ML19308C437
| ML19308C437 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Crane  |
| Issue date: | 09/28/1979 |
| From: | Ingram F, Page R NRC - NRC THREE MILE ISLAND TASK FORCE, NRC OFFICE OF PUBLIC AFFAIRS (OPA) |
| To: | |
| References | |
| TASK-TF, TASK-TMR NUDOCS 8001240587 | |
| Download: ML19308C437 (49) | |
Text
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' O N U CLE A R R E G UL ATO R'l CO MMIS S!O N l
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IN THE MATTER OF:
THREE MILE ISLAND SPECIAL j
INQUIRY DEPOSITION l
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DEPOSITION OF FRANK L.
INGRAM l
1 o
200R BRIGINAL Place -
Bethesda, Maryland Date -
Friday, September 28, 1979 Pages 1 - 49 l
4 i
Telechone:
(202)347 3700 ACE-FEDERAL REPORTERS,INC.
OfficialReponers M4 Ncrth Cc; itol Street Washingten, D.C. 20001 240 8 NATIONWIDE COVERAGE D 1 Y 7
1 I
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION 3
X In the Matter of:
5 THREE MILE ISLAND 6
SPECIAL INQUIRY DEPOSITION 7
____________x 8
DEPOSITION OF FRANK L.
INGRAM 9
Room 6706 10 Maryland National Bank Bldg.
7735 Old Georgetown Road 11 Bethesda, Maryland 12 Friday, September 28, 1979 9:00 a.m.
13 f-
,1 BEFORE:
14 For the Nuclear Regulatory Commission:
15 RALPH G.
PAGE 16 WILLIAM !!. FOSTER 17 18 l
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i Ace r 1 Reprters, in,
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E E f. 1 E_ N,, 1 S,,
2 WITNESS:
EXAMINATION 3
Frank L.
Ingram 3
4 5
_E X _H _I _B _I _T _S-6 INGRAM EXHIBITS:
IDENTIFIED o
7 5054 5
8 5039 5
9 5066 19 10 11 12 4
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3 334 01 01
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PR0CEED1NGS r' T
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2
?!he re upon,
3.
FRANK INGRAM 4
was called as a witness and, having Deen duly sworn, was 5
examined and testified as follows:
6 EXAMINATION o -
7 BY MR. PAGE:
8 0
Please state your f ull name for the record.
9 A
Frank L. Ingram, I-n g-r-a-m.
10 0
Mr. Ingram. I show you what has been marked for 11 identification as Exhibit 5039.
Is this a copy of a letter 12 sent to you oy the NRC-TMI Special Inquiry Group confirming 13 your deposition here today?
14 A
Yes,-sir.
It is.
O 16 0
Do you understand the information set forth in 16 this letter, including the general nature of the NRO-TMI 1/
Spe:i al Inquiry and your right to have an attorney present IS here today as your representative, and the f act tnat the 19 information you provide here may eventually become public ?
23 A
I understand that, yes.
21 0
'A r. Ingram, is counsel representing you personally-i 22 here today?
23 A
.No, sir.
2; Ma. PAGE:
I would like to note for the record 26' that the-witness is not represented by counsel today.
(~T
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4 7334 01 02 o
k apMM i
BY MR. PAGE:
73
(_)
2 O
Mr. Ingram, if at any tima during the course of 3
this interview you f eel you would like to be represented oy 4
counsel and have counsel present, please advise me and we 5
will adjourn these proceedings to afford you the opportunity 6
to ma ke the necessary arrangements.
Is this procedure agreeaole to you?
' ~
s 3
A That i s agr eeable.
9 0
Mr. Ingram, you snould be aware that the testimony 10 you give has the same force.and effect as if you were 11 testifying in a court of law.
Our questions and your 12 responses are being taken down and they will later be 13 tr ans cribed.
You will be given the opportunity to look at 14 the transcript, to make changes that you deem necessary.
(-s'-)
15 Ho we ve r, to the extent that your subsequent changes are 15 significant, those changes may be viewed as affecting your 1,
c redi bili ty.
So please be as complete and accurate as you 13 can be in re sponding to our questions.
19 If you at any point during the deposition do not 23 understand a question, please feel free to stop and indicate 21
.that, and we will make the clarification at that time.
22 Let me warn you -- two basic ground ruless one is that 23' you permit us to answer -- to finish our questions oefore 24 you give your re sponse, even if you know what the que stion 25 is going to oe, because the reporter cannot take down both
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5 (334 01 03 kapW4 I
of us speaking at the same times secondly, respond
(_).
2 audioly.
Motions such as nodding your head cannot be taken 3
down by the reporter.
4 Have you brought along with you today, to the deposition, 5
a copy of your resume ?.
~
5 A
Yes.
- E' 7
M.f. PAGE:
Would you please identif y this as 8
Exhioit 5065?
9' (Ingram Exhibit 5054 identified. )
10 MR. PAGE:
For the record, Mr. Ingram has provided 11 a one page document entitled " Resume Fr ank L. Ingram."
12 BY MR. PAGE:
13 Q
Mr. Ingram, does this summarize your educational 14 and employment background accurately?
15 A
Yes,-sir.
It does.
15 0
Ine letter that was sent to you, which we have 1/
marked.as Exhibit 5039, asked that you bring with you any 18 documents in your possession or contol concerning the TMI-2 19 accident, or any precursor events which you have reason to 23 oelieve may not ce in of ficial NRC files, including any 21 diar / or personal working file.
22 Have you any such documents?
'23 A
I have not been able to iaentify such documents.
24 (Ingram Exhioit 5039 identified. )
21 l
)
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334 01 04 6
kap!!#
I BY MR. PAGE:
j()
2 0
Mr. Ingram, were you interviewed oy the 3
President's Commission?
4 A
Yes, I was.
5 0
Were you provided a copy of the transcript of that 6
interview?
?-
4 A
No, I was not.
8 0
To begin our questioning, Mr. Ingram, would you give us a enronological description of your emergency 10 response activities that you were involved in 'following the 11 accident on Wednesday, March 28, 19797 We would like you to 12 take this on a day-by-day basis and go up through Sunday.
13 But let's start with Wednesday.
Can you tell us when you 14 were informed of the accident and what your activities were OV la on tnat day?
16 A
I was informed of the accident by Carl Abraham of Il our Region I office, by telephone, some time in the time 18 frame of 8:00 to 9:00 in the morning, as close as I can 19 r emem be r.
At that point, or very shortly thereafter, 23 Mr. /ouchard lef t to take up duties in the operations center 21 and I remained here in our office, public af f airs office in 22 Bethesda, primarily taking telephone calls throughout the 23 remainder of that day, up until. some time in the late 24 evening.
25 During tne day, there were two or three public I)
7 (334 01 05
' kep MM i
announcements, originated in the operations center, which 7(J 2
wers either dictated or f acts -- probably the la tter -- to 3
our o ffice here, and which we issued to the news media.
My 4
recollection is most probably by telephone.
And in the two 5
wire services, Associated Press and United Press 5
I nter national.
We perhaps may have put them on the public t
relations wire, out I don't recall that for sure.
And that 8
pretty well sums up my activities during the first day, on 9
Wednesday.
10 0
All right.
Let's move on to Thursday, then.
11 A
Tnursday was a repeat of Wednesday, as I recall, 12 coming into the office in Maryland National around 7:00 13 o' clock in the morning and remaining until some time late 14 in the evening and answering the telephone, so f ar as I s
15 recollect.
We did not have any formal public announcements 16 on that day.
Il Q
Did you go to the NRC Incident Response Center on la Thurs day?
19 A
No, sir.
20 0
You stayed, then, in your office, and answered 21 calls from tne media that day, or were you accepting also 22 calls from the public at large?
23 A
de were receiving calls from the public at large.
24 We were trying primarily as our priority business, to handle 25 media calls, although the volume had become so great by bo L
i
8
!334 01 06 f
I Thursday that it was a matter of, if you happened to be o ff k{~p NN
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j(f 2
the phone for a minute, you got buzzed, picking it up and 3
taking whatever call was there.
The yellow call slips piled 4
up so you could paper the walls with it, practically.
You 5
graboed what was on. top when you set down the phone.
So it 6
was a little bit of both, but primarily news media.
i~
7 0
All right.
Would you continue, then, with the a
description of your activities on Friday?
9 A
On Friday, I started --- I started the day in the 10 Maryland National Bank Building, Office of Public Af f airs, 11 continuing with telephone calls.
At some time during that 12 morning, my recollection being maybe 9:30 to 10:30, 11:00 13 time frame, I can't pin it down more precisely 'than that, 14 Fouchard called me f rom'the Incident Response Center and (j,,
15 directed me to come -over there, that he was leaving for the 16 Middletown area.
II I arrived over at the Response Center, my recollec tion 18 would be something on the order of 11 :00 o' clock, at which 19 point Joe was in essence on his way out the door, headed for 20 Pennsylvania.
Shortly af ter arriving at the Response 21 Center, mayce on the order of an hour or something -- that's 22 very hard to put together -- I received a call f rom 23 Commissioner Gilinsky, directing that we establish a press 24' center out here in Bethesda.
25 0
This would have been at about what time, though?
V
9 3 34 01 07 kep MN I
A Tnis would have been, to the best of my 2
recollection, in the lunch hour, kind of time frame, and it 3
was his wish to have that facility established as rapidly as 4
possi ble.
5 0
Were you involved in any of the considerations 6
con:e rning whether or not a news center should be
~
/
established in Bethesda, or were you just instructed to go 8
ahead and establish the news center?
9 A
I was not involved in any consideration prior to 10 Commissioner Gilinsky's call directing that one be li established.
12 O
Had there been any consideration to establishment 13 of one on Wednesday or Thursday?
14 A
Not to the best of my knowledge.
7s 16 Bf MR. FOSTER:
~
16 0
Had you received any -- had you received any 1e requast from the medium witn respect to establishing a press 1
13 center, a briefing center, specifically the director of 1/
news, NBC Washington?
20 A
Not to the best of my recollection.
Now, there 2
may have been, over the Wednesday and Friday time frame some 24 suggestions of that kind of thing.
I don't remember l
23 anytning particularly, specific.
I do rememoer that I think 21 Stan Benjamin of the Associated Press insisted on coming out 25 ano sitting in our office at some point during that time.
I (3
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334 01 08 10 kep MM -
I can't rememoer whether it was Wednesday or Thursday.
My
()
2 recollection is he did not stay all that long, because we 3
weren't getting all that much information.
We were so tied 4
up on the telephone we coulon't do anything f or here out 5
here in Bethesda.
6 O
Do you know what the motivation for Commissioner 7
Gilinsky's instruction was, to have the press there?
8 A
I have no idea.
9 0
Were you aware, either at the time or 10 subsequently, that Chairman Hendrie received a telegram f rom 11 the director of news, NBC News, Washington, with respect to 12 a request to estaolishing a briefing center?
13 A
Not to the best of my recollection, no.
As far as 14 I can remember -- I really, until after I got over to the 16 operation at the Incident Response Center on Friday, had no 16 contacts with H Street, with the possible exception of it talking to Congressional Aff d 3rs.
18 BY MR. PAGE:
19 0
All right.
Af ter Commissioner Gilinsky asked that 23 a news center be establisned, how long did it' take to cet it 21 up and advise people that tne center was being estaolishad?
22 A
It was managed on fairly short order, my 23 recollection being a matter of maybe a couple of hours.
24 Perhaps the IdE training facilities -- they are on, I think, 2a the.f if th floor at East ' West -- they either were available u
11 B34 01 09 k epMM -
I or were vacated.
I can't recall specifically.
There was a
'q sj 2
telephone -man present in connection with other programmatic 3"
activities.
4 So, to the best of my recall, we prooably had that 5'
f acility operational with a note on the wires to that eff ect 6
in, like around the 2:30 time frame, something in that
/
order.
8 0
All right.
Did the NRC hold any news conferences 9
in the news center on Friday?
10 A
In the afternoon, and my recollection, a feeling 11 would have earlier, prooably must have been close to 4: 00 12 o' clock, or thereabouts.
Since we had established a news 13 cente r. I told Mr. Gossick that it was necessary to be 14-present up there and to have some technical types go up to
.(
l a-answe r questions.
16 de did prepare a brief statement related, as I recall, to It releases, and I've never been able to find a copy of it and 18 it's never gotten formalizea, as f ar as a press release kind 19 of. thing.
I asked Mr. Gossick, and I recall Mr. Case and 20 Mr. Davis ware present, to designate one or two individuals 21 to join.me upstairs.
That was done.
22 We went up.
I read this brief statement that we had 23 prepared and then opened the floor to questions.
24.
J-Do you recall who the tecnnical people were, there l
23 with you that day?
t l'
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334 01 10 kap MM I
A Dudley Thompsen from I&E and Brian Grimes from
()
2 NRR.
3 0
Tnis. conference went on for about how longs do 4
you recall?
6 A
My recollec tion is, probaoly, well, over an hour.
6 0
Was there any kind of a transcript made of this.
7 that was distributed to the press?
3 A
There was no transcript made of that particular Y
session, no.
10 BY MR. FOSTER II J
das it recorded?
12 A
Not by the NRC Office of Public Af f airs.
It's 13 quite possible that some ' representatives of the media who 14 were there may have had tape reco: ders and recorded it.
15 B( MR. PAGE:
16 0
Would you continue, then, witn your other 11 activities f ollowing the conf erence that day?
18 A
I was continuing to receive telephone calls or at 19 least messages from the media, who, by that time, had the 23 2811 number for the operations center.
From my office in 21.
Mar / land National -- and I don't recollect during that time 22 frame, I may have heard from Fouchard or somebody in Region 23 I.
I t just doesn't f all together right now.
Some time, 24
'ich.must have oeen late in the af ternoon or early in tne 2a evening, the Chairman called and dic tated a statement which p-v s,--
13 934 01 11 kapMM i
he directed be issued as soon as possible.
)
2 As I recall, I hand wrote the statement in longhand,
'3 typed it myself, and we distributed it in the press centar 4
and sent it over here to Maryland National to be put out on 5
the' wire services.
6 0
.Tnis was at about what time?
4 A
It had to be late af ternoon or early evening.
8 And the rest of that evening, I. essentially continued to reponsd to telephone inquiries.
10 0
Again, mostly from the news media?
11 A
Mostly from the news media.
That's right.
12 0
Wno else was assisting you in answering calls f rom 13 the news media during this time?
14 (Pause.)
O is A
Bf some time on that af ternoon, as I recall, Ken 16 Clark from Region II had arrived here and had come over to il the pre ss center.
To the best of my recollection he spent 13 almos t all nis time up tnere with the newsmen.
Again, at 19 some point early in the evening, John Harris and Gail 20 Bradshaw arrived from DOE to offer what assistance they 21 coulc.
I don't recall them taking any media calls that 22 night.
So I guess, to the oest of my recollection, I was 23 primarily taking whatever media calls I could in East-West, 24-but the primary telephone load was here in Jaryland, I
'?5 understand.
v[ 'l
14 i33'4 01 12
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0 Were any of the calls being ref erred to members of
.r"N-(_j 2
the Exe'cutive Mangement Taam?
3
'A I can't answer the question, of my own knowledge.
4 I don't know.
I did not, as f ar as I can recall spend much 5
time in the Incident Response Center per se, during that 6
evening.
I was either operating out of individual offices F-e on that floor, v.
individual offices on the fif th floor, 8
and trying to keep the Incident Response Center switchboard 9'
generally apprised of where I was.
10
-Q Do you know what percentage of your phone 11 conversations would have been over phones that were taped,
- 12 versus calls through phones that were not?
13 A
I wouldn't have any idea.
14 0
As I understand it, you were in the Incident
( 's')
15 Response Center at times, and other times you were occupied 16 in other offices out around?
II A
Yes.
18 19 20 21 22
-23 24 25 A
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334.02 01
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I Q
How long did you stay in the Incident-Response
~
2 Center on Friday?
When did you leave ?
A It must have been some -time _ af ter midnight, around 4
1: 30 or ~2: 00.
0 Then. you re turned on Saturday morning?
6 A
Yes.
' ~
7 0
Would you continue, then, with what you were doing 8
.on Saturday?
9 A
The first thing I clearly remember doing was 10 calling the Chairman's office and recommending that he come 11
.out to Bethesda and meet with the news men who were 12 assembled out here.
We were getting a substantial amount of 13 flak because no member of the Commission, so far as I can 14 recollect, had made any formal statements except on paper O
15 the previous day.
16 0
I-gather, then, that there were a numoer of le requests coming to you for aa appearance by a commissioner?
IS A
Tnat's correct.
19 0
Were-they specifically asking f or the Chairman, or 20 were they just wanting someone at a high management position 21 in tne organization?
22 A
I think at that point tney would have taken_ any 23 commi ssioner, but of course, the Chairman --
24 SY MR. F05TER:
25-0 Tnis recommendation to the Chairman, was that your O
16 7334102 02 k apMM i
own, or were you instructed to request Chairman Hendrie?
O)
(
d A
I did it on my own initiative.
I was not 3~
'instruc ted to do it.. Now, we may have talked aoout it 4
internally, I mean, among my own puolic :+ fairs associates.
5 Whether I had talked to. Joe and men 1oned i' prior to that, 6
I don't know.
I do remember having a conversation not too
' ~
7' long af ter I put -in the call to the Chairman's office, with 8
him, telling him what I had done, and as I recall, his 9
giving his nearty support for the idea.
10 BY MR. PAGE:
11 0
Tnis was, then, on Saturday morning?
12 A
Ye s.
13 0
All right.
Will you continue, then, with your 14 activities?
15 A
I put the request ~in through Bill Dorie.
I don't 16 recall whether the Chairman was not in, or whether he was in 1e a mee ting at that point in time.
Telephone calls were 18 continuing.
A f air amount of time went by during tne 19 morning and I had not gotten response back from the 23 Chairman's o f fices, I recall.
And I called down again and 21 ta14sd to Dorie.
And whether I ever talked to the Chairman-22 direc tly tha t morning, I do not recall.
23 At some point in time it was agreed that the Chairman 24 would come out in the afternoon.
And as I recall, we 25 settled on a time like 2:03 or 2:30. _ Now, something was
.f 5 V
17 334 C%l 03 kap MM i
going on in Pennsylvania.
Whether Harold Denton was meeting
- (3 l
_/-
2 with the governor, or having a press briefing or whatever, 3
the Chairman wanted -- and I certainly agreed --- to talk 4
with Denton before he met with the press to make sure, or 5
attempt to make sure that what they were saying. was in tune 6
with.each other.
4 0
Do you recall who had the press briefing first, 8
Mr. Denton or the Chairman?
9 A
I'm quite sure that whatever was taking place in 10 Pennsylvania was the precursor.
The Chairman and the other 11 commi ssioners did come out to. Bethesda in the early 12 af ter noon.
I think I told the Chairman I would limit the 13 time he would have to spend to something on the order of 30 14 minutes, but we woulo need somebody to take more detailed U,_
15 questions following his appearance.
I think Ed Case was 16 s el e c ted.
17 Jy recollection is we went upstairs, some time at about
- 18 2:30 or so.
I cut the Chairman off at approximately 30 19 minutes after that.
And we came back downstairs.
20 0
Do you recall if the other commissioners were 21 present curing this news conference?
22 A
Tne only one I recall was Commissioner Kennedy 23 standing in the doorway.
24 Bf MR. FOSTER:
25 0
Were there any recordings or transcriptions made?
(~)
t_J y
e-
I 18 7334' 02 04 L
kap NN
>l A
There was a - transcript of the Chairman's remarks
(,s)l 2-made.
I think you have that in your records.
e-3 0
On the selection of Ed Case ~ to provide the 4
Chairman with support, do you rememoer how that came about?
5 A
I don't. remember how that came about.
6 BY MR. PAGE:
i 0
Would you then continue, af ter the news a -
8 conf e renc e?
9 A
The telephone calls continued at a rather hectic 10 pace for the rest of the day until, as I recall, some time, 11 it must have been early evening, I received a rather 12 agitated call f rom Joe about Associated Press reports that 13 were appearin'g on television and radio in Pennsylvania.
And 14 he asked that I contact Stan Benjamin and find out what he la had written, which I recall doing.
16 To the oest of my recollection there was nothing I could it really quarrel with, at least as I recall, all the caveats 18 were there.
Joe called again, a little later on, and said, 19 Call Stan Benjamin again and have Ed Case listen, which I 23 believe we did..
I don't recall whether Ed stayed on the 21 lina during the entire call, or whether he was pulled off s
22 for another call.
23 Bu t again, as I recall, neither one of us could find 24~
anything that we could factually fault.
25 0
For the record, Mr. Ingra m, I have your two-page h
s i
19 334 02 05 kep MM i
document,.which I believe contains the story prepared by p.
(_)
2 Mr. Benjamin of the AP on Saturday.
3
-I have marked it f or identification as Exhibit 5066.
4
. Would you take a look at it and see, to the best of your 5
knowl edge, if this was the story 'that. he. called you about 6
(handing document to witness ) ?
(Ingrara Exhibit 5066 identified. )
) "
e 8
A (witness examining document)
That looks to me, to V-the oest of my recollection, to be generally similar to what 10 we talked about, yes.
11 0
Do you recall if you indicated to Mr. Benjamin 12 that the time specified as to the critical point that would 13 be reached when the hydrogen level might become a critical 14 proolem would be a matter of two days ?
Did you respond to 13 him on that question as to the imminency of the problem?
16 A
Tne question came up and my recollection is that 1/-
cefore I could say anything about it, Stan said something to 18 the e ff ec t. You did not say that and I'm going to write it 19
-- or something like that.
There was some conversation to 2J that e ffect.
21-0 Did anyone indicate to you who had made that 22 statement?
23 A
No.
24 Bi iAR. FOSTERS 25-0 I would like to back 'up a little bit.
You said i
k.j
20 T334 :02 06 kap MM i
that you. initially received a call from Mr. Fouchard with t'n
()
2 respect to the AP story, and Mr. Fouchard was agitated?
Do 3
you know.htiy he was agitated?
4 A~
I could onlyLguess.
And that would be the 5
apparent impact it was having in the area.
Of course, I - wa s 6
q uite isolated during-this period.
I don't rememoer reading t
a newspaper or listening to a radio, except I may have in 8
the car on the way to or from home, or watching a television 9
program -- f or several days during this period.
10 0
During this first call with Mr. Fouchard, did he li have any instructions specifically for you with respect to 12 this matter?
13 A
To call Stan Benjamin and find out what he had 14 written.
(~s) 15 0
And you called Mr. Benjamin back?
16
.A Yes.
17 0
Could you describe the substance of that 13 conversation with Mr. Benjamin?
19 A
I asked him to read me what he had written.
20 0
And when he read what he had written, at that 21 point in time did it have the two-day time f rame ?
22 A
I do not recall.
No --
23 0
Let me show the initial aavisory bulletin that AP 24 put - o ut in this respect.
Tnis was the initial advisory 25
. oulle tin (handing document to witness ).
[v~
i
!334.'02'07-21 kop MM.
I MR. PAGE:
-For the record, you are now referring
. ;/
\\_/
2 to Exhibit 5066.
3 THE WITNESS:
(Examining accument) Okay, it may 4
have been that Fouchard's first call -- and I cannot swear 5
-to this.
I am not remembering precisely, it may have been-6 cased on this.
When we talk about it, my recollection is
~
t that Stan's story when I first ' called, had not been flushed 8
out.
9 BY MR. PAGE8 10 0
So, again, for the record, you are ref erring to 11 the first page of Exhibit 50667 12 A
I am ref erring to the first page of 05066.
13 0
The second page of the exhibit is the flushed out 14 story?
(~)
A #'
la A
That is my recollection.
16 BY MR. FOSTER:
ll 0
We've had Mr. Fouchard's first phone call with 13 instructions to call Mr. Benjamin back, which you had done.
19 You may have discussed the short advisory bulletin with him 20 at that point in time.
What transpired between this call to 21 Mr. Benjamin and Mr. Fouchard's second phone call?
22 A
As best I can recall, I was taking other telephone 23 calls.
J 24
-Q You didn't have any dialog with any NRC technical 25-staff or your own people, with respect to the AP story,
' {}
v
.v 22 334:-02'08 kcp kN I
then, between Mr. Fouchard's first and second phone call?
A)
(_
2
'A tt's possible but I don't recall. it.
3 0
Then Mr. Fouchard does call back a second time, 4
and he instructs you to have Ed Case --
5 A.
Listen in, and call Benjamin again, and have Ed 6
Case on the line.
i 0
And you did this?
8 A
Yes.
9 0
Could you describe the substance of that phone 10 call with Mr. Benjamin?
11 A
I asked him again to read what he had written.
I 12
. had Ed Case on the line.
I'm pretty sure I must have 13
. identified that, and he went through what is at least i.
14 similar to page two of Exhibit 5066.
15 0
vinat was Mr. Case's response to Mr. Benjamin's 16 reading this story?
17 A
Generally speaking, as be s t I can recall, he could 13 not find anything at fault with it.
19 0
Is that what he responded to Mr. Benjamin?
23 A
I don't recall whether he told Benjamin that, or 21 whether he told me that.
I think he may have made the 22 remark during the phone conversation.
23 0
Ha may -- did he make any remarks to Mr. Benjamin,
.24 that perhaps this was incorrect and he should not go ahead i
25 with the story?
l
23 1334 02 09 kepMM i
A Not to the best of my recollection.
}
'2 0
At the termination of this phone call, what dialog 3
did you have with Mr. Case?
'4 A
I do not recall _ having any.
5 G
At the termination of the phone call, what next trans ired with respect to the AP story?
6 c
/
A So f ar as I can recall, that was the termination, 8
at least so f ar as we were concerned.
3 You didn't receive a third phone call f rom 10 Mr. Benjamin?
11 A
I do not recall receiving a third phone call from 12 Mr. Benjamin.
I won't argue that it's possible.
13 BY MR. PAGE8 14 0
Let me pursue one more thing before we go on to
[T 15 another question.
When you spoke with Mr. Benjamin the 16 first't'ime, and heard generally what he was planning to say, le you indicated at that time, as I understand what you are la saying, that the release appeared to be reasonable, what he 19 was saying appeared to be reasonable.
23 What information had been made available to you up until 21 that time by the Executive Management Team or others as to 22 what the condition of the core was and what the problems
.23
.were with respect to the hydrogen oubble?
Was this 24 something that you had gotten orally, or in writing?
How 23 were you getting your information from the EMT, so that you
.ry L.) '
24
'334 02 10
.k cpMM i
can appropriately respond to press inquiries?
- M
/~
(_j 2
A It was largely based on the responses that were 3
given to the questions in the press center oy Dualey 4
Thompson and Brian Grimes on Friday, and by the Chairman on 5
Saturday.
6 BY MR. FOSTER:
/
0 If I understand you correctly, Mr. Ingram, the 8
basis of the technical knowledge with which you made your 9
advisement to Mr. Benjamin, was your own understanding of 10 the situation, rather than specific instructions from any of 11 the technica'l people ?
12 A
I had no specific instructions, but I had heard 13 what they had said.
14 0
And that formed a casis, again, for your
.C)
\\' -
15 understanding of what that situation was?
16 A
'Yes.
Is Q
Moving on to another question, an article that was 13 written by Peter Sandman and Mary Paden, P-a-d-e-n, in the 19 July-August 1979 i mue of the Columoj a Journalism Review, 20 says something to the effect that they had reviewed an 21 article contained in the Washington Post, wnich stated that 22 NRC " worked hard to make sure mainly reassuring inf ormation 23-would reach the public" following the accident.
24 How would you respond to this assertion?
25 A
I don't recall any effort on our part to do r~s N. !
25
- 334102 11 kapMM i
anything more than -try to answer questions f rom the way (a_)
2 people perceived the situation at -the time.
Daring my 3
interview with the Kemeny Commission, I think I was asked 4
a bout the Co: mission statement of Friday, and if that didn't 5
seem to be an attempt -- I'm not sure if.the words 6
" reassuring the public" were used, out I think the thrust 7
was of that same general nature.
8 BY MR. FOSTER:
9 0
Wnat was the substance of the statement you are 10
. referring to?
11
.A The statement on Friday by the Chairman or the 12 Commission that the probability of a meltdown was very low.
13 And, as I think I may have probably told Dave' Rubin, my 14 perception of that, at least at that point in time, was that 15 it was not a great aeal different from what was being said 16 by members of the technical staff to the news media.
The is wording mignt have oeen different, but the thrust was the IS same.
19 BY MR. PAGE:
23 Q
Do you believe that NRC actions with respect to 21 information releases were prompted oy any underlying effort 22 to protect the nuclear industry?
23 A
Not to the ber' of my knod'. edge.
I really don't 24 Delieve that, no.
26 0
This is something that wr har - nad indicated to us O
L]
26 4334 02l12 kap MM i
by some of the news people, people that we have spoken with,
()
2-and we just wanted to get your response to this.
3-They also indicated they felt that the inf ormation 4
- eleases were prompted by an underlying effort to play down 5
potential radiation hazards from the acciden t.
How would 6
you respond to that part of the assertion?
4 A
I don't believe tha t, in my own view, to be true.
8 O
Mr. Ingram, do you believe that NRC gave timely 9
and correct inf ormation to the media, then?
10 A
To the extent that it was possible and available 11 in that situation, that existed over that period of time, 12 which was, I am sure you are aware, the communications were 13 not good.
I am sure the media will say that we -weren't 14 giving out enough inf ormation.
We probably weren't but to
(--)
15 my recollection we were giving out what we had on a timely 16 bas is.
14 0
Were you making eff orts, you or your office, to 18 obtain current information so that current information could' s
19 be released to the media concerning the accident?
20 A
To the extent that
. was possiole.
Again, it
+
2I was extremely difficult to get current inf ormation that 22 s eemed to be -- that anybody could agree on as being f airly 23 accurate.
.24 0
In retrospect, are you generally satisfied with 25 the number and quality of the public announcements. that NRC
=p)-
i.
I
~
(33402l3 kapkN.
-1 issued following the accident?
'b 2-A Of' the public announcements?
v 3'
O Yes.
4 A
No, I don't think so, but on the other hand, I'm 5
not sure that if you were doing the thing-over again in' the 6
same circumstances you would be able to improve it.
7 BY MR. FOSTER:
8 0
With respect to the three public announcements 9
that were draf ted in the Operations Center Wednesday and 10 then sent over, the f acts, over to your office, did you have 11 any input to these three public statements?
12 A
No, I did not.
13 BY MR. PAGE:
14 0
You testified earlier that Chairman Hendrie had a
-sb '
15 press. conference on Saturday af ternoon, on March 31, I guess 16 that would have Dean.
In some of our talks with the media l/
people, they have -- we were told that they were suspicious 13 when they heard that Chairman Hendrie was going to have his 19 press conference, and that he had had it.
The concern was 20
-that Mr. Denton was at the site and was giving press 21 conferences there as to what was happening at the plant, 22 what NRC was doing, and they looked upon a second news 23 con'ference oeing held in Bethesda as being somewhat 24 suspicious in that possibly diff erent inf ormation was being 25 released away from the site in order to underplay its
/\\
f-
28 334' 02114
-kaphN
'l significance.
. n)
\\,_
2 Have you heard any such thing as-that?
And how would you 3
respond to this?
.4 A
I have not heard that.
There was certainly no 6
thought given to that kind of thing, at least in my own 6
mind.
As I indicated, the Chairman aid indicate his wish 4
' and did talk to Mr. Denton shortly -- just before going 8
upstairs, to make sure that they were not giving disparate 9
information out.
10 I guess I probably was not thinking much about il Pennsylvania because of the pressures from down here.
de 12 still had 40 or 50 or 60 news men up on the fif th floor, 13 hollering and screaming for information.
And we were trying 14 our best to help them out.
And, as I have already k-15 indicated, there was also this continuing pressure to have a 16 member of the Commission say something, and that had to be il down here.
18 0
Were you generally satisfied with the number and 19 manner in which NRC press conferences were held?
I 20.
recognize you were not up at t he s i t e -- I celieve that's 21 corre ct s is it not?
22 A
Yes, sir.
23 0
So you can only speak, I guess, with personal 24 knowledge, of what transpired in Bethesda.
But, in 23 retrospect, would you have preferred having more news
' t"3 tv!
29
'/334 02 15-p kapNN
- I conferences than were held?
/%
'(_)
2 A
In retrospect, I think the answer would be yes.
-3 BY MR. FOSTER:
4
~0
-Would 'you have also, in hindsight, then, had them 3
earlier in Bethesda?
5 A
I don't -- I guess I really even in hindsight
' -~
7 can't answer that question, because f or the first two days a
I was operating in Maryland National, which was a totally 9
diffe rent situation f rom East-West.
I guess I really don't 10 know, on that point.
11 BY MR. PAGE:
'12 0
In light of the TMI experience, how do you believe 13 NRC can improve its effectiveness in communicating with the 14 news media?
n
15' A
one, I see the need to have one or two technical 16 people assigned to the office of Puolic Affairs here in the Il Maryland National Bank Building, to at least give guidance 13-on answering questions, or to help with answering questions.
19 BY MR. FOSTER:
20 0
On a full-time basis?
21 A
At least during periods like that beginning on 22 Wednesday, March 28th.
I would have to even extend it to 23 continuing for a couple of weeks thereafter.
But my 24 preference would be -- and I doubt if it would ever be 23 po ssi ble, since'this is Washington, and so f orth -- would be
. (3 LI
30 7334-02 16
~
'~ kap MM l-
-to. move the whole public aff airs operation totally out of 3m,/.
2 Washington, to the site -- and not do anything here at all.
3 0
What's' the basis f or that thought, Mr. Ingram?
4 A
I guess.the basis f or it is my experience with the 5
old AEC plowshare program where there were a few peaceful 6
nuclear explosive tests conducted away from the Nevada test t
site in Mississippi and New Mexico and so forth.
But in 3
essence, where the whole operation or public aff airs 9
organization or whatever it was called at the time, was 10 lif ted out of Las Vegas to the site, nobody was calling Las 11 Vegas or as f ar as I know -- very much into Washington.
It 12 was all centered there.
13 O
And in these instances that proved to be efficient 14 Irom a public affairs point of view?
15 A
Yes, it did.
I must add, though, you're not -
16 acting under a crisis situation in those respects, so it may 17 not be fair to assess them totally that way.
18 BY MR. PAGE:
11 0-Some of the people we have spoken with who were at 20 the site or in the Middletown area, have indicated that they 21 had a somewnat different perspective on the significance of 22 events that were taking place at the plant, than people who 23 sta/ed behind in Bethesda.
24 Is this one reason why you would suggest that the news 25-center establish in the regional office or close to the b
m)
31 334 02 17 kap MM i
site --- would be Detter than - being established in Bethesda, O
(_j 2
following an-accident?
-3 A
I think you must have a better f eel for puolic 4
affairs problems and so forth if you are actually there, 5
than you can possibly have from Washington, would be my 5
view.-
Although' again, I point out I wasn't there, so I'm sort of looking at it with blinders on.
4 8
Secondly, you.would have a division of resources which makes it difficult to operate as eff ectively as you might, 10 at le ast from my point of view, down here.
11 BY MR. FOSTER:
1.
On this same subject, were you at all involved in 13 decision-making to have all statements coming from the NRC 14 come from the site?
/~T
\\#
15 A
No, I was not.
16 0
Do you have an understanding of how that decision 17 was made?
13 A
I do not.
That decision was made, as far as I 19 know, at some time late at night or early in the morning on 20 Sunday.
21 I went home on Saturday night -- Sunday morning -- I 22 think I didn't get home until 3:30.
At that point, I had 23 been working from 6:30 or 7:00 in the morning until 11:00 or 24 11:30 on Wednesday and Thursday, until some time well.af ter 25 midnight on Friday.and Saturday, and I got up Saturday O
32 334 02 01-kap MM i
-morning, was shaking so bad and so tired out, that I just
)
2 could. not physically make it in.
And I finally got up and 3
called.the center aoout 10:30 or thereabouts, to say I would 4
be in at noon.
-5 And I think at that point Mr. Gossick told me the 5
-decision had been made to center all activities at 7
Miculetown.
o 8
BY MR. PAGE:
9 0
You had not heard that, then, before leaving the 10 Incident Response Center on Saturday night?
11 A
No.
12 0
In reading the Incident Response Center tapes, it 13 appears that a call was received late Saturday night from 14 someone indicating that it would be oest to have the public 15 releases be made from a single location, and then, as we 16-undarstand it, the decision was made later on that it would 1s be oest to have the releases made from the site because they 18 were closer to the problem there, and could speak more 19 currently as to' events taking place.
23 Is that what you were told by Mr. Gossick on Wednesday 21
-- on Sunday, rather?
Did he indicated to you the casis for 22 the decision?
23 A
No, he did not, so far as I can recall.
I left 24 the Center. around midnight or some time thereaf ter on 25 Saturday night, and came back over to our of fice of public s-l
33
{3340202
. kap K4
.I aff airs in Maryland National, and stayed for only a couple
'b-2 of hours.
3-0 I think we were interrupted when you were telling 4
us 'the steps that might be taken to improve NRC's 5
eff ec tiveness in communicating with the news media.
6 Did you have other things to add to what you already
/
said?
8 A
Ye s.
I'll add one thing.
I think one of the 9
major difficulties that we encountered here in Bethesda, 10 trying to do our job, is the split location.
If we had had 11
-- well, Joe was at the Operations Center -- even af ter I 12 got there, if we had had all our people in one building, 13 where we could have communicated with each other more 14 effectively without having to use phone lines which were
~
f,s U
15 totally jammed up, I think it would have made a di.fference, 16 too.
l/
J Okay.
For the record, what you are referring to 18 is that your office is located in the Maryland National Bank 19 Building and the Incident Response Center is located several 23 blocks away at the East-West Towers, and the communication, j
21 as you are indicating, was difficult, just oetween the two 1
22 buildings, cecause of the influx of calls.
23 A
Tnat's correct.
It might have even made a 2:4 difference -- I haven't really thought aoout it -- to have 23 the commissioners in the same locar. ion.
- (^\\
.L]
34
$34:G2 03 k ap.M'd 1
0 Do you have any other-suggestions f or improvement?
O 4,/ -
2 A
I really have not had an opportunity to think-3 about it all that much.
4 0-What do you think might be done for the future to 5
lessen the impact of public demands placed on the NRC for 6
information?
Is this something that you think should 7
perhaps be controlled in a better manner than it was 3
f ollowing the TMI incident?
Or do you think the impact f rom 9
Jublic requests for information did not have a significant 10 impact on NRC operations at the time?
11 A
I am not sure I understand the thrust of your 12 q ue s t ion.
13 0
Tne point that I am trying to get at is whether or 14 not you celieve that the large public demanJ placed on the
'/
15 NRC. f ollowing the accident had any adverse impact on the 16 ability of the NRC to respond to the accident itself ?
Il A
Not that I am aware of.
It may have impacted, in 18
- a. sense, that from the of fice of puolic af fairs in the 19 Maryland National Bank Building, you might have been able to 20 pursue information a little more aggressively, but you
'21 simply didn't have time to because of the volume of 22 inqui rie s.
Whether that.would have made a diff erence, I 23-
. don't know, becauss I still maintain the view that the
~24 information was sketchy and somewhat confused, at bes t.
23 0
Did you observe following the accident.a large
'N
_.)
r
35 D34J02 04 kap MM 1
involvement by members of the Executive Management Team, in f
s-
-1_). _
2 responding to puolic inquiries that-would have detracted 3
f rom their_ management decision involvement that they had to 4
take care of ?
5
.A I did not observe it of my own --- myself.
When I 6
was in the operations center, I was trying to field media
/
calls that came in there.
Now,- there were a lot of people 8
-in and out of there and around the ouilding, so to what 9
extent other people may have been taking calls f rom the 10 media, I don't know.
Il O
During the time that you were in the Incident 12 Response Center, f ollowing Mr. Fouchard's departure from the 13 site, who wire you officially reporting to?
14 A
Mr. Gossic k.
)
13 0
Mr. Gossick?
16 A
Or whoever was acting in his place.
It 0
Looking back on what transpired following the 13.
accident, how good do you believe NRC's emergency planning
- _as, prior to the accident, to assure that the news media 19 w
23 would be kept promptly and e ff ec tively informed?
Do you 21 celieve-that the planning was adequate before the accident?
22 A
Probably not.
Although I am not sure, in my own 23
-mind, that any amount of planning would have been acequate, 24 because of the n 'ure of this accident.
When we had talked 2l2 accidents oefore, at least I-had always conceived of a pipe p:
\\j.
36 c)34.02 05-kap MM i
breaking things going whoosh, and the consequences sort of
~2 being immediately apparent.
This didn't come about that 3
way.
4-BY MR. FOSTER:
5 0
Could you be a little more specific on where you 6
felt some of the inadequacies were?
/
(Pause.)
8 A
de certainly were not prepard to cope with the 9
numoer of media and public inquiries that we received, and I 10 am still trying to assess in my own mind whether you. could 11 ever be prepared -- you could be prepared, but whethe r the 12 cost-benefit ratio, how that would work out, to have the 13 number of telephones and the people that we could have 14 used.
de have nine or 10 telephone lines into our of fice.
O' 15 Pie probably could have used 100, and whether you can 16 maintain that kind of preparedne ss, if you will, for what 17 hopef ully is an infrequent kind of situation, I don't know.
13 Then if you have the equipment, you have to have the people 19 to answer it.
2]
It is certainly obvious that we need some kind of 21 portable f a ility to move to a site which will have 22 communications equipment, typewriters and that kind of 23 thing.
de have talked about the necessity of NRC purchasing 24
~such, althougn in-some conversations I have had since then I 25 understand that there is such an animal out here at Andrews l
[^q >}
37 334 02 06 ~
-. kap M%
1 Air Force Base, and in a similar kind of communications 2
center pod at the Nevada test site.
3
-B( MR. PAGE:
4 Q
(iho manages those?
Is this DOD?
5 A
DOE, I believe, at least the one at Nevada is.
6' Now the one at Andrews, whether it's DOE or DOD, I don't
~
e know.
8 Q
Have you explored the possible use of those l
9 facilities oy NRC in an emergency?
l 10 A
Not formally.
The informal indications I have had l
11 is that they would be available to us.
12 a
13
.)
14.
l a.
16 le IS 12 23 21 22 23 24 f
25 j
(~)
u, i
\\'
[~
p
~
38 334 03-01 pv MM l.
10 Would you tell us what' you might have heard f
2 f ollowing tne accident concerning any plan of NRC to taka 3
- over direct operation of the TMI plant?
4 A
I heard nothing.
.5-0 On one of the IRC tapes a call was received from a 6
reporter who called to say that he had heard that the 7
licensee had threatened.to withdraw its personnel from the 8
site if HRC attempted to direct plant operation.
Did you
?
hear anything about that incoming call?
10 A
Nothing, to the best of my recollection.
11 0
Did you hear anything on Wednesday morning, the 12 day of the accident, March 28, of any possiole need for NRC 13 to recommend an evacuation from around the TMI site?
14 A
No.
("s) 16 0
Did you hear any evacuation discussions on 16 Thurs day?
1, A
To the oest of my recollection, I heard nothing 15 a bout evacuation until Friday.
19 0
Until Friday?
20 A
Ye s.-
21 0
What about on Saturday or Sunday, did you hear any 22 conve rsations about the neea for evacuation on those days?
23 A
I can recollect talking oriefly with John Davis at 24 some time on.Saurday evening, when he said something to the 2a effec t that the commission had asked for something like
()
s-t
39 334 03 02' pv ' MM i
evacuation planning, pieces of paper.to oe. drawn up p)-_
overnight. and ready for consideration early that morning, or
(,
2 3
the next morning.
4 0
Yes.
I believe this was the request by 5
Commissioner Gilinsky for NRC to prepare a planning document 6
of what to do if certain events took place?
l' A
Ye s.
8 0
Did you hear anything else about evacuation 9
recommendations?
10 A
I don't recall anything more.
As I recall, that li conversation was cut off because I was called to the phone 12 or John was called to the phone.
I don't recall going into 13 it in any more detail than that.
14 0
With respect to tne discussions on Friday O'
-15 regarding evacuation, can you tell us what. involvements you 16 had with those discussions?
It A
I don't recollect any direct involvement.
My la recollection is that I heard or was told sometime af ter I 19 arrived in the emergency response center that the chairman 23 had recommended to the governor the precautionary five-mile 21 evacuation.
That's the first thing I recall hearing.
22 O
You had not heard anything before arriving at the 23 emergency response center?
21
'A No.
Not oefore getting over to east-west.
2a 0-Were you personally involved in any way in efforts
.h
- L/
40
'334 03 03 pv MM '
I to keep the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania informed concerning
'()
2 the accident recovery actions or-potential radiatio hazards?
3 A
I don't oelieve so.
4 0
Were you involved in any conversations with 3-repre sentatives of other federal agencies, such as the 6
Department of Energy, EPA, and DCPA --. De fense Civil 4
Preparedness Agency?
8 A
Only the DOE public aff airs people who were 9
assisting us during that period of time, to the best of my 10 knowledge.
11 0
You were not involved then in any way in 12 coordinating the assistance e ffor ts that were being provided 13 oy DOE 7 14 A
I don't believe so.
/]
\\-
15 0
Would you tell us what contac;s you had with the 15 White House following the accident?
Had you spoken with 17 anyone at the White House before Friday?
18 A
Not to my recollection, unless possibly Fouchard 19 haa asked me to read 'one-or more of those Tnursday public 20 announcements to the White House press office, and I do not 21 recall whetner that took place or not.
22 I 'have only read one piece of transcript f rom the 23 opera tions center tapes, and that one happened to de shortly 24 af ter I arrived over there on Friday, and I f ound that I did 25' h ave a conversation with Jody Powell at that time, which I
(~v)
}
41
{.3340304 pv MM i
did not recall at all.
()
2 0
This was on Friday?
3 A
This was on Friday.
4 0
Do you recall what the suostance of the 5
conve rsation was, based on your reading of the transcript?
6 A
Basically, it was a matter of Powell getting ready
' ~
s for the noon oriefing at the White House, and the general S
thrust of it was did we have any problems with saying that 9
Denton was on his way to the area or would be on his way to 10 the area, and I allowed as how I didn't see any problem with 11 that.
So nothing should be hidden or needed to be.
12 There was some conversation about additional -- do we 13 need nelp, additional helps and I alloweo,es how we could 14 use some, ye s.
b,_'
13 O
Did the subject come up concerning the possible 15 use of the White House communications system to improve 17 communications from the site, to and from the site?
18 A
Not to my knowledge, at that point.
19 0
Did you have later discussions with him on this 20 ma tte r?
21 A
At some point in time, the following week, which I 22 would guess was early on, Joe called me from up there and l
23 asked me to call I think it as Walt derfel of the '# nite 2r House press office and see if I could get them to get a 25 mult, one of these deals that you can plug in lots of
~,
42 314 03 05 pv MM i
microphones so you don't have a whole gob of them sitting on 2
the podium.
)
3 0
Do you know if NRC requested the White House to 4
provide its communications system, or did the White House 5
simply offer the use of it to NRC?
6 A
I don't know the answer to that one.
a -
i O
Did you have other conversations with anyone in 8
the White House af ter the conversation that you just told us 9
about?
10 A
None that I recall, although I cannot foreclose 11 that possiollity.
12 Q
Do you recall who was principally responsible for 13 communicating with the White House in this time period?
My impression was it was the commission.
14 A
)
x' 13 J
Tne commission directly.
15 You mentioned a oriefing at the White House on Friday at le noontime?
13 A
Oh, that is the usual practice of the White House 19 press office, to have a press briefing at noon on a daily 20 oasis.
21 2
To your knowleoge, was anyone from the NRC asked 22 to attend that?
23 A
Not to my knowledge, no.
24 BY MR. FOSTER:
25 O
Do you have any appreciation for now the cecision 4
I 4
43
{334 03 06 pv MM i
was reached for Metropolitan Edison to discontinue gf ving
_)
2 public statements on plant status?
3 A
I do not.
All I know is what Joe Fouchard nas 4
told me.
a O
And what did Mr. Fouchard tell you?
6 A
To the effect that it was a mutual agreement.
4 0
A mutual agreement between who?
8 A
Be tween the NRC and Metropolitan Edison.
9 BY MR. PAGE:
10 0
I gather from your answer, then, that you have no 11 personal knowledge concerning any initiatives by the NRC to 12 get Met Ed to stop naving pre ss conf erences in f avor of 13 relying upon NRC as the sole spokesman at the site?
Are you 14 aware of any such -
,~
~
15 A
All I can tell you is just what I said before, is 16 what Joe has told me.
It was a catter of mutual agreement.
Il Q
dare you involved in any of the NRC coordination 13 activities with congressional offices following the 19 a cc id ent?
23 A
Only by accident, that I can recall.
I do not 21 even rememoer what day this was when a group of congressmen 22
-- I guess this is not even really WRC involvement --
23 appeared in the loboy on the third floor, see king -- I think 24 it may in fact have been Sunday.
I think maybe the press 25 center was still opent I don't recall it at the moment, at 9
44 334 03 07 pv MM i
least.
Nobody from UCA was available.
I was asked to go
()
2 out and greet them, which I did.
And I think at that point, 3
Carl Kemmerer arrived at the scene.
4 0
Do you recall how large the. delegation was?
5 A
Not specifically.
It mt. nave been like seven or 6
eight.
But that's strictly-a --
3'-
7 0
Do you recall any of the names of.the congressmen?
3' A
No, I do not.
0 Ware they actually cor.gressmen, or were they 10 staf f s from congressional offices?
11 A
My impression was that they. were congressmen.
I 12 may oe totally wrong on that, but that's my impression.
13 0
Wnat was your understanding of their purpose for 14 coming to the center?
.O 15 A
I think they were looking f or information.
16 0
Were you involved in any way with the arrangements I/
being made for the congressional delegations that went to 18 the site?
19 A
No.
23 BY MR. FOSTER:
21 0
During the first couple of days when you were 22 working out of your office in the Maryland National Bank 23 build ing, I gather there was quite an influx of telephone 24 calls'from the media?-
23 A
Tnat's correct.
I
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A5 334'03 08 pv : NN 1
0 And you could only answer so many.
Could you tell fi
(,/
2 me wnat your selection criteria was for which telephone 3
calls you would personally answer?
4 A
By mid-day on Wednesday, it was taking the yellow 5
slip that was on the top of the list.
There was no way to 6
sort through them.
It would have taken you half an hour to b -
/
go through what had collected there.
It kept building.
3 0
What would you do then when people would call in 9
and specifically request you?
10 A
I don't know what the girls were doing.
I think, 11 you know, they just were finally saying "Everybody is on the 12 phone."
Some people would hold for a considerable length of 13 time and maybe never get through.
14 The only occasion I really remember is sometime during f.
\\-
15 that period, finally taking a minute to go to the John, l
16 coming back in, and one of the gals saying, "You have a 1/
phone call," and it was a reporter, I don't remember who, 18 saying who it was, saying, "I can't oelieve it."
And I 19 said, "You just made it by accident."
23 fnere is no way -- I remember the first night I tried to 21 sort out ana save the phone calls that we had not gotten 22 returned, and I did that, and the next morning there was
-23 never even a chance to start those call-cacks.
And by 24 Thursday night, by the time we quit, we just dumped them, 25 because there was no way.
i
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.(_/
334 03LO9' pv MM * -
l
~0 Did you have any contact with any of the personnel
()_
f rom ' Metropolitan Edison or' the general public?
2 3
A No.
4 0
Wednesday morning, in any of~the discussions that 5
you may have had with Mr. Abraham, did you.have any 5
instructions for him with respect to his going to the 7
governor's office?
8 A
.1s may have discussed him going to the site.
I 9
aidn' t give him any instructions, and I don't recall the 10 governor's office being mentioned at all.
11
~0 Did you remember any dialog that you may have had 12 witn him with respect to participating or not participating 13 in a joint news conference with Metropolitan Edison?
14 A
I don't remember that we had any such O\\~/
15 conversation.
16 0
Did you receive any instructions f rom Mr. Fouchard 17 with respect to any advisements that you should make to 18 Mr. A braham on media contacts he should or should not have?
19 A
On media contacts?
20 0
Ye s.
21 A
No.
22 0
Do you remember-receiving a call f rom the CBS 23 Northeast Bureau chief ~ requesting that Mr. Abraham oe made 24 available at the site to CB5 News?
I Ei A
I 'do not recall such a call.
That's not saying k
t, /
n e, - - -
n
+
r,
,,,e--
47
$34 03 10 pv W4 i
that I did not get one.
()
2 0
Wnat would your position have been if you had 3
received such a call?
4 A
Did you say to participate with Metropolitan 5
Edison Company in a press conference?
6 Q
No, the call from CBS News would have been just to i
have Mr. Abraham made available to answer questions by CBS 8
News.
9 A
At the site?
10 0
Yes.
11 A
I guess -- and I am looking at this purely in 12 hinds ight -- is that if it had been on Wednesday --
13 0
I believe the call was Thursday, if indeed it was la made.
15 A
I don't recall.
Wnen did Carl go to the site?
16 0
On Wednesday.
II A
Madnesday night.
I think my view would have oeen 18 to leave it up to Carl's judgment cased on whatever else was 19 going on up there, to assess the relative importance of that 20 versus whatever else he may have been doing.
21 0
I see.
If Mr. Abraham haa requested instruction 22 witn respect to whether or not to participate jointly ir a 23 press conference with Metropolitan Edison, what would you 24 have advised Mr. Abraham?
25 A
I suspect I would have advised against it.
48 D34 03 11 pv MM i
0 Way would you have.made such an advisement?
I 2
A As a regulatory agency, it's been our general 3
practice that we do not participate with licensees in these 4
kinds of things.
Very of ten -- and I don't need to speak of 5
a situation like Three Mile Island -- a licensee's 6
perspective of things is different from our perspective, and 1
I think it is important to preserve our independence, in d
that sense of the word, not seeming to at le ast collude, if 9
you will.
10 0
In view of the events at Three Mile Island, do you 11 still hold this opinion?
12 A
I think generally speaking, yes.
13 0
Tnank you.
14 BY MR. PAGE:
~
I
'l
\\v
15 0
I oelieve that we have completed all of the 16 specific que stions that we had for you today, Mr. Ingram.
1/
Before closing the record, though, I did want to asK a la couple of general questions.
19 Do you have any additional information that you celieve 23 mignt be pertinent to this inquiry that has not come out 21 through our earlier questions ?
22 A
Nothing that comes to mind.
23 J
Is there anything else that you would like to say 24 for the record oefore we close it?
25 A
I can't think of anything.
49 334 03 12 pv MM i
MR. PAIGE:
In conclusion, let me indicate that
/i,)
2 this is an ongoing investigation, and although we have 3
completed tne questions that we hava for you today, we may
./
4 need to bring you back for f urther.depositi6n.
We w!11,
'r 5
however, make every e ffort to avoid having to do so.
6 I will now recess this deposition, rather than terminate 1
it.
8 I wish to thank you for your time an being with us here 9
today.
10 THE WIINESS:
Thank you.
11 (Whereupon, at 102 30 a.m., the hearing was 12 adjou rned. )
13 14
,s N
l5 16 9
l' 18 l9 23 21 22 23 24 22