 10 to 19 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br /> of advance notice, I think we could have executed --
20 not certainly in as orderly a fashion as later, as the items 21 were refined -- but we could have executed in a quite adequate O
22 menner with 10- to 12-hours notice.
1 em not serine 1o to 23 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br /> total.
10- to ll-hours notice, we could have executed 24 in the time involved.
Let's say something in the area -- this AcFFedersi fieporters, Inc.
25 is strictly conjectural.
It~has-to be a personal opinion.
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would say-for 10 miles, let's start at around 15 hours1.736111e-4 days <br />0.00417 hours <br />2.480159e-5 weeks <br />5.7075e-6 months <br /> is how
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2 long we could think it might be done in-an orderly manner.
3 Less than that time, you will have accomplished the evacuation 4
of a number of people.
5 WhereI have given you the time of about 15 hours1.736111e-4 days <br />0.00417 hours <br />2.480159e-5 weeks <br />5.7075e-6 months <br />, that's 6
saying, Okay, we have also made the majority of the arrange'-
7 ments to do the whole thing in an adequate manner.
That is 8
concerned with hospitals and nursing homes and public school 9
transportation and a number of other things, 10 Obviously, on Friday night, the plans were in sketchy form 11 as far as written material.
But we have got to understand that 12 many of the people who are invofved in doing such have done it 13 under other circumstances for other programs, hazardous spills,
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14 floods, and other matters.
15 Therefore, we must give consideration to the personal 16 capabilitites of the people who, by word of mouth, have set up 17 something that is a currently urgent problem, and then we get 18 it down into a more refined written form that is understandable 19 to the outsider who has not been personally involved in the 20 functional development of implementing capabilties.
21 Q
But your initial judgment still is 15 hours1.736111e-4 days <br />0.00417 hours <br />2.480159e-5 weeks <br />5.7075e-6 months <br />, give or 22 take some number of hours I am quite sure, but on the order of
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23 15 hours1.736111e-4 days <br />0.00417 hours <br />2.480159e-5 weeks <br />5.7075e-6 months <br /> to complete an evacuation including your hospitals
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24 and nursing homes, some of which would be orderly --
Aes F:. der:A Reporters, Inc.
25 A
It's getting a bit dif ficult right here.
We are 1
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talking about several hundred patients.
At this time we have 2
got to bring in ambulances from outside counties.
Our planning 3
recognized we are looking at 20 miles.
We were looking at 20
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miles by Friday night; 10 miles was an inside cabability.
5 Our plan had to be predicated on 20 miles.
6 So you're asking me for an opinion on Friday night that has 7
to do with a matter we had already pushed out to; our concerns 8
and considerations involved a much greater number of people, 9
more than four times as many are involved.
So that was what 10 we were thinking about, better said, than we were thinking 10 1
and then thinking 20.
We jumped through to 10 very rapidly 11 r
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What would your judgment be for a 20-mile evacuation 14 of Friday night?
15 A
Interestingly enough, I don't think there is as much 16 more time involved as might be considered necessary with that 17 greatly increased number of people.
More time means we had 18 more time to bring in outside resources, particularly transpor-19 tation assets for hospitals, such things as that.
20 I would say if we could go with a 15-hour as a first 21 estimate here of the situation, having to pull all of the
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22 facts together again, I would say another three to four hours 23 we could have done the whole thing.
The work is going in all
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24 directions at once, not just in one little area.
Ac34ederst Re;mrters, Inc.
25 O
Getting back to the planning aspect before I
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Three Mile Island, I assume that one of your responsibilities
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was to review or' coordinate, or whatever the best words might 2
3 be, the county plans.
O 4
A No, that is an erroneous assumption.
5 My duties had to do with the nuclear self-protection pro-6 gram which was in place, shelter, and crisis relocation plan-7 ning, not nuclear effects; had facility plans and not hazard-8 ous spill plans.
9 0
int you did pick up the responsibility after TMI of 10 coordinating these plans?
11 A
Yes.-
12 O
In your y e ;what was the state of adequacy of the
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13 county plans that existed at the time of TMI?
14 How much upgrading was necessary, as opposed to 15 desirable?
16 A
Well, I am going to qualify --
17 O
The five-mile plan I am now talking about.
18 A
All right.
When I became interested in the problem, 19 we had already passed the five-mile plan.
The five-mile plan 20 dealt with about 25,000 people roughly.
The five-mile plan had 21 been judged adequate, but we already escalated into five times 22 that many people at 10; 25 times that many people-plus at 20 s
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So the adequacy o f five-mile plans is -- or was not a
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24 matter of great concern to me then.
We were in a whole new Ace Foceral Reporters, Inc.
25 ball game.
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MR. ERNST:
Off the record.
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(Discussion off the record.)
2 3
MR. ERNST:
Back on the record.
4 BY MR. ERNST:
5 0
Are you aware of the Daupin County emergency prepar--
6 edness plan dated April 6, 1979, signed by Kevin Molloy and 7
John Minich?
8 A
Yes, I am.
9 Q
Was that plan and the other county plans developed 10 subsequent to TMI reviewed or commented on or concurred 11 in between counties by PEMA?
12 A
Let me answer that question by saying our role at 13 PEMA in development of these plans was to ensure there was
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14 coordination, county-to-county, and to assist the counties 15 as far as planning goes.
16 Now, we also had in the counties representatives of our 17 office -- that is, grea directors plus DCPA personnel to pro-
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18 vide assistance.
19 Now, in each case., the personnel -- outside personnel as 20 well as inside personnel, speaking of counties -- assured me 21 Personally that their view was that plans in each case, for 22 six counties, was that they were adequate for the problem.
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23 Q
We have heard several times that when you get to the p) 24 20-mile evaluation area, you are talking not just the six
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25 counties, but you are talking numerous host counties.
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A Yes.
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Q Is it fair to infer from that that these host 3
counties were part of that planning process and were aware of S
4 what would be called upon in the way of mass care. stores, 5
and things of that nature in the event of that kind of an 6
evacuation?
7 A
Yes, it is fair to say they were aware of this.
8 Now, the approach used was again that PEMA act as a coordin-9 ating agency for assistance.
DCPA provided representatives to 10 the great majority of the so-called lost counties to ensure 11 that the planning was adequate in the sense of when additional 12 assistance was needed or not.
These representatives of DCPA,
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13 as they completed their effort, they came back through our 14 office and we debriefed, plus they provided us materials having 15 to do with the written aspects of the problem and any problem 16 areas that were involved.
17 The counties, however, in the initial instance, had made 18 direct contact with other counties to ensure that their citi-19 zens could be accommodated in the host counties.
As an example, 20 a county north of Dauphin County would be contacted by a repre-21 sentative of Daupin County with an inquiry:
Can you take, for
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22 mass care purposes, some of our citizens?
If so, how many?
23 In this manner then arrangements were made.
Now we assisted (A_)
24 as we could.
We correlated the information to include resource Aco Feder# Reporters, Inc.
25 requirements.
And with the debriefing materials that we had I
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from the mass care counties or support counties, host counties, 2
as you will, we coordinated this and made it a little better.
3 Now we are dealing with a number of counties, 26 to 30,
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4 depending on last-minute arrangements, whether or not Lancaster 5
still is going to evacuate, and other considerations.
6 This was not the highest priority in the beginning.
The highest priority has to ensure orderly, safe evacuation of the 7
8 risk area.
The second priority was to assure there were 9
adequate resources available to care for the people on the 10 other side.
I am not saying it is not c highly important 11 matter, but the first concern is to ensure an orderly evacua-12 tion of the risk area.
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13 0
In the area of response by DCPA, was there response 14 in accordance with pre-planned criteria or the numbers of peo-15 ple they sent down and things of that nature?
Was that pretty 16 much in accordance with state-federal agreements?
17 A
I think I am really not the source for the best 18 judgment on that.
I was planning'-- from my view, DCPA was 19 extremely helpful.
They did a fine job in providing person-20 nel and assistance.
But as far as judgment from the state 21 as to state and federal arrangements, I had a piece of the
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22 information only working with the paper..
23 0
In your view, was this assistance in this situation
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24 critical?
Ace Federe! Reporters, Inc.
25 A
It proved to be extremely important to'have some of I
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the very fine planning assistance that we received from DCPA on
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the scene.
3 0
Could you describe what has happened since TMI O
4 regarding the upgrading of county planning and local planning?
5 I understand you are still in this area, actively working on 6
the upgrading of county and local plans.
7 A
Yes.
I am working with the counties with a team, if 8
you will, representing various state agencies and our own 9
FEMA offices trying to provide assistance to the counties in 10 upgrading the written portions of the county plans to meet the Il new criteria that we believe NRC has decided on.
12 Q
How about local plans?
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13 A
Local plans essenttally are a matter of county to 14 municipality, borough or township.
Obviously, they are of 15 importance.
Yet the state, with well over 2500 municipalities, 16 would find it quite difficult to monitor each municipal plan.
17 It's a county function.
County commissioners, as elected 18 officials, and then the municipal officials, as elected 19 officials, we believe have that responsibility -- not to say 20 we would not provide assistance as required.
21 Q
Have you provided the counties or the locals any D) 22 upgraded guidance as to what should a good plan consist of
(_
23 and how should it be structured, and who should be responsible
()
24 for what, and what kind of time frame, things of that nature?
l Ace Federot Reporters, Inc.
25 A
We are working with the counties in upgrading their I
jl 13 22 I
plans.
We have not distributed a model in the sense of each 2
county having certain unique concerns and considerations.
We 3
have sample materials that are available.: represented by vari-
[)
x-4 ous county plans from TMI, for example.
5 We are working with the individual plans to ensure that they 6
are adequate for the populations in those counties.
Our 7
priorities are Beaver Valley, Peach Bottom, TMI, Berwick, and 8
Limerick.
9 0
In your efforts to upgrade county planning for 10-10 and 20-mile evacuations, are you aware of any groups or persons Il either appointed by the Governor or perhaps some other agent KW A E S 12 whose task was to also assess qualities and state of prepared-13
(..)
ness during this -- say, the time frame of Saturday, Sunday me ~
14 A
You are talking March --
15 Q
March 31, April 1, that kind of time frame.
16 A
I was not aware at that time of anything having to 17 do with evaluation of plans.
OG TPH EU S 18 Now, other aspects, remembering I was not 19 privy to particularly -- in other words, what were the county 20 commissioners doing, or one thing or another?
It wasn't 21 necessary that I know if such things were going on.
That was
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22
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not part of what I was charged with doing.
23 O
What level of detail to you believe should be con-
)
24 tinaed; state plans, county plans, and local plans?
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25 A
I think you will have to be a little more specific on hnd t.3 than that.
l
V 23 218 04 01 sonLRa i
O All rignt.
The state plan basically has O
2 assignments of general responsibilities.
The county plans 3
cefore TMI consisted largely of assignment again of 4
responsibilities and appeared to contain little detail 5
except for perhaps notifications, telephone numbers for 6
notification.
/
And, as I understand it, there were very f ew, if any, 8
formal local plans.
Since TMI, there have Deen county 9
documents produced that go into quite some detail, such as 10 the Dauphin Country plan of April, that goes into quite some 11 detail as to who to call and what evacuation routes and who 12 puts up what signs, where, how many vehicles should be 13 available and where should they go.
14 A very great amount of detail as to who should do what 15 and when and how.
My question ist what kind of level of 16 detail in your judgment is f elt to be. necessary or useful, Ie one or the other, for the three levels of planning?
IS Namely, state, country and local.
19 A
dall, I will answer your general question in a 23 gener al way.
The state plan should provide necessary 21 guidance to the counties, particularly in the manner of 22 c oo rd ina tion.
It should also provice for a general 23 des:ription of state agency involvement, and if appropriate, 24 relationships with Federal agencies.
73(J 25 The county plan obviously would oe more specific.
- Yet,
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24 218 04 02 sonLRd I
if you are dealing with tens of thousands of people, 2
obviously the implementing instructions that would move Joe 3
Doe from 123 Main Street through a particular route to a
()
4 reception center where he could be cared for would De too 5
much detail for the county plan.
That is a trade-off.
6 A plan that is too detailed at a given level is not a 7
good guide f or the managers who must take that plan and 3
adapt it to the specifics of the given situation.
Each situation will be somewhat different.
10 So if you provide exhaustive detail in the country plan 11 that goes all the way down to the individual, have you taken 12 into account weather, have you taken into account time of 13 day, have you taken into account a particular hazard 14 analysis for the plant, which, by the way, we don't have?
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15 Each of these situations will dictate an adjusted 16 response.
If the detail in your plan at the country level I/
addresses a particular situation and the situation as it la develops is somewhat diff erent, you may have a plan that is 19 not as useful as you would like.
It might not De usef ul at 2J a ll.
So I think we must be a little wary of believing that 21 a pie ce of paper can provide an exact response to the 22 multi tude of shaded situations that could develop.
23 ilow that was oy comment everything to do with the county 24 sios.
Now the municipal plan I think should provide I ()
25 particularly for the notification of individuals in the G
t V
25 218 04 03 sonLRW I
area for which this local governing body is responsible.
(
2 That is a particular thing.
We could have published, 3
however, general plans for the country that could be adopted
()
4 and s tate plans and what not that would provide for 5
a ssis tance and coordination, but when it gets down to 6
individual notification, that being an important aspect of 4
the matter, perhaps it is the fire company that will have to S
knock on doors in a certain rural area, you wouldn't want to 9
detail that in a county plan.
That is more appropriate to a 10 munic ipal plan.
11 I don't know whether I have answered your question, but 12 in general that is my view of the planning approach.
13 0
Is this kind of detail, wherever it may occur --
14 we are assuming now it occurs in the local plan, or more 3
b 13 appropriate in a local plan -- is this kind of detail 16 critical to effective evacuation?
Is A
Let me say that whether it be in writing or not, 13 it is critical, out the problem to be considered at every 19 level of elective authority, f rom the local to the Federal, 23 is that hopefully a functional organization exists which 21 could respond to the situation at each level.
That detail, 22 whether it is in writing in a voluminous document, or 23 whetner it is an arrangement which can ce made which mignt 24 easily De tnat fire company A will contact all personnel on D)
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25 this route and from this street to this street without
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26 h218 04 04 sonLRW i
going down to Joe Doe individually -- this again is where
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the unique considerations of planning in each community come 3
to bear and where it becomes difficult to design a model rm
(_)
4 that will fit each situation without taking the risk of not a
considering unique problems in one area.
6 As an example, school children in an urban area as opposed to school children in a rural area.
A situation or e
8 incident which occurs during school or af ter school.
How do
)
you handle that?
Each community has to be satisfied that 10 that is handled adequately.
But it is a community decision.
Il Bf MR. HERR 12 J
I would like to get a little oit more specific 13 information on how you coordinated the county plans.
As I 14 und3rstand i t, you held a series of meetings on Saturday g
16 with -- let me ask the question.
Were there a series of 15 meetings held on Saturday and who were they with?
Il A
.4311, you understand our operation in the 13 emergency operation center of people and where we have 19 response team representatives from various state agencies 2) thera.
You also understood we had direct lines to each 21 county concerned.
22 There was, of course, communication by telephone with the 23 counties direc tly.
There was communication with the state 24 agencies involved in meetings either with representatives of 25 the agency who came in or where their response team
(~h V
i l
27 U218 04 05
,sm representative, who are capable of making decisions for the bnLRW I
2 agency conce rned.
This particular document, which is 3
Exhioit 3, was explained in meetings on an individual basis O) with various agencies and various county representatives or
\\-
4 5
our own representatives of people and who were sent to the 5
counties.
They weren't so much called for a particular hour, but e
d thef were done as the opportunity presented itself to provide information to agencies and activities that needed 13 this information.
11 J
I understand that a specific meeting was held with 12 the state police.
I believe three representatives of the 13 state police.
It is my understanding that that meeting was 14 to coordinate the overall state police response and to jgg 15 provide coordination of the various county plans.
16 Is it f air to say that the individual people and il representatives and the individual representatives of tha IS state police that were assigned to each of the counties were 19 doing extra county coordination and that these meetings with 20 you or the discussions with you were the intercounty 21 coordination mechanism?
22 That the state police and counties weren't expected to 23 c oordinate ce tween counties?
21 A
dall, I don't want to say that they weren't
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i 25 expected to.
State police can talk to their state police n
28 1218 04 06 sonLRA 1
counterpart in the next county.
If it was a e
2 Daupnin-Cumoerland County problem, there is a phone there.
3 Call up and say it doesn't look like this particular traf fic
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4 artery should be utilized their way, a
Tne meetings on Saturday, I met at 10: 15 with Jim Cox from the police and gave him a briefing on the approach we thought was appropriate.
4 p.m.
I briefed other state e
3 police officials on this same matter.
We hoped to have by thi3 arrangement representation f rom the state police in 10 each concerned county to be sure that the police approach 11 was recognized and their assistance was incorporated into 12 the county's effort.
13 If there were problems, that is what we are for. With the jJg 14 response team capability 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> a day in our EOC from the 15 state police.
They had this, for example, as did other 16 agen:les.
We had, as I recall, a specific instance where il there was a misinterpretation in one of the counties by the 13 state police representative who went down.
I talked to that 19 state police representative and we got an understanding of 20 what was hopef ully to be accomplished.
There was no 21 difficulty.
22 There were multitudes of telephone calls to be sure that i
23 everything was going without difficulty. That again is the 24 purpose of coordination.
Why we had good communications (r')
2a with the county and we used the response teams and met with 3(G i
29 218 04 07 s,bpLRW i
their management personnel as appropriate to ensure these 2
other s were coordinated.
3 0
Was your primary communications link with counties
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4 the phone?
5 A
Mine was.
6 0
The two-way communication?
e A
Mine was.
And as the opportunity presented 8
itssif, visits from the county to talk over whatever I had if there was a representative from the county who could get 10 away, and they were quite easily as busy or busier than we 11 were, trying to put their plans together.
12 So it amounted tc telephone. communication.
For me, in 13 the planning business.
Now obviously the TWX, cable 14 business and what not, was utilized.
Mine was really trying jgg 15 to pu t the plans together.
Operations going on at the same 16 time and a multitude of other things.
Ie O
Did you experience any difficulties in your effort 13 because of the communications system, because the phone 19 lines were overloaded, where you couldn't get through in 23 communicating with the counties?
l l
21 A
I wouldn't say it was always without problem, out 22 I can't recall a time when an essential thing couldn't be 23 accomplishea given a little more time.
24 Bf MR. ERNST:
25 0
Do you have anything else you would like to state
~ A)
N_,
30 1218 04 08 sonLRd I
for the record at this time regarding any aspect of TMI that f}
k' 2
might help our inquiry?
3 A
No, I can't think of anything at the moment.
I'd
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4 O
Any recommendations, lessons learned?
5 A
No, I think not.
I am sure you have access to the 6
various hearings that are in progress or have been completed I
and studies and what not.
Many of these have had 8
contributions f rom various representatives of people and I 9
think a great amount of detail can be obtained from those.
10 Things which have already gone on the record.
11 O
In conclusion, let me say this is an on going 12 investigation.
Although I have completed the questions I b
13 have for you today, it is possible, however unlikely, tha t y
14 we would have to bring you back.
I will certainly make ggp 15 every e ffort not to, unless it is necessary.
15
?or that reason, however, I will recess this deposition ie ratner than conclude it.
I thank you very much'for your 18 tima and trying to help us out.
19
( dhereupon, at 2: 00 p.m., the takihg of the deposition 23 was adjourned.)
21 22 23 24 f^~7 s% s' 2a.
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