ML19308C441
| ML19308C441 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Crane  |
| Issue date: | 10/01/1979 |
| From: | Bernero R, Dircks W NRC - NRC THREE MILE ISLAND TASK FORCE, NRC OFFICE OF NUCLEAR MATERIAL SAFETY & SAFEGUARDS (NMSS) |
| To: | |
| References | |
| TASK-TF, TASK-TMR NUDOCS 8001240597 | |
| Download: ML19308C441 (78) | |
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N U CLE AR REGUL ATO R Y COMMIS 5!C N
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i IN THE M ATTER CF:
i TH3EE MII.E ISLAND SP 'CIil I
i INQUIRY DEPOSITION 1
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DEPCSITICd CF:
i WILLIAM J.
DIRCKS i
'O EHiDRGINAL
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Monday, October 1, 1979 Peges 1 - 78 I
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(:c2)m-3 Oo ACE -FEDERAL REPORTERS. INC.
'-A Offic:alRepor:ers
.th Ncrth C.-;tel Strg Wcshingten..C 20gr10 01 2 4 0 NATIONWIDE COVERAGE - D AILY 7
1 UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
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NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSIsN (v"s.
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In the Matter of:
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5 SPECIAL INTERVIEWS
____________y 6
7 DEPOSITION OF WILLIAM J.
DIRCKS l
8 Room 6211 9
7735 Old Georgetown
- Road, 10 Bethesda, Maryland I
11 Monday, October 1, 1979 9:45 a.m.
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BEFORE:
13 p)
A-For the Nuclear Reculatory Commission:
l 14 I
ROBERT BERNERO i
15 ROBERT CHIN, ESQ.
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CONTENTS 1
WITNESS:
EXAMINATION William J.
Dircks 3
3 0
4 5
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PR0CEEDINGS
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2 MR. BERNERO:
On the record.
3 Mr. Dircks, if you look at this le tter, you can see that
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4 Kevin Cornell has written to me, granting me the 5
Commission's authority to take testimony under oath in the 6
case of your deposition here today.
So let me ask you to 7
raise your right hand.
6 Whereupon, 9
WILLI AM J. DI RCKS 10 was called as a witne ss and, having been first duly sworn, 11 was examined and testified as follows:
12 EXAMINATION 13 BY MR. CHIN:
14 0
Please state your f ull name and current position.
O k/
15 A
My name is William Dircks -- D-i-r-e-k-s.
I am 16 the director of the office of nuclear material safety and 17 safeguards.
16 MR. CHIN:
Off the record.
19 (Discussion off the record.)
20 MR. CHIN:
Back on the record.
21 BY MR. CHIN:
22 0
I show you what has been marked as Exhibit 1.
Is l
23 this a copy of a letter f rom the special inquiry group to 24 you confirming your deposition here under oath today?
25 A
It is.
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o Have you read this document in full?
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2 A
Yes.
3 0
Do you understand information contained in the 4
letter, including the general nature of the NRC-TMI special i {}
5 inquiry?
6 A
Yes.
7 0
Your right to have counsel here today and the f act 8
that inf ormation you provide here may eventually become 9
public?
10 A
Yes.
.11 0
Mr. Dircks, is counsel representing you personally 12 today?
13 A
No.
14 MR. CHIN:
I would like to note for the record
()
15 t ha t the witness is not represented by counsel today.
l 16 BY MR. CHIN:
17 0
If at any time during this interview you should 16 f eel need f or counsel or you would like to have counsel 19 present, please stop us and we will make appropriate 20 arrangements.
Is this procedure agreeable to you?
21 A
Yes, it is.
22 O
Did you bring a copy of your resume to this 23 interview today?
24 A
No.
I forgot to.
I will send it to you.
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25 MR. CHIN:
Let's no te f or the record that l
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Mr.. Dircks will send us a copy of his resume.
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2 BY MR. BERNERO:
3 0
Mr. Dircks, I would like to ask you questions now, 4
starting with a few questions about the Three Mile Island (ag 5
incident itself, just for the record, for the level of 6
involvement you had with it.
And then we will go into some 7
generic questions.
8 So, first of all, can you tell me, plea se, when did you 9
first hear of the Three Mile Island accident?
10 A
I heard it on the television set, I guess, the
.11 morning of the accident or th e evening of the accident.
12 0
Were you notified formally or through formal 13 channels of the accident and called upon to participate in 14 the response to the accident?
()
15 A
I was never called upon officially to participate 16 in the accident in any way wha tsoever.
17 0
We understand that later on, as events developed 18 and manpower needs turned up, tha t some of your staff 19 members were called in, especially in the area of health 20 physics --
21 A
That's right.
22 0
-- To participate.
Were you in any way directly 23 involved witn their participation?
f 24 A
Af ter the accident occurred, offices were asked to
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25 identif y people who would be available to work on the (2)
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6 1413 01 04 pv BWH I
a cc ident, and I think we were told to identify six people or
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2 so.
I identified f our that I thought I could spare at the 3
time, pleading that I didn't have any others at that moment, 4
f or the a ccident.
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V 5
0 In re trospec t, Mr. Dircks, do you think it would 6
have been useful if your office, the office of nuclear 7
material saf e ty and saf eguards had been formally notified o
and haa a f ormal presence, a liaison, at least, in the 9
incident response center here in Be thesda?
10 A
I don't think so.
I think it would have been good
.11 if we were brought in to the later aspects of the accident 12 most particularly in the area of the question of what do yud 13 do with the waste f rom the cleanup activity that is out 14 there.
That is the one area that we think that we should
()
15 have been deeply involved in.
Io O
Your office is now quite deeply involved in thi s,
17 is it not, in the f orm f or low-level r: ;es cr wastes of all 16 kinds generated at the site and the transportation thereof?
19 A
1 would not say "dee ply involved.
I would say 20 that we have invited ourselves in.
We have asked for 21 information, and we are providing guidance, but I don't 22 think we have been brought in as an integral part of the 23 cleanup campaign.
24 0
In other words, then, you feel that in an instance
()
25 such as this where a significant quantity of waste was O
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obviously going to be handled, that it would have been
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2 be tter to have a f ormal structured participation by the 3
office of nuclear material saf ety and saf eguards in some 4
reasonable time af ter the accident -- the crisis -- had
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5 passed?
6 A
That's right.
7 0
All right.
Thank you.
o I would like to go on now to an area of generic v
questions that is being put to you because of your stature 10 in this agency.
Your position as the director of one of the
.11 major offices puts you in a position to speak 12 authoritatively about how this agency works and what it 13 does.
Now, some of these questions may be too 14 reactor-specif ic, and -they may be outside your individual
)
15 knowledge or expertise, and we fully understand that in s
lo those instances, if you don't have knowledge yourself, you 17 may choose to decline giving any response.
This is 16 obviously understandable.
19 But we would ask you to respond to those questions, 20 especially those which deal with how the agency functions, 21 its organizational structure and its management ef ficiency, 22 which we f eel you do have expertise to respond to.
I will 23 icentify, as I go through tha se que stions, each area by its 24 gencric character so that you can at least set the frame of
()
25 reference.
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The first area is the area of reactor safey review, the 2
a pproach used for that saf ety review.
The NRC, as we
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3 understana it, reviews reactors for safety by requiring that-4 the plant be able to cope with a specific set of postulated 5
a ccidents, the so-called " design basis accidents."
I s thi s 6
your understanding.
7 A
My general understanding, yes.
6 0
How long, in your view, has this design basis 9
a ccident approach been used f or reactor saf ety analysis?
10 A
I don't know.
When you ge t my resume, you will 11 s ee t ha t I previously had been connected with the Council on 12 Environmental Quality, so I have some touching f amiliarity 13 witn the AEC practices back to 1971.
And from that 14 acquaintance, I knew that the design basis accident approach
()
15 was being used by the AEC.
16 0
But you have had no involvement, even as de puty 17 EDO here, in any depth with the design basis accident lo a pproach or controversies about it?
lY A
Tha t's righ t.
20 0
Would you pref er that I leave this area of 21 questioning?
Do you feel that there might be any questions 22 in tnis area that you would be able to answer?
23 A
Only in a very superficial way.
24 0
Let me try just one Were you at the NRC in 1975
()
25 when the Browns Ferry fire occurred?
O 1
9 7413 01 07 pv BWH I
A No.
()
2 0
You were not?
3 A
I came shortly af ter the accident.
4 0
Were you involved at that time or aware at tha t Ov 5
time of any reanalysis of the NRC saf ety analysis approach 6
because of the Browns Ferry fire because it was an accident 7
that was outside the design basis for the plant?
8 A
Let me tell you how 1 got into this thing.
The Y
accident occurred when I was still with EPA.
I read about 10 it in the newspaper.
I arrived on the scene somewhere in 11 April 1975, and I followed it as an interested observer.
12 S hor tly, sometime in 1975, I believe, Steve Hanauer 13 finished up his task force report on the fire, and it was at 14 that point that I suggested tha t we take all of the 15 recommendations made by the task force report and put them 16 on some sort of a chart to see if anyone was -- everyone was 17 on board on paying attention and following through getting 16 their a ssignments done.
19 I think, Bob, you were mixed up on that, too.
20 So, that was the origin of the fire activities report.
21 I think tha t is maybe still going on today, tracking through 22 generic issues.
23 0
Which, in essence, upgraded or improved the 24 ability of the plants to handle this new design basis event,
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25 a major fire?
O
10 7413 01 08 pv BWH I
A That's right.
.)
2 0
But did you know of or participate in any critique
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3 of the recommendations of the Hanauer group?
Or were the 4
recommendations.taken as a given?
You were implementing the 5
recommendations of that task forty?
o A
We took the recommendations as given, and put them 7
on some sort of a work plan to see if anyone was paying e
a tten tion to the recommendations.
Y Q
And carried forward with that?
10 A
Yes.
11 0
Do you know or are you involved with any 12 reevaluation of the design basis accident approach that is 13 now current within the agency?
14 A
No, I'm not, except we have taken, I think, the
()
15 so-called "Le ssons Learned" cook in my of fice, and I have lo circulated it with a directive to each of my division 17 directors to look over this whole report of lessons learned 16 and see if we have any le ssons learned in our own licensing 19 activities.
20 0
For your fuel cycle materials licensing, 21 transportation?
22 A
That's right.
23 0
For the se ?
24 A
Yes.
()
25 0
Are you f amiliar -- I am going to turn to another I
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/413 Ul 09 pv BWH I
area now, and this is an area that perha.~s will also be
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2 difficult for you.
It rela tes to wha t is called 3
" saf e ty-grade equi pment," the NRC saf ety review, in which 4
the distinction is made between saf ety-grade pumps and
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5 nonsaf ety-grade pumps.
Are you f amiliar with that 6
distinction?
7 A
only in a side manner.
I understand the waste 6
handling capabilities of reactors are not safety-grade 9
equi pme nt.
It is an area where I would like to see more 10 attention paia to it, because of my current interest in 11 treating waste coming out of reactors.
12 O
If I were to tell you that, in general, 13 safety-grade equipment is t ha t equipment which either 14 contains the reactor coolant directly or is involved with pJ 15 the mitigation of accidents or the prevention of off-site
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16 releases ano not much more, tha t is why much waste 17 management equipment is saf ety-grade -- is this wha t you are le saying you f eel is not a good way to do it?
19 A
Looking at i t f rom a parochial standpoint, I think 20 waste, it it is not saf ety-related on the reac tor site, it 21 is certainly saf e ty-related in the transportation end and 22 the cisposal activities.
And I think to ge t saf e ty l
l 23 transportation and disposai, you have to look at where it is 24 generated and treat it there.
()
25 0
I am going to turn to another area which is
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reactor-specific but has a certain amount of inf erence for
?
2 licensing activities in your offices and that is the
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3 so-called " reactor standard review plan."
4 Since about 1975, the NRC has used a standard review 5
plan f or reac tor saf e ty review.
Are you aware of tha t?
o A
Yes.
7 0
Do you have an opinion on wnether the current 6
accident, the recent accioent at Three Mile Island, ex po sed 9
deficiencies in the standard review plan?
10 A
No, I don't have an opinion on that.
11 O
When the standard review plan was implemented, it 12 was implemented with the knowledge of the commission, but 13 without the very direct involvement of the commi ssion.
Are 14 you considering anything like a standard review plan for
()
15 licensing activities in your of fice where you have multiple 16 a pplica tions of, say, uranium mills?
17 A
Yes.
Cons; dering it f or mills; we are considering 16 i t and actually doing something about i t, quite recently, IV since I got over to that of fice on the f uel cycle plants or 20 pharmaceutical pl. ts, any plants dealing with processing 21 material.
So, we are moving toward a standard review plan 22 in our licensing activity.
23 We are not acing it waste management because we expect 24 maybe one or two applications, so we don't think it is wise
()
25
.right now to look f or a standard review plan on a waste l
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7413 01 11 13 O
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management repository application.
()
2 O
Waat are your f eelings aoout. the appropriate level J
of participation for the commission itself in your
()
4 implementation of a standard review plan?
5 A
dell, I think -- and. here I am speaking only as an 5
interested outside ooserver -- I think much more has to De e
done in terms of ouantifying and putting limits and erecting 3
standards by which licensing reviews will be done.
And I
/
think the more you take the review and judgment of what is 13 safe away from the individual review and transfer that up to 11 the c ommission, the better of f we will be.
ld Now, that may os looking at it in a very amateurish way, 13 because I understand you can't apply a lot of numerical 14 Doundaries to reactor licensing decisions, out I think we O
15 should do much more in that area, so the individual reviewer 15 will not be forced to make a judgment of what is safe anc 17 what is not safe.
He shoulc be making judgments:
does this 13 comply with the standards as agreed to by the commission or il not?
2J Q
So, you would look to the development of general 2i standards and a f airly close involvement of the commission 22 in it least monitoring what you are doing in implementing 23 some standard review plan?
24 A
Ye s.
I think the role of the commission is to t
23 agree on broad standards, the regulatory framework oy which O
14 7413 01 12 pv bWH 1
licensing decisions are madet and then if the licensing
()
2 review i's'to stay within those standards, then I would say 3
we are on firm ground.
If they have to make a judgment
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which might require some exce ptions to those standards, then 4
5 they should go back to the commission and ask for o
permission.
7 0
That brings us to the subject of backfitting.
The 6
idea that one has approved a design.
The owner or a pplicant Y
has gone forward to build it or to operate it.
And the 10 question arises of changing it or of going back and making 11 some change to improve its saf ety.
12 Would you agree t ha t this has been one of NRC's more 13 difficult problems in deciding when to backfit' a change to a 14 previously a pproved design?
f 15 A
Yes, it is a dif ficult area.
lo Q
Are you aware of any written criteria f or making 17 such decisions?
16 A
I am not aware of any.
IV 0
Do you feel that the cost of requiring a backfit 20 required a licensee to make a change f or saf ety reasons is a 21 significant f actor in the backfitting decision?
22 A
I think it is a part of the decision.
I don't 23 know how significant it should be.
I think the costs should 24 be made clear, but I don't think you can work it out in any
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25 formula.
I think i t is a f actor that should be quite O
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evident, of how much a backfit will costi and I think
()
2 alternate ways of backfitting should be viewed with some 3
kind of costs involved in the alternatives.
I don't think 4
you can lay out any firm equation by which to make a
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5 backfitting judgment.
6 0
Should there be an a ttempt, though, to spell out 7
wahtever standaras are possible, generically, for such cost 6
analysis and for such judgment?
Y A
I think there should be some way to get at the 10 analysis.
There should be some firm guidance as to what 11 goes into making those Juagments.
I aon't think there can 12 be any magic numbers that would come out to say that if it 13 exceeds this or doesn't exceed that ratio, you would backfit 14 or won't backfit.
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15 0
How would you distinguish the role of the lo licensing of fice f rom the role of the commission in 17 backfitting decisions?
16 A
Well, again, I guess, you have the general sort of IV format laid out by the commission in an agreed-upon forinat 20 that in order to make a backfi tting decision here are the 21 consicerations that you will look a t, here is the type of 22 justification you must have in order to make a backfitting 23 decision; and then I guess it is up to the licensing of fice 24 to make the Juagment.
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()
25 Again -- I am going to contradict myself -- if it falls OV
7413 01 14 pv BWH I
out of a certain area, say, it requires backfitting of every (C
2 plant in the United Sta te s and it may wind up costing 3
billions of dollars, hundreds of million, I think in that 4
case it cuts across the board and should go to the 5
commission for a general type of judgment.
6 If it requires backfitting of a single plant, upgrading 7
of certain pieces of equipment in that plant, I think tha t
)
8 judgment can remain at the licensing office.
Y Again, I guess, my general view is to refer the big, 10 broad social-issues standards to the commission and allow
.11 then the licensing office to make single-plant decisions.
12 0
Let's turn now to another category of questions 13 about the legal proce ss of licensing.
This is the, hearing 14 process, which is an area with which your office is now 15 becoming a lot more familiar in your licensing, work.
16 Do you believe, based on your knowledge of what has 17 happenec in reactor licensing hearings and what is happening 16 in the hearings that your office now is holding, do you 19 believe that the licensing hearing process contributes 20 nearly as much to the health and saf e ty of the public as the 21 s ta f f safety review with whatever ACPS oversight is 22 providea?
23 A
I think it does.
And I think it does for a couple 24 of reasons.
I think one is that I think that there are 25 instances where the public has brought new factors to bear O
7413 01 15 17 pv BWH I
in the hearing.
2 Two, I think, a second reason that is very important is
()
3 that the knowledge tha t the public will be -- and whoever 4
represents the public -- will be scrutinizing the saf ety 5
analysis re port, the environmental re port, in excruciating o
detail, brings a good amount of discipline into the thought 7
processes of the staff.
I think that is why the public 6
hearing is important when you go about this decisionmaking.
Y Q
Do you see it, then, as a process where thy 10
!#ase0ce of an intervening public is crucial where the 11 hearing board is not so much the vehicle of improvement, but 12 it is the intervenor or intervening public that makes it?
13 A
I think it is combination of the intervening 14 public and the -- through the f orum of the hearing board.
()
15 In my own case, we have got, much to my amazement, over at to NMSS a flock of licenses that are never contested, and, 17 believe it or not, I am pushing the staff to notify the le public more, notif ying unions who work in the plants, that 19 licenses are up for renewal, trying to stir up some public 20 desire to have hearings in licensing.
21 I think it is important to get that extra discipline to 22 bear on the staff effort.
23 0
Would you consider possibly having mandatory 24 hearings even without a petition f or hearing?
()
25 A
I would consider it.
()
l
I413 01 16 18 pv SWH 1
0 Can you identify any way that the existing hearing 2
process could be improved, especially with respect to
()
3 participation of the public?
4 A
Well -- and, again, speaking as an outside 5
ama teur, and I don't mean to hurt any profe ssion's f eelings o
-- I think a lot of the hearings, and maybe justifiably so, 7
are boggea down in a lot of legal maneuverings.
6 Whe ther or not you can hold a hearing and get the 9
amount of participation that is required to rigorously 10 subject decisions to analysis, without the legal 11 encumbrance s, I don't know.
But I just think an awful lot 12 of hearing time is spent in maneuverings by opposing 13 a ttorneys, and not enough time is spent by the exchange of 14 tec hnical inf orma tion.
()
15 O
Some people argue that the intervenors are forced 16 to do this, f orced to delay f or the sake of delay, because 17 they lack the resources to engage in L.2 direct technical le debate.
And t ho se people argue that private intervenors 19 shoulc be provided with f unding or perhaps a special 20 i nde penden t legal and technical staff that would assist 21 them.
Wnat are your f eelings on this?
22 23 24
()
25 O
1413 02 01 PV BWH I
A Again, it is my own bias.
l '. funding intervenors
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2 would contribute to an exchange of technical debate, fine.
3 If it just contributes to more legal maneuvarings, then I 4
would say it is a waste.
I don't know how to get around
{}
5 t ha t problem becaese you are dealing with human beings with 6
their own motivations.
7 I think a technical substantive su pport might be needed, 8
maybe through some sort of a center.
I don't know.
But to 9
f und more a spects of the case that deal with discovery and 10 cross-examination -- all of these terms which I am familiar 11 with but I am not exactly sure of all of the benefits that 12 you get out of it.
13 0
But right now, do you have a strong opinion one 14 way or the other about the benefit of funding intervenors?
15 Do you think it would be a productive move if undertaken at 16 this time, nr are you doubtful that it would be?
17 A
If done -- taking into consideration all of my 1
16 biases in this ma tter -- I gue ss it would be a productive 19 endeavor.
If done to promote more getting into the case 20 Just for the simple point of debate, I am not quite sure 21 what good it would do.
22 0
Let's turn to another area.
This area ir 23 generally ref erred to as the " audit review method, tha t NRC 24 uses.
As a general practice, we understand that the NRC has
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25 always held the licensee as primarily responsible for the O
I 20 f413 02 02 pv BWH I
health and saf ety of the public, and NRC's role is to ensure
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2 that the licensee satisfies that responsibility.
3 Consequently, both for licensing and f or inspection, we lay 4
out standards for the licensee to do its job.
And the NRC 5
audits or does a sample review, reviewing part of it, enough 6
to give confidence that the licensee is doing that job, is 7
satisfying that responsibility.
Is this consistent with 8
your understanding of the licensing process?
i 9
A Yes, it is.
10 0
Do you feel that that present method is l
.11 satisfactory in light of the Three Mile Island affair?
1 12 A
Well, given the size of the territor/ to be 13 inspected, I don't know how else you can do it extv!% s*
14 a udi ting, picking out certain selected areas and then
()
15 sam pling.
lo I think where the problem occurs, in NRC's case, i s t ha t 17 the licensee really isn't held responsible, in a sense.
He 16 i s -- t he re is a mixture of emotions here; there is a desire 19 to assure that mends his way, but on the other hand there is 20 a desire not to come down too yr#u 00 yz~.
21 My own view is I think the NRC should be much more 22 vigorous in using fines, violations enforcements, and other i
23 tool s to ge t the attention of the licensee to sound i
24 management of his enterprise.
I think we are awf ully timid
()
25 in the way that we treat licensees.
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21 F413 02 03 pv BWH I
O Are you aware of any approach NRC might use in
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2 selecting what areas it audits or those limited areas which 3
NRC will review?
4 A
I am aware of the module-type approach that 5
inspection and enforcement uses.
I think there should be 6
much more interchange between the licensing offices and 7
inspection and enforcement in looking at those modules and 8
agreeing on which ones should be looked at.
I think there 9
should be much more interchange between inspection and 10 enforcement and the licensing office and feedback from what 11 inspection if finding back to the licensing process.
12 I think there should be much more activity by the 13 licenses -- licensing people going out and taking a look at 14 the f acilities that they have licensed.
I think tha t there
()
15 should be much more detail in the conditions attached to 16 licenses.
17 I think the inspectors should be encouraged to roam more 18 freely and to report more on the activities of the 19 licensees.
I think keepinx z0S!vt%0#S %0 %yvz# tyveklist is 20 not a very good a poroach.
21 I think there should be a much f aster crackdown on 22 viola tions that are found in these facilities.
23 0
Would you see any possible benefit from a marriage 24 of the licensing and the inspection offices so that one
()
25 office would be responsible f or the licensing and the nU
22 7413 02 04 pv BWH I
inspection?
2 A
I would like to keep one as a quality-control
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3 check on the other.
In fact, I would like to see -- my 4
theory of regulation is I would like to see very strong 7\\
5 standards-se tting function, with heavy commission 6
involvement and agreeing on these tough, broad standards.
I 7
would like to see the licensing offices license according to 8
those standards.
Y And I would like to see inspection and enforcement go out 10 and police the system and maybe -- and this zs r uzwwv#vo%
11 approach -- I would like to see maybe inspection and 12 enforcement broken up so then you would have inspec tion and 13 then another office of enforcement which is almost like an 14 office of a prosecuting a ttorney going out and -- so you
()
15 don't have the inspectors acting as the policemen and the lo judges.
I would like to have the policeman go out and 17 re port everything, and I would like to have the enforcement 16 office si tting there looking around as to where they can 19 bring in the most convic tions.
20 Then I would like so see the f eedback come right back to 21 the circle agains standards looking at what is being done 22 out there and coming up with new standards to plug the gaps.
23 0
In this matter of review, safety review, as a 24 practical ma tter, i t seems that, especially on large i
()
25 facilities like reactors, t ha t the saf ety responsibility is
(
O_;
l l
23 7413 02 05 pv BWH I
f ragmented with the NRC, the utilities, the principal
()
2 contractors, nuclear steam suppliers, architect engineers.
3 In the Three Mile Island incident, Babcock & Wilcox wrote to 4
Met Ed with an admonition about the tendency of those relief
{}
5 valves to stick open, and that seemed to f all through the 6
cracks.
7 Do you agree that that f ragementation exists, that 8
f ragmenation of saf e ty re sponsibility?
9 A
It exists, I think, in actual practice.
But if 10 you look at the organization, you would say why should it 11 exist within NRR?
I think it is a unit that should have --
12 it should cover enough of the saf ety aspects to do a good 13 job.
14 Now, when yG& xv% O&% zo%0 %yv wzv )d, when you look at b>
15 construction of reactors, yes, I think you do have a real s
16 major problem in whether -- but that may be due to the 17 nature of the construction industry -- you look at the 16 sites, with the utility Jealing with a very strong, usually, 19 natior.al company in the presence of the venaor, dealing with 20 construction architect engineers, who, in turn, deal with 21 the ma jor contrac tor, who, in turn, deals with 22 subcontractors.
I don't, for the life of me, see how 23 anybody can control that.
Once you identify the problem, I 24 don't know the solution unless you have some sort of a s/
25 reformation in the nuclear construction engineering field.
l [D s-l
24 7413 02 06 pv BWH 1
0 In essence, though, are you not saying that it is 2
not practical for NRC to insist that the licensee is
[}
3 responsible f or that grea t juggernaut of contractors?
4 A
I always thought we did insist that the licensee 5
is responsible.
6 0
Yes, we do.
7 A
But you are looking at licensees who are not --
S who are sort of small local companies dealing with giant 9
national corporations, and I don't know how one can control 10 the other.
And maybe the heart of the problem is that you 11 are dealing with a lot of local utilities that find 12 themselves with not enough muscle to deal with the big boys.
13 0
That may not have the managerial competence or the 14 sheer size needed to cope with the problem?
()
15 A
That's right.
16 0
Do you know, or can you foresee, any solution to 17 this, this dilemma?
IS A
Given our existing way of doing busine ss or given 19 a revolution?
l 20 0
Even if it meant legislative change, given 21 wha tever, doe s thi s suggest to you perhaps that all reactors 22 should be owned by an agency, a major agengy, that is big 23 enough to deal with these con tractors and then sell the 24 power to these people?
()
25 A
That is certainly an approach, and I have heard l ()
1 I
o 25 7413 02 07 pv BWH I
that one.
You could have regional power, wholesale, much
({}
2 along the line of TVA.
You could have the -- another 3
a pproach may be, being that you would have an agency in 4
charge of building power plants and then selling them back 5
to utilities to operate, some thing like a corps of engineers 6
being responsible.
7 I think there are approaches.
They would be radical 8
approaches, and some of them might be needed.
The idea of 9
regional wholesalers, regional electrical wholesalers, 10 might be applicable both to the nuclear area and to the 11 f ossil area.
12 O
Do you think the public looks to the NRC to assure 13 that some satisf actory solution is achieved to this, though?
14 A
I think anything dealing with nuclear, the public
()
15 looks to the NRC f or solutions and actions.
I think in my 16 own case, when I am dealing -- in the transportation area, 17 where generally the bulk of radioactive material is movec 16 under the Department of Transportation regulations, the 19 public looks to the NRC as the responsible agency to deal 20 with accidents on the road, to deal with bad packages that 21 may be regula ted by DOT.
22 I think anything dealing with radiation or nuclear, the 23 onus comes back to the NRC.
24 0
Who is responsible for analyzing the quality of
()
25 NRC's safety review in licensing?
O
26 7413 02 08 pv BWH I
A I am not quite sure how to a pproach that 2
question.
I know the ACRS does a review.
I know tha t the
[}
3 whole thing is subject to review by the hearing boards and 4
the public and the appeals board.
I think there' again we 5
are talking about another role for the commission.
I think 6
they should be much more deeply involved in making -- in 7
making aecisions of this magnitude.
6 0
Well, the NRC has extensive published 9
quality-assurance criteria for the conduct of saf ety-related 10 work which we apply to and impose on licensees.
We have a 11 variety of things, a variety of regulations and regulatory 12 guides on how to do saf ety-related work.
13 Does the NRC staff or the NRC management structure in any 14 way ever ir.spect itself against these criteria?
()
15 A
I don't think they do.
lo O
Do you think they should?
17 A
I think they should.
I would like to see these 16 guides, standard review plans, regula tions, branch technical 19 po si tion s, I would like to see a concerted effort, bring all 20 of those things together in some sort of a good, solid 21 regulatory framework so that we can see where the gaps are 22 in the standards and regulations and inspect what is 23 missing, how we go in certain areas, how strongly in certain 24 o ther areas.
()
2b I recently found out in my own area that I am examining A\\>
27 7413 02 09 pv BWH I
myself since I got over to NMSS, in that we license 2
everything on Part 20; I think Part 20 just is not a good
{)
3 regulation in the se days.
So we are going back and 4
establishing numerical standards around each one of our 5
licensees so that when they come up for renewal we will slap 6
on numbers on them.
7 That is going back to my numbers philosophy.
I feel more 8
confident with triggering numbers around a licensee so that 9
the inspectors can go out and see if they have exceeded 10 certain numerical effluent standards, and then enforcing 11 against i t.
12 O
So, some values stricter than the broad baseline 13 numbers in Part 20, in other words?
14 A
Yes.
()
15 0
Because Part 20 says "as low as reasonable 16 a c hi e vabl e. "
So basically you are looking for a numerical 17 statement of "as low as reasonably achievable"?
16 A
That's right.
19 0
Let's turn to the area of operating experience.
20 Would you agree that the Three Mile Island accident was 21 rather dramatic proof that NRC hasn't done a good job of 22 evaluating operating experience?
23 A
I don't think I agree with that.
Again, this is 24 my own philosophical approach.
I think the thing about
(])
25 nuclear is that it i s, by any standard, it is a new O
~
l t
28 7413 02 10
)
pv BWH I
technology, and I think it is like leaping f rom the Wright 2
brothers' plane into a jumbo jet.
If anything, maybe it
(}
3 moved along too quickly.
And what we are doing :ow is 4
f inding that there are bugs in these things that we are 5
going to be f rtvu (z%y %yr% (v sy0&)u ya'e picked that if we 6
had hac a long history of technical regulation they would 7
have come along in the compact, semi-compact stage of a
6 development, but we leapt f rom the biplane to the jumbo jet, 9
and we are picking up the errors along the way.
10 I think it is typical of any technology that you are 11 going to pick up defects as you go along, and what we are 12 seeing now is a more dramatic eff ect.
But I think it is 13 being picked up.
14 O
Are you saying that we need to concentrate on
()
15 scrutiny of operating plants?
16 A
Yes, I am.
And I think, like the industry is 17 learning how to put these things together, NRC is learning 16 how to regulate them.
19 0
Are you aware of the recently established 20 operations evaluation group under the ED07 21 A
Yes.
22 0
Do you think that this group will have the 23 autnority and resources to be an effective oversight 24 f unction for operating experience?
()
25 A
I don't know.
I don't know the scope of the job G
v
29 7413 02 11 pv BWH I
yet.
I think they are going to have to f eel their way into 2
it.
I think they are starting off with 23 people or
(]}
3 something like thats I don't know how much money.
It is a 4
s tar t.
)
5 I think what they have to do is to see if they need more 6
ared then come back for more.
I think it is a good idea.
I 7
hope that you wi.11 have a turnover of people there f rom the 8
licensing offices into this activity or from all of the 9
offices of the commission into this activity and then out 10 again so they don't sit back and collect idle numbers, that 11 they actually know what makes these big reactors operate and 12 where the pumps are and how they f unction.
13 I think it is a f unction that could get isolated and 14 immune f rom the day-to-day operating problems of these
()
15 things.
16 0
We have had some oversight groups before for 17 opera tional information, and they were generally not taken le with suf ficient gravi ty.
They didn't have clout.
Do you 19 think it is f air to say that this office can only succeed if 20 it is technically strong and has the respect of the 21 licensing office?
22 A
Yes, it has to be technically strongs it has to 23 have respect.
It has to have some sort of a mechanism to 24 throw tneir findings up on the coard so that everyone gets
()
25 aware of it.
I think they should have some sort of a O
30 f413 02 12 pv BWH I
procedure that could almost put a hold on things until 2
something is solved or resolved one way or the other.
They
{}
3 f eel strongly about a pattern of def ects.
They should be 4
able to put a hold on something.
5 0
Some sort of regulatory authority, huh?
6 A
Yes.
A block, saying, Okay, we have discovered l
7 thi s pa ttern.
Stop everything while we figure out where it 8
is coming f rom and where it might be going."
9 Now, with that sort of authority, if they do that too 10 of ten and there is nothing there, they are going to lose il respect very quickly, and they may be hooted out of l2 existence.
So, they have got to be technically com pe tent to 13 ring that bell and make sure that they have rung it l
14 c orre c t1.y.
()
15 0
Wha t about the role of private industry in this?
16 What do you see is the role of private industry in providing 17 surveillance of operating information?
16 A
Again, it has to be -- it can't be company by 19 company.
There has to be some sort of a clearinghouse 20 activity to get the pattern of alarms.
I am aware of the --
21 w ha t the c: evil do they call that thing --
22 0
23 A
That just did not work out, because it was 24 not unif orm nor broad enough nor comprehensive enough to
()
25 really ao the job.
It was a voluntary program that some O
31 7413 02 12 p v SF!d I
companies went into halfway, others went into all the way.
(])
2 And so you.just didn't ge t the data base.
3 I think any industry effort would have to be mandatory, 4
would have to be on universal guidalines, and there would
{)
5 have to be f ull participation.
6 0
Could you foresee a circumstance where the 7
industry surveillance of operating inf ormation could be 6
sufficient, and if it were of a high enough quality that the v
NRC could forego independent surveillance of operating 10 information directly?
11 A
No.
I think there is a role for industry in 12 supplying the data.
But the regulatory action, which is a 13 necessary part of the whole thing must come from the 14,
government.
()
15 0
There was an aspect of the TMI experience where we 16 learned after the fact that a precursor event to TMI had 17 occurred in a foreign reactor some years ago, and, due to le various information barriers, we didn't know of it.
Do you 19 f eel that it is important for us to obtain and evaluate 20 operating experience from foreign countries?
21 s
Yes.
22 0
And are you familiar with the barriers to such 23 information flow?
24 A
Yes.
I think they shouldn't be tolerated.
()
25 C
Do you believe we can improve that receipt, that O
32 1413 02 14 pv BWH 1
we can get around those barriers?
2 A
Yes.
I think simply, because we are supplying so
(}
3 much data to the outside worla on our reactors, and I think 4
inf ormation has to be a two-way stree t, and we have been 5
overly timid in dealing with these foreign governments.
6 O
So, you feel the.U.S. Government should take a 7
much more rigid or strong posture with the foreign 6
governmnets in order to assure the f ree flow of information?
Y A
Yes.
10 O
Let's turn to the ACRS for a moment.
And do you 11 f eel that the present role of the ACRS in reviewing safety 12 issues is a good one, is satisfactory?
13 A
I just don't have a f eel.
I am aware of the 14 ACRS.
I have never participated in a review of a reactor
()
15 portion of their work.
I think the ACRS probably should --
lo we should have several ACRSs one for reactors.
I think 17 wha t they have,ried to do is broader. themselves out as a 16 general aavisory commi ttee to the commission, and I am not 19 quite sure that is their function.
But maybe it is a 20 f unction tha t the commi ssion has let them get to be default.
21 I think what they need in the commission is a toagh 22 technical review board for reactors.
I would like to see 23 another one for my area of the commission's activities.
And 24 let these two deal on that sort of narrow technical review
( [)
25 basis.
If the commission wants a general advisory O
33 7413 02 15 pv BWri i
commi tt ee, then let them establish a general advisory O
2 commi ttee, but don't try to dilute the ACRS with too many 3
functions.
O 4
5 6
7 8
9 10 11 12 13 14 O
is s
/_..
16 17 le 19 20 21 22 23 24 O
2s O
34 r7413 03 01 pv BriH I
Q In NMSS right now, do you not use the services of
(])
2 the medical isotope committee that is, in some sense, an 3
analog of ACRS for that specialized area?
4 A
Yes, but they are much more narrowly focused.
It
(}
5 is a group that you can go to on a rapid turnaround basis.
6 They are not -- they haven't set themselves up to -- in the 7
same way that the ACRS has -- to be the general oversight 6
committee of the activity.
I t is a technical review group, 9
technical board of competence that we can go to and seek 10 advice and get some opinions, and we are bound by i t.
And
.11 if we have a medical licensing problem, then we can go to 12 them, and they will give us an insight of which way to go 13 with the regulation.
14 0
Are you not saying they have a selected area of
)
15 oversiqht and no more?
16 A
Tha t's right.
17 0
And that you believe the commission should 16 consider caref ully the area of oversight f or advisory 19 committees such as the ACRS?
20 A
Yes.
It is the tec hnical compe tence.
I think, 21 knowing how a reactor operates doesn't necessary give one 22 grea t insignt on how a waste management repository should 23 operate.
24 I would like to see ciff erent review committees set up in
()
25 the different areas.
O l
l
e 35 813 03 02 pv BNH I
O Are you at all familiar with the standardization
({}
2 policy in reactors, reactor design?
Hav e you had --
3 A
Yes.
4 0
Do you think that NRC should promote the greater 5
use of standardized plant design?
5 A
dell, as a general rule, yes.
Dealing, though, i
with the way the industry is going, I don't see any 3
particular need for it right now.
I don't think that there 9
are going to be too many more reactors.
10 0
A de f acto moratorium, in other words?
11 A
Yes.
12 0
dnat you are saying, then, is if there were 13 f urther purchase of reactors, that you would encourage the 14 use of standardized plant design or you would suggest that 15 NRC --
16 A
Yes, I would.
But getting back to my concept, 17 mayce if the standardized plant were expressed in terms of 18 my standardized numerical regulatory framework, that is the 19 type of approach.
Now, I am speaking not as a reactor 20 engineer; I am speaking as a nontechnical economist.
I 21 woula rather see performance specifications laid on for 22 plants than mandating a particular design.
I don't know 23 whetner that is clear or not.
24 But rather than saying a particular pump should be
()
23 designed of so many components and have so many moveaole O
+
36
,7413 03 03 pv BWH I
parts, I would rather have it standardizd as a performance C
2 specification that says the pump will operate at t hi s 2
're l 3
of capacity and allow so much material to pass through it 4
and so on lay out a perf ormance specification as opposed to 5
a design - drawn-out design.
o 0
Would you consider it worthwhile for us to require 7
standaraization of approved designs unless the owner or 6
a pplicant could demonstrate a saf ety justification for 9
change?
10 A
Yes.
I would say that.
11 Also, I would leave some room for -- given existing level 12 of saf ety, can you do a be tter job more economically?
13 0
In other words, you would accept change for the 14 sake of economic ' benefit if equivalent saf ety could be 15 demonstrated?
Io A
Yes.
17 0
Are you -
16 A
Let me go on.
19 0
All right.
20 A
Or, if you coul1 - if a particular reactor design 21 woulo contribute less to the waste management problem or 22 contribute le ss to the saf eguards problem and so on, to look 23 at other areas, given -- you fix the level of saf ety that 24 you want, and if you can achieve that level of safety and 25 meanwhile accomplish some other objectivv, I (0&)u )v% %yr%
O
37 7413 03 04 pv BWH I
be justification for varying off the standardized plan.
2 0
Are you f amiliar with NRC's history of control
{}
3 room design review and the treatment of operators in 4
reactors, that is?
5 A
Genera 11.
o O
Do you think it NRC has given sufficient 7
attention to this area, opera tor licensing and -
6 A
No.
They have not.
9 0
Do you know of any plans that NRC has right now to 10 improve in this area of control room design?
11 A
I have seen some -- not on design, but I have 12 certainly seen some pro posals on operator licensing.
13 0
Do you understand that when we give a F art 50.55 14 license, when we give a Part 50.55 license to an operator,
()
15 is it your understanding that NRC is saying that that 16 operator is qualified to run the plant or to participate in 17 any position in the minimum crew necessary to run the plan t?
16 A
I am not that f amiliar with that regulation.
19 0
Where does this responsibility lie in NRC, in your 20 understanding, f or ensuring plant operators' capabili tie s?
21 A
I understand it lies somewhere in NRR.
22 0
Is it your experience or understanding that 23 occasionally saf ety problems that are discovered in review 24 are solved by directing or committing that the operators
- ()
25 will take certain selected actions in order to cope with a
(~)
I
38 7413 03 05 pv BWH l
given emergency?
- O 2
^
1 neve oaty reec esout this ta pre== reports-t 3
am just not f amiliar with it.
4 0
Do you think it would make sense for NRC to press 5
for the establishment of a national reactor monitoring o
center where operational data could be brought together?
7 A
Yes.
In fact, that is sort of a follow-on to what 6
we have talked about before in the operational data.
Yes, I V
think i t is impor tant.
10 0
Excuse me.
I mean a real-time monitoring, not 11 af ter the f ac t, but a real-time monitoring of plants, so 12 that this national center might par.ticipate in some way in 13 assisting a plant during a crisis or in an emergency.
14 A
I am not too sure of that.
I am always hesitant 15 about centers several hundred miles away trying to manage lo emergencies on the scene.
I think much more benefit could 17 be go tten out of having highly trained, highly motiva ted 16 people on the scene than reading computer printouts in a 19 center.
That is why I think the whole area af crew training 20 is so important, treating crews as you would treat a crew on 21 a ship or on an aircraf t and giving them the dignity and 22 status that aircraf t crews have, giving them -- making their 23 qualification as rigorous as aircrew qualifications, t hrough 24 a very tough system of licensing and requalification.
25 I would rather have a technical competence on the scene O
I
7413 03 06 39 pv BWH l
than back in a center.
2 0
The licensing offices are responsible for
{)
3 assessing the com pe tence of the staff of the -- not merely 4
the operators, but the competence of the owners to operate 5
the plant or the f acility, whatever it is.
You have this in 6
your own licensing areas in NMSS as we]' as does NRR have 7
it.
What standards are applied to that, to the judgment of 6
technical compe tence?
9 A
Well, we have a different level in our office.
We 10 look at the educational qualifications, the experience and 11 so on, of the management, and the technical plant work 12 force.
And we are dealing with not the control room 13 atmosphere that you are dealing with at a reactor where l
14 decisions are made in a split second.
()
15 Our plants are chemical processing plants, in a real lo sense, and you are looking at the technical management and 17 structure and the peo pl e there.
And the reactors -- and 16 this is an old theme, and you yryv yvr#u z%~~r0* %z~vS >> I 19 just think you should take a look at the pay scales of these 20 people, I think, the educational qualifications.
I think, 21 the responsibility of -- I like the analogy of having a 22 f ully rounded engineer in charge of that plant who has the 23 authority when he signs on as shif t manager, shif t 24 su perin t encen t, not to operate the plant, and he is again to
()
25 the airline captain who will refuse to take off the plane if
_.,,,_y
40 7413 03 07 pv BWH I
he f ound anything that he just does not like about the
(])
2 operation of that things he is in charge of it.
3 I don't think he should be a shif t manager or of a shif t 4
in the control room.
I think he should have full roaming
{}
5 capability throughout the whole plant.
He is the captain of 6
t ha t pl an t.
I think he should be paid accordingly.
7 We pay an airline captain S60,000 a year to fly a 747.
I o
6 think we should pay this shif t manager or whatever his title 9
-- s hi f t captain, if you want to call him tha t -- the same 10 equivalent of pay, and le t him review the operating 11 characteristics of the plant, the operational data that has 12 come in over the past eight, 10, 15 hours1.736111e-4 days <br />0.00417 hours <br />2.480159e-5 weeks <br />5.7075e-6 months <br />.
If he does not 13 like anything about it, he says, I am not operating it 14 today."
And the company can't call in another man to 15 operate it.
16 Given that responsibili ty, tha t man should be -- person 17
-- should be paid as much as you pay the f ellow t ha t takes IS an airplane up with 200 people in it.
IV O
You are saying it is a comparable responsibility?
P 20 A
Comparable responsibility.
I think he should be 21 given comparable dignity and comparable status.
22 0
Let's turn to the question of NRC's role as an 23 agency during an emergency; for example, a reactor 24 emergency.
Do you think that NRC should consider a 8' SWAT
()
25 team" approach to take over the aff ected plant?
(1) m
~
,.r._
3
41 7413 03 08 pv BWH 1
A Yes, I would have to say "Yes."
We are doing that
()
2 right now in NMSS, reviewing what happened at TMI.
We have 3
an effort now to catalog exac tly what is in each one of our 4
own licensed f acilities:
the material, the proce sses, the (j
5 output, the work f orce, e t ce tera.
And if an accident o
happened, we are prepared to go in and take over a plant.
7 I think the same thing is true of reactors, too.
6 0
Would you extend that to the manipulation of Y
controls, operation of pumps or valves, what have you?
Or 10 does it take over in the managerial or administrrtz'v svo$v?
11 A
No, I think you have to go in and take the whole 12 thing over.
Reading about TMI from the press, I would say 13
'that operating through intermediaries just didn't look like 14 i t was working out too well.
15 0
Do you think, then, that NRC, if i t doe sn't have 16 the qualified operators necessary to take over, should train 17 such or have such?
16 A
Yes.
19 0
In reactors, there is a potential f or release, 20 particularly of iodine fission products.
Do you think NRC 21 should be the principal authority for making decisions on 22 protective measures, measures which protect the public, such 23 as instructing the public to take shelter, to evacuate, or 24 perhaps even to taking iodine-blocking tablet solutions?
()
25 A
My own reaction i.s I think that should go with the G<,
t
42 7413 03 09 pv BWH I
governor of the state or his representatives or the
(])
2 surrouncing states.
I think they have to ge t 3
recommendations and technical advice from the NRC.
But on 4
that issue, I prefer to let the state s pick that one up.
)
5 0
Do you think, though, that NRC should make a firm o
-- take a firm position or make a firm recommendation on 7
things like that?
6 A
Yes, I think they should, and it should be based, 9
again, on some triggering cri teria or standards.
If the 10 release looks like it is going to exceed certain limits or 11 will land in certain areas, they certainly should advise the 12 governor that it is our recommendation that a particular 13 action should be taken.
I think the governor, though, 14 should be the one to issue the command.
()
15 0
Would you consider NRC's knowlegeable judgment of 16 uncetain conditions where no numerical estimate is at hand, 17 just the uncertainty of conditions, as a possible ground for 16 a firm recommendation by NRC to take public prote ctive 19 action?
e 20 A
Yes.
I think we have to feed in the 21 uncertainties.
And the reason why I say the governor should 22 make the decion is that we are -- we can give the best 23 advice as far as the -- w ha t is in our technical realm of 24 confidence.
I don't think we know what are the f actors that
()
25 may affect the governor's decision on evacuation, for O
43 7413 03 10 pv BWH I
example.
To be safe, we would say evacuate.
But on the
({}
2 o ther hand, the governor may be aware of what ha ppens when 3
you put thousands of people on the road, what the conditions 4
of the roads may be, what the accident potential of people
{)
5 killing themselves in automobiles, what the ca pabili ti tes o
are of the police force to get people saf ely out of a
- area, 7
where there may be schools in the way of a mass evacuation 8
route that you may injure more children evacuating them than 9
if you had them take shelter somewhere.
10 I think those are complex decisions best made by the 11 people who have the knowledge of the area.
12 0
With our present organizational structure, from 13 what position or level do you think major recommendations 14 such as public protective action in a crisis should come?
()
15 A
Let me go back to the only case I know, Three Mile 16 I sl and.
I think that should have come from Harold Denton, 17 who was on the scene, or whoever the senior NRC man is on 16 the scene.
19 0
Would that indicate that you f eel that there 20 should be a relatively senior NRC person put on the scene 21 i mmediately ?
22 A
Yes.
23 0
In a rough qualitative sense, how senior do you l
24 think that person should be?
An office director, a division
]
l ()
25 direc tor, an a ssistant director?
i l
44 9413 03 11 pv BWH 1
A I think in the case at Three Mile Island we made
()
2 the right decision getting Denton up there.
I guess a 3
deputy director could have done -- could have had the 4
technical ability to do the job.
And I think it would
{}
5 include a division director.
I don't know if you have to 6
have an office director.
7 0
In the TMI emergency, it came about that NRC was 8
the sole public source of inf ormation af ter a while.
The 9
NRC was the spokesman to the local authorities and the 10 public.
Do you think this is good for us to be, for NRC to 11 be the sole spokesman?
12 A
I don't think we have any choice.
I think, as I 13 mentioned bef ore, when some thing in the nuclear area goes 14 haywire, they come immediately to us and ask f or the word.
(
15 It is an uncomfortable position to be in because there are 16 others around that are deeply aff ected by this accident or 17 a ccidents tha t may be o ccurring, but the public looks to the Ib NRC.
19 0
In your view, does the Nuclear Regulatory 20 Commission have stated policy guidelines for the promotion, i
21 development, and regulation of nuclear power for energy and 22 other uses?
23 A
I am not qui te sure what that might encompa ss.
24 0
Do we have any guidelines -- does the Commission
()
25 have any explicit guidelines on its posture regarding the O
s 45 Ml3 UJ I2 pv BWH I
use, let's say, of power reac tors?
(])
2 A
I don't think they do.
3 0
Do you think this is. a suffitiently important 4
policy question tha t it should have a stated policy or 5
guideline?
6 A
I don't think it is needed, and it might even be 7
harmful.
8 0
Let me make an analogy to something in your own 9
area.
Not long ago, your office assisted the commission in 10 publishing a statement of policy on the regulation of Il nuclear medicine,' which defined the NRC's position with 12 respect to the responsibility of the doctor prescribing the 13 use of nuclear medicine for a patient's welf are with respect 14 to the patient and with respect to local authorities.
()
15 Do you think an analogous policy statement --
16 A
Now I get what you mean.
I thought you meant 17 should power reactors, the use of power reactors in the 16 society and whether they should be used to ger.erate 19 electricity and so on.
In that case, no.
In the case you 20 are talking about, yes, I think it would be helpf ul.
21 The role of the agency, the role of the licensee, the 22 role of other agencies, I think that would be hel pf ul.
l 23 0
If we had explicit 24 A
If we had it.
We are doing the same thing, as you
()
25 know, in a say -- in my area, not only nuclear medicine,. but (2)
46 A413 03 13 pv BWH I
the area of waste management, a general statement of policy
(])
2 now being converted to a regulation.
And certainly the 3
prograc plan which outlines responsibilities of this agency, 4
the states and the other federal agencies.
I think the more
{}
5 we can do that in our areas, yes.
6 I am sorry I missed your point.
7 0
Let's go right to the top of the structure we b
have.
Do you believe that the present commission form of 9
NRC regulation should be abolished, not that NRC in total 10 would be abolished; I mean, to replace the commission with an administra tor?
12 A
I have mixed f eelings on this because I am not 13 quite sure what you would replace it with.
You could 14 replace it with a single administrator.
The problem there
(
15 is that the single adainistered agency would then f all under 16 the executive branch, and I think the commission as an 17 agency is looked to for independent actions outside the lo executive branch.
It is looked upon as almost a check on 19 some of the activities of the executive branch.
I think we 20 would lose that if we were brought under the single 21 acministrator and made a part of the executive branch.
22 I think what the be tter approach is would be to take a 23 look at the way the commission operates and maybe they are 24 still f inding their way.
It is a new agency.
Maybe they
()
25 are encumbered with the old baggage of the Atomic Energy O
L __
47 441J UJ 14 pv BWH I
Commission, where the commi ssioners were looked on more as
()
2 managers than as a body of people brought together to make a 3
balanced judgment on extremely complex technical nd social 4
regulatory issues.
[}
5 I think a commission is the worst f orm invented by man to 6
manage an agency.
It should never be involved in 7
management.
It should be involved in making the sort of e
value-laden decisions that requires a broad spectrum of 9
views.
You can only make a decision after a debate in an 10 open forum.
11 I would like to see the commission operate more as a 12 forum f or making complex decisions and somehow or another, 13 voluntarily or nonvoluntarily, allow many of the day-to-day 14 decisions to be made by -- I hate to use the word -- general
(
15 manager or administrator.
16 So, I am not in favor.
And the way I can see the 17 advantages of not having a commission form of agency; but in 16 another way I can see the real disaavantages, mainly that we 19 not be able to take some very strong positions via the 20 development of nuclear energy in this country.
21 I think the position we are taking in the area of waste 22 management we would never be allowed to get away with if we 23 were working inside the administration, because many of 24 these things just are going -- placing additional checks on
(
25 the development of waste proposals.
s (Y
48 f413 04 01 pv BWH I
I regard them to be good.
Others may be viewed as
()
2 blocking the road to progre ss.
I think the whole area of 3
export-import, we woulo never be allowed to take the
(';
positions we have taken if we were subjected to presidential 4
5 pressure.
6 There is a need for an independent cgency, especially in 7
the area of nuclear development, nuclear regulation, and we 8
couldn't function inside the executive branch.
9 0
Let me invite your attention in this general line 10 here.
In 1971 the President's Council on Executive 11 Organization issued what was called the ASH report.
This 12 r e po r t, which involved a study of independent regulatory 13 commissions, made several generic observations about such 14 regulatory commissions.
I would like to ask you to comment 15 on some sta tements which are taken f rom the ASH report and 16 how they might a pply to the NRC.
I will try to limit the 17 amount I give you piecemeal here so you aren't asked to take lo 17 paragraphs and asked to comment at length.
19 Tne first area is the subject of policy f ormulation.
The 20 remarks or comments f rom the ASH report are as follows:
21
" Collegial ' bodie s are inef ficient mechanisms f or 22 f ormulating ano implementing policy in a timely manner."
23 Again, "The usual proceoure is to f ormulate policy in the 24 context of individual cases brought before the commission.
)
25 Policies thus maae are na rrow, af ter-the-f act, and fail to
\\n
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t
49 7413 04 02 pv BWH I
provide sufficient timely or constructive guidance for 2
interested parties."
()
3 And lastly, "Co-equal commissioners too of ten have' r~)
difficulty agreeing on ma jor policy statements and tend to 4
(J 5
wait for suitable cases to come along and force the issue.
6 Do you think any of this applies in the case of NRC7 7
A All of them a pply in a way.
But not all 6
necessarily in a bad way.
Major policy is not immediately 9
made, and I don't think should be made.
I think should be 10 subject to deliberation and debate.
I think that is why you 11 appoint diverse commissioners.
I think that is why it is 12 the major benefit of a commission.
13 I think, in the case of NRC, a major policy in a very 14 real sense is made in many cases by the appeals board.
()
IS I am speaking the disadvantages of NRC.
I think -- and 16 there are individual cases being referred to the appeals 17 board, which is rather sort of a prestigious group within le NRC, but certainly not known outside the NRC as a IV policymaking body.
But the decisions reached by the appeals 20 ocard have major implications on the way reactors are 21 licensed, sited, and construc ted in this country.
22 By default, the appeals coard is doing that.
23 I think some of those cecisions should be up to the 1
24 commission to make, and the commission doesn't get involved j
()
25 in cases that much.
I think they should.
When they are O
50 7413 04 03 pv BWH I
broad, generic, value-laden decisions, I think they should
()
2 pick up and mske those decisions.
3 There was something else I wanted to say, but I have
(}
4 f orgo tten i t.
5 0
Was it related perhaps to dealing with things on 6
individual cases?
7 A
Yes.
I think, on individual cases, I think the 6
commission should deal in individual cases more f requently 9
than they have, because the individual cases in the Nuclear 10 Regulatory Commission, they are not the same as the 11 indiviaual cases that go before the Federal Energy 12 Regulatory Commi ssion or the ICC.
When you are dealing with 13 cases involving the siting and licensing and construction of 14 a $1,200,000 facility, I think that is a big enough case for f~)
k-15 the Commission to get itself involved in.
I 16 I think when we get into the licensing of a waste 17 management repository, I think that is a big social issue 16 t ha t the Commission should get involved in.
When you talk IV about tne application of the Environmental Policy Act to a 20 specific licensing case that cuts across 70 reactors and 21 many cases the appeals board aebates on, I think that is an 22 area that the Commission should get involved in.
23 0
On the major licensing cases, such as a waste 24 repository or a large power reactor, are you suggesting that
)
25 the Commission might be the hearing board?
o)
I
51
.7413 04 04 pv BWH I
A No.
I think the hearing board in this case will
(~N 2
do its job.
I think the appeals that go f rom the hearing
()
3 board should go directly to the Comaission.
In that case, 4
you have isolated out some major questions that the 5
Commission should focus on as national issues, not specific, 6
whether the shale is two miles down or 20 miles across, but 7
is this the best way to deal with this particular waste f orm 6
in this particular area?
Should we have more waste form?
Y Should we have more repositories considered?
How should we 10 make comparisons and so on?
I think that is an issue the Commission should get 11 12 involved in.
I guess my point is I think there is a real 13 reason to have a commission, and I think they should -- the 14 reasons shculd not be management of an agency, but for these
()
15 broad policy decisions that they have to make.
lo 0
Le t's turn to another area of comment by the ASH 17 report.
This is a basic comment on management by a le commission forum with f our subheadings that I will read 19
" Collegial bodies are not an efficient f orum for managing 20 operations.
Extensive deliberations, multiple and 21 conflicting values, and disparate views create inefficiency 22 when trying to implement policy through the management of 23 resources in day-to-day operations.
Collegial management 24 tends to manifest itself in several key areas (A) failure
()
25 to coordinate regulatory policy with other agencies; (B),
O
52 7413 04 05 pv BWH 1
the process is protracted, creating backlogs and
]
2 concentrating on details, often at the expense of 3
expeditious action and administrative flexibility; (C) 4 perpetuating a court-like environment which permeates the 5
agency and has the eff ect of legalizing the agency processt o
(D) has little direct consideration to appropriate 7
allocation of resources within the agency."
o 6
Can you comment on tho se ?
9 A
I think, again, the key words are " day-to-day 10 mana gemen t," and I keep saying the commission should not be 11 involved in day-to-day management of an agency.
I think it 12 is true about the over-legalistic s tmosphere that a 13 commission has developed.
14 I think it would be much be tter to have a more free and 15 easy exchange between the program directors and the 16 commission, almost - I hesitate to say -- almost on an 17 equality basis.
le Bu t on the other hand, I think the commi ssion - you --
19 the commission - the commission form of agency is basically 20 an inef ficient creature, but I think when you deal with the 21 broad spectrum cecisionmaking, you have to deal with 22 inef ficiencies, and maybe the inefficiencies contribute to 23 the debate and maybe they serve a good purpose.
24 Again, I think, if you can take the commission and say, O
25 okev. vou commissioners eeet witn these very broed-spectrum O
7413 04 06 53 pv BWH I
i ssues ano let the day-to-day management be turned over to
(~)
2 an administra tor," we would be better of f.
3 0
There is a brief comment the ASH report had on 4
adaptability, saying:
"The regulatory commissions do not 5
adapt easily.
Agency action lags behind new technology, 6
economic trends, and industry structure."
7 Do you think NRC is a f air target f or tha t sort of a 8
comment?
9 A
I don't think so.
Again, ASH was talking about 10 the economic regulatory agencies, and I think it is very 11 true; you get backlogs of cases going back years with the 12 ICC and FCC and those outfits.
I think economic regulation, 13 we are seeing the end of many of that type of regulation.
. 14 But again, when you are dealing with nuclear, you are
()
15 dealing with new technology and how is it going to be lo regulated, whether it is going to blossom forth or wither on 17 the vine.
I think those are very big decisions that you 16 should have a deliberative body attack.
19 0
Tha re are two other comments the ASH report made 20 that are somewhat redundant to areas we have just covered.
21 The one, " legalistic environment," the judgment was made, 22 "The legalistic environment resulting f rom commission 23 predisposition to case-by-case analysis contributes to 24 pa ssive, overly judicial approach in regulation."
()
25 And on resource alloca tions, tha t " Multi-headed n
s-
54 7413 04 07 l
pv BWH I
management may result in a misallocation of agency resources 1
()
2 in the absence of agreement on well-defined priorities.
3 Would you care to make any f urther comment on those 4
points?
{}
5 A
I agree with both of them.
I think, again, it 6
gets back to my points decisions on resource allocation, 7
m an agemen t, e t ce te ra, should be with an administrator, but 8
I don't want to take away the independence of the agency.
9 And I want to kee p the broad decisionmaking, policymaning 10 role to this multi-headed creature which we call the 11
" co mm i ssi on. "
12 0
The ASH re port makes perhaps a contradictory 13 judgement on accountabili ty.
The ASH report says 14
" Inde penden t regulatory commissions do not provide for 15 political accountability required to ensure public 16 r e sponsi bili ty. "
17 A
Well, I think in the area -- ASH was working for a 16 president who was very much f ascinated by the idea of 19 a ccountability; namely, President Nixon.
And there was an 20 a ttempt to get political accountability in that 21 aaministration And if you weren't accountable, you no 22 longer worked for them.
23 I think wnat we are dealing with here is nuclear.
It is 24 not a short-term reaction to a vote in a particular m,)
25 election.
It just goes over generations, and maybe you l
l
55 7413 04 08 pv BWH I
don't want to be overly responsive to the party in power.
! (])
2 Tha t party is in for four years and won't be arounc again.
3 That party may not re present everything, or that particular
}
aaministration may not represent everything you would like 4
5 to see happen over the next 20 or 25 years.
6 I think the idea of having something that may not be 7
politically accountable to the administration may be a very 8
good mechanism f or dealing wi th a technology such as nuclear 9
that extends over long periods of time.
10 0
I would like to turn now to some final questions 11 in the area of the efficiency of management in the present 12 structure of NRC, which may be a bit sensitive.
13 Right now there are a number of inquiries of the TMI 14 accident and related events:
the Pre sident's Commi ssion,
()
15 the Rogovin inquiry being done for NRC itself, and a number lo of industry evaluations.
17 Are you conscious of a coherent plan on the part of the 16 agency f or reviewing and integrating all of the 19 recommendations and findings that are expected and caking 20 decisions based on them?
21 A
No.
22 0
Do you recall that the Rasmussen report or reactor 23 safety study took several years back in the early 1970s, and 24 about the biggest f ruit of that seems to have been the l ()
25 creation of the Lewis Commi ttee to study the Rasmussen C) 4
1413 04 09 56 pv BWH I
re por t?
Do you think the present situation suggests we will
()
2 do the same with all the TMI inquiries?
3 A
Yes.
The commi ssion may not have the luxury they
(]}
4 had with the Rasmussen report.
And, of course, the Lewis 5
Committee came about because the Udall Committee suggested 6
strongly that we have a Lewis Commi ttee do the job that they 7
did.
6 I think, in this case, I am convinced that the Congre ss 9
will demand an action plan to deal with these 10 recommendations of the various committees, and the 11 commission will be held responsible for addressing each and 12 every one of the recommendations and coming up with an 13 alternate, or at least some sort of a plan, to deal with 14 them.
15 0
Do you think if galvanized by the proper pre ssure, lo this five-man commission can gather up and f airly consider 17 all of these in a proper action plan?
Io A
Yes.
They respond well when goaded from the 19 outside.
I think we will see the various investigating 20 groups issue their reports.
I think that there will be an 21 ef f ort on the part of the comm'.ssio to designate a 22 high-ranking official to draw out how they are going to 23 respond to each one of those issues.
And I think the 24 commission will move rapidly.
()
25 I can't speak for them, but I just know f rom outside --
'413 04 10 pv SWH I
f rom the area of an interested observer, they will move
]
(]}
2 quickly.
3 0
Do you see the congressional oversight as the 4
principal pressure for prompt action?
5 A-Yes.
o O
Do you think that there can be a rational and 7
consistent judgment, even with the lack of clear policy 6
guidelines, at least lack of set-down, wri tten, clear policy 9
guidelines, that exist now in reactor regulation?
10 A
Give that to me again.
Il O
Previously, we had been discussing policy 12 guidelines for the regula tion of reactors, and I was 13 suggesting that they are not spelled out, they are not 14 clearly defined.
And now we would look to the results of
()
15 all of these inquiries and make some coherent -- take some 16 coherent actions based on those results.
17 Do you think it is possible to draw such together without 18 having explicit reactor regulation polic '
19 A
I think one is going to lead to the other.
I 20 think the goading of these commission reports will lead to 21 the development of thase policy statements and more explicit 22 procedures.
l 23 When you look back on reactor regulation, it is just a l
i 24 collection of precedents that came about when they started
()
25 reviewing reactors back in the '60s, and it has been a sort l
7413 04 11 58 pv SWH I
of handed down f rom its f olklore or something.
I think the
()
2 idea now that they have to formulate and put together a 3
clear policy, I think the trend had been over there.
I
{}
think they had been trying to get something going, and this 4
5 is certainly going to push it along.
I know I am pushing it 6
along in my own office.
7 0
In the present structure of NRC, the personnel are 6
located in about 10 buildings in different locations all 9
over town.
Do you have an opinion on whether it is 10 nece ssary to consolidate the personnel of the NRC?
11 A
I am glad you asked that question.
I think tha t 12 is the biggest scandal that is going around here, why this 13 agency has not been able to get itself located so that the 14 managers are somewhat near one another in making decisions.
15 More than that, I think, the agency belongs in the --
16 downtown where the rest of the government agencies are.
I 17 think this busine ss of keeping the agency scattered in the 18 suburbs almost as if it were a part from the rest of the 19 government is a very bad thing.
And the burden there lies 20 not only here, but also with the Congress.
21 I think it is a real shame tha t this agency is located 22 and scattered about as it is, and I think the condition of 23 the offices is another reason to be_ angry as hell about t he 24 whole thing.
I mean, this agency lives in pretty shabby
()
25 surroundings, and if you live in shabby surroundings and O
59
'l413 04 12 pv BWH 1
dispersed around the countryside like a bunch of refugees,
()
2 the staff will get the f eeling that they are second-class 3
citizens, and there has really been so little ef f ort to get (v'T this agency consolidated and moved to where the rest of the 4
5 government is.
It's a shame.
6 MR. BERNERO:
I would like to insert for the 7
record that the NRC TMI special inquiry can speak with great 6
expertise on shabby quarters.
9 SY MR. BERNERO:
10 0
What ao you think has been the cause of this 11 delay?
The agency now is five years old and is no closer to 12 consolidation, it seems, than it was when it was formed.
13 A
Here I am going to eat my words.
Part of the 14 problem is that it has this multi-headed head s t he O
n
(/
15 co mmi ssion.
Again, I don't think the commission should be 16 the body to cope with the problem of where the agency should 17 be loceted and how it should be housed, because you get a 16 debate among commissioners of where should we be -- i n th e 19 suburbs, should we be in Germantown, should we be somewhere 20 else?
21 And on the other hand, I think the comissioners are all 22 consolidated downtown together, and there is a f eeling down 23 there that they don't need the 3000 o ther people who work 24 f or this agency to be down there with them.
They debate
(
25 among themselves and they forget they are part of an g
s_
1
60 7413 04 13 j
pv BWH I
agency.
(])
2 I think the heart of the problem there is the 3
commissioners -- and I will eat my words again -- it is the 4
lack of knowledge of how things are done politically in 5
If you had a single presidential administrator, 6
the first thing he would have done was to get himself an 7
agency headquarters and proper housing for his agency.
6 EPA was se t up, and the first act of business of 9
Mr. Ruckelshaus was to assure himself that he had a building 10 f or his agency.
11 Look at all of the other new agencies that have come into 12 existence since EPA, and they all have themselves located --
13 correctly and well.
This one, I mean, that in itself is 14 cause for righteous indigniation.
P)
(_
15 0
Perhaps the Department of Education will beat us 16 in to a building.
17 A
They will.
The "De partment of Snail Darter 18 Protection" will beat us into the building.
19 0
In recent experience, bef ore Victor Stello took 20 the job of director of I&E and before Harold Denton took the 21 direc tor's job in NRR, there was a period of more than a 22 year in both cases where John Davis, on the one hand, in 23 I&E, and Ed Case in NRR were acting directors.
Why does it 24 take so long f or NRC to get office directors?
Why does NRC
()
25 exist in this limbo with acting directors of major offices?
O
61 7413 04 14 pv BWH 1
A Well,.I think, a couple of reasons one, other
{]}
2 agencies at this level draw in a political base.
It is 3
equivalent to assistant secretary in agencies in the 4
executive branch.
There is a certain status involved there, 5
a certain desire on the people to rush in and apply for 6
those people.
We don't have that sort of reservoir of 7
outside talent that we can go to.
6 I think the desire on the part of the commission is to 9
loca te people with national stature f or these things, and 10 they find it hard to do tha t because, I think, the lack of Il national stature of the positions, and they have to be 12 satisfied with looking in a more narrow arena for more 13 narrow technical talent, and the search takes a long time.
14 I can understand why.
I recruited like mad to get
()
15 somebody to take this job that the commission appointed me 16 to.
I touched every base, and I couldn't find any 17 i n te re s t.
ri-)
16 19 20 21 22 23 24
()
25 O
i a.
CR 7413 l
62 WHITLOCK l
t-4 mte 1 f{>
1 O
Are you saying you took that job because you couldn't O
2 ri=a o eo#e2 3
A The Commission asked me to take it because I couldn't 4
find anyone to take it, nor could they.
5 G
Can you think of any solution to that problem?
6 A
I can't, unless you give due recognition to these a
7 office directors as key members of the agency team, again 8
defining what their responsibilities are, allowing them some 9
freedom in policymaking.
And maybe, as the agency matures, 10 there will be a greater recognition of the challenges of these Il positions and more applicants will come forward.
12 I think it is going to be difficult during this next,
13 several months, while all of these Commission reports are 14 coming out, to attract people who have career amaitions in 15 this area.
It may be a very short career.
16 on the other hand, I think it would be good to have turnover 17 in these positions, not to look at them as career positions, 18 and hope that people do come and go after a couple of years l9l in this job.
20 G
You seem to be saying, now, that if this agency 21 had a structure under a single administrator, it would have 22 the governmental channels to attract more people to these 23 positions, and at the same time would enhance the attractive-24
~)
ness of the positions by giving more policy-setting authority As(jer:t Report',s, Inc.
25 to the office director.
L i
L
mte 2 63 l
This seems to contradict the arguments that say the agency 2
should continue with a five-man o'r a Commission form.
~
t 3
A.
I think there are tradeoffs.
Naturally, you are 4
going to get -- if we were a single-headed agency under an 5
administrator and you were told that, you are the assistant 6
administrator for Nuclear Materials Safety and Safeguards, 7
the White House would be happy to give you the names of 8
political types who are looking for jobs.
You would have 9
ready access to people.
10 Of course, you would be getting politically responsive II people in the jobs, and whether that is good, I would say 12 probably not right now.
13 What I am saying, I guess, is that it would be nice to I#
have the stature to these jobs, but without the political 15 ties that a normal political appointee has.
But again, I am 16 getting -- I don't think I am contradicting myself on the I7 Commission-staff relationship.
Again, if the Commission could 18 keep to the very broad decisionmaking powers and trust these 19 other staff to make day to day decisions, even some day to 20 day policy decisions, that is in line with what I said.
And 21 you would have to do that in order to get people into these 22 jobs.
23 You can't be second-guessing them on key staff appointments, 24 f'T on relatively mundane trips up to the Hill to testify, and on A
es Repon.n, inc.
v l some day to day decisions in the area of licensing.
25 i
l l
l l
i
mte 3 64 a
i G
Could you conceive of any linkage between a position 2
as an office dir.ector and a position as a member of the
{~ )
3 Commission, in some sequence perhaps, some relationship of I
(
4 that sort?
5 A
Office directors going to be Commissioners?
6 0
Yes, something of that order.
7 A
I think it could happen.
There would be -- there 8
would be some encumbrances, because, again, the Commissioner 9
has to have the broad view of the horizon and he shouldn't get 10 up there and try to be a Commissioner with his view back in 11 managing an office.
There is a tendency, then, to dip back 12 into the staff and try to be a'n office administrator as opposed 13 to being a Commissioner.
g-)
V 14 G
Right now the NRC has a variety of separate offices.
15 The Executive Director for Operations is to coordinate the 16 work of these offices.
Do you think the work of the offices 17 is adequately coordinated right now?
It depends -- I guess some would say the way you 18 A
t 19 stand is the way you sit.
l l
20 When I sat as deputy, I thought they weren't coordinated well.
21 Now, over at NMSS, I don't think it is too bad.
It is not 22 bad at all.
But maybe that is because I came over with the 23 idea that things should be better coordinated.
24 I have a feeling now in my office that we do try to
-)
usjuu neoonm. inc.
25 coordinate in the major areas.
Now, I am not going to say 1
mte 4 65 1
that applies across the board.
I guess there are a reas that
()
2 are still fragmented.
But I am not overwhelmed by the frag-3 mentation.
()
4 4
When we started this deposition and I was asking 5
you about Three Mile Island in particular, you said something 6
about the coordination on waste management in Three Mile Island 7
that suggested it was less than adequate.
8 A
You got me there.
That's true.
But it is not 9
because we don't want to be coordinated.
We would like to be 10 coordinated and we haven't been.
So I guess there is room for 11 more interaction.
12 I am thinking of the waste management program that seems
("3 13 to be coordinated like mad.
I am thinking of safeguards, which LJ 14 is now coordinated.
And true, on individual actions I think 15 there is a tendency on the part of, say, NMSS to talk about 16 our fuel cycle plants, our waste management repositories.
And 17 certainly in the area of reactors, where there is discussion 18 of anything within the site boundary, it belongs to the 19 Reactor Regulation people.
There is still that problem.
20 I think that may break down as you -- there should be a 21 tendency to move people from office to office to office.
I 22 think that is important.
I think John Davis came over from
{
23 Inspection & Enforcement to NMSS and he did an awful lot to j bring I&E and NMSS together.
I think if you can move key
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24 AtMed Reporters, Inc.
25 people from offices, that would help.
i
'l l
l l
1
mte 5 66 I
G Do you think that altering or strengthening the EDO 2
management line would assist in this, too?
3 A.
Well, I think the EDO can make that job whatever he
,j 4
wants to make of it.
I think the EDO has a lot of functions 5
now that could be carried out if he wanted to do it.
It 6
depends on how the incumbent in that job wants to do it.
7 My own view of the EDO, I think, is that he can't be an 8
agent of the staff to the Commission.
I think what the EDO 9
should be is an agent of the Commission.
He should be the 10 executive agent of the Commission.
He cannot run five offices II by trying to keep informed on everything that is going on in 12 those offices and funneling it up to the Commission.
I think 13 almost the Commission should take the EDO from wherever he is
]C Id located here in Bethesda, bring him down -- if they have to 15 have this dispersed location, bring him down to H Street and 16 say:
You are our executive agent, and when we carry out I7 actions A, B,
C, D and E, you are to make sure they are done.
I8 You are our man to tie together these things and keep us --
l9 keep this agency functioning.
20 0
Are you saying the line offices would report to 2I the Commission only through the EDO?
22 A.
I don't think it is reporting through.
I don't p) 23 think that is important.
You can't break down the fact that 24 f')
the line offices are going to continue working with the AcVed Reporters, Inc.
25 Commission, because the Commission has a tendency to go
mte 6 67 1
immediately to those line offices.
()
2 My vision now of the EDO is more that he is the expediter, 3
the puller-together of major Commission areas of concern in
()
4 getting things done.
If a decision has been made by the 5
Commission that TMI things are going to be brought together 6
and an action plan will be brought out and Congress will be 7
informed, the press will be informed, I think he should then 8
'be the man who coordinates all these things.
He should have 9
press reporting to him and the Congressional Affairs Office 10 reporting to him, and he should lay out a series of implement-11 ing steps for the Commission decisions and carry them out and 12 give directions to the offices in the name of the Commission.
13 Maybe he is a super --
14 G
You seem to be defining the principal executive 15 officer of the Commission, which the statute seems to give 16 to the Chairman.
17 A
Well, I don't think the statute is workable in that 18 regard.
I think when you define the Chairman as a principal 19 executive officer, he still is subjected to votes of five 20 Commissioners.
And yet, I think what is lacking in the 21 Commission is somebody, when the Commission does take an
(-)
22 action, is to give it to an executive officer and administrator,
\\/
23 key official, and say:
You have got the ball now, you tie I
l (s
24 together these programs and get things done, and lay out a Ada, Reporters. inc.
25 schedule and move it, and day to day have contact with the I
mte 7 68 1
Commissioners.
2 (L
Would you leave it to this executive position to be 3
the filter or the agent for supporting the Commission insofar 4
as if one of the Commissioners wants to dip down into the 5
staff to take an especially close look at a topic, wouldJ'you 6
require that Commissioner to work through that executive 7
position?
8 A.
I think I would.
But on the other hand, I think of 9
the so-called executive director, if he was down there with 10 the Commission working day by day, I think the Commissioners 11 would naturally turn toward him and ask him for help on matters.
12 He should be there as the right hand office of the Commis-13 sioners.
He should be available.
He should be seeking out 14 disparate views of the office directors.
15 And maybe -- I think the executive director has been more 16 of a synthesizer of staff views to present to the Commission 17 a package of views that comes from here down there (Indicating).
18 I think the executive director, in my view, should be not a 19 j packager to make sure everything is smooth and nicely rounded, 20 so the Commission can swallow a pill, but to be down there 21 as the agent of the Commission, seek out different views of 22 the office directors.
23 All right, the Commission is going to be looking at this 24 p
particular thing and' Commissioner so and so has this problem;
, g,.roi seporteri, inc.
25 what about it?
Do you have a different view?
Let's outline l
l t
69 mte 8 1
where the real down sides of these things are.
What is the
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2 political interests we are going to harm on this?
How does u
3 Congressional Affairs look on this?
How are we going to keep'
(
4 the Committees informed?
How is the press going to be 5
informed?
6 It is that sort of view that I have in mind for the 7
executive agent of the Commission, not a packager of staff 8
Papers.
9 O
Let me pursue that in one specific area.
At the 10 present time, the EDO consists regular PAR reviews, capital 11 P-A-R.
Do you view these reviews as being made as a packager 12 or as the agent of the Commission?
13 A
I have not very good vibrations from the PARS.
If O
14 the PARS were held to focus on major program items that are 15 happening in the offices, I would say that is a good role for 16 the Commission's executive agent.
Right now the PARS are 17 overly detailed.
They look for information that even I as an 1
18 office director wouldn't even try to keep track of.
In fact, 19 I have to memorize my lines when I give a PAR.
And to come 20 up with all of this dredging up of details and minor thoughts 21 and minor activities to inundate the executive director with, 22 I think is a giant waste of time.
23 I would rather see -- again, the executive director should 24 be reflecting where the Commission should really be interested g, t Reporters, Inc.
I :e is 25 in a thing:
What is the major impediments in the waste I
I I
70 mte 9 I
management program area?
What is happening to delay things?
2 What is getting it off the track in major terms?
Where is 3
the Congress coming from on this thing?
Where do you see 4
people from the outside coming into this thing?
That should 5
be an item that the executive director should keep track of, 6
and he should be picking apart the staff to find out where 7
there are real problems in the waste management areas and 8
highlighting those things.to the Commission.
9 He shouldn't be looking at details of contractual expendi-10 tures or EDO goals, as important as they are.
That is not Il really what is the driving force of the agency.
Anything else 12 is diluting --
13 0:
If you reformed the PAR to concentrate on more 14 significant issues, do you think the PAR mechanism should be 15 done not only with the EDO, but with the Commission itself?
16 A.
I would say -- I would say it is a filtering process.
17 I think EDO should then highlight, as part of his executive 18 agent's role in this thing, in a very summary form where(there lareproblemsfortheCommissiontofocusitsattentiononin l9 20 the broadest sense.
21 What I am trying to do is avoid draining the Commission 22 of -- unless it has very important major policy areas that 23 they can really focus some time on.
And that is why I think i
24
' O the executive director should be a part almost of the AQerti Reporters, Inc.
25 Commission's mechanism, and not as a staff ambassador of the I
l l
i mte 10 71 I
staff to the Commission.
0 2
Q G
In the present structure, the EDO runs a more 3
detailed PAR review.
Does the Commission have any other 4
different mechanism of appraisal?
5 A.
No.
They have what they call the program plan that 6
Commissioner Ahearne wants to talk about, where the offices 7
would come down and brief on where they want to go on major 8
objectives and where the resources are being spent and so on.
9 G
This is a fairly recent development?
10 A.
It is fairly recent.
II O
And only in selected waste management or areas like 12 that?
13 A.
Yes.
The Commission gets involved, of course, during Id the two or three times a year in the budget process where a 15 lot of this is outlined and where people are going.
They have 16 no disciplined way of, in capsule form, picking out where a 17 certain major problem area is in the agency.
18 I think the monthly review or semi-monthly review is good.
I9 But not to brag about accomplishments, but more to outline 20 where major problems are occurring and what can be done where 21 the Commission has a role in solving those problems.
Keeping 22 people informed just for the sake of keeping them informed 23 on programs, I think, is just a big waste of time.
i 24 i
leO 0
You are the director of a large office in the NRC.
vw a.ponm inc.
25 l
In what fashion are you appraised -- is your performance l
mte 11 72 1
appraised by your supervisors?
es
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2 A
Only, I suppose, in the case of where I have made a N/
3 major gaffe, if the program gets so completely out of line ll 4
that I have missed a major Commission commitment to the 5
Congress or somewhere else, would I be told to pack it in and 6
leave.
But I think that is the way that -- that is how people 7
at my level should be treated.
Report cards are not for this 8
level.
You wouldn't give report cards on the Assistant 9
Secretary of State for Middle Eastern Affairs unless he really 10 blew something badly, mucked up a key negotiation.
You 11 wouldn't eliminate the Assistant Secretary for Installation 12 and Logistics in the Department of Defense unless he was 13 caught in a major gaffe.
v 14 You give people at that level a certain amount of freedom 15 and say, go to it and if you blow it you are finished.
But 16 you don't keep track of them day by day.
17 When I worked as the executive assistant to Russell Train 18 at EPA, that was a. major agency, 10,000 or 11,000 people.
And I
i 19ll he didn't give detailed performance appraisals on assistant I
h
'l 20 administrators.
You met with them frequently enough that 21 you knew when one was not performing or not carrying out his 22 duties.
But you didn't give a detailed report card.
You
,f 3
(
)
23 have a feel for when things are going normal in an office.
rg i
G Let me ask one more administrative question.
24 Ace
,14 Reporters, Inc. l 25 The Commissioners and, for that matter, all of the major l
l ll i
mte 12 73 1
offices have an open door policy, which permits any NRC staff
()
2
. member to come in and speak directly.
Do you think this is a 3
valuable process, of significant benefit to the efficient
(
4 operation of the agency?
5 A
I think it is.
I don't know how much it contributes 6
to efficiency.
I think it contributes to the feeling that you 7
shouldn't bottle up your problems and -- as a staff member and 8
not have some feel that you can bring something to the atten-9 tion of people.
10 I think it is important that, if someone felt that strongly 11 about any issue, they could go to any Commissioner and unload 12 it.
And there should be follow-up, key follow-up.
13 0
Do you think the agency's record in follow-up of bv 14 disgruntled employees or dissenting employees is a reasonable 15 one right now, reasonably good one?
16 L
Yes, better than any other agency I have been in.
17 There is an awful lot of attention paid to any employee who 18 has a major gripe about a safety issue, and a lot of resources 19 j go into looking into that gripe.
i 20 l
Now, maybe that is not the most efficient use of resources.
21 But I think it is important, because one of these days maybe 22 something is there.
23 MR. CHIN:
I have one or two clarifying questions.
24 BY MR. Cnzy
, /~T
"'G*U Reporters, sne.
25 You indicated earlier that the NRC had no choice l
I i
74 mte 13 1
but to be the sole spokesman in terms of the TMI accident.
()
2 Do you believe it is a good idea to muzzle a utility?
3 A
Oh, no.
I think they should be allowed to say 4
whatever they want to say.
5 g
So you believe.the action taken at TMI to muzzle a 6
utility was not an appropriate action?
7 A
on the specific case of TMI, again, I did not get 8
involved in any inner workings of the Commission.
I read the 9
newspaper and I looked at the television set, and I certainly 10 didn't know what the details of the relationship between NRC 11 and the utility were.
12 My own view is that anyone who wants to say anything on 13 any issue, let him say it.
If he is wrong, so be it.
But I g
(~1 14 think the NRC has an obligation for getting up front and 15 saying it.
16 Now, if the utility persistently puts out faulty data that 17 were going to lead people astray, I think the NRC has an 18 obligation to say that the utility is not telling the truth 19 l and, rightly or wrongly, is misleading the public, and let l
l 20 that come out as a statement.
21 I don't believe in muzzling anyone.
22 G
Another question:
During the TMI accident, parti-23 cularly after Friday, the Commissioners developed a so-called 24 decision tree for evacuation.
You have earlier said that you yual Reporters, Inc.
A 25, believe the evacuation recommendation from the government i
l 1
i
mte 14 75 1
side, from the Federal Government side, should come from the
()
2 senior NRC man on site.
I take it you disagree with the 3
notion that if there is sufficient tbne the decision should (A_j3 be referred back to Washington?
4 5
A I disagree with that.
I think the people on-site 6
should have the basic decision.
7 0
One final question.
You also indicated that the 8
best thing to happen at the TMI accident was for Mr. Denton 9
to appear on-site.
At what point in the accident process 10 should a senior NRC official be sent to the site?
II A
I think as soon as it becomes evident that you 12 don' t have -- that you have -- that you don't have the little 13
(}
leak or something like that.
I think as soon as it became Id evident that this thing was big, it is going to last and 15 there were going to be major decisions involved regarding 16 effects of this thing on the public, we shouldn't waste any I7 time.
We should get up there immediately and show that we are 18 on the scene and available to make decisions.
19 0
I recognize you were not very much involved in the 20 accident at TMI.
I assume you read a lot about it since that 2I time.
22
(}
A Yes.
23 g
At what point in that accident would'you have sent
(~)
a man like Mr. Denton to the site?
gjer:t Reporters, Inc.
25 A
I probably woull have sent him up there Wednesday i
mte 15 76 1
night, Thursday morning.
I didn't realize how bad this thing
()
2 was until I -- it happened on a Wednesday, I think, and'I 3
realized, I think, the seriousness of it maybe through some 4
television thing on Wednesday night.
I think someone wandered 5
into my office Wednesday around~ noontime and said, they have a 6
reactor trip or something up at TMI.
And I said, gee, these v
7 things happen all of the time; so what?
8 And he laughed again.
And then the television came on.
9 And I think the~ next Thursday the Commission had some sort 10 of a briefing.
And I was downtown anyway, and I sat in on it.
II And it sounded serious as could be at that point.
And I think 12 if it were as serious as I heard, I would have had somebody r^g 13 out there that day taking charge of the whole thing.
C) 14 G
One of the problems discovered by the Governor of 15 Pennsylvania was the inability of the utility and NRC people 16 on-site to diagnose the problem.
So you would still wait for 17 almost a day to send someone capable of diagnosing the acci-12 dent?
h 19 1 A
I think so, because in this case I would have, e
h 20 l because from -- I don't know exactly what was going on up 21 there.
But from what I gathered, these reactors that trip 22
(~)3 off if you blow a gasket here or there, and the plumbing leaks
\\_
l' here and there.
23 l
And it was my view that we didn't -- I thought i
24 this was all -- anyhow, what I heard was going on up there, you
(~)
sq,nt:4 Reporters, Inc.
l 25 l blew a pipe or something like that.
I I
mte 16 77 1
If it became more and m ore clear that this was not an
[)
2 ordinary plumbing incident at TMI, I would have sent him up l
s.
I 3
there right away.
I wouldn't have waited.
I don't know how l
4 soon people got the word that, gee, this is not the ordinary 5
trip, this is not the ordinary blowing of a reactor plumbing 6
system, this is big stuff.
7 Now maybe they knew that on Wednesday.
I didn't know it.
8 I picked it up on Thursday some time, that I would -- as soon 9
as it became clear to me that this was not an ordinary thing, 10 I would have sent somebody up there.
It may not have been II Denton. It may have been a division director or something.
12 And what would have happened if this were in California, I 7
suppose, if all of the indicators lit up on the warning board r
13 L,)
14, that this thing was turning on all t' lights, I would have 15 put somebody on a plane to get them out there right away.
16 G
Is it your view that the I&E office is capable of 17 diagnosing the kind of a situation that was at TMI Wednesday 18 morning?
19 A
I just don't know.
20 g
Is it your view that I8E's purpose is to diagnose 21 a problem?
22 A
Probably not.
I think what they should do is get 7-ts 23 on the thing and give quick read-out as to what is happening, 24 because from what I gather, the I&E people me not at that ijerot Reporters, Inc.
25 technical level to look at the big picture.
What they can i
l i
mte 17 78
?
I do is basically tell you all of the indicators of things that O
are wr ng and tel y u if it is right within the boundary or 3
outside of the boundary.
4
{
I think the center of expertise is probably back here in 5
NRR, where they can put these things together and come up with 6
some sort of a coherent warning light to get the. hell on an o
7 airplane and get up there and find out what is going on.
8 g
I gather that you subscribe to the view you indicated 9
earlier, that a utility must have a senior person on-site 10 capable of making that kind of diagnosis?
11 A.
Yes, very definitely.
I think that person should 12 have much more responsibility than he has now at these 13 utilities.
O O
I have no further questions.
MR. BERNERO:
I don't.
16 MR. CHIN:
In conclusion, let me say this is an I7 ongoing investigation and, although we have completed our 18 questions for you today, we may need to bring you back for U
l further deposition.
We will, however, make every effort to 20 avoid that.
21 I will now recess this deposition, rather than terminate it.
22 n
I want to say to you that I think we have learned a lot from V
23 you today, and I wish to thank you for your time for being here.
2
with us this morning.
Thank vou.
m no nwonm. nne.
25 (Whereupon, a t 12:02 p.m.,
the taking of the e-6 instant deposition was recessed.)
I l
4 e
- ' q, g>R SEco UNITED STATES
?g NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
[
((l Q WASHINGTON, D. C. 20555 Qs]$~
%._.V )h E September 13, 1979 d
Mr. W. J. Dircks vi U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, D.C.
20555
Dear fir. Dircks:
I am writing to confirm that your deposition under oath in connection with the accident at Three Mile Island is scheduled for October 1,1979 at 10:00 a.m., at Roo'n 6717 Maryland National Bank Building, Bethesda, Maryland.
This will also confirm my request for you to bring with you a copy of your resume and any documents in your possession or control regarding TMI-2, the accident or precursor events which you have reason to believe may not be in official NRC files, including any diary or personal working file.
The deposition will be conducted by members of the NRC's Special Inquiry Group on Three Mile Island.
This Group is Leing directed independently of the llRC by the law firm of Rogovin, Stern and Huge.
It includes both NRC personnel who have been detailed to the Special Inquiry Staff, and outside staff and attorneys.
Through a delegation of authority from the NRC under Section 161(c) of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended, the Special Inquiry Group has a broad mandate to inquire into the causes of the accident g
at Three Mile Island, to identify major problem areas and to make recommenda-V tions for change. At the conclusion of its investigation, the Group will issue a detailed public report setting forth its findings and recommendations.
Unless you have been served with a subpoena, your participation in the deposi-tion is voluntary and there will be no effect on you if you decline to answer some or all of the questions asked you.
However, the Special Inquiry has been given the power to subpoena witnesses to appear and testify under oath, or to appear and produce documents, or both, at any designated place. Any person deposed may have an attorney present or any other person he wishes accompany him at the deposition as his representative.
The Office of the General Counsel of NRC has advised Ls that it is willing to send an NRC attorney to all depositions of NRC employees who will represent you as an individual rather than represent NRC. Since the NRC attorney ma at your affirmative request, you should notify Richard Mallory (y attend only 634-3224)in the Office of the General Counsel as soon as practicable if you wish to have an NRC attorney present.
You should realize that while we will try to respect any req;ests for con-fidentiality in connection with the publication of our report, we can nake no rm guarantees. llames of witnesses and the information they provide may eventually d
become.public, inasmuch as the entire record of the Special Inquiry Group's investigation will be made available to the NRC for whatever uses it may deem appropriate.
In time, this information may be made available to the public i
B
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., =
2 voluntarily, or become available to the public through the Freedom of Information Act. Moreover, other departments and agencies of government may request access to this information pursuant to the Privacy Act of 1974. The information may also be made available in whole or in part to committees or subcommittees of the U.S. Congress.
If you have testified previously with respect to the Three Mile Island accident, it would be useful if you could review any transcripts of your previous statement (s) prior to the deposition.
Thank you for your cooperation.
Sincerely, Mitchell Rogovi,
irector NRC/TMI Special Inquiry Group o
b
.