ML19308C442
| ML19308C442 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Crane  |
| Issue date: | 09/28/1979 |
| From: | Ernst M, Williamson C Federal Emergency Management Agency, NRC - NRC THREE MILE ISLAND TASK FORCE |
| To: | |
| References | |
| TASK-TF, TASK-TMR NUDOCS 8001240598 | |
| Download: ML19308C442 (49) | |
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N U C l. E A R R E G U 8. A T O R 't C O M M I 5 5 ! O N
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l IN THE M ATTER OF:
THREE MILE ISLAND i
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SPECIAL INTERVIEWS i
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DEPOSITION OF CRAIG A. WILLIAMSC" l
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80!FORIGINM l
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Harrisburg, Pennsylvania Octe-Fr.iday, September 28, 1979 i
as 1 - 49 4
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(202)247-3700 ACE - FEDERAL REPORTERS,INC.
OfficialReporters A.t.1 North Ccpitol Street i
Washington. O.C. 20001 8 0 0124 0 f%-
NATIONWIDE COVERAGE. DAILY T
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I UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 6
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i NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION 4
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In the Matter of:
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l THREE MILE ISLAND SPECIAL INTERVIEWS 6l 7l
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1 3i DEPOSITION OF CRAIG A.
WILLIAMSON 1
a Holiday Inn Town Motel 10 f 2nd and Chectnut Streets Harrisburg, Pennsylvania 3
11 Friday, Septe6er 28,1979 i
12 :
10:00 a.m.
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13 BEFORE:
i 14 For the Nuclear Regulatory Commission:
4 15 MALCOLM ERNST FREDERICK HERR f
16 PETER SICILIA, JR.
i 17 18 19 20 l
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WITNESS:
EXAMINATION l
3 ! Craig A. Wil. amson 2
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')q the record.
I aneraucon, LAIG A.
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'res :elleo as a witness anc, having oeen first auly s 'ac r n,
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des exeminea an; testified as follows:
3 EX A:!I N ATI:)N 5i MR. GR.i3 T s i
is State your name ana position for tne recora.
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.t / full name is Craig A. /li lli amso n.
I n aecuty 1e dirac tor of the P?nn sylvania ETiergenc y Management.
1.5 fr. Xilliamson, have you received a le tt?r f rom us s
14
.orovi ding c a rtain import ant information concerning.nis is a 9 po s i tio n ?
That's this letter here.
la A
Yes, I have.
This letter is marked as Exhibit 1.
li 13 C.:xnioi t i icentifisc.)
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fi di MR. ERUSTt i
This is a photoco]y of a le tter tnat was sent to 1) 2i you?
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i 22 A
inat's correct.
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23 fais confirms that your deposition here will 03 24 und?r oath.
23 A
That's correct.
_. _ _. _ - -. _ _ _ ~.
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J Have you read the documan; in full?
4 A
Yes.
3 J
Jo you un;iersten; the information set for:n in tn3 0
letter incluuing the generel nature of the incuiry, your s
rigat to have an attorney present end tne f ac t that 3
information you provide here may eventually oecome puoli:7 j
A I do.
d Mr. Williamson, is counsel representing you
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perso na ll y?
13 A
.-10.
11 J
I.tould like to note for tne record tnat tne-12 witn!ss is not representea oy counsel today.
13 If at any time during the course of this interview you I
14 feel like you would like to be represented oy couns31 ana j
i la have counsel present, please advise me and we will adjourn
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i 15 these proceedings to afforc you the opportunity of obtaining
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counsel.
Is this agreeaole?
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13 A
Agreeacle.
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0 You brougnt a copy of your resume to tnis t
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2J deposition.
This is that copy?
21 A
T7at is correct.
22 Mif. ERNST I would like te enter that as Exhioit 23 2.
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( Exhioit 2 identified.)
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2 ins document is entitled at the top "Bioorachical 2
3 5%e::h of Cr aig A.
ailliamson."
It's one page.
Coas this
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4 accurately summarize your ecucational and employment
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3 cac<grounc?
5 A
It ooes.
I J
Mr. Williamson, I voncer if you would descrios for 3
me four assigned, regular duties at PEMA.
9 A
As deputy director, I am responsiale for assisting 10 the direc tor of state, county, and local emergency 11 management programs and to assure their c oordination wita 14 like programs in other states and with tne 13 Federal Government.
14 0
So your basic responsibility is not coordinating 15 inside Pennsylvania cut coordinating with other 13 governments -- otner state governments and the Federal 14 Government?
13 A
No.
It's coordination of state, county, and local 19 plans within the Commonwealth with those like plans of other 20 states and the Federal Government agencies.
21 O
I see.
So to that extent, your reasonably 22 f amiliar with existing county plans and local plans?
23 A
Tnat's correc t.
24 0
How did these duties change during the Three Mile O
25 Island accident?
Like the first week or so.
What were your i
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principal cuties curina this period of time ?
i A
17 Principal dutias for tne first several veeks in J
the TMI incident were those.cf assisting the oirector in the j
conouct of emergency operations associated with the Dil 4
5 incicent.
In that respect, not greatly unlike my oay to day a
res33nsiailities as fast as my relationshi.o with the director I
and tne cutias and responsioilities of the 1;ency.
3 Q
A ai f f erenc e -- I'm postul ating now -- might have been that you were on essentially 24-hour emergency call so 1) you were snort of sharing tha directing responsibilities?
11 A
tb t really on call out there all the time, 4
12 a ssis ting the director in tnings thet had to be done in the 13 agency and working in conjunction with the 3cvernor's of fice 14 and the Lieutenant Governor's office.
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is J
.4aat responsibility does ?EMA have for assuring i
13 the sxistence of county and local plans in correspondenca 1e with the puolic law of 1978 in that such plans and sta ffing 13 are adequate and plans are :apable of being impleasnted?
ly A
fne Pennsylvania Emsrgency Management Services Ac t 23 of 1978 estaolishes that responsibility with PEMA, and those 21 responsioilities are legally established for the agency.
22 Q
As I understand it, is it true that all local 23 emergency coordinators were appointed at the time of the TMI 24 incident, recognizing that some were being replaced and in Os i
25 the status of being approvec at that time, out that thera i
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were -- and tnet all county plans '1are -- written acerce7cy
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j-plans were f ormulat?d, a t la ast to tne extent of the six 3
counties involved in"the T.MI incident.
There were :7unty 1
l plans tnet had oevn reviewed cy ?EMA and were effective et i
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thac tia??
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?rior to TMI?
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3 A
Ine plans reviewed oy PE'.tA wer e limited to the s
counties of Jauphin, Lancaster, and York.
At that time de i
i l) were working with tne five-alle radius evacuation plans and i'
11 the/ only inclucac tnose three counties I aantionea.
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12 we went out to 10, we picked uo Leoenon and CuanenlunJ, out 1
i lj to 20. Pe rry, to come up co your total of six.
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Let me clarify ona point of a previous question I i
l la nac to make sure that the record is cleer.
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la Tne previous question, I also talked about local clans.
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I4 Joes PEMA nave a responsioility for assuring the existe7:e and acequacy of local emergancy plans?
Not the county pla1.1 l
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19 out the local.
i 23 A
Tney don't.
The county coordinators aave that 21 resconsioility under the state plan progrem.
Did I 22 understand your initial question to deal with local i
23 c oora inators ?
You started off oy askino about local i
24 coorcinators?
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23
.0 I did ask a question whether, to your knowledg3, i
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.cIl of tne :coroinators had cean ;esignated, recognizing a
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T s-4 f ew were in tne proce ss of. ceing replaced.
I think. y y rr i
enswar was that tney -- the local coordinators were in 3
4 existence, -cesigna ted at tnat tine.
5 A
Inat's correct.
de have some 2233 local a
cooroinators of record, culy sopointed amergency management r
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coordinators, out of approximately 2600 politic 21 t
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s uoJ ivisions.
So tnere are a few who have not reconmen;3d
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an appointment ana, enerefore, are without the services I
IJ of a duly appointec, at least, local c oorcin a tor.
Il 2
Mnat physical planning, acainistrative, 12 opera tions1 anc other' duties were assigned to the director l
13 of PEMA by the Pennsylvania Emergency Vanagement council in It correspondence with.the ?ublic Law-323 of 1978?
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l'he formal assignment of duties and 4
15 responsioilities for the director position are those J
l4 contained in the position description for that 13 classification.
I am not in a position to recite them ou t i
11 that would oe the only formal setting out of duties and 20 responsioilities that I am personally aware of.
21 0
During the' TMI emargency response, what one_aight 22 describe as a de f acto command center was apparently 4
23 estaolished in the Governor's office, which consisted of 24 mayos a half a dozen people who were relied upon by the
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25 Governor in making recommendations.
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How old you relate to this function or how cid PEMA relate
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2 to it?
3 A
From time to time, Colonel Henderson, I believa, 4
met with the group, either individually or collectively, and 5
on several occasions I had contact with this group, as we 6
will desc rios them.
On one occasion, I had a lengthy I
conversation with Secretary Nilburn of the Of fice of a
Budge t Administration concerning the adequacy of the then 9
5-mile plans.
10 On another occasion prior to the Governor's announcement 11 of his recommendation involving pregnant women and 12 pre-school-age children, I was in the presence of the group as 13 they were discussing some of the ramifications of that 14 decision.
That's the only two occasions that I was directly
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15 involved with them.
I was aware of the existence of those 16 supporting the Governor.
Il 0
On these two instances, do you recall the la approximate time f rame of this involvement?
19 A
My conversation with Secretary Wilburn was on 20 Saturday morning.
That would have been March 31.
The 21 occasion of the meeting with the group in the Governor's 22 office was in the morning, Friday the 30th.
23 Q
Do you recall who was present at these two l
24 meetings?
25 A
The first meeting I described was limited to
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-l Jr. elilourn.
The secono meating, I rece11 in eddition to 2
tae.3cvernor, Mr.'Gerusky, Press Secretary Critenlov, anj s-J.
Jay Waldman and-others who I at tna momen; c an't r acs11.
4 2
Do you recall some of tne information sources that 5
this group was relying uoon at that time?
a A
In my conversation with 3r. clilcurn, I was
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oroviding tne information.
On the other occasion, tne 3
cecision hed oeen made oefore I arrivec in the Governor's 9
office as to what the announcement vould ce, so there wasn't 1) a graat deal of discussion associatea with what led to 11 maki79 that decision.
12 Maen I laf t our emergency operations center, we had 13 received the telephone call from Mr. Collins recommending 14 evacuation out to 10 miles.
Of course, we had the two u
id preceding calls from the plent.
As I lef t on ny way to che la Governor's o ffice, I encountered Mr. Dornsife, who is an is employee of the Sureau of Radietion ?rotection, and he 13 indicatea to me as I was en route to the Governor's o ffice 19 that ne did not consider the NRC recomnandation for 2]
evacuation out to 10 miles to be a valia one cased on the 21 data that he haa received from the plant.
f 22 He also indicated that tne Bureau of Radiation ?rotec tion l
l 23 nad oeen attempting jg[ read _ 3 our headquarters and couldn't 24 because of the overload on the Commonwealth telephone system at 25 that time and he was coming to personally deliver the I
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50 whea [ left for tne Gavernor's office, I was not awara J
of calls tha: I sucsecuently leerned had oeen made to 4
Comaissi~oner Hendrie and conversations oetwe3n the Jo ve rnor a
anc 1.r. Geruszy and tnese tnings tnat led to the dec ision a
and the Governor's announcement.
!17 arrivel at the
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Governor's o f fice vas the first that I '<new thet Colonel i
Hendarson's recom.nendation to the 3cvernor was not goin]
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2 os accepted.
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50 your arrival was af ter Colonel Menacrson naa 4
gons to the Governor's o ffice.
J A
Talked with the Governor on the telephone, yes.
4 It was subsequent to that conversation.
3 J
So the PEMA -- or Colonel dende rson's --
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recommenJations were by te13 phone and not in person?
4 A
Tnat's correct.
5y telegnone.
a L
Inen you were the personal representative y
subsequent to that time in the Governor's office?
10 A
shat's correct.
Il a
The conversations with Mr. Jilourn on Saturday, 12 what was it that was discussed?
fou mentioned, as I recall, 13 on the record some appraisal or evaluation of the aaecuacy li of five-mile plans.
What specifically was discussed and how 15 did.dr. dilourn discharge his assignment?
16 A'
He was interested -- and I assume had been 1
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assigned the responsibility oy the Governor to look into the 13 aatter and evaluate the effectiveness or the capaoility of 11 the counties to evacuate if called uoon to do so.
23 So I explained to him initially tne proceedings of tne 23 previous day, ?riday the 30th, when we went f rom 5 to 10 to 22 20, and indicated to him that we haa no plans for the l
23 current 20 although we had been working all night in 24 conjunction with the now six counties to develop them.
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25 He was interested in my evaluation of their ability to O
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perform or :1rry off an.eva:uation even in the aosence of 4
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aetaileo plans at that poinc.
That :onve rsation lea into a 3
dis:ussion aoout the adequacy of tnv written plans thet we k
4 aid have, tne five-mile plans.
i a
0 t!nat was your evaluation at that time ?
a A
Iney wars adequate for the circumstances asso:iatec with an evacuation in tne five-mile zone, where 4
3 we were dealing with something in the neighoorhoca of 25,00]
i people, and the evacuees would ce taken care of in the e
I 10 county in wnich they resided.
Under those circumstances, it t
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11 was an acequate plan.
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12 J
Mare there any weaknesses identified at that time i
13 that were surprising?
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th, not really.
'V J
daat were the plans for taking care of some of the la
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16 more difficult evacuees, such as hospitals and nursing 11 homes?
13 A
dell, tne state Department of Health, working in 1/
conjunction with local healtn authorities -- this was a very 2]
large part of the preparation of an evacuation plan for the 21 20 mile area -- they were busily engageo in that from 22 midnight Friday on until they comoleted it, utilizing tne i
23 emergency medical system people in the county, the county 24 medical society, authorities from the hospitals, nursing
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25 homes.
A team effort to get in place.
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,rAnLRd i
The county planning ef fort would ultimately reflect a
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2 oeficiency in their resources to do what the y wanted to do.
3 This would oe relayed to us and we would attempt to resolve 4
the matter f rom other resources outside the area.
When 3
sufficient resources to do this were not available, then we would place a requirement on the Federal Government in the 7
person of Bob Adamcik, the then Region II director of the S
Fedacal Disaster Assistance Administration who had oeen 1
designated as the coordinator of federal activities in 10 support of the Commonwealth.
1 11 0
dare these resources required for hospital or 12 nursing home evacuation for the five-mile plan adequate at 13 that time?
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s 14 A
Ye s.
Mainly because there are no hospitals (d
15 involved, for example, in the five-mile evacuation zone.
I 16 belie ve two nursing homes.
Then, when we moved out to 10 is and then to 20, which would include the cities of Harrisourg IS and York, we picked up a total of 12 hospitals and something 19 in the neighoorhood of 65 to 70 nursing homes, plus Stat 20 Corre ctional Institution and six or seven other prisons.
de 21 had a lot of special handling problems that didn't exist 22 with the five-mile treatment.
23 0
das Mr. Wilburn also looking at the adequacy of r~
24 the current planning activities for the 10- and 20-mile
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25 evacuations or was he only interested in the five-mile?
l 12 sl7 02 s3 r OL.li i
A He was interesteu in ois:ussing tais out I haa 2
notning to snow nlm at enat point in time otner taen some of J
the preliminary route essignments tnat nac ceen cada, so
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4 that was principally a discussion and a reporting to him on a
wnat we were doing and how we were Joing it, which included 3
at taat point, we.had assigned additional state people end additional tederal people to essist the county authorities in 4
d tneir planntn] efforts.
G Mare you aware of any otner activities cy Mr. Wilourn at that time in his evaluation?
11 A
No.
14 J
dere any other groups or people requested oy tne 13 Governor, or perhaps somebody else, to also assess the 14 adequacy of planning?
15 A
Mr. McConnell -- John McConnell from the def ense la Civil Preparedness Agency -- had oeen designated to assist 1/
us in our evacuation planning, I celieve representing the IS
'd hi t e House, anc it was our understanding that we oc also 11 utilize the experience of Mr. Aoamcik end his outlet to the 20 other federal agency people.
21 Mr. McConnell visite? I oelieve, all of the counties.
22 Pardon me, in the period of prooably Saturday through Monday, j
23 in that tima f rame, he personelly visitad the six countie s 24 and I believe he reported back to tne Governor on the r
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25 adequacy of their planning ef fort.?s he viewed it.
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0.
Are you aware of afforts 3f the daita House to l
- 4 evaluate plans on Sunday, parhaps, of Mr. Eicenoura or i
J Jessica Mat: hews or anyone af tnat nature ?
4 A
No.
i j
You're not aware of any plans that they might alve f
a evaluated or anything like that.
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A I am not.
The only asso:tation tnat I would o
mak3 with tne unite House was tne presence of Mr. 4:Connall.
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J M!re any recommenJa tions made oy Mr. dcConnell or l'
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oy Mr. Wilburn as a result of their evaluations?
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A As I recall, Secretary Nilourn haJ no specific le sugaastions otner tnan the oovious suggestion that vnere in 13 our judgment we thought we needed to bolster the county the i
j 14 most, we tried to direct our cest people tnare.
13 Mr. McConnell's report -- i t would be more of a report I-1.5 than a recommendation -- would treat generally now the i
il planning e f f ort was proceedino, and if there were taings 13 that needed to os bolstered or strengthened, he would i
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sugg3st tnat.
There was no formal recommendation and I 2-)
can' t recall o ff hand anything that ne spe cif ically suggested, 21 out there ware things tnat you would expect.
We reac ted to 22 that.
1 I
23 0
From the previous questions ana answers. I would 2
24 assume, then, that Mr. Wilburn was looking at tne existing k
da five-mile' plans for the three counties?
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A inat's corr 3ct.
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3 hu mantioned fecaral assistance f or the necessor/
3 resources to conduct an evacuation.
I Onin% you said tnat 4
suen resources would not be necessary for tne five-nile olan, that there were suf fi: lent Common'13alth resources to a
do tnat eva:uation?
A Jat nece ssarily Commonwealth resources, out
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3 resources wi:nin the Commonwealth, within ??nnsylvania.
J I infer from that, then, tnat f ederal resource s IJ would have oeen required for a 10- or 23-mile evacuation?
II A
fhat's correct, principelly in tha areas of li additional Joc tors and nurses, acaitional amoulances, and 13 cots and clankets, and a neonatal airborne unit that we knew 14 of as ceing availaole for evacueting incubetor inf ant 15 p rool e ms.
15 Those are the ones that come immediately to my mind as j
1; being the most critical ones.. Tnere wer2 otners out those were 13 the most cri tical.
11 0
dnere would resources like this come from and what 23 kinJ of tim 3 frame was necessary for response?
21 A
ih11, the American Red Cross-- there were a numoer i
22 of federal agencies that could proviae some resources in 4
23
-ter.as of ad;itional doctors and nurses, but the assistance 24
.off ared to :4r. Adamcik by the American ded Cross wes the i
25 most promising.
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15 El 4 02 36 r 24R..
1 As I recall, 19 were tallina 2cout somatnin; in :ne c
neighoorhooo of 150 to 200 nurses' and 53.to 100 do: tors.
3 I'm not sur3 of tne figure.
They said tney could provi;9 4
ta 3 r.. I celi 3ve, within a matter of 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br />.
Loca:2d at 3
the Lett1r'<enney ordnan:e d3 pot in Cnamoersourg, which is l
6 aoout 45 miles from here, there wer? 100 or something closa L
i to 100 ambulences ana I celieve the ;elivery time, if you
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3 will, on tnat was something in tne neigacornood of four
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nours because of their need to mustir driv 3rs, principally.
la The aquipment was ready to go.
Il inen there were additional resources, out then you got 1'
'nta a time frame that was considersoly greater than the 13 hours1.50463e-4 days <br />0.00361 hours <br />2.149471e-5 weeks <br />4.9465e-6 months <br /> that we were looking for.
1 -1 2
.laat kind of additional-r2 sources woulo have oeen 15 needed?
15 A
.1211, at that point we neaded more amoulences than 14 the - 100 at Le tterKenney.
I forgot tne aetails of where tney 13 were.
Pernaps at Meade or something lire tna t, out they is were talking aoout a lead time in naurs that would nave mada 23 it extremely difficult working with the two-to eight-hour 21 kind of acvance warning tha: we-had oeen told we were 22 wor.<ing with at tnat time.
23 J
Mhat was the sour:e of tnis two-to eight-hour 24 advance warning?
O 23 A
As f ar as I'm con;erned, Colonel Henderson picked
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16 r ' $7.4 i
- n't; up at on? cf his meetings or oriefings eith :n* 470 4
p eop '. e 330 che Governor.
C' ans of the occasions vnen n3 3
attenced those sessions.
Considering the necessar/ resources, what was four 4
2 re asonaols estim-3te to conduc t a nile en; a 20-mile 4
eva:Uation at the time that you wer3 first advisec that you I
nad to start preparing for a 10- or 20-nile, cefore you ned L
3 started the process of working on olans and getting things
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in motion?
IJ A
I don't really oelieve that -.if you're telking la of tne period, say, midnignt Friday night, how long woul it Ic hava taken us to concuct a 10- or 20-mile evacustio1, I 13 don't reall/ have any sophisticated guesses as to wn3t tnat 4
i 14 ti.ne elecent might o?.
de did compute with the f
l la cir:umstances we were dealing with on Sunday, April 1, tnat i
15 we could conduct a 10-mile evacuation in seven hours, a 4
14 20-mile in 10 hours1.157407e-4 days <br />0.00278 hours <br />1.653439e-5 weeks <br />3.805e-6 months <br />.
Assuming that we aid not have any i
l 13 unusual proolem associatec with the special handling cases, 4
i 11 nospi tals, nursing homes.
l 20 0
How was this computation made?
i 21 A
Tnis was made in conjunction with the Department i'
22 of Transportation as f ar as traffic flow was concerned, and 23 consultation with the state department of Health and Puolic 24
. Welfare emergency response members working with us in th3 l
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(ou are aesting with' Chu:.: Crows latar on toozy.
de 0 37 l
d' g'ivs you more detail on ?enn J3f's involvem3nt in ta?
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i 3
con;utation of traffi: flew.
4 0
I think I ecall somewners on the record tnat this i
i l-co.nou tation might have oeen an assuaption.of mayce 30 niles a
i a
.aer nour int cars and tnree occupants per car or svaething
(
)
of taat nature.
3 A
fast's correct.
f 1
J 43yos half the people left in the area that have r
13 to ge t out oy automooile and a few things like that.
l l
11 A
I don't 0311 eve we used that nigh a factor on i
(
14 voluntary evacuation.
I think it was less then half.
I
[
i 13 think it was a third or soaething.-
i t
l-14 0
A third lett or a third tnat ne evacuated?
l l
15 A
N), that figure -- those figures. of 7 and 10 hours1.157407e-4 days <br />0.00278 hours <br />1.653439e-5 weeks <br />3.805e-6 months <br /> 16 were on total evacuation of the area.
As I recall, that was I
l 17 not taking into consideration any voluntary evacuation.
At Id that point, we were genera y aware that there had oeen suca 19 a thing, but we didn't have any good inte lligence on the 2) degree of it.
21 Now, this was 6redicated on the situation as it existed 24 then.
The patient-load in all of the hospitals had oeca 23 redu:ed to scout 25 percent of what was normal oy tne hompital 21 authorities and everyoody was leaning forward, if you will, in
[
22 anticipation of having to do something.
Of course, the
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Q I know it's difficult to make a judgment, but I would
(^N i
2' like to pursue the point one more time.
Considering seven i
3.
hours and 10 hours1.157407e-4 days <br />0.00278 hours <br />1.653439e-5 weeks <br />3.805e-6 months <br /> for a 10- and 20-mile evacuation on Sunday, i
I
, cine was somecne frcm Met Ed, calling Mr. Cassid Are you aware 2.
14 of who made the second call, the one to Mr. Cassidy?
15 A
No, I am not.
i 16 Q
Could you please describe the calls or how you 17 became aware of these two calls?
18 A
I became aware of the two calls as a result of being 19 advised of them by, I believe, our operations supervisor some l
20 minutes after the conclusion of the individual telephone I
conversations.
21
(,~I 22 Q
So this was secondhand, either Mr. Kuehn or 23 Mr. Cassidy talked to you directly about these.
h 24 A
That's correct.
Ace +ederal Reporters, Inc.
25 Q
How did PEMA decide to recommend evacuation l
1
. j l.7 25 1
following these calls and the ones from Mr. Collins.
(UA) 2 A
Please state that again.
3 Q
Rephrased:
After these calls, these two calls, 4
combined with some telephone calls from Mr. Collins of the 5
NRC, Colonel Henderson recommended to the Governor a five-mile, 6
360 degree evacuation.
I was curious about the discussions 7
within PEMA prior to Colonel Henderson's recommendation and 8
what was discussed, and how was it decided that thic recommenda-9 tion should be made.
10 A
Following Mr. Collins' conversations with Il Colonel Henderson, I subsequently reported the gist of the 12 conversation to Mr. Gerusky and asked him to get back to us 13 with their recormendation. At that point, or shortly thereafter, we had 14 a second call from Mr. Collins, indicating that his previous 15 recernendation had the support of the -- I forget -the exact 16 words -- the brass or the Commission -- or the Commission, 17 something -- and there was a very limited discussion among the 18 management element of the agency because so many different 19 things were going on at the same time and we were doing so
{
20 many things simultaneously.
21 What we did -- shortly thereafter, the Governor called 22 Colonel Henderson and asked for an analysis of Mr. Collins and 23 asked him what his recaranendation was, and we had a hasty conversation m
24 prior to ColonelHenderson talking with the Governor.
Ace-Federal Reporters, Inc.
25 i
Under the circumstances that we had at the moment -- the two l
26 jl'8 1
calls from Mr. Collins, two calls from the plant, one of which 2
was identified as a very excited kind of conversation -- we 3
felt that we had no other prudent position than recommending 4
a 5-mile evacuation.
5 In the absence of any information to the contrary, that Bnd t 3 6
seemed to be the prudent thing to do.
I st4 7
Q Was there a telephone call from Colonel Henderson 8
or perhaps yourself to the Governor's office after the TMI 9
calls but prior to the telephone call from Mr. Collins?
10 A
There was a telephone conversation between Colonel 11 Henderson and the Lieutenant Governor.
I don't believe there 12 was a conversation between Colonel Henderson and the Governor (n;
13 during that time frame.
%)
14 Q
And the purpose of that was just to advise the 15 Lieutenant Governor of the TMI telephone calls?
16 A
Right.
And a similar call was made following 17 Mr. Collins' initial call.
18 Q
Which counties were called by PEMA on the morning 19 of March 30 regarding a possible evacuation; that is, Friday?
20 A
Dauphin, Lancaster, and York Counties were informed 21 of the calls and were told to stand by and that evacuation was c
j (')
22 a-possibility.
23 Q
Do you recall who made each of these calls?
()
24 A
I believe Colonel Henderson made them.
I don't know.
Ace-eJai Reporters, Inc.
25 I believe Colonel Henderson did.
I L
27 il
-9 1
Q At the Governor's meeting Friday morning, you
[_ \\
~
2 indicated that you weren't present at the decisionmaking
~-
3 process -- during the decisionmaking process.
Could *ou
,_7 I
i w~/
4 describe to me what was decided?
5 A
When I entered the room, I noted Mr. Gerusky lament-l 6
ing the fact that the announcement was going to be made.
He 7
didn't believe that that kind of action was indicated.
But 8
he indicated to me that he understood that the Governor had to 9
do that in light of what had been recommended by NRC.
I 10 There were a number of questions addressed to ne by the Governor 11 and others in the group as to numbers of schools involved and 12 !
where would the people go and these type of things.
Then most I
,/7
(
13 everyone lef t the session except the Governor, myself, and, I 14 believe, Mr. Waldman.
15 The discussion then had to do with the upcoming press con-16 ference, arrangements that were being made to carry that.
17 Q
There was one discrepancy that we seem to have run 18 into in these advisories that went out.
Let me describe to 19 you the problem.
At noon on March 30th PEMA sent a teletype toi 20 all affected counties lifting the " stay indoors" advisory.
21 You are aware of that teletype?
(
22 A
Yes, sir.
23 Q
However, also about noon, the Governor held a press 9
24 conference at which, in answer to a question, he said that the Ace ederal Reporters. Inc, 25 advisory still remained in effect.
l
28 jl 10 1
Then subsequently, at a 10 :00 p.m. news conference on j
f~3,
_f 2
Friday, the Governor officially lifted this advisory, ef fective I
3 immediately.
We were just unclear as to the circumstances l
(m
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4 regarding this apparent dis epancy.
5 A
It would appear to me that it's a discrepancy.
I I
6, was not present in the headquarters when the teletype message 7'
was transmitted to the counties.
I learned of it later.
It 8
appears to me that it was a misunderstanding between PEMA and 9
the Governor's office as to that item.
10 Q
Do you know where PEMA headquarters got its informa-Il tion to support the teletype?
i 12 !
A No, I don't.
7 13 Q
Do you recall the nature of the original advisory (v) 14 that was to "take cover" at 10 :00 o ' clock ?
Was th'e nature of 15 that the two-hour advisory or an open-ended advisory?
16 A
It was until noon, as I recall.
17 O
The original one.
18 A
The original one, the one that was issued mid-19 morning.
20 Q
We are a little curious as to how there could be a 21 teletype out to the affected counties saying one thing and then
( )
22 the Governor at a press conference saying something else, and 23 the public not reacting to whether or not they should still 24 take cover.
Is there any explanation of why this went t
Ace Federr2 Reporters, Iric.
25 unnoticed by the public?
jl 11 29 1
A The teletype message is directed to the County
. (_,/
2 Enargency Management Coordinators.
At this period, and con-3 tinting, we'were doing our best to keep the counties informed of decisions that were -being made, press conference's that were 4
5 being held, and announcements that were being made.as a matter 6
of information to the emergency system.
We didn't -- we 7
weren't providing that for them to notify the public, because 8
in most instances it was after-the-fact kind of information 9
which frustrated us, but we kept plugging along.
10 Q
So you would not have expected the county organiza-11 tion to do anything with regard to notifying the public based 12 !
on the teletype ?
( ))
13 A
No, because the press conference and the Governor's u
14 announcement had already been made at the time that that was 15 transmitted.
16 Ideally, we would like to get this kind of information to 17 them ahead of the fact so they have it and don't have to hear 18 it from some other source, but even under those circumstances, 19 we would not expect them to make any public announcement 20 unless we requested them to do so.
21 If this was necessary or desired, we would so indicate in
()
22 the body of the message.
23 Q
During your meeting with the Governor at 10 :00
()
24 o' clock or thereabouts on Friday morning, what was your l AmkJai Reporters, Inc.
25 opinion to the Governor regarding the state of readiness for a l
..~
jl'12 30 1
five-mile evacuation?
O( )
2 A
I wasn't asked'that question.
i 3
Q As I understand it, for nuclear power or fixed-fault 4
kinds of accidents, PEMA relies on BRP for' technical evalua-
- tions and recommendations regarding protective measures and 6
things of this nature.
7 However, the emergency response to implement a protective i
as endon agah, as I drsM h, h is W. gmM-mu e 8
9 ity of PEMA as far as coordinating, directing, things of this 10 nature, what are the peacetime, radiological exposure criteria 11 for emergency doses and lifesaving doses for PEMA personnel and 12 other people who would be critical to a successful evaluation (s
such as the State Police and Nadional Guard?
( }
13 14 A
I can't answer that.
That information we would 15 expect to be provided by the Bureau of Radiation Protection.
16 Q
But there are no criteria existing.
This would be 17 an ad hoc determination?
18 A
It has been established,and it's part of our plan.
19 I can't personally quote the numbers.
20 Q
What are the consequences of an evaluation?
- Clearly, 21 an evaluation is taken to protect public health and safety from
()
22 some potential or actual hazard, but what are the consequences 23 of an evaluation?
It clearly is not a consequence-free O
24 measure.
j gj l Am + Med Recturs, tm.
t i
25 A
Well, you are disrupting the lives and exposing them 1
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I
j l 13 31 1,
to certain dangers which are an inherent part of any evacua-l
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tion.
We attempt to minimize those in doing our best to l
3 effect an orderly evacuation with the kind of traffic control
\\
(3
)
- s' 4
and the kind of assistance that are required under those cir-5 cumstances.
6, The consequences of some of the special-handling kind of i
7 evacuees is quite a decision.
If you are moving aged or infirm, 8
ill people, the gamble there is you are going to lose some if 9
you move them.
10 The consequences of particularly that group who have medical 11 j problems, scme of the consequences are quite difficult.
You're 12 j damned if you do, and damned if you don't, that kind of thing.
(
)
13 Q
How strongly do these consequences enter into your 14 decisional process for making recommendations regarding 15 whether or not to evacuate?
16 A
Well, some of the later consequences that I described 17 are more appropriately applied to movement plans for a special 18 group as contrasted to an evacuation of a large area.
Maybe 19,
under one set of circumstances it would be better to let the 20 residents of a nursing home or hospital, a certain segment of 21 the hospital patients, remain there even though the area f~)
22 generally would be evacuated.
t '
23 A number of these kinds of special considerations would be
- eral Reporters, Inc.
24 treated perhaps independent from the general decision to Ace-25 evacuate an area.
I
jl 14 32 i
1 Q
The Dauphin County emergency plan, dated April 6, I
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2 1979, which was put together after the TMI incident and was a j
3!
planning document for 5, 10, and 20-mile evacuation, states
/ ~N l
t
/
I 4
that "After evacuation of hospitals, PEMA will provide 5
emergency services in the evacuated area."
We were curious 6,
what this type of statement means.
Generally, how would an 3
7 injured person or someone within the evacuated area, after the 8
hospitals are no longer functional, what would PEMA do about 9
this kind of situation?
Is it PEMA's responsibility?
What 10 would they do?
11 A
Are you talking about someone that was injured as 12 '
part of the evacuation?
(
13 Q
Perhaps.
14 A
I don't understand your question.
15 Q
Perhaps.
The statement basically indicates to me 16 that somehow PEMA picks up the responsibility for somebody who 17 is injured within the evacuation area, but after the hospitals 18 and facilities are not longer functional --
19 A
I don't know that that is meant in that manner.
20 As far as the Dauphin County plan is concerned, those ser-21 vices provided outside of Dauphin County are the responsibility
[';
22 of PEMA.
Medical assistance would be provided in the support 23 counties through available medical facilities, just like it 9
24 would for any other resident of that particular county utiliz-Ace-ederal Reporters, Inc.
25 ing available medical resources, perhaps augmented where the i
j1 15 33 I
support county has indicated a deficiency.
i
/
s i
i i
Q Augmented by PEMA actions?
I 2jl 3I A
That's correct.
l-
~
4 Q
To what extent is reliance placed on the State Police 5lduringanevacuation?
6!
A Well, they are the principal traf fic control element i
i 7
associated with this kind of planned evacuation.
This is their 2
8 set and assigned role.
9 Q
As I understand it, the State Police was on a four-10 hour white alert during this time period.
Would that affect 11 their ability to respond in case an evacuation had been 12 necessary?
f ')
13 A
I believe it was the National Guard that was on a
~._./
14 four-hour white alert.
15 Q
If they had been on an alert status, would that 16 substantially affect the ability to evacuate?
17 A
It would increase the mobilization time.
If I 18 understand yom: question correctly, it would increase the 19 mobilization time by chat number of hours that it would take i
20 1 for them to muster sufficient forces in the area to effectively 1
21 control an evacuation.
I think it's important to understand 22 that our understanding of our mission, following the TMI N
23 incident, was to proceed with your evacuation planning.
But j
9er:
24 we understood very clearly, and accepted and supported the 8 Reporters, Inc.
Ace-25 Govertor's desire to play this down as much as possible, so
jl 16' 34 I
things-that'we would have done.normally had we been anticipat-2 ing some other kind of emergency 6r disaster, we didn't do in 4
3 this instance because of the effect that it would have on the
~
([)
I 4
public.
l 5
This includes the mobilization of State Police.
You don't i
6 move a lot of troopers into an area without arousing somebcdy's j
r 7
curiosity.
)
8 The same thing is true of the Pennsylvania National Guard.
i 9
We would normally move some of our stockpile facilities, 10 resources, in closer to where we plan for their possible i
11 use.
12 These things weren't done because of the effect it would i
en
.4 13 have.
14 15 16 17 18 i
19 20 21 4
(E) 22
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25 I
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I- - - - - - -
35 jdllLG6 JI fne Jeu 3hin Ccuat/ emercen;y plan of ipril '73.
/(i;!rof f
a i k, wai:n is the ]ne in effect at the time of tne T'il accine7,
2 anticipates tnat a represen stive from JRP will ce at the-county emergency coerations center, if possiole, to assist i
a
-in :ne evaluation of incoming inf orme tion.
Also, as I recall, during the TMI a cc i den t, there was an e
aamitted snartcoming in eitner ?EMA or uncerstandiq; tne proclems, taat B:1? would nev? perhaas been acre sole to t
)
e ff e:tively communicate with PEMA had they had a 10 representative in your emer;ency operations center.
II A
light.
12 0
In your view, how important is this direct 13 interface with BR? at the state level ena at the county 14 level in a situation-11%e tais?
)
la A
I think it's extremely important that rad 15 protection of canable and compe tent personnel in the state I,
emergency operations center to give direct technical advice 13 to tne council and the agency ano tae emergency res3onse 11 teams.
l 23 I don't celieve it's necessary for them to be directly s
i 21 represented in any one county.
We have the-means o'; getting l
22 that information to the counties when it's made arailaole to i
23 us.
24 I assume that the reason that that was included in the t
.25 Dauphin County plan is that they were given some t
a f
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4 36 51./ 95 32 1
Laarci i
a nc ou racamen t to incluos that as 2 slannino a ssumotion os sej d
on cne if.cossio19 zind of --
l 3
2 It's clear from rredin; tne stata plan tnat tnira 4
are different functions to ce-performed oy ?sMA and the state and 3
local emergancy coordinators, and clearly in my nina there should oe a difference as to what is containea in tne
/
various amergency plans as you go from the state lava l do in 3
to tne local level.
/
?lould you please give me your oose rvations as to,enet i
Id level of detail should oe containe; in state plans, county
'l l plans ana local plans?
. shat you migat expec t to find to 1:
nave the most eff ective reasonaole olen.
4 13 A
In my view, tne state emergency coerations plan 14 should ce a guide for state, county and local emercancy s
13 forces to conduct disaster operations.
As you go aown froc 15 the stata plan to county plans and to local plans, more and I,
more detail snould oc provided down to the point wnere you 13 hav3 telephone numbers ano intersections and assignments STJ I
1/
individuel's named and that type of thing.
That is the Kind 23 of detail taat 'oelongs in the local plan.
21 A certain amount of specific detail, less than tnat 22 contained in the state plan -- more than that contained in 23 the state plan but less than that contained in most local i
24 plans, should ce what is found in county plans.
. ('}'
23 fio w, there is some variation as to the method of I
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i 37 11/05 33
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olanning in several counties in the Commonwealth.
S o~me
/
2 coun;y orcenizations rely ?. ore heavily on the count /
3 or7cnization to conduct emergency operations with less 5
4 involvement on the part of local organizations.
There is a oit of flextoility in tnat across tne Commonwealth.
s 5
clo w, tne incividual Commonwealta departments end agen;ies
/
snould have plans in considiracle de tail associatad lita 3
their duties and responsioilities associatea wita emergencies, all under the umore11a of tne Pennsylvania 13 Disaster Operations Plan.
11 ib w, generally that's our acproach to planning in the la Commo nwe al ta.
Under most circumstances, it seems to track 13 well.
The one possiole ev.ception has b?en planning N
14 associated with fixed nuclear f acilities.
A 15 de are providin7 more detailed guide answer in Annex E, 15 for example, than we would normally f or some other kind of Il disaster, out we f eel we have to oc this.
IS Q
Mny?
In what areas?
19 A
'!ainly because emergency plans essociated with 20 fixed nuclear f acility incidents are scrutinized oy people 21 who, for one reason or another, either don't have our 22 disaster op.irations plan available to them or don't take the 23 time to wada througn it, it being a document of considerable 24 s ize.
So we have-attempted to have our emergency planning 25 for fixed nuclear sites be not so dependent on our
8 11 / 05 -34
-L os umorilla plan as we co in other -- I don' t <now if that
.(
2 makes'any sense or not.
3 J
Ta%ing the Dauchir County clan of April 5th as an 4
examole-for discussion purp;ses, this particular plan a
contained 3 fair emount of aetail, as I recall, in the area a
of routes a,d placement of signs and people and cars and I
buses and things of tnis nature.
50 1 guess it would or 3
f air to :haracterize that as a copaination county / local
/
pla7.
IJ A
Yes.
11 J
Thet is, in essence, I guess, how it wa 12-developed?
i 13 A
Right.
14 Is this the kind of detail that you feel is i
is necessary for local plans?
15 A
In support of county plans, yes.
Since that i
1/
April 6th date, in this vicinity, a numoer of local plans 13 have been developed oy subdivisions in the immediete area 1/
that strengthen, if you will, the county plan end flow with i
2J it.
21 O
How often would such piens have to be updoted, i
22 since they are so very specific?
23 A
Our current instructions are at least annually, i
l 24 0
Is it a fair stat 3 ment that existing county plans O
22 at the time of T'4I had virtually no detail in them except N
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4
$1 ll35; J5 LP ro5 i
noti f ic 3 t ion ' re quirements ?
2 A
Linited d3 tail.
3 J
It's also fair to say tnat thare were no -- or i
essantially no -- local plans in existence at that tima?
)
.\\
-rnare wer? few local plans in exis tence.
1 0
Th9n we seem to have a disagreement of what
/
pernaps yourself or mayce PTTA in general feels is nacessary 3
for adequata planning on the on3 hand, as opposea to what was in existence on the other hand.
Is that a fair 10 statament?
i II A
do.
I think that's based on the assumption tn3t 14 if you don't have a written plan you can't oossibly react to 13 an emergency.
I don't believe that's a valid assumotion.
14 We find in our daalings with county and local emergan:y 15 organizations that written plans ar? not their strona point, 15 out they can implement their plans -- they have i
Ia organizations who we have confidence in as a result of 13 wor <ing with them tnat can implement and get the joo dona j
19 without volumes of written plans.
20 Now, we would like to have many more written plans of th?
21 type that we are all comfortable with, cut g? ttino them is i
22 something else.
One of the proolems that we have following i
23 an incident, for example, like TMI is to convince or som3how i
24
. interpret for someone who is not familier with the county
.i-(
2 eme rgency organization, for example, the f act that they i
l t
___.,___,._____,,__,,______.__m._
40 sl7 05 Jo L:1Fros i
nava the cassollity to impisment tneir plan, even taouan tha
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i plan is not written or if it i s written, it's in less taan 3
desiracla form in _ sucstance.
4 2
Inen you would characterize an emergency plan -- e 3
detailed em3rgency plan as desirable but not necessary?
.dighly desiracle.
)
A Enat's carrect.
Q-anet aoout plans f or f ederal coordination?
Is it 3
clear that averycody knows who the ectors are and vaat tne
/
state-federal interf ace is and who you go to in an 3merg3ncy Il quickly and how f ast the response can be?
And are these li pro:idures and oefinitions of responsibilities clearly set il t or ta ?
13 A
I celieve they are clearly set forth a-d 14 unda r stood oy employees of dennsylvania Emercency Manage nent la Agency, yes.
Now, some of the relationship oetween federal lo egencies and other Commonwealth depertments and agencies 1/
sometimes is not tnat clearly known to us.
Id ele are generally f amiliar with the kinds of emergency 19 assistance available f rom all federal agencies out tne 23 intricate detail of some of it is contained oy individuals 21 in tnat state agency.
They know more aoout their f aderal 22 counterpart than we do.
23 J
Okay, is it fair then, to rephrase that tnat you 24 are intimetely familiar with those agencies providing N
25 O
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diridt suoport to thinas 1122 evacuation, suca as 00?A ano a
'/0A\\, out Mr. Gerusky would oe. tore familiar with tnos?
3 kinds of rasponses necessur/ from JJE anc radiologi: 31 4
. monitoring?
1 A
fnat's correct.
Ne are g3nerally f amiliar that l
3 that kind of assistance is generally availaale, and i
-generally who can provide taea,. out the Bur 3au of 1231stion 4
i l ~
s
?rotiction nows -specifically wnat kind of assistan:e is j-i available a,d how to ootain it.
13 The same concition exists, for exacple, with US 11 dep3rtment of Agriculture.
?Ie are f amiliar witn many' of 12 their disastar programs cecause we are in and out of them 13 alnost on e daily casis.
There are other kinds of I
I4 a ssis tan:e that is availabl3 to a state tnrough USJA that we la don't have that muca occasion to become involvea in, but.the 16 State Department of Agriculture knows these avenues and we 1/
look to them and their emergency response team members to 13 provide the missing link,
+
j I;
O Inat's about all I have in the way of questions.
23 Jo you have anything else you would lik? to staP. for the 4
i 21 record at this time regarding any aspect that.aight help our 22
' inquiry?
4 1
23 A
I don't believe so.
I can't tnink of anything.
i 23
.In tnose instances where th3re has oeen something thet I 25 chought I-could add that woul'd ce tter describe the 1.
J 1
.., _ -,, _. _ -.. _ _,.. ~.., _., -. _ _ _ _,, _ _ _ _,.
42 si7.05 J3 Lp"' o s I
suos;ance caino talked aoout; I have come tnat.
1 2
J L2 t me ask you one more que stion, I cuess to try a
anJ wrepLuo.this local plan aspect.
\\
4 I think you previously said tnet ?E'dA has no resaonsioility for the existence or adequa:'/ of local a
plans.- 'ut you neva also said that detailea lo:al clans, 30 e
least 11 your view -- and I essume i n P Ei.t A's v i e w -- are 5
hignly desiracle.
It would appear to me that ?2MA woulu ce int 2 rested in trying to assure that1 sucn plans exist, and I
/
10 wonder if you could tell me to what extent ?E?:lA mi;nt carry 5
11 this interest?
v 12 A
I don't know that -- if I inoicated we hava no 13 responsioility for the preparation of local emergency plans.
14 Legally or technically, that's so.
But we are constantly 15 wor <ing wita county directors in the development of model 15 local plans and continuing to pressure them, if you will, to l
1/
gat out and. work with F-'ir locals and oevelop the kind of i
IS plans, detailed plans, c :t are essential and will make an li amergency operation go that much more smootaly.
I 2)
.is do a lot of this.
This.is the kina of day-to-day
{
21 assis tance that we provide counties.
We are constantly 1
21 after them to improve and update th31r own planning e f fort 23 and to get in and pitch and help the local folks develop ana 2;
update their plans.
23 Md. ERHSTs
'fr. Harr?
sli 05 21 43
.rh4bdl i
dl U.
i5723 l
J l
2 J
I have several areas whe?3 I toula lite to tie up 5
so7s loose anos.
You mentioned at tne start that wa?n tne evacuation alanning vent out f rom five to 10 miles -- I 4
1 5
caliive i t was Fr i d ay -- tna t tais expanded the numoer of 5
counties from three to five.
I thint you said Leoenon-and 1
1 Como3rland countie s war? in:1udea.
5 A
fa at's ;orrect.
/
To your knowlecge, was Leoanon County advisec to 1) cegin a lO-nile evacation pla n on Fr iday ?
11 A
I would have to answer taet of I assune sa.
I 14 didn't personally speak wita Leoanon County concerning thet 13 out l'assuma that someona else on the staff aid.
14 0
Do you '<now when tne notification went out to tne la counties to 'oegin 10-mile planning?
15 A
No.
It happened in tnat period from mid-morning
- le to noon, while I was in the Jovernor's o f fice, cut I assume 13 it occurred during that period, but I don't know that as a 1/
matter. of f act oecause I was not in neacouarters.
That g
E 2]
would be my educated quess, that we notified them during 21 that period.
22 0
Oksy.
You mentioned also that there are somewnero 23 around 2200 localities within the state that have local 21
-coordinators and I celieve you said at the time of the 2a accident there were a few localities that-cid not have local i
O 8
i L
i
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44 21/ 05 02-rJ L L i.-
Coorfinators?
4 A
En30's corr 9Ct.
i J
2 Mire any of those Nitain the 20-mile zone I - (*
4 surrounding - f1I ?
a A.
I couldn't tell you tnat.
I coula get that-information for you out I d3n't nave it at my fin 7ertips.
a I
/
J I would. appreciate if you could orovide that 3
information to us.
I 7
A Fine.
I IJ You mentioned that a PE.'AA representative was li pre 33nt at most of the meetings or oriefings in the la Gov 3rnor's a ffice tarougn Sunday.
iowever, you weren't 13 present af ter Sunday.
I celieve the Lieutenant Governor was 1
14 pres 3nt in most of those meetings and he serves as chairman i
15 of the council, Emergency Mana^ement Council.
15 das PEMA receiving oriefing or information from the 14 Lieutenant Governor following Sundey as to what was takinc 19 place at these meetings and oriefinas in the Governor's l
ly office?
f-23 A
I would like to qualify my previous statement f
21 about we were present at most of the meetings during this 22 period from Friday to Sunday oy adding that I am eware o' 23 I'm sure there were meetings conducted that we were not
!l '
24 aware of.
How many they might add up to, I really don't i
i 25 know but I'm sure there were meetin;s conducted durino tne L
l
..... - _ ~.. _ _
l 45 217.-05 03 t
[
r ' ? Liv, I
?riJay to 3uncay period. we aid no: Inow coout.
We war?
- invited to-mos: of :ne ones we /.new icou.
i.
{
.Lat me clerify my question 3 oit.
I gue33 I am
~
2 i-j
' interested primarily in the meeting orsc? ding the Governor's i
s 2
press conference, the joint press conferences oetw?en Herald.
j
~a Jenton and the Governor whidil Delieve too'< place 91most 1
4-every evening, and there wa3 e meetino.areceJin7 tnose prec3 j
3 contarences.
i r
A C31onel Menderson was present at only a vary f 3w i
13' of tnose.
{
li U
Until Sunuay.
After Sunday na was not or'39nt at la any?
13' A
Inat's correct.
14 J
7fu s : PE'JA receiving information from the Lieutenant i
la Govirnor, or any otner person that was present for that 1-15 matter.
I j
li A
Colonel Henderson was rec 3iving some information i
i 13 f ron~ the - Lieutenant Governor Scranton, information tha t 1/
Lieutenant Governor Scranto, considered to oe of some value
- 2D to our evacuation' planning e f fort.
1L
>l C
.ias PE4A notifie6 when these meetings wer3 takin; 4
i
- 22 place or wh?n the press conf erences were going to ce held so
'23 you could at -least listen to the radio, that kind of thing?
2.
' Frequently we would hear of them from somecody 2i A
?
.25 outside.
We would attempt. to keep 'our television and raaio t-I
[
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I t
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,.we,
L 46 di'l 06 V4 i
. AqL4M
-i equipment in our smargency :?nter tunad to loc;l stations p/
\\s-i 2
out very frsquently we woulu hear aoout announcenents fr7m J
some outsiairs.
f.l '
4 2
J;ay.
Une final question.
I celieve you saia
(
l
'that you wer? present in the Governor's office ?riday 1
morning shortly oefore noon, cefore the press confaron:1.
during the meeting precedin; tha ore ss :onf erencn, was the o
lif ting of tne stay indoors advisory dis:ussed?
)
A do.
1]
Q It was not discussed at ell?
i il A
.10.
]
12 J
As far as you war? concerned, the savisory wnich 4
13 went into e f f ect at noon -- e xcuse.re, the 2avisory that l-14' went into e f fec t at 10: 00 o' clock and Nas at that time to i
l la last two hours was to expira at noor. as criainally plannad?
I j
15 A
That was my -- this was not discussed specifically I
li in the discussion dead of the press conference.
The emchasis of tnat dis. ussion was on tne pregnsnt wom?n and pre-scacol i
13 i
j 11 chilcren ena closing schools and proolems associatea witn
- 2) those three thin]s.
I 21 0
So to your knowledge, the Governor's response to r
22 the reporter's question during the press conf erence as t >
23 whether the stay indoors advisory would remain in effect or 24
.would be. lifted was a-personal aecision made oy him without
/
-25 any input from you or --
47 t
sl7',.5.uo-l L LWi i
A Anythin7 :nat I was awar2 o f, yes.
rf A
(
1 4
- 14. Held:
I have notnin; 9137.
l 3
al MR. HRa5T:
L l
0 I would li%e to ask one clarifyin; cuestion ana i
i i
a mayce one ad diti7nal. If you tal% acout ast3t1 in amer 7?ncy l-i i
piens, fron waat I neve hear: cefore there could o3 two i
i types of detail.
One type of detail coulo ce a listin7 of 4
t
]
a availaole r3 sources or resources tnst miaht ce taco 3o or 1
i mignt ce availacle.
10 A secona type of detail mipht ~
specific evacuation os a 4
li rou:3, specific things that specifi: people do and at what t
l 12 time they da tnam ano who they pict up ano thin,s-of that t
13 nature.
l 14 Jo you perceive any diff 3rence in th3se two types of i
j 13 aetail?
iihich one would be more adtantageous than tne 3
j la oth3r?
1/
A Cae resource inventory, wnich is something that w3 J
13 have long advocated that county and local emeraency 1/
coordinators have and constantly uposte, is not really a 2) plan in my mind.
It coes not qualify as a plan.
i i
21 four second description woulo more closely agre? with my t
}
22 impre ssion o f a plan.
However, man / people in the 3mergency 23
.syst3m will point to their resource inventory as "my plan" l-24 and therein lies tha basis for my comment aoout the kind of i
23 detailed plcnning that approval planners ar? LooV.ina for.
i l
}
j 48 1
lli Q6^ 26 i
iau knov, vnen :nare is e scarcity of this, th?7 Jon't I
F L1!
I t
J cnini an or:anization coul.: possiols respon; yet that f1110w J'
vita his-resource' inventory in nis alp poc%et, 30,3: 1395
{
a 4
it's amazina, you know, an operator, a corn op?rator, with
(
I j
j som) thin: It%s tnat can get an awful lot don? in almost 3 l
f 4
2 complete cosence of Iritt?n.ol ans.
(
l i
6 ia your 'cnowlecge, diu rna r2 source inv?ncories l
3xist at tn3 county and local lavels at the time of tne (".I t
j l
1 1
acciaent-i 1]
A faey existeo at the county lev 21.
I woula not l'
1 11 Anou about the local level.
i 12 0
Tais is separate from tne plan.
a t
13 A
fnat's correct.
I.
Have you personally retlewed some o f these files 14 a
i 15 ano s o f or tT to get a f eel as to tne extent that the t
16 counties know acout their resources?
1 l
i It A
.4311, tnis is som3 thing tnat we constantly pursue 4
I li at our annus1 ser.inars.
I nave reviewea tnam on tnase i
.1/.
occasions wnen I have oeen visiting a county coordinator.
{
2)
Others in tne agency regularly review these for accuracy and 21 update tnem.
22 It's something we put considersole effort into 02causa l
23 it's a very. necessary ano useful device in the conduct of i
22 emergency operations.
If you don't Know where your i
2a resources are, you're sort of lost.
{
~ ~... -..
I 49 eli 05.27 In conclusion, I !v11L 11.: 3 to sa/ : It
3' t!!!
ri L.,
i s
4 1st 1 Ocay of tais nposition f7r lov :orre:tions you f>r!
1 2
31 ;n; os
'<!-1 rr17 t ? 2 I
v I woula also lib to 57y this is an oncoina inv?stio.ition ana 11th3ul:1 I n.17e com,aletid tne miestions I havs f7r '/r!
to b/, it's 33ss1013 e ai rl: nee; :o nrino /ou c10m for i
t u
.1 ?r 7aa s t i ons - I douot it end.'ill c?r.ai,17,;:9
?v3r/ ?ffor not to o so - out for that r33 son only, I J
's will rec 233 tais deoosition ratner tn an class it, out I Je i
13
- tisa to th;q': you for your time and your help in our 1
li inquiry.
li
( ine rau3cq, tne takin7 of the a? position ma j
Ia ad journea at 1l:aa a.a.)
.i 1
i.)
I Ia li db i>
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4 91 u.-
21 2a
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