ML19308C400
| ML19308C400 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Crane  |
| Issue date: | 09/25/1979 |
| From: | Heward R GENERAL PUBLIC UTILITIES CORP., NRC - NRC THREE MILE ISLAND TASK FORCE |
| To: | |
| References | |
| TASK-TF, TASK-TMR NUDOCS 8001230372 | |
| Download: ML19308C400 (55) | |
Text
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i N U C L E A R R E G U L A T O R 't C O M M I S S ! O N i
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l IN THE MATTER OF:
l TMI SPECIAL INQUIRY j
DEPOSITION 1
i DEPOSITION OF RICHARD N.
HEWARD /
i O
Place - Parsippany, New Jersey Date - Tuesday, September 25, 1979 Pages 1 - 55 i
rei.enen e:
( 02)347 3700 ACE - FEDERAL REPORTERS,INC.
OfficialReponers 8 0 012 3-037d.
444 Nenh C=pitol Street Washingten, D.C. 20001 l
NATIONWIDE COVERAGE. O ALLY
1 CR7296 I
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
)
Tf!REE MILE ISLAND SPECIAL 2
INQUIRY GROUP 3
g) i 4
DEPOSITION OF RICHARD U. IIEWARD 5
OF GENERAL PUBLIC UTILITIES 6
by NRC/TMI SPECIAL INQUIRY GROUP TRANSCRIPT OF 7
INTO Tile ACCIDENT AT THREE MILE PROCEEDINGS 8
ISLAND
]
9 10 GPU Headqunrters 260 Cherry Hill Road 11 Parsippany, New Jersey Tuesday, September 25, 1979
.a CJ 13 APPEARANCES :
14 DAVID J. EVANS, ESQ.
R. LAURENCE VANDENBERG 15 NRC/TMI Special Inquiry Group 16 JAMES B. LIBERMAN, ESQ,
General Counsel for General Public Utilities 17 DOUCLAS E. DAVIDSON, ESQ.
18 19 20 21 REPORTED BY:
MA RGARET J. TEILHA BER, C. S. R.
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22 23 7-J 24 Ja e - Fedral Reper ters, Inc.
25
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2 I
INDEX i O l
2
_ WITNESS DIRECT e'
3 RICHARD HEWARD-
- O
- 4 By Mr. Vandenberg 4,6,10,16,23, 29,44,49 By Mr. Evans 6,10,15,20,22, 6
29,32,43,45,49 4
i 7
8 l
9 EXHIBITS i
10 NUMBER DESCRIPTION FOR IDENT, II 1108 Position Description 21 12 1109 CORB report 21 O
n i
f 14 4
15 16 17 4
18 19 i
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21
' O 22 23
' O 24
- ' Ace-Federal Reporters, Inc.
25 6
3 1
MR. EVANS:
I want to note that this is 2
a deposition of Mr. Richard Heward which is be-3 ing conducted by the NRC/TMI Special Inquiry 4
Group.
It's being held at the offices of Genera l 5
Public Utilities Corporation in Parsippany, New 6
Jersey, on September 25, 1979.
7 Present in addition to the deponent is 8
Mr. Jim Liberman, the general counsel of General 9
Public Utilities Corporation, and also Mr. Doug 10 Davidson of Mr. Liberman's firm.
II Present for the NRC/TMI Special Inquiry 12 Group is Mr.
R. Lawrence Vandenberg and David J.
13 Evans.
14 Mr. Heward, I'm going to ask you if you 15 had an opportunity to read the Witness Notifica-16 tion form and the 1cteer to you from Mitchell 17 Rogovin which I have shown to you earlier today.
Id MR. HEWARD:
Yes, I have.
19 MR, EVANS :
Do you understand your right a 20 as set forth in those forms?
21 MR. HEWARD:
Yes, I do.
qLJ 22 MR. EVANS:
Do you have any objections 23 to proceeding at this time?
24 MR. IIEWARD:
No.
Aca - Federal Reportets, Inc.
25 MR. EVANS:
Would you stand and raise m
4 1
r3 your right hand.
V 2 RICHARD W.
H E V A R D, having been duly sworn accord-
'];
3 ing to law, testified as follows:
4 MR. EVANS :
Mr. Heward, at this time Mr.
5 Vandenberg will direct questions to you.
6. DIRECT EXAMINATION 7 BY MR. VANDENBERG:
8 Q
Mr. Heuard, my questions are going to deal with 9 the area of bringing TMI-2 into com:tercial operations at the end 10 of 1978 and to some extent your responsibilities at the site dur-II ing that time period.
I would like to start by having you describe 12 for us your position wich GPU in 1978 and who you recorted to and
(
)
13 who vere your inmediate subordinates.
14 A In 1978 ray title was Manager of Projects and I reported 15 to William H. Hirst and my irmediate subordinates regarding the 16 Three Mile'-2 project were John J. Barton, project manager.
17 Q
Can you go up the line a little bit rnore.
18 A
Beyond Hirst?
I9 Q
Yes.
20 A
Hirst reported to Robert C. Arnold, vice-president of 21
,o generation.
t 1
22 Q
Mr. Heward, were you aware of any possible finan-23 cial incentives for bringing TMI-2 on line before the end of 1973?
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)
24 3 gg, M e - Federal Rcrot ters, Inc.
25 Q
Were you aware that the unit was the subject of i
Heward - direct 5
1 a rate case and that there was a test year ending in December of 2
1978?
3 :A I believe i was aware that the unit was the subject of a 4 rate case which I think was quite a few times.
I'm not aware of 5
a test year.
6 Q
Were you aware that it was a possibility for se-7 curing investment tax credits based on construction of TMI-2?
8 A
No.
9 Q
Did you ever attend any staff meetings with Mr.
10 Herbein or Mr. Arnold where these kinds of things might have been 11 discussed?
12 A
I never attended any with Mr. Herbein.
I attended each 13. one with Mr. Arnold that he held monthly, and it might have been 14 discussed there.
I don't recall at this time.
15 Q
Did you ever hear employees below you talk about 16 any advantages to Met-Ed or GPU that might be secured by bringine 17 TMI on line?
18 A
Well, when you set out to build a power plant, it's ob-19 vious that you unnt to produce power with it so it's obviously 20 advantageous to get the thing on the line as soon as you can and 21 that was the project goal.
You are referring, I take it from 22 your previous questions. to financial benefits and I don't re-23 ;' call that I was aware of any specific financial benefits.
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24 Q
Were you aware in a general sense?
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25 A
Yes, sure.
1
Heward - direct 6
1 DIRECT EXAMINATION
-s 2
BY MR. EVANS :
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3 Q
Let me probe this a little bit, Mr. Heward.
4 When were you first made manager of projects?
5 A
August 1, 1977.
6 Q
Before that time, what was your title?
7 A
Proj ect manager.
8 Q
When did you assume that job?
9 A
At Three Mile Island?
10 g
- yes, 11 A
November 8, 1971.
12 Q
So it would be fair to say that you have been 7.-
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13 involved with Unit Number 2 of Three Mile Isinnd since construc-I4 tion begac at the site?
15 A
That's fair co say, yes, except for tuo years prior to 16 November 8, 1974 when I was project manager at Forked River.
I 17 was not at all involved in Three Mile Island at that time.
18 Q
So that would be 1969 or so you were involved l9 in the Forked River project?
20 A
That's correct, yes.
21 Q
When you first became involved with TMI-2, what p ).
22 was the date that had been c :
for commercial operation?
23 A
I don't really remember.
I don't remember when it was.
g.
24 It was substantially earlier than when it went commercial.
Ace - Federal Rcycr ters, Inc.
25 BY MR. VANDEMBERG:
Heward - direct 7
~
1 Q
Did you have any understanding that there were
,,V 2 some criteria to be rnet for bringing a plant into commercial op-n 3 eration?
O 4
A Yes, I did.
5 Q
What were those criteria or how did you learn of 6 them?
7 A The cr'iteria defined in a corporate procedure that iden-8 tifies what is to be reviewed to bring a plant commercial, and 9 my recollection is that it has to do with the level of training 10 and adequacy of the staff and the fact that the systems have been II cornpleted, t'ested, and have been turned over to the operator and 12 accepted by the operator with acceptable punch list items.
There 13 may be more criteria in S t procedure.
I don't recall at the 14 moment.
15 Q
Did you attend any meetings in the last half of 16 1978 that discussed at what time or how those criteria were goin. n I7 to be met?
18 A v
I participated in a meeting in October of 1978.
es.
I9 That was the meeting for the Commercial Operation Review Board 20 to make the decision as to whether or not they considered the 21 plant acceptable for commercial operation.
-h 22 Q
h"nat was the view at that point?
23 A
The view at that point was that the plant had only been
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24 tested to 75 percent power level and that the final testing had Ace - Federal Repceters, Inc.
yet to be'done and subject to the acceptable final testing that 25
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Heward - direct 8
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'they did consider adequate and acceptable to be classified com-i (3 2
mercial.
j 3
Q Were you involved in bringing TMI-1 into commer-O-
i 4
cial operation?
5 A
I certainly was, yes.
6 Q
Was there similar criteria applied there?
7 A
There were but it was not done formally.
It was not a 8 corrorate procedure at that time but we did sit dotm and review 9
similar~ things on an infornal basis at that time to bring Three q
10 Mile Island commercial, yes.
II Q
Dick, have you ever been awarc of a FERC and 12 before that Federal Power Commission 120 day rule, sometimes O
13 called Elcetric Plant Instruction 9D?
v 14 A
The 120 day rule vaguely rings a bell in my mind but I 15 guess I can't' tell you -- I think I knou what it is.
Is it a I
16 requirement that the plant is to be in commercial operation 120 17 days after making its" first power?
18 Q
Is that.your understanding?
i~
I9 A
I'm pulling this out of my head.
I vaguely remember 20 something like that and I don't know whether that's the rule or
' ;i 21 not.
22 Q
Did you ever discuss that with Bob Arnold?
I 23 A
Yes, if that's what it is, I think so.
- O U
., 4 Q
As far as I know, that's what it is.
Ace - Federal Reporters, Inc.
i 25 A
Okay.
120 days?
Is that correct?
That doesn't seem i
Heward - direct:
9 I
reasonable.
Maybe that's what it is.
Offhand it doesn't seem
)
2 like a reasonable time period.
3 Q
Did you ever discuss with Bob Arnold or others 4
the running of that 120 day period?
You stated, as I recall, 5
that the beginning of that period was -- how did you put it --
6 when it's first synchronized with the grid.
Was that ever a 7
problem?
8 A
Synchronized with the grid?
9 Q
No, the running of the 120 day period.
10 A
It was not a problem for me in that the objective of 11 the project was to get the testing done as laid out in the test 12 program, and in the particular case of Three Mile Island-2 ue 13 certainly were unable to get the testing done in 120 days be-14 cause of the problem we had with the innin steam relief valves.
15 So no, it was not a problem with.r.e offhand.
If you're 16 asking me was there a lot of pressure on me to meet the 120 days, I7 the answer is no.
18 Q
Did you talk with anybody, though, about ways to--
I9 let me rephrase that.
20 Did you discuss with anyone dealing uith FERC I
to re-establish or stop the running of the 120 day period?
A I didn't.
Q Okay.
Thank you.
24 (A discussion van had off the record.)
we -rederai nepe, ten. ine.
25 Q
Mr. Heward, back in May 4 of 1978, do you reca11 1
10 licword - direcc I
receiving a copy of a memo from'Mr. Seelinger to Mr. Miller 2
and in that memo there was a section dealing with philosophy 3
that stated:
"We must slow down and proceed forward deliberatel y C
4 and correctly.
Senior station management must convey this phil-5 orsphy to shift personnel."
6 Does that ring a bell with you?
7 A
No.
8 BY MR. EVANS :
9 Q
Let me try to refresh your recollection.
On 10 April 23, 1978, there was a transient at the plant involving Il main steam relief valves.
Is that a correct --
12 A
That certainly is, yes.
13 Q
11 ewing that transient, did you receive a car-14 bon copy of this Seelinger memo which was written to Gary Millet 15 providing his comments on the transient and procedures at the j
16 plant?
l 17 A
It's probably likely I did if he wrote it but I don't 18 recall it now.
I9 Q
You were typically carbon copied on those kind 20 of memos in the plant.
21 A
Yes, that's correct.
22 Q
Did you file those?
23 A
I probably did, yes.
24
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A:e-Federal Reportets, Inc.
25 Q
Wero you in any discussions, again, the last a
m
Heward - direct _
_11 I
part of 1978, that there was some pressure to declare n11-2 to
. Q.
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be in commercial operation because to not do so might put at 3
risk the allowance of the AFC on the plant, Allowance for Funds (q
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used during construction?
5 A
I don't think so.
I don't recall such a conversation.
6 Q
In these staff meetings you had with Bob Arnold 7
'that you attended, what kinds of things were discussed relative 8
to either rate cases or relations with FERC or the general sub-
~
9 ject of cornnercial operation of TMI-2?
10 A
Bob generally tried to keep us informed of testimony tha t l'
he gave in various proceedings.
I don't recall specifically any 12 discussions of conversations with FERC.
We talked about progres s O
13 on the various projects and we talked about problems on the ear-14 ious projects that were the kinds of things that should be dis-15 cussed at upper levels to try and assist in the resolution of 16 those problems and maintain progress.
I7 Q
Did those things include establishing a schedule 18 for completion of R11-27 19 A
No, because the schedule for completion was done outside 20 the scope of staff meetings.
The project staff assessed the 21 schedule and proposed that this was the amount of time they fore -
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22 saw would take to complete the remaining testing and that was 23 reported mostly in other places.
There was a monthly progress kJ 24 report issued to Arnold that discussed schedule cach month.
He - Federal Repor ters, Inc.
25 There was a letter to the Board of Directors that discussed
[
.]
Heward - direct 12 i
schedule each month.
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2 I handled project review meetings each' month and we dis-3 cussed _ schedule with the major contractors.
4 Q
Are you saying that you didn't have any input 5
into the establishment of the schedule?
6 A
No.
I said that the project produced all the input into 7
the establishment of the schedulei 8
Q What was your role in that process?
9 A
Well, the project manager reported to me at that time so 10 I approved what he produced, if I thought it was appropriate, 11 Q
Did you ever change what he produced?
12 A
I probably did, yes.
O 13 Q
Did you ever change his ertimate of when certain 14 tests should be completed or when the overell project should be 15 completed?
16 A
I' don't recall a specific case of that, but that may 17 have happened.
The project manager has a very long past history 18 of being the manar;er of ' testing, not only 'here but elsewhere, 19 and is probably as expert as anybody I know in the establishment 20 of schedule for test program for a nuclear power plant.
21 Q
You are implying you wouldn't have any reason --
g LJ 22 A
l'm implying that it's probably unlikely.
I don't alway s 23 agree ulth things people say an1 I might have had a difference 24 at one time, but I can't recall a specific case of that.
By and Ace-Federal Reporters, loc.
large, if you look at the history of what happened in the year 25
lleward - direct 13 1
1978, the plant was to be commercial in the spring.
The April 2
23rd transient put.a substantial delay in that.
There were 3
'other items that came up during the summer that we had to attenc
.(}
4 to and the plant went commercial when the test program was com-5 pleted.
6 I daresay if it weren't completed until two weeks later, 7
it wouldn't have
- gone. commercial until two weeks later.
8 Q
You said you had a lot of interface with the 9
different groups there. -That would include the constructor, UE 10
& C7 II A
Yes.
They were on the site in 1978.
12 Q
So that would be Catalytic in that.
O
'3
^
ves.
14 Q
What was the nature of your interaction with UE 15
& C for the time they were on site?
16 A
UE & C was the construction manager and constructor.
17 They hired subcontractors to do specialty jobs and they hired 18 labor to do jobs themselves.
They essentially worked for me as 19 the project manager for GPU when I was project manager.
20 By the way, there is a project organization responsi-21 bilities document that cicarly defines interface of UE & C and
~22 the other cajor contractors with GPU.
23 Q
Ubich document is that?
A 24 1 /
A It's called The Proicct Organization and Responsibilitic s
ice - Fe,deral Reporters, Inc.
25 Document, and it has a project number attached to it which I u
4-
Heward - direct 14 1' don't remember what it is.
2 MR. EVANS :
Will you be willing to make 3
Q that document available to us?
V 4
THE WITNESS:
Sure.
5 Q
When was Catalytic brought in?
6 A
I believe the official date was September 1st, 1977.
7 Yet I started' Catalytic in small numbers on the site as early 8
as May or June of '77 so we could get an appropriate interface 9
with United.
10 Q
What was the reason for switching constructors?
II A
We did not switch constructors.
What we did was to bring 12 on a contractor who would ultimately wind up with the maintenance 13 contract of the finished plant and also act as a completion con.
14 tractor.
We did the similar thing on Unit 1.
It' worked out 15 very well.
The only thing we decided on Unit 1 that we wanted 16 to do different on Unit 2 was to bring the guy in earlier and I7 we did that.
18 Q
Could yo'u give me an estittate of percent complete 19 on TMI-2 when the switch was made.
20 A
In the nineties.
21 Q
Low nineties?
'j 22 A
I.ow nineties, mid-ninetics, somewhere.
23 Q
Was the switch due in any way to any of the
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24l GPU. company's dissatisfaction with UE & C's performance?
l Ace-rederai nepeiters. ine, l
25 A
I discussed that switch at least a year or more before L
Howard - direct 15 1
it happened with the vice-president and project manager of UE &-
,f-).
'v 2 C and explained to'him that we had good experience on Unit 1,
- C).
which he participated in that very well, and told him I thought 3
u 4 we ought-to do it a little sooner on Unit 2 and he concurred.
5 This was something that was premetitated and in agree-6 ment with UE & C.
7 Q
Those discussions were with Earl Nagle?
8 A
That's correct.
9 BY MR. EVANS:
10 Q
Let me ask at the time that UE & C left the site 11 do you have any indication of how tnany punch list items were 12 open?
O C'
13 A
I'm guessing the number was in the order of 8,000.
14 Q
Would you consider that unusually high?
15 A
No.
In my view it was high, L'gher:than 1 expected, but 16 I would say no for this reason.
When Three Mile-1 went commer-17 cial, it had 4,000 punch list items.
UE & C left the site just IO prior to the hot operations in the test program which meant that I9 there was still a lot of things not done, a lot of things not 20 tes teil.
21 So if you put those two numbers in perspective, I would
.p i
J 22 say that it's not terribly out of line.
l 23 Q
Do you think when the company learned that therc g
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24 were that inany punch list items open it was surprised?
- Ace-Federal Reporters, Inc.
25 3
- 1. don't know.
It was higher than I thou;;ht it was but t
'h
Heward - direct 16
'l I' don't think it was any serious oversight or any. such thinr:
as
()
that.
2 3
Q Let me ask this question.
Was Mr. Arnold.sur-4 prised when you told him there were that many open ite'ms?
5 A
I don't remember.
He probably was.
It looks like a 6
big number but when you sit down and look at each one of these 7
items, you go to one item and it says test number so and so is 8
not complete.
Well, test number so and so hasn't yet been run 9
so, of course, it's not complete and you go down there like 10 that and there's a preponderence of those kinds of items that 1I makes the number so large.
12 You say 4,000 items on a commercial operation on Unit 1 O
b 13 is a very large number; well, it is a large number, but when 14 you look at the items and you see what they are, it's apparent 15 that they are not serious items.
16 BY MR VANDENBERG:
17 Q
You mean that most of those items could be re-
'18 solved-with minimal effort?-
19 A
Yes.
As a matter of fact, a lot of them didn't have to 20 -be resolved, may still not be resolved.
If you take an extremely 21 large and complicated thing such as a nuclear power plant and
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22 you try and get yourself to the point where you have no punch 23 list items, even if the thing is-in operation, it's not posst.bl e (u) 24 and the reason it's not possible is you always have a valve
' Me -Federal Repostars, Inc.
-25 that's going to leak and something like that and those items i
lleward - direct 17 I
go on the punch list.
You have electrical recept 5cles that
. 't,j -
or 2
don't work /one is needed somewhere.
That's a work list item.
(5 3
It goes on the list.
The items that were important to safety tJ 4
and'to proper operation of the plant, they got fixed.
5 Q
I would like to switch the question to a differ-6 ent area a little bit.
Mr. Heward, I want to ask you if you car 7
identify this document which appears to be a Position Descrip-8 tion for you.
Is that correct?
9 A
Yes, I guess so.
10 Q
What was the date of that?
II A
9/1/72.
12 Q
You've identified that as being the official O
13 Position Description for you at that date.
14 A
It certainly looks like it is, yes.
15 Q
Did your official position description change 16 much or at all through 1978 from that time?
I7 A
I had a different position in 1978 than I did in 1972.
18 I was the manager of projects in 1978.
I was the proje'et man-l9 ager in '72.
20 Q
On page 2 of this, there's a statement I wish 21 you could explain to us.
The iden that then as project manager 22 there's a need to comple te an initial warranty run prior to com-23 mercial operation; could you explain to us what that means.
24 A
The initial warranty run was a test that was required
%e -Federal Reporters, Inc.
J 25 in 'the Babcock and Wilcox contract that verified that the reactc r l u
i Heward - direct 18 I
plant would produce so many pounds of steam an hour.
i, V
2 Q
Why was that made a pre-condition to commercial
(~N 3 operation?
U 4
A-Well, on Unit 1 which I was working on primarily in 1972 5 I don't believe that any large B & W plant had ever been run and 6 it was certainly essential for us to verify that the plant that 7 we bought woul'd put out the amount of steam that it was adver-8 tised to put out, and so we ran the warranty run and, as I recal l 9
on Unit 1, the warranty run was the last thing run in the power 10 range test.
II As a matter of fact, I think I believe that the power 12 range testing had all been completed prior to running the war-13 ranty run, and we did the warranty run just prior to commercial I4 operation.
Now, on Unit 2, the warranty run was not as importan :
15 an item to us as it was on Unit 1 because once again it still 16 required s'o many pounds of steam per hour from the plant and the 17 plants, Unit 1 and Unit 2, are essentially the same reactor, yet 18 the Unit 2 reactor operates at a substantially higher power leve l I9 than Unit 1; and since we had already run Unit 1 and knew what 20 the output was, the certainty of getting a similar output was 21 there.'for Unit 2.
n 22 As a matter of fact, we ran at a substantially higher 23 outPu t ~- than what was warranted.
v 24 Q
h 6h hMd wmq m & um Mg u Ace - reo rai nepo,teis, inc.
25 the. Unit Acceptance Tes t?
Was that another name for the same h
Heward - direct 19 I
test?
2 A
Yes, I think so.
3 Q
Was this test run in 1978 or was it run later?
4 The reason I ask that is that --
5 A
Oh, sure.
6 Q
On Unit 2.
7 A
I believe it was run later.
8 Q
The reason I asked that was I seem to recall 9
that in a schedule of the tests remaining to get to commercial 10 operation that Bob Arnold supplied to the Pennsylvania PUC, the II Unit Acceptance Test was shown as a milestone prior to commer-12 eini operation.
Did Bob Arnold ever discuss thnt kind of sched-13 ule with you?
14 A
Yes.
We had always scheduled the warranty run to be 15 done in the test program.
If you look at the test program sched-16 ules going back where we got into power range test, they all I7 showed the unrranty run being run late in the test program but 18 prior to commercial.
The warranty run was run for the reason I9 that I just said; namely, to verify that we got the pounds of 20 steam per hour out of the reactor that B & W advertised it would
]
produce.
22 There was no question about getting it here and the var-23 ranty run was simply a contract obligattan, if you even want to
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24 call it an obligation, because I think the contract says if you Ace-Federal Repciters, Inc.
25 don't run it you sitanly raake your inst payment, if you don't rur
Heward - direct 20 1
it so many months after it is ready for it, but it was a con-2 tract item and it could be run at any time on Unit 2.
3 Q
Do you recall why it was d'ecided not to run thi!
4 test on Unit 2 prior to the commercial operation declaration?
5 A
Well, as you are aware, Unit 2 was delayed for many 6
reasons throughout the years, and I'm here to tell you, we looked 7
all the time at things that may be in our program that weren't necessary.
Obviously that's our job.
If they aren't necessary 8
9 and they don't provide you something tangibic for the operation 10 and the safety of the unit and you can delay it or defer it or Il not do it, why not?
12 And the warranty run on Unit 2 was an academic exercise.
+
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13 The data had aircady been taken, I believe, on two occasions in 14 unofficial warranty runs.
When the warranty run occurred, it 15 meant we had to make a payment to B & W.
16 Q
So the data was available and you proved to your -
I7 self internally that the initial warranty run test could be met" 18 A
Oh, yes.
I9 Q
And you decided to delay the official performanc e 20 of that particular test.
21 A
Not only that, we were abic to get 100 megawatts or mor e
m 22 of power out of Unit 2 more than we ever got out of Unit 1.
23 BY i!R. EVANS:
/
24 Q
Let me ask a few preliminary questions.
Mr.
Ace - f*ederal Repotters, Inc.
25 IIcward, you said you participated in a meeting on October 26,
Ileward - direct 21 1
1978, a meeting of the Commercial Operation Review Board; is h,,
2 that correct?
3
'A That's correct..
4 Q
Did you see the final report of what has been 5
called the CORB?
6 A
The what?
7 Q
The CORB.
8 A
Is that the Commercial Operation Review Board?
9 Q
Yes.
10 A
Yes, I saw the final report.
11 Q
Would you identify this as that document?
12 (A discussion was had off the record.)
13 A
Is there an appendix in this?
14 Q
Yes, I believe when you look at the very end.
15 A
Okay.
Yes.
16 MR. EVANS:
Could I ask you to mark this 17 as Exhibit 1108 and to mark the previous docu-18 ment that was shown to Mr. lleward as 1109.
l 19 (Exhibit 1108 and 1109 are marked for 20 identification.)
21 MR. EVANS :
Just to clarify this, what's b
22 been marked for identification is 1108, titled 23 General Public Utilities Position Description, 24
-and it's a position description for Mr. R. W.
4e-Federal Reporters, Inc.
j 25 Heward, Junior, and what has been marked for
Heward - direct 22 c
1 identification as 1109 is titled Report of Revic a
b' 2
Board for the determination of technical and 3
organizational readiness for placing Three Mile h
.4 Island Unit 2 into commercisl operation.
5 BY MR. EVANS:
6 Q
Mr. Heward, in Exhibic 1109 there is a discussio rt 7 of the testing program and it's my understanding that this dis-8 cussion is really the minutes of the meeting that was held on 9 October 26 at the site, and as I will show you, it states in 10 this section that seven tests that were originally scheduled to 11 be done at Unit 2 were canceled or climinated because they w.ere 12 determined not to involve any Federal, State or local require-7-
13 ments.
Would you look at that.
14 MR. LIBERMAN:
Mr. Evans, don't you want 15 to also note that the same sentence says that 16 there were no unresolved problems?
I7 MR. EVANS :
That's fair.
18 Q
My only question is these seven tests, are they l9 in addition to the Unit Acceptance Test or is the Unit Acceptanc e 20 Test one of them?
21 A
I don't remember.
n LJ 22 Q
Let me ask if these tests, then, are of the same
- 23 nature in your mind as the Unit Acceptance Test.
24 A
Yes, that's correct.
We did look and I~think I even Ass.- Federal Reporters, Inc.
25 instigated looking to find out if we had -- and we did this a
11eward - direct 23 1
number of times -- if we had any tests in our program 1: bat be-2 cause of new information that waa available from other units
(])
3 that had been run or changes in requirements, whatever, t. bat if 4 we had tests that we could avoid doing, we should omit them fron
.5 the program.
6 Q
Would it be fair to say, then, that every test 7 which was run on' Unit 2 was necessary to meet a Federal, State 8 or local requirement?
9 A
No.
10 Q
What was the criterion for eliminating a test?
II A
Well, the criterion was that it was not a requirement 12 from some regulatory activity, it,was not needed by us to satis-13 fy ourscif regarding the acceptability of the unit, and possibly 14 other industry information had come into play in the intervening 15 years since we put that in the test program that did not require 16 any further test or data to be taken in that area, so we took 17 them out.
That's a general statement of the criteria.
Maybe I8 Ron Toole can be more specific.
I9 BY MR. VAliDEllBERG:
Q Dick, you mentioned earl.'.cr that in setting the 20 21 schedule for TMI-2, you nearly always accepted the schedule pro 22 posed by the project manager, particularly the last part of 197f.
23 Did the project manager have the responsibility to interface fJ 24 with Catalytic and B & W and Burns & Roc at that time?
Ace - Federal Reporters, Inc.
25 A
Yes.
d.
W
lleward - direct 24 1
Q So the project manager was responsible for coor-p U
2 dinating the inputs of all those various groups?
{}
3 A
That's correct.
4 Q
And assessing their impact on the schedule.
5 A
Yes.
6 Q
Who was the highest management official that 7
ever made changes or provided specific input to the schedule for 8
TMI-2?
9 A
I'm not sure what answer to give you.
It could have 10 been Mr. Hirst or Mr. Arnold.
Il Q
No one above Mr. Arnold.
12 A
I don't know.
Not that I'm aware of.
I'm sure Mr.
V 13 Dieckamp was aware of what the schedule was because he partici-14 pated in a number of reviews from time to time to understand 15 what was going on at the site, but I can't say whether he ever 16 input any information into the schedule.
17 Q
When the operating license was granted for Unit 18 2 in February of 1978, is it your reco11cetion that the terms l9 of the operating license required certain tests or certain work 20 to be completed uithin specified time frames?
21 m
A No.
U 22 Q
Uns there any time condition associated with any 23 part of the OL?
24 A
No.
Mc -rederal Reporters, inc.
25 Q
Also with regard to the operating license, what 1
Heward - direct 25 1
uns the mood of the company in February?
Were people anxious
- (V3 2
and in a hurry to get that cperating license?
You said there 3
were about 8,000 punch list items outstanding at the time.
f]
4 A
No.
I believe I said the 8,000 punch list items were 5
outstanding when Catalytic took over which would have been Sep-6 tomber of 1977.
I believe a good many of the 8,000 had been 7
worked off by that time.
As a matter of fact, I believe that 8
most of them had been worked off by this time and it certainly 9
was our desire to get the operating license and proceed with 10 the test program.
11 Q
When you say they were worked off by that time, you mean they were resolved prior to February 8th of 1978?
12 b-13 A
Yes, most of them.
The majority were.
14 Q
Do you recall any meetings with NRC insp'ectors 15 from the office of the Inspection and Enforcement regarding the 16 approximately 8,000 item punch list?
17 A
No, but I do recall that there were meetings of NRC in-spection with our test group to review the outstanding' punch 18 19 -list prior to the operating license.
I'm certain that happened.
20 Q
Can you describe the substance of those meet-(]
ings?
What were NRC's concerns at that time?
21
%.)
22 A
I did not attend the meetings but-the concern was the n
punch list items remaining needed to be screened to ascertain
'3
~U 24 if any should hold uo issuance of the operating license and in-l We-Federal Reporters, Inc.
j 25 deed they agreed with us that there should not. be any there tha t i
a
Heward - direct 26 I
woul'd hold up the operating license issuance.
2 Q
Who did that review to determine if there were 3
any that should hold up the OL?
4 A
Who was it, the I & E inspectors?
5 Q
It was the I & E inspector that did the screen-6 ing?
7 A
Yes.
8 Q
Rather than you as the licensee?
9 A
Wait a minute.
I didn't say that.
What I said it was 10 the I & E inspectors came in to verify our decision'that those II punch list items should not hold up the operating license.
12 Q
I'm a little confused about that February, 1978, GV 13 time period.
There were still some pre-operational tests to be 14 completed at the time the OL was granted; is that right?
15 A
No, I' don't think so.
16 Q
And all canstruction was complete prior to the I7 granting of the OL?
18 A
Yes.
l9 Q
Did, in your view --
20 A
Just a minute.
Construction was complete but bear in 21. mind there are always modifications and punch list items that 22
-have to be worked and at that time there were such things being 23
- worked, fs'i 24 Q
Do the punch list items relate to pre-operation: 1 i Acc.-Federal Reporters, Inc.
25 test-_ items perhaps?
Heward - direct 27
-1 A
Some may.
g U
2 Q
Let me strike at this directly.
Do you think 3
that when you got the OL for TMI-2 that that, because you then
(]
4 had to live under a set of tech specs and the conditions o.E the 5 OL, did that hinder in any way the completion of ounch list iten s 6
relating to work normally done before the granting of the OL7 7
A No.
8 Q
It didn't.
9 A
No.
10 Q
Who do you think really had the final say on iI when TMI-2 went commercial?
12 A
The chairman of the Commercial Review Board, Bob Arnold.
13 Q
As I understand the situation, GPU Service Cor-14 poration was acting to perform all the power ascension tests and 15 Metropolitan Edison was the licensee who operated equipment that 16 needed to be operated to perform a test'and responsibility for would I7 the unit / transfer to Met-Ed upon a commercial operation declara-18 tion, whereas prior to that point it was the responsibi11ty of I9 GPU Service Corporation.
20 Am I correct?
21 A
No..There's one exception and that is from the time nV i
22 the OL was issued until commercial, the operator had the respon-
)
\\
23 sibility to the Commission to perform under the terms of the O'.
24 license and that was a responsibility that GPU Service Corpora-Ace - Federal Repor ter5, Inc.
25 tion could not assume.
Heward - direct 28 I
Q In late 1978 as Manager of Projects you were 2
working for which company?
l 3
A GPU Service Corporation.
4 Q
Did you see any signs -- well, struggle is too 5
harsh a word -- but any dichotomy between the service corpora'-
6 tion and Met-Ed, the service corporation perhaps wanting to com-7 plete the plan and turn it over to Met-Ed and Met-Ed perhaps 8
saying " Hey, we don't want to accept this plan until everything 9
is totally done"?
10 A
Met-Ed certainly didn't wish to accept anything until II it was complete.
Indeed, they did sign off to accept every sys-12 tem in that plant prior to it being completed.
13 Q
To your knowledge did officials from Met-Ed ever I4 say " Hey, wait a minute, I don't think it's ready to turn over 15 to us"?
16 A
Certainly.
I7 Q
Can you give ma a for instance?
18 A
No, but in the various system turnovers that we had, I'it I9 sure there were times when Met-Ed felt that I'm not ready to 20 take this system because, and the becauses were resolved between 21 the start-up and test group and the operator, and when they werc U
22 resolved they took the system.
There was no system shoved down their throats as far as I know.
i
}f
~/
Q Did Met-Ed raise any of those kinds of concerns
-:e -reeerai nenete,s inc.
25 during the month of December, 1978, on nny particular system or
lleword - direct 29 1
set of systems?
gV 2
A Not that I know of.
No, they didn't have to sign for t' }
turnover and receipt of-a system unless they were satisfied th'at 3
4 the punch list was small enough and inconsequential enough to 5
accept the system.
6 BY MR. EVANS:
7 q
Let me pursue this.
Who signed off for Met-Ed?
8 A
I'm not sure.
I think it was the superintendent but 9
I'm not certain.
10 Q
Mr. Miller?
II A'
Yes, I guess Miller was the superintendent then.
- Yes, 12 I believe he was.
(.)
13 Q
If a Met-Ed operator and a GPU test engineer 14 disagreed over an instruction, what was the next ' step in making 15 a decision?
16 A
Well, it would go to the project manager and the statiot t I7 manager, but I don't think that ever occurred.
Q You don't believe there was ever a disagreement?
I8 19 A
No, I don't. -I believe that the two of them sat down 20 and thrashed it out between them until they got it settled.
I'n 21 reasonably sure on Unit 1 that was the case, and I was a lot p
22 closer to it than obvio~usly --
t 23 MR. EVANS :
Could we go off the record.
4 24 (A discussion was had off the record.)
j f+s-Federal Reporters,Inc, l
25 BY MR. VANDENBERG:
e-Heward-- direct 30 1
Q Dick, I'm goir3 to show you this report which
. ( _s) 2 was marked in a previous deposition as Exhibit Number 1107, the
- ( q 3
report by Touche Ross Company.
Have you seen that before?
'U 4
A Yes, I believe I have.
5 Q
In that report there are inclusions that con -
6 struction momentum and productivity bottomed out in mid-1977 just 7 prior to replacement of UE & C by Catalytic and it goes on to 8
further talk about morale being quite low at that point.
9 Was that true?
10 A
Yes.
i II Q
Why was that occurring?
Do you know?
I2 A
Well, when you take a group of people working for a com-h 13 pany who have been employed for approximately ten years on a 14 project and the project comes to a close, why, they reali~e that 15 before.long they may be out of work and morale drops and that's 16 something you get at the end of every project.
17 You see, that was another motive for bringing the com-18 pletion contractor early so that some of the employees could see the action of this guy coming in.
Some of them were picked up 20 on these roles because they needed people.
They did some local 21 hiring.
I believe that that's a beneficial thing to do.
.g V~
22 Otherwise, people. lose. their motivation if: they see the 23 end. coming ~ and they tend to lose incentive and you never get the
~
24 job done.
fee -Federal Reporters,1,1c.
25 Is this the kind of thing you discussed with Mr.
Q l-r L
t 1
Heward - direct 31 I
Nogle of UE & C?
2 A
Oh, sure, yes.
There is an incentive for a guy who sees 3
a maintenance contractor for a number of years beyond commercial 4
operation.
If he works hard he may get picked up by that com-5 pletion contract.
6 Q
You mean picked up in the sense of being con-7 tinued as a maintenance contractor and working with them?
8 A
Yes, that's right.
9 Q
There was also a conclusion in this Touche Ross 10 report that the project control, at least early on, of TMI-2 was II weak.
Did you during your time, both as project manager and as 12 (m
manager of projects, see a change in the roics among CPU Servicc L,)
13 Corporation, Met-Ed, and the consf.ructor, whether it be UE & C I4 and Catalytic?
15 A
Yes, but that's a complex question.
First of all, Met-Fd' 16 was responsible for the project management of that job until I7 October of '71 so there was a decided change in role at that 18 time when the service corporation took over responsibility for the project and I would say that I did see a change in the ef-20 fcctivenes of the control that we exercised during the period 21 of construction.
I would say our control became greater as tim o
a went on.
93
("
Q Uhen you say our, you-mean --
24
~
A GPU Service Corporation.
Ace - Federal Reporters, Inc.
25 MR EVANS:
Let's take a five-minute
I IIeward - direct 32 1
recess.
2 (Five-minute recess.)
3 BY MR. EVANS:
'J
.4 0
Mr. Heward, in what has been marked as Exhibit 1109, thr 5
CORB report, section 2.5.2 of that document contains a discussicn 6
of a screen ou~tage.
Do you know when that screen outage cas 7
held at Unit 2?
8 A
I'm not sure I recall exactly but I believe it was very 9
late in the test program, if not after it was completed.
I be-10 lieve it was -- I'm sorry.
I don't remember.
1I THE WITNESS:
May I have that.
12 (Counsel producing.)
/
)
13 A
I have a schedule here or a chronology of the testing 14 program that tells me the screen outage occurred about mid-Novert-15 ber.
16 Q
Can you tell me why the screen outage is con-17 nected with the test program?
18 A
Sure.
When you start up a power plant, you place cer-I9 tain screens in fluid systems so that any residual dirt or for-20 eign objects that might be in the system won't go through the 21
. system.
They will be taken out of the screens, so after you L'
22 have run your components' specified time by the manufacturer, 23 they are satisfied that all icose dirt and so forth that may i
24 carry away has already carried away and ought to be on the he - Federal Reporteis, lac.
25 so there is a time in the test program where you shut
- screens,
Heward - direct 33 I
down for the screen outage.
v 2
On Unit 1 it was af ter the testing was complet-You 3
(
take the screens out and you Icave them out and that's the re-4 lationship of the screen outage with the test program.
5 Q
Is it true to say that at TMI-2 the screen outage 6
was not planned but it was in fact done during a period of down 7
time caused by another occurrence?
8 A
Well, it's not fair to say it wasn't planned because it 9
had always been planned.
10 It appears from the chronology I have that there may II have been another problem at that time that caused us to proccet 12 with the screen outage rather than delay it.
13 Q
Can you tell me what is meant in Exhibit 1109 I4 when it says that plans exist to blitz deficiency list during 15 the screen outage.
16 A
Sure.
What that means is that during the period of the I7 screen outage when the equipment is not being run, the plant is 18 not being run, it's the intention to bring in a larger 'than nor-l9 mal number of crafts so that the punch list items can be worked 20 with a larger force.
Possibly it means two shifts overtime, 21 that hind of thing.
It's more than a normal work effort.
m 22 Q
Do you recall in fact at TMI-2 hov many addi-23 tional people were brought in?
g 24 A
No, I d on ' t.
4e -Federal fleporters, lac.
25 Q
But it's your recollection that more people were
' Heward - direct 34
. 1 brought in.
l 2
A I remember reading that item.
I guess I can't truth-3 fully say that I remember that more people were brought in.
I 4
think at that time I was spending a good deal of my time on 5
Forked River and probably that's why I don't remember that.
6 Q
Did Ron Toole report to you?
7 A
No.
Ron Toole reported to the start-up and testing man-8 oger and in 1978, late 1978, I believe that was Don Hetrick.
9 Prior to August of 1977, it was John Barton.
10 Q
And both Mr. Barton and Mr. Hetrick reported to 11 you?
12 A
No, they did not.
13 Q
Would you please cont-inue the chain of command.
14 A
Hetrick reported to Bachofer, I believe, who was'the 15 director of operations, and I believe that was subsequent to 16 August of 1977.
17 Prior to August of 1977, I recall that John Barton re-18 ported to Ron Williams, who was the manager of engineer'ing.
l9 Q
Let me ask the question this way.
How would yot 20 be made aware of concerns that Mr. Toole had in running the test 21 ! program?
m 22 A
When I was project manager and Toole was the superinten-23 dent, he was under tay operational control, al though not under 24 my functional directly,and he uas there under Barton's operatior-we edersi neporters, inc.
25 al control when Earton was the project -aner and that's how
Ileward - direct 35 n
1 because there were meetings held uith test superintendent at a V
2 high frecuency.
He participated in our review meetings and he
.O 3
waa ce=ti=uatty eavisten us of enia enat were of coacero to 4
.him.
Thefr trailers on site were immediately adjacent to one 5
another and it taas a close relationship.
6 Q
Did Mr. Toole ever report to you major problems 7
with running the test program as it had been set forth?
8
.A If you can restate that question, I am not sure I under-9 stand the question.
10 Q
Through your operational interaction with Mr.
Il Toole during the course of these meetings, would he outline the 12 problems which existed with meeting the test schedule which had 13 been set?
14 A
Oh, yes, but if your question is did he ever come to me 15 and say " Gentlemen, I can't complete the test program" the answer 16 is no., he never said that.
17 Q
Did he ever say "I need more people to complete 18 the test program"?
19 A
l'm sure he did, yes.
20 Q
Did he get.the people?
21 O
A Probably did,-yes.
I did not provide people for Toole.
G 22 I assisted if he had a problem getting people in helping him to 23 get peopic.
=O 24 Q
Who provided the people?
- Ade -Federal Reporters,Inc.
25 A
The people would generally be provided by his immediate L-
Heward - direct 36 I,,).
-1 supervisor or by' contractors.
He had significant contractor v
2 assistance from the start-up test group.
3 Q
What'wcre the names of the contractors?
4 A
United Engineers Constructors, Babcock and Wilcox, 5
Stearns Roger, Burns & Roe, NUS.
There may have been others.
6 I don't recall'.
7 Q
All those people from various organizations re-8 ported to Mr. Toole?
9 A
~Yes, they did.
10 Q
Do you know if Mr. Toole's start-up test group I1 was required to work large hours of overtime?
12 A
They were.
O 13 Q
Did any of those peopic ever complain about wori 14 ing those many hours?
15 A
Everybody complains about working overtime.
16 q.
Was any consideration given to extending the I7 test schedule so that larger numbers of people and more hours 18 wouldn't be necessary?
l9 A-No.
That was never a consideration.
The consideration was that the people that had to work these hours tihat were ex-20 21.empt-peopic were given additional pay.
,gd 22 Q
In your opinion did the test program suffer be-23 cause of that increnced staffing?
g 2
24 A-Because of the increased staffing?
' ke-f~ederal Reporters, Inc.
25
- q
- yc3, m
Heward - direct 37 1
A What increased staffing?
o 2
Q As I understand what you've told me here today, 3
more contractors were necessary to assist Mr. Toole in complet-
- /
4 ing the test program.
5 A
You have possibly interpreted my statement to mean that 6
as time went on we had to seek the belo of additional contractor s.
~
7 Q
That's my understanding.
8 A
That's not correct.
9 Q
Would you correct my understanding.
10 A
The original intent of the start-up and test group was 11 to incorporate the services of all diose contractors.
GPU 12 doesn't maintain a permanent start-up and test group of a size
,~
' ' )
13 that is required to start up and test the nuclear power plant.
14 So we supplement our staff with contractor help.
15 Now, where we-were shorthanded for some reason or anothc r 16 and we needed more peopic, we would get them from these con-17 tractors, but the personnel demand rose and fell throughout the 18 test program, depending an what was going on and during the 19 period when we had the mainstream safety valve outage, the de-20 mands on the test people slacked off considerably so they had 21 a substantial period there unen they were not uo? king the same t',
22 hours2.546296e-4 days <br />0.00611 hours <br />3.637566e-5 weeks <br />8.371e-6 months <br /> that they would have otherwise.
23
,=
Q Did any test engineers other than Mr. Toole com-(
24 plain to you directly about the test schedule or the working Ace - Federal Reporters, Inc.
25 conditions that they were subjected to?
Heward - direct 38 1
A Yes, I believe I recall complaints about the test sched-2 ule and the extension of the project schedule.
I don't recall-
.O 3
enet eavdear cemeteteea edoue the werki a coaateieas-4 Q
What was your response to the complaints?
'S A
There isn't much one can do about the problems one runs 6
into except fix them and let me tell you, when a guy signs on 7
for a test program,.the people that we hired have been through 8
it before.
They know what to expect.
I know what to expect 9
because I've been doing this icind of thing for over 20 years.
10 Some of these guys haven't been doing it that long but they knov II what to expect.
12 Q
Does the name Rick Butler mean anything to you?
13 A
Say again?
14 Q
Rick Butler.
15 A
No.
Who is Rick Butler?
16 Q
That's not important for the question.
I7 Mr. lleward, did either UE & C or Catalytic ever 18 provide GPU or GPUS with a~ certificate of completion?
I9 A
1 don't know.
20 Q
In your experience with these units, is that I
(~')
normally the case that after completing the construction a v
22 certificate of completion of construction is provided?
A-I don't ever recall having seen such a thing except with p
U 24 Ace -Federal Reportws, Inc.
25 -tem is completed and ualked for punch list items and they were 2
Heward - direct 39 m
.I wallied from end' to end for punch list items, paint on pipe, nutt U
2 not tight on the hangers, all that kind of thing, and one gets
- (] -
3 through all that, it's a superfluous thing to ask for a certifi-4 cate of completion because we take it piecemeal system by systen,
5 building by building, so the answer on systems and buildings is 6
yes, we get 1: hat.
That's part of the turnover package, but 7
there's no such certificate that I can recall ever seeing that 8
says yes, I built you one plant; it's all done, because it wasn' t 9
all done.
They left before it was finished.
10 Q
Who is they?
II A
UE & C.
12 Q
What about Catalytic?
bm 13 A
They haven't Icft yet.
14 Q
Would you characterize a portion of their work 15 as being construction work?
16 A
Yes, I would.
I7 Q
For that construction work they do not provide I
18
- a. certificate.
I9 A
Same-thing.
It's building turnover, yes.
20 Q
No formal p!;cm of paper.
21 n
A I don't think so.
V 22 Q
As both project manager and rnanager of projects 23 with some oversight responsibility for Three Mile Island-2, p
v 24 would;you be aware of union problems that the constructors were Me - Federal Reporters, loc.
25 having?
.a
Howard - /.irect 40 1
A Yes.
2 Q
Do'you know if there were.any problems in attrac t-(3 3
ing and holding the necessary amount of craft labor in building
%J 4
Unit Number 27 5
A
-There was a point in time when the local crafts could-6 not supply enough pipe fitter welders and we had to request then 7 to go outside their local and bring welders in from Baltimore 8 and New York and other places like that and you run into that 9 with a small labor pool and it does happen and you have to make 10 other arrangements.
11 Q
Who took the responsibility for recruiting those 12 additional people?
, O 13 A
The crafts did that.
They did that when UE & C went to 14 them and said we are short by this much.
You've not been able 15 to supply them.
I require you to have other means to supply 16 these, people.
They did.
They go to other locals and get the I7 people.
18 Q
Once that additional recruiting has been done, I9 there was satisfactory staffing?
20 A
Yes.
21 Q
Let me ask just a few questions about what we
-O 22 previously discussed, the April _23rd, 1978 transient.
Were you 23 involved in the discussion following that transient to replace
-24 the Lonergan valves?
- Me - Federal Reporteis, Inc.
~
25 A
- Yes,
.l
~
Heward - dircet 41 1
Q Who would you say rnade that decision?
2 A
My recollection is that between recommendations made by 3
Ron Williarns and by me that Bob Arnold made that decision.
)
4 Q
Can you describe for me the contacts that you 5
had, if any, with the Lonergan Company itself following the 6
7 A
Shortly after the transient, a week or two inter, I con-8 ducted a meeting with the president of Lonergan Company, their 9
chief engineer and others to ask them what their opinion was of 10 the Silure.
II Subsequent to that, there were numerous phone calls.
I 12 believe I participated in one or two incetings where their repre-l
)
~'
13 sentatives came here to talk to us and subsequently participate (
14 in a meeting regarding a litigation with Lonergan.
15 Q
Following the transient, it's my understanding 16 that a number of valves were removed and sent to the Lonergan 17 Company; is that correct?
18 A
That's correct.
I9 Q
Do you recall approxirnately what time period this ggg7 20 21 l
A May.
22 Q
Was the Lonergan Company told that it had a cer-23 tain period of tirne in which to complete its analysis of the 24 valves to your knowledge?
Ace - Federal Rcr,citm, Inc.
25 A
Typically, to ray knowledge -- I'm really guessing be-t
Heward - direct 42 I
cause typically we assess a problem like that and we would tell
,..s i
1 V
2 them, Look, here is a problem that we want you to look at and
(~3 -
3 we would like to have an answer in so many days, so many weeks,
\\J 4
and I am quite sure we did that, but if the question is did they 5
have a drop. dead date to have the things fixed, the answer is-6 no, because there's no way you can give them that.
7 Q
Did the company have a drop dead date for Loner.
8 gan?
9 A
Did we have a drop dead date for Lonergan?
10 Q
A date at which it would no longer consider the 11 ability of Lonergan valves to fulfill their function, 12 MR LIBERMAN:
Can I interrupt just a 0
13 second.
Unless it's absolutely indispensable 14 to you-interrogation, your deposition, I'm 15 troubled because we have pending litigation with 16 the Lonergan Company.
I don't want to foreclose 17 any avenue but'I have trouble because these are 18 areas that I think Mr. Heward has not been in-I9 volved.
2 1
e
'^ ji MR. EVANS:
Well, Mr. Howard, I will in-21 struct you,.too, only to answer questions which f-V 22 you have personal knowledge of and I don't want 23 to push you beyond what you were involved'in fsr x>
'24 personally, but I am interested to know if ther e-
< ce -Federal Reporters, Inc.
25 was'a date to your knowledge after which you
Heward - direct 43 I
would not consider, the company would not con-2 sider the Lonergan valves.
3 Now, let me state on the record, if you 4
would rather that Mr. Heward would not answer 5
that question, I can accept that.
6 MR. LIBERMAN:
I want to cooperate in 7
every way that I can.
I can tell you that there 8
is correspondence in which I participated in the 9
preparation of which Mr. Heward was not involved 10 that did exercise contractual remedies against II Lonergan Company.
12 MR. EVANS :
Let me withdraw the question.
,~
i 13 Off the record for a minute.
14 (A discussion was had off the record.)
15 BY MR. EVANS:
16 Q
Mr. Heward, you've testified earlier today that I7 you didn't have any knowledge of rate base matters or tax mat-18 ters or other general financtai considerations which affected I9 completing Unit Number 2 by the end of 1978.
Is that a correct 20 statement of what you've told us?
21 A
Other than the fact that I was aware that while the plant 22 was under construction that AFDC was collected and it ceased to 23 be later on, I think that's a fair statement, yes.
.c Q
Let me follou that up for a minute.
How do you 24 4e - Federal Reportets, Inc.
25 perceive AFDC?
Is it a problem for you as either the project
lloward - direct 44 1
manager or manager of projects?
7-~
2 A
No.
(")
3 Q
Let me ask if during the time period, that is v
4 the last six months of 1978, you attended any meetings of GPUS S
Board of Directors and officers?
6 A
No, I did have meetings with Bob Arnold who is an of-7 ficer.
Possibly others from time to time but not on that sub-8 ject.
9 Q
Did you have any meetings during the time period 10 with Mr. Holcombe?
II A
No.
12 Q
Did you have any meetings during the time perioc v
13 with Mr. Graham on this topic?
14 A
No.
15 BY MR. VANDENBERG:
l' 6 Q
Mr. Heward, the original estimated date for com-17 pleting TMI-2, I think, was quite early 1975 or so.
18 A
I don't remember.
It was a lot earlier than 1978, that' s 19 for sure.
20 Q
In the Touche Ross report the in-service dates 21 are often nearly always given in terms of May of a given year pb) 22 and this is information that I presume Touche Ross received fron 23 GPU.
Why was that that in-service date was always expressed as g)
May or May 31 of a given year?
(_
24 Atc -Fed &ral Reporters, Inc.
25 A
I could only speculate.
.st.
Howard - direct 45 1
MR. LIBERMAN:
Can I call to your atten-o
-m b,
2 tion the fact that there was discussion of that 3
matter in the cross-examination of Touche Ross
.]
4 and rebuttal testimony in the Pennsylvania pro-5 ceeding which I furnished you which you may want 6
to look at.
At least I believe I furnished it 7
to you.
8 BY MR. EVANS:
9 Q
Mr. Heward, following the replacement of the 10 Lonergan valves, what I understand to be Dresser valves, did yot.
Il notice a change in the attitude either at the site or here at 12 corporate headquarters regarding Unit Number 27 G
G 13 A
I don't think so.
14 Q
Was there more of a desire to complete it in 15 1978 than before?
16 A
During 1978 there was always a desire to complete it in 17 1978.
Originally in 1978 the in-service date was May or June.
18 Q
Let me ask it this way.
Were people ex.trernely 19 disappointed by the failure of the Loncrgan valves?
20 A
Certainly.
Of course.
That's a terribic disappointmen':.
21 Q
I would like to clarify one thing.
We were nU 22 talking earlier today about the test program and the tests which 23
-were listed in one form or another and I am going to attempt to 24 distinguish between the various ilsts of tests to be performed.
Aye-Federal Reporters, Inc.
25 7g,s my understanding there was a list of tests which GPUS had m
II ward
. direct 46
'.a 1
itself established to be run; is that correct?
2 A
Yes.
p 3
Q There was another list, maybe even an identical--
4 excuse me.
5 A
There was no other list.
There was a single list.
6 Q
Are you aware of commitments which' were made to 7
the Pennsylvania Public Utilities Commission to complete certain 8
tests?
9 A
I don't think so.
10 Q
Are you aware of any regulatory impact other II than in dealings with the NRC to complete the test program at 12 Unit 27 O
13 A
I have a vague recollection of discussion -- no.
I don't 14 have any recall on that, no.
15 Q
Are you aware that there were tests specified -
16 in the final safety analysis report which is presented to the 17 NRC7 18 A
- Yes, i
~l9 Q
Is that of tests identical to the list of tests 20 which'are listed in the internal GPUS procedures?
21 A
No, I don't. think so.
I think the test program.itself g.g 22 very likely had more tests in it than were listed in the final 23 safety analysis report.
The commission is interested in seeing 24
.that you committed to certain tests and those tests must-be Ace -Federal Reporters, Inc.
'25 addressed to the safety analysis report.
The test program over m.
lieucrd - direct 47 I
all 'is established by us and a decision to do so many trips l
~
2 from certain power levels is curs, so long as you meet the var-3
(;
ious regluatory requirements, so we produce the test program 4
to suit ourself.
5 Q
So to clarify this on the record, if you will 6
agree with me 'that the FSAR contains one list of tests and Met-7 Ed's interna 1' procedures may be another list of tests, those 8
may not be an identical list.
9 A
That's probably right, yes.
10 Q
Were you present for the full power generator II trip test at TMI-27 12 A
No.
13 Q
Do you know when it was performed?
14 A
From the appearance on the chronology, I trould have to 15 say it was done in either November or December but I do not 16 know when.
I7 Q
Let me attempt to refresh your recollection.
18 Would December 28, 1978, be a realistic date for that test?
I9 A
It may very well be, yes.
It appears that we were at 20 full power up to the 28th, so that may be, yes.
21 Q
Can you tell me where the full power generator 22 trip test fits into the FSAR lists of test to be performed?
23 A
No.
i 24 Q
Can you tell me where it fits into the GPUS Ace - Federal Repor ters, Inc.
25 internal list of tests to be performed?
i
lleward - direct 48
('T 1
A Well, it certainly doesn't fit in prior to going to 100
'L) 2 percent power.
The power esenlation program is one that occurs
']
3 in steps up to full power so it would certaLnly be in the latter 4
stages of the test program, only after achieving the 100 percent 5
power.
6 Q
In "our opinion is it normally necessary to 7
successfully complete the full power generator trip test in 8
order to declare a unit in commercial operation?
9 MR. LIBERMAN:
Can I object to the ques-10 tion for clarification there.
Commercial opera-II tion in terms of GPU corporate procedure or --
12 is that what your reference is or some other 13 connotation?
14 MR. EVANS:
Yes.
My reference is the 15 report of the Commercial Operation Review Bonrd 16 criteria.
I7 A
For nuclear power plant, you want to do that test in I8 your test program to verify that it's an acceptable transient I9 to the plant, and I would say that it's norrnally prograrrmed to 20 be dono during the test program and therefore prior to cot:ciercio L
21
('\\,
operation, yes.
LJ 22 Q
If I understand what you've said, it's your opin 23 lon that the entire test program and, again, tying this to the p
LJ 24 GPUS internal list of tests, the internal test program, did that I
. Ace -l'ederal Reporters, Inc.
25 entire test program should be cornpleted prior to the commercial I
Heward - direct 49-l operation. -Is L.at accurate?
,q L.)
2 A
Only to the extent that you consider the test to be a.
(]
mandatory test.
Prior to making the plant availabic commerciall y 3
4 I think that you might consider putting a plant into commercial 5 operation at a power level less than 100 percent and take an 6 outage later on and complete the higher. level testing.
I think 7
that's a possibility.
It's-not-something we did but I think 8 te s something you could do.
n 9
For example, I don't see why you couldn't go up to 50 or 10 75 percent power range testing and if the power were needed, run Il the plant at that level first or a reduced level for a period of 12 time in commercini operation and then take an outage and complet a h
your higher power tests.
I think that's possibic.
I don't know 13 14 - what makes it impossible.
15 (A discussion was had off the record.)
16 BY MR. EVANS:
I7 Q
Just one last question with respect to the full 18 power generator. trip test.
Were you involved in any discussions I9 a's to the postponement of that test beyond 19787 20 A
I don't remember that, i
21 g
BY liR._VANDENBERG 22 Q
Dick, did anybody at any' time express to you 23 concern that the test program was being pursued at too quick a
.g V
24 pace or was being rushed or that the tests were just being sched Ace-Federal Reportets, Inc.
25. uled in too short a time?
lieward - direct 50 1
A Well, let rne tell you that when you schedule a thing 2
like this, the right way to do it is aggressively.
You should
(
3 bring the plant along as fast as you can.
4 When I say that, I rnean within the context of it being 5
safe to do so and ready to do so.
Now, there is a full spectrur i 6
of what people think is necessary to be ready to do so.
You are 7
always going to get a diversification of opinion as to whether 8
you are going too slow or too fast, I believe.
9 I've seen that for many years and particularly when you 10 have people that have a lot of procedures to get ready, it's II more cor,:fortable to give them more time to get the procedures 12 c
ready.
But if you proceed and review the things as you go alon;
- j s
13 and make sure that what they have is adequate to proceed rather 14 than what makes everybody real comfortable, I think that's the 15 way to proceed with completion of the plant.
16 Q
Are you sort of saying that schedules are inade to be broken?
I A
No, I don't mean that, but what I think you should do 19 is schedule the program in a way that you think you can rneet it 20 without having serious things go wrong.
My recollection of how n
21 the Unit 2 program was scheduled is it fit the actual conditions
,j 22 on Unit 1 and I think if you go look at the schedules that we
('~'
made on Unit 2, the durations were taken from what we achieved m
a wy mod Wt pqm m WR 1, we
, e -receia: neporters, inc.
25 paratively speaking.
L
[
I Ileward - direct 51 I
So I'm sure you can find a lot of people who think the m
2 thing was pushed too fast, but we had the history of doing it in 3
f7 that time period on Unit 1.
U 4
Q You think, then, that the differences between of 5 Unit 1 and Unit 2 weren't/any significant, wouldn't in any sig-6 nificant way affect test time periods or schedules?
7 A
Well, we had perturbations in starting up Unit 1 but we 8 didn't have any real big items such as the safety valve problem 9
affecting Unit 1.
10 Q
And also with regard to NRC, did you know of any 11 employees or workers at the site who expressed a concern to say 12,something to an I & E inspector but then declined for one reason 13 or another?
I4 A
I only know of one case with it..
I guess the case I kno i 15 of the guy did~ talk to or write a letter to the I & E inspector 16 and we posted the notices on the site conspicuously to tell peopte I7 that that was their right.
I know of no case where a guy wanted 18 to and was afraid to and.didn't do it.
I9 Q
Which case are you referring to where it hap-20 pened?
21 A
We had a report from an employee that had been there some (q
22 years ago who said that he had drilled a hole inside the contain-23 ment and had hit reinforcing steel or something like that and he
_I
>i 24, didn ' t feel the anchor range was quite right.
I don't remember Ne - Fedarat Reportets, Inc.
25 all the details.
Howard - direct 52 1
Q This is the one that was subsequently invesci-
%/
2 gated by I & E in March of 1978?
h 3
A I don't know when but it might have been March of 1978.
v 4 It was' investigated and I believe we did find that we had a 5
faulty anchor and fixed it.
6 MR. VANDENBERG:
I have no further ques-7 tions.
8 MR. EVANS:
Mr. Liberman, do you have 9
any questions or remarks you would like to make-10 on the record?
II MR. LIBERMAN:
I want to be sure you 12 were furnished with a copy of the document calle d
O' 13 Three Mile Island Determination of Technical and 14 Organizational Readiness for Placing Three Mile i
15 Island Unit 2 into Commercial Operation dated 16 October 2o, 1978.
I7 MR. EVAN5:
I believe we have.been fur-18
- nished a copy of that.
Would you-like ine to put I9 it into the record?
20 MR. LIBEPJMN:
No, I-just wanted to be 21 sure that you kneu the document existed because 22 you hadn't mentioned it and you did refer to an 23 appendix which was in a sense a follow-up on I
,f3
- GI.
24 this document.
Me - Fedatal Repos ters, lnc.
25 MR. EVAUS :
Off the record.
s
53 1
(A discussion was had off the record.)
2 MR. EVANS:
I've asked Mr. Liberman if 3
he had anything to add.
c
(
4 MR. LIBERMAN:
I guess I would like to 5
add one other thing.
I think the term "commer-6 cial service" has been used in such a variety 7
of ways that I would like to clarify that this i s 8
now one of four contexts in which it has been 9
used.
10 The document Mr. Heward identified pre-1I viously, which I believe is document 1109, re-12 ferred to commercial service in the sense it was 13 used by the GPU Service Company Internal Commer-14 cial Operation Review Board.
It is a document 15 which has no governmental connotation as such.
16 The' term commercial operation has been 17 used also as a shorthand for the time when a 18 unit will be transferi cd from construction work 19 in progress to utility plant in service for FERC 20 accounting purposes and there was an earlier 21 reference to that and to the Electric Plant In-
~
22 s truction 9D.
23 The term commercial service is used alsc i
24 on a dLfferent context in terms of certain tax 4 e - Federal Repar tets, Inc.
25 treatment for depreciation and investment tax
54 I
credit purposes.
In that context is is a collo-2 quialism.
It is not a term which is used in the 3
regulations under the Internal Revenue Service.
f, 4
Finally it is used in terms of again a 5
shorthand for the status for interconnection 6
dispatching purposes by the PJM.
7 I would like to clarify that my under-8 standing is that all of Mr. Heward's testimony 9
has been directed to the first of these senses 10 and not to any others; is that correct?
11 Tile WITNESS:
Yes, that's correct.
12 MR EVANS:
At this time, Mr. Howard, 13 I would like to thank you for being present here 14 today.
We are going to recess this deposition 15 rather than terminate it on the possibility that 16 we might want to ask you additional questions 17 at a later time.
I would say we will make every 18 attempt not to need to ask additional questions, I9 but should that become necessary, we would like 20 to have you available to us.
^
21 Thank you very much, 7-,
s 22 (The deposition is recessed at 5:30 p.m.
)
23
,,#w,,
24 t re - Federal Reperters, Inc.
25
55 1
_ CERTIFICATE 2
I, !!ARGARET TEILHABER A Notary Public and Certi-
{}
3 fied Shorthand Reporter of the State of New Jersey, do hereby 4 certify that the foregoing is a true and accurate transcript 5 of the proceedings in the above-entitled raatter as reported 6 by me stenographically on the date and at the time and place 7 hereinbefore set forth.
8 I DO FURTilER CERTIFY that I am neither of counsel nor 9
attorney for any party in this action and that I am not in-10 terested in the event nor outcome of this litigation.
11 12 jr3 L
13
- b.. :,
){
/ th i fi,-
15
~ A Notary Public of New Jersey 16 17 18 19 s
20 21
,~s i
1
\\,6 22 23
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24 rue - Feetal I?cpor te rs, Inc.
25 i