ML19308C434
| ML19308C434 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Crane  |
| Issue date: | 09/18/1979 |
| From: | Dienelt J, Ross M METROPOLITAN EDISON CO., NRC - NRC THREE MILE ISLAND TASK FORCE |
| To: | |
| References | |
| TASK-TF, TASK-TMR NUDOCS 8001240584 | |
| Download: ML19308C434 (75) | |
Text
._.
' ql e 2.:
T u
4 i
O i
i N U CL E A R R E G U L ATO R'l CO MMI S S!C N i
l O
I I
I l
i j
IN THE MATTER OF:
l l
THREE MILE ISLAND SPECIAL INQUIRY DEPOSITION l
DEPOSITION OP:
MICHAEL J.
ROSS P00R ORIB K 1
Place.
MIDDLETOWN, PA.
j Date -
September 18, 1979 Pages 1 - 75 l
L O
Telechone:
(202) 347-37C0 i
ACE - FEDERAL REPORTERS,INC.
OfficialRepor:ers 444 North Ccpitol Stree 0 012 <1 og Washington, D.C. 2000 NADONWIDE COVERAGE. DAILY
JS4886 1
.nb l
CR7096 1
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA b'
/
2
X 3
BEFORE:
f]
4 NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION THREE MILE ISLAND 5
SPECIAL INQUIRY GROUP 6
X 7
Oral D2 position of MICIIAEL J. ROSS 8
APPEARANCES :
9 BROWNSTEIN, ZEIDMAN & SCIIDMER BY:
JOHN F. DIENELT, ESQ.
10 1025 Connecticut Ave., N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20036 11 For - Nuclear Regulatory Commission Special Inquiry Group 12 GEORGE FRAMPTON, ESQ r
13,
For - Nuclear Regulatory Commission
(
l Special Inquiry Group 14 PITTMAN, POTTS & TROWBRIDGE 15 BY:
DELISSA A. RIDGWAY, ESQ, 1800 M.
St., N.W.
16 Washington, D.C. 20036 17 ALSO PRESENT:
Ronald Haynes
- rM :""
P00RORGIBL 19 TAKEN AT:-
20 Three Mile Island
- Tuesday, 2;
Middletown, Pa.
September 18, 1979, at 2 :00 p.m.
bN 22 23 y
25 i
Mousca s?t woonaPaesc sepvict, sai3 CLo MsLL nomo. wwouessimo. PA nos'o
la-INREX l
2-WITNESS :
EXAMINED BY:
PAGE 3
Michael J. Ross Mr. Frampton 2, 38 Mr. Ha ynes 29 4
Mr. Dienelt 63 5
6 E X.I.I..I B I T S.
Marked 8
No. 3027 - Resume of Michael J. Ross 73
?
10 11 12
- O a
15 16 17 18 19 20 21 0
23 J,O-25 i
MONiCN Sf f 40Gna PMIC SERVsC E.
tot a OLD MetL moaO, wvoMISSING. PA $9410 N
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2 1
PESCEEElESE 2
' MICIIAEL J. ROSS, sworn L
- 3 BY MR. IIAYNES:
4 Q
Picase state your full name for the record.
5 A
Michael J. Ross, R-o-s-s.
6 MR. FRAMPTON:
This is a deposition Scing taken by 7
the Nucicar Regulatory Commission's Special Inquiry Group 8
on ihree _ Mile Island at ihree Mile Island, Pennsylvania, on 9
-September 18, 1979 of Mr. Michael Ross of Met-Ed, 10 Present in addition to the witness are John 11 Dienelt, Ron Ilaynes, Paul Murray and Pete Sicilia and George 12 Frampton all of the Special Inquiry Group.
""^""' ":
O 14 Q
Mr. Ross, you have in front of you a one-page 15 witness notification form that explairs the purpose and 16 authority of the Special Inquiry Group and your rights in 17 connection with this interview, llave you read that and do
~
~
'18 you unders tand it?
19 A
.I have read it.
20 Q.
As I said to you before we began, we do have the 21-
-benefit of having read the transcript of the interviews 22 conducted with you by the NRC's I&E inspectors in their
]
23
' a cc ident investigation and the transcripts of depositions taken of; you by staff of the President 's ' Commission and we 24-A-
25'-
will try.not to duplicate all that material..
o.o...........e..... u..... m., u.o... m o.... ~.. ~.....
3
~1 llave you had an opportunity to review the
]
2 transcripts of those interviews and depositions?
3 A
I have reviewed them on occasion.
(]
4 Q
You have reviewed them in the past?
5 A
That's right.
6 Q
Based on your review, were the answers that you 7
gave to the questions asked during those interviews and 8
depositions subs tantially accurate?
9 A
They were.
10 Q
Mr. Ross, a t the time of the accident, I believe 11 you were the supervisor of operations for Unit 1, is that 12 correct?
13 A
That's correct.
14 Q
What previous experience have you had, official 15 res ponsibilities, in connection with Unit 2 and during what 16 time pcr.iod ?
17 A
Previous to becoming supervisor of operations of 18 Unit 1, I was a shif t supervisor for the station.
That meant 19 I worked and exercised licensed res ponsibilities in Unit 2.
20 left everyday contact with Unit 2 in January of
-21 1978, at which time I was promoted to supervisor of operations O
22 for Unit 1.
O
'23 Q
Prior to January of 1978, how long had you been (7
24 shift supervisor with res ponsibilitics in both units ?
QJ 25 A
I became shift supervisor -- I was one of the o ~,c... ~ o......c.,.. c....., oi o, u...... m o....m.........
4 I
original shift supervisors at the station.
The date of that
({}
2 is about July,1972 when I made it for station supervisor.
3 Q
You were originally licensed on Unit I and then
(')
4
. cross-licensed on Unit 2?
5 A
That is correct.
6 Q
When you got your cross-license, did you take any 7
oral examination to get the second half of the cross-license?
8 A
I did not.
9
-Q You just took a written exam administered by the 10 company, is that correct?
11 A
That is correct.
12 Q
Do you remember whether your training for your
}
cross-license primarily stressed plant differences between 13 14 the two units?
15 A
They primarily stressed plant differences, the 16 forma l tra ining.
17 Q
Would you say, based on your experience in being 18 cross-licensed, that the training -- the minimum training 19 and test requirements that are imposed for the cross-20 license require a person to be as familiar with the second 21 plant as he or she had to be with the initial plant?
O("N 22 A
The actual training itself, is that what you are 23 referring to?
24 Q
Whatever the minimum training is, the test -require-
~
r 25 ments that are imposed by the NRC.
In other words, do you
]
....c. m.......
.....c..
m ato u..o... mo.....,.....
5 t
1 t :nk given the minimum requirementa that the NRC imposes,
{}
2 that a person can get away with being a lot less familiar 3
with uhe second unit than when a person 'gets cross-licensed?
O 4
^
t setteve te te noseinte, yes.
5 Q
What about the actual training that you went 6
through that was provided by the company here, do you think 7
that was designed to make a person as familiar with the 8
second plant as with the first?
9 A
I think it was.
I think there is a portion that is 10 not listed as formal training.
Every shift actually goes 11 out and starts systems up, traces it out.
They actually 12 review operating procedures.
I think that goes a long
(
13 way towards learning.
I think that is a pa rt that doesn't 14 show up any place.
I think it does tend to make you more 15 fa milia r.
16 Q
Could you get a cross-license as far as the NRC 17 required test is concerned without going through a lot of 18 that kind of informal training?
19 A
It would be possible.
20 Q
Prior to January of 1978, did you have some actual 21 operating experience on Unit 2 during the testing or the (u'Y 22 period prior ~ to fuel loading and so forth?
23 A
_ I d id.
I was active in the start-up program which Q-24 included hydros, flushings, starting up the system.
W 25 Q
How did you learn of the trip.on bb rch.28,1979 o..a.u.......c.....u...om.,u..................
A 6
1 and when did you first arrive here at the plant?
['i 2
A I first heard it at 4:35 in the morning when I r) 3 received a call from my shift foreman on' Unit L saying that O
+
uate 2 had ertpged and thee we had test heat tng se_ fre.
5' Unit 2.
6 Unit 1, at the time, was in the process of being 7
heated up in preparation for going critical af ter refucting 8
that day, llo told me, a t tha t t ime, the shift supervisor 9
from Unit 1. wa s in fa c t in UniE 2 and he didn't report any-to thing abnormal; just that he had a problem in Unit I whero 11 he didn't have heating steam and we a re going to have to 12 feed with the emergency steam pumps on Unit 1 because wo 13 didn 't have a good (guality water going into the steam 14 genera tors.
15 Q
So you were being notified not to assist somebody 16 in Unit 2 because this had ramifications for Unit 1 that
- 17 affocted the operatton of the unit which you were responsible 18-for?
19 A
That is correct.
20 Q
What happened next ?
21
'A I dtscussed for some time with the sh Lft foreman O
"" "t d 4 "
" "t"'rx
"'" t
"" "' '=
23 generator icvel s ontrol in Unit 1.
-O 24 At that time I got up and ato breakfast and came i
J A'
25 to work.
. I wa s in no particular hurry. -
..............e...m......m..a..........~o.
7 1
-Q What time did you arrive here on the site and get 2
.to the Unit 1 control room, if that is where you went?
3 A
I am not sure what time I arrived on site.
O I think it was somewhere around 5:30, twenty to 6:00.
I 4
5 did go directly to the Unit ~ 1 control room.
6 Q
What did you Icarn when you arrived at the Unit 1 7
control room?
8 A
I icarned nothing about Unit 2.
I immediately 9
engaged in looking at the Unit'l problem and discussing with 10 the shift foreman where we should go from here in attempting 11 to reestablish feed water heating to Unit 1.
12 Q
Was the shif t foreman the senior person in Unit 1 13 when you arrived?
b, 14 A
Ile was.
15 Q
Who was that?
16 A
Bill Siuglitz.
17 Q
Did he communicate to you in-any sense of Unit 2 18 is -continuing to have a substantial problem?
19
'A lie did not.
~
20 g
When was the first time that you realized there 21 were some continuing problems in Unit 2 or were called to 22 respond to those problems?
23 A
I received a call over the page from Bill Zewe 24
.saying that he was in need of some assistance and would I 25 please come;ta Unit 2.
MONaca grt NOGnaPHec SthwtCt, tal, OLO MeLL seOAO, WTOMetteNG. P A. 966tO
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8 1
Q Do you remember what time that was?
(]
2 A
I do not.
I feel it was somewhere between 6 :00 3
and 6 :20.
g U
4 Q
Can you go ahead and tell us what happened when 5
you got over thoro?
6 A
When I went to Unit 2 I still had no sense of 7
urgency to get there.
He didn't express anything particular 8
Ilke, "Como right this minute," but the fact that he asked 9
me, I knew he was concerned about something so I did go.
10 When I got to Unit 2, I found, basically, no 11 reactor coolant pumps running, and basically the beginning 12 of a big problem.
]
13 Q
If you could put yourscif back in that position, 14 what kind of an assessment did you make when you arrived 15 about the status of the plant in Unit 2?
16 A
Well, when I walked in it was tough to datormine 17
_ what was going on.
It takes a littic while to walk around 18
'and to determine the situation the plant is in and that is 19 what I was doing.
20 Q
Was that what Mr. Zowe asked you to do;, basically 21 take a look and tell me what you think?
Q 22 A
Ye s.
23 Q
To see what we got?
A 24 A
Yes, a nd tha t is what I was working on when we ch 25 heard the first radiation a larms.
f i
on.cn ovemoanarme senwice. tais oto wtt mono wromssimo na imo
9 1
Q Do you recall when you arrived whether the I)
2 pressurizer relief valve had been -- or the block valves,
L~s 3
had been closed on the relief valve?
()
4 A
Right after I got there they were discuss ing that.
5 I kind of feel it was shut at about the same time I walked 6
in; that is why I say it was shut around 6 :20 in the morning.
7 Q
What do you recall about the. circumstances of it 8
being shut at the time you came into the control room?
Do 9
you have a recollection of what happened?
10 A
The thing I recall is that someone said, "Yes, 11 the valve was open."
12 They sa id, "We miss ed it.
It was opened.
The r-13 valve is shut now. "
It is a kind of regulation when we 0'
14 increase pressure in the plant.
I did see a few things that 15 I didn't like.
I did have some conversation with Bill Zewe 16 about emergency boration and about emergency injection.
Wh' n you say you saw some things you didn't like, 17 Q
e 18 was one of those things the low boron??
19 A
I saw an increase in the source range indication 20 that I didn't like right after I walked in.
Tha t was one 21 of the things that caught my eye.
22 Right af ter I saw that. I stepped across the line
{}
23 and asked Bill if he was injecting and was the emergency r^S 24 borated, and he assured me he was doing_ both.
T/
25 Q
Your recollection is then that with respect to MONtCR Sf thCON APHIC St4WICE, 1413 OLO MILL RO AO. W TOMISSING, P A.
19410 t
10 I
closing the block valve on the pressurizer relief valve, "s
2 that. shortly a fter that was donc people realized that the
-(d 3
relief valve itself taust have been opened, is that correct ?
(')
4 A
I think they had the feeling it mus". ve been 5
opened.
6 Q
Prior to the time Fk. Miller arrived in the 7
control room, did you and Mr. Zewe a nd. Mr. Kunder -- he was 8
there at that time, was he not?
9 A
Kunder was there before I came in.
10 Q
Did the three of you or anyone else sort of gath2r 11 together and make any assessment of what was happening after 12 that block valve was closed or did the alarms start going 13 off at that point?
d(~s 14 A
within a short period of time they started receiving 15 alarms.
I did not have the chance -- I talked to Bill on 16 and off but I didn't have a chance to regroup and pull back 17 and make an assessment of where we are with Zewe and with 18 Kunder.
.t 19 Q
Were there any other things that you saw that 20' you were concerned about, as you put it, when you came into 21 the control room and were in the process of looking over
' (')
22 the situation, things that concerned you right away?
v 23 A-Nothing concerned me as much as the increase p
24 in the source ranges.
LJ -
25-Q Were there any other things down the line that MONtCit ef tN00n APHIC Samv'CE. t elt OL D MILL ROAD. w f 0MittING P A.
teele k.m
E 11 I
concerned you?
2 A
Nothing right that minute.
Later on we started
'(})
3 rocciving radiation alarms and at that time we became very C<s 4
concerned.
5 Q
When you said you asked Bill Zewe if he was 6
injecting and he assured you that he was, did you ask him 7
that because you would have to be using high pressure 8
injection to get the maximum amount of borated water into 9
the system or was that a question that related to core 10 cooling?
11 A
It was both.
It was a question relating to both.
W' s there any discussion between you and anyone 12 Q
a 13 else the first hour or so after you had come into the Unit 2
(])
14 control room as to whether high pressure injection had in 15 fact been on for a very long period af ter 4:00 a'.m.?
16 A
I did not ask that question.
I didn't have time 17 to go back and look at what happened between 4:00 and 6:00 18 or whatever time it was that I got there.
19 Q
Was there subsequently any conversation about that 20 whether you asked the question or not?
What I am getting at 21 is whether, at some point in the time period before 11:00 22 o' clock 'in the morning, it was generally discussed that a
.([])
23 combination of the EMOV being opened and high pressure
- ~}(^
injection being off could have resulted in a substantial loss 24-Sc t
25 of inventory?
MOpetCR I TE#eOGR APMsC SteveCE, t elt OLD MILL RO AD. wvoutSteseG., P&, 19610
12 1
A I think we discussed the fact that high pressure l({J 2
injection 'had been off for some time or throttled back.
3 I don't think we ever rela ted it to fullp uncovering the n
- (_)
4 core that early.
5 We were concerned that the possibility existed.
6 In our own minds we had a concern that we had to do something.
7 We knew we had some problem.
We had radia t ion monitor ala rms.
8 We knew 'we had fail fuel of some sort, and_ the seriousness 9
of it was not known, of course.
10 Q
In your own mind, did you entertain the possibility 11 that the core had been partially uncovered for a period of 12 time?
13 A
No, I guess I really didn't.
I was kind of
' {}
14 concerned about it -particularly as the day went on but I 15 don't think I ever said, " Hey, that thing could have been 16 uncovered," definitely.
17 Q
What were the things that kept you from considering W' s it anything other than 18 that as a realistic possibility?
a 19 the press'arizer level continuing to be high, if you can 20 recall?
21 A'
Being honest, we just never had full time to 22
' sit back and analyze the whole situation very closely and
({}.
23 very l methodically.
I think that is the only thing that-l (~}
24 prevented us _ from making that look-see effort.
V 25 Q
'I want to ask you a _ question about tha t but maybe MCMCK Sith0GRAPMsC SERVICE. 1413 000 usLL NO.s0 WW FOMsSSING. PA. 19810
-3 '. :
13 T
1 I should move forward a little bit first.
(3 2
When Mr. Miller came, did he assign various people V
3' responsibilities af ter the emergency had been declared ?
(~'J
)
4 A
Ile d id.
R 5
Q What responsibility did he assign to you?
6 A
Ile a ss igned immed ia te opera t ions interface.
7 Basically, the emergency director would be Miller and he a
would have only people o'n certain.' disciplines talking to 9
him and helping him sort out the facts.
I would be his to interface between operations and him.
11 Q
Did you rema in' in that ca pacity thr6ughout the 12~
day?
13 A
I did, and into the next morning.
Cl w/
ja Q
Just to jump ahead for a second, do you remember 15 what time you left the Unit 2 control room, a pproximately?
16 A
2:00 to 3:00 o"' clock in the morhing, some place 17 in that area.
18 Q
Let's just get a frame point for when you were 19 ba ck a t the site after that on Thursday and Friday and
~
20 Sa turday, as best you can recall..
21 A
The first day back, I think, was a round 9 :00
('
22 o' clock in the morning, and I am not s,u r e.
After that I
-v 23 wish I could be more sure, but I am not.
We went on 12 24 hour2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> shift rotations after that.
I worked daylight one
. (#n) ;
25 day and turned to night shift one night.
We had a turning secesica siswoona.nec senvect. sees oto asett noao. wronsassene. ra speto '
r 14 I
.a round period right' in that Thursday, Friday, Saturday
. (n) a rra ngement.
2
'3 Q
Were you rotaeing 12 on and 12 of f with Mr. Floyd?
.cV:
4 A
I was, 5
Q And the two of you were in offect the operations 6
people in the control room, right?
7 A
That is correct.
8 Q
Who would you report to, an instructor?
9 A
We had two senior superintendents on shift, Jim 10 Seclinger being assigned to one and Gary Miller being 11 assigned to the other.
12 We had two operations type peopic and they called
.O us something cisc.
Floyd and I and then we had two technical I
14 p9opic a'nd Kunder and a bo:c-type guy, and some engineering 15 peopic.
That would be our basic arrangement.
That changed 16 progressively as we went on to where I eventually end up as 17 a night superintendent along with everybody reporting to me 18 days down the pike.
19 Q
Going back now to the time when the general.
20 emergency is declared and Gary Miller assigns poopic to 21 various responsibilitics, was it at this time that it wa s (n) 22 decided that only certain peopic should ta lk to Gary; his 23 input should be Tirited?
P 24-
- A-That is correct.
.h) 25 Q-Then the people who were going to talk to him met MONaC 4 titN00mapmC tr MWsCt. 14 9 8 OLD MtL L RO AD. W TOMetteNG. P A 19610
15
- 1 with him periodically throughout the day?
'('Y 2
A We d id.
%J
^
3 Q
.To discuss the situation?
()
4 A
Right.
5 Q
Looking back at - it in hindsight, you would say, 6
even that organization probably didn't give you really a 7
chance to kind of go off in the corner and assess what had 8
ha ppened ?
9 A
I think our organization looked at what is
~
10 ha ppening now and where are we going more than where have 11 we been.
12 I don't think I ever really stepped back and looked
' 13 at this is where we have been when obviously we knew the 14 loops had been dry by tiien.
15 I never went back and looked at what caused the 16.
accident., how long was high pressure injection secured; we 17 never really went back that far into it.
18 Q
From the time that you came in, and I think this 19 is after Mr. Miller came in, high pressure injection was 20 consistently on, is that.right?
21 A
That is correct.
--()
22 Q
Did there come a time when you decided to v
23
. increa se it - to the maximum or try to at 1 cast take the
(~j 24 pressure up?
A /.
x 25 A-
_Yes.
MONsC81 Sit NO4R APM8C SERVaC E.
0 A19 OL D M8t h RO AD. WVOMISSING. PA.
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16 I
Q And use the block valve of the cycle?
2 A
We did.
We felt that there was no reliable means 3
of removing heat, _so we thought we should increase the rm.
O. -
4 pressure or move heat by dumping water through the operator 5
release valve to the floor through the.eactor cooling 6
. draining tank.
7 Q
So this strategy was adopted as a conscience 8
heat removal strategy at a time when you weren't sure whether 9
you were removing heat, is that right?
10 A
We wererelatively sure we weren't doing much on 11 heat removal.
12 Q
Would you characterize that strategy as a feed
-O
'3 eed 8 teed eerete87 here ve" ere reetty eet"etty 8teedtes 14 off liquid?
Were you hoping to dump water through the EMOV?
15 A
I think we had two goals.
One was to increase 16 the pressure and the second was to push water through the 17 EMOV and remove the heat from the core.
18 Q
Increase pressure. in order to try to collapse the 19 steam voids ?
20 A
The voids that.we knew had formed, yes.
21 MR, FRAMPI'ON:
For the record, I am going to show h
22 Mr. Ross a graph of a number of plant parameters on the 23 first day, which is a very rough series of charts developed
.C 24
'for working purposes..
ig 25
-BY MR. FRAMPTON:
MONiC 4 Sif NOGR APHIC $E RVICE_ 9 4 f 3 OLO MeLL RO AO, W YOMISSING. P4_
19490
17 1
1 QL I ~ wa nt to ask you a question about the time
(])
12 period between about 7 :00 and 9:30 a.m. where the reactor 3
coolant _ system pressure seems to be drop' ing off gradually p
w,)
4 down to a low of about 1400 PSI.
5 Do you recall what was happening during this 6
period of time; whether there was a particular strategy 7
for heat removal during that period of time?
8 A
I-think during tha t period of time we were 9
attempting to start reactor coolant pumps.
I think that is 10 what we were trying to do'there, lloping that the loops 11 would be full and we could get a normal force of circulation.
12 Our goal throughout the day was one:
Try to come
(~T.
13 up with a reliable force circulation for cooling.
I believe w/
14 that is what we were doing in this time period here.
15 Why the pressure came down like that, I don't have 16 a good answer _ for it right now, particularly that area 17-(indicating).
18 Q
So the decision to repressurize and cycle the 19 PORV was in effect an alternative to try and restart the 20 reactor coolant pumps wh i,ch d idn ' t seem to be successful, 21 is tha t right?
-(~'y 22 A
The reactor coola nt pumps did not seem to bc l
\\s 23 successful.
Repressurizing was our method --we were cycling 1
l 24 the block valve, that is what we were doing and you can tell l - ("y C-
- 25 by the spikes, trying to remove any residue through that HokiCW sif NOOR APHeC $thweCr. 14 9 3 OLD MILL MOAO wroneesslNG. PA. 19410 c
m n
e
18 1
method.
A(
2 Q
Do you recall how it was decided to try to q j.
3 increase the pressure and cycle the PORV; how it was
)
4 dec'ided and by whom it was decided?
5 A
We discussed it briefly in one of our littic 6
get-togethers.
One, increase pressure and two, remove heat 7
by dumping water applied through the pressurizer.
We thought 8
that was the only reliable motive we had.
9 That would have been a group of people other than 10 Miller, Rogers, myself, Zewe, at this time.
11 Q
You would say that is pretty much of a group 12 d ec is ion?
(~)T 13 A
Yes.
\\_
14 Q
Or at least you all concurred in the decision 15 recommended to Mr. Miller which he made, is that fai r to say?
16 A
I would say that is fair to say, 17 Q
Do you recall what kind of consultation there was 18 and decision made at about 11:30 in the morning to blow 19 down the system and then try and go to decay heat?
Can you 20 tell us about what went into that decision and how it got 21 to you?
Ir 22 A
At that time we were becomi'g nore and more 87 23; concerned that maybe the core itself wasn't covered now.
('[
24 At that point a coupic thoughts were made.
One was we
~
.. g'
~
would try to make.a run for decay heat and try to get force s
25 mou cn svenomanwie senv.cr. isis oto wiu nomo. wrouise.wo. ca seeio i
l -'
)
19 I
-cooling.
Two:
Let the core flood tanks come in and hope
~
]'
2.
they would tell us something about the condit ton of the 3
core and also it would blanket the core with water.
- O 4
Durtes thts time we eheeshe we weetd keen hi h 8
5
. pressure injection on for cooling water and forcing water 6
up through.
It was one of the reasons we had at the tiene..
7-I am not sure that was one of the best decisions ever made 8
in the world, but that is what we were thinking about at i
9 the time.
~
10 Q
At some point or shortly-after the decision to l-blow the system down, there was a decision made to close the 12 atmosphere steam dumps and stop steaming at least one of the 13
' p) steam generators to the atmosphere.
Do you recall that?
b 14 A
Yes, I do.
15 Q
Do you know what the impetus for that decision-16 was, where it-came from7 17 A
The impetus where it came from was of f site.
It 18 was directed to Gary based on the concern that we were
'19 spilling radiati.on to the atmosphere by steaming it with 20 the A. steam generator.
Of course, we-were all convinced 21 that the A steam generator was cleaned by a number of
.pa 22 methods.
One:
We had people up that took as elose monitor 23 radiation readings as they could in the area of the steam
.d 24
- d ump.-
We could see nothing on the steam lines on that t-Q-
25 pa rticular site.
' wo
.c..m.oo... e.....c.... ot o u.u. no o. mou...%
e.
L
20 J
1 He got -directions from someone to do that, and I
'(
j-2'
- am i, t sure who and he tmparted that to me.
3 Q
Were you concerned or was he concerned that this
(
4 was costing you a heat sink?
5 A
Well, we did discuss it.
Wo. felt we were getting 6
some heat off of the A steam generator, not a lot, but 7
anything in better than nothing in the condition we were in.
8 There was some discussion about shutting it.
The 9
final decision was based on the fact that it wa s very, 10 very minimal and would solve the problem at 1 cast with the 11 off site peopic.
12 Q
When you say you thought you were getting some 13 heat removal, is that because ou thought you might have some a
14 natural eirculation?
15 A
1 don't think we ever felt we had any full natural 16 c ircula t ion.
I think we felt we were probably getting some 17 heat out of the gene ator just due to the fact of having a 18 whole basic piece of steam.
19 Q
At that time you didn't have condenser vacuums,
20 did you?
21 A.
_ We probably did not at that time.
We probably did -
Q 22 get condenser vacuum some -place down the pike.
v 23 Q
La te a f ternoon? '
- ' f3
-24 A
Late a f ternoon.
jy
{
25 Q
Have you had-any prior indicaeions of a leak in MONiCst 4f f MOGR A PH4C SS SYiC f.
5 4 9 3 OL D M6L L RO A D. W TOMeSSING. PA l9610 u
e
Zal I
the B steam generator?
2 A
The shif t supervisor had the B steam generator fay
- V 3
is ola t ed.
He thought he_ had a primary secondary leak in
. (v~}
the steam generator based on the radiation monitor and the 4
5 indications on the generator and also on the fact of what 6
he thought was a tevel change in the generator.
W' s that a radiation monitor that was measuring 7
Q a
8 the activity on the seconda ry side someplace?
9 A
It was a monitor that: would be mea suring the 10 off gas in the main condenser.
That is what he kind of 4
11 based that on.
12 Q
Do you recall if there were ever any samples taken 13 of secondary cooler or feed water on the B side to try and 14 determine whether there really was a leak?
15 A
There were samoles taken.
16
.Q What did they show?
17 A
I think they showed activity.
18 Q
That would have supported the idea of a leak?
19 A
Yes.
20 Q
~ Has anybody ever determined whether those samples --
21-why those samples did show activity?
22 A
I can't answer that.
I know that there is work
,sU 23 that has been done in that area.
I am not fully current 24 in Unit 2 at this time.
I am assigned to Unit 1 for the
\\
/
25 time being.
M O Pu sC K SitNQGR APHOC Sanyect. 9 4 9 3 OLD MILL NO A D. W WOMISS8NG. P4 19610
22 1
QI Wan it ovor' determined whether there was or wan v(j.
2'-
. not = a tank Ln fact in tho 'll neonm generator?
3 A-I'do not know that fo r - a - fa c t. -
(vl 4
Q If tho Il steam generator was Eno ta ted, in it att11 5'
ponntble that activity of nomo kind could have gotton back 6
Ento the A steam generator through the renant. bodn or 17 nomo other icak, through the main condannor?
8 A
1ho activity that would have como out of the 9
generator goon into a ' common condannato nyntom.
When you 10 would have returned the food water to the steam generator 11 it would have sproad the activity to the A.
12 Q
Wan that a concern that was dLucunned?
13 A
Yon, it wan.
There woro sampion taken on it. 'They
_ p
%)
14 -
showed a lot better on the A nido.
15
-Q Ilut you were banically of the view, and when'I 16 -
mean you, I mean the poopic of the plant, that there wan no 17.
release to the atmosphora from the necam dumpn on the A 18 a ld o, in that correct?'
19 A
That in correct.
Wo bano that 'on the fact that we actua1Iy took. road Engs an clono to the steam plumo an 20 21 we could 'and also on line readings on that nido.
22 Q
Do yov have a reco11cetion of knowing anything p-v 23-about readingr. taken during the morning or early afternoon 24
.of; that f Lrnt day off the in-coro thermocompann?
(";
25-A I do.
r7
_..o.,. m......e... m..... mm m u..... -............
r
b 23 1~
Q What.do you recall about that?
2 A
I recall the readings coming up and being given to 3
Cary Miller.
The readings bning a very wide range, anywhere h
4 from zero - to 20 to 200 to 2,000, 5
Basically, the readings being not taken on a 6
serious vein because there were many readings questionable 7
and low than there were any that showed a high temperature.
8 They determined, at least at the time, that the readings 9
were inconclusive.
~
10 Q
Did you see the numbers yourself?
11 A
I d id not.
12 Q
Who ordered those to be taken, do you know?
13 A
I believe it to be Mr. Miller.
v 14 Q
Do you know whether the man who was responsible 15 for taking them, himself represented any view as to whether 16 he thought they were reliable?
17 A
That would be Ivan Porter.
He d idn' t ex press a ny 18 strong view either way to me.
He said, "Well, you got a 19 wide range, nothing firm. "
He determined nothing firm from 20 those readings.
21
-Q Did you, in your own mind, doubt the credibility
-p of those readings, or did you think that some of the high 22 v
23 readings might be accurate, can you remember that?
A 24 A
I guess I didn't sit down and look at them long l
t, '
25 and ha rd.
'I guess I wrote them off as being serious just like y
MONtCK STt N00RAPHaC SENVICE. la t S OLD MILL RO AD. WTOMISS4NG, PA 19610 h
i
, l
24
-1 everybody else, erratic.
h 2
q.
One of the things that people have told me is 3
that it is sort of an axiom in an emergency to trust your nV 4
instruments.
If they tell you something is wrong you are 5
better off to believe that something is wrong rather than to 6
believe the instruments are wrong.
Is that a principle that 7
you have encountered before?
8 A
Yes, that is a prf ciple I heve encountered 9
before.
10 Q
That principle doesn't seem necessarily to have 11 been ' applied to these particular readings by any of the 12 people in the control room during that day; those people 13 represented a lot of collective experience.
Is there any --
14 can you _ explain that?
15 A
I think, mainly, it is 'because they weren't 16 sa fety grade type instruments.
Also, I don't know that we 17 would have done anything different had we known what those 18 readings were and known what they were reading.
'I don't 19 know what you would have changed other than pcrhaps 20 s uspecting that maybe we.would have some zirc damage 21 carlier.
.(
22 Q
I take it ute reason the people did not consider 23-the _ readings trust was not because of anything that had
}]
happened before, that they had been erratic, but only 24 s
25 because you didn't know aat conditions they were under at MOheCat sigNOGRAPMic SERV 8CE, lef t OLD MILL ROAO WFOMitsameG. PJ, 19410
25 h
1~
this t ime, is that right ?
(']
2 A
That's right.
I think the other thing would be, V
3 it wasn't something the operators used every day.
They
(~3 4
.didn't go in and take in-core temperatures every day at the A/
5 beginning of the shift or anything like that.
6 Q
Does that mean the operators really hadn't pa id 7
that much attention to this instrumenta tion?
8 A
- That is probably a very true statement.
9 Q
It was there for the test program s tart-up, 10 prima rily?
1; A
Right.
12 Q
Do you know whether there had been any history of 13 those thermocouples being erratic or going out or anything 14 like that?
15 A
I do not know.
I know there were a lot of 16 problems with them during the installation.
I know there 17 were reading problems and there were connection problems.
18 Q
So you think there was some history of unreliability 19 there?
20
- A Yes.
21 Q
Did that play any role in your own mind about
-22 whether you thought these were probably accurate or not?
-)
s_-
23 A
I think it just added -- fell right in line with
,-s
- 24 the thinking to try to discard them or to discard them as L L( /
- 25 being ' representative of high temperature.
MONICit ST ENOGR APHIC $tRVaC E,.14 8 3 OL D MILL RO AO. WYOMISSING. PA. 1941@
26 1
Q When you say it is a little hard' te think about
{);
2 what you would have done differently had everybody believed 3
those high temperatures were all accurate, wouldn't the high g
s_/
3 temperatures have possibly told you that you might still 5
have some part of the core that wasn't covered or that wasn't 6
being steamed ratherethan covered with liquid?
7 A
It may have.
It may have led you to think that.--
8 well, it would have.
9 Q
I know this is a hypothetical question, but if 10 you had known that during the period of time when you were 11 cycling the valve, would that have -- is there a clear 12 alternative strategy that you might have perceived to try 13 to get more inventory into the core other than what you
.({}
14 were doing?
15 A
No.
You just make up all that you can and you 16 got a choice, either let the system go solid or open a hole 17 some place and remove energy and sater and that is basically 18 what you are doing.
I don't think it would have changed 19 the strategy here (indicating).
It may have changed the 1
20 strategy down here (indicating).
I 21 Q
When you say "it might have changed the strategy l
f(])
22 down here," you are pointing to the period of time when you
[
23 51ew down the system after 11:30 in the morning and tried i
< L ( 'y 24 to get lower pressure?
25-A Yes..
We may.have considered that a lot differently women are oonar.c scavice. ma o6o una nono. wrouisema. en imo
27 1
had we -- we may have considered what we did with the
(]}
2 system in this area heta (indicating).
3 Q
Do you think after the fact that there is a
[)
4 chance that the core was uncovered during a substantial 5
portion of the time from noon to 5 :00 p.m. on bhrch 28th?
6 A
With the amount of makeup we had going in I would 7
like to think it wasn't.
8 Q
It was not covered ?
9 A
It was not uncovered.
10 Q
It was not uncovered?
11 A
Right.
12 Q
Because although you were blowing down you were 13 sti11 ' adding a lot of makeup flow?
14 A
Yes.
15 Our strategy may have been a little different in 16 tha t a rea.
We may have went at a thousand gallons a minute 17 had we known it.
Tha t is all I was saying.
I don't know 18 that to be a fact but I am sure it would have entered into 19 it.
20 Q
What was the flow during that period, if you know?
21 A
We told them always to be around 400 gallons.
We
(~',
22 never gave them a number and said make it 327 to whatever.
23 We said make it around 400 gallons flow, 24 The basis for tha t, we were told that 400 gallons g
25 a minute would remove anythinP you had to worry about in the MonstC R ST E NOG 8t APHeC S ERWaC E.
14 9 9 OLD MsLL RO AD. WV0aestgeseo. P A 19410
28 I
system as far as core-cooling and as far as keeping the
- (m) 2'
. core covered for an accident.
One makeup pump was satis-3 factory for any accident.
That is the kind of reasoning g
- (-)
4 we used under the conditions we were in.
5 Q
400 gallons per minute would be about 80 to 90 6
percent of the capacity of one pump, is that correct?
-7 A
Right.
One pump has a normal ca pacity of 500 8
gallons.
9 Q-That would be a little less than half of the 10 total maximum capacity, is that correct?
11 A
That is correct.
12 Q
During this period from 7 :00 or 8:00 o' clock in
(])
the morning up until noen when some high pressure injection 13 14 was continuing and the pressure was relatively high, do you 15 think there was a mechanism by which the water could have 16 been bypassing the core and simply not have provided any 17 cooling effect on the core itself?
18 A
Well, one of the things that we wem concerned 19 about was that there wasn't a mechanism doing that.
I guess 20 the mechanism would be the point of high pressure injection 21 as you are discharging the reactor coolant pumps.
All
/~
22 designs says it should go through the core.
(].-
23 In th7 condition we were in, there was a question 24 in' our mind, was it all going through the core.
.("')
X 25-
-Q Can you imagine what an -alterna tive flow path or NOh tCM $f t NOGR A PHIC SERytCE. 141S OLO MILL RO AD. W WOMISSihG. PA.
19810
29-
- 1 paths 'might have been?
d'
'2 A
The only alterna tive flow path would have been k_s -
)
3
'that through the reactor coolant pump up through a higher l(])
~4 leg of water' which was an. undamaged reactor and certainly
.5 you would have a higher ' differential pressure and there 6.
would be a higher resistance flow path, 7
Q Where would that water have gone, out through the 8
pressurizer?
9 A
Event ua lly.
10 Q
Before getting into the core?
11 A
Right.
But I think what we saw af ter we started 12 the reactor coolant pumps showed that the water did go 13 through the cooler.
g
.O-14 When we started the reactor coolant pump the 15 temperature was around 300 and some degrees and that tells 16 me that we cooled the core with this method.
17
-Q What time are you referring to when you start at 18 the reactor coolant pumps ?
19 A-7:00, 8:00 o 'cloc k at night.
20 BY MR. II5'YNES:
21 Q
Fk. Ros s, wa s th e pres s uriz e r s p ra y va lv e o pen 7
22 for the first time that morning up until shortly after 23 noon?
/s 24 A
I think the pressurizer spray valve was opened J-('x in the morning.
25
' MON *Cet $7 ENQQR APHIC G ERV4CE, 949 9 OLO MILL NO AD, wfCMetteNG. PA 10000 -
e
Je 30 1
Q Why was it opened?
{.
2 A
I think some of the logic there, and I am not -
3 really sure of what t_he logic was there, but at the time.
A Lj
- 4
'I think we were trying to get any kind of circulation we 5
could find of any kind.
I am not too sure, but I do 6 4 vaguely remember operating the valve.
fre)y<.ts/Q 7
Q' If the (corroborated / relief valve and this block 8
valve were opened simultaneously with the pressurizer 9
spray valve opened, would this' give you a path for bypassing 10-the core?
11 A
It would be possible-in that the spray valve 12 comes off the discharge reactor coolant pump.
13 Q
That is near where the makeup water is being 14 injected --
15 A
To me it was, yes.
16 Q
That is a separate penetration than --
17 A
It is a separate penetration.
18
-Q Was there any extended period when the pressurizer 19
. spray valve was opened simultaneously with the power 20 operated relief valve?
21-A No, not to my knowledge.
(~}
22
-Q When the pressurizer spray valve was opened, who x
23
-did open the valve?
24 A
-I am not absolutely sure of that.
It would bc
- ('T a
Q2 one of the' operators and _ I am not absolutely sure of that.
25 MomeCR sitNoonAPhlC SERV *CE, 14 9 3 OLO M4LL PO A D. wv0Mf 96tNG. PA. 19480 i
31 I-12 Who was actually issuing orders to the operators?
([ )
2 A
Bill Zewe would have been giving orders to the 3
operators and I would have been talking to Bill Zewe.
4 Q
So you decided on a course of action that you
/
5 would communica te tha't to hk. Zewe?
/
6 A
Right.
7 Q
He in turn would communicate it to the others ?
8 A
- Right, 9
Q Then the manipulation of valves and pumps and so 10 forth, like that, from the control room controls, that was 11 under the specific direction of Nr. Zewe?
12 A
I would say yes.
In normal conditions, everything
([])
13 would have come through the shift supervisor or the shift 14 fo rema n.
15 Q
Were there occasions that you know of when 16 controls were being manipulated without Mr. Zewe's knowledge?
17 A
No main line control, I will put it that wa y,
18 ilke an operator manipulating a control to start a vacuum 19 pump without specific direction from Bill Zewe because he 20 was given an order to put the vacuum on the secondary 21 system and Bill wouldn't have known who started that, but y,)
22 that is not unusual I don 't think,
(
23 Q-hk. Ross, have you had a chance to review portions f'
24 of the I&E investigation, report, Document 600, with respect y)'
25 to the accident?
MOMC R STINOGR 4PHIC S t #wsCf.' 1418 OL D MILL RO A D. WTOMe$ SING. P A IDet0
32
-~
1 A
I' scanned portions of'it,
. f.gg~i,
-2 Q
Are you familiar with a section there where it 3
talks about disabling of the diesel generator automatic hoca -
s
{]).
,4 start system and also the pump % out of the core flood 5
ta nk' valves ?
6 A-
.Yes, I am familiar with that, 7
Q Are you-satisfied that the diesel generator 8
automatic start system was disabled during this event for 9
some period of time?
10 A
That it was?
11 Q
Yes.
12 A
I think it is possible.
I don't'think we had 13 specific knowledge of it.
g%)
-14 Q
You do not have spacific knowledge of it?
15
'A I did not. Q Ihve you heard anything since then from people coah d
- r.,--
17 that were working in thefcore at the time that led you to
-18 be? ieve that it was in fact disabled for a portion of time?
19 A
~I have heard that there is a good chance that ~it-20
. was done for a _ period of time.
21 Q
According to your understanding, how was that r~g -
22 a ccomplished ?
U 23~
A It is my. understanding that. it wa s accomplished 24 by ; turning the switch to the maintenance position and h,
L t. vb>&A,
25-ran it from starting every time we had an evacuation ~; ~
o~.c
... oe....c.....c.... m o. u.o....o.... ~........
33-1 Again, this is secondhand information.
2-Q Had you heard that the fuel racks had been l#"} -
x-3 tripped and not reset and in that manner the disabling of --
. (]'f made the equipment disabled?
4 5
A I have not heard that specifically.
2 6
Q Is there a difference between tripping the fuel 7
racks and turning the switch in the control room to the 8
ma intenance position?
9 A
Very definitely.
10 Q
How is that?
11 A
When you trip the fuel rack it takes all auto e!.
c 12 starts and remote control, lab'or.
It has to be reset.
13 Q
So an operator would have to be dispatched to 7s 4 -
14 start the diesel generator?
4 15 A
Right.
16 Q
How long would. it take an operator to respond?
17 A
It w) uld not take a long period of time.
It 18 would be a-five minute period to get a guy down there to 19 pull the icver back to reset', -if that was the case.
20 Q
Tha t is a f tc they have figured it out, is that 21 correct?
How long would it - take to figure it.out
.en?
A_^) A He would look at that pretty. quickly.
g-23 Q
How long does it take to get a diesel generator es
. 24 back into service if the maintenance contro1~ switch is c
I
\\,/
25-placed in the maintenance position, which I.under-tand is MON *Cu $7E NO4R APHIC SERVICE. t ela CL D MILL RO AD, W TOMSSSING. P A 19410 e
w
34 c
I
. located in the control room?
(
2 A
'A-short period of time.
'3 Q
A few seconds ?
O 4
A A '-few seconds.
.v 5
Q ~
To your knowledge, you don't know if it was 6
disabled by tripping of the fuct rack?
7 A
I have no knowledge of that at all.
8 Q
You would not have recommended it?
9 A
That is correct.
I would not have recommended it.
10 Q
- With respect to locking out on the core flood 11 tank valves, are you aware of that?
12 A
I was questioned on whether I had any knowledge of 13 that.
I did not have any knowledge of that and I guess I
)
14 still don't believe anybody did that, to answer your question.
15 Q
Back on 3-29 when you got off work at 2:00 to 16 3 :00 a.m.
In the morning, who relieved you at that time?
17 A
There really wasn't any relief for me at the 18 moment.
19 What' had happened throughout the day, we had
- 20 called Lynchburg and asked for all our supervisory people 21 who went down there to the simulator to come back and that 22 included Jim Floyd and at 1 cast one shift supervisor and
- ( sc c) 23 we expected them momentarily.
24 At that time in the. morning we were in a fairly r4 G
- 25 stabic position and decided at least those of us who were MOh*C R Stf MOGR APHlC SERVsCf. tela OLD M*LL PGA O W TOMISStNG, P A.
19490
35 I
there,~ we had another superintenden", would go home a nd
~
("Y 2-get some sleep and come back and relieve Miller.
I decided 3
I should go home with Miller and get some sicep and this
- f'T 4
other_ gentleman would have been here very shortly.
Idid v
5 not physically see Floyd that morning.
6 Q
Who was in the control room when you icft?
Who 7
was Icft in charge?
8 A
The night superintendent was Icft in charge.
I 9
believe it to be Jim Seelinger, ~and it has been a long-time.
10-It would have been a shift supervisor and a shift 11 foreman within our technical guidelines.
12
-Q When you came back on at 9:00 a.m.
on 3-29, did pg you take over charge of the control room again at that time 13
'w) 14 or shortly thereafter?
15 A
We worked in the control room.
I stayed on Unit 2 16 that particular day.
I worked for the superintendent.
It is littic vague. for me to remember exactly what we did that 17 a
18 da y.
19 I think by that time we had a posture that we had 20 a superintendent and I guess they had what we call an 21 operations coordinator, I guess they went to a fancy titic.
22 Yes, I did function in that capacity, I think,
)
23 that morning.
Floyd and I turned around where he worked days 24-and I work nights somehow.
With me working nights the S
_NJ' 25 next day I am not too sure how we did that.
I think we Mose'CK S T E NOGN A PHIC Sf RytCE. 1413 OLD MetL RO AD WVOMtS$1NG. PA 19610 1
n
36 I
worked eight on and eight off.
m 2
Q Do you. remember 3-29, that 'Ihursday also, being
' iQ) long day for you, possibly you worked 'up to midnight that 3
a O
4 night?
' v 5
A I do not remember, but in the course of turning 6
around, it could have easily been a long day for me.
7 Q
With respect to the organization on the 29th, 8
I understood that you said that Mr. Seelinger and Mr. Miller 9
were relieving one a nother on '12 on,12 off ?
10 A
Yes.
11 Q
Then you and Mr. Floyd and I missed a name, a nd 12 I must apologize, was that Mr. Kunder and who else?
13 A
I am not sure rhether it was Potts or whether
(]
14 it was Logan.
Potts was in Unit 1 at the time.
I don't 15 know when he got transferred over.
Eventually he ended up 16 in Unit 2 as a night superintendent before it was all over.
17 Q
And Mr. Logan was on --
18 A
He was on some kind of schedule, also.
19 Q
Similar to you and Mr. Floyd?
20 A
Yes.
21 Q
Was Mr. Toole also on a schedule?
f
)
22-
-A Toole and' his group showed up some time in there, 23 and they were put_ on a schedule in some other ca pacity and
~
h 24 I don' t remember their titles, but there was a group of people like them -- Toole, Boje, those type.of guys.
25 l'
MOMsCK STEN 0cmaPHsc sinytCf. tela Oto MtLL noso, wrouesseNG. PA. 19410-L._
37 1
Q
' Ikit: to your recollection, Mr. Iogan and Mr.
(,I 2_
Toole did not relieve one another in the same manner as 3
yourself and bk. Floyd, is that correct?
7-x
(_)
4 A
I am not sure of that at - this time.
5 Toole was put in, in a rotation some place there 6
and I am not quite sure where he fit in at the time.
W s he located in the control room?
7 Q
a 8
A Ile worked out of the control room.
I j ust don't 9
remember exactly what his function was.
10 Q
During this period of 3-29 through April 1st, on 11 these rotating shifts, where were you normally located on 12 your work?
'r'Y 13 A
I moved around the plant normally but we worked
(_/
14-out of the shif t' supervisor's c. rice where we held the shift 15 meetings.
We were all assigned jobs and everybody left 16 from there.
I was free to rove staying close to the control 17 room, of course, and I carried a radio all the time.
18 Q
Where were Mr. Seelinger and Mr. Miller located 19 when they were on duty?
20 A
They worked out of the same office, the shift 21 supervisor's office, f~)
22 Q
But they would not necessarily remain in the
- x. g 23 control ~ room?.
24 A
Not necessarily.
There was always one 'of the two Q{~}'-.
25 of us there al1~ the mme.
-l MON 'C H STf hCGR APHIC $thysCE. lef S OLD edeLL #0AD. WTOMIS$5NG PA 19610
38 1
.Q Was there any pa rticular instruction with respect A
2
'to who had to remain in the control room at all times during
.L) 3 this period, to your recollection?
.q
(,
4 A
Not specific ins t ruc t ions.
We have a license 5
requirement to keep a certain number of people who are 6
Licensed in the control room but it doesn't say that you 7
must have one duty superintendent or. one office coordinator 8
in the control room at all times.
9 Q
I understand that yo6'had a shift supervisor 10 reporting to you and so forth, but as.far as you are 11 concerned, you did not havc to remain in the control room?
12 _
A No, but I felt I should stay close and I did stay 13
-close.
14 MR. FRAMPTON:
This is probably a good time to 15 break.
^
16 (short recess. )
17 BY MR. FRAMPTON:
18 Q
hk. Ross, I think we were taking you through 19 March 28th and had gotten up to about 2:00 o' clock in the 20 afternoon, after the decision had been made to depressurize 21 the system.
/G 22 At about tha t time, Gary Miller and Jack !!erbein, U'
23 I believe, departed to go to the State liouse to brief the (G
24
. Lie ut ena nt Governor, do you recall' that?
i
~
25 A
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39 1
Q Who was left in ' charge of the control room?
2 A
Joe Logan.
(}
3 Q
Mr. Loga r.?
()
4 A
Right.
S Q
You reported directly to him?
6 A
Correct.
7 Q
What instructions were you left or wa s he left,
8 if you know, when Gary Miller left the site?
9 A
Two very: clea r instructions.
One:
Don't steam 10 the generator to the a tmosphere.
The second instruction I n
had wa s, " Don't make any major changes in the plant 12 c o nd it ions. "
r3 13 He explained to us how we could get in contact LJ 14 with him.
15 Q
Wha t was the strategy when they Icft for core 16 cooling?
I", other words, what was the course you were l'7 Pursuing that you weren't supposed to make any substantial is changes?
19 A
I think he left after we depressurized, as I 20 remember.
21 Q
I believe that is correct.
(~T 22 A
- The stra tegy a t that point was to continue the V
23 high pressure' injection and try to continue to cool the 2a cooler.
Our hope there would be that eventually it would I'w) p 25 be cool' enough to refill the loops or get on the KE, one of i
(.
..c.... ~oo... ic....c...., o t o o, u..o. o.
....., ~........
t
40 1
the two, eventually.
()
2 Q
But you were continuing to try to drive the 3
pressure down during this period?
~
' h)
(-
4 A
I think we were hoping it would come down so we 4
p,tque)s 5
could go on to 'RE but we were continuing to inject at the 6
same t ime.
7 Q
And you were not being successful in etting the s)eog%t 8
pressure down far enough to go on to the KE system?
9 A
That is correct.
10 Q
Did that strategy or course continue until bk.
11 Miller and Bk. IIerbein came back to the plant?
12 A
It d id.
Some place in there I guess we started to
(~S 13 see tempera ture changes and we started to see indications w) 14 tha t we were possibly starting to fill loops.
We sta rted to 15 see temperature changes starting to come on some place in 16 tha t a rea.
I am not too sure exactly what the time frame 17 would be.
18 Q
Would that be hot leg temperatures coming down?
19 A
Yes.
20 Q
I think it wa s during the afternoon that you were-21 bypassing the high pressure injection flow toward the A leg,
~(])
22 is: tha t correct ?
23 A
I don't know that -it was the A leg.
Towa rd one
(~')
24-Icg' is correct.
y-25 Q
What was the purpose of tha t?
MONICE SFf NOGRAPHIC StutV4CE lef $ OLO MILL RO40. wvoustotNG, PA ISSIO L'
41 1
.A Looking back, I am not too sure.
They thought 2
they had seen a temperature change in one loop.
They
]
3 thought by injecting real, real heavy into that one loop b-)
4 that possibly we would be able to fill it first and get on 5
to something.
6 Q
As long as you were getting a little flow, if you 7
went toward that loop you would actually estabitsh flow 8
through --
9 A
We seen a temperature' change on tha t side, and that 10 is what made us go in that direction.
We had seen tha TH
+
11 come down, I believe, and I think we said that we will bias 12 the flow to one side and see if that changes anything as q
13' far as the volds.
It was kind of a try.
kJ
~14 Q
Do you recall calling Mr. Seelinger during this time and asking him to come over to the Unit 2 control room?
15 16 A
I d id.
17 Q
Why did you want his: help?
18 A
I want to pick my words carefully.
I guess the 19 thing I wa r.t to say is tha t I was not just satis fied we 20 had the same type of control we' had when Gary was there, 21 and that is why I asked for him to come down.
22 Q
When you say " control," are you talking about l^]
i 23 control over the plant or control over what various people.
24 were doing in the control room?
f p.m
~\\
25 Contr el over what the various people were doing.
A L
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42 1
Q Did he successfully assist in that when he O) 2 a rrived ?
3 A
He d id.
(-
4 Q
Were you aware of the pressure spike in the. con-5 tainment building that occurred during the af ternoon of the 6
28th?
7 A
1 wa s.
8 Q.
What was reported to you and what conversations do 9
you remember about that ?
10 A
What was reported to us is that the ES system had 11 indicated pressure of 30 pounds in the building and that the 12 building s pray pumps had started and that we had actually 13 got spray flow and the building actually sprayed.
14~
We, being Miller, I and the group, looked back and 15 sa id, "Yes, the s pike wa s on the rec orde r, it d id s ta rt. "
16 I guess we just felt that it was either one:
Something we 17 j us t d id n ' t unde rs ta nd, a nd we d id n ' t a ss oc ia te it with Od\\
18 anything else and we just went on.
Pressure f6 Llai very 19 ra pidly back to a low pressure, one or two pounds, whatever 20 we were running at the time.
W' s this reported to you af ter FE. Miller came.
21 Q
a (O'T 22 back'from the State House?
)
1 23 A
lies.
24
-Q After he came back?
25 A
'Yes.
MONICM STEN 04aaPHoc SEnwsCE. tal) OLO MtLL RoaO. wrouestsNa, pa teeto
43 Ws it reported to you as it happened or some time 1
Q a
([ }
2 a f terwards ?
- 3 A
As I remember, we were actually in the control.
()
4-room when it ha ppened, Miller and I both.
5 Q
Do you recall who reported it to you?
W s that a
6 br. Zewe?
7 A
Bill Zewe turned around and,. I don't know that he 8
physically reported, but he said, "The spray pumps have 9
started," and we all turned around and looked.
Then we had 10 some discussion on what could have caused it.
Then we watched 11 the pressure fall back to zero in seconds or minutes, whatever,
12 very ra pidly.
13 Q
Do you remember whether it fell of f instantaneously
[}
14 or it fell down over a period -- over a short period of time?
15 A
It looked lihe it fell amost ins ta nta neo us ly.
16 Q
Did you come to any joint view about what it was ?
17 Whether it had actually been a pressure spike or whether it 18 was a electrical pulse of some kind?
19 A
We came to the conclusion, be it right or be it wrong,tl[at it was an electrical spike of some kind and 20 21 not a pressure spike in the building.
I know that to be
(~}
22 wrong now, by the way.
v 23 Q
Was there any discussion of what could possibly cause 'a real pressure increase of that magnitude in that 24
= {^/}
25 space?
MO*siCM STENOGR A PHIC SE RWaC E.
t ot S OLD MeLL RO A ~. WYOMISte%G, PA teste
44 I
1.
-A There was not, not one of that magnitude, p (3 2
Q' So nobody sa id, " Hey, that could be such and such,"
%)
3, G -d other people say, "No, that is impossible"?
l~h 4-A
'No.
5 Q
.You didn't even consider an event that could have 6
ca used. tha t ?
7 A
We did not.
8 Q
Do you have any recollection of any input during 9
the af ternoon from bk.. Arnold or any other GPU people as to 10 whether the core was really covered?
11 A
I a m not a wa re of a ny.
12 Q
You don't recall anything like tha t, a telephone 13 call from bk. Arnold to hk. Wilson, Mr. Keaton, involving (Nw]
14 the status of the core being covered or the system being 15 solid ?
16 A
No, I am not aware of that.
17 Q
Do you recall any similar type of input from NRC 18 headquarters in Bethesda through the Unit 1 control room?
19 A
I do not.
^
- 20 Q
We have a tape of a telephone conversation that 21 apparently was held between an NRC official in Washington,
/~T 22 hk. Stello, and Greg HidI, who was in the Unit 1 control
(_)
23 room in which Mr. Stello expressed some concern about super-24-heat, implying that the core might be uncovered,
(~
y 25 My question to you is whether a message of that MON *CK STENOG8tAPHIC SEmwsCE. 14 9 3 OLD MILL RO AD. W TOMISSING. P A.
19810 m
45 t
I significance ever made an impact, got to the Unit 2 control 2
room, and made an impact?
By that significa nce, I mean NRC
[]
3 people recommend that you take a hard look at the possibility 4
tha t the. core may be. uncovered.
5 A
If it did, I am not aware of it.
6 We did have NRC people in the control room at the 7
' time with us on the phone.
8 Q
Let me ask you about that phone hook-up.
- 9 Do you recall whether there was a telephone line 10
'available from the Unit 2 control room to NRC's regional 11 office, region 1, during the afternoon of the first day?
12 A
There was a line being used by NRC in the shift 13 supervisor's office.
Where that line went I do not know.
14 Q
But you assumed that they had contact with NRC 2
15 s omeplace?
16 A
Yes, sir, I d id.
17 Q
And therefore, you assumed that if NRC officials 18 in Washington or somewhere else wanted to get an important 19' message into r.he Unit 2 control room, they could do it via 20 their man who w.is standing there?
21 A
That was a na tural function.
22
-Q Tha t was Mr. Higgins?
Do you recall him being
.,~.)
23 there?
(
O 24 A
Yes, I know him and yes, he was there in the
- (%../
25 a f ternoon.
MOMCIL Sf t NOGR APHIC dE RVeC E.
9 414 OLD MILL RO AD. WVOMIS$1NG. PA. 99600
46 1
Q Do you recall Mr. Walter Baunack there?
'2 A
Yes, I do.
3 Q
I believe late in the afternoch a decision was r3
- (_j 4
made to try to repressurize the system and take it solid 5
and do everything you could to get a reactor coolant pump 6
started again, am I correct?
7 A
That is correct.
8 Q
Wha t is your impression of how that decision was 9
made and by whom?
10 A
I think our goal throughouw the day was always to 11 end up with a reactor coolant pump on or some forced 12 c irc ula t io n.
-13 We spent most of the day trying to figure out
{
la which one to start first and making sure the oil pumps were 15 o perable.
There is a lot of that you won't find going on 16 regularly, going on throughout the day.
17 I think once we saw the temperature change we
'18 were convinced that we had a chance of refilling the loop -
19 and getting normal circulation.
20 At about the same time that we were talking with 21 B&W through Lee Rogers about which pump and what duration 22 for a pump to start.
A call came directly to Ga ry Miller.
- .{}
23 I-am not positive who it was from, but I believe it to be
'24
' Jack lierbein.'saying to go solid right now.
We went solid
(~)
i.(s right'then.
We actually used two. makeup pumps to go solid.
~
25 MON'C R SitPeOGR A PH8C SE RVsC f.
14 9 3 OLD MILL RC AD. W TOMeSS6Nd. P A 99410
{
47 1
What we saw during that time was temperature change and it
(,
2 wa s clea r t o us that we had a shot a t sta rting the reactor O
3 coola nt pump and that is what we did.
)
4 Q
Was there any resistance to the instructions to go,
5 solid right now?
Were there people in the control room who 6
thought that might not be the best thing to do right now?
7 A
I don't th ink.
I think in our mind we had seen 8
some temperature change and we knew we were going to refill 9
the loops to start a reactor coolant pump so I think we 10 wanted to go to that situation, too.
11 Q
Was this the first instruction, so to s peak, that 12 had come from the company management at the observation
/~5 13 center, if that is what you perceived it to be?
U 14 A
I didn't perceive it to be that.
Other than the 15 steam dump -- Miller did talk on and off throughout the 16 day to somebody and who that was I don't know.
17 Q
From your own perception, was there any change 18 in the command structure at that po int, basically control 19 or initiative for plant strategy had shifted from the control room to the observation center?
20 A
We felt right af ter we started the reactor coolant 21
(
22 pump, or about in that time period, now that we had senior V
23 management at the observation center, they would plot our
[,
24 course from there.
At that point we kind of just held onto 25 what we had.
We had a full circulation mode.
We were able M r3 Pe sc al STENOGR APHtC SERWIC f.
1413 OL D MILL MO AO. WW TOMi$$s NG PA 19410
48 1
to steam' the generator and we were able to establish vacuum.
2 We felt the next step would be from them.
()
3 Q
From the observation center?
r-(j.
4 A
Yes, sir.
5 Q'
So when you say "we," would you say you and Mr.
Miller?
6 7
A It was our feeling that.the senior management 8
was-now in place.
9 Q
And would be in a position to take the initiative 10 for any changes ?
11 A
Fh j or cha nges.
We would kind of maintain what we 12 had at this point.
(~'
13 Q
. I think our information is that Mr. Herbein must V) 14 have been over there. from 11:00 a.m. or noon on bbrch 28th, 15 but it wasn't until late afternoon that you felt, as you 16 Put it, senior management sort of took over.
17 A
In my mind I d id n ' t feel we had clear communica-tions and clear lines until late in the afternoon other 18 19 than through Gary.
I also didn't fect the plant was stable at the 20 21 time.
I felt they were catching up most of the day.
22
.Q When you 1cft that night, wa s it your view that
('
23' the plant was pretty much stabilized?
24 A
Yes.
We had a stable force cooling mode.
I felt l
(~}
V:
that we were in a condition where we didn't have to do 25 l
pomen stanoonanmc srnvice. seis oto wtL noao. wvomssimo. PA.
issio
49 1
anything right now other than maintain what we had.
n 2
Q From the point of view of any future problems with v) -
(
3' respect to off site releases or plant stabil Lty, did you
- G 4
pretty much feel that the thing was over when you went 5
home that night?
The problem had been solved?
That is a 6
bad way to put it.
Let me ask you what your perception was 7
rather than try to suggest things.
8 A
My perception was that we had the plant in stable 9
c ond it io n.
We did not know the full extent of damage, but to as far as the off site consequences, they would go down 11 rather than go up from that point on; they would diminish 12 rather than go up.
I think that is what you are trying to
(]
13 ask me.
%.s 14 Q
Did you become aware at any time on Thursday of 15 the problem of the gas building up in the makeup tank?
16 A
I d id.
I am not sure if it was Thursday, but it 17 must have been Thursday that we had seen some pressure come 18 up in the makeup tank.
We went into a venting acquence 19 where we vented periodically.
I am not even sure which shift 20 I was working Thursday.
I think I worked two shif ts 21 Thursday.
I think ~I was eight on, eight of f and eight on.
/
22 I am pretty sure that is what happened that day.
23 Q~
Do you recall that some time on Thursday people Q
24 drew a correlation between the venting of the makeup tank Q
25 and seeing some off site activity or some release?
I
... a. m o..... e..... u.... m o -. u o......... ~. ~.....
~
50 I
A We drew that correlation.
I am not positive that 2
(( }
it was Thursday, but we did draw that correlation some time 3
during that period.
13
(_)
Q Do you remember that that correlation was drawn 4
5 at some time before the continuous venting of the tank on 6
Friday morning that created all of the stir about evac ua tion?
7 A
I feel that it was but I am not sure.
We felt it 8
was something on site.
We could see it on our building 9
monitors in the building.
10-Q In the auxiliary building itself ?
11 A
We actually felt that it would eventually go out 12 into the atmosphere.
r~%
13 Q
Do you remember whether this was perceived as a V
14 problem that was going to grow, that you were going to have.
15 more and more gas coming into the makeup tank and more and 16 more problems with venting it or burping it?
17 A
I don't think we perceived yet tha t there would be 18 a growing type problem.
We just felt the problem was 19 there.
I-don't think -we icoked ahead to say, "Yes, it is 20 going to grow."
21 Q
You did not, you say?
(~)
22 A
No.
V 23 Q-Why would it not have grown?
Why would you have (43 24 thought that the gas coming into the tank, the degassing Q) process, was. going to be of d' creasing magnitude rather than 25 e
i MOhlCM ST E NOGN APHIC st NYlCf. 1413 OLD MILL NO AD. WTOncestehe, P A.
99630
51
' ncreasing magnitude ?
i 1
("N 2
A I don't think we had any reason at the time to O
3 feel that we had an excessive amount of ' gas in t he system.
p
{ 4 We knew we had something. I don't think we had a good 5 handle on what we really had as far as gas in the system at 6 that time on Thursday. 7 Q Do you recall during what period of time you were 8 on duty on Fridny morning, early? .Were you in the Unit 2 9 control room when the decision was made to vent the makeup 10 tank continuour ly at 7 :00 a.m. on Friday morning, a pproximate-11 ly? 12 A I was not. I kind of feel I was home in bed, which 13 makes me think I worked midnight that night. 14 Q That would have been an 11:00 p.m. to 7 :00 a.m. 15 shift? 16 A I had gone home at 7 :00 o ' clock in the morning 17_ with the thought of coming back to the night shift that 18 n ight. I don't knew what time I came back. It wa s probably j 19 7:00 o' clock but I don't know. ~ 20 Q Do you recall on the second shift which would 21 have been the early morning hours of Friday, tha t the gas f-22 Problem was building up in the makeup tank before you wm t 5 )T .23 home? Does that ring a bell? It would have been early a.m. 24 on Friday, midnight Thursday and early Friday morning, if 25 you were on then. MO*e CM Sf F NOCP APHIC SERV 8CE. 1413 De.D MILL RO A D. WrYOMa sssNO. PA. 99610 e
52-1 A We were venting the makeup tank but we were able -- /^ 2 we were venting it period ica lly. We were abic, at that As] 3 ' point, to keep with the gas increase. I don't think any of (v~ls 4 us were overly concerned about the buildup rate at that 5 time. 6 Q Do you recall whether there was any discussion at 7 all at this time about the possibility of rigging a line 8 from the makeup tank or from the waste gas decay tank back 9 into containment to try to degas the system? Do you remember 10 during this period of time, before the continuous venting 11 of the makeup tank, whether there was any such discussion 12 about that possibility or did the discussion of that 13 possibility come later? U<s 14 A I am not sure whether it came before or af ter. 15 Q You don't recall that? 16 A No. 17 Q During the first day, Bb rch 28th, what did you 18 perceive the rule of the NRC people in the Unit 2 control 19 room to be? 20 A ' I guess I really didn't have a perception. They 21 were there but they never said anything. 22 Q They never made any recommendations or suggestions -(~) x_/ 23 about the operations ? 24-A Not to me they : td n ' t. ~ -). Q./ 25-Q As far as you knew, were they. there to report back l uom.cn s+rnoanaewie senvecc. sais oto uiu. acao. wvomissmo em seeso
53 1 to the NRC on what was' happening? - fm. 2 A I think I drew that conclusion' only because they U-3 spent a lot-of their time on the phone. They were party to h ~ 4 our conversations and our meetings in the shif t s u pervis or 's 5 office. They-had access to everything we said. We d idn ' t 6 go someplace else and then go someplace else. They were i 7 working out of the of fice that we were working out of. 8 Q But they were playing a completely passive role 1 -9 as far as you could see? 10 A As far as I was concerned, they were playing a 11 completely pascive role. 12 Q Did that change on Thursday or Friday, to your 13 obs erva tion? + 14 A Someplace in there, and I don't know it to be 3 l 15 Friday, but they became involved in procedure writing, 16 improvals and planning through the Dick Stello-Arnold 17 chain. 18 Q So that would have been after lia rold Denton and 19 Mr. Stello arr'.ved on Friday afternoon?- 20 A I think so. It is hard to put a time frame on a J 21 lot -_of these items. It kind of runs together. p 22' Q Well, you said you weren't sure whether it was v 23 Frida y. Do -yo'u think that it could have begun on Thursday 24 or after Friday? p - n.) ( 25 -A It could have been Saturday is wha.t I was thinking MONtCN STEteOGmAPHtC S(MytCf $413 OLO W4L ROAO. WTOMIS$:NG. PA $S410 --s
'54 I more of. [] 2 Q Probably Saturday is the most likely? V 3 A Yes. -- 4 Q Friday or Saturday? 5 A To me it is more than Thursday. 6 Q Up until tha,t new rule became a pparent, the NRC 7 inspectors in the control room were not making any recommen-8 daeions or suggestions ? 9 A They did not make any to me. 10 Q Did you know of any they were making to other 11 people that were obvious to you? 12 A I was not aware of anything they made to anybody 13 else. 14 Q And they weren't exercising any veto or seeking 15 to exercise any vetoes c"er what you were doing as far as 16 you knew? 17 A No, sir. 18 Like I sa Ld, they were present throughout the 19 time we filled the system and started the reactor coolant 20 pumps: 21 Q Apparently some time on Thursday letdown flow was 22 reestablished. 'Ihe control room log indicates that that 23 occurred about 6 :00 o' clock in the morning but the ECS 24 log suggests that it occurred at 7:00 or 8:00 o ' clock at pO 25 night. Do you have any recollection about tha t ? o.c .m.oo......c.....c...... oto itt.......o
- i. m.....
i... )
55 1 A I believe it was established close to 6:00 o' clock 2 in the marning than it was to 7:00 o' clock at night. (]} 3 Q Do you think it was early in the morning? ( )' 4 A Yes, s ir, I do. 5 Q The control room log indicates that the auxiliary 6 building sump tank was pumped to the waste tank in the 7 af ternoon of thrch 29th but the ECS log indica tes that it 8 was the auxilicry building sump that was pumped to the waste 9 tank. Do you recall which would have been accurate? 10 A I do not. My way of thinking and my thoughts on 11 that would be that it would be the sump. T 12 Q The sump pump? 2 13 A Yes, because we would be worried about water on (m v; 14 the floor. 15 Q Apparently, there is a log that shows at abo ut 16 7 :00 p.m. on bbrch 30th, which would be Friday, that there were efforts underway to refill the borated water storag'e 17 18 tank. How was that done, do you remember? 19 A Yes, I do. 20 It was done by.really two methods. One was, we 21 strung hose from Unit 1 across and into the spent fuel l j) 22 system for Unit 2 avi ve transferred spent fuel fluids of l 23 Unit L1 over and we transferred the Unit 1 BWST into the l '24 Unit I spent fuel pools. We also brought Al Burton in,'and l }<]- . g. 25 I am not sure when, and they topped off the. tank, also. Our MONtCE STENOGR APHIC SERVtCE, 6 413 OLD MILL RO A D. WYCMeSSING. P A. 18410
56 I idea.was to get - a reserve of -water.on.ha nd for a ny further .e s 2 )- emergency. 3 Q Do you remember whether the possibility or -() 4 probability of a large amount of noncondensible gas, hydroger. 5 ga s, wa s realized? 6 A I can't say for sure. I am trying to think it 7 was Friday or Saturday. 8 Q Do you recall being aware or being concerned as 9 early as Thursday night or Friday morning about whether 10 the re wa s a lot of hydrogen still in the primary cooling 11 system? 12-A No, I don't recall that. 13 Q By your recollection, that would have been Friday {-} 14 a f ternoon or evening at the earliest when a hydrogen bubble m . 15 problem became to be perceived as a problem? 16 A By my recollectio n, yes, s ir, tha t is correct., 17 Q Do you remember wlyo undertook, at tha t time, to 18 make any calculations about this or assess the prablem? 19 A GPU, but I don't know who would have been the GPU 20 person. 21 MR FRAMPTON: Off the record. (~} (Discussion had of f the record. ) 22 (. 23 BY MR. FRAMPTON: 24 Q - Mr. Ross, one further line of questioning. f(~3 Az/ ^ -25 You were deposed rather extensively by staff MONacst ST E h0GR APH8C SERVtCE. 14 9, OLD MILL RO A D, W VOMlSStNG, PA. 99910
~ 57
- 1L members and
- th~e ' President 's Commission on the ' issue of 1
.2 - making 7the-bypass. valve for the condensate polisher system L3 in Unit 2 a n' automatic valve. .h 4 -I believe that there was a trip of that system -5 during November -of 1977_ while you were 'still a shift 6 . supervisor ~, is that right ? 7 A .That is correct. 8 Q As a result of that, you were involved in writing 9. a problem report that suggested that the valve be made an 10 a utoma t ic va lve, is tha t correct ? 11-A That is correct. 12 Q Can you describe for me, a nd I will be ha ppy' to - .c 13 show you the document that you were asked about, which were 4 - 14 marked as exhibits 119,120 and 121 to your President's i e 15 Commise'on deposition, what the various responsibilities . 16 were when something like this ha ppens. In other words, whose 17 responsibility would it have been to decide whether a 18 design change was necessary to make a request for such a 19 . change and. actual.ly implement such a. cha nge between Met-Ed, - 20 GPU a nd Burns & Roe? Can you tell me what the various 21 responsibilies were in that kind of a situation at that '22 L t ime ?. '3 23: A-In the situation we were in, GPU has overall-
- 24
. construction authority and res ponsibility for the p lant. 25 . That is' where we were in November-of 1977. in Unit 2.: - mokica svenoomarwie aanvice. sats oto uitt e ano. wrouissimo. ca. iesto n ...e-.g.n+,,.. ,,-,.,4 n > -, -
58 1 We,; as the plant owner, can and do question and X -2 write up GPU start-up problem reports and that is what I 3 .have written here. The start-up group of General Public n(-)- 4 Utilities would resolve those quertions. 5 Q So GPU would decide whether to ask Burns & Roe 6 to make a design change if one were required? 7 A That is correct. 8 Q That would be GPU's decision? 9 A That is correct. 10 Q If they had asked Burns & Roe to do that and Burns 11 & Roe would have ordinarily done it or would Burns & Roe 12 made an independent decision on that? 13 A I am sure Burns & Roe would have engineered it f'-) s 14 but they just told GPU how -much it costs. 15 Q In other words, if GPU had decided that it wanted 16 an automatic valve instead of a motor driven valve, an air 17 operated automatic valve, then they could have instructed 18 Burns & Roe to engineer it and procure it, is thrt right? 19 A They could have instructed them. They could have 20 also asked - Burus 16 Roe to make an independent assessment i 21 o f whether or not it was required, which they have done many O 2 et=ee-23 Q What was the role that Met-Ed, as the operating .( ) 24 company, was playing at that time? Were they simply y*./ 25 requesting GPU to evaluate things like that.or were they mo~,c5 stenoana e stav ce m s o6a uiu poao. wrouissiaa. ca. issio
59 1-sometimes saying to GPU, "We need a cha nge," in so many O 2 word s ? kJ 3 A Normally we would just write a GPU start-up () 4 problem report requesting them to evaluate the situation. 5 Q -So you, as a Met-Ed person, would flag this 6 issue for GPU to consider a nd decide? 7 A That is correct. 8 Q Can you explain to me, from these documents as 9 they refresh your reco11cetion', what ha ppened here? 10 A Yes. 11 What happened here was that the pla nt was in -- 12 the secondary system was hot and vacuum and seals 13 established. W'e had an inadvertent valve operation in the 14 polisher system that concerned me very much. 15 Inadvertent valve operation can cause a total 16 loss of flow in the secondary system. At this time we 17 didn't even have fuel in the core to my knowledge anyway. 18 We then decided to look at one of the causes we 19 were concerned about and we had several people look at it 20 and I was one of the people, there was an I&C engineer 21 .that looked at it and there was an operations engineer that T 22. looked at this particular problem. What we generated was ('/ x-23 one: A letter to our superintendent and to our then /~N 24 supervisor of technical support, our chief engineer, Jim t) 25 Seelinger at the time, a request and an evaluation of what M o re tC R ST E NOGR A PM4C SERYlC E. le t S OLD MetL RO A D, W TOMeSSING, PA-19410
60 I we saw and included in that was the 'PC ' questionnaire.
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Q In the incident that you acuressed yourself to, 3 the flow through the condensate polishe'rs wa s lost ? () 4 A Tha t is correct. 5 Q What happened was that the operator tried to open 6 the bypass valve? 7 A That is correct. 8 Q And could not operate it from the control room 9 because the pressure differential was too great across the 10 valve, the bypass va lve, is that right? 11 A I don't know for sure if it was the pressure 12 differential but the valve would not operate from the control I ~ 13 room. ()- 14 Q-When that was the case, you had to send somebody 15 to operate it by hand with a wheel or something? 16 A That is correct. 17 Q You suggested that one way of dealing with this 18 problem was to put in a bypass valve that would operate 4 19 automatically and more effectively in the case of loss of 20 flow ceross tbc polisher. units ? 21 A That is correct. 22 Q Do you know what caused the loss of flow across g-b- 23-the polisher unit or units ? ,/-) 24 A We felt,-at the time, it was induced by water L/ 25 getting into the control air system for the polisher. l i MOhtCM Sf t NO3paPMIC StevtCE, 18 6 3 OLO MILL Mo tD. W TOM 86$4NG. PA. 19410
61 1 Q: . What did the control air system control? Dld it (}}) 2 control the inlet and outlet valves on each condensate 3 po lisher ?- () 4 A Tha t is correct. 5 Q And water getting into that air system caused 6 those valves ~ to trip close? 7 A That is correct. 8 Q Do you know what the original design was for those 9-inlet and outlet valves ? Were'they supposed to fail open 10 a nd fa it c los e or fa ll a s is, do yo u know tha t ? 11 A I do not know at this time. 12 Q But in any event they failed closed in this (') ' 13 particular failure? y 14 A That is correct. 15 Q It appears from the documents that the response 16 of the t people who reviewed this was that no a utoma tic k 17 valve was necessary, is that what the document shows ? 18 A It appears that that was their response. 19 Q' Can you interpret the documents for me? It. 20' appears that in response to a request that a design change 21 be considered that the GPU people said, "No design change -( T 22 is necessary to improve the bypass valve because the thing \\~) 23 that caused the ~ bypass valve to have to come into operation ' ('I 74 in-the first place was n't supposed to-happen." Is tha t a l p 'q./ 25 fair interpretation of the way you read the documents? I MOh8CK Sf f MOGR APHIC SERVICE. I443 000 MILL NO AD. W TOME sttNO, PA. 19410 ~
62 I A I think that is probably fair. I') 2 Q That response didn't really address itself to \\~/ 3 the concern you were raising, did it ? (,,s) _4 A Not fully. 5 .I think.we wrote two concerns. One: We had 6 water in the -air. Two: We added on the valve problem. 7 In hindsight, perhaps we could have been more 8 effective by separating the two problems. 9 Q Was this a problem that had arisen or come to your 10 attention before this incident in November of '77? 11 A No, this was the first, at least to my recollection. 12 Q Do you have any knowledge about a trip that 13 (} occurred in November of 1978 in Unit 2 that caused all these 14 valves -- same valves to close on the condensate polishers'- 15 and stop, terminate all feed water flow? 16 A I do not. 17 Q An incident in which somebody turned off a switch 18 and turned off all the power to that system and closed all 19 the valves inadvertently? 20 A I know of the incident. I don't know any 21 specifics of it. i ,( } 22 Q Other than the questioning that you went through 23 with the President's Commission staff and the qu2 stion I l f) 24 have asked you here about this condensate polisher system, i Q~' ~ i 25 are there any things that are significant to this matter l MONeCM sith0GRAPMic SEnviCE, 1413 OLD MILL poao, wroMassime. Pa sesso
63 I that-you really haven't been asked about that are important, f') 2 any knowledge that you have about it ? v 3 A Nothing that I think is impcrtant. I think it. is n 'V' 4 stated pretty well there. 5 FR. FRAMPTON: Thank you. 6 FR. DIENELT: I have some additionni questioning 7 about venting _ the makeup tank. 4 8 BY FR, DIENELT: 9 Q To your knowledge when was the tank first vented 10 subsequent to bbrch 28th? 11 A It was vented L fcro the release on Friday. How 12 soon after the accident I ca n ' t really put a time table on 'p 13 it. I do know we were venting it the night before. v 14 Q Were you on duty or present when the first venting 15 took place? 16 A That I don't know for sure. I did vent the cank. 17 I don't know if it wa s the first time. 18 Q Did you make the decision to vent the tank when 19 you first vented it alone or did you have discussions.with 20 naybody else regarding the venting? 21 A I am sure we had discussions. I don't specifically ]. 22 remember - the discuss ions but in the frame we were dealing 23 .with, we talked about everything a.
- ha t t ime.
p . 24 ,Q With whom did you discuss it? ! gs) 25 _A Again, I don't have specific time frames but we WOhrCR SithCCR APHIC 6f ayaCE. 14 9 5 Oto MtLL 840AD W TOMISSING. P A 49410
64 I would have discussed it with the duty supervisor. Fo r me 2 -it 'would have been Seelinger, I am sure. 3 Q Do you know whether there was a written procedurc. 4 wit) respect-to the venting of the tank? 5 A Probably not; not until some time later. 5 Q I show you a document which has been introduced 7 into a prior deposition as Exhibit 7. It is a one-page 8 handwritten document. At the top of which there is the 9 title Vent:ing MU Tank Gas Space Event Pattern. Do you 10 recognize that document ? 11 A No, I don 't. It could have easily been in 12 existence at the time. Many of the procedures we started to C) 13 write sta rted to take this format. I don' t specifically 14 remember that one. 15 Q This format meaning handwritten? 16 A Yes. 17 Q Do you know whose handwriting that is written in? 18 A I t' o no t. 19 Q It is not yours? 20 A It is not mine., I don't write quite that good. 21 Q Neither do I. t 22-Am I correct that neither before, during or after 23 the time of the intermittent venting, did you consult or use i ) 24 this written procedure? 25 A I never recall using it. 1.O*stCM STE NOOR A PHIC 5tRveC E. - t ela OLD MILL RO AD WYOMIS$1NG. PA 99610
65 1 Q' When the venting was done on your shif t., who did bm)+ 2 the physical acts necessary to achieve the venting? 3 A It would be one of the control room operators. p/. 4 L-Q- Am I correct that the physical act consisted 5 essentially of turning or opening MUV 13? 6 A-That is correct. 7~ Q During the period on Thursday the 29th up to 6 11:00 p.m. or midnight and beginning when you took over 9 the shift on Thursday afternoon, do you know how many times 10 the makeup tank was vented? 11 A I do not. 12 Q What record, if any, exists that would show that? Q 13 A I would probably say there would be no record. 14 The only chance you would have of a record, sometimes on 15 the 28th we established a gentleman that did nothing but 16 write down movements in the control room, knowing that some 17 day we would have to go back and I don't know where that i 18 record is. 19 Q Who was that individual? 20 'A I am sure it wa.s more than one person that did tha t. 21 The Only one I can rem;mber on the 28th was Don Berry. ) 22 Q Did you tell him when you were going to vent the J 23 makeup tank? -( 24 A The instructions to everybody in the control room 57 - 25 -was that when they manipulated anything they were supposed wo=ica struoan..mc senwice. eus oto usu acao. wrownsino. n-. sesio
~66 I to tell Berry. 2 Q Would it have been the centrol room operator who (~]' 3 actually turned the MUV 13 who would have told Berry rather (m.) 4 than you? m 5 A It would have been. 6 Q When you first were involved in venting the 7 makeup tank, what was your reason for doing so? 8 A I think just to keep the pressure down. 9 Q Fk. Floyd relieved you at about 11:00 p.in., 1 10 midnight on Thursday, is that correct ? 11 A I am not sure if that is correct. 12 Q Do you remember Mr. Floyd relieving you at some 13 point between Thursday and Friday? 14 A 7 do. 15 Q When Mr. Floyd relieved you, did the two of you 16 have a discussion of the status of operations ? 17 A We did. 18 Q What did you tell him with respect to the venting l 19 of the makeup tank? 20 A I thb k I just, told him we were periodically 21 venting it to maintain pressure. I _think I gave him a (") 22 basic rundown on the plant and that is about it. 23 Q ~ Did he ask.you any questions about the venting? ("T 24 A No, sir. \\.). 25 Q Do you recall, whether at the time that you and he MOhicot STENOGmaPMIC SERveCE.
- e. 3 OLD MILL RO AD. WYOMi$51NG. P A.
testo
67 I had the transition, you were aware of any correlation which /'S 2 had been drawn between the venting and any radioactive (,/ 3 release? ( )I 4 .A We were aware of a correlation but I am not sure 5 that we were aware of it right then. At some point we were 6 aware of. that correlation and control. 7 Q Would it be fair to say that at the time you 8 transferred to bk. Floyd, you regarded the periodic venting 9 of the makaup tank as a routine procedure as opposed to 10 something which was of particular significance in the 11 response to this incident? 12 A Yes, I think that is fair. I don't think anything 13 was extremely abnormal at that time, S s/ 14 Q Do you recall coming back to relieve Fk. Floyd 15 on Friday the 30th? 16 A Vaguely, yes I do. 17 Q Do you recall t 5out what time that was ? .18 A. I feel it was in the. evening. I feel it was after 19 dinner s ometime. 20 Q Dinner meaning,the noon meal or the evening meal? 21 A
- Supper,
'22 Q Did you and Mr. Floyd discuss the status of the e] J 23 plant when you relieved him at that-t ime ? 24 A .Yes. p/ l '(" P 25 Q Wha t, if anything, did he tell you about the venting l ~~ o~.a.m. ...~,e m.a..... m o. u...... m o........,.....
68 I at that point ? /s 2 A At that point we discussed the venting and I s.) 3 think at the time we were leaving the valve open all the /~') 4 time. I think that is where we came in. He mentioned that k) 5 they had had some sort of a release during the day and 6 didn't elaborate an awful lot upon it. 7 Q Were you aware that the release that he referred 8 to was a release which had at least arguably prompted 9 consideration of or an order to evacuate? 10 A At tha t t ime I wa s not. 11 Q When did you become aware of that? 12 A I think I became fully aware of it during the 13 Presidential hearings. 14 Q It was not, in any event, a matter of hours or 15 days af ter you took over from Mr. Floyd tha t you became 16 aware of that? 17 A . didn't become fully aware of it. I was aware 18 that there was a release that prompted some miscommunication 19 or communication between the agencies. I wasn't aware of 20 .Floyd's s'tatement of any emergency contacts at the time. 21 I was aware there was a problem. I became fully aware n az-the next day. () 23 Q Were you aware, during your shift or on the next f~s 24 - day, that the problem had its origin in the_ continuous 4 ( V' ' 25 venting of the makeup? MONICK STENOOR APHIC SERveCE, tel, OLD MeLL NOap, wvouesslNG. PA, l9990 s a
~ ~ '69~ 1 A Yes, I was. 7'[ 2 Q What, -if anything, was done on your shift on Q/ 3 Friday and on subsequent days, with respect to the operation - h 4 of the venting or the monitoring of the venting? 5 A I F.m working on my recollection, but what I 6 remember is, we opted to keep the pressure just as low as 7 we could on the makeup at that time. Essentially, we kept 8 the valve open and kept it down to vent air pressure. 9 -Q Was the decision to keep the valve open at that 10 point made at your level? 11 A No. At that point it was made at a level higher 12 than mine. 13 Q In other words, you got dtreet Lons from someone 14 else to keep the vent opened? 1 l 15 A Yes, sir. 16 Q As shifts changed between you and Mr. Floyd, yo u 17 relayed to him or he relayed to you that the instructions 18 were still the same? 19 A' That is correct, 20 Q Who did those instructions come from? 21 A I can't be absolutely sure. I f el t tha t they came . (~ 22 from the IIerbein-Arnold circuit. 23 Q There is currently or there was last week on the p 24 MI V 13 switch in the Unit 2 control room, a small notice v' 25. dated 3-31 instructing no one to change the status of MUV 13 MonstCM ST E h0GW APtolg SE RWeCf. 94 I 3 000 MILL NO40. W WOMe & SI*84. P4 19890
~ 70 I without prior approval signed J. Herbein. Do you know any-p~ 2 thing about that note? -3 A I am sure that note was put there during that
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time period. It was put there in an effort to control the 4 5 venting of the tank.. 6 Q Do you know of your personal knowledge when that 7 was put on there or the other circumstances surrounding it? 8 A I can't give you a date that it was put there. 9 Q You didn't put it on' there? 10 A I did not, 11 Q You didn't observe anyone putting it on there? 12 A I did not. 13 Q Were you aware of a reading of 3 rem that was made U 14 over the stack on Thursday a t about 2 :00 p.m. ? 15 A No, sir. I am sure I would have remembered that 16 one. 17 Q What discussions or communications did you have, 18 if any, with Mr. Dubiel and Mr. Mulleavy, M-u-1-1-e-a-v-y, 19 regarding the venting of the makeup tank or the consequences ~ 20 of the events leading up.to the venting of the makeup 21 ta nk?. '22 A I don't recall any specific discussions with them mb 23 at all, 24 em Q Were you involved in the decision-making with U 25 respect to installing pipes to run from either the makeup MONIC K ST E h0GRa PMIC SthveCE. f et S OL D MILL ROAD. WTOMistiNG. PA. 19800
71 I tank or the waste gas disposal tank to the containment ? O ^ vee e=d #o. t ee tevetvea te te-8eese e 3 felt we had gas building up in the gas decay tanks and we ,V d were worried about inadvertent release to the atmosphere. c 5 We didn't know where it came from but eventually 6 we. generated a procedure and started running a line. 7 Q From your answer, do I understand that it is your 8 view that you were not a principal actor in the decision ~ 9 to run the additional pipiag? 10 3 .Ihat is correct. 11 Q Were you on duty when the piping was put into 12 use? D) 13 A Yes, I wa s. V I4 Q Do you recall when that was ? 15 A No, sir, I am sorry I don't. 16 Q Did you make the decision to initiate use of the 17 piping yourself or did that come from higher authority? 18 A It came from higher authority. 19 Q Again, the Herbein-Arnold cireuit ? 20 A I would think.. 21 MR. DIENELT: Off the record. /h 22 (Discussion had off the record.) 23 BY FR. DIENELT: t3 24 .' y;. Q Do you know whether there was any piping run A 25 from the reactor coolant bleed holdup tank to containment? o. c...........c.... c..... om -m
- o... m o...i ~....... io
.i
72 [ 1 A To the containment building itself? {]} 2 Q yes. 3 A No, the re wa s not. (~) 4 Q Is there any additienal piping run from the 5 reactor coolant bleed holdup tank to any source? 6 A There wasn't any additional piping run. There 7 were arrangements made in the system such that waste water 8., could be pumped into the biced tank and that consisted of, 9 I think, a small _ jumper and a removal of a check valve. I 10 guess that is some additional piping but no major job. 11 Q Did the group, Mr. Schicmann, bk. Fa us t a nd Mr. 1 12 Frederick, who were, as I understand it, on duty in the (T 13 control room in Unit 2 when the incident began, work V 14-directly for you in Unit I? Y s a nd no. In their duties in Unit 2 they 15 A e '16 . would have reported to James Floyd. All of them at one 17 time or another had experience in Unit I which they would 18 have had... 19 Q Had they worked as a team for you prior to March ~ 20 28th? 21' A . No, sir, they had ' not. 22L Q Did you bring with you today a. copy of your {'y 4 23 resume? - /N. 24 - 'A' .Yes, sir, I d id ~. j./ 25 MR'. DIENELT: Picase mark this - as~ the next exhibit. seO N*C W ST E NOGR A PHIC 55RVeC E. Gef t OL D MtLI. ROA D, WYOenceSsNo, PAi Opelp
73 1 1 (Whereupon, the reporter marked the resume of (v") 2 Michael J. Ross as Exhibit No. 3027.) 3 BY MR. DIENELT: 7_x V 4 Q I have marked as Exhibit 3027 a three-page 5 document entitled Resume of Michael J. Ross. For the record, 6 can you identify that? 7 A Yes, s ir. That is an accurate up to date resume 8 of mine. 9 Q When was it prepa red ? ' 10 A It was prepared by me and typed by somebody else. 11 Q When was it prepared? 12 A I am sorry. It was prepared approximately a couple /^J weeks ago for a deposition by the Presidential Committee. 13 G 14 Q During the period beginning bbrch 28th and .15 continuing to the present, did you maintain a log or diary 16 of your activities? 17 A During the day of the 28th? 18 Q During the period from the 28th to the present, 19 had you maintained a log or diary? 20 A I have not. 21 Q Have you maintained any notes regarding your /S 22 act ivities ? .V 23 A I have not maintained any notes. ( _/'N -24~ Q Have-you ' prepared any memorandum or other documents e . \\./ 25L summarizing your activities in. connection with 'the '1hree Mile asometC et STINOGRAPMic SERysCE, 94t3 OLD acLL NOaO. WTOMISSING PA 19410 l
74 1 'sla nd incident ? rA() 2 A I have not. We have a joint document that I believe 3 they already have, prepared by the group shortly thereafter t' 4 and I had a pa rt in that. 5 Q This is a document prepared by or for bk. Miller? 6 A Tha t is correct. 7 Q And you made an input to that? 8 A Yes, s ir. 9 Q This hopefully concludes or is about to conclude 10 this deposition. You have also been deposed, as we know, for 11 two or three days by the President 's Commission and you have 12 been interviewed by I&E. Notwithstanding all of that, I dNF 13 would like to ask you if there is anything else that we and 14 they have not asked you which you know and which you believe 15 would be helpful to us in our broad inquiry. 16 A There is nothing in addition. 17 MR. DIENELT: With that we will adjourn this 18 deposition. I don't think it will be necessary to ask you 19 to come back to answer any other questions. If that proves 20 to be the case, we will make arrangements through your 21 counsel. Thank you very much. / 22 (Whereupon, the deposition was concluded at 5:30 p.m. ) 23 m j 24 s 25 M O Pe eC K STENOGRAPMsc SERveCt. 1413 OL D Meil RO A D. W TOMISSING. P4 19410
79 I CERTI FT CATE [ 2 I hereby certify that the proceeding,s and evidence 3 are contained fully and accurately in the notes taken by me 0, /~w 4 on the hearing of the foregoing cause, and that this copy is 5 a correct transcript o f the same. 6 ( . op"oph C. Spont 3relli, Rep)rter '.i.mo'Ynwealth a f Pennsylvania 8 9 MONICK STEN 0 GRAPHIC SERVICE 10 My Commission expires July 20, 1981. 11 12 13 u e 15 16 17 .18 19 20 21 i . j^3 (/- 22 23 ( 24 25 uove..rsnoon. .e...v ce.,. i s s o u,a no... vo....m..,a '... , -. _. -}}