ML19308C446
| ML19308C446 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Crane  |
| Issue date: | 09/11/1979 |
| From: | Jordan E, Rivenbark G NRC - NRC THREE MILE ISLAND TASK FORCE, NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE) |
| To: | |
| References | |
| TASK-TF, TASK-TMR NUDOCS 8001240602 | |
| Download: ML19308C446 (41) | |
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- O NUCLE AR REGUL ATORY COMMISSION i.
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i IN THE MATTER OF:
l THREE MILE ISLAND i
j SPECIAL INTERVIEWS I
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INTERVIEW OF EDWARD L.
JORDAN O
P00RTENE Place. Bethesda, Maryland Date.
Tuesday, September 11, 1979 Pages 1 - 41 Teleobone:
r (202)047 3700 ACE - FEDERAL REPORTERS,INC.
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OfficzalReporters f
444 North Ccpitol Street 8 0 01 2 4 0 502 Washington, D.C. 20001 4
NATIONWIDE COVERAGE DAILY T
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I l-A UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 1
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NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION l
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3 jQ In the Matter of:
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l THREE MILE ISLAND S
SPECIAL INTERVIEWS 6
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INTERVIEW OF EDWARD L.
JORDAN i
8 Room 6711 9
7735 Old Georgetown Road i
l Bethesda, Maryland 10 l
Tuesday, September 18, 1979 l
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APPEARANCES:
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For the Nulcear Regulatory Commission:
I GEORGE W.
RIVENBARK 14 NRC/TMI Special Inquiry, Member
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. C _O _N_ T _r.: _N T _S i
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EXAMIhATION j
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Edward L. Jordan 2
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EXHIBIT NUMBER:
IDENTIFIEO l
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1 5018 2
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, Ace-Federal Reporters, Inc.
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1 P,R,O_ C E,1 D_ I_ N G S_
2 MR. RIVENBARK:
On the record.
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3 This is a deposition of Mr. Edward L. Jordan for the 1
4l Nuclear Regulatory Commission Three Mile Island Special 5l Inquiry.
I IhavebeendelegatedtheCommission'sauthorityl; 6!
Mr. Jordan, I
7j to take your oath with respect to this deposition.
Would l
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8 you please raise your right hand.
l 9
Whereupon, i
10 l EDWARD L. JORDAN 11 was called as a witness and, having been first duly sworn, was 12 !
examined and testified as follows:
O 13 EXAMINATION 14 BY MR. RIVENBARK:
15 G
Please state your full name for the record.
16 A
Edward L. Jordan.
17 MR. RIVENBARK:
Would you mark this as an Exhibit 18 No. 5018.
19 (Exhibit 5018 identified.)
20 BY MR. RIVENBARK:
21 G
I show you what has been marked as Exhibit 5018.
O 22 Is this a photocopy of the letter sent to you by the NRC 23 TMI Special Inquiry Group confirming your deposition here today 24 under oath?
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25 A
Yes, it is.
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Q.
Have you read this document in. full?
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A.
I have.
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G Do you understand the information set forth in this 4
letter, including the general nature of the NRC TMI Special 5
Inquiry, your right to have an attorney present here today as 6f your representative, and the fact that any information you
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8 A.
Yes, I do.
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9l Q.
Mr. Jordan, is counsel representing you personally 10 today?
II A.
No.
12 MR. RIVENBARK:
I would like to note for the record s
13 that the witness is not represented by counsel today.
If at 14 any time during the course of this interview you feel you 15 would 3ike to be represented by counsel and have counsel 16 present, please advise me and we will adjourn this proceedings 17 to afford you the opportunity to make the necessary arragements.
l 18 Is-this procedure agreeable to you?
l9 THE WITNESS:
It is quite satisfactory.
20 BY MR. RIVENBARK:
21 G
Mr. Jordan, you should be aware that the testimony 22 that you give has the same force and effect as if you were 23 testifying in a court of law.
My quer;-ions and your responses (L-24 are being taken down and they will be transcribed.
Am Feder::: Reporters, Inc.
25 You will be given the opportunity to look at that transcript
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and may make changes that you deem necessary.
However, to y m.,
2 the extent that your subsequent changes are significant, I
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those changes may be viewed as affecting your credibility.
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4 So please be as complete and accurate as you can be in i
5 responding to my questions now.
6' If you at any point during the deposition don't understand i
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7 the questions, please feel free to stop and indicate, then we l
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will make the clarification at that time.
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9 Let me ask you to follow two basic groundrules in replying 10 l to my questions-I 11 !
One is that you permit me to finish my question before you 12 !
give your response, even if you know what the question is l
iO 13 going to be, because the reporter cannot take down both of 14 us speaking at the same time.
15 The second is that you respond audibly.
Motions such as 16 nodding your head cannot be taken down by the reporter.
17 Did you bring a copy of your resume to the deposition?
18 A
Yes,.I did.
19 MR. RIVENBARK:
I would like to note that Mr. Jordan 20 has presented a 1-page document entitled Professional 21 Qualifications of Edward L. Jordan.
22 Would you pleare mark this as Exhibit 5019.
23 (Exhibit 5019 identified.)
O N/
24 BY MR. RIVENPARK:
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25 G
Does this document accurately summarize your l
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1f educational and employment background?
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Yes, it does.
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G Mr. Jordan, when did you first learn of the Three g-)
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A On March 28, a very few minutes after the initial i
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phone call came into headquarters office.
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From whom did you learn of the incident?
I 8l A
I believe I learned of it from Norm Moseley, the
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G Do you recall what he told you?
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A I do not.
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G Do you recall the esse'nce of what was said?
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The closest to the essence is that there was an 14 accident at Three Mile Island and we were being notified and 15 we should staff the Incident Response Center immediately.
16 G
And a'fter you received this message from Mr'. Moseley, 17 what did you do then?
18 A
I proceeded to notify members of my staff and to 19 man the Incident Response Center.
20 By man the Incident Response Center, can you explain 21 what that means?
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22 A
Yes.
This is providing I&E staff members to function l
23 in the role of field coordinator and technical support backup
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24 for the Center in operating reactors.
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25 G
After the -- after you manned the Center, what did i
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'you do for the remainder of the day?
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My role was one of an EMT coordinator, and that
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function is described as one in which information that is l
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received in the IRACT section is then conveyed to the EMT 5
members.
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And subsequently questions developed by the EMT are then 7
transmitted back to the -- through the IRACT to be relayed l
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to the region or to the personnel at the site in order to l
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9 develop answer for them.
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Is the EMT/IRACT coordinator the same as the EMT/
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- Yes,
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Were you in this role the remainder of the day or 14 did your role change from time to time during the day?
15 A
I was in the role primarily, I would scy, for two 16 days, although there was a gradual change af ter the first day.
17 After the second day, the change I think was complete, so 18 the coordination was in providing information to Congressional 19 inquiries that came into the Incident Response Center and 20 to providing information to the Commissioners who called and 21 other offices, other NRC offices.
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22 And innthat capacity, Dudley Thompson and myself alternated 23 subsequently the second day.
O 24 G
Can you describe how communications by the EMT --
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25 between the EMT and the IRACT, that is, the Incident Response m
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1l Action Coordination Team were handled on -- initially?
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Very early -- I think it was in the classical role 3
as defined in the I&E manual chapter.
Because of the severity
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5 so that there was more direct communication between the IRACT 6!
members and EMT than perhaps had been initially proposed in the.
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8I So that the mood was when the field coordinator, the field i
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liaison individual and the IRACT received information from 10 !
the site, he was taking a log or making notes.
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would obtain from those notes the information which I then l
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Now, as the role changed from the role described in 14 the Incident Response Plan and that role, I believe, is the I
15 one that you described earlier where written communications
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17 the EMT, between the IRACT and the EMT?
18 A
The written communication would be generally in the 19 form of questions from the EMT back to the IRACT.
So that a 20 limited number of questions would be proposed, and then 21 distributed to the appropriate team, either the reactor team
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22 or the effects type team.
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As the -- as these teams that you are describing, r~x
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24 can you describe how the Incident Response Center teams, how Acefederal Reporters, Inc.
25 the IRACT teams were organized, laid out in the control center I
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A Certainly.
The two teams sat at two sets of tables
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operating reactor support team and the table on the left was 6!
the radiological effects team.
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To the IRACT?
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To the IRACT director, Norm Moseley, yes.
9 G
The IRACT consisted of Norm Moseley and Victor i
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Stello on that first day; is that correct?
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That's corret.
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14 A
Yes.
15 4
Did Mr. Stello act independently of Mr. Moseley?
Is 16 it fair to say that Mr. Stello and Mr. Moseley coordinated 17 the activities, as opposed to saying Mr. Moseley directed the 18 activity?
19 A
I think that is an appropriate description.
I should 20 add that the -- in addition to the two positions in the IRACT 21 roc.n, there were also satellite offices that were set up, and tN l
22 these increased during the week, as a matter of fact, so that 23 there were support staff in the various offices around the
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Now, with the two support groups, the operating
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2 Incident Response Center and the satellite offices around the i
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4 the EMT and the IRACT handled?
How did the EMT communicate I
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Generally, the EMT did not communicate with the i
7 satellite offices.- Those were managed primarily by Vic Stello.I 8
These were mostly NRR personnel with some I&E personnel also 9l involved in the satellite offices.
i 10 So that the communications from EMT to the satellite 11 offices would be through the IRACT and with me initially as 12 the communicator, the liaison officer.
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Then you as the communicating officer, the 14 coordinator would pass information from the EMT to Mr. Stello?
15 A.
No.
Mr. Stello was in the IRACT capacity.
I would 16 be passing information to Mr. Davis and Mr. Gossick and to 17 Mr. Denton and whoever else at that particular time was in the 18 EMT room.
19 G
Would you be passing information to Mr. Stello from 20 those people?
l 21 A.
Yes.
22 G
Would you be passing information from that information l
l 23 group downward to Mr. Stello in the I*stACT?
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24 A.
Yes.
I was-the individual *.tho was going between l
" Ace-Federd Reporters. Inc, 25 those two rooms primarily.
And certainly after the initial I
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1; events there were movements between the two rooms, people were 2 ji not totally isolated.
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days as they began to have more interfaces with these people?
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A I think the change was one in which it became I
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apparent that an intermediary inbetween the two rooms was no fi i
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longer necessary.
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IRACT officer by the EMT and there were periodic briefings of l
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Was the EMT communicating them directly only with l
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13 the IRACT members Stello and Moseley, or were they also
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14 communicating directly with the operating table and the 15 radiological table in the IRC?
16 A
Primarily with the IRACT directors.
And there were 17 some shift changes necessary so that Mr. Moseley and Mr. Stello 18 were not there 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> a day, although it seemed it was that i9 long.
20 4
Were there ever more than one liaison officer at a 21 time?
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No.
23 G
Were all of the communications between headquarters
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direct by the field coordinator to the TV site.
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Were you aware of other communications going from j
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to the site from the operating group, the radiological group, l
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or the satellite office?
7 A
I recollect that there were some other communications.
8 I can't recall the specifics.
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Within the IRACT, the IRACT support staff, the l
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contingency plan information, the incoming data and other 12 )
information coordinated among these people?
13 A
I would say primarily by notes and by being developed 14 in some cases on the bulietin boards in the Incident Response 15 Center.
And I would certainly venture an opinion that that 16 was one of the weaknesses in the role in that it is very 17 difficult to provide information for large numbers of people 18 that are involved in such an occurrence, maintaining current 19 status and disseminating information so that the new individual 20 coming into the Center or going to a satellite office can 21 rapidly get caught up on the status of events.
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How did the field communicators know to whom 23 information should be sent when it came in to them over the 24 telephone?
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25 A
Generally, the information~was directed to either l
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the operating reactors individual or o the radiological M
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information either through one of the IRACT members to the I
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appropriate satellite office e.
once again, made a nc te back i
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There were two telephones to the site from time to i
9 time on the first day?
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- yes, II l G
By that, I mean direct lines, one to Unit I, one I
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to Unit II.
13 A
That's correct.
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Did we have a field communicator for each of those 15 telephones in headquarters?
16 A
No.
The field' communicator, I believe, was generally 17 communicating with Unit II centrol room.
In the Unit I control 18 room was, you might say, a backup as far as information.
And 19 I believe that the radiological team communicated to a larger 20 extent to Unit I control room.
21 Were they communicating directly, the radiological O
22 team with Unit I?
23 A
That's my impression.
And this was after some time, O
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Besides serving as liaison officer, did you serve
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in any other capacity on day one, on Wednesday?
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we were doing.
One of those that I was involved in was in rs b
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developing an appropriate PN, preliminary notification of the 5l occurrence, and in serving in some cases on the IRACT team t'
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itself.
7 Fundamentally it was a communication role.
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G Your role on the IRACT team was fundamentally l
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l 10 A.
Yes.
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Can you explain that a little bit?
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What I em saying is the IRACT is -- the intent is
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13 to obtain techr..t. cal information on the status of the plant 14 and the radiological -- and to make recommendations for 15 actions, both to the EMT and to the site.
16 And so in an information role between the IRACT and EMT, 17 I was naturally, I think, involved in some of the recommendations 18 that the IRACT was making in understanding the plant status.
I9 But fundamentally it was to communicate between those 20 two organizations.
21 Who were the leaders of the I&E IRACT support staff 4
22 on Day One?
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23 A.
For radiological, I believe Jim Sniezek and Leo i'
24 Higgenbotham were principals.
And.for the cperating reactors,
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25 I believe that Roger Woodruff of my staff, Jerry Klingler, and t
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I believe Mike Wilbur was initially the communicator with d
2 the site, so he was the field liaison.
1 3
4 These people that you have described in the
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radiological area, Sniezek and Higgenbotham, were they serving i
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in parallel roles, or was Higgenbotham in support of Sniezek?
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How as that --
7 A
The latter.
Higgenbotham was in support of Sniezek.
8 And understand that the staffing essentially contantly changed.
9 The initial notification, the people that were immediately 10 available in the I&E offices manned the center.
And then this l II manning was augmented"by NRR personnel through the day and 12 l through the weeks that followed.
O 13 So it was not a static manning force at all.
i Id G
Do you know how these I&E people were coordinating --
15 let me back up.
Can you describe the differences in the roles 16 of the I&E' support staff and the NRR support staff?
I7 A
The purpose of the Incident Response Center is to 18 put the staffs together so that they are not separated by I9 natural function.
The I&E people were, I believe, looking, 20 perhaps more directly at the plant operating condition in 21 terms of the operator's viewpoint.
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How did they -- how did I&E people coordinate with
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discipline 9 i
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For instance, how did the operating I&E people coordinate 7
with the operating NRR support staff?
8 A
They were generally working as a group in the same t
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The satellite offices contained people who were working i
10 l:on a particular problem or were in a particular narrow i
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So that there were in many cases both I&E and NRR people in
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13 the satellite rooms so that the staffs did lose some identity end #1 14 in responding to this incident, which was by design.
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Did I understand you to say that NRR people and the O
2 I&E people were sometimes together, working together in the Q
3 satellite offices?
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A.
Yes.
5 G
Who was deciding, then, what course of action should 6
be taken by the MRC staff, what suggestions should be made, 7
what information was needed in a given area?
For instance, 8
in the operating area, who would decide for the team what'it 9
should do?
10 A.
Once again, it was generally whoever was serving II as the leader of that group in the IRACT at that time.
I2 G
Was that leader ever an NRR person?
O 13 A.
Yes.
14 G
So while you have listed Woodruff and Klingler as 15 being lead I&E support staff in the operating area, there I0 were also NRR lead support staff in that same function?
17 A.
Yes.
As I said earlier, the personnel that are 18 staffing the center changed, evolved, as a function of time l'
and shift type arrangements, so that there was a turnover 20 that was almost constant.
21 G
Is it fair to say that at any given time there was q
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23 A.
Yes.
O 24
.G And that one person was either an I&E person or an Ace Federal Reporters, tric.
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1 A
That's correct.
2 Q.-
Is it fair to say the same thing with respect to r-3 the radiological group?
\\_T) 4 A
Definitely.
5 G
I was just trying to determine whether or not there 6
was a single person in charge over a given function at any 7
given time.
8 A
Yes.
And I will qualify that by saying once
- again, 9
a criticism of the way the center worked was that-in some 10 instances there were too many people physically in the room, 11 and perhaps it wasn't clear who was the responsible officer at 12 a given instant.
I believe that was -- not the majority of O~
13 the time, but there were instances in which that occurred.
14 g
Then it is fair to say that whoever was the leader 15 at the time was making final decisions with respect to what 16 information was needed?
17 A
Yes.
Let me qualify.
For that team; and, as another 18 comment or criticism on how we were managing at that time, we 19 were competing for the services of the field coordinator,
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20 field liaison individual, between the reactor-oriented and the 21 radiological-oriented teams.
There was, very early on, a
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22 lack of information, and then the restriction in obtaining 23 information from the site.
There was one person in the 24 control room and he was trying to follow the events and Ace Federal Reporters, Inc.
25 communicate.
So that it was very difficult to obtain information
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from either radiological or operations on a timely basis.
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G By " constraint in the field liaison person," you o
3 mean the constraint by -- in that sense, you mean the member Q
4 f the on-site inspection team at the plant, or do you mean 5
the field communication person in the IRACT?
A.
The constraint was one of communication logistics.
6 7
In a given amount of time, one can only speak so nany words,
8 and once you have conveyed the message the individual that 9
received it must go out and then seek the necessary 'infor-10 mation to respond.
While he is away, you can't communicate 11 any more questions.
12 And so we were just -- we could obtain only a discreet 13 amount of information in a given time frame.
And so the j4 quality of the questions had to be such that we were getting 15 the essence of the operation.
And the discussion about the 16 competing interests between radiological and operations was 17 clearly that.
18 We purposefully set the teams separate so that they would 19 pursue their areas of concern without conflict, and then we 20 built in a conflict by having only one communicator to the 21 site to communicate both aspects.
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But you have indicated that we have communications 23i sometimes between the radiological group and the Unit 1 O
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24 on-site inspection team member and communications between the Ace Federal Reporters, Inc.
25 field communicator in the headquarters IRACT and the Unit 2
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on-site inspection team member.
2 A
That's correct.
But that was not early on.
I 3
think I also.said this was after the first half day.
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G So what you are describing now is the early on 5
conflict, the early on bottleneck at the one point.
6 A
That's correct.
7 Thank you.
8 Can you describe some of the things that the operations 9
support staff was doing on day one?
10 A
The operations staff were looking at plant condi-11 tions with respect to the plant design, in order to understand 12 l what the corrective actions might be to get the plant out of 13 the condition they appeared to be in.
So that it was 14 intaking, I must say, a very small amount of information and 15 trying to understand what condition the core was in, what 16 condition the cooling systems were in, and then looking for 17 possible avenues out, out of this particular situation.
So 18 that the individuals were looking at the piping and instrumen-19 tation drawings, trying to find what indications the operator 20 would have which would convey to him more clearly what the 21 plant status was.
22 Because it was, I think, our view that the people at the 23
. plant didn't understand physically what had happened to them.
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24 And we were handicapped by not, of course, having the instru-Aco Federal Mooorters, Inc.
25 mentation indications in front of us and, in many cases 7 i
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not having the f amiliarity with -- I can' t say the word --
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2 familiarity with that particular plant instrumentation.
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we had a generic familiarity, but not the specific plant 4
familiarity.
5 G-Did anybody_ask the utility what its view was of 6
what was happening in a broad sense, from an overall systems 7
point of view?
And I ask that question in the light of the 8
many detailed questions that I know we did ask of where we 9
were asking for specific readings on -- at one point in the 10 system, specific information about another point in the system.
11 What I would like to know is if anyone ever asked the 12 utility what the big picture was from their point of view?
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13 A
I have not reviewed the tapes.
I think that would 14 be the best place to find that information.
I don't have 15 any knowledge of anyone asking a big picture type question.
16 MR. RIVENBARK:
Off the record.
17 (Discussion off the record.)
18 MR. RIVENBARK:
Back on the record.
19 BY MR. RIVENBARK:
20 0
Were operations problems being discussed with the 21 region or was -- and the on-site' inspection team, or was O
kl 22 the region and the on-site inspection team merely asked to 23 provide data?
(m
\\-
24 A
I think more in terms of providing data, although Am-FWwW Reorwrs, lm.
25 there certainly was some discussion, and the preponderance
21 I
mte 6 I
was providing data.
And we are still talking about the very
_s 2
early stages, the first day or day and a half.
3 G
Did anyone ask the on-site inspection team to provide
{
an o' erall evaluation or a system by system evaluation?
j v
4 i
5 A
That was done insofar as system status.
lat I 6
believe that was during the second day, as. far as developing 7
some type of a tabulation of what components and systems were 8
9 G
It might be a good idea, then, at this point to 10 note how the communications changed later on, if you can.
11 A
Certainly.
12 G
So that we don't leave it always with the problems 13 that were there on Wednesday.
How did the -- can you describe 14 in general how the communications changed with time?
15 A
I think in general, during the first -- I would say 16 the first day, the mission was to try to obtain the information 17 on what the plant was doing, what had physically occurred.
1 18 And then the second day we were getting down to a systematic 19 evaluation of what systems were operable, what components were 20 still functioning, and what information we were getting from 21 instrumentation on a more systematic basis.
22 So it was, in the initial stage, since we did not have i
23 the instrumentation available for ourselves to look at in the
(~s) 24 incident response center, it was obtaining the ceiling infor-Ace Federal Reporters, Inc.
25 mation from our man in the control room, which at this time 1
i
22 mte 7 I
frame may not have been in a systematic fashion.
U 2
G Moving now from what was going on on the first day 3
to the emergency plan itself, are you familiar with the NRC i
4 manual chapter 502?
5
+A Yes, I am.
6 G
This manual chap ter, of course, concerns the NRC 7
incident response program.
Can you describe briefly what 8
this manual chapter, what the purpose of this manual chapter 9
is?
10 A
I think, very succinctly, the purpose of it is to 11 develop for the NRC a method of coping with accidents, 12 emergencies, a way of compressing the staff and melting the O>
13 staff so that we have in one particular place a concentration 14 of personnel that can obtain information and evaluate it and 15 make decisions on that information without time delays by 16 having them physically in the same location.
17 4
Now, you participated in the development of the 18 manual chapter, is that correct?
19 A
That's corrent.
20 4
Can you tell me what time period this covered?
21 A
Well, it was during the period that I was executive
'- )
22 officer for operations Jsqport, which was from about June of 23 1977 until July of 1978.
And the manual chapter is dated --
[)
t-2d I am not sure what the date is -- some time early '78, I
+
An FMwd Rnotun, tu.
25 believe.
The date is February 6th, 1978.
s 1
23 mte 8 1
G Would you describe your role in the development of
_G 2
that chapter?
3 A
f-)
It was a responsibility of the Executive Office for
\\nJ 4
Operations Support to develop and coordinate the development 5
of this manual chapter.
Bernie Weiss on my staff at the time 6
was the individual that was direct 1:r preparing this plan and 7
coordinating with the other NRC offices, and in developing 8
a plan that was concurred in by all of those offices.
9 G
Are you also familiar with the red-covered notebook 10 entitled "NRC Headquarters Incident Response Plan"?
II A
Yes, I am.
12 G
Can you chscribe the purpose of this book?
)
13 A
The purpose of that book is an implementing procedure 14 for I&E based on the directive in the NRC manual chapter 502.
15 And I think it goes a little beyond that in giving details 16 of how the IRACT functions in providing a call list and 17 information necessary for the immediate operation of the 18 center.
19 G
You said " implementing for I&E."
Does that infer 20 that..it is not an implementing chapter for NRR?
21 A
It was issued by I&E.
It was coordinated with NRR.
ts-22 So that it is a joint use procedure, but issued by I&E.
j 23 G
Now, is it true that you participated in development l
r~T (f
24 of this response plan also?
I Ae Federes Reponen, Inc.
25 A
Yes.
1
24 CR 7092.03 l
BWH rmg 1 1
There is once again a transitional period.
And the time
}
2 frame that we are talking about is the immediate response 3
time within the first two days.
(
{
4 In this case, and I believe it would be the case in other I
5 accidents, the direction of the NRC forces of the site would I
I 6!
revert to the site once an organization has been established l
i 7
there.
That is, the direct management of the personnel at 8
the site.
9 And, let's say, the management of the occurrence during I
l 10 '
the first, approximately tw3 days remained in the Incident i
l 11 Response Center.
l 12 l There was a transition then, so that the Incident Response 13 Center was tracking and understanding the occurrences, 14 understanding the events during the course of the recovery, i
15 but were not directing them any longer.
And I think that is l
16 also a natural transition.
17 G
Is that something that was envisioned.by the plan?
18 A
No, I don't think it was envisioned by the plan.
I l
19 think the scale of this accident was on the margins of the l
20 plan, if you will.
21 0
The headquarters response plan doesn't on the N-)
22 surface seem to address round-the-clock operation of the 23 emergency center, and how the different functions of EMT and 24 IRACT will be covered, i Ace Federd Reporters, Inc.
25 Was this an oversight or was it considered, or am I correct I
h 1
1
25 f
rm 2
lj in making that statement?
l 2l A
I don't believe it is specifically covered.
It was I
3 considered and it was acknowledged that there would be cases f
s, x-4l in which it was necessary to man the center around the clock, 1
S' so that we had identified those personnel within I&E, for i
i i
6' instance, that would contribute to the center, and they would 3
7' be placed on call as the actual event warranted.
i 8;
And in, I guess, assessing the plan, one must realize that l,
i 9'
it was developed for a wide range of problems, ranging from a j
10 '
safeguards-type event to a reactor accident or transportation II '
accident.
12 '
So it was necessarily quite broad in its terms.
'~N, i
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13 G
I guess I was referring to things like the fact
~'
14 that EMT membership is described: the executive director, 15 the director of NRR, the director of I&E --
don't their 16 stand-ins during round-the-clock operation, was not described 17 there, how the chain of command would be passed on.
18 A
The chain of command was, I think, a very natural 19 evolution.
The directors, the IRACT team members delegated 20 that responsibility to a member of the staff, and I saw no 21 void, no problem in that respect.
(
's' 22 So as the occurrence stretched on in time, there was a 23 natural evolution, natural staffing that occurred as it would
,~
~!
24 in any fashion.
Aa-Fewaf Reporters,1N.
25 G
Do you know if it was the intent of the manual chapter
26 rmg 3 1
0502.or of the headquarters Incident Response Plan that the O
2 Commission have an active role in responding to the incident?
3i A
It was not envisioned in the plan.
4 G
The manual chapter states that the EMT will transform, 5
Commission policy into specific guidance for response.
Was
-l 6!
it the intent of the manual chapter that the Commission approval i
7 of EMT decisions be obtained before the EMT implemented its l
8 decisions?
9 A
Not to my knowledge.
10 G
Then basically, when it says transform Commission l
11 '
policy, is it fair to say that it was referring the policy 12 !
already existing at the time the incident occurred?
r%
(_
13 A
I think that is a fair assumption.
I think the EMT 14 members know the extent of their jurisdiction and if they 15 felt that they were outside of it, they would go to the 16 Commission staff.
17 G
Did EMT make any substantive decisions on its own, 13 to your knowledge, independent of the Commission?
19 A
By independent of the Commission, the Commission 20 wasn't meeting, I don't believe, in the first day.
The EMT 21 was keeping the Commission informed of the unfolding of events,
/~'
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22 so that I believe there was awareness of decisions that were 23 being made, not necessarily concurrence that was requested of 24 the Commission as a whole.
. Am-Federal Reporters, Inc.
25 g
That is on the first day.
I
27 i
3 rmg 4 1
A Yes.
l 2
0 Is that fair to say that that was true in the 3>
remaining days?
f 1
~
4 A
I think there was more communication, more discussion!
5 with the Commissioners subsequent to the first day.
j 6
G Can you think of any substantive decisions that l
l 7l EMT made on the first day?
8 A
Certainly, the concern over evacuation was a i
9, decision on the first day not to, based on the information i
i l
10 we had.
i 11 f Insofar as other decisions, there were decisions with i
12 regard to placing staff onsite, to sending a team of NRC 13 personnel to the site, a very,large contingent.
14 G
Were they, to your knowledge, was that an EMT 15 decision, or was that a Commission decision, or a Commission-1 l
16 prompted item?
17 A.
To my knowledge, that was an EMT decision.
18 MR. RIVENBARK:
Off the record.
l 19 (Discussion off the record.)
20 MR. RIVENBARK:
Back on the record.
21 BY MR. RIVENBARK:
22 G
Moving on to Thursday, what did you do personally i
23 with respect to the response on Thursday?
Do you recall when 24 you first -- do you, first of all, recall when you arrived Ace-Federet Repo,ters, Inc.
25 at-the site:-- at the Incident Response Center on Thursday?
i
28 rn 5
1 A
It was quite early.
Because Darrell Eisenhut and I
2 myself had been identified to give a Commission presentation on r-3 Thursday, and then to meet with the Udall Committee subsequent Ny l
j 4
to that Commission presentation.
i i
5 G
Can you then proceed to tell me what you did on that I
6',
day, as best you can recall?
i 7
A The initial function that Darrell and I had was to f
I 8i devr ap a suitable sequence of events to use in discussions e
l 4
i 9!
and to obtain the radiological information as far as dose j
I 10 rates and accumulated doses, the effluents, and any environ-l II l mental samples that had been obtained.
12 i So we were pulling information together to use in the
('8
+
t t' -
13 presentations.
14 G
Was this the sum total for all -- did this t'ake all 15 day?
16 A
That pretty well took the day.
I don't recall the 17 time of the meeting with the Commission.
I believe it was 18 immediately after lunch, and then after the Commission meeting, 19 we went to the UdalD hearing.
And then after the hearings, 20 returned back to the Incident Response Center for the 21 remainder of the evening.
r's i
i
\\/
22 G
Until about how late?
23 A
Quite late.
We were on quite long shifts, so it p.
/
24 was probably midnight or so.
Ace Federd Reporters, Inc.
25 g
When you returned that evening, what was going on at i
29 em 1
the Incident Response Center?
ly'g6 f
i 2l A.
Immediately upon returning, I was attempting to get
!3' (V]
up to date on what had transpired in the interim while I was 4
away in the briefings.
And I believe that the principal l
5'
' concern was in the mode of core cooling, and the interest in 6
maintaining or obtaining a stable core cooling condition.
7' And there was concern over the bubble or a voiding that 8
had occurred in the core at that time.
9 4
Did you participate actively in the communications I
t 10 l after you returned, as you had done on the first day?
i II A.
The coordination role had, I think, diminished I2 between the IRACT and the EMT.
But the evening -- by Thursday 13
- evening, 14 And so I believe that my principal role, once I had gotten 15 briefed, was to assist in developing the next preliminary 16 notification and to begin and assist in obtaining appropriate 17 staffing for the center so that we could get on a rotating 18 shift arrangement.
I9 G
So up until this time the center had been on the 20 long shifts, as opposed to having three rotating shifts a 21 day?
^O' 22 A.
Yes.
Some of the personnel had stayed around the 23 clock.
Cots'had been brought in so there were quiet sleeping n"
24 rooms down the halls.
Ever since the occurrence was clearly Aa Feder-2 Reporters, Inc.
25 going to stretch out in time, it was established that we had i
j
30 rma 7 1
to get people on a reasonable shift in order to maintain their 2 j' ability to make decisions and function efficiently.
g^)
3!
G When you went to the -- earlier in the day when you K/
i 4l were preparing for the Commission briefing and for the Udall 5l session, who was acting as the -- in your old role as the i
l 6:
liaison officer?
Was there someone?
i I
I l
7' A
I believe that Dudley Thompson was.
That is my B i simply recall at this moment.
9li G
A group headed by Mr. Vollmer was sent to the site i
10 !
on Thursday.
Do you recall why they were sent to the site?
I l
1 11 !
A There were discussions on the level of manning or l
12 level of staffing that was necessary to respond to the occur-
,r8 h/
13 rence.
I don't recall specifically discussions on why Vollmer 14 was picked.
15 I do recall that each of the regional offices were called 16 and were requested to provide staff members to go to the site 17 so that there were parallel staffing efforts that were 18 occurring.
l9 O
So that it is fair to say that you don't recall 20 any specific ~ role that the Vollmer group was supposed to 21 undertake when it arrived at the site?
)
22 A
No.
23 G
You mean that it is fair to say that you don't
(.
/
24 know of the specific role?
You answered no.
Ace-Federd Reporters, Inc.
25 A
I know now what his role was, i
t
31 I
rg 8 1
4 At the time.
2l A.
My recollection of, at the time I was not involved I
3 in those discussions with Vollmer, and so I have not direct 4
knowledge of what his role was intended to be at that point.
j 5l G
Today, what do you understand his role was intended i
l i
6 to be?
7 A.
My understanding is that he was to, if you will, 8'
direct the site efforts.
And this would have been a 9
communication with IRACT.
And it would be a centralization 10 of the efforts at the site.
11 I believe that Boyce Grier was going at the site at about 12 !
the same time frame.
13 G
Do you know of any other activities on Thursday 14 that are worthy of mention here?
15 A.
No.
And I guess I must make the observation that 10 the activities as they occurred in time subsequent to the 17 fi:'.st day have sort of melded together, so it is hard to 18 differentiate what happens Thursday, Friday, Saturday.
l I9 G
Sure.
When did you come back to the Incident 20 Response Center on Friday?
21 A.
As I recall, I left sometime around midnight 22 Thursday and was at the Center fairly early in the morning 23 on Friday.
24 G
And what did yc,a do when you arrived at the Center Ace-CoderJ Reporters, Inc.
25 on Friday?
l
.o
32 l
Il A
My role had shifted to I think the one that was n9Q i
2:
earlier discussed in terms of then providing information to I
e 3
(]
the Commissioners when they called in, providing information i
4i to Congressional affairs, er members of Congress when they l
5 called in with questions on status, to preparing or directing I
6 preparation of the preliminary notifications and maintaining l
7 current state of knowledge of the plant activities and the 8
radiological consequences.
9 How did you keep up to date on the information that 10 you needed to respond to these inquiries?
II A
Through discussions with the IRACT director and 12 I the respective section chiefs for operating reactors and for 13 the radiological effects.and -- for the radiological effects Id and through the review of logs that were being maintained by 15 the field coordinator and the two teams.
16 G
There were releases from the plant on Friday morning I7 that resulted in EMT's -- the Executive Managemer. ; Team --
18 discussing evacuation.
Were you involved in these discuscions, either with IRACT or IRACT support staff or with the EMT?
20 A
I was aware, and peripherally involved in those 21 discussions, yes.
-22 G
Can you expand that a little to explain what you 23 mean by involved peripherally?
24 A
I was not a decisionmaker in that aspect at that Ace-FooerJ Reporters, Inc.
25 time.
I was trying to maintain the current level of knowledge L.
I a
l l
r 10 1
on the plant conditions and on decisions that would affect G
2 the NRC's ac'. ions at the site.
t 3
G Were you aware before the releases were reported 4
that there was concern with the waste gas decay tanks e
l 5
A I believe that I was.
That is a recollection that j
i 4
6; both the water storage tanks and the waste decay tanks had --
7 were filled.
8 G
Do you recall where you learned that the waste decay 9!
tanks were filled?
10 l A.
I don't recall who the specific individual was, no.
i Il f G
Do you recall the group from which you learned it?
12 l A.
I believe it was the radiological group.
13 G
Do you recall how that group knew?
I4 A.
No, I would be stretching it to try to make that 15 statement.
16 G
The Denton team ent to the site on Friday afternoon.
17 Do you r:now why that team vas sent to the site?
18 A.
My understanding was that the President had directed 19 that the NRC put a senior official at the site in order to 20 direct personally the efforts that the NRC was making at the 21 site.
22 G
Do you know why Mr. Denton took with him a number 23 of NRC staff?
/Q V
24 A.
I would simply say in order to effect the directives Ace Federd Reporters, Inc.
25 that he had been issued;in order to manage the site activities L
I
34 i
smg 11 1
he had to have a staff physically at the site.
W i
2 G
Did Mr. Denton's arrival at the site have the effect 3'
of taking away the headquarters, the EMT role of directing
(^)
V 4
the activities?
j l
S' A
I think it did, because the headquarters role 6!
became one more of communicating information from the NRC to I
7!
Congressional, for instance, and to tracking the occurrence l
8 and to providing support to the site team then.
1 i
I 9:
At that time we had NRC trailers that had been established I
10 l at the site vicinity and telephone lines to those trailers.
i 11 i So we were providing support information using the NRC i
12 ;
resources and the headquarters office to support teams at the r^.
(
)
v' 13 site.
14 You told me you became the information's status 15 officer on Thursday?
16 A
Thursday evening is about when that occurred, and 17 Thursday evening I was more acquiring information than 18 disseminating it.
19 G
After you became the information officer, did you 20 continue to work on the evaluation generic concerns?
21 A
Yes.
I guess that is the other role which was in
,m i
)
22 developing the bulletins in conjunction with NRR personnel 23 that were ultimately sent as Bulletin 7905, 7906, and 7908.
g i
24 0
Would you describe these bulletins in general?
Aa Feud Reporters, W.
25 A
Bulletin 7905 was a generic communication to B&W
35 f
i g 12 1
licensees identifying our understanding of the occurrence, the 2l sequence of events, and so it was an outgrowth of the presen-3 tation made to the Commission and to the Udall organization
('l K-l 4I that had been then refined.
l l
Sj And I believe that 05 and 06 had been issued on Saturday, 1
6 is my recollection.
I 7
And then 7908 -- 7906 was then the bulletin which was 8
issued to CE and Westinghouse plants.
l 9l And 7908 was the bulletin issued to General Electric plants.,
i l
10 In conjunction with issuing those bulletins, we developed l
11 '
guidance for the inspectors at the site.
We identified the i
i 12 :
need to staff the B&W facilities with NRC inspectors aronnd thel rw t
k#
13 clock to verify implementation of the bulletin actions.
And 14 I believe that that particular recommendation was one that 15 Commissioner G11insky offered.
16 What was the guidance for these inspectors at the 17 site?
18 A
First of all on the B&W facilities, the guidance was 19 in explaining through conference calls with the inspectors the 20 intent of the bulletin, the actions that we felt were warranted 21 at those particular sites, and then developing written
/-
22 instructions, temporary instructions that went to those 23 inspectors so that they had a program which they would follow.
I
/
24 G
Did you work on any other generic concerns than the Ace Federci Reporters, Inc.
25 ones you described?
I
i 36 l
=
l i
i g 13
- 1 A.
'The. bulletins conveyed our principal ca',
tic concernslage 2
my normal staff duties were being performed the residual
~
3 staff as far as other generic actions.
My bQiness is generic i I
actions for I&E.
4 j
5, So, during this week following the accident, I was totally l
i i
6I immersed in the TMI accident.
I did not do any of my normal i
end #3 7
duties.
8 i
9 i
i 11 i
i 12 13 4
i 14 i
15 i
1 16 i
17 18 19 i
i 20 1
21 5-
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22 23 O.
24 i
25 1.
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t.
37 d092.04.1-iinile you were in the I AC f rom Nednesday through gsh I
u
.(v 2
Sunday, were you aware of any coordination.oroolems with 3
-information coming f rom DOE at the site.
f 4
A Department of Energy.
i 3
Japartment of Energy.
3 A
I was aware of some communications problems.
I was not dire ctly involved in the communications with DOE, so 3
I really don't have direct <nowledge of it.
9 Q
Can you suggest someone wno would?
IJ A
The individual that I believe connunicatea' more 11 than others with the Department of Energy was Bernie Weiss.
12 And as f ar as proolems with DOE, my recollec tions were that, 13 in general, the coordination with tas other agencies was 14-extremely good and their cooperation was tremendous.
[
i 13 There were nece ssarily some communications problems.
There
~
la were authority responsioility proolems tnat showed up and 1/
were resolved. No longstanding proolems, to my knowledge.
13 0
'doving now to Saturday, did you --
i 19 A
Excuse me.
I think I moved on to Saturday already 20 with regards to the oulletins.
21 3o we have fuzzed a little bit as f ar as the t ime-f rame.
22 0
Is it fair to say, then, that on Friday and 23 Saturday that you were doing the same things that -- on 24 Saturday and Sunday you were doing the same things you were fS 25 on Friday?
r.
, ~ - - -
,,,.y v-
,-,r yy------
9 --
y
38
'092.04.2 gsh i
A
_Y=s.
The oulletins are quite ext 3nsive.
And so
)
i tnere was coordination in caveloping what we were conveyin?
3 to the licensees and the oulletins oe tween I AE and.1R9 O
\\/
4 staff members, and oetween I AE staff memoers themselves.
And then subsequently, developing the ins truc tions to a
the inspectors and conv3ying that inf ornation to the 4
inspectors.
3 30 tnat pre tty much took care of, I would say, tne latter v'
part of Friday, all of Saturday and Sunday, from my 10 s tand poin t.
11 2
You continued on those days to ce tne information 12 status of ficer?
13 A
Alterneting with Judley, 14 0
During those days, did you ever go back and work g~)
.%)
10 as a memoer of the IRACT support staf f ?
10 A
Not to a great extent, no.
If I was, it was like II a suostitut3 role for a short time.
la O
riere you involved in the hydrogen oubble evaluation?
19 A
I was not directly involved.
20 Q
dnat does that mean?
21 A
That means that I was in and out of the center 22 during the time it was being evaluated, and participated in 23 some discussions regarding the apparent growth or 24 subsequent shrinkage of the double size.
25 But I wasn't involved in the procability calculations or 0-L
l l s 092.0 4. 3 gsh I
3xplosive mixture calculstions.
(,)w d
a aast was your und?rstunding of th? nydrogen 3
explosive possioility from wnat you hearo?
-()
4 A
- 311, my understanding w25 that taere was a i
5 onjecture tnat the radiolytic decompositien of water could 3
ce providing suf ficient oxygen to tne existing or apparent existing oucole which was understood to ce primarily 3
nydrogen steam to perhaps approach an explosive mixture.
9 And tne problem was one of what was the reduction reta and 10 what was the rate of going into solution of the oxygen, il and whether or not an explosive mixture could oe a ccu mula te o.
12 0
00 you recall where you got your information on 13 this, on this suoject?
14 A
It was througn discussions with the bulk of the
(-
10 people who were staffing the center at that time.
16 0
In other words, the same sourc es of information that 4
1e you were touching base with to keep informed of status so IS you could respond over the telephone to inquiries from y
19 whoever?
2J A
Yes.
And to, if necessary, perform some 21 determination of the generic applicacility.
22 I think one has to recognize that there were many 23 discussions of hypothetical situations that were occurring.
24 There were many hypotheses that were discussed and subsecuently A)
(_
20 discarded.
And there were many evaluations that were s
40
- 092.04.4 gsn i
occurring catn in tne satellite offices in the center ano
. n)
(,
d in of fices at NRR and research and at laos ecross tne country i
3
-t that time.
a
(
4 30 there were cany pockets of information.
3 J
Jid you have any other noteworthy conversations or a
take any noteworthy actions on Saturday or Sunday that we
/
haven't dis:ussed so far?
3 A
Ine only other action, and I am not sure of the 9
timeframe, was discussions with Norm Moseley and estaclishing 13 s taffing of the I&E investigative team that 'te were il disoetching to the site.
12 This is to investigate the detailed sequence of events to 13
' interview operators.
And I f rankly don't recall which date 14 that occurrad.
But we went througn discussions and esteolished O
~
15 the team composition and then began calling the regions 13 obtaining the necessary staffing for that team and ge tting 14 the team into the headquarters office for orientation.
13 0
Is there anything else that you would like to 19 tell me?
2J A
No, I don't have anything else at this time.
21 0
Thank you, Mr. Jordan. In conconclusion, le t me 22 say that this is an ongoing investiga tion.
And although I 23 have comple ted the questions I have f or you today, we may need 24 to oring you back for further depositions.
25
,1e will, however, make every e ffort to avoid having to do so
41 1092.04.3 gsh i
I will now recess tais deoosition ratner than terminate it.
^
2 (ihereupon, at 10:55 a.m..
the ha3 ring was j
l 3
racessed.)
4 3
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