ML19308C357

Transcript of 790723 Comments Presented Before Presidents Commission on Accident at Tmi.Pp 1-40

ML19308C357
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Site:	Crane
Issue date:	07/23/1979
From:	Rickover H NAVY, DEPT. OF, NAVAL NUCLEAR POWER UNIT
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,. f COMMENTS BY-ADMIRAL H. G. RICKOVER, USf!

' DIRECTOR flAVAL NUCLEAR PROPULSION PROGRAM IN MEETING WITH MEMBERS OF THEPRESIDENT'SCOMMISSI0t[ONTHEACCIDENTATTHREEMILEISLA JULY 23, 1979 e

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COMMENTS BY

-ADMIRAL H cG.. RICK 0VER,..USM

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.IN MEETING WITH' MEMBERS OF-

-IHE PRESIDENT'S' COMMISSION'ON'THE ACCIDENT AT IHREE MILE ISLAND JULY 23, 1979 YOU HAVE ASKED ME TO PRESENT MY VIEWS ON' ASPECTS OF YOUR

-INVESTIGATION I-BELIEVE WOULD~BE HELPFUL-TO YOU.

THE VIEWS I D

EXPRESS ARE MY OWN : BASED ON 60 YEARS OF' GOVERNMENT SERVICE.

THEY

'D0'NOT NECESSARILY REFLECT THOSE OF MY SUPERIORS.

Ihf MAY 24, 1979, I TESTIFIED BEFORE THE HOUSE SUBCOMMITTEE ON ENERGY, RESEARCH, AND PRODUCTION OF THE COMMITTEE ON SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY.REGARDING MY PERSPECTIVE ON. NUCLEAR SAFETY AND TH PHILOSOPHY;AND APPROACH USED IN THE-NAVAL REACTORS SAFETY PROGRAM.

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COPIES.0F MY STAl'iiMENT FOR THAT TESTIMONY HAVE BEEN PROVIDED T I BELIEVE THE INFORMATION IN THAT STATEMENT IS AS PERTINENT TO INQUIRY AS IT WAS TO.THE CONGRESSIONAL COMMITTEE.

SINCE YOU ALREADY HAVE THAT STATEMENT, I WILL NOT REPEAT ITS CONTENTS.

I WILL DISCUSS THOSE MATTERS I BELIEVE TO BE OF MOST INTEREST TO YOU.

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IO PROVIDE A PROPER CONTEXT AND PERSPECTIVE', HOWEVER, I WILL l

L INCLUDE-AS-1 PROCEED.BRIEF REMARKS ON SOME OF THE MAIN POINTS I MADE THERE..

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NAVAL RFACTORS PROGRAM _

-I LWILL BEGIN.BY' BRIEFLY DESCRIBING THE EXTENT OF THE NAVAL--

REACTORS PROGRAM'AND'0UR EXPERIENCE TO'DATE:

IHERE.ARE 127' NAVAL ~

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---_s NSEAR_E0jiERED SHIPS IN OPERATION.

lNCLUDING NUCLEAR SHIPS AND THE

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NAVAL PROTOTYPE REACTORS, I AM RESPONSIBLE FOR THE OPERATION OF 152

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NAVdL-REACTORS.

SINCE-THE USS NAUTILUS FIRST PUT'TO SEA IN 1955, NAVAL NUCLEAR

^ POWERED ' SHIPS HAVE STEAMED OVER 40 MILLION MILES AND HAVE ACCUMULATED t

OVERy00REACTORYEARSOFOPERATION.

IHIS IS SEVERAL TIMES THE

~APPROXIMATELY 400 REACTOR YEARS OF COMMERCIAL REACTOR OPERATION IN THE U. S.

WE HAVE PROCURED 508 NUCLEdR CORES,'AND HAVE PERFORMED 166.

REFUELINGS.

ENVIR0fiMENTAL RFCORD

'IN THE ~ TWENTY-SIX YEARS SINCE THE NAUIILUS LAND PROTOTYPE FIRST OPERATED.THERE HAS NOT-BEEN AN ACCIDENT INVOLVING A NAVAL' REACTOR NOR HAS THERE BEEN~ANY RELEASE OF RADIOACTIVITY WHICH HAS HAD A-SIGNIFIC' ANT EFFECT ON THE ENVIRONMENT.- FOR EXAMPLE, IN EACH OF THE PAST EIGHT YE/.RS, THE TOTAL GAMMA PADI0 ACTIVITY, LESS TRITIUM, DIS-CHARGED IN..LIQU'DS WITHIN 12 MILES OF SHORE FROM ALL OUR NUCLEAR POWERED I

i SHIPS,. SUPPORTING TENDERS, NAVAL BASES, AND SHIPYARDS, WAS LESS THAN TWO L

THOUSANDTHS'0F A CURIE.

IF ONE' PERSON WERE ABLE TO INGEST THE ENTIRE AMOUNT OF THIS RADIOACTIVITY DISCHARGED FROM THE NAVAL Nuci. EAR PROPUL-

'S!ON PROGRAM INTO ANY HARBOR,IN 1978, HE WOULD NOT EXCEED THE ANNUAL l RADIATION EXPOSURE PERMITTED BY THE EUCLEAR REGULATORY

COMMISSION FOR AN INDIVIDUAL' WORKER.

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EACH' YEAR I ISSUE'A REPORT WHICH DESCRIBES IN DETAIL'THE

. AMOUNT OE RADIOACTIVITY DISCHARGED TO THE ENVIRONMENT FROM.OUR-NAVAL:-SHIP OPERATIONS.

THE REPORT ALSO DESCRIBES'0UR METHODS OF CONTROL AND ENVIRONMENTAL MONITORING.. YOU HAVE ALREADY

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BEEN PROVIDED WITH' COPIES OF THAT REPORT.

OCCUPATIONAL RADIATION EXPOSURE FOR THE'PAST TWO YEARS THERE HAS BEEN INCREASED PUBLIC AND CONGRESSIONAL INTEREST IN THE HEALTH EFFECTS DUE TO LOW LEVEL RADIATION.

MY MAY'24TH STATEMENT TO CONGRESS PROVIDED TO YOU INCLUDES A REPORT WHICH GIVES THE OCCUPATIONAL RADIATION EXPOSURE RECORD FOR CIVILIAN AND MILITARY PEOPLE INVOLVED IN THE NAVY NUCLEAR PROPULSION PROGRAM.

PAGE 2 0F THAT REPORT IS i

A GRAPH SHOWING THE TOTAL OCCUPATIONAL RADIATION EXPOSURE TO THE PERSONNEL WHO OPERATE OUR NUCLEAR SHIPS AND TO THE WORKERS IN THE. SHIPYARDS WHICH BUILD AND MAINTAIN NAVAL NUCLEAR SHIPS.

IN 1978 THE TOTAL EXPOSURE WAS ABOUT ONE QUARTER-THE AMOUNT IN 1

THE PEAK YEAR 1966, EVEN THOUGH THE NUMBER OF NUCLEAR POWERED i

SHIPS ~0PERATING IN 1978 WAS NEARLY DOUBLE THAT IN 1966.

THIS REDUCTION IN OCCUPATIONAL EXPOSURE DID NOT JUST HAPPEN.

IT

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REQUIRED HARD WORK AND CONSTANT ATTENTION BY EVERYONE - WORKERS AND MANAGEMENT.

IHE REPORT SHOWS-THAT SINCE 1967 NO CIVILIAN OR MILITARY L

PERSONNEL IN THE NAVY'S NUCLEAR PROPULSION PROGRAM HAVE EXCEEDED THE QUARTERLY-FEDERAL LIMIT OF 3 REM.OR ANNUAL RADIATION i

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'EXPOSURELLIMIT 0Ff5: REM. -THE AVERAGE ANNUAL JOB-RELATED EXPOSURE OF-SHIPYARD RADIATION WORKERS.IN'1978.WAS'ONE QUARTER OF~AEREM.-

IHE! AVERAGE ANNUAL JOB-RELATED EXPOSURE 10F NUCLEAR.

SHIP: PROPULSION' PLANT OPERATORS'IN 1978 WAS ONE TENTH OF'A REM.

THE REPORT ALSO '0UTLINES MANY '0F THE MEASURES EMPLOYED. TO LIMIT 0CCUPATIONAL RADIATION EXPOSURE.-

I BELIEVE THAT-THE REPORTS ON RADIOACTIVE DISCHARGE AND ON

. RADIATION EXPOSURE WILL BE OF VALUE-TO YOU BECAUSE THEY CONVEY-

~SOME IDEA 0F THE~HARD WORK AND ATTENTION TO DETAIL WHICH WE HAVE APPLIED TO MAINTAIN HIGH ASSURANCE THAT THE PUBLIC AND THOSE IN-THE. NAVAL. PROGRAM ARE PROTECTED.

DIFFFRFNCFS RFTWEEN NAVAL REACTOR AND COMMERCIAL NUClFAR PLANTS SINCE THE THREE MILE ISLAND INCIDENT, THERE HAS BEEN-INCREASED INTEREST IN COMPARING COMMERCIAL AND NAVAL REACTOR

' P LANT S. -

USEFUL' LESSONS CAN BE LEARNED FROM THIS.

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CAUTION-AGAINST ANY~AiTEMPT TO APPLY DIRECTLY TO COMMERCIAL PLANTS ANY. SPECIFIC FEATURES, METHODS OR. PROCEDURES FROM NAVAL l

REACTORS - OR TO APPLY DIRECTLY TO NAVAL APPLICATIONS ANY SPECIFICS FROM' COMMERCIAL NUCLEAR REACTORS.

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THERE ARE FUNDAMENTAL DIFFERENCES BETWEEN NAVAL AND CIVILI AN NUCLEAR POWER PLANTS BECAUSE OF SPECIFIC MILITARY

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2 JREQUIREMENTS~WHICH'MUSTEBE" MET-lBY NAVAL PROPULSION REACTORS.

fMANY OFfTHESE;ARE,'0FLNECESSITY,~MORE EXACTING THAN THOSE FOR CESIRALfSTATION-PLANTS.

FORLEXAMPLE, THE' SHOCK LOADINGS DUE TO UNDERWATERfEXPLOSIONS,;FOR WHICH NAVAL PLANTS ARE DESIGNED,

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ARE FAR GREATER-THAN THE EARTHQUAKE SHOCK LOADINGS-FORLWHICH

' CIVILIAN PLANTS ARE DESIGNED.

IN ADDITION, BECAUSE MANEUVER-

ABILITY IS ESSENTIAL FOR MILITARY SHIPS ~, NAVAL PLANTS ARE DESIGNED TO ACCOMMODATE MUCH MORE RAPID AND FREQUENT POWER TRANSIENTS'THAN THOSE-EXPERIENCED IN CIVILIAN PLANTS.

ALSO, EACH' NAVAL SHIP MUSTzDEPEND-ENTIRELY ON ITS OWN POWER PLANT.

THERE IS NO INTERCONNECTED GRID TO PICK UP THE LOAD TO ALLOW THE SHIP T0; CONTINUE FUNCTIONING.

BECAUSE OUR SHIPS-MUST BE ABLE TO OPERATE AT SEA UNDER COMBAT CONDITIONS WE INSIST ON CONSERVATISM IN EVERY ELEMENT OF NAVAL REACTOR PLANTS.

CENTRAL STATION PLANTS ARE DESIGNED TO-PROVIDE

. RELIABLE POWER-AT MINIMUM COST.

IHESE DIFFERENT OBJECTIVES ARE-REFLECTED IN ELEMENTS'0F THESE PLANTS.

-COMPARISONS AND CONCLUSIONS MUST TAKE THESE DIFFERENCES INTO ACCOUNT.

NFFD TO AVOID OVER-CONCFNTRATION OM SPFC!FICS I AM NOT AN-EXPERT ON THE IHREE MILE-lSLAND INCIDENT.

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'OTHERS'ARE FAR MORE KNOWLEDGEABLE OF THE DETAILS OF THAT PLANT

- DESIGNAND'THEEVENTSLEADINGTOTHEINCIDENT.

YOU AND YOUR l

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.c STAFF AS'WELLjAS;SEVERALLOTHER GROUPS ARE DEVOTING CONSIDERABLE

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aTIME?TO UNDERSTANDINGi!T. !IHEREFORE,El:WILL NOT ATTEMPT TO LCOMMENT ON.THE TECHNICAL DETAILS OF THE PLANT 0R THE EVENT.

FURTHER, THERE IS A-DANGER'THAT OVER-CONCENTRAT10N'ON THE

. DETAILS 0F THISLONE-INCIDENT WILL HINDER IDENTIFICATION OF

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STEPS WHICH-MIGHT PROVIDE GREATER'0VERALL ASSURANCE OF THE SAFETY OF COMMERCIAL NUCLEAR POWER.

I'WILL THEREFORE CONCEN-TRATE;0N PRINCIPLES.RATHER THAN ON-DETAILED FEATURES OR

. COMPAR I SONS '.-

BASIC PRINCIPIFS 0F NAVAL RFACTORS PROGRAM 0VER'THE YEARS, I-HAVE FREQUENTLY BEEN ASKED HOW l RUN THE NAVAL REACTORS PROGRAM.

SOME BELIEVE I HAVE'A1 SIMPLE, EASY GIMMICK THAT MAKES MY PROGRAM FUNCTION.

-IHEY'ARE' DISAPPOINTED TO. FIND THERE-IS NONE - THE SUCCESS OF ANY PROGRAM DEPENDS ON MANY INTCRRELATED FACTORS.

THIS THOUGHT IS IMPORTANT IN YOUR DEllBERATIONS.

IHE

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PROBLEMS YOU ARE INVESTIGATING CANNOT BE. SOLVED BY DIRECTING

' COMPLIANCE WITH ONE OR TWO.SI'MPLELPROCEDURES.

REACTOR SAFETY l-REQUIRES ADHERENCE TO'A TOTAL. CONCEPT WHEREIN ALL ELEMENTS-ARE RECOGNIZED:-AS IMPORTANT-AND EACH IS CONSTANTLY REINFORCED.

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'l WILLLDISCUSS SOME OF THE PRINCIPLES I BELIEVE WILL BE OF INTEREST T01Y0u.

0THERS 'WERE DISCUSSED. IN DETAll IN MY PRIOR lTESTIMONYLTO WHICH 1 HAVE REFERRED, AND WHICH YOU HAVE.

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' STROHG CENTRAF TFCHNICAL CONTROLL

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ALL-ASPECTS OF NAVAL NUCLEAR' PROPULSION-ARE' CONTROLLED BY JONE CENTRAL-TECHNICAL ORGANIZATION'.'

IT IS NOT POSSIBLE TO~

SEPARATE 1THE RESPONSIBILITYLAND AUTHORITY INTO SEPARATE PHASES OR PACKAGES WITH EACH ASSIGNED TO:AN INDEPENDENT GROUP.

DESIGN,

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MANUFACTURE,' ASSEMBLY, TEST, OPERATION, MAINTENANCE AND SELECTION AND TRAINING 0F PERSONNEL ARE.SO. CLOSELY INTERRELATED AS.TO REQUIRE CLOSE TECHNICAL COORDINATION-AND DIRECTION.

A TECHNICALLY LCOMPETENT HEADQUARTERS' STAFF AND EXPLICIT PROVISIONS TO HAVE PROBLEMS BROUGHTLDIRECTLY TO THE ATTENTION OF TOP MANAGEMENT ARE ESSENTIAL.

FOR EXAMPLE, I GET FREQUENT REPORTS OF PROBLEMS -

'NOT THE GOOD NEWS BUT THE BAD' NEWS - FROM EACH OF OUR LABORA-TORIES, MAJOR MANUFACTURERS, SHIPS, AND SHIPYARDS.

I ALS0'SEE THAT'0UR DESIGNERS KNOW WHAT THEY ARE WORKING ONT THEY~SEE COMPONENTS BEING BUILT AND PLANTS BEING CONSTRUCTED AND OPERATED.

TFCHNICAL COMPFTFNCF IN:A COMPLdX TECHNICAL AREA SUCH AS NUCLEAR POWER, ALL INDIVIDUALS WHO MAKE DECISIONS IN ACQUISITION, DESIGN, OPERATION, L

' MAINTENANCE TRAINING, ETC., MUST UNDERSTAND.THE TECHNOLOGY I NVOLVED. :.IHEY MUST HAVE A FUNDAMENTAL UNDERSTANDING-OF AND

COMMITMENT TO THE TECHNICAL ASPECTS OF THE JOB AND A DETERMINA-TION TO-SEE'THAT CAREFUL < ATTENTION IS PAID TO..THE TECHNICAL DETAILS, t

1 IN DISCUSSINGLTRAINING INITHE1 NUCLEAR BUSINESS MOST PEOPLE lTHINK--OFtTHE. PLANT;0PERATORS - MOST OF.THE D'ISCUSSION I HAVE' HEARD HAS-CONCERNED ITSELFzWITH JUST:THAT -1 TRAINING OF' OPERATORS.

.- NUCLEAR _-POWER, HOWEVER,: REQUIRES A.MORE' BASIC AND BROADER' CON--

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' CEPT ~0F TRAINING..lIKE1ALL'NEW TECHNOLOGIES, IT ESTABLISHES

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ITS OWN REQUIREMENTS.

EvERYONE' INVOLVED MUST UNDERSTAND AND

- APPRECI ATE: THE TECHNICAL ASPECTS OF1 NUCLEAR POWER AND HAVE A' DEEP-SENSE OF RESPONSIBILITY AND'A DEDICATION TO EXCELLENCE ~.

THIS' INCLUDES THE UTILITY MANAGERS, THE PLANT DESIGNERS, THE COMPONENT DESIGNERS AND FABRICATORS, THE ARCHITECT ENGINEERS, THE CONSTRUCTION COMPANIES - PARTICULARLY THEIR INSPECTORS, THE ENGINEERS AND TECHNICI ANS WHO ~ ASSEMBLE AND TEST THE PLANT, THE PEOPLE WHO MAINTAIN AND CALIBRATE THE EQUIPMENT, THE OPERATORS, ETC.

MHEN I. STARTED THE NAVAL NUCLEAR PROGRAM'l DEVOTED MYSELF TO THE TRAINING OF MANAGEMENT AND KEY PERSONNEL IN ALL THE ORGANIZATIONS INVOLVED AND TO SEEING THAT THEY IN TURN TRAINED THE REST.0F:THEIR PEOPLE.

THIS IS STILL A MAJOR ELEMENT OF THE

. NAVAL REACTORS PROGRAM - SEEING THAT ALL ORGANIZATIONS-INVOLVED HAVE QUALIFIED AND TRAINED PEOPLE.

EACH PRIME' CONTRACTOR IS REQUIRED.TO HAVE A TRAINING PROGRAM'FOR SUCH PEOPLE AS DESIGN I'

- ENGINEERS,fFIELD-. REPRESENTATIVES, TECHNICAL AUDITORS, AND

!!NSPECTORS.

FURTHER, THEY ARE. REQUIRED TO HAVE MANAGERS WHO KNOW WHATETHEY.-ARE DOING, TECHNICALLY AND WHO ARE RUNNING THE l:

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J JOB ~-1NOTIJUST; REPORTING ~O'N IT'AND. PASSING ON THE;RECOMMENDA-TICNS(OF' SUBORDINATES. ' MANAGERS 1MUST GET OUT.0FKTHEIR}0FF

AND'SEE'WHAT IS REALLY.--GOING-O'N...MY REPRESENTATIVES. CHECK ON

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THE' EFFECTIVENESS.0F'THESE TRAINING PROGRAMS.-

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.WE'ALSO REQUIRE THAT PERSONNEL SUCH ASlPLANT TEST ENGINEE AT10UR SHIPYARDS, AND KEY. INSPECTORS AT ALL.0UR VENDORS, BE QUALIFIED?AND TESTED BY-UAVAL REACTOR PROGRAM PERSONNEL IN ACCORDANCE WITH NAVAL REACTORS AP. PROVED STANDARDS.

IN OTHER CASES,;WE SPECIFY THE SCOPE AND EXTENT OF TRAINING NEEDED AND THEN THE COMPANY HAS TO CARRY IT OUT.AND CONDUCT APPRbPRIATE WRITTEN AND ORAL-EXAMS OR ACTUAL DEMONSTRATIONS.

IN ALL CASES,

'HOWEVER, STEPS ARE.TAKEN TO ASSURE THAT EACH. ORGANIZATION HAS ADEQUATE MEANS TO PROVIDE QUALIFIED PEOPLE, AND TO CHECK UP ON-THEM.

FOR PERSONNEL AT NAVAL REACTORS HEADQUARTERS, MEMBERS

-OF.MY SENIOR STAFF AND I PERSONALLY-INTERVIEW EACH CANDIDATE TO LENSURE HE IS COMPETENT TECHNICALLY AND HAS THE RIGHT ATTITUDES AND MOTIVATION.

IHEY ARE THEN TRAINED IN THE DETAILS OF REACTOR PLANT; DESIGN, CONSTRUCTION, AND OPERATION, AND TAUGHT TO MANAGE

.THE-PROGRAM THROUGH A THOROUGH-KNOWLEDGE OF THE TECHNICAL FACTS,

-LOGIC,~ COMMON. SENSE, AND.HARD WORK.

' CONSERVATISM 0F DESIGN'

. IN ANY ENGINEERING ENDEAy0R, AND'PARTICULARLY IN A HIGHLY E

-TECHNICAL' FIELD SUCH=AS NUCLEAR ~ POWER's. CONSERVATISM IS ESSENTIAL.

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'IHE! DESIGN MUST, FROM THE_VERY BEGINNING,' ALLOW FOR ALL THE' LUNCERTAINTYJ AND LINACCURACYi lN THE AVAILABLE ~ KNOWLEDGE.

-IF THE

~ BASIC DESIGN-IS-NOT CONSERVATIVE,-IT,BECOMES 'NECESSARY TO COMPENSkTEBYADDING'DESIGNFEATURES.ORSYSTEMS. THESE ADDED FEATURES OR SYSTEMS INCREASE THE COMPLEXITITY OF THE PLANT, MAKE IT HARDER TO. UNDERSTAND AND OPERATE, AND THUS FEDUCE-CONSERVATISM, RELIABILITY, AND SAFETY.

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-ANOTHER'IMPORTANT CONCEPT IN DESIGN IS WHAT I REFER TO AS MAKING THE PLANT " SAILOR PROOF".

I-IATRODUCED THIS CONCEPT IN THE-EARLY DAYS OF~THE NAVAL NUCLEAR PROGRAM.

IT MEANS THAT THE DESIGNER MUST-ASSURE -THAT THE PLANT, ITS EQUIPMENT AND ITS PROCEDURES ARE SUCH THAT THE SAILORS WHO.WILL OPERATE THE PLANT CAN BE' EXPECTED, REALISTICALLY, TO UNDERSTAND, OPERATE AND MAINTAIN IT PROPERLY.- IHE CONCEPT ALSO REQUIRES THAT THE PLANT BE DESIGNED TO ACCOMMODATE, INSOFAR AS ?RACTICABLE, OPERATOR-ERRORS THAT'MAY OCCUR - THAT IT BE " FORGIVING" AND THAT ITS ARRANGE-MENT ALLOW READY ACCESS FOR NEEDED REPAIRS.

MY iMAY-24,:2979 STATEMENT CONTAINS MANY EXAMPLES OF

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CONSERVATIVE DESIGN PRACTICES USED IN THE NAVAL REACTORS

_ PROGRAM.

THE-FOLLOWING ONES MAY BE'0F PARTICULAR INTEREST T0lYOU:

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Y USE SIMPLE SYSTEM DESIGNS SO THAT RELIANCE IS PLACED

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PRIMARILY ON D; RECT! CONTROL ~BY TRAINED.0PERATORS RATHER THAN

- ON. AUTOMATIC CONTROL.

DESIGN, BUILD, OPERATE, AND MAINTAIN.THE PLANT-SO AS TO EFIVINI ACCIDENTS, RATHER-THAN RELYING ON SYSTEMS AND PROCEDURES PROVIDED TO' COPE WITH' ACCIDENTS AFTER THEY OCCUR.

' ~. DESIGN 'THE PLANT SO THAT, AS FAR AS PRACTICABLE, ITS

- RESPONSE-TO EXPECTED TRANSIENTS IS SELF-L'IMITING ANS ALLOwT REASONABLE TIME FOR THE OPERATOR TO CONTROL THE PLANT PRIOR TO REQUIRING AUTOMATIC PROTECTIVE M TION.

• USELFORMAL DOCUMENTATION F0E ALL PARTS OF THE PROGRAM -

DESIGN ~ DECISIONS, MANUFACTURING PROCEDURES, OPERAlING PROCEDURES, l

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INSPECTION REQUIREMENTS, INSPECTION'RESULTS,-aHR'FOR ANY WAIVERS.

LIECHNICAL FACTS,-RECOMMENDATIONS AND DECISIONS MUST' LBE THOROUGHLY REVIEWED BY. SENIOR-PERSONNEL IN ALL.THE DISCIPLINES INVOLVED.- IECHNICAL: ACTION BYLLOCAL RESIDENTS CANNOT BE ALLOWED.

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IHE DECISIONS AND THE BASES FOR THEM MUOT BE IN-WRITING.AND THE.

DOCUMENTATION MUST BE REPT FOR REFERENCE USE AS !ONG AS THE i

' PLANT IS IN OPERATION.

v. CONDUCT FREQUENT, THOROUGH, AND DETAILED AUDITS OF AL'L ASPECTS OF THE PROGRAM BY INDIVIDUALS SELECTED AND TRAINED FOR THIS PURPOSE.

THERE SHOULD BE.BOTH UNANNOUNCED AUDITS AND EXTENDED OBSERVATIONS OF INDIVIDUAL OPERATIONS.

1 COMPLIANCF WITH DFTAllFD OPERATitlG PROCFDURES OPERATING A NUCLEAR POWER PLANT PROPERLY REQUIRES KNOWLEDGE AND UNDERSTANDING OF THE CHARACTERISTICS OF MANY SYSTEMS AND-COMPONENTS, AND OF THEIR INTERACTIONS.

RELIANCE MUST ULTIMATELY BE PLdCED ON THE 0PERATOR.

HOWEVER, WE PROVIDE, INSOFAR AS PRACTICABLE, DETAILED PROCEDURES FOR THOSE OPERATIONS AND CASUALTIES WHICH CAN BE FORESEEN.

PREPARING SUCH' PROCEDURES ALLOWS DELIBERATE, THOROUGH CONSIDERATION BY A NUMBER OF PEOPLE

~0FEALLETHE FACTORS INVOLVED.-

IT ALSO PROVIDES A LARGE DEGREE

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OF' STANDARDIZATION-AND PROVIDES A MEANS TO IMPROVE-TH

E. PROCEDURE

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/BASEE ON OPERATINGLEXPERIENCE..

WHERE PROCEDURES ARE PROVIDED-T0 THE:0PERATORWELREQUIRENERBATIMCOMPLIANCE.

IF THE OPERATOR 11

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BELIEVES THE PROCEDURE:TO BE WRONG-OR. FINDS IT CANNOT BE' CARRIED OUT'AS WRITTEN, HE MUST STOP AND OBTAIN APPROVAL-OF A REVISED PROCEDURE.

SIMILARLY, IF HE BELIEVES THE PROCEDURE CAN BE

-!MPROVED, HE.IS~TO RECOMMEND A CHANGE BUT EQI IMPLEMENT IT UNTIL'IT IS APPROVED.

IF NO PROCEDURE EXISTS FOR A PLANNED EVOLUTION,'ONE'IS TO BE WRITTEN AND APPROVED BEFORE PROCEEDING.

OF COURSE, IN A TRUE EMERGENCY THE OPERATORS MUST DO WHAT THEY JUDGE NECESSARY - BUT THE VAST MAJORITY OF SITUATIONS ARE COVERED BY APPROVED PROCEDURES.

KNOWLEDGE AND UNDERSTANDING OF THEM AND THE BASES FOR THEM AID THE OPERATOR TO UNDERSTAND THE PLANT AND DECIDE WHAT TO DO WHEN HE HAS TO ACT ON HIS OWN.

DON'T " LIVE I;!ITH" DEFICIEflCIES IT IS NAIVE TO ALLOW. ROUTINE OPERATION WITH MANY DEFICIEN-

-CIES SUCH AS " ALARMS" OR ABNORMAL CONDITIONS PRESENT, AND THEN EXPECT OPERATORS TO RESPOND PROPERLY TO ALARMS WHICH INDICATE A CASUALTY.

ONCE YOU LEARN TO " LIVE WITH" DEFICIENCIES-SUCH AS SIGNIFICANT LEAKAGE AND A NUMBER OF. ALARMS OR ~ ABNORMAL CONDITIONS, THERE ENSUES A LOSS OF ABILITY TO RECOGNIZE AND RESPOND TO NEW PROBLEMSHOR NEW CONDITIONS WHICH MAY ACTUALLY JEOPARDIZE THE s-PLANT BUT' SEEM TO BE JUST ANOTHER ACCEPTABLE DEFICIENCY.

IT IS~ UNUSUAL FOR MY PLANTS TO OPERATE WITH ANY ALARMS I

.FOR AN' EXTENDED ~ PERIOD-Od TIMEJ EXTENDED OPERATION WITH SEVERAL L

l l ALARMS. IS. UNHEARD OF.

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a TRAINING OF PLANT OPERATOPS e

I CONSIDE'R THE SELECTION"AND TRAINING OF.THE OFFICERS AND.

ENLISTED MEN'WHO OPERATE'0UR SHIPS JTO BE AT LEAST AS IMPORTANT

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TO' SAFETY-AS.ANY OTHER ELEMENT OF THE NAVY NUCLEAR POWER PROGRAM.

THE' MENTAL ABILITIES, JUDGMENT, AND LEVEL'0F TRAINING OF PLANT OPERATORS MUST.BE' COMMENSURATE WITH THE RESPONSIBILITY INHERENT IN OPERATING.A NUCLEAR PLANT.

SELECTION AND TRAINING-OF PER-SONNEL IN THE' NAVAL NUCLEAR. POWER PROGRAM ARE CARRIED OUT'WITH THESE CONSIDERATIONS.IN MIND.'

ACADEMIC ABILITY, PERSONAL CHARACTER AS DEMONSTRATED BY ANY ACTS REFLECTING'UNRELIABILITY, AND PERSONAL MOTIVATION ARE TAKEN INTO ACCOUNT IN SELECTION OF PERSONNEL.

ONCE SELECTED,

THE INDIVIDUAL IS CONTINUALLY SUBJECTED T0 REVIEW.

NOT ALL-THOSE SELECTED FOR TRAINING' PASS THE COURSE AND. QUALIFY.

SOME HAVE TO.BE DROPPED.

ALSO,.IT IS NOT SUFFICIENT TO QUALIFY AN OPERAT0R:0NCE, AND THEM LET HIM ALONE.

IHEREFORE, OUR TRAINING

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LPROGRAM IS.A CONTINUING ONE.

THE'SAME STANDARDS ARE USED FOR REQUALIFICATION AS FOR INITI AL QUALIFICATION - AND, AGAIN, NOT

'EVERYONE REQUALIFIES - SOME FAIL AND ARE DROPPED.

I WANTLTOLMAKE' CLEAR'THAT WE TRAIN AND~ QUALIFY ALL PROPULSION PLANT OPERATORS - INCLUDING -STEAM PLANT OPERATORS.

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IHEREJIS SUCH. A DIRECT-INTERACT 10N' 0F THE STEAM ~ PLANT AND THE

. REACTOR PLANT THAT THIS IS REQUIRED.

IN ADDITION TO THE TRAINING AND RETRAINING PROGRAMS,.

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' INSPECTIONS OF PERSONNEL IN THE FLEET ARE~ CONDUCTED BY MEMBERS OF MY STAFF - BOTH FROM FIELD OFFICES AND FROM HEADQUARTERS ~.

' ADDITIONAL INSPECTIONS ARE CONDUCTED BY SPECIAL EXAMINING BOARDS ESTABLISHED BY THE. CHIEF OF NAVAL OPERATIONS AND BY. NUCLEAR

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. TRAINED PERSONNEL ON VARIOUS OTHER' NAVAL STAFFS.

I REVIEW THE RESULTS OF ALL INSPECTIONS.

I HAVE ESTABLISHED A FORMAL SYSTEM OF REPORTING PROPULSION PLANT PROBLEMS WHICH IDENTIFIES AREAS IN NEED OF IMPROVEMENT IN-

-THE TRAINING PROGRAM.

I ALSO REQUIRE THE COMMANDING OFFICER OF EACH NUCLEAR POWERED SHIP TO WRITE ME PERIODICALLY CONCERNING PROPULSION PLANT PROBLEMS.

IHESE LETTERS MUST ALSO CONTAIN DETAILED INFORMATION ON THE TRAINING HE HAS CONDUCTED So l'CAN EVALUATE WHETHER SUFFICIENT TIME AND ATTENTION ARE BEING PAID TO-THIS IMPORTANT AREK.

ANOTHERLIMPORTANT ASPECT OF OUR TRAINING' PROGRAM'IS OUR INSISTENCE THAT OPERATORS BELIEVE THEIR' INSTRUMENTS UNLESS AND-LUNTIL THEY ARE PROVEN WRONG.

IF THEY CONSIDER AN INSTRUMENT TO 1

BE-IN ERROR,.THEY MUST REPORT IT IMMEDIATELY.

OUR OPERATORS ARE DRILLED CONSTANTLY ON THIS PRINCIPLE AND TAUGHT THAT THEY CANNOT IGNORE INSTRUMENT READINGS EVEN IF :THEY BELIEVE THEM TO BE

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-)

INVALID.

THEYEARE-ALS0' DRILLED IN WHA'T AN INSTRUMENT' READING-1

~REALLY MEANS AND HOW ITECAN BE.AFFECTED BY CASUALTY CONDITIONS.

IN CASE :0F DOUBT AS TO 'THE ACTUAL MEANING, THEY ARE: SPECIFICALLY -

~

. TAUGHT TO BELIEVE THE' WORST.

THERE: IS. ONE OTHER ' POINT -WITH REGARD TO TRAINING I ~ WANT

~

I T01 EMPHASIZE - AND IT IS THIS:- IOP MANAGEMENT PERSONNEL MUST

~

JBE' TECHNICALLY. KNOWLEDGEABLE AND BE FULLY: INVOLVED IN SEEING THAT THE TRAINING'IS DONE. PROPERLY.

IT IS INSUFFICIENT AND MISLEADING FOR-MANAGEMENT TO DEAL, AS MANY DO, SOLELY WITH THE TOTAL NUMBER OF MAN MONTHS'0F TRAINING OR THE. LENGTH dF THE PROGRAM, OR THE COST, OR'THE FACILITIES, OR TO DELEGATE-TRAINING

'TO A SUBCONTRACTOR, THEREBY LEAVING THE VITAL " DETAILS" TO SOMEONE-ELSE.

SIMILARLY, THE CONTENT OF ~ THE PROGRAM CANNOT BE DEVELOPED

~BY THE DESIGNERS ALONE OR BY OPERATORS ALONE - BOTH MUST BE

' DEEPLY. INVOLVED ON A GONTINUING BASIS.

THESE'ARE JUST;THE MAIN ELEMENTS OF THE-TRAINING EFFORTS

.IN MY PROGRAM.

BECAUSE TRAINING IS SO~IMPORTANT, I HAVE

-PROVIDED,: IN MY MAY 2flTH STATEME:, A MUCH MORE' DETAILED

DESCRIPTION 10F 0UR. TRAINING OF PLANT' OPERATORS.

I RECOMMEND

.!THATfALLETHEcCOMMISSIONLMEMBERS AND YOUR' STAFF READ IT.

i

'SOME HAVE SUGGESTED THATETHE. SUCCESS OFLNAVAL NUCLEARL

(

LPOWER':IS: A RESULT 0F THE DISCIPLINE.WHICH CAN BE ENFORCED IN A l.

[

'y

15l

-MILITARY ENVIRONMENT, BUT WHICH CANNOT!BE ACHIEVED IN A COMMER-

. CIAL NUCLEAR ~ ENVIRONMENT.

- I DO NOT AGREE.

l BELIEVE THAT ADEQUATE: DISCIPLINE CAN BE OBTAINED IN COMMERCIAL NUCLEAR POWER.

- DISCIPLINE IS AN ESSENTIAL' CHARACTERISTIC OF ANY SUCCESS-FUL PROGRAM AND OF ANY SUCCESSFUL PERSON.

THE DISCIPLINE IN THE NAVAL NUCLEAR PROGRAM HAS BEEN SUCCESSFUL, NOT BECAUSE THIS

- INVOLVES MILITARY APPLICATIONS, BUT SECAUSE I HAVE INSISTED UPON STAFFING THE PROGRAM WITH INTELLIGENT, MOTIVATED PEOPLE, WHOM I

' HOLD ACCOUNTABLE.

ACHIEVING THE REQUIRED DISCIPLINE.IN THE COMMERCIAL NUCLEAR FIELD WILL REQUIRE ATTENTION TO RESPONSIBILITY AND THE.0THER. THINGS I HAVE SUGGESTED, AND RECOGNITION BY ALL INVOLVED THAT TAKING PART IN DESIGNING, BUILDING, AND OPERATING A' NUCLEAR. POWER PLANT IS NOT A "RIGHT" GIVEN TO EACH AMERICAN AT BIRTH ANY MORE THAN.BEING A SURGEON OR AN AIRLINE PILOT HAS SUCH A "RIGHT".

SELECTION AND RETENTION OF PEOPLE MUST BE BASED SOLELY ON' COMPETENCE AND PERFORMANCE.

IHESE MUST NOT BE SUBORDINATED TO OTHER. GOALS.

MANAGEMENT RESPONSIBLE FOR SAFE OPERATION MUST HAVE THE AUTHORITY TO ENFORCE STANDARDS.

FORMALITY Af!D DISCIPLINE ANOTHER IMPORTANT-ASPECT OF OPERATING A NUCLEAR PLANT IS

.TO ENSURE THAT THE OPERATORS' ATTENTION IS CONSTANTLY FOCUSED ON

~

~ THE '. P LANT'.

THIS IS DIFFI4 ULT, PARTICULARLY IF THE PLANT 'IS 16 U

n.m..+r-r as,#.

• ...m.

• • -ev.s*=a

*=+sa

^

4, p.

OPERATING : ATl AL STEADY STATE. CONDITION.

IN THIS-SITUATION THE

~

0PERATOR HAS LITTLE OR NO DIRECT' ACTION T'O TAKE: -HE MERELY MONI-TORS.'iTHERE~IS THENLAN. INEVITABLE TENDENCY FORLHIS ATTENTIGN TO DRIFT:- FOR, IDLE CONVERSATION OR EVEN. READING OR EATING TO TAKE L P LACE.

THIS CANNOT BE! TOLERATED.

jCLEARJCOMMUNICATIONS ARE' ESSENTIAL IN DEALING WITH NUCLEAR

. POWER.

THERE'IS NO PLACE FOR MIS 81NDERSTANDING OR FOR GUESSING WHAT IS MEANT.

'IN MOST HUMAN COMMUNICATION, PARTICULARLY AMONG

=THOSE WHO ARE ACCUSTOMED TO DEAL FREQUENTLY. AND CLOSELY WITH ONE ANOTHER, PRECISE LANGUAGE IS'0FTEN NOT USED OR REQUIRED, MUCH OF THE' MEANING-BEING CONVEYED =BY TONE OR GESTURE.

.THIS IS NOT ACCEPTABLE IN THE OPERATION OF ANY ADVANCED TECHNO-

~

LOGY SUCH AS NUCLEAR POWER. ;ALL COMMUNICATIONS MUST BE PRECISE, USING STANDARD TERMINOLOGY WHICH LEAVES NO FEANING TO BE-!MPLIED

.AND REQUIRES'NO INTERPRETATION.

ALL ORDERS MUST BE GIVEN aM2-

'ACKNOWIFDGED IN SPECIFIC AUTHORIZED TERMS.

FOR FORMALITY AND DISCIPLINE TO OBTAIN WHEN THERE IS AN EMERGENCY,,ITLMUST H^"i

• EN PRESENT WHEN THINGS WERE GOING ROUTINELY.

CREWS THAT ENGAGE IN ~ TALK NOT DIRECTLY RELATED TO PLANT CONDITIONS OR OPERATIONS OR WHO INDULGE IN SLOPPY PERSONAL HABIT 3 ON WATCH WILL NOT RESPOND QUICKLY AND CORRECTLY TO A FAST MOVING

. PROBLEM.

IN THE NAVAL' PROGRAM WE. PAY-CAREFUL ATTENTION TO STRICT

? FORMALITY.. 'dHENEVERLTHE PLANT {IS' OPERATING, THERE ARE ON DUTY NOT I

l}

17-

y 4

JUST[THE QUAL'IFIED OPERATORS BUT ALSO QUALIFIED OFFICERS-WHO~

SOPERVISE'THEM.-

ONELOF THE SUPERVISOR'S-RESPONSIBILITIES-IS TO

-ASSURE FORMALITY, DISCIPLINE, AND ATTENTION.

- lN CIVILIAN PLANTS, WHICH OPERATE LARGELY'AT STEADY POWER, CONDITIONS AND WHERE THE F

c INDIVIDUALS ARE'ON WATCH FOR EIGHT HOURS AT A TIME INSTEAD OF-FOORTAS:IN.THE IIAVY, IT IS MORE-DIFFICULT.T0' ACHIEVE THE PROPER WATCHSTANDING PRACTICES.

-MUCH TIMELAND ENERGY IS REQU' IRED TO ACHIEVE STRICT WATCH-STANDING PRACTICES-AND TO AVOID CONFUSION IN COMMUNICATIONS.

1THIS IS ALWAYS NECESSARY, AND ESPECIALLY WHEN A CRISIS' ARISES.

~

W

+

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~

4

-. DANGER OF PLACIMG UNDUE RELIANCE ON PRIOR-INVOLVEMENT IN NAVAL NUCIEAR PROGRAM IT APPEARS'THAT SOME IN THE CIVIL!'AN NUCLEAR INDUSTRY AND,

~

~

~

PERHAPS;THE NRC HAVE BEEN PLACING UNDUE RELIANCELON THE MER5 FACT THAT A PERSON HAS BEEN INVOLVED IN THE NAVAL NUCLEAR PROGRAM.

I BELIEVE THE TRAINING PROVIDED TO OPERATORS IN THE NAVAL NUCLEAR. PROGRAM IS~ FULLY. ADEQUATE AND EQUAL TO THAT ANYWHERE.

'HOWEVER, SUCCESSFULLY COMPLETING A' TRAINING PROGRAM IS IN ITSELF NOT ENOUGH TO. QUALIFY ONE TO ESTABLISH OR RUN SUCH A'PROCRAM.

ALSO, AS I POINTED OUT EARLIER, OPERATOR TRAINING IS ONLY ONE ELEMENT OF THE TOTAL PROGRAM.

OTHER ESSENTIAL ELEMENTS ARE STAFFING LEVELS,-SUPERVISION, AUDITING AND QUALIFICATION, AND r

-REQUALIFICATION FOR THE SPECIFIC PLANT.TO BE OPERATED.

FINALLY, IT MUST' BE RECOGNIZED THAT UNDER PRESENT LAWS AND

-REGULATIONS IT IS NOT EVEN POSSIBLE FOR A PROSPECTIVE EMPLOYER TO DETERMINE WHETHER AN INDIVIDUAL-WHO WAS IN THE NAVAL NUCLEAR PROGRAM PERFORMED SATISFACTORILY OR NOT.

PRIVACY REGULATIONS PREVENT THE NAVY FROM RELEASING SUCH INFORMATION UNLESS SPECIFICALLY; AUTHORIZED BY'THE INDIVIDUAL.

IHERE ARE AND HAVE1BEEN MANY COMPETENT HIGHLY TRAINED' PEOPLE.oIN THE NAVAL 1 NUCLEAR PROGRAM - BUT THE RESPONSIBILITY TO EVALUATE ~THEIR COMPETENCE AND PERFORMANCE WITH RESPECT TO ANY

. 18

?

=

~

E O

~~

JOB.IN-CIVILIANiNUCLEARLPOWER RESTS WITH THEIR-CIVILIAN EMPLOYERS -

1WHO ALSO.HAVE. THE RESPONSIBILITY: TO = PROVIDE THE :NEEDED SUPPORT.

- PLANT MAINTENANCFi

'?ANOTHER IMPORTANT.~A'SPECT 0F NUCLEAR POWER IS THE PHYS'I

. CONDITION 0F THE PLANT'AND'ITS-HOUSEKEEPING.-

. NAVY: EXPERIENCE OVER MANY YEARS HAS SHOWN THAT THE GENERAL.

CONDITION:.0F ANY -POWERiP'LANT, ' INCLUDING EVEN SUCH APPARENTLY INCIDENTAL ITEMS AS' TIDINESS OR HOUSEKEEPING, ARE IMPORTANT TO

' RELIABILITY AND SAFETY. EIHE GENERAL APPEARANCE.AND CONDITION OF A PLANT-IS A GOOD INDICATOR OF THE DISCIPLINE AND COMPETENCE 0F THE PEOPLE WHO RUN IT.

IF A HOME IS NEAT, THERE IS LESS CHANCE OF AN ACCIDENT.

IHE SAME CONCEPT APPLIES TO A POWER' PLANT,'AND.THIS ATTITUDE MUST PERVADE THE ENTIRE OPERATION.

PEOPLE'WHO WORK INlA SLOPPY ENVIRONMENT ARE.LIKELY TO ACT IN A

. SLOPPY MANNER.

. HOUSEKEEPING.IN NUCLEAR' POWER ' PLANTS POSES ~A PARTICULAR PROBLEM SINCE SOME-PARTS 0F THE PLANT ARE INACCESSIBLE MOST OF

THELTIME...EVEN DURING THE REMAINDER OF THE TIME THEY ARE

~

9:

l DIFFICULT TOLINSPECT'BECAUSE OF RADIATION.- UONETHELESS, THOROUGH, PERIODIC INSPECTION AND CLEANING OF THE~ ENTIRE-PLANT'AND' CORRECTION

'0F'DEFICIENCIESLARE-ESSENTIAL.

'IO. AID IN THIS, THE DISTRIBUTION,-

0F RADIOACTIVITY--IN.THE PLANT-MUST BE CONTROLLED.

RADIOACTIVITY.

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jTHATISTAYS?WITHIN!THE'CORECONTRI30TESLITTLETO>THERADIATION:

RECEIVED INIWORKING-ATlTHE PLANT.

TH'EREFORE,'THE PLANT:MUST.

i:

HAVE HIGH1 INTEGRITY ~ FUEL ELEMENTS TO-RETAIN ~THE RADIOA'CTIVE-

^

-FISSION PRODUCTS.-

MUCH OF THE RADI ATION RECEIVED DURING PLANT MAINTENANCE COMES'FROM RADIOACTIVE CORROSION PRODUCTScSUCH AS COBALT.

THE AMOUNT-OFLTHIS TYPE:0F RADI0 ACTIVITY CAN BE MINIMIZED BY PROPER SELECTION'0FJMATERIALS AND CONTROL OF COOLANT' CHEMISTRY.

ITS LOCATION CAN BE CONTROLLED BY DETAILED DESIGN OF SYSTEMS AND-

~

COMPONENTS'TO ELIMINATE LOCAL SPOTS WHERE RADI0 ACTIVE MATERIAL l

COULD ACCUMULATE.

MOST IMPORTANT, AIRBORNE ACTIVITY AND RADI0 ACTIVE CONTAMINATION OUTSIDE THE PRIMARY COOLANT SYSTEM CAN' BE MINIMIZED BY ELIMINATING ROUTINE LEAKAGE OF PRIMARY COOLANT AND BY LOCAL CONTAINMENT OF ANY TEMPORARY LEAKAGE WHICH DOES

. 0CCUR..

.IN DISCUSSING INSPECTION OF THE' PLANT, I REFER PRINCIPALLY'

.. ~

' TO-~FINDINGJAND REPAIRING THE LITTLE THINGS - STEAM LEAKS, VALVE PACKING. LEAKS,- WETTED INSULATION, RUSTING VENTS, INOPERATIVE 0R

~

JOUT OF CALIBRATION INSTRUMENTS OR COMPONENTS, ETC. - ONCE'A POWER PLANT IS: CONSTRUCTED, ITEMUST NOT JUST BE LEFT-ALONE.

IT REQUIRES LCONTINdOOS,cDETAILED ATTENTION.

IT ALSO REQUIRES THAT COMPLETE-

- RECORDSJBE MAINTAINED?OF THE. DEFICIENCIES'WHICH DO OCCUR AND HOW THEY J ARE CORRECTED.-

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L TOLENSURE THAT PLANTS ARE BEING:KEPT IN GOOD CONDITION, I l

-REQUIREETHOROUGH,' PERIODIC INSPECTION

. INCLUDING-THE REACTOR

COMPARTMENT - BY THE SENIOR

0FFICERS.

. I ALSO'HAVE'SUCH 4 -

i!NSPECTIONS MADE BY PEOPLE FROM HEADQUARTERS.

1 FACE FACTS ANOTHER PRINCIPLE.FOR SUCCESSFUL; APPLICATION OF A SOPHISTICATED' TECHNOLOGY IS TO FACE-FACTS.

ONE MUST BE CONSCIOUS OF AND= ACTIVELY GUARD AGAINST THE HUMAN INCLINATION TO EQEE THAT' THINGS WILL WORK OUT DESPITE EVIDENCE OR SUSPICIONS TO'THC CONTRARY.

ONE IMPORTANT WAY TO DO THIS IS TO HOLD. PEOPLE.

ACCOUNTABLE FOR LONG-TERM PERFORMANCE.

ONE WHO KNOWS HE WILL BE

,HELDsACCOUNTABLE IF THINGS DO,NOT WORK RELIABLY IS MORE LIKELY TO RESIST'-SHORT-TERM OPTIMISM THAN ONE WHO ' KNOWS HE WILL NOT.

.A MANAGER'WHO'IS-EVALUATED.ON SHORT-TERM RESULTS ALONE IS LESS

-LIKELY TO FACE THE FACTS AND ACT.WHEN THE CORRECTIVE ACTION'IS UNPALATABLE AND COSTLY,.- 'l HAVE ALWAYS ACTED IN EACH JOB I HAVE-HADTASTIFil-WOULD HOLD IT AND BE HELD RESPONSIBLE FOREVER - EVEN ON JUDGEMENT DAY - AND PERHAPS BEYOND.

~

lFc: THINGS'DO NOT APPEAR TO BE QUITE RIGHT, YOU MUST-DIG OUT THE FACTS AND MAKETNEEDEDLCHANGES DESPITE.SIGNIFICANT-COSTS AND-l.

. SCHEDULE DELAYS. lA: NUMBER OF TIMES DURING THE COURSE OF-MY WORK-L

.I'HAVE'MADELDECISIONS-T0'STOP WORK'AND REDESIGN OR REBUILD EQUIP-L

~

TMENT?-1NO MATTER WHATlTHEi DELAY-OR COST - TO PROVIDE THE

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-REQUISITE ASSURANCE OF/ SATISFACTORY PERFORMANCE.

DON SOME l

OCCASIONS') -ILH VE 'FOUND ?!T _NECESSARY ~TO'-REPLACE PERSONNEL.

..IHE1MdN1 1N CHARGE MUST PERSONALLY: SET THELEXAMPLE.IN~THIS o

' AREA'A !D REQUIRE HIS ~ SUBORDINATES TO DO LIKEWISE.

-THOSE 'WHO WILL.NOTJOR-CAN NOT DO-THIS MUST BE REPLACED.

L

-POSSIBILITY OF'MISTAKFS MUST BE TAKEN-INTO ACCOUNT x

WHATJI-HAVE PRESENTED UP TO THIS POINT AND THE INFORMATION

!I FURNISHED TO YOU IN MY MAY 24TH STATEMENT INDICATE SOME OF WHAT;lLDO IN RUNNING.THE NAVAL SEACTORS PROGRAM..

EVEN WHEN 1.

THESE M'E'ASURES.ARE CARRIED OUT. MISTAKES WILL BE M'ADE WILL1 FAIL)1BECAUSE WE ARE DEALING WITH MACHINES AND THEY CANN

-MADE PERFECT.- THE: HUMAN-BODY IS GOD'S FINEST CREATION WE K

.AND YET IT IS NOT PERFECT - WE GET SICK.

WE CANNOT EXPECT, PHILOSOPHICALLY, THAT. MACHINES WILL BE MORE NEARLY PERFECT THAN THE: HUMAN, BEINGS WHO C,REATEfTHEM.

NUCLFAR POWFR CAN PE SAFELY USFD IF THE~ PRINCIPLES I HAVE 0UTLINED ARE CARRIED OUT WITH.

STEADFAST COMMITMENT,~l BELIEVE NUCLEAR, POWER CAN BE SAFELY LUSED,'EVEN1TNKING INTO ACCOUNT MISTAKES THAT WILL INEVITABLY

~

~0CCUR.. DIHAT'IS.THE BASIS'ON WHICH l HAVE CONDUCTED'ALL MY WORK ANDji(BELIEVELIT~JUSTAS,STRONGLYTODAY'ASIEVERHAVE.

.h l..

~

77

)

SOMF'SUGGFSTFD ACTI0t!S t

LETLME NOW:SUMMARIZELSOMEz SPECIFIC' ACTIONS I SUGGEST BE

~

C0NSIDERED,-AND COMMENT ON SOME 0THERS WHICH'I UNDERSTAND HAVE 2BEEN5 SUGGESTED:

Ll'.

UTILITY' MANAGEMENT AS THE OWNERS AND OPERATORS OF THE

~

PLANTS'HAVE PRIME RESPONSIBILITY'FOR THEIR' SAFETY. _IHEY MUST ACCEPT THEIR1 RESPONSIBILITY AND BECOME KNOWLEDGEABLE:IN THE~

' TECHNICAL FACETS OFLNUCLEAR. POWER.

'IHE UTILITIES SHOULD UPGRADE THEIR TECHNICALLSTAFF AND GIVE THEM DIRECT AND FREQUENT ACCESS TO i

TOP. MANAGEMENT.. THE STAFF -SHOULD HAVE FULL RESPONSIBILITY FOR SAFETY. INCLUDING DESIGN AND TRAINING AS WELL AS OPERATIONAL MATTERS, AND SHOULD HAVE.THE AUTHORITY TO TAKE-THE NECESSARY ACTIONS.

TECHNICAL' DECISIONS'MUST BE MADE ON A TECHNICAL BASIS.

IHEY CANNOT BE MADE BY PURCHASING AGENTS, COMPTROLLERS OR-LAWYERS.

I HAVE-

' CONTRACT AND BUDGET PEOPLE BUT THESE PEOPLE SERVE THE TECHNICAL

GROUPS THEY DO f!OT; RUN THE PROGRAM OR OVERRIDE TECHNICAL CONSIDERATIONS.

-FOR?MANY EARS.I HAVE RECOMMENDED THAT THE-UTILITIES UNITE TO -ESTABLISH A. SEPARATE TECHNICAL ORGANIZATION WHICH COULD L

PROVIDE.A' MORE COORDINATED AND-EXPERT TECHNICAL INPUT AND CONTROL FOR THE COMMERCIAL NUCLEAR' POWER PROGRAM THAN IS PRESENTLY w

POSSIBLE FOR-EACH UTILITY-WITH ITS LIMITED STAFF.

THE ELECTRIC f

~

-POWER RESEARCH INSTITUTE, EPRI, IS AN: EXAMPLE OF THIS.

IT

.23-

).

o PERFORMS RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT IN TECHNOLOGY. ASSOCIATED WITH

' NUCLEAR POWERLAND'OTHER'FORMSHOF POWER GENERATION.

I~ UNDERSTAND THAT'A SIMILAR. ARRANGEMENT ISEBEING MADE IN THE AREA 0F OPERATOR TRAINING.

THESE ARE GOOD' STEPS - BUT NOT ENOUGH..

IHELCENTRAL l TECHNICAL ORGANIZATION -I RECOMMEND SHOULD 'HAVE A CLEAR MANDATE FOR SAFETY ~ ASPECTS AS A PART OF ITS FUNCTION..

AMONG.THE THINGS SUCH

~

1AN' ORGANIZATION COULD.DO:ARE:

A.

DEVELOP THE1 STANDARDS AND SPECIFICATIONS UTILITIES SHOULD REQUIRE FOR DESIGN AND CONSTRUCTION OF THEIR PLANTS.

B.

. PROVIDE : DIRECT, IN-DEPTH TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE TO

' UTILITIES IN DESIGN, CONSTRUCTION AND OPERATIONAL. QUESTIONS.

C.

. ESTABLISH RECOMMENDED STAFFING REQUIREMENTS FOR OPERATION OF NUCLEAR PLANTS.

FOR EXAMPLE', I UNDERSTAND-THAT AT TIMES THERE MAY BE ONLY A SINGLE OPERATOR WITH N0' SUPERVISION PRESENT IN.THE CONTROL R00M,0F AN OPERATING PLANT.. ALSO,~THAT OPERATORS MAY BE ASSIGNED AND ACTUALLY CARRY OUT UNRELATED DUTIES WHILE ON WATCH.

.IHESE ARE CONTRARY TO NAVY' PRACTICE.

D.

DEVELOP A COMPREHENSIVE TRAINING AND~ RETRAINING PROGRAM,. : INCLUDING LESSON PLANS, QUALIFICATION REQUIREMENTS, ETC.

FOR UTILITIES TO'USE IN. TRAINING THEIR PEOPLE.

THIS MUST BE BASED ON WHAT IS NEEDED-AND NOT GEARED SOLELY 1TO PASSING LICENSING-EXAMINATIONS.- IT SHOULD2 COVER ALL TYPES OF~ PERSONNEL,.

NOTJJUST 0PERATORS.

+

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PROVIDE:TRAINEDLTECHNICAL. TEAMS T0' PERFORM PERIOD AUDITS.0F NUCLEAR-STATIONSLAND CRITICALLY. EVALUATE THE PLANTS

'AND--QUALIFICATIONLAND PERFORMANCE OF PERSONNEL'.

F.

ADVISE UTILITIES-ON TECHNICAL SAFETY QUESTIONS.

c

0THER' FUNCTIONS PROBABLY'WOULD BECOME' APPARENT IN TIME.

IHE CONTRIBUTION SUCH AN ORGANIZATION.COULD MAKE WOULD B CONSIDERABLE IF GIVEN THE PERSONNEL AND AUTHORITY TO CONCENTRATE:

ON THE TECHNICAL ASPECTS, WITHOUT UNDUE CONCERN FOR ISSUES SUCH AS SCHEDULES, ECONOMICS.AND THE LIKE.

IF THEY ARE SET UP TO BE JUST A MOUTHPIECE.FOR JUSTIFYING WHATEVER THE UTILITIES WANT TO D0' BASED ON PROFIT AND LOSS, AS ISLTHE CASE WITH MANY.

INDUSTRY ORGANIZATIONS, IT WILL BE A WASTED EFFORT.

ALSO, IF UTILITIES 1 MANAGEMENT SIMPLY TURN OVER ALL TECHNICAL MATTERS TO THISLORGANIZATION, IToWILL'NOT. WORK.

UTILITIES ALSO NEED THEIR OWN IN-HOUSE TECHNICAL COMPETENCE.

INl SETTING-UP SUCH AN ORGANIZATION, CARE MUST BE TAKEN TO.

GET.THETPROPER-PEOPLE.

IT IS'MORE IMPORTANT THAT THEY HAVE A PROVEN. RECORD OF ACTUAL-ACCOMPLISHMENT IN ALPRACTICAL, SUCCESS-

- FUL. APPLICATION OF TECHNOLOGY THAN THAT THEY BE " EXPERTS" OR

'ISENIOR' STATESMEN" WHO HAVE BECOME WELL KNOWN BECAUSE T

-DOME A-LOT OF: TALKING FOR MANY YEARS ABOUT-THE NUCLEAR' POWER FIELD.

MANY'" EXPERTS"'HAVE~A FAR BETTER REPUTATION THAN THEIR

~

' ACTUAL' ACCOMPLISHMENTS WARRANT CONSIDERATION SHOULD BE GIVEN.TO

~

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1W'HETHERLTIP[ PEOPLE ^TOBE: SELECTED'FORSUCHORGANIZATIONS THEtPRESENT PROBLEMS AND.-TOOK STEPS ~TO HANDLE.THEM IN PROGRAMS-

'FORLWHICHhTHEY:WERE" RESPONSIBLE BEFORE THEYLACHIEVED:THE-REPUTA -

~

TIONEOF'" EXPERTS".'

IN-0THERLWORDSrjTHEY SHOULD~BE JUDGED ON.

~

ACTIONS;AND RESULTS, NOT:0N. VERBAL ABILITY.

IHE BIBLE SAYS'IN

]

LPaovsansE"EVEN.A CHI'LDTIS KNOWN'BY. HIS DOINGS..'.. AND WHETHER IT L

(RIGHT".

12.

THE CONCEPT OF~ PERSONA'L RESPONSIBILITY MUST-BE. APPLIED.

FUNDAMENTAL TO THIS CONCEPT OF PERSONAL RESPONSIBILITY.IN.

~

'. ~.

. NUCLEAR POWER OR ANY ENGINEERING ENDEAVOR IS UNDERSTANDING AND

^

+

PROPERLY: INTERPRETING: TECHNICAL FACTS IN MAKING DECISIONS.

RELIANCE ON"" MANAGEMENT TECHNIQUES" HAS BECOME RAMPANT THROUGH-9 0UT~ GOVERNMENT AND INDUSTRY.' SO LONG AS THE PEOPLE IN CHARGE MAKE. DECISIONS WITHOUT UNDERSTANDING.THE TECHNICAL ISSUES,-A LACK OF PERSONAL RESPONSIBILITY WILL OBTAIN.

Il0W CAN-ANYONE WHO DOES-NOT UNDERSTAND THE TECHNICAL ASPECTS OF WHAT HE IS DOING REALLY BE RESPONSIBLE OR FEEL PERSONALLY RESPONSIBLE?

IF.YOU KNOW-AN AUTO MECHANIC-'WHO>TAKE6 PERSONAL RESPONSIBILITY'FOR HIS WORK, LISN'TnIT BECAUSE HE KNOWS EVERY FACET OF ENGINES AND HOW TO-MAKE

~

THEM-WORK?c;UNTIL-THIS BASIC FACT IS RECOGNIZED-AND ACCEPTED, JWE-CANNOT.REALLY-GET1 PERSONAL RESPONSIBILITY IN'ANY TECHNICAL LAREA.- WHILEul AM~NOT PERSONALLY' FAMILIAR WITH THE" SPECIFICS,

' NEWSPAPER ARTICLES:SUGGEST THAT-CURRENT PROBLEMS WITH.THE.NEW 1 YORK 1 SUBWAYS CAMEtABOUT BECAUSERNON-TECHNICAL MANAGEMENT OVER-RULED 9THELENGINEERS[' TECHNICAL OBJECTIONS IN FAVOR'0F SUPPOSED m

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-7.,

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i COST SAVINGS.

IHE-COST.0FLREPAIRSIIS REPORTED TO'HAVE EXCEEDED

~

THE'ESTIMATEDLSAVINGS)ALREADY.. WHEN THEY.lARE SUBORDINATED-IN' LTECHNICALL MATTE'RS TO' ACCOUNTANTS, B JSINESS MANAGERS'i LAWYERS AND

, BANKERS,3YECHNICALnPEOPLE CANNOT1BE EXPECTED TO -EXERCISE PERSONAL

^

RESPONSIBILITY.

3. LTHERE SHOULD BEJA GOVERNMENT REPRESENTATIVE IN THE:

' CONTROL' ROOM AT ALL TIMES WITH THE AUTHORITY TO SHUT THE_ PLANT

- DOWN~IF HE BELIEVES THIS'TO BE~NECESSARY FOR. SAFETY.

I HAVE-

)

, ADVOCATED THIS:FOR YEARS.

IT PROVIDES AN INDEPENDENT MONITOR' WHOSE? SOLE' CONCERN IS SAFETY.

4.

ALL ACTIVITIES INVOLVED IN NUCLEAR POWER - UTILITIES, REACTOR VENDORS, MANUFACTURERS, AND REGULATORY AGENCIES MUST LESTABLISH AND RETAIN AS PERMANENT A STAFF AS POSSIBLE, SO LONG AS THEY PERFORM WELL.

THIS IS ESSENTIAL IN THE NUCLE'AR BUSINESS"

~

WHERE ITiTAKES OVER TEN. YEARS FROM THELTIME A PLANT IS ORDERED LUNTIL:IT STARTS OPERATING - AND WHERE-THE FLANT IS THEN EXPECTED TO OPERATE SAFELY FOR ITS LIFE.0F 30 TO 40 YEARS.

WITH PERMANENCE

.YOU. GAIN EXPERIENCE, JUDGEMENT, AND A'" CORPORATE MEMORY" WHICH ARE HARD TO : REPLACE.-

HOWEVER;-YOU;CANNOT PREDICATE YOUR-PROGRAM ON-THE BASIS THAT E

~

JPEOPLE;WILL NEVER' LEAVE, BECAUSE;THEY DO, NO ONE IS INDISPENSABLE, 2NORlSHOULD-ANY1 TECHNICAL EFFORT ~BE PREDICATED ON ANY INDIVIDUAL mBEING,1NDISPENSABLE...IHAT IS-WHY-THERE.MUST BE. FORMAL DOCUMENTA-

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TION AND WHY' THOROUGH TRAINING AND AUDITING PROGRAMS ARE'

.NECESSARY1-1SO THAT NEW-PEOPLE CAN BE BROUGHT.IN WITHOUTECOM-

~

LPROMISING1 SAFETY.

I RETAIN-PEOPLE,JTHEY'MUST BE. PAID ADEQUATELY.

Il0REJIMPORTANT,"TO ATTRACTJAND RETAIN GOOD TECHNICAL PEOPLE,;

<THEY MUST BE TRAINED AND GIVEN AUTHORITY AND RESPONSIBILITY.

NOTHING CAUSES TECHNICAL' PEOPLE TO: LEAVE MORE QUICKLY THAN NOT

.BEING'ABLE TO~DO THEIR TECHNICAL' JOBS PROPERLY.

UNTIL-ADEQUATE RECOGNITION IS GIVEN T0; TECHNICAL COMPETENCE, THE TURNOVER-0F-

. PEOPLE NEEDED FOR NUCLEAR ; POWER WILL BE GREATER THAN WARRANTED.

f.

~

~ PLANT DESIGNS, EQUIPMENT, CONTROL ROOMS, TRAINING, 5.

ETC..SHOULD BE STANDARDIZED INSOFAR AS PRACTICABLE.

I DO NOT Kt!OW HOW FAR - IT 'IS POSSIBLE TO STANDARDIZE CONTROL ROOMS, INSTRU-MENTATION AND-0THER FEATURES OF EXISTING PLANT' DESIGNS SINCE THE PLANTS THEMSELVES ARE NOT STANDARD.

CERTAINLY IT SHOULD BE-POSSIBLE~TO STANDARDIZE TYPES, COLORS AND SIGNIFICANCE OF ALARMS, SWITCHES, ETC.

ON NEW PLANTS, MUCH MORE STANDARDIZA-TION-IN-ALL ASPECTS INCLUDING REACTOR RATING SEEM PRACTICABLE.

TO THEJEXTENT IT IS PRACTICABLE TO-STANDARDIZE, TWO

~

~ DISTINCT' BENEFITS WOULD RESULT. ;IHE FIRST IS THAT A LARGER NUMBER.0F ENGINEERING: MAN HOURS COULD BE APPLIED TO THE STANDARD

' DESIGNS 1THAN:TO EACH 0F MANY EIFFERENT DESIGNS.

IHIS.SHOULD RESULTJIN BETTER DESIGNS.

THE QUACIFICATION,, TEST-P'ROGRAM,

? DEVELOPMENT;0F10PERATING: PROCEDURES, OPERATIONAL MANUALS, TEST

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PROCEDURES, AND-CALIBRATION PROCEDURESTSHOULD ALSO BENEFIT '

'FROMLTHE INCREASED ATTENTION. - FURTHER,;WITH A LARGER NUMBER 3

OFDIDENTICALJ0PERATING SYSTEMS,10i JRATIONAL EXPERIENCE -

EWILL~ PROVIDE A VALUABLE SOURCE OF INFORMATION THAT-CAN BE.USED

?

c TO IMPROVE THE: DESIGN 1AND PROCEDURES: AND ESTABLISH. A MORE

~

EFFECTIVE PREVENTIVE MAINTENANCE PROGRAM FOR ALL PL NTS.

THE~SECOND BENEFIT'0F STANDARDIZATION RELATES TO THE TRAINING.0F. OPERATING AND INSPECTION PERSONNEL.

THE USE OF STANDARD' DESIGNS WOULD MAKE'IT POSSIBLE TO TRAIN' OPERATING PERSONNEL MORE EFFECTIVELY AND TO CONDUCT MORE EFFECTIVE AUDITS.

IN. ADVOCATING MORE STANDARDIZATION I AM MQI SAYING THAT

'THERE SHOULD BE ONE SINGLE-DESIGN.

I HAVE STANDARD'IZED IN MY

' PROGRAM AS~FAR AS PRACTICABLE.

EVEN-THEN WE HAVE A NUMBER OF DESIGNS TO' SUIT THE-DIFFERENT POWER: RATINGS AND SHIP TYPES AND TO TAKE ADVANTAGE'0F NEW DEVELOPMENTS AND TECHNOLOGY'WHICH HA'VE BECOME AVAI LABLE.

6.

MINIMIZE. RELIANCE ON AUTOMATION AND COMPUTER CONTRO ILRECOGNIZE.THAT THIS' RUNS COUNTER.TO THE BELIEF'0F SOME, BUT

?MY-EXPERIENCE.IS THAT PRIMARY RELIANCE FOR' SAFELY OPERATING A

' NUCLEAR-POWERLPLANT MUST,BE PLACED ON THE:0PERATOR'.-.l AM NOT LAGAINST COMPUTERS). :THEY.ARE IMPORTANT.

FROM THE EARLIE'ST DAYS LOFfTHE IIAVALsREACTORS' PROGRAM, THE MOST ADVNACED: COMPUTERS HAVE BEEN US'ED.IN..THELDESIGNfANIVANALYSIS:OF OUR PLANTS'..EUT'IN MY-b 4

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CONSIDERED OPINION, UNDUE RELIANCE ON AUTOMATION AND COMPUTERS FOR CONTROL CANLIMPAIR SAFETY.

THERE ARE SEVERAL-REASONS FOR THIS:

FIRST, FOR A COMPUTER TO OPERATE. PROPERLY IT MUST BE PROGRAMMED PROPERLY.

PROGRAMMING IS A PRE-ESTABLISHED SET OF INSTRUCTIONS.

FOR A COMPUTER TO BE EFFECTIVE UNDER EMERGENCY CONDITIONS REQUIRES THAT THE CASUALTY AND'THE SEQUENCE OF INFORMATION EXPECTED FROM THE COMPUTER HAVE BEEN DEFINED IN' ADVANCE.

MOST MAJOR PROBLEMS RESULT FROM UNEXPECTED EVENTS WHICH CHANGED A PREDICTED EVENT INTO AN EVENT

'OR SEQUENCE OF EVENTS NOT COVERED BY PREVIOUS EXPERIENCE.

IF IT IS POSSIBLE TO PREDICT COMPLICATED CASUALTIES IN ADVANCE, IT IS BETTER TO TAKE ACTION TO CORRECT THE DESIGN TO PREVENT OR MODERATE THE CASUALTIES THAN TO ADD ADDITIONAL EQUIP-MENT SUCH AS COMPUTERS TO TRY TO CONTROL THEM.

THE-EMPHASIS SHOULD BE NOT ON MORE COMPLICATED AND

' SOPHISTICATED CONTROL BUT ON DESIGNING AND BUILDING A SIMPLE, STABLE PLANT.

AN INHERENTLY STABLE REACTOR MAKES FE4ER DEMANDS ON THE CONTROL SYSTEM AND THE OPERATORS.

THEREFORE, IT RESULTS IN A SIMPLER MORE RELIABLE PLANT - ONE WITH A LARGE DEGREE OF l

" FORGIVENESS" BUILT INT 0 IT.

WITH SUCH A REACTOR, IT IS POSSIBLE FCR AN OPERATOR TO DEVELOP A FEELING FOR PLANT PERFORMANCE AND

-BEHAVIOR.

HE CAN THEN RECOGNIZE ABNORMAL BEHAVIOR AND HAVE-

~

TIME TO' INITIATE CORRECTI,VE ACTION.

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SFcONDi FOR _-CASUALTIES WHICH IM) OCCUR, THE OPERATOR MUST HAVE ~ AVAI LABLE,. IN A MANNER HE -CAN UNDERSTAND, INFORMATION RELATING TO THE ESSENTI AL1 PLANT PARAMETERS.. PLACING A COMPUTER BETWEEN THE OPERATOR AND THE. REACTOR PLANT IS EQUIVALENT TO

- PLACING A FILTER BETWEEN< THE OPERATOR AND THE CASUALTY.

THIS FILTER CAN PREVENT THE OPERATOR-FROM HAVING ESSENTIAL INFORMA-TION AVAILABLE.

THIRD, ANY COMPUTERS USED CONSTITUTE ADDITIONAL SOURCES OF ERROR ~ 0R -MALFUNCTIONS 194ICH CAN MISLEAD THE OPERATOR RELYING ON-THEM. ~IHIS IS PARTICULARLY TRUE IN AN EMERGENCY WHEN THE TIME TO TAKE CORRECTIVE MEASURES IS AT A MINIMUM.

FINALLY _, THE.VERY EXISTENCE OF THE COMPUTER OR AUTOMATIC

~ CONTROL LEADS THE OPERATOR AND OTHERS INVOLVED IN OPERATION, DESIGN, AND TRAINING TO RELY ON THE " MAGIC" IT PROVIDES.

IHIS

-DIVERTS NEEDED ATTENTION FROM OTHER AREAS.

IN THE' FINAL ANALYSIS, WE MUST DEPEND ON HUMAN BEINGS.

NO MACHINE, INCLUDING A COMPUTER, CAN BE MORE PERFECT THAN THE.

HUMAN BEINGS WHO DESIGNED IT, USE IT, OR RELY ON IT.

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' SIMPLIFY AND'RFnUCF THE Sf7: OF CONTROI ROOMS.

EVEN J

RECOGNIZING THE DIT'ERING-REQUIREMENTS-FOR NAVAL AND CIVILIAN l-NUCLEAR-POWER PLANTS THERE ARE SEVERAL THINGS' l' HAVE READ AB0u.

LTHEl CONTROL ROOM AT'IHREE' MILE ISLAND WHICH'WERE A SURPRISE TO ME. -

I UNDERSTAND THAT M0'ST IF NOT ALL OF.THEM WERE~ IDENTIFIED IN AN ELECTRIC P0wER RESEARCH' INSTITUTE' REPORT OF UOVEMBER 1976

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. TITLED " HUMAN' FACTORS REVIEW OF: UUCLEAR; POWER PLANTLCONTROL.

ROOM: DESIGN".. THE REPORT--IDENTIFIED SUCH PROBLEMS AS PHYSICAL SIZE' 0F THE CONTROL' PANELS, NUMBER OF ' GAUGES ~ AND' ALARMS, _ ARRANGE-MENT AND~ MARKING l0F ALARMS, GAUGES AND CONTROLS.- ~IT-WOULD'BE.

-WORTHWHILE TO LEARN WHAT. ACTION WAS TAKEN AS A RESULT OF THAT

-REPORT.

lN'THENAVALREACTORS: PROGRAM, WE MINIMIZE THE NUMBER AND TYPES OF INSTRUMENTS AND ALARMS NEEDED.

THIS RESULTS IN MUCH SMALLER CONTROL' ROOMS.

o. :D0 NOT' DIVIDE RESPONSIBILITY.

FOR EXAMPLE, IT HAS BEEN SUGGESTED THAT AN AGENCY OTHER THAN THE. PLANT OWNER EMPLOY THE OPERATORS OR THAT AN' AGENCY OTHER THAN THE NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION (NRC) BE RESPONSIBLE FOR REGULATING OPERATOR TRAIN-

-ING.

I DO NOT SUPPORT EITHER OF.THESE PROPOSALS. CONTROL ROOM OPERATORS SHOULD BE EMPLOYE3 BY THOSE WHO OWN AND OPERATE THE PLANTS.

RESPONSIBILITY FOR SELECTING AND TRAINING OP'ERATORS SHOULD NOT BE SEPARATED FROM RESPONSIBILITY FOR DESIGN,

MAINTENANCE, AND OPERATION OF THE PLANT.- WITHIN THE EXISTING FRAMEWORK IT SEEMS' APPROPRIATE TO ME THAT THE NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION ESTABLISH _THE NECESSARY REQUIREMENTS ~FOR PERSONNEL QUALIFICATION'AND TRAINING.

IT IS THEN UP TO THE UTILITIES TO i

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. PROVIDE ADEQUATELTRAINING - SUBJECT TO NRC OVERSIGHT.

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IT HAS BEEN SUGGESTED THAT ALL INSTRUMENTATION FOR^

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tNUCLEAR POWER PLANTS BELR'EQUIRED TO BE " DIRECT' READING" AND 1.'

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THAT ALL MONITORING SYSTEMS INDICATE WHETHER'A CONTROL. FUNCTION

.ACTUALLYfHAS~BEEN PERFORMED - RATHER.THAN WHETHER.THE CONTROL SIGNAL'HAS'BEEN GIVEN.

I DO NOT' AGREE WITH=SUCH GENERALIZED-REQUIREMENTS ON SPECIFIC DESIGN FEATURES.

J

' INSTRUMENTATION USED FOR REACTOR PLANTS MUST BE RELI ABLE

'AND READILY. MAINTAINED AND~ CALIBRATED..

SOMETIMES', S0-CALLED

" DIRECT READING" INSTRUMENTATION.CANNOT PROVIDE THE ABOVE FEATURES.

ALSO, S0-CALLED " DIRECT READING" INSTRUMENTATION CAN BE AS SUBJECT TO MISUNDERSTANDING OR FAILURE AS CAN ANY OTHER INSTRUMENTATION.

FOR EXAMPLE, REACTOR FLOW CAN BE MEASURED "DIRECTLY" BY A FLOW METER - A METER WHICH, IN ACTUALITY, MEASURES NOT FLOW BUT PRESSURE DROP ACROSS A SECTION OF PIPE -

OR^IT CAN BE INFERRED BY MEASUREMENTS OF TEMPERATURE, PUMPING POWER,.OR. PUMP SPEED.

MEASURING THE FLOW DIRECTLY IS NOT

~NECESSARY TO ASSURE. SAFE OPERATION OF THE REACTOR AND REQUIRES

. ADDITIONAL. COMPLICATING EQUIPMENT-AND INSTRUMENTS.

~

SIMILARLY, IT;IS DESIRABLE IN MANY CASES THAT MONITORING-SYSTEMS INDICATE THAT.A CON 700L FUNCTION HAS BEEN PERFORMED i

!RATHER THAN THAT'THE. COMMAND-SIGNAL HAS BEEN SENT TO THE DEVICE

',1N: QUESTION.

HOWEVER, IN SOME CASES,.IT IS IMPRACTICABLE TO PROVIDE 1THIS INDI' CATION.

FOR THOSE CASES, OPERATING PERSONNEL

'SHOULD BE. TRAINED TO LOOK FOR OTHER INDICATIONS WHICH SHOW.WHETHER 3THEECONTROL. FUNCTION HAS OCCURRED.

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AGAIN, LIT IS"POSSIBLE'TO PROVIDE T.00 MUCH'INSTRUMENTATIONI

THIS WILLDCONFUSELTHE' OPERATORS OR, IF'THE INSTRUMENTATION'IS NOT RELIABLE, OPERATING PERSONNEL WILL DISTRUST IT AND NOT'BELIEVE ITS INDICATIONS WHEN THEY SHOULD.

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-WHATLINSTRUMENTS ARE. REQUIRED TO ASSURE SAFE ~0PERATIONo0

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REACTOR' MUST BE DETERMINED FOR EACH' SPECIFIC REACTOR AND PLANT DESIGN.

10.- THE tTTILITIES MUST PLAY THE MAJOR ROLE IN ACHIEVING EFFEC USE OF IMPROVED SPECIFICATION CODES AND STANDARDS.

I KNOW THERE ARE SPECIFICATION AND STANDARDS PROGRAMS UNDERWAY FOR COMMERCIAL NUCLEAR POWER.

THERE ARE THREE THOUGHTS'l WOULD LIKE TO GIVE YOU RELATI TO SUCH PROGRAMS:

FiasT, THERE IS NO USE HAVING SPECIFICATIONS, CODES OR STANDARDS

!F THEY. ARE NOT INVOKED AND ENFORCED.

IN FACT, IF THEY ARE NOT

- ENFORCED, THEY ARE HARMFUL'BECAUSE THEIR EXISTENCE IS CONSOLING TO THOSE IN AUTHORITY AND GIVES THEM UNWARRANTED ASSURANCE.

THERE MUST.BE AN' EFFECTIVE WAY TO.SEE THAT THE PROPER REQUIREMENTS ARE

- IN FACT' INVOKED AND ENFORCED, AND THAT THERE IS PROPER TECHNICAL CONTROL OVER ANY WAIVER.- IN THIS REGARD, THE CUSTOMER.- THE.

UTILITY

.MUST TAKE THE LEAD.

SFCONna SPECIFICATIONC MUST BE KEPT UP-TO-DATE.

KNOWLEDGE AND l

, TECHNOLOGY AREJINCREASING RAPIDLY.

WE REVISE OUR SPECIFICATION CODES AND' STANDARDS PROMPTLY IN RESPONSE TO SPECIFIC PROBLEMS OR NEW11NFOR.MATION.

WE ALSO REVIEW EVERY SPECIFICATION EVERY Y' EAR ND f

WE. FIND'IT NECESSARY TO CHANGE ~ABOUT ONE THIRD OF THEM EACH YEAR.

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THIRil,lMOST IF NOT ALL.INDUSTRYECODESLAND STANDARDS REPRESENT A'" CONSENSUS"...IN PRACTICE,LTHE. SUPPLIERS, NOT-THE

- ' CUSTOMERS,; DOMINATE' DEVELOPMENT.0F:THESE STANDARDS.- IHAT'MAY BE ~

PROPER'FOR CLOTHES PINS AND' LIGHT BULBS BUT NOT FOR NUCLEAR q

POWER PLA'NTS.

AS THE~ PERSON RESPONSIBLE;FOR flAVY PLANTS, I HAVE'HAD TO ESTABLISH REQUIREMENTS'ON MATERIAL AND EQUIPMENT-WHICH 0UR SUPPLIERS WOULD NOT AGREE TO MEET.

INITIALLY,IHAb TO'TAKEDTHE'RISKLOF PAYING FOR AN ITEM:AND THEN NOT USING IT-BECAUSE !T DID NOT-MEET WHAT WAS REQUIRED.

LATER, WHEN THE

-SUPPLIERS HAD SEEN THAT.THE REQUIREMENTS COULD BE MET, THEY 1WOULD ACCEPT THEM.

HOWEVER,.!F I HAD WAITED.FOR " CONSENSUS"'ON

.THE REQUIREMENTS OR RELIED ONCEXISTING OR PROPOSED INbUSTRY

~

STANDARDS ^TO ASSURE ADEQUACY, I WOULD NEVER HAVE OBTAINED THE NEEDED; IMPROVEMENTS.

NAVYSPECIFICATIONS'AND-MAtlUALSARENOTDIRECTLYAPPL TO COMMERCIAL NUCLEAR POWER BECAUSE OF SPECIAL' MILITARY REQUIRE-

~MENTS. 'HOWEVER, THE PRINCIPLE THAT THE CUSTOMER MUST BE TECHNICALLY

-KNOWLEDGEABLE AND BASE.HIS SPECIFICATIONS ON WHAT IS NEEDED DOES. APPLY.

11. 'DO NOTJSUCCUMB TO CALLS FOR MORE.RESEARCH AND DEVELOP-MENTEAS'A RESPONSELT01THE IHREE MILE ISLAND INCIDENT.

THERE ARE.

LALWAYS CONTRACTORS SEEKING LARGE-SUMS OF FEDERAL MONEY TO SPEND ON-

!NTERESTING~RESEARCH.

BY. SUPPORTING THATTIDEA WE CAN GIVE LIP

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l SERVICE.TO THE PROBLEM-AN'D PROMISE.THAT BY OFFERING UP MONEY.TODAY, A

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'A SOLUTION WILL'BE FOUND-BY SOME R&D ORGANIZATION'IN'THE FUTURE.

BUT'IN MY OPINION, SUCH ACTION WILL ONLY OBSCURE THE REAL-PROBLEMS

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LAND DELAY THEIR. SOLUTION.

i SOME SPECIFIC AREAS MAY WARRANT.RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT BUT.

THAT IS A MINOR PART OF WHAT IS NEEDED.

IF ANYTHING,'THERE HAS

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BEEN TOO MUCH EMPHASIS ON RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT IN NUCLEAR POWER AND NOT ENOUGH ON THE DAILY DRUDGERY OF SEEING THAT EVERY ASPECT OF NUCLEAR POWER IS IN FACT BEING PROPERLY HANDLED EVERY 1

DAY BY'EACH OF THE ORGANIZATIONS INVOLVED.

1861 IS.WHERE THE EMPHASIS IS NEEDED.-

ALL HUMAN ACTS INVOLVF RISKS I WOULD LIKE TO MAKE A PHILOSOPHIC POINT WHICH SHOULD BE UNDERSTOOD.

NOTHING THAT WE DO IS WITHOUT RISK.

FOR EXAMPLE, WE ACCEPT THE INEVITABILITY OF AUTOMOBILE ACCIDENTS.

SINCE THE THREE MILE ISLAND ACCIDENT, WE HAVE SEEN THE CRASH OF A DC-10, FAILURES IN flew YORK' SUBWAYS, RELEASE OF T0XIC MATERIAL FROM TRAIN ACCIDENTS, AND.MANY OTHER RESULTS OF MAN'S ACTIONS.-

SEVERAL OF'THESE INCIDENTS RESULTED !N LOSS OF HUMAN LIFE.

SOME HAVE INVOLVED EVACUATION OF ADJACENT AREAS.

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~0F-NUCLEAR ^ WASTES AND:THE' POSSIBILITY 07 GENETIC EFFECTSLIN FUTURE LGENERATIONS~~ARE;NOT UNIQUE.TO.-NUCLEAR POWER ~."

IHERE IS' INCREASING

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TIN:0UR' CLIMATE DUE TO THE PRODUCTIOW OFfCARBON-DIOXIDE.-1THE

" GREENHOUSE"fEFFECTa LTHE APPARENTi" LIFETIME".0F/ CARBON DIOXIDE

!S LONG IN TERMS ~0F.!OUR OWN! LIFE SPAN AND..THE.: QUANTITIES" INVOLVED' ARELFAR. GREATER THAN THE QUANTITY"0F RADIOACTIVE WASTE.- TO MY-LKNOWLEDGE, THERE"ISLNO: EFFORT UNDERWAY EVEN TO ATTEMPT:TO ISOLATE SUCH WASTES FROM THE ENVIRONMENT.

[ALS0i I' UNDERSTAND, MANY OF THE CHEMICAL _ SUBSTANCES WIDELY LUSEDcTODAY HAVE. POT 8NTIAL' GENETIC EFFECTS WITH IMPLICATIONS-FOR FUTURE GENERATIONS.

NUCLEAR POWER' !NVOLVES POTENTI AL RISKS TO LARGE. NUMBERS.0F 2 PEOPLE.

IT WOULD BE-WRONG TO IGNORE THOSE RISKS OR TO IMPLY THAT'THEY CAN BE REDUCED TOlZERO.

YOU CANNOT MORALIZE' TECHNOLOGY.

YOU-CAN ALWAYS FIND WHERE-HUMAN BEINGS HAVE ERRED.-

HOWEVER, THE CARE AND ATTENTION WHICH HAVE BEEN' DEVOTED TO MINIMIZING THE.

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RISKS 0F NUCLEAR, POWER HAVE BEEN GREAT.

-THE REAL QUESTIONS ARE'-

NHAT-MORECANANDSHOULDBEDONE:TOREDUCETHE. RISKS?

I HOW CAN.WE-ASSURE THE NEEDED ACTIONS ARE IN FACT' CARRIED OUT?

1 ARE THELREMAINING RISKS WORTH THE-BENEFITS?

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DECISION 0M NUCIPAR POWER j

.NUCLEARtPOWER ISLDIFFIC' ULT:TO. DEAL WITH.. ~lT INVOLVES

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ENERGY -1A1 VITAL ELEMENT.INLOUR LIFE TODAY.

LIT INVOLVES

INDIVIDUALS'1 CONCERNS FOR THEMSELVES'AND THEIR-FAMILIES, AND IT

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LIS? A HIGHLY TECHNICAL, SOPHISTICATED : TECHNOLOGY.

ULTIMATELY,.

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1 THE DECISION AS TO WHETHER WE=WILL1HAVE NUCLEAR POWER IS A

' POLITICAL ONE - IN THE TRUE. SENSE 10F THELWORD

'THAT IS,JONE MADE BY-THE PEOPLE THROUGH=THEIR ELECTED-REPRESENTATIVES.-

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ESSENTIAL THAT THE DECISION BE MADE ON THE BASIS OF FACT, NOT RHETORIC, NOR CONJECTURE OR' HOPE,'OR AS A RESULT OF THE WIDE-H

SPREAD TENDENCY TO.SENSATIONALIZE-THE CURRENT TOPIC AND' IGNORE THE TRUE -LIMITS OR RISKS 0F THE ALTERNATIVES.

I AM NOT'AN EXPERT OR SPECIFICALLY KNOWLEDGEABLE ABOUT ENVIRONMENTAL. EFFECTS OF OTHER FORMS OF POWER GENERATION.

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.HOWEVER, I AM AWARE THAT KNOWLEDGEABLE PEOPLE HAVE CONCLUDED j

THAT THE TOTAL RISK INVOLVED IN THE USE OF NUCLEAR POWER IS NO

' GREATER THAN THAT OF ANY ALTERNATE SOURCE WHICH CAN BE TAPPED l

-IN THE NEXT FEW DECADES.

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ljREMEMBER THE OPTIMISTIC PROJECTIONS MADE FOR NUCLEAR POWER WHEN IT-WAS FIRST BEING DEVELOPED.

IHESE SPRANG FROM HOPE AND FROM: IGNORANCE OF THE ENGINEERING PROBLEMS THAT WOULD BE ENCOUNTERED IN'USING NUCLEAR POWER.

THERE IS NO REASON TO BELIEVE THAT CURRENT OPTI.MISTIC PROJECTIONS-FOR ALTERNATE MEANS x

0F PROVID'ING LARGE AMOUNTS OF. POWER'ARE MORE PRECISE. TODAY, MANY

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(THED. PROBLEMS.f0F: MINING,eTRANSPORTATION,'AND-SAFETYr :THOSE WHO.

ENV'ISIONlSOLAR'AND OTHER S0-CALLED " NATURAL"?S0bRCES.OFJENERGY)

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WITHO'UT;CONSIDERINGzTHEIRi!NHERENT LIMITATIUNS:'ANDlTHE DEMANDS ETHEY;MAKE ON OTHER RESOURCESL THOSE~WHO ADVOCATE EXPLOITATION ~

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-- 0FiSHALE OIL DEPOSITS 1WITHOUT MENTIONING THE VAST A' MOUNTS-0F' WATER 2 REQUIRED.

ANY LARGE-SCALE GENERATION'0F. POWER INVOLVES-

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MAJOR' ENGINEERING:DIFFICULTIESLAND POTENTIAL ENVIRONMENTAL IIMPACTS. !NUCLEARD POWER IS~NOT UNIQUE IN_THIS RESPECT.

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.YOUR' JOB I'S'NOT EASY.

I HOPE YOU WILL FIND'THE.' WISDOM qTO MAKE.THE RIGHT JUDGEMENTS AND RECOMMENDATIONS.

I ALSO HOFE

-THAT MY COMMENTSLWILL CONTRIBUTE TO YbuR DELIBERATIONS..

lN C' LOSING, I WANT T01 POINT OUT THE DEBT ~l OWE TO THE MANY, MANY, PEOPLE WHO HAVE SUPPORTEDLME AND1THE NAVAL NUCLEAR PROGRAM OVER:THE. YEARS'. l!!THOUT THE SUPPORT OF CONGRESS, PARTICULARLY e

L THE: JOINT COMMITTEE-ON ATOMIC-ENERGY, THERE WOULD NOT BE-A NUCLEAR NAVY AS'WE^KN,W IT'TODAY.-

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SIMILARLY,;.I HAVELBEEN'GIVEN-STRONG SUPPORT BY THE DEPART-l

.MENTf0F_ ENERGY AND*ITS' PREDECESSOR.-AGENCIES, THE. ENERGY-RESEARCH.

ANDTDEVELOPM5NT: ADMINISTRATION AND THE ATOMIC ENERGY COMMISSION.

20F{THOSE"IN.lTHE DEPARTMENTn0F ENERGY, I SHOULD MENTION

~ PARTICULA.RLY DR.?SCHLESINGER, DR,1DEUTCH, MR'.MYERS.AND MR.

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