ML19308C401
| ML19308C401 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Crane  |
| Issue date: | 10/04/1979 |
| From: | Dunn B, Folsom F, Hebdon F NRC - NRC THREE MILE ISLAND TASK FORCE |
| To: | |
| References | |
| TASK-TF, TASK-TMR NUDOCS 8001230373 | |
| Download: ML19308C401 (96) | |
Text
{{#Wiki_filter:, /,. 9, i;-. O NUCLE AR REGUL ATORY COMMISSION i IN THE MATTER OF: i i THREE MILE ISLAND i SPECIAL DEPOSITION d DEPOSITION OF: BERT M. DUNN l i o P00RORGNA_ i 1 Place - Lynchburg, Virginia ' ' ~ 9 4 October 1979 1 - 92 t I i l l l l Telechone: (202) 347 3700 t' ~ ACE - FEDERAL REPORTERS,INC. l l Official Reporters 444 North Capitel Street g I 23 0373 Washington, D.C. 20001 i NATIONWIDE COVERAGE D AILY i i
n 1 1 M*^9LON UNITED STATES OF AMERICA \\-. ipbl 2 NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION 3 4 In the matter of: 5 THREE MILE ISLAND S ECIAL DEPOSITION 6 DEPOSITION OF: BERT M. DUNN 8 Conference Room A 9 Babcock and Wilcox 3515 Old Forest Road to Lynchburg, Virginia 11 4 October 1979 1:00 p.m. 12 O arroaz: is FRED FOLSOM, ESQ. ja FRED HEBDON, ESQ. GEORGE EDGAR, ESQ. 15 LISTA CANNON, ESQ. JOHN MULLIN, ESQ. 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 ((q ,/ 24 Ace-Feder:A Reporters, Inc. 25 s
2 t' 1 10 9 C,O_ N T E_ N_ T S_ Witness Examination 3 Bert M. Dunn 3 4 5 I t 6 7 Insert 1 and Insert 2 follow page 6 i l 8 9 i I 10 l i 1 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 j Ace-Federal Reporters, Inc. l 2S l l
3 f "Pbl P_ R O,C E E_ D_ I_ N_ G S_ ~ 2 MR. HEBDON: Would you raise your right hand, l 1 3 please? 4 Whereupon, 5 BERT M. DUNN 6 was called as a witness, and, having been first duly sworn, 7 was examined and testified as follows: 8 EXAMINATION 9 BY MR. HEBDON: 10 Q Would you please state your full name for the 11 record? 12 A Bert Merrit Dunn. I k-Q Okay. 14 MR. HEBDON: For the record, this is a copy of the 15 letter to Mr. Dunn dated October 1st, 1979, from Mr. Rogovin, 16 Director of the NRC TMI Special Inquiry Group. 17 BY MR. HEBDON: 18 Q Have you read this document before? 19 A Yes, I read it at lunch. 20 Q Do you understand the information set forth in this 21 letter, including the general nature of the NRC TMI Special 22 Inquiry, your rights to have an attorney present today as your 23 representative, and the fact that information you provide here () 24 may eventually become public? Ac 44 r. n porters, inc. 25 A I believe so. I
4 1
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Are you represented by counsel today? 2 MR. EDGAR: Yes. 3 THE WITNESS: Yes. 4 MR. HEBDON: Would you state your name, please? '5 MR. EDGAR: George Edgar. 6 BY MR. HEBDON: 7 You should be aware that the estimony you give has Q 8 the same force and effect as if you were testifying in a court 9 of law. My questions and your responses are being taken down 10 and will later be transcribed. You will be given the opportunity 11 to look at that transcript and make changes as you deem necess-12 ary. However, to the extent that your subsequent changes are [h 13 A/ significant, these changes may be viewed as affecting your 14 credibility. So please be as complete and accurate as you can 15 in responding to the questions. 16 If you at any point during the deposition do not 17 understand a question, please feel free to stop and we'll try 18 to clarify the question for you. 19 What is your current position? 20 A Manager, Emergency Core Cooling Analysis for B&W. 21 Q Could you briefly describe what that position 22 i involves? 1 I 23 l A It involves seeing that analyses are performed on (\\ 24 the emergency core cooling system, which is called upon to lAceh at Reponen, Inc. 25 actuate in the event of a loss of coolant accident at a nuclear I
5 I mpb3 plant, providing documentation to various review bodies to 2 demonstrate that an effective analysis has been undergone or l 3 has been done to assure that the ECCS will perform its 4 intended functions, mob uning a staff and the staff capability 5 to perform those functions, and certain administrative tasks 6 associated with the maintenance and employment of personnel. 7 Q Okay. 8 What was your position in late 1977? 9 A It was the same. 10 Q For whom did you work? II A At that time I was the -- the individual? I2 Q Yes. 13 A Dr. Don Roy. 14 Q For whom do you work now? 15 A Dr. Allen Ulmack. 16 Q Approximately when did that change take place? I7 A I think it's been about a year. 18 Q All right. I9 What is your educational background? 20 A I have a Bachelor of Science Degree in physics 2I from Washington State University and a Masters of Science in 22 physics from Lynchburg College. 23 Q Could you briefly describe your employment history, 24 including positions held at B&W? Ace-Feder') Reporters, Inc. 25 A I graduated from Washington State University in
i 6 j \\ 1968. I think it was just January or something; I may be off 0pb4 i 2 a year. And I went to work for Douglas United Nuclear at the l 3 Hanford installation near Richland. i I 4 I was employed in various positions at that installa-5 tion. In approximately May of 1970 I was involved in a reduc-6 tion of force effort at the Hanford installation associated j with the plutonium cut-back needs of the Defense Department l 7 f 8 and secured employment in Babcock ar d Wilcox within the emergency I i 9 core cooling group, or unit or whatever it was called at that i 10 time. 11 I was employed as an engineer in ECCS, although 12 it wasn't called that but it was the same function, and later 7s 13 I became a supervisory engineer in ECCS and then following that 14 was promoted to manager. 15 BY MR. FOLSOM: 16 Q Do you have a resume? 17 A Yes, I do. It's probably got better dates on it 18 than I remember. 19 Q All right. I 20 MR. FOLSOM: We'll mark that Insert number two and 21 put it in the record. 22 (The docurc.2nt referred to follows; and the 23 Rogovin letter to Dunn, dated October 1, 1979 follows:) ( 24 Ace-Federal Reporters, Inc. 25 1
/ 2 /lL4 Gi A(_,/ October 1,1979 In Reply Refer to: NTFTM 791001-07 Mr. L. M. Dunn c/o George Edgar, Ecquire Margan, Lewis & Bockius Attorneys for Babcock and Uilcox Co. 1800 M Street N.U. Uashington, D.C. 20036
Dear Ih. Dunn:
I am'vriting to confirm that your deposition under oath in connection with the accident at Three Mile Island is scheduled for October 2-5, 1979 at Babcock and Wilcox facility, Lynchburg, Virginia. This will also confirn ny request for you to have your resume and any docunents in your possession or control regarding TMI-2, the accident or precursor events which you have reason to believe may not be in official NRC files, including any diary or personal working file. The deposition will be conducted by members of the NRC's Special Inquiry Croup on Three Mile Island. This Group is being directed independently of the NRC by the law firm of Rogovin, Stern and Hugc. It includes both URC per'onnel uho have been d(called to the Special Inquiry Staff, and outside sta -J and attorneys. Through a delegation of authority from the NRC under ( -)g (, Section 161(c) of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as anended, the Special Inquiry Group has a broad mandate to inquire into the causes of the accident at Three Mile Island, to identify najor problem areas and to take reco=nenda-tions for change. At the conclusion of its investigation, the Group will issun a detailed public report setting forth its findings and recommendations. Unless you have been served with a subpoena, your participation in the depos-ition is voluntary and there will be no effect on you if you decline to ansucr some or all of the questions asked you. Houcver, the Special Inquiry has been given the power to subpoena witnesses to appear and testify under oath, or to appear and produce documents, or both, at any designated place. Any person deposed nay have an attorney present or any other person he wishes acconpany hin at the deposition as his representative. You should realize that while we will try to respect any requests for con-fidentiality in conntetion with the publication of our report, we can make no guarantces. Nancs of witnesses and the infornation they provide may eventually become public, inasmuch as the entire record of the Special Inquiry Group's investigation will be made available to the NRC for whatever uses it may deem appropriate. In time, this information nay be made available to the public voluntarily, or become availabic to the public through the Freedon of Infornation Act. Moreover, other departncnts and agencies of government nay recuest access to this information pursuant to the Privacy Act of 1974. The infornation may als^ be made available in uhole or in part to connittees or () subcomnittees of the U.S. Congress. l ornce )I. suaNAuch l orTe W. J. i 1 NRC FoRIA 318 (9 76) NRCM 0240 DU.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING of CICE: 19f 9 289 309
Mr. B. M. Dann 2 Octcber 1,1979 A91 If you have testified previously vith respect to the Three !!ile Island accident, it would be useful if you could review any transcripts of your previous statement (s) prior to the deposition. Thank you for;your cooperation. Sincerely, s. e 4 ?!itchell Rogovin, Director NRC/U!I Special Inquiry Group 4 DISTRIBUTION TERA FFolsom FHebdon WParler PNorry RDeYoung EKCornell GFrampton MRogovin i NRC/TMI .9 ./1,PNoYry O 7 9/c;/79 4 ff OFFICE k... .h /. s. .h,-{/. .b
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EDUCATIONAL AND PROFESSIONAL QUALIFICATIONS BERT M. DUNN f ( UNIT MANAGER ECCS ANALYSIS UNIT NUCLEAR POWER GENERATION DIVISION BABC0CK & WILCOX COMPANY 1. My name is Bert M. Dunn, My homd address is 409 Washington Street, Lynchburg, Virginia, 24504. I am employed by the Babecck & Wilcox Company in the Nuclear Power Generation Division.as the Unit Manager for the Emergency Core Cooling System Analysis unit. 2. I received a Bachelor of Science degree in Physics f rom Washington State University in 1968, and a Master of Science degree in Physics from Lynchburg College in 1973. 3. From March 1968 to April 1970 I was employed as a physicist by the Douglas United Nuclear Corporation in Hanford. My assignments were in [Q) reactor operations, reactor safety studies (kenitics), nuclear f uels engineering, and plant reactivity calculations. 4. Since May 1970 I have been employed by the Babcock and Wilcox Company in the area of Emergency Core Cooling Analysis. These years saw the first implementation of multinode LOCA analysis, the Interin Acceptance Criteria, the ECCS Public Hearing, and finally the Final Acceptance Criteria. Although I did not appear at the hearing, I had a lead role in supporting our witnesses and following the issuance of the Final j Acceptance Criteria,' I shared prime' responsibiltiy for' development ~ oi 4 cow laint model. 5. In May 1975 I was appointed Unit Manager of the Emergency Core Cooling (j System (ECCS) Unit and have held this position continuously. n.
7 y 9 BY MR. HEBDON: 9pbl 2 Q I'd like to ask you some questions concerning' 3 an incident that occurred at Davis-Besse on September 24, 1977. 4 I'm particularly concerned with the knowledge and understanding 5 of that incident that you had prior to the accident that 6 occurred at TMI. 7 Specifically, prior to March 28, 1979, what 8 knowledge did you have concerning the incident that occurred 9 at Davis-Besse on September 24, 1977? 10 A Well, that could be very difficult, and I'm sure 11 I can't respond fully at this time. I knew that the incident 12 had occurred and I had drawn certain conclusions from it and I'^, 13 1/ about it, that it was an incident involving a stuck open PORV 14 and that Operations had successfully managed to secure the 15 plant in that incident. 16 Q How did you first become aware of the incident? 17 A Probably the first I was aware of the incident was 18 through the grapevine, and later on, a day after the incident 19 -- it was either a day or two days after that we had a presenta-20 tion describing the incident and the evolution of the plant 21 through the incident by some engineers we had sent onsite to 22 collect the data. 23 Q Who were those engineers? (m) 24
- Acehe erst Reponen, Inc.
A The only one I really remember is Joe Kelly. I 25 think there was more than just Joe that went up there. I
8 mpb2 Q
- Okay, t
And this meeting was within a day or two after the jl 2 i 3 incident? 4 A Yes. 5 0 All right. 6 What significance did you attribute to the inci-7 dent? 8 A That's another extremely broad question. 9 Q Well, when you heard about the incident did you 10 feel ' Gee, this is a major incident of significant proportions';, 11 'this is something that happens with some degree of regularity', 12 'this is a minor operational problem that we'll need to take (~^, 13 'w J care of one of these days'? On a scale of concern for signifi-14 cance, where would you put this? What sort of perspective did 15 you have? 16 A Well, there was -- we don't very often get an 17 opportunity to examine a transient that comes reasonably close 18 to being a loss of coolant accident. There was a high level 19 of interest on my part because as the particulars of this 20 transient became available there was a stuck open PORV for I 21 believe approximately 35 minutes, which involved a loss of 22 coolant from the primary system. That was not the instigating 23 event, I believe. And we were interested in viewing it from k 24 the standpoint of did it fit with our state of knowledge about j Are Feder") Reporters, Inc. what should happen in a loss of coolant accident, examining d: i
9 1 pb3 the evolution of the various primary system parameters, the I water, et cetera. 3 And other than one issue which surfaced because 4 of the accident, I would say I viewed it as an incident which S would be resolved by finding out why the PORV stuck open and 6 fixing it so that it wouldn't. 7 Q What was the one incident that surfaced? 8 A The operator had in my view taken manual control 9 of the high pressure injection system at an inappropriate time. 10 Q Why did you feel it was inappropriate? 11 A In examining the data he terminates his high 12 pressure injection before he reachieves a solid and controllable m ( 13 reactor coolant system, and had that occurred under other circum-14 stances there could have conceivably been some serious conse-15 quences of that maneuver. 16 Q What other circumstances? 17 A Well, in Davis-Besse, as I mentioned, he secured 18 his PORV in abent 35 minutes. He also had a very small 19 rupture of the primary system -- if you want to call it a 20 rupture -- an opening in the primary system. It's probably 21 not proper to term'a stuck open valve as a rupture. 22 Had it been bigger, had he not -- I said " secured" 23 didn't I? -- had he not closed the PORV or the blocked valve j o l ) 24 not sue wMch he m; boe wod accompHsh de same Ace Federd Reporters, Inc. 25 function -- in the 35 minutes and had he not been at a low I
10 power level, he conceivably could have had troubles with his $~ob4 2 core at some later time. 3 Q Okay. 4 I have on the wall here a graf of some parameters 5 associated with that particular event that was prepared by 6 Mr. Leon Engle of the NRC Staff and it's based on some reacti-7 meter data that he acquired after the incident. 8 You'll notice that one of the parameters that's 9 plotted is pressurizer level, and pressurizer level goes up 10 and then he comes back down as the plant starts to cool down, 11 and then at about two and a half minutes it turns and starts 12 to go back up, which I assume is due to the impact of the high [) 13 pressure injection system. 's 14 Then at about four and a half minutes into the 15 event it turns and goes back down again, at about the same 16 time that the operator secured the high pressure injection 17 system. Then at about six minutes it turns and goes back up j 18 again and continues to increase until the pressurizer level is 19 offscale high at about eight minutes. 20 Now again in the transient at about 36 minutes the 21 pressurizer level drops off very sharply, and at that point, 22 as I understand it, the operators initiated HPI again, and 23 then secured it again about 60 minutes into the event. ,/' l 24 Now of the two times that the operator secured I Ace-Federet Reporters, Inc. 25 high pressure injection, which one of those two were you 1
11 1 e concerned about? I )pb5 %J 2 A Primarily the first time. 3 Q Did you see anything inappropriate in the securing 4 of the high pressure injection the second time? 5 A I don't think so. I'd have to go back and 6 really ask myself whether I had asked that question and look 7 at this data again and try to reconstruct my state of know-8 ledge at the particular time I'm reviewing the transient. 9 But I believe I reached the conclusion that in the second 10 securing of high pressure injection he has had sufficient 11 information such that he knows he's got a solid reactor 12 coolant system and that maintaining the high pressure injec-I~) 13 is really not going to do any good \\- tion on past that perio r 14 in terms of water availability within the RCS. i 15 Q Okay. 16 I'd like to ask you some questions about the 17 specific transient itself. 18 Did you realize that steam formed in the reactor coolant system during the transient? 20 A I would say at some time during the review of the 21 transient we reached that conclusion. 22 Q Do you recall approximately when in the review 23 you realized that? [t 24
- Am) Int noomn. ine.
A I think it was reasonably early, probably before 25 the presentation on it. We probably had some strip chart data, i
12 f pb6 but I can't recall exactly when. N-] 2 O What significance did you assign to that fact? 3 Was it a particular concern, did it come as much of a sur-4 prise? 5 A No. 6 C It didn't strike you as particularly unusual or 7 particularly surprising that steam formed in the reactor 8 coolant system? 9 A No. 10 Q Okay. 11 Did you realize that the steam formation in the 12 reactor coolant system caused the pressuri: fr level to increase /~' 13 k-while the leak continued? 14 A I don't think I'd phrase that statement that way. 15 I think the increase of pressurizer level is a complex phenome-16 non caused by many things, and I would have to describe it 17 completely. 18 Q Well, the increase I'm referring to would be the 19 increase from the six minute point until about the eight 20 minute point. How would you explain that increase in pressuriz-21 er level? 22 A I wouldn't even attempt to explain that i'ncrease 23 until I had really reviewed this particular set of charts and I\\ 24 .iid., n.pon.n, inc. the timing of the event, what may or may not have gone on A 25 that's not shown on that chart, and really put the thing in
13 1 total perspective. (erpb7 ) 2 I believe the generation of steam in the primary 3 system may very well play a role in such an explanation, but 4 I think I'd primarily blame it on the stuck open PORV. 5 0 Did you assess what caused the pressurizer level to 6 increase in that manner at the time that you analyzed the 7 transient? A Yes, we did. 9 Q What did you ccnclude then caused it to happen? A I don't remember explicitly. I remember we analyzed 11 the event. We concluded that it was reasonable, that it fit 12 very well with our physical understanding of what should (\\- happen, and that there was not anything unusual about the 14 reaction of the pressurizer level to this set of boundary condi-i l tions. 16 Q Then in reviewing this particular event you did 17 not find it unusual that the pressurizer level was pegged high 18 during a LOCA? 19 A Not for that loss of coolant accident, no. 20 Q In your analysis -- I believe you performed an 21 analysis of a loss of coolant accident associated with a stuck 22 open safety valve, is that correct? 23 A We have at times. f) 24 l E i d, n. n..ine. O In your analysis of that transient, do you show 25 pressurizer level going offscale high? 1
14 1 pb8 A In general the analysis provided for safety is 2 one that indicates that this is bounded by other loss of I 3 coolant accidents and is not of a degree of concern that one 4 would perform a specific analysis of that. 5 In the past I've testified that we have not per-6 formed a particular safety valve break. I was corrected on 7 that yesterday. It is my present understanding that we have 8 performed one in 1973, and that the result of that evaluation 9 was pressurizer level going offscale high. 10 Q What was the context of that evaluation? Why was 11 it done? 12 A That was done to show the results of the stuck / 'l 13 \\/ open safety valve, I believe. ~ 14 Q Would it be possible to get a copy of that evalua-15 tion? Was it documented? 16 A We can look for it. 17 MR. HEBDON: Would you provide a copy of that, 18 please? 19 MR. EDGAR: We'll search for it. If it's available 20 we'll provide it. 21 BY MR. HEBDON: 22 Q Yeu mentioned that you were informed that that 23 analysis indicated the pressurizer level would go offscale ( ) 24 Acs Federet Raporters, Inc. high. Who informed you of that fact? 25 A Mr. Bob Jones. t
15 I m b9 Q What was the basis for his conclusion? What was 2 the basis for his recollection of it if he was not looking at 3 an actual document? 4 A He may have been looking at an actual document, and 3 there quite well could be an actual document in place. If I 6 remember correctly, his basis for telling me about it was 7 briefing me on what you would ask him during his deposition 8 here. 9 Q Okay. 10 Now getting back to this change in pressurizer 11 level, I think we've discussed the possibility that it could 12 have been associated with a voiding in the primary, and we /'T 13 't) discussed the fact that it could have been because of the fact I# that the leak was from the top of the pressurizer. 15 Could you explain b w a leak from the top of the 16 pressurizer could have caused a high pressurizer level indica-I tion? 18 A Well, I will try in various degrees. When we have 19 a loss of coolant accident almost anywhere the tendency of the 20 system is to blowdown through the opening. During that process 21 there is a rush of fluid in two possible states, either in the 22 water state or the steam state to that location, attempting to 23 relieve itself out the opening. I L ' In the case of an opening in the top of the Ace Federet Reporters, Inc. 25 pressurizer the rush of fluid would be to the pressurizer and j l
16 to the opening, which, depending on the exact configuration Gpbl0 2 of the break and the break size, the specific location in the 3 pressurizer, could easily cause water to fill the pressurizer, 4 a water and steam mixture. 5 Q Where would tha'- water have come from? 6 A From the reactor coolant system. 7 Q The reactor coolant system is a solid system. You 8 can't take volume out of it. What would have made up for the 91 volume that that water occupied that was in the reactor coolant 10 system? 11 A Well, it would have either expanded to a less sub-12 cooled Jtate or expanded to form a saturated state with a steam g i 13 ,i/ and water mixture. 14 Q So then that in-rush of water would have been 15 associated with the formation of voids in the reactor coolant 16 system, wouldn't it? 17 A In all probability. 18 Q So isn't that what we've just been talking about,- 19 that you can get into an argument of which came first, the 20 chicken or the egg. But if the leve' went up in the pressuriz-21 er as a result of a surge from the primary system, that volume j 22 that's lost from the primary and put into the pressurizer has 23 to be made up, and it would seem that the mechanism that would ) 24 l Acehebrat Reporters, Inc. make that up would be that the primary would start to void, making it act like the pressurizer acts when a surge goes the I
17 1 r~7bil other way, with the pressurizer into the reactor system. ~ 2 A Well, I think you're reasonably correct. I think 3 we're talking about what the driver is, whether we're sucking 4 or whether we're pushing. 5 In~this case I think sucking is a little bit more 6 appropriate as opposed to a heating effect in the primary 7 system that overpressurizes the reactor coolant system and 8 pushes the water in. Q Well, wouldn't the sucking effect, so to speak, be 10 associated with the fact that the steam void in the top of the 11 pressurizer, and therefore the pressure throughout the reactor 12 coolant system, is reduced below the saturation pressure for () 13 the temperature in the reactor coolant system? 14 A Certainly. 15 0 So then are we still talking about steam void 16 formation in the reactor coolant system in both cases? 17 A Oh, yes. 18 Q Okay. 19 In your analysis of this particular event did you 20 give any consideration to what might have happened if the plant 21 had been at a higher power level? 22 A In my analysis of the termination of the high 23 pressure injection, yes. In my analysis of the transient it-( 24 4e..'ide n.pon.,,, ine, self, I don't think so. -25 0 !What did you conclude as a result of that analysis?
18 I "7bl2 A Which one? i i '/ 2 0-The analysis of what might have happened if the 3 plant had been at a higher power level? 4 A That was related to the termination of the high 5 pressure injection system, and I concluded that there might 6 well be serious problems caused by the incident had it occurred 7 at, say, full power, or the majority of the distance to full 8 power. 9 Q Did you in the course of your evaluation consider 10 any of the events that occurred during this incident to have 11 any generic implications? 12 A The termination of high pressure injection I -~ -} considered to be reasonably generic, yes. 14 Q Did you give any consideration to whether or not 15 this concern about securing high pressure injection should be reported to the NRC? 17 A I believe that would have crossed my mind, yes. 18 Q Do you recall considering it? 19 A At this particular time I can't recall a moment 20 in which I sat down and thought that particular thing through. 21 But I'm pretty sure I considered it. 22 Q Did you take any action to initiate any sort of a 23 chain of defense that might result in that being reported to ( 24 i Aceho)w.e n.pon.n, inc. the NRC? 25 A No.
19 ,e'7bl3 -Q So then I would assume you concluded that you did 2 not feel.it was necessary for you to take action to have that 3 reported to the NRC? 4 A I concluded that the path for resolution that I 5 chose was appropriate. 6 Q Okay. 7 BY MR. FOLSOMs 8 Q Do you recall what action was taken to correct the stuck open PORV problem? 10 A To some level of detail, not totally. It's my 11 understanding that the PORV stuck open because a relay 12 the circuitry had not been properly installed, or perhaps not [~) 13 A' even installed, at all, and that was I guess installed and 14 checked and made sure it was in there right. 1 15 Q
- ?culd that ensure that the valve would not fail 16 l
open again? 17 A Well, I'm not responsible for the design of that 18 valve, so as to whether or not that valve is assurred to not 19 fail again, it's a question that I really would need a lot 20 more detail to respond to. 21 I think there were good people in charge of that 22 program and they probably felt that.way. 23 Q And do you know whether the utility did anything () 2A other than to install the relay properly to ensure that the %.,w %,,,, 25 valve wouldn't fail closed if it failed?
20 1 l A No, I'm not familiar enough with the series of 6pbl4 2 events on that issue to tell you whether the utility did any-3 thing other than reinstall the relay and correct the relay 4 problem, whichever may be the case. And I'm not even aware 5 that that valve should fail closed or should fail open. 6 BY MR. HEBDON: 7 Q Just to make sure we didn't leave something out 8 here, we talked about this one mechanism by which you felt 9 the pressurizer level could increase as a result of a leak 10 from che top of the pressurizer. 11 Are there any other mechanisms that you believe 12 could have caused the high pressurizer level indicatiJn during f I 13 \\> this event? 14 A During this event, I don't think so. Subject to 15 our negotiation on the sucking or the pushing, I don 't 16 believe I know of any other mechanisms during this transient 17 that would result in that effect. 18 There is a potential related scenario which can 19 occur in other types of loss of coolant accidents or loss of 20' coolant accidents that proceed to longer time frames which 21 would relate the mechanism to a monometer type phenomenon 22 associated with the specific design of our surge line that 23 conceivably could also lead to a high pressure level. ( 24
- Acehi ere Repor'm, Inc.
Q All right. 25 Just as a matter of curiosity, do you know if this I
21 1 pbl5 type of pressurizer level indication uses a reference leg? A I couldn't swear to it in a court of law. I 3 believe that there is a reference leg in the Davis-Besse s' pressurizer level. S Q Could it be possible that in an event such as 6 this there woald be some flashing of water in the reference 7 leg which might give you an erroneous high level indication? 8 A Well, subject to the overriding statement that 9 all things are possible, the subject of flashing in the 10 referen leg has been reviewai in the past and determined 11 not to be of serious concern. 12 Q Do you recall when in the past, prior to TMI or _3 ('-) 13 after TMI? 14 A It was prior to TMI. 15 Q So there has been an assessment of this possibility i 16 of reference leg flashing? 17 A
- Yes, j
Q And i t was concluded that it was not considered 19 to be a credible event, is that correct? 20 A Well, not th3t the event itself would not be deemed credible, but that the degree of flashing, if there 92 was any, would be such a low level that it would not seriously 23 perturb the indicated measurement. /n) 24 Ace Nederat Reporters, Inc. -o h wouMn't Cause a signmcant change in 25 pressurizer level? I
22 bl6 A That's correct. 2 Q For example, it couldn't cause an erroneous 3 indication of a full pressurizer when the level was in fact 4 only around 200 inches? It couldn't cause an error of that 5 magnitude? 6 A I think that's fair. 7 Q Okay. 8 I'd like to go on to discuss a series of memoranda 9 that have come to be known as the Kelly-Dunn memoranda. 10 Specifically, did you receive a memorandum dated November 1st, 11 1977, in which Mr. Kelly raised concerns about customer guid-12 ance on high pressure injection operations? (m) 13 'ss' A I would expect I did. I certainly was aware that 14 the memo had been written. 15 MR. HEBDON: For the record, I have a copy of a 16 memo here from Mr. Kelly with a distribution list, dated 17 November 1st, 1977. 18 BY MR. HE900N: 19 0 I believe you are listed on the distribution list. 20 The subject is " Customer Guidance on High Pressure 21 Injection Operation". 22 (Handing document to the witness.) 21 Do you recall seeing that memoi 24 'Y Ace-Federst Reporters, inc. 25 Q Before or after Three Mile Island? I
23 A Oh, before. dobl7 2 Q Okay. 3 Could you describe basically the sequence of events 4 as you recall them that led up to the preparation of that memo? 5 A Yes. 6 That sequence here -- This should be treated as 7 subject to my memory, and it is a rather lengthy sequence in 8 that there are involved in ic many I think short interactions. 9 And I don't believe I'm going to try to describe each one of 10 those. 11 But on a high point basis, as I recall it, I 12 became aware of the incident at Davis-Besse. I felt it was (~b g3 probably of interest to review from the Staff point because 14 it was a close to a loss of coolant accident at that time, as 15 close as I felt we'd ever get. And so I examined it. Every-16 thing seemed to be in order. We had explanations for the 17 phenomena that occurred. We believe we would have predicted 18 those phenomena had we performed a specific evaluation of 19 that incident, with a single exception that surprised us: 20 The operator terminated high pressure injection. 21 I mentioned thic to Joe Kelly and Mr. Eric Swanson. 22 It had been later identified that I did mention that, or Bob 23 Jones of my staff mentioncd that to Mr. Kelly at the review l 24 meeting, just after the review meeting where he presented the Am Feerat Rgorms, W. 25 data to us, and that I thought that was highly inappropriate l l 1
24 - pbl8 and that we should do something to prevent that from happening NJ 2 in the past -- I mean in the future. We couldn't prevent it 3 from happening in the past. 4 And for the first week, two weeks, on up to the 5 point when this memo was written, Joe and I are discussing it, 6 and I think it would be reasonable to characterize my efforts 7 as attempting to have Integration initiate a chain of events 8 which would lead to resolution of the difficulty I was having. 9 We needed a resolution which would say 'the operators made a 10 mistake and they did something they shouldn't have done' or 11 a resolution which would say ' hey, you know, we need to correct 12 this.' [) 13 ss Q Why did you feel that Integration should initiate 14 this activity? A Well, because I'm not directly involved with operat-16 ing procedures. There were possible interplays with other 17 systems for which the action by the operator may conceivably 18 have been deemed appropriate, and Integration I felt was one 19 of the best people to resolve that to bring the total picture 20 so that we knew all of the facets of the concern I was raising, 21 together, and to cause something to happen. 22 In the course of this consideration did you give O 23 any thought to any problems that might be associated with leaving the HPI system on with respect to the possibility of Am wet Rummrs, filling the pressurizer and causing water surge on one of the i
25 1 -7bl9 relief valves? f \\- 2 A I don't really remember whether that occurred at 3 that time or occurred later. 4 Q Okay. 5 A But I think some time by February I was aware of 6 that concern. 7 Q Okay. 8 Now Mr. Kelly prepared this memo. Did he show it 9 to you before he sent it out? 10 A I'm sure he did. 11 Q Okay. 12 So then he prepared the memo and sent it out. '/ Would you then describe what happened in the se-14 quence? 15 A In terms of my state of knowledge at that time? 16 Q Yes. 17 A 'To the best I can recollect, very little happened 18 as a result of this memo. 19 Q Do you have any feeling why very little happened? 20 A No. 21 Q Did it strike you at the time as unusual that after 22 sending this memo out to a number of people nothing apparently 23-happened? m( ) 24 , u.)b ne, % A Yes, it did. 25 Q Did you have any explanation or any idea in your t
/ f 26 l 1 g ~pb20 mind why nothing happened? 2 A Well, I felt we weren't being paid attention to. 3 Q Do you have any feeling why you weren't being paid 4 attention to? 5 A No, I would not care to comment on that. 6 0 Who did you feel was not paying attention to you? A I can't recall whether I felt at that time we were directing this to Customer Service, that occurred then or 9 later. But at some time between the generation of this memo 10 and the generation of my memo, I believe that I was feeling -- 11 I don't know whether this is correct -- Should I testify to my 12 feeling? O \\~/ MR. EDGAR: Your state of knowledge, what you knew. 14 THE WITNESS: All right. 15 I believe that my feeling was that the lack of 16 action or lack of response was primarily centered in what we 17 would call Customer Service. 18 MR. HEBDON: Okay. 19 BY MR. HEBDON: 20 Q Now Mr. Walters, who's in the Nuclear Service group, 21 did prepare a response that he sent to Mr. Kelly. It was dated November 10, 1977. 23 Were you aware of that response? [ 24 yh, i A In terms of my state of knowledge between November ,g 25 lst and February, I'll have to say I don't think.so.
27 b21 Q Okay. 2 A I have since been made Lware of that. 3 MR. FOLSOM: May I correct the record? I think 4 that's November 18th. 5 MR. HEBDO1!: I thought we decided the other day it 6 was the 10th. MR. EDGAR: It is the 10th. MR. FOLSOM: Okay. I thought we decided just the 9 opposite. I'm sorry. 10 BY MR. HEBDON: 11 0 So then you recall seeing this memo, but not between 12 the time that Mr. Kelly wrote his memo and you wrote yours, is ( ) 13 v' that correct? 14 A Yes, that's what I believe to be true, yes. 15 Q Do you recall if you saw this memo before the 16 accident at TMI? 17 A No, I'd have to state the same thing, I don't think 0 I did. 19 Q So you don't believe, then, that you'd seen this 20 memo prior to the TMI accident? 21 A That is correct. 22 Q Okay. 23 Now in February I believe you wrote two memos, the 24 ,,jy,,g,,,,,,,,, first one dated February 9, 1978, to Mr. Taylor. What caused 25 you to write that memo? I
28 t pb22 A Well, I wasn't seeing any action on my concern, and, 'l 2 I felt like there had been enough attempts to start a resolu-l tion process in the people I was counting on at that time to 4 start the resolution process, and that we had to shake some things up a little bit to get some things started. O Okay. Who did you feel should have done something? 8 A Well, the particular individual I don't believe I was associating with. I don't think I had a particular 10 individual in mind. 11 I believe what I was asking was for Customer 12 Service to provide an answer either in the form that this was an individual mistake or that further guidance on operator 14 management of high pressure injection needed to be put out. 15 0 Okay. 16 Did you talk to Mr. Kelly about whether or not 17 anyone had contacted him? 18 A Probably. 19 Q Do you recall if he ever mentioned the fact that he 20 had heard from Mr. Walters? 21 A No. I think if I recalled him mentioning that to 22 me I would have said I probably knew about the Walters memo in that period of time. ( ); 24
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Q Okay.. 25 A That doesn't preclude that he did that. l
29 l i 1 i b23 Q Did you try to talk with anyone in customer Service: i 2 about the memo to see if they were working on a response, if 3 they had any thoughts on the subject? A I do not believe I did. 5 0 Well, if you were feeling that there was a problem 6 that you weren't getting a response from Customer Service that i 7 you felt you should have gotten, it seems a little bit strange 8 that you didn't try to make some contact within the Customer 9 Service group to find out why you weren't getting a response 10 prior to writing your memo. l 11 l A I suppose it could be viewed as strange. Joe and l 12 l I were in communication and I think the question was 'is ('~~l' anybody doing anything about this, are we getting a resolution', 13 \\~ 14 The answer was 'no', and he went back and said 'I've got to do 15 something'. 16 0 Okay. j 7 Sc you wrote your memorandum now, and you sent it l 18 to Mr. Taylor. 19 A Yes. 20 Q Why did you send it to Mr. Taylor? 21 A I felt Jim Taylor was -- he is -- a highly influen-22 tial person. I wanted to get in touch with Licensing on the 23 issue because I felt this might be of interest to Licensing, ( 24 that there was perhaps a safety concern associated -- well, Ace-Fed rol Reporters, Inc. 25 in my mind at that time there was a safety concern associated I
30 b24 with that incident, and that Jim Taylor would be able to I 2! instigate a forum within which we could resolve my concern-l 3 l i 0 When you say that you felt there was a safety 4 concern, I believe there is a mechanism within B&W for raising 5 safety concerns in the name of the System -- the name of the 6 report escapes me at the moment. 7 But did you consider preparing or forwarding your i 8 conccrn in that format? 9 A Yes, I did. l 10 I Q Was there some reason you chose not to do it in 11 that way? I i 12 A I felt that if we could get action started through ) 13 the use of the more informal process of memos and resolve the L/ 14 issue in that fashion, that that would be acceptable. I was 15 prepared to issue safety concerns had I not been satisfied 16 that these memos had worked. 17 Q Okay. 18 Now you had -- back-up a moment. 19 Why didn't you write a memo simply to someone in 20 Customer Service to try and get them to start working on your 21 concern? 22 A Well, the exact reason at the time -- now this was 1 23 almost two years ago now -- is not clear. I think it can be l 24 j related to the fact that I felt that had already happened with. Am-FWw3 Reporurs, W. l the Kelly transmittal and that nothing was being done, and that-t
31 l ~ b25 I wanted to widen the scope of awareness and bring seme outsidel i 2 I pressure to bear. I 3 Q Did you have any feeling at any time during the j 4 sequence we've been talking about that possibly Customer 5 Service didn't understand what the concern was related to? j i l A No, all I knew is they weren't doing anything -- 7' Q Okay. 8t -- or somebody wasn't doing anything. A 9 O Let me make an observation just that you may want 10 ! to comment on. I 11 1 We've talked with sme of'the people that were in the 12 Customer Service group, particularly Mr. Walters, and it would [ 13 appear that when tney analyzed or when they looked at the \\> 14 September 24th incident they didn't realize that the high 15 pressure injection system had been secured the first time, and 16 it appears they thought you were talking about the second 17 securing of high pressure injection which they thought to be 18 the only time that high pressure injection was secured, and i 19 that's why tney felt that your concern was not a particularly 20 sign.ificant concern. 21 Did anyone ever give you any indication during the 22 time that you were working on this that misunderstanding 23 existed? lll 24 A No. Ace.Feder:$ Reporters, Inc. 2S Q Do you believe that that misunderstanding is credib'leT l
32 b26 A Oh, boy. Well, after I wrote my February 9 memo I I I was contacted by somebody, who we believe was Mr. Cal Goslow 3 from what we weuld term either Customer Service or Nuclear Service -- the terms are somewhat synonomous. As far as m'y ~s i interaction with Cal is concerned and my explanation to him, i i 6' i I don't believe he was confused. I i 7! As far as Mr. Walters or the rest of the people in i 8 Nuclear Service who had becone involved in this event, I have I
- l no judgment to maka, i
i 10 I l J Q Why did Mr. Goslow become involved in this? Why I Il i was there a discuscita with him about this? 12 A Well, it's my understanding, after I wrote my nk_j 13 memo to Jim Taylor, that Nuclear Services assigned him to I# contact me and to work out the difficulty. c2 Now I didn't ask him why. 16 Q Okay. I7 So you did have a discussion with him, though? 18 A Yes. O And it's your perception that he understood the 20 fact that there had been this first securing of high pressure 21 injection while the PORV was still open? 22 A Well, you've nit me with something brand new, and 3 that's the fact that they may have misinterpreted the second r~'s I i 24 4,.)yh'3g,,,,,,,,, interruption. I would say that I provided a description of my concern, an analysis, if you will, or a discussion of what was i
33 I ,;"?b27 needed to servive a small break, and that he understood that, 6 ~' 2 that we worked out jointly a procedure or a guideline, a rule, 3 prescription that would allow termination of the high pressitre ' injection under acceptable conditions, and that with all that 5 in mind in the nature of what we finally worked out and the 6 conditions in the plant at the time the high pressure injection 7 was secured the second time, it would seem unlikely that he O felt we were worried about the second termination. 9 Q Okay. 10 A Now I couldn't say it was impossible. Q Now you wrote two memos to Mr. Taylor, the first 12 one on the 9th, I believe the second one on the 16th of /~s V 13 February. What was the reason for the second memo? 15 A Well, I had alerted Mr. Taylor to what I considered a problem. We had worked out a technique for termination of 17 high pressure injection -- Q Now when you say "we", who are you referring to? l 19 A Mr._Goslow and myself. O Q All right. 2I A And we decided that that -- my agreement to this 2 technique ought to be documented, and I wrote it to Mr. Taylor 23 because I had written the first memo to Mr. Taylor and I wanted [\\ 24 .Am)idwsnoomn w. to inform him that I was in agreement with what Fuel Services 25 would do now.
34 I m Q So then was it your understanding in writing this l epb28 2 second memorandum that Customer Service was in agreement with 3 the actions that are described in that memo? Did you feel that 4 Mr. Goslow was speaking L : Customer Service? 5 A Yes. 6 Q Okay. I 7 So then it was your understanding that this was a d mutually agree,ble solution to the problem? 9 A Yes. l 10 ? Q And you sent this memo on to Mr. Taylor? I 11 l A Yes. 3 Q What happened next? 13 A Well, as far as I'm concerled I considered the I# issue resolved at that time. 15 In the depositions which I've read of other people 16 and since TMI-2 when we've reexamined the situation, there was I7 a series of memos written after that period of time on the concern of trying to track down and' interface with problems 19 that other people thought would occur because of the prescrip-20 tion Cal and I agreed to. Q Okay. 22 Now I have here for the record a memo dated 23 August 3rd, 1978, from Mr. Hallman to Mr. Karrash on the ,m I 24 subject of operation interruption of high pressure injection, Ace F ral Reporters. Inc. and I believe you're included on the distribution for this memo. t
35 l 1 l l i 1 7b29 (Handing document to the witness.) l 2 Do you recall receiving that memo? 3 A I do not. 4 Q Since you are on the distribution for it, would 5 you reasonably conclude that a copy was at least cent to you? A I think that would be reasonable to conclude, yes. 7 I have two explanations for not recalling this memo: 8 The first ene is that the mails didn't work; that 9 happens occasionally. It's not likely. And the second one is 10 that I failed in reviewing it, in looking at it, if I did get 11 it, to recognize its significance, and the result of that is 12 that I do not recall it. () 13 Q So then you don't recall receiving the memo at all? 14 A Not post-TMI -- 15 Q You mean pre-TMI? 16 A Pre-TMI. 17 Q Do you recall any other contac'. with this issue of la high pressure injection after the memo that you wrote on 19 February 16? 20 A Not pre-TMI. 21 Q So then would it be fair to say that you were of 22 the understanding that the change in the procedure that you 23 and Mr. Goslow had agreed to had been sent out? \\ 24 Aa.56.)ra n.,on.n, ine, A Well, at some time after February 16, yes; I think 25 I would say I thought it had gone out on February 17th, but 1
36 1 ( Ob30 subject to their processing, yes, I was under the impression 2 ~ that they were going to issue that. Q Some time within some reasonably short period of 4 time after your February 16th memo? 5 A Yes. O Would you have expected to receive a copy of the transmittal sending that material out? 8 A I don't know, maybe yes, maybe no. Sometimes we 9 get copies of it and sometimes we don't.
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So then it wouldn't have raised any concern in your 11 mind that you didn't see a copy of the transmittal going out? 12 A No. q-) Q Okay. I'd like to ask you some questions about a report 15 that's come to be known as the Michelson Report, and, again, 16 I'm trying to focus on what you knew about that particular 17 report before Three Mile Island. Specifically, prior to March 28, 1979, what 19 knowledge did you have concerning the Michelson Report? 0 A Well, I knew that there was an entity called the Michelson Report. I don't know that we said "Michelson" at 22 that time; we may have said "TVA". 23 I viewed it as a set of questions concerning small \\ (~% 'AceF erW Reponen,1. breaks, the phenomena associated with small breaks, the 25 capability of the ECCS sysPems to protect the plant from small 1
37 I I r"7b31 breaks which resulted from an independent so-to-speak first \\~ 2 principal review of small break phenomena by an individual at I 3 TVA, and that we were being asked to respond to that set of I l questions or respond to the report itself and describe to TVA 5 how the licensing basis of their plant as performed by Babcock 6 and Wilcox either allowed for or satisfied the issues raised. 7 Q How did you come to receive the report? 8 A Personally I don't think I received the report. 9 One of my engineers received the report from our project 10 management function. Il i Q Do you recall who that engineer was? 12 A Yes, that was Mr. Bob Jones. s Q Okay. 14 A He reviewed the report and briefed me on it. 15 0 All right. 16 A And because of that I may very well have received 17 a copy of the report after that. If such, I would have just 18 done something superficial with it. i I 19 Q Do you recall reviewing the report at all? 20 A Not pre-TMI, I don't believe I did.-- 21 Q All right. 22 A -- other than mentioning that I was briefed on it. 23 Q Okay. () 1 24 Would you describe, then, the briefing that Mr. l , Ac..r.o.r. n. port.n.,ne, 25 Jones gave you concerning the report? i L
38 1 1 ~7b32 A Yeah. I would say Bob informed me that we had b 2 -s received a.small break -- I think he would have said ' set of 3 questions' along with a phenomenological description of 4 expected results from small breaks from TVA, that he would S have I think called it.a review by them of the small break, and 6 a desire to have us respond to show the coordination between 7 this document and what we were doing for small breaks in terms 8 of the SER material, that he told me it was something that 9 would have to be worked on and he was upset by having to do 10 things because he didn't do it because he didn't consider it 11 necessary. 12 O Why didn't he consider it necessary? m 13 A Because we were just going to tell them a bunch 14 of 'yes', 'nos' and ' yeah, that's right and it's all in your analysis anyway'. 16 C So then he gave you the impression that based on 17 his initial review that there wasn't anything particularly -- 18 A Alarming. 19 Q -- alarming about it? 20 A Yes. 21 Q How often do you receive documents similar to the 22 Michelson Report? 23 A Oh, not very often, not from customers. /m
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( 24 Q This was a fairly unusual occurrence to receive a 25 report such as this? i
39 i I 1 1 i b33 A
- Yes, Perhaps not as unusual coming from TVA as 2
from our other customers. { Q Why? Did TVA seem to ask more questions of this l 3 4 type than other customers? 5 A Yes. TVA does delve more deeply into the vendors, i i 6 supply, and he checks the vendors more deeply than I believe i i 7 I other customers do. 8 Q Okay. 9 What was your perception of the priority associated 10 with the review of this report? 11 A That it was one of the items that would need to be 12 i done at some time, but that there bei.g any lack of alarming i /^N () 13 concerns raised in the thing that we could do it at out leisure, 14 subject to the customer's agreement. 15 Q What was the source of that priority? Was that 16 your perception of what the priority was or did someone tell i 17 you that that's what it was? 18 A I believe I probably said that, or jointly said 19 it with Bob. We both viewed it the same way. 20 Q Did you have any feeling for how long it would take 'I ~ you to provide a response? 22 A Well, I think our feeling of the nature of the response we would give would be one of verbal explanation, of I ) 24 agreement or disagreement with the report -- written, I said lAu r.3 Reporars, lm. 25 verbal, written explanation of it, outlining our judgment on
40 the issues and providing that in a letter to TVA, that we would epb34 m 2 not respond with any specific analyses in terms of a computer-t l 3 ized evaluation of any given accident, and that it would be 1 4 probably because a lot of items were covered by the report, it 5 is an in-depth review in terms of the aspects of the small break problem that are looked at. It would take two to three 7 weeks. 8 Q Two to three weeks of work, or it would be two to 9 three weeks before you could have a response available? I A Two to three weeks of work; of the span of time 10 11 after review, et cetera, maybe a month, month and a half. 12 Q How long did you feel it would be before this two ('/h 13 x.- to three weeks of work would be available? 14 A At that time? 15 Q Yes. 16 A Oh, I think at that time we probably felt we could 17 Taspond to it in three or four months. 18 Q Would you go on, then, and describe what happened 19 as a result of the report? 20 A As a result of the report? 21 Q Do you recall being contacted by anyone? 22 A There were telephone communications, I think. I 23 think we told -- we provided our study to Project Management 24 for them to g'.ve to TVA, that we had received the report, that Aceredeo Reporters, Inc. 25 we had read it, that we didn't feel there were any concerns in
41 1 I 1 b35 it and that we were to respond to it in the future as time l i 2 became available. J l 3 Q Do you recall being contacted by Project Man 1gementj i requesting the status of the response at any time? 5 A At the approximate time that we did write the first response to the report, I think there were telephone f 6 conversations describing our intentions on the report prior to 8 that. It dragged on, our response to the report, it dragged 9 on for pretty close to a year at that time, and people were 10 wondering why we weren't saying anything. 11 I wouldn't recall aay particulars. 12 Q Do you recall a telephone conversation with some ,a ( ) 13 people from TVA which would have occurred at some time around '/ 14 the end of 1978 concerning the report and your response to it? 15 A I seem to recall something like that. I'm not 16 sure whether I was involved in telephone conversations or Bob 17 Jones was involved in it. 18 Q Do you recall any of the details of the call or 19 conclusions that were reached, any of that sort of thing? 20 A Well, I mentioned I seem to recall that call. I 21 don't want to go on record as saying I do. 22 I think the conclusions were primarily an attempt 23 to respond to the issues in the report over the phone, and then l 24 a Call to finally put it to bed and Write a memo or letter on AwFewJ Reponen. W. 25 the report and forward that to TVA for their consideration. l
42 1 And that memo did finally go out. l g-)gb36 u. 2 C A letter was finally sent to TVA? 3 A Yes. 4 0 As a result of that phone call, do you recall 5 any indication that rather than reviewing the report itself 6 you would simply provide a file of the documents associated 7 with the NRC review of the B&W small break LOCA analysis? 8 A Rather than respond to the report on an independent 9 basis, do I recall suggesting or having it suggested that we 10 merely provide a list of the documents we had created on small 11 breaks and the NRC's approval of the a documents, is that what 12 your question was? ' () 13 Q Do you recall anyone proposing that from TVA? 14 A No, I can't say I do. I don't know that they didn't, 15 but I don't think I recall such a proposal. 16 Q Okay. 17 You don't recall anyone saying that it was decided 18 that rather than respond to the report itself you would dimply 19 provide them a set of documents? A No. - I would think if somebody suggested that we 21 probably would have done that. 22 Q Would that have been easier than responding to the ) 23 report? I 24 A Yes, I believe so. It would have been a short Ad?FhwW Rgenen, loc. 25 j . paragraph and the titles of three or four documents would have i l I
43 I I been written down below it. f Gob 37 i 2 0 Okay. 3 Now in January a report was sent off -- excuse me -- a response was sent off to TVA. What happened after that? 5 A We received a set of questions on our response 6 from TVA. It was either two or three specific questions. And i< I don't believe we ever responded to that one. We may have { 7 8 had a phone conversation discussing what we thought they were 9 asking and trying to explain what we had said in our response 10 l to them. 11 l l If I remember correctly, the TVA letter back had a l 12 few specific items in it, was concerned to some extent about ("T t '< 13 explanation -- the explanation Bob provided in terms of what 14 we would call a volume balance scheme for determining pressure, 15 and wound up with saying that these things have to be treated 16 with the proper physical conversion laws, and we would be 17 saying back to them 'yes, you're right, that volume balance 18 which we described to you is a technique, it's a way you can 19 understand it short of differential equations, but certainly 20 an accurate prediction, and you need to use the differential 21 equations with accurate state searches and the real laws of 22 thermodynamics'. 23 Q Did the models that yor actually used for your g i 24 analyses include those differential equations? Ace Fe er:J Reporters, Inc. 25 A Yes, they did.
44 l I r--b38 Q So then would you describe the volume balance 2 l approach that Mr. Jones had in his response to be more of a 3 method of explaining the response of the system rather than 4 the actual method you used for your analysis? 5 A Well, it depends on what type of analysis we're 6 talking about. In terms of computer evaluation, the answer i' 7 Nould be yes, we used thermodynamic relationships in -- well, 8 not the most rigorous form, but in a rigorous form. 9 1 In other analyses where we may be looking for 1 10 insight or we may be choosing to evaluate a plant performance 11 without the expenditure of computer dollars -- which are 12 expensive -- we may very " ell analyze with the volume balance. I3 13 '/ It does produce reasonably acceptable results. 14 Q Was it your perception that there was a disagree-15 ment between your group and Mr. Michelson concerning the method 16 of analyzing these very small breaks? 17 A I'd say there was a misunderstanding on Mr. 18 Michelson's part as to how we analyzed them and why we did 19 what we did. 20 I don't believe we ever talked to Carl Micnelson 21 in person. I think there was always an intermediary on the 22 TVA side between us. 23 I would also say that it was looking at developing ('S s i 24 Concerns for break sizes which we considered to have already
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25 been bounded, and that we would probably, had we been concerned .m
45 l 1 I ,gb39 about the same type of accidents that he was spending some 2 l time in his report developing, we might very well be much 3 closer together. 4 We considered the consequences of larger breaks 5 to be far more severe than the consequences of some of the 6 breaks he talked about in which he deals with interruption 7 of natural circulation, for example. 8 Q Would the break size that he was talking about, or 9 the break size that you were analyzing include the PORV failure 10 at Three Mile Island? 11 A I'd want to go back and really review in depth one 12 l particular point that he makes, but I'd say that it's my O is 1 understanding that he does discuss a break of that nature in terms of where he indicates the pressurizer level could confuse 15 the operator. 16 Q Okay. We'll get to that particular part of it in a 17 moment. 18 But -- 19 A The other breaks are different. They are of the 20 same size, but they are at different locations and location 21 is not irrelevant to the phenomenon of a small break. 22 Q As I understand it, there's been a fair amount of 4 23 analyses done as a result of the Three Mile Island accident () 24 focus.ing on-the concerns that Mr. Michelson had. 4.Feoero noners. Inc. 25 A Yes. I
46 1 f'7b40 0 With the benefit of a lot of hindsight, how would 2 you now describe the technical merits of the concerns that he 3 had raised? 4 A Very much the same way I did at that time. 5 Q Would you elaborate on that a little? 6 A Well, that we spent a lot of time confirming our 7 interpretation of the bounding nature of the breaks at the pump 8 discharge, that they are significantly larger than the ones we 9 talk about in terms of interruption of natural circulation has 10 been verified. 11 0 Do you still feel that the very small breaks that 12 he was talking about are bounded by the small breaks that you (j~ 13 had analyzed? 14 A Oh, yes. 15 Q Now I would like to go back and pick up this one 16 somewhat separate issue of how the operr. tor would interpret 17 pressurizer level during such int:idents. 18 Do you recall that -- 19 MR. EDGAR: Can we take a break now? 20 MR. HEBDON: Sure. Let's go off the record. 21 (Recess.) 22 l MR. HEBLON: Let'sogo back on the record. l 23 BY MR. HEBDON: [ 24 Q As part of the Michelson Report there's a section 1 lA. n.pon.n, ine. 25 in there that discusses the fact that the possibility exists i
47 l i 1 b41 that the operator might misinterpret pressurizer level during l 4 2 an incident such as the break that he was describing. 3 Did you focus on that particular issue at all? ) 4 A We were aware that that issue was contained in the 5 i Michelson Report. We had previously developed our own concerns I 6' j on it and we were trying to take action on those concerns. l I 7 And I think we recognized that Michelson felt the same way we 8 did. I'm not sure that he recognized the impacts of the 9 stater.its as I'd say we did. And I think that's about the 10 I level of focusing we did on it. 11 Q Now by saying that you had already developed your 12 own concerns, what are you referring to? p 13 +\\-) A Well, the memos resulting from Davis-Besse. 14 Q So the Kelly-Dunn memos? 15 A Yes. 16 Q All right. 17 So, then, would it be fair to say that although j you recognized the concern described by Mr. Michelson, you 19 felt that the issue was basically a moot point because you j 20 have already taken care of that with the memo that you had 21 written to Mr. Taylor? 1 22 A As far as the operating plants are concerned. As i far as the plants designed, that information had been given to ( 24 Integration, and because Integration shared our concerns there A NEmI Rmonm, W. 25 we felt that they would resolved in designed plants as well. I
48 g 1 ~ b42 Q Now what information had been given to Integration?' l i' 2 A Mr. Kelly is from Integration. 3 Q Okay. 4 And he had been given a copy of the Michelson 5 Report? 6 i A No, but he shared my concern of high pressure 1 7' injection termination. 8 Q I see. 9 So you felt his involvement with the high pressure 10 injection issue, although he hadn't actually seen the concern 11 Mr. Michelson had raised, would ensure that it was taken care of 12 in the design phase as well as the operational phase? Ii 13 '/ A For as much responsibility as we have for the 14 procedures, yes. 15 s Q Okay. 16 Another issue that has come up that is somewhat 17 related to the Michelson Report are some questions that were 1 18 asked Of Mr. Ebersole of the ACRS during the review of the 19 Pebble Springs application, and some of those questions -- 20 particularly.a question number six out of that group -- relatta l 21 to this-issue of the Michelson Report, although it isn't 22 actually referenced as such in the question. 23 Prior to March 28, 1979, what knowledge did you ) 24 have concerning the questions raised by Mr. Ebersole of the Ace Federal Reporters, Inc. 25 ACRS concerning small break LOCAs? i
49 I -mpb43 A Well, this is kind of drawn out too. I suppose I j i l am primarily involved, was the author of our response to l 3 I question number six. l I think I'd like to -- if you'll bear with me -- 5 spend a moment properly categorizing this series of events. 6 Q Certainly. I A I may mix this up a little bit, but I'll try not to.I 7 O In the PASNY subcommittee on ECCS, at which I was 9 not present, Mr. Ebersole asked some questions dealing with 10 the heat sink on the primary system and how the inventory or 11 levels within the primary system evolve during a small break 12 ' and coordinate with the capability of the steam generator to /~'t 13 (_) provide a heat sink. The levels would go up and down during 14 a small break, and he was concerned about how this would relate 15 to the maintenance of that heat sink because there were or are 16 certain size breaks in which heat removal via the break itself 17 would be insufficient because the break would be too small to 18 prUvide a heat removal path and therefore the steam generator 19 is necessary as a -- well, it's not absolutely necessary, but 20 it's highly desirable. 21 We can remove heat by forcing it out the safety 22 valve on the primary system. 23 This was responded to by the people of B&W who were at that subcommittee meeting and there was an interchange Ac. n.i n.pon.n, ine. 25 of ideas and concerns and what have you.
50 l I 1 pb44 Q Excuse me. 2 Do you recall approximately when that meeting i 3 occurred? 4 A I think we could look it up. It was in the fall 5 of -- let's see, my memo came out the fall of '77. 6 Q Okay. 7 Do you recall which case it was related to? 8 A Case? 9 Q Which plant? l 10 A PASNY. 11 Q And that is Power Authority of the State of New 12 York. Would that be Indian Point? /~D 13 (-) MR. EDGAR: It was the Greene County plant. 14 MR. HEBDON: Greene County, okay. 15 THE WITNESS: I usually remember one name about 16 these things, and it can get me in trouble at times that I 17 don't remember six names for a plant. 18 MR. HEBDON: All right. 19 THE WITNESS: That's the only one we have for them, 20 at any rate. 21 BY MR. HEBDON: Q They have others, just as a point of reference -- 23 A
- Yes, kh
}# Q -- other than B&W? Am-Feerd Reponen, lm. A Yes. t
51 l 1 pb45 0 Okay. Thank you. A That question was expected to be reraised at the 3 PASNY full committee meeting -- ACRS I'm talking about -- and i I 4 the parties that heard thecpestion came back to Lynchburg and 5 talked to me and other people about how to respond to it. And i 6 in particular their concern was when the level -- during a 7 refill of the reactor coolant system the water would rise sufficiently in the primary system to effectively shut off 9 heat transfer from the primary system to the secondary side. 10 It wouldn't shut it off completely, but it would do a tremendous 11 decrease in heat transfer or heat sink capability would occur. 12 And people wanted to know whether that was acceptable, and, 7_ \\'/ 13 you know, an explanation given. 14 So we dealt with that concern. And I went to the B s PASNY full committee meeting prepared to answer a question on 16 that issue, expecting that Mr. Ebersole would ask it. And the 17 answer is straightforward. The answer is yes, you can shut off 18 the heat transfer, we have such a mechanism. But it's of no 19 concern whether~the heat transfer is shut off, and if it 20 becomes of concern the heat transfer will automatically be 21 reestablished. 22 It's a necessary condition to have a core problem 23 to have low liquid levels in the primary system, and when you 7, t 24 have low liquid levels in the primary system you have the heat A Feder:] Reporters, Inc. 25 transt: to secondary side.
52 1 f7b46 A rather lengthy question was asked by Mr. Ebersole. 2 I attempted a res ;nse to it. He and I both recognized that 7 the response would be a discussion of level inventories within 4 the primary system during small breaks, which would take a 5 considerable amount of time to communicate. It's not easy to 6 do this. And he said perhaps -- I think he said something like 'Perhaps the Staff would care to look into this or provide a 8 report'. 9 There was also a subject of noncondensible impact 10 on the heat transfer in the primary and secondary side. There 11 was a discussion immediately following between myself, Mr. 12 Israel and Mr. Ebersole. I believe I remember that, in which Il 13 N/ I was trying to get across this point of balancing of liquid 14 levels being reasonably consistent across the primary system so that there wouldn't be a core problem at the time you 16 l interrupt it -- or at the time it w, possible to interrupt j 17 the heat sink there could not be a core problem. 18 I guess that discussion probably didn't go anywhere., 19 that we did not communicate fully enough to really reach a 20 common level of understanding. 21 At the Pebble Springs subcommittee meeting l practically nothing was said on this issue. Shortly following 23 that time -- and perhaps as a result -- I'm not sure where uf([,w n.,on,, ine, the question really originated, but perhaps as a result of the I 24 . 25 PASNY full committee meeting -- a set of I think 26 questions t
53 I l e^pb47 was forwarded to the NRC, and these were forwarded to the I 2 Pebble Springs -- which is Portland Gas and Electric -- 3 Q Portland General Electric, I think, bat something 4 like that. PGE is it. 5. A At any rate, these questions were forwarded to them f 6, for response, and their response was to be in the full committee 7 meeting for that plant. In turn that particular question, 8 number six, was provided to B&W, which in turn got provided 9 to me. 10 And because of the interactions we had had in the 11 subcommittee meeting on PASNY and the full committee meeting 12 on PASNY and the wording of the 7 articular question, we respond-e(ni 13 ed with an answer that discussed the levels as they would ] 14 evolve during a small break and how this would affect steam 15 generator transfer, and the fact that, you know, everything 16 was okay, it was fine, and your core would be protected. 17 That response was provided by the Pebble Springs 18 full committee meeting. That's where it ended as far as we 19 know. 20 I understand that some of the testimony in the 21 full committee, at which I wasn't present, a response was 22 recognized as being timely and adequate. 23 Q One part of the question that was asked by l 24 Ace Federal Reporters, Inc. Mr. Ebersole was a question concerning -- and I can give it 25 to you and quote the particular part that I'm referring to. I i
54 I b48 It says: f 2 "What does operator do in respect to 3 interpreting level in the pressurizer?" 4 (Handing document to the witness.) 5 Do you recall focusing on that particular question? 6 A Well, that particular part of this whole question 7 here, no. In terms of the sentence that says: J "What does. operator do in respect to 9 interpreting level in the pressurizer?" 10 I didn't believe that to be, you know, as we could 11 quantify that in hindsight. Today I think we could make a 12 great deal out of that sentence. At this particular time I Im) 13 felt I knew what his concern was, he was worried about percola-14 tion during the refill. He was worried about the possibility 15 of the pressurizer filling up and going to discharge of water 16 through the pressurizer on the safety valves. 17 And in terms of that, I responded. I said 'Two 18 things can happen: One, the level can fall back down and heat 19 removal via the sceam generator will be restarted; or, two, the 20 system can fill back up and will go to a single pass heat exchanger arrangement with water flowing out the pressurizer 22 and onto the containment floor, and the operator shouldn't worry about the level'. fl 24 Am FMeral Rgeners, lrm. That was the implication. I hope that I said that 25 correctly. I
55 1 pb49 Q Well, that's a concern I think that we've had, is 2 that there doesn't seem to be any direct response to that 3 question, or that part of the question, because that isn't a 4 separate numbered part. 5 Did you feel that the answer that you gave address-6 ed that particular question? 7 A I felt the answer I gave responded to the total 8 concern that Mr. Ebersole seemed to be trying to relate. I 9 responded to this particular question knowing what had been 10 said at the subcommittee meeting for PASNY, the full ACRS for l 11 PASNY, and I wanted to make a complete response primarily on 12 the heat sink required to survive a small break, and I believe em ( ) 13 I did that. And that's what it was. 14 Q Now you mentioned that it's possible that the j system would refill and that the water would start going out 16 through the relief valve on the pressurizer. I believe that 17 that was one mode, one option in the scenario that you were 18 talking about, is that correct? 19 A Yes. 20 Q Were you concerned that as the pressurizer film 21 and water started going up through the relief valve, the 22 operator might interpret that as a problem with the plant 23 going solid and secure the high pressure injection system? (_) 24 Aa hbw3 Rooners. f m. A Was I Concerned at the time I wrote this response 2S about that? I think the answer is no, I didn't make a I
56 l i i I 1 connection between that time in the transient and his terminat ! 6pb50 2 ing the high pressure injection. 3 This timing of a transient will probably be hours 4 after the event, okay? Today I would say that -- well, that's 5 probably irrelevant, but today we would say that this is very, 6 very unlikely, close to impossible to refill the system unless 7 we can secure the break, unless we can close off the break, 8 stop the break. 9 Q Did you feel that that question that's asked in 10 that section had anything to do with the concerns that you and 11 Mr. Kelly had been discussing in your memos which are of about 12 the same time frame? ,f3, 13 i* ' ' A No, I did not. I did not feel this had to do with 14 the termination or interruption of high pressure injection. I 15 felt it had to do with whether or not an acceptable heat sink 16 would be continuously provided. 17 Q Well, isn't that part of the concern that you had 18 with securing high pressure injection? 19 A I think that would be unfair. I think the concern 20 in supplying high pressure injection relates to having a 21 medium for transfer -- and I'm going to get awful fancy here; I don't really want to. I'm trying to draw a line here. 23 Obviously we have to have water to transport the ( ) 24 AcebderW Reporters, Inc. energy from one location to another location. Okay. The 25 water -- and sometimes plays the same role in the event that I
57 the break is the cooling or the heat sink, the water could be dpb51 2 viewed as the heat sink I suppose. 3 When I was saying the heat sink before here I am 4 talking about the final reservoir, whether that is the steam 5 generator as the final reservoir for the energy or whether that 6 is the containment, and I'm kind of divorcing that from the 7 medium by which it is transported. 8 Now they are interrelated. Okay. We really can't 9 exclude one from the other. 10 Is that an acceptable response to your question? 11 Q Uh-huh. 12 Would it be fair to say, then, that rather than /" '1 13 trying to respond to each of the specific questions that's 14 included in question number six, you were really trying to 15 respond more to your perception of what Mr. Ebersole's concerns 16 were? 17 A Yes, I think that's quite fair. I was trying to 18 treat it reasonably globally, because I thought he was really 19 concerned and really didn't understand how the various mono-20 meter effects in the primary system would occur in relation-21 ship to the necessity of providing an outside eventual heat 22 reservoir. 23 Q With the benefit of an awful lot of hindsight, ) 24 what do you now assess -- or what is your current assessment AwFMw: Reporms, W. 25 of the concerns that Mr. Ebersole had raised? I
58 I 1 mob 52 A Well, that would require me getting into his brain S 2 an awful lot. 3 Q Well, if he were to ask you these questions again, 4 with the benefit of all of the work that's been done on 5 Three Mile Island and possibly the additional insights 6 associated with Three Mile Island, would your response change 7 any? l 8 A I think I would expand his word " interpretation 9 of level" where he says that in here, I would expand that to 10 include the operating guidance that's been provided post-TMI-2-- 11 Q Okay. 12 A -- and my memos of February. l'~~) 13 \\/ Q All right. ~ 14 A That's today. 15 Q Understood. I qualified that with the fact that 16 that is with the benefit of an awful lot of hindsight. 17 I'd like to go on and talk about a somewhat 18 limited involvement that B&W has had with an issue that's 19 involving Mr. Cresswell of the I&E Region III Staff. 20 Did you attend a meeting here of B&W on February 21 14, 1979, to discuss the investigation discussed by Mr. Kohler 22 and Mr. Foster of I&E Region III? 23 A The names -- what did you say? g 24 Q Kohler and Foster. Ace-Red Reponen, Inc. 25 A The names Kohler and Foster are not immediate in I
59 I pb53 my cognizance of who was involved in a meeting that I did I 2 attend at that approximate time. 3 Did you say this was related to Davis-Besse? 4 Q Somewhat. It was related to Mr. Cresswell's 5 concerns, although I'm not even positive that his name was used c3 in the meeting. 7 To refresh your memory, for the record, this is a 8 memo from Mr. Wilson of B&W to a distribution list, dated 9 March 9, 1979. And although you do not appear to be included 10 on the distribution list, it does note that you did attend the 11 meeting. 12 (Handing document to the witness.) /'N 'I 13 That might refresh your memory just a little. 14 (The witness reviewing document.) 15 A After reading the first paragraph of that, I believe 16 we're talking about the same meeting. 17 Q Okay. 18 Could you describe your recollection of that meet-19 ing? 20 A Oh, boy I'll have to say here that I believe I'm familiar with the concerns surrounding the meeting, and the 22 times up to the meeting and perhaps the past. But I'm not a 23 large actor or a controlling party for B&W in this issue, okay?
- i. l 24 Acadedwal Reponen, Inc.
And therefore this is not been a meeting in which I have 25 chosen to catalog. I
60 I. i 1 g"7b54 The meeting involved the operators of our 177 l k/ -2 plants. I think there were three or four operating units 3 represented directly at the meeting by one or two people 4 apiece. There were two NRC representatives which I believe 5 were probably the people you mentioned from Region III, and 6 several people from B&W. 7 The concern was if an overcooling transient of some 8 sort were to occur at Davis-Besse, is there a safety concern 9 associated with the pressurizer level going offscale low, and 10 we described what we thought about that, whether there was a 11 . great deal of concern over that problem or not. We felt there 12 wasn't, and the inspectors I think were trying to judge on / 13 whether there was a great deal of concern about it. I think I 14 they reached the impression that there was not. 15 Q Why were you included in the meeting? 16 A I was there primarily to provide a story on core 17 cooling and the capability of the system to continuously cool 18 the core, even under the condition that the pressurizer would 19 totally drain and that steam from the pressurizer would be 20 injected into the primary system. 21 We believed that was not possible within the limits 22 of the degree of overcooling we were discussing at the meeting, 23 'and if we put an unbounded overcooling transient on the plant s Am FNwd Roomn, lm. -- and that is possible within the control scheme proposed -- 25 we believed _that was not possible, that although the pressurizer i
61 l 1l level would go offscale low, it would be momentary and it would 7b55 2 recover onscale in short order. 3 3 But my role was if that wasn't sufficient in terms 4 of a response, I was to present a discussion of the facts that l 5 even if we got steam and saturate water within the primary I i I 6 system, the conditions for core cooling would still be very 7 acceptable, and that the plant would be recoverable. 8 Q So that it was your perception that even if a 9 significant amount of steam bubble were drawn into the reactor 10 coolant system after the pressurizer emptied, that that wouldn't 11 be a particularly significant problem? 12 A Yes, that's quite true. () 13 Q Okay. 14 Did you get any feeling at the conclusion of the 15 s meeting for what Mr. Foster and Mr. Kohler's opinion was as a 16 result of the meeting? Did they give you any indication of 17 whether they felt there was a problem or whether their concerns 18 had been answered? 19 A Well, any time a meeting stops short of verbal 20 violence you, I think, draw the conclusion that probably the 21 concerns have been responded to adequately. I think I felt 22 they had been satisfied and would draw a favorable conclusion, 23 a conclusion along the lines that we were trying to put forward. I '( ) 24
- AcehedwW Reponen, Inc.
I'dIsay later_on I probably received Communication from somebody 1 25 that they had drawn that officially. 1
62 1 fc7b56 NRC will never commit itself, or it is unusual 2 for them to commit themselves to any particular position during 3 a meeting. They would generally think over what'they've heard 4 afterwards, consider it, go over it again themselves and who-5 ever else they may be consulting with, and then come to a position. 7 Q Did you get the perception at all during that 8 meeting that a person who had raised the concerns was in any 9 way a troublemaker and the purpose of the meeting was simply to 10 obtain enough information to shut up that particular individual? 11 A Well, I think some of us at B&W probably had that 12 opinion because we felt very strongly that it was an acceptable I) 13 \\- condition. 14 Did I get any impression from the NRC people? Would i 15 that be a better question to ask? 16 Q Yes. 17 A No, I don't think so. 18 Q Was it your perception that the individual who had 19 asked the question was a troublemaker? 20 A No, I think he was wrong on this issue. I don't 21 think that I necessarily perceived hin as a troublemaker. I 22 think he was wrong on this issue. 23 Q Did 'I understand your earlier comment to be that (T) 2s Acehedec) Reponen, Inc. Possibly there were some people here at B&W who felt that he 25 was a troublemaker for raising this particular issue? I
63 i r"?bS7 A_ Oh, I perhaps treated your question too lightly. 2 I think they were probably closer to my statement, that there 3 was a greater degree of difficulty involved in this resolution 4 than was necessary, okay, but that it was causing people to 5 have to do things. 6 But the term " troublemaker" I think involves chronic. 7 Q All right. 8 A And I don't think anybody felt that. 9 Q Did you give any thought to the possible implica-10 tions of this particular concern with respect to Part 21? 11 A Did I give any with respect to Part 21 of this 12 particular concern? h' 13 Q Yes. 14 A No. No, I would have left that up to other people, 15 I was really just trying to provide a story that, okay, you 16 know, if the worst possible thing happens we're still okay. 17 Q Okay. 18 A And I wouldn't have tried to judge the situation 19 relative to whether it was any kind of concern with Part 21. 20 I would have left that up to somebody else.
- 3
.Q In the course of this discussion with Mr. Kohler 22 and Mr. Foster, or this meeting with Mr. Kohler and Mr. Foster, 23 did you give any consideration to discussing with them your () 24 Concern about the operator securing high pressure injection? . Ace Feder:: Reporters, loc. 25 A Excuse me, would you repeat just the last part of I . ~. -
64 - b58 it? 2 Q Did you give any consideration to discussing with them your concern about the operator securing high pressure 4 injection? 5 A No, I held that issue separate. 6 Q Do you recall ever being asked by Toledo Edison i 7 if a specific analysis of the event of the PORV sticking open 8 had ever been analyzed by B&W? 9 A I don't recall it. I'd say I wouldn't disallow 10 that they'd asked that question. I do not recall a specific 11 request to provide that analysis or a specific question as to 12 ! whether such an analysis had been performed. ( ') 13 Q Is it correct to say that such an analysis has not 14 been performed? 15 A Of the PORV? 16 Q Of the PORV. 17 A I think so. I mentioned earlier that I was wrong 18 on one thing we had done previously on a safety valve. I said 19 in front of the'Kemeny Commission that we had done a safety 20 valve computer evaluation. Apparently we had. I again say 21 that I don't think we have done a PORV stuck-open evaluation 22 pre-Three Mile Island. We have done a lot of them post-Three 23 Mile Island. G 24 O Would such a request be referred to your group? AeFeer:3 Reporars, lm. 25 A Oh, yes. In c7swer to such a request we probably l l i
65 g pb59 would respond and have responded to similar such requests, ~ 2 mainly requests from the NRC, that this accident is bounded by the small break spectrum provided in support of this plant I 3 4 for these reasons, and document the reasons. We would try to S handle the concern that way. 6 Q Okay. 7 I'd like to go on and ask you some questions 8 concerning plant procedures and technical specifications. 9 MR. EDGAR: Can we go off the record a moment? 1 10 (Discussion off the record. ) j 11 MR. HEBDON: Let's go back on the record. 12 BY MR. HEBDON: t' 13 Q This is a little out of sequence here, but just 14 to make sure we haven't missed anything: 15 We talked earlier about the priority of the work 16 on the Michelson Report, and I wonder if you could give us 17 some perspective of the work that was being done by your group 18 at that time, the intensity of that effort? 19 A-Yes, I would like to do that. 20 At approximately the same time that the Michelson 21 Report was received by B&W, or perhaps slightly earlier to that, we had discovered a concern on the LOCA evaluation 23 performed for the 177 lower loop plants and filed in support ') [ 24 of their operating licenses. This concern related to what's
- Ace Feded Reponen, Inc.
2S been termed a pump discharge break. And in the review of that t I
66 1 concern we identified that we had not provided the NRC an (~7b60 2 evaluation of a worst case small break, and that the consequences 3 of the evaluation of the worst case small break were rather 4 severe. 5 We had filed a PSC on this. The PSC had been deemec, 6-reportable and the issue had been reported to the Nuclear 7 Regulatory Commission, and a large scale effort involving 8 three or four months for about the entire ECCS crew in 9 Babcock and Wilcox was gone through in which operating 10 instructions for assuring penetration of the high pressure 11 injection to the reactor vessel were issued, agreed to by the 12 operating plants and put in their emergency procedures. And (') 13 an evaluation of the success of those procedures was documented 14 and presented to the NRC. 15 That as well as a number of critical progra ns 16 associated with the large break evaluation for specific plants 17 were involved during this whole time frame, and to a great 18 deal of extent these occupied our time at least for the first 19 several months in which we were cognizant of the Michelson 20 Report. 21 I should say that I would like to add that that 22 gives an issue in which we recognized a potential fault of the 23 emergency core cooling system and brought that to people's ~ /~N t i 24 Ac.?iM n.,on.n, inc. attention, and it caused since a considerable amount of time 25 and money and hardware fixes, if not in place now, to be put in i
67 r 7b61_ place shortly for those. plants, and meaningfully increase the 2 level of safety involved in their operation. 3 0 Okay. Thank you. 4 I'd like to go on now and ask you some questions 5 about plant procedures. And I recognize your answers will be 6 based on your perceptions and are not the official company 7 policy or anything else. But I'm just trying to get an under-8 standing for the way things work. 9 Who in B&W organizationally is responsible for 10 preparing plant operation procedures? 11 A Well, this will be my perception definitely. I 12 don't really feel we are responsible for preparing plant ( ') 13 operating procedures. I think at best we prepare representa-14 tive procedures which are used by the customer as guidelines 15 for the preparation of actual operating procedures. 16 In some circumstances we will provide I believe 17 warranty information or criteria, as in the case of water 18 chemistry. We would probably-say 'Your water chemistry on the 19 secondary side has to be this good in order for us to hold any 20 kind of guarantee or warranty on the steam generator tubes'. 21 The people responsible'for that I think are jointly 22 involved, Integration and Nuclear Services or Customer Services. I 23 Q Is your group involved at all in the preparation N\\ 24 Am Fbest Roorurs, lm. of draft procedures, especially draft emergency procedures 25 associated with small breaks or LOCAs in general? I
68 I 1 l A We have not been highly involved in the past. I Gmpb62 2 think we have stated and answered questions at times, but I -3 think the answer has to be that we have not been directly 4 involved to any great extent. 5 0 Who in B&W is responsible for preparing technical 6 l specifications? 7 A That would be joint. The lead responsibility I 8 think is with the Licensing organization, and in each case 9 each functional unit responsible for a certain area provides 10 the draft material, they incorporate it into their technical 11 specifications and then I think that unit again would review 12 the final. (') 13 k' Q Is your group involved with that at all? 14 A We are involved to a slight extent in terms of 15 HPI flow rates, low pressure injection flow rates, et cetera, 16 core flood tank pressures. 17 Q Who in B&W reviews the actual procedures developed 18 by the licensee to see that they are consistent with the i 19 procedures proposed by B&W? 20 A Again, I think that's going to be Nuclear Services j 21 if it's asked for by the customer. 22 0 All right. 23 A That would have to be at the request of the customer. 24 O Are you aware that the Davis-Besse small break Am Feer:J Reporters,1N. 25 procedure was revised to include precautions designed to prevent t
69 I 1 pb63 premature securing of high pressure injection and to alert the l g"N 2 operator to possible failures of the PORV? l 3 A I was under the impression that it was. I did not 4 look at it, nor would have any firsthand knowledge to say that 5 it was or wasn't. 6 Q When were you under the impression? 7 A I'm not sure I can tell you. 8 Q Before or after? 9 A I just was under the impression that some reasonable period of time after their September 24th incident they took 11 action to prevent termination of the high pressure injection 12 or action which would accomplish that if it was not directly I i 13 \\_/ in those words. 14 Q Did you become aware of that before or after ] 15 Three Mile Island? 16 A I think I was aware of it hafore Three Mile Island. 17 Q Did you give any consideration to wanting to see 18 what that change was to see if it was consistent with the 19 changes that you had proposed? 20 A No. I felt it was probably my changes. 21 Q Do you recall how you became aware of that change? 22 A No. 23 Q Okay. I'd like to go on and ask you some questions ' Ace eral Reponm, I. 25 concerning the activities immediately following the TMI i
70 i i I pb64 accident, particularly about the first 24 hours or so. l 2 A Okay. 3 Q Would you describe your involvement with the TMI 4 task force which was formed on March 28, 19797 5 A I wasn't a member of the task force itself. I was 6 responding to the various people that were members of the task force and doing work for them. This was the task force that, l 7 8 as you said, was formed March 29th, the day after the -- 9 Q No, March 28th, the day of the incident. 10 A Oh. I guess I didn't think we had an official 11 organization until the day after. 12 0 Well, what was your involvement with any contacts '(' / i 13 or meetings associated with the Three Mile Island accident on Id the day of the accident? 15 A I had a briefing in my manager's office that an 16 incident had occurred. I7 Q Approximately when did that briefing occur? 18 A That would be I think between eleven and eleven-19 thirty. 20 Q All right. 2I A As I recall, I was somewhere else at the time that i 22 that meeting was called and I walked in a little bit late to it.' 23 And one of my supervisors was in the meeting for me, and I c 24 / barged into it. Ace Federd Reporters, Inc. 25 Q Was that your first awareness that an incident had i
71 i 1 ob65 occurred? 2 A That's kind of funny. My first awareness of the l 1 3 incident -- that an incident had occurred and that it might be ! 4 serious enough to warrant attention was in the laboratory. I 5 overheard some people talking in the stall next to me. I then 6 questioned one of the fellows on the floor up here that was i reasonably senior that I expected might -- 8 MR. EDGAR: Let's go off the record. 9 (Discussion off the record.) 10 MR. HEBDON: Okay. Let's go back on the record. 11 THE WITNESS: I then asked John Merchant, who is I 12 a fairly senior person, in the front of the building here, ?o 13 8 dealing mainly with an ECCS flow, and auxiliary systems, N 14 safety injection systems, the actual design and pipe layout 15 of the systems, whether he knew anything about it, and he 16 described it to me briefly. From that -- 17 BY MR. HEBDON: 18 Q Excuse me. What did he say? 19 A I don't really remember. I remember forming the 20 conclusion that it was important. I think he indicated that 21 there had been a release of activity. 22 From there I went back to my station and back to 23 Allen Lomack's office to find out what was going on. l' ) 24 Q Approximately what time was this discussion? AcehNw:1 Reponus, Inc. 25 A In Allen's office? l l
72 b66 Q ~No, the discussion with the -- g^7 A John Merchant? 3 Q Yes. A That would probably have been 10:45. 5 Q Okay. 6 Now at that discussion did you get the impression that the concern was that an incident had occurred and we need 8 to get going on getting the plant recovered, or was it a perception that there has been an incident and they're still 10 in trouble and we're trying to figure out how to get the 11 plant to a safe condition? 12 A I got the impression that the incident was finished. O() Q All right. A Maybe not totally, but the plant was stable now. Q Okay. 4 16 A I did not get the idea t. hat there was an ongoing 17 concern -- 18 Q All right. 19 A -- for safety. 20 BY MR. FOLSOM: 2I At 10:45 -- I want to get the time of this Q 22 perception. 23 A Yes. O 4 Ace-Federd Reporters, Inc. 25 A Don't hold me to the minute.
73 1 g"yb67 Q No. / 2 A In the plant design manager's office there was a 3 discussion of what we knew about the transient. I believe at 4 that time we became aware that a PORV Fad become involved in 5 an accident for an extended period of time, but again the 6 implication that the plant was stable, that people had been 7 dispatched to the site to collect data so that we could review 8 it and evaluate what had happened. And after that I was told 9 to give a very short briefing to people on the floor so they 10 wouldn't find out about it first on national news, which we d 11 And that was pretty much it. 12 Q Was that the end of your involvement with the c 13 incident that day? 14 A No, that's the end of the involvement up until 15 about one o' clock. Q Okay. 17 A I ate lunch -- 18 BY MR. HEBDON: 19 Q Excuse me, let me ask another question backing up i 20 just a little bit. 21 In the status report that you received do you 22 recall any discussion of the hot leg temperature or the 23 temperatures and the pressures in the reactor system? ' )i 24 f' s ' Ace hoIed Reporters, Inc. o. 25 Q Do you recall any discussions of the status of the 1
74 I 1 '*;b68 HPI system? N-] 2 A No. I 3 0 Did you recall any discussions of the strategy 4 that was being used by the plant or any impression that the 5 plant was trying to depressurize the system? 6 A No. 7 Q Okay. 8 Would you go ahead, please? 9 A Okay. 10 I think it's proper to say we weren't worried at i 11 that time -- at least I wasn't, because over lunch I played 12 cards. [~/ h 13 'm Q Okay. '4 A I returned to my work station after lunch and 15 s Mr. Charlie Parks asked me a question about whether or not -- 16 something to do with the possibility of a forced blowdown -- 17 and I can conceivably mess this up because it's not really -- 18 it turns out to be false information that the question is 19 based on. 20 Q Okay. 21 A Let's leave it this way: 22 He provided me some information and asked me 23 whether a certain procedure could be gone through with accept-24 able Consequences to the reactor and the core. Ace-oder ) Reponers, Inc. 25 0 What was the procedure? I
75 j. 1 b A It was something like a voluntary blowdown of the l g"? 69 \\- 2 system to go to low temperature and low pressure. I 3 l Q Okay. 4 So he asked you -- now this is around one o' clock? 5 A Yes, this is close to one o' clock. 6 Q So around one o' clock he asks you if they could 7 blow the system down to low pressure? 8 A Yes. 9 Q Did he give an indication why he was asking you 10 that question? 11 A He must have, but I can't recall it now. I think 12 it must have been that, you know, it's obvious there had to cm a need or somebody was indicating a desire to do this, and.... 14 Q Did he indicate to you that possibly the plant had proposed or had indicated that they were in the process of i f 16 j doing this? J 17 A No; maybe proposed, okay? Q But he didn't give you the impression -- 19 A That they were in the process of it, no. 20 Q All ri c'..t. -21 A They were having trouble controlling it. I had 22 the impression they were having some trouble controlling pressure. 23 They wanted to open it up perhaps. /~T ( ) 24 O Okay. A*Feder-J Reporters, Inc. 25 What was your reaction to that strategy? I
76 t I A Well, with the conditions he gave me at that time, 6p570 2 my reaction was that, yeah, he could do that if he wanted to, l 3 that that would be okay and the system would be all right 4 following it. What he described was the full reactor coolant 5 system -- I think this is right, I could be 100% out of phase 6 here. 7 Q All right. 8 A -- that the temperature was low, the pressure was 9 high, okay? Now if that's true, if you take the top off it 10 you'll immediately go to a low pressure just about, you know, 11 j in a few seconds. And I said 'Yes, you're just going to go 12 down to a low pressure, there's no problem with that, they'll /, (\\ ') 13 still have plenty of water in there, they could survive a blow-14 down'. 15 After that I went back to ask some questions of 16 some people about this and think it through a little bit. And 17 for some reason I got up to the war room, and in the war room we had actual plant data. And I guess I provided an answer to 19 somebody that said you could do what I had been asked. 20 Oh, I was trying to get to Allen Ulmack. Charlie 21 had said Allen had asked him to look at this, okay, and I had 22 given the answer to Charlie and Charlie didn't know where Allen 23 was or whether we had to go barge into the thing. And I guess o ( ) 24 I Considered it weighty enough that I had to go give Allen the Ace ud Roonen, Inc. 25 answer directly. I had to do whatever searching for Allen was o I
77 g 7b71 necessary to provide any information, so we had it available. k# 2 I gave the answer -- or I think I gave the answer and then 3 stayed around to listen to some of the plant conditions and 4 find out what was happening. 5 At that time I became aware of the hot and cold leg 6 temperatures and,,.ou know, it finally dawned on me that this 7 plant could have been or was perhaps at that time in real 8 trouble, and then I started preaching high pressure injection. 9 0 Okay. 10 Did you at this time get information that the hot 11 leg temperatures were high? Was that what you were referring to? 12 A Yes. (^l T 13 Q And did that lead you to any conclusions about 14 whether there was steam and void formation in the reactor 15 coolant system? 16 A The hot leg temperatuiw' were super-heated. I can 17 describe that almost perfectly. The fellow that used to work 18 with me and for me was sitting next to me. His name is Lou 19 Carton. Everybody else was kind of around the table listening 20 to the squawk box. The hot leg temperature and the system 21 pressure and the cold leg temperature were broadcast on the machine. About sixty seconds later Lou and I both looked at 23 each other, stared at each other at the same time, and I rememb-im i ). 24 A..'isco n orari. w. er saying to him 'That's super-heated; the core's uncovered'. 25 And we proceeded to try and convince people to -- we wanted to I
76 1 ~9672 know what the high pressure injection was. I think we found 2 out. I dcn't know that that was accurate information at that I time or not, but I think we found out that they were playing 4 around with the high pressure injection. 5 They were opening it. They were using the PORV 6 or the block valve to block pressure at very low high pressure 7 injection. 8 Q Okay. 9 What time did that temperature and pressure come i 10 over? 11 A I'm going to put this in a time frame of around 12 three, three-thirty. I would suggest that perhaps a better ') 13 recollection, because I spent more time trying to put together 14 that first day, may be involved in my testimony in front of 15 the Kemeny Commission. And at times they asked the same set 16 of questions. The time I related them there is probably better 0.440 than today. 18 And then we started preaching high pressure injec-19 tion and trying to get to the riant to tell them, you know, 20 that they had a serious problem. There is no way to super-21 heat short of uncovering that core. 22 Q When you came to that realization, prior to that 23 time was it your impression that the other people that were () 24 A..)d,,i n,on.,,,, % in the room didn't feel that the plant wa- .n trouble? l 25 A
- Yes, j
i
79 1 7 7b73 Q So then would it be fair to say that that was -- N-] 2 A Well,'let me put it this way: I don't think they \\ 3 appreciated -- in my mind at that time when we heard those 4 temperatures, Lou and myself I think in that room at that 5 . time Lou and I were the only ones who truly appreciated the 6 -- it was my impression that nobody else appreciated what 7 could happen to that plant in the next 15 minutes, the next 8 30 minutes, okay, because of the condition that was told to us, \\ 9 that at that time it was our information that they were charg-l 10 ing nothing for a very small amount of water. Maybe we had a 11 number like 100 gpm or 40 gpm was told us at that time. The 12 plant is super-heated. And that even if they're in good condi-13 N-tion then, they're going to lose it shortly if they don't turn 14 on the high pressure injection system. 15 I did not see or recognize the -- well, I was the 16 one who was screaming and shouting, let me put it that way. I 17 was the one who was verbally demanding that we do something to 18 initiate high pressure injection. I didn't see that in other 19 people, so I conclude from that that they didn't recognize 20 the possibility of a real problem. 21 Q Did you have any difficulty convincing the other 22 people in the room that the plant was in trouble? 23 A Yes. I~) 24 AA'FWwd Reorms, Is. O Didn't they share your concern about super-heated 25 steam in the hot leg? I
80 i f I i A They asked me to explain it. dob74 2 Q Did you explain.it? 3 A Yes. f 4 Q After you explained it, did they share your concern? 5 A After I convinced them. 6 0 Approximately how long did that take? 7 A I have guessed at it at about 40 minutes in the 8 past. I wasn't keeping track of the time. 9 Q All right. 10 After you had explained it and after this 40 minate 11 period, did you feel then that they shared your concern that 12 the plant was in trouble? m I i 13 '/ A This is a very personal response and this is not 14 a response you should measure B&W by and I'm not 100% sure 15 that it's accurata. 16 I don't think that they felt as vehemently about 17 this as I did. 18 O All right. 19 Now you mentionod that Lou think you had some 20 feelings on the rtatus of high pressure injection system. Are 21 you certain that you knew that the high pressure injection 22 system had been throttled or secured during that period of 23 time? lll 24 A Well, I think we knew that we were having trouble Ace Federal Reporters, Inc. 25 in terms of communication with the site. We say I'm certain i
31 1 r~7b75 that I knew that our information said that they had throttled 2 ~ or run back the high pressure injection system. As to whether 3 or not the plant-was in that condition, that's subject to the 4 quality of the information we were getting at Lynchburg, okay? 5 Q But it was your perception that the high pressure 6' injection system was throttled back considerably? 7 A Yes. 8 Q Approximately when did you become aware of that? 9 A At about the same time. 10 0 So that was part of that same phone call at about 11 three to three-thirty? 12 A Yes. I did a quick Hewlitt-Packard calculatio;t /~] and requested that they advance the charging rate to 400 gpm. 14 Q So at that time you recommended increasing the 15 charging rate to 400 gpm? A Yes. 17 0 Was that recommendation passed along? 18 A After a period of time I believe it was passed 19 along to the best of B&W's capability. It's my impression we 20 had some problems passing that information. 21 Q To whom was it passed outside of the room that you 22 were in? 23 A Well, we were talking to somebody over the squawk (,_) 24 box and the information eventually went over that. To this day h -F M R e rs, W. 25 I don't really know. I thought we were in communication with t
82 1 (~7b76 one of the rooms beside the control room. I guess I'd been 2 .nformed later we were in communication with a private house, 3 which would in turn then make a telephone call to the control 4 room, or the control room, the B&W representative in the 5 control room would call them occasionally. 6 We were also -- Don Roy and I think Allen -- we 7 were on a separate line trying to get hold of GPU to pass the 8 informt, tion on, and I remember that the NRC was calling us and 9 asking us for advice, and we were trying to tell them the same 10 thing, NRC to tell them. We were trying every way we knew to 11 get that kind of information into that control room. 12 Q Do you recall passing to the NRC any recommenda-(~l N tions about reestablishing high pressure injection? 14 A I didn't personally pass it to them because I 15 wasn't involved in the communication with the NRC. That was 16 handled by either my boss or my boss's boss, Don Roy, or perhaps 17 maybe even somebody else. 18 Q Would that be Mr. Womack or Mr. Roy? 19 A Yes, but I recall being under the impression we did 20 pass that information to the NRC. 21 Q Do you recall passing to the NRC any information 22 about the fact that you felt the plant might be super-heated? 23 A I think so. (m,) 24 / Q Okay. Ace-Federe4 Repc,ters, Inc. 25 Do'you recall anything about any calls to GPU?
83 pb77 A Well, again, all those calls took place in other offices and I stayed in the war room -- we call it the war rooml 2 1 3 I don't know, probably -- can I replace that term? 4 Q It's as good as any. 5 A People were coming in and out saying these communica-6, tions had taken place, saying we had called this person and 7 we had called that person and the NRC was on the line, et cetera. 8 But directly, no, I don't. 9 Q Do you recall anybody saying that they had talked 10 to Mr. Arnold? 11 A It's pcssible. No, I don't recall any. 12 Q Okay. (")T 13 's Do you recall at hny time reconsidering your earlier 14 discussion about the advisability of trying to depressurize 15 the plant? 16 A No. I think that technique or the possibility of 17 doing that now that we were online with more accurate informa-18 tion was just dropped. I think we were solely occupied with 19 trying to establish enough high pressure injection to recover 20 the core, just.let it alone, recover the core and then do 21 something to follow on, which, after they got the conditions 22 to be more acceptable, we would evaluate further actions. 23 I mean, now that's where I was at. At that point ^ 24 y b w, in time I envisioned a water level somewhere around the middle 25 of the core decreasing, and then to act to stop that first. r
84 l b78 Once I got past that then I could go on and worry 1 I 2 about how we were going to do whatever was necessary to really j I 3 I control the thing. 4 Q Now this was around somewhere between, say, three 5 and four o' clock in the afternoon? 6 A Yes, right. 7 Q Okay. 8 At any time during that first day or so do you 9 recall making any connection or any parallel between the acci-10 l dent that was occurring at TMI and the incident that had i 11 occurred at Davis-Besse? 12 A No. That was a day or two later. In my mind I ('J knew what was happening and I knew what needed to be done. I 13 \\ 'N 14 wasn't searching for other examples. l 15 Q You say that a day or two later you did make that 16 connection? j 17 1 A Yes. 1 18 BY MR. FOLSOM: 19 Q Did you know that the PORV had failed open? 20 A I think I did. 21 0 Do you know when that fact was known to you? 22 A I believe that fact was known as early as the 23 eleven o' clock meeting at Womack's office. In the afternoon /'~', 24 Acer _ !za sepon.n. anc. we knew that they were controlling pressure with their block 25 valve. t
85 I l l BY MR. HEBDON: Gob 79 2 Q Would you describe the circumstances under which 3 1 you made this connection between the TMI accident and the 4 Davis-Besse incident? 5 A It's really not direct. What happens here is that 6: the day following it, after we got it stabilized to some extent, 7 at least stabilized to the point where we were providing core 8 cooling in a continuous fashion, we went home with the expecta-9 tion that they would follow the cool-down schedule. We even 10 had a dinner party that night which I was late to. 11 The next day we had a meeting on the events in 12 Allen's office, and I recall we were primarily at that meeting j / t 13 not concerned with the recovery of the plant. I think we were 14 still under the impression that the plant was in control, was 15 going to go to cold safe shutdown and clean itself up and 16 recover and go through the usual process, that it was going to 17 be a very serious event in terms of its implications for 18 providing explanations, that there would be a lot of involve-19 ment with the NRC in terms of why it happened, how to prevent 20 it from happening, was it a new incident, one that we really 21 hadn't analyzed before, were there concerns here that really 22 faulted the capabilities of the emergency protection systems, 23 questions like that we expected to be raised. ,o t 24 And I remember telling my boss an almost perfect Ace.'Fedefel Reporters, Inc. 25 description of what had happened. I said 'Do you guys want to I
86 i l hear what occurred there?' They were making other plans to l Gob 80 l 2 gain information in certain places and do certain things, and l I told them. I said I had an initiating incident: he stuck 4 open his PORV. He didn't recognize it; he kept it open. And 5 after he'd lost almost all his inventory, he tripped his 6 reactor coolant pumps. And then somebody said he couldn't 7 do that without throttling back the HPI. I thought about that 8 about two seconds and said 'Right, he throttled back the HPI bu4 as well'. 10 That turns out to be nn almost perfect description 11 f of that incident. Shortly after that there had to be a rising 12 pressurizer level or something like that, some reason for him [ 'd' 13 to terminate the high pressure injection. I think we thought 14 about it for a while, why he would have done it. I made the connection that he was either told that 16 the pressurizer level went up or I made that connection myself, 17 and I guess I'm not sure of that. I went back and got my 18 numbers out and reviewed them to see if there might have been 19 something done about that and started asking questions about 20 whether my instructions had ever gone out. 21 In about that same time frame Allen came back and 22 said ' Hey, the NRC's going to call; they want to know what we 23 can do to prevent this from happening to any other plant'. l 24 And I handed him the February 16th memo and said 'That's what Ace Federal Reporters, inc. 25 you do'. t
87 l l 1 ,~7b81 That's about what went on. 2 O When you handed him the February 16th metao and said : 'That's what you need to do', hcw did you know that that 3 4 hadn't already been done? '5 A Well, we knew at that time what had happened at 6 Three Mile Island and I guess I didn't know that the instruc-7 tions hadn't already gone out, but I did know that they certain-8 ly hadn't been implemented in terms of the operators effectively. 9 If my instructions were in place the operators at 10 Three Mile Island didn't follow them. 11 Q Okay. 12 A And I don't think we did know then. I think we 13 / 1 were trying to determine whether those instructions had '/ 14 actually gone out for a numFar of days after that. 15 O So then it would be fair to say the day after 16 Three Mile Island, that morning you had already made the 17 parallel between that incident and the incident that occurred 18 at Davis-Besse? 19 A No, I don't think that's fair as to whether it was 20 that morning or not. It might have been that morning, it might 21 have been that afternoon, or the following morning. It's 22 pretty close in there. 23 Q Within a day or two. ) 24 A But that morning I did know what had happened up
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25 there.. I didn't have much concrete evidence, but I said 'This i
88 mpb82 1 is what must have happened at that plant', and later on when 2 we got the data back, you know, that was confirmed. 3 O When you said 'This is what must have happened at 4 the plant', was that because of the fact that you were drawing 5 a parallel between that incident and the Davis-Besse incident, 6 or was that just based on your -- on information you had 7 received? 8 A No, I just know what will happen in the small break 9 loss of coolant accident, and that's the only set of circum-10 stances I could envision that would explain the results. 11 Q So then it was more based on your general knowledge 12 of small break LOCAs than your specific involvement with O 13 oevi -8e==e2 14 A Yes. 15 Q All right. 16 Do you know of any other precursor events that are 17 relevant to the accident at TMI? And let me define " precursor 18 events" because we're using the term a little more broadly here: 19 basically any event or issue t. hat might have indicated that an 20 accident similar to the accident that occurred at TMI might 21 happen at some' point in the future. 22 A I think, as I look at them, there are a number of 23 candidates which have been proposed. There are a number of () 24 people trying to qsalify them as a precursor. 1 Ace.Feder'.I Reporters, Inc. 25 I would say the precursors that have sufficient i i
89 b83 connections -- and the key connection in my mind is that the ~ 2 operator will go and push a button -- that Davis-Besse is 3 probably the only one. 4 Following that I think the specific timing of the 5 Kelly memo relates to a second incident at Davis-Besse, when 6 j although not as severe as this September 24th incident, there 7' had been another incident where they said 'We really have to 8 write something'. I think up until that time they were trying 9 to figure out whether they should write something or not, and 10 then he did. So I think there may be a second one that's 11 l
- simpler, 12 But at that time we still had the knowledge from
(. ) 13 bm/ Davis-Besse, so that's kind of like treating an accident in 14 hindsight. So I'd say Davis-Besse is it. 15 The Michelson Report may be a precursor. I don't 16 think it's as valid a precursor as the Davis-Besse. It's not 17 as dramatic as, for example, as my conclusions from Davis-18 Besse. 19 The other events that I know of in hindsight can 20 be interpreted as 'They should have told you'. But I think 21 there is a dramatic gap between the quality of information 22 they portray and recognition of the implications. 23 Q What type of events are you talking about? 24 A Well, things like the Ebersole question. Aa. ew;: n.mnm, ine 25 Communications that we had from Mr. Cresswell, which really
90 1 ,~7 84 weren't related too much. It was the pressurizer level b (> 2 concern to us. When we heard about it it was in the other 3 direction. Now it's my understanding he was also talking 4 about it going up, but he wasn't talking to us about that. 5 Any previous evaluations performed by B&W were 6 not mentioned in 1973. And then I've heard that some plant 7 in Switzerland underwent something similar. But there you 8 lack determination of the high pressure injection in that 9 plant. And one might consider any time that the PORV stuck 10 in the past as a potential precursor. There again I think 11 the key connection is the termination of high pressure injec-12 tion is not well made. / h 13 ' A/ Q Oxay. 14 Do you have any additional information that you 15 feel might be relevant to our inquiry into the events surround-16 ing the accident at TMI? 17 A Well, I'm not 100% sure how far your investigation 18 is going to go, or how far the other investigations are going 19 to go, or what areas you would like a response in. 20 I have a lot of personal opinions on things, but 21 in terms of particular information, hard information, I think 22 we've done a fairly reasonable job of covering it. 23 Q Okay.
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24 Is there anything else that you want to say? Am-25 i i A I guess there's one other little thing that I'd 1
91 I i l I 1 b85 like to say. i i 2 As I view the NRC's regulation in the past there l 3 has been a large stress on cookbook approaches, that I think 4 there is a tendency to involve the vendor and the customers 5 in filling in the blocks, and that cause an expenditure of 6 dollars and man-hours which don't do a great deal towards 7 improving the safety status of the plants. And those same a expenditures in man-hours could be spent on improving the 9 safety of the plants. And I think it creates a little bit of 10 a bad environment. 11 Q In what respect? 12 A Well, in the respect of just a person's capability r '? 13 or time to find out things that really should be fixed. I can 14 give you several examples on ECCS where I've done ridiculous 15 things. I mentioned one of them to you off the record in 16 terms of -- oh, that's probably a bad statement -- in terms of 17 the number of points we have to put into a LOCA spectrum. 18 These points cost a lot of money to fill in and 19 they don't do anything, they don't accomplish anything. To 20 some extent you want to do spectrum approaches, and then there 21 comes a point where it's kind of ridiculous. It's a personal 22 opinion. 23 I think the NRC frequently passes that point. We h 24 get statements that say 'It's the law, you have to fill in Ace-Federd Reporters Inc. 25 this box because it's part of Appendix K, 10 CFR Part 50.46'. l l
92 1
- b86 The law doesn't do anything to help improve the safety or to A
2 fix any real problems that may be there. And I'm concerned 3 about that a little bit. It's a personal viewpoint. 4 0 Okay. 5 A That is not B&W's viewpoint whatsoever. 6 l MR. HEBDON: Anything else to add, Mr. Folsom? I 7 MR. FOLSOM: No. 8 BY MR. HEBDON: 9 Q Do you have anything else to add? 10 A No, I don't. 11 MR. HEBDON: Okay. 12 That completes the interview. Thank you very much. I' 13 ) k/ (Whereupon, at 3:55 p.m., the deposition in 14 the above-entitled matter was concluded.) 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 g 24 Ace-reder:) Reporters, Inc. 25
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