ML19308C287
| ML19308C287 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Crane  |
| Issue date: | 02/26/1979 |
| From: | Lewis H AFFILIATION NOT ASSIGNED, HOUSE OF REP., INTERIOR & INSULAR AFFAIRS |
| To: | |
| References | |
| TASK-TF, TASK-TMR NUDOCS 8001220659 | |
| Download: ML19308C287 (6) | |
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TESTI40NY OF !!. W. LEWIS l
13EPORE THE SUBCO3ri1TTEE ON EllERGY AND THE ErNIRON:1ENT j
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OF **HE !!OUSE CO.'131ITTEE ON INTERIOR AND I!! SULAR APTAIRS TEDRUARY 26, 1979
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I am pleased to have the opportunity to appear before you,to f_
discuss the findings of our Risk Assessment Revicw Group, the response thereto of the' Nuclear Regulatory Commission, and other
. matte.rs of,nuelcar safety.
Nuclear safety is a complex issue, involving as it does difficult technical and social considerations, and is one in which some hold strong views.
Indeed, in.all too many cases, strong views serve as an easy substitute for knowledge.
If there is any one thing I will try to do in this testimony, it will be to sound a call for rationality in the handling of reactor safety matters, and to get us away front the' mode in which we simply vote on whether reactors are safe.
Though I would like to spend as much time as possible answering your questions, I have brought 's brief written statement which may perhaps serve to focus the discussion.
It seems to me that there are four matters that require special c=phasis.
They are 1.
Safety - what is it?
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WASH-1400 and RARG - what was found?
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Risk Assessment Methodology
.where do we go from here?
4.
Are reactors safe?
On the first and last of these items, although 'you know that i,
I was chairman of the American Physical Society study on Light-l Uater Reactor Safety and of the Risk Assessment Review Group, I wP.1 i
speak only for myself.
On the second and third, which are, in effect, our report, I,will do my best to speak for our group.
Obvious-ly, no one can do that perfectly, since each of us' gave a bit in 8001220 h[ [
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his personal vicws to produce a balancad report,.and~ unanimity is one of its strengths.
I will do nothing to dissipate that strength.
-First, safety, and I hope that you will allow me a few plati-tudes.
There is risk in nuclear power, just as there is risk in coal' power, hydroelectric power, and even in some more personal
, pleasurable activities.
IIndeed, as we will learn shortly' before "
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noon t.oday,' even the sun cannot be trusted as a source of power.)..
We do not seek to avoid risk, but only to avoid unnecessary risk, and at best to have soms meager understanding of the level of risk we are entertaining for perceived gain.
I make this trivial comment because so many discussions about nuclear power seem to have as a premise, spoken or unspoken, that the objective is zero risk.
It-albeit certainly saves a great deal of hard work to have such simple, unattainable, objectives, but it is intellectual sloth.
Presumably, a rational objective must be to understand the risk as best we can, s
and somEhow limit it to proportio'ns co:nensurate with the benefits It is a to be gained, and that' is the problem with nuclear power.
strange and unfamiliar technology in which the potential for disaster is great,,.so that it finds itself an easy target in the generally anti-technology temper of our times.
In summary, there is risk! and cur job is to understand and limit it.
Turning to the Risk Assessment Review Group, you know that it
- was set up in response to pressure from the chairman of this Committee.
Our' charter had tuo principal parts -- to clarify the achievements and limitations of WAS!!-1400, the Rasmussen' Report, and to recommend to the.1:ucicar Regulatory Commission whether and how such rish assess-ment nethodology can be incorporated into the regulatory process.
Though you have'our report, and know our conclusione, let me briefly encapsulate:them.
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a5v Teatimony cf H. W. L;wle First we concluded that the Ecactor Safety study was a conscien-tious and honest effort to quantify the risk and consequences of a reactor accident.
We concluded that, though it fell short of the mark, it was still the best singic available source of information We found that the methodology was sound, but that' on these matters.
the implementation of the methodology was imperfect for a number of reasons, among them an inability to adequately quantify common cause failures, an inadequate data' base, inadequate statistical techniques, We were able to find a number of places in which our view was etc.
that the treatment understated"the risk, and others in which it able to say which overstated the risk, and we were not, on balance, However, it was clear to us that the error bands.
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(a factor of five in either direction) greatly stated in the report
.Our conclu-understated the fragility of some of the calculations.
simply that the caleulations are considerably sion was, therefore, less certain than appeared to be the case at the time of the report, to some extent, Norm Rasmussen will agree with and I believe~that,
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It is important to emphasize that this does not this statement.
mean that' reactors are either more or less safe than was projected -
in that report, only that we are less sure of the conclusions.
Since this is such an important issue, it may be worth mentioning I think most of
,cxplicitly.some things we found on 2ither side.
us feel that the treatment of ATNS (Anticipated Transients Without d
. Scram) was nonconservative, as was the treatment of earthquakes an,
On the other side, there is perhaps, other common cause failures.
i a general conservative tone throughout the report, as would befit f
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tism,'not realism,
.a group drawn from a profession in which conserva is the order'of the day.
In addition, there was failure,throughout O
EDtimony Of II. U.
LewiO
- the report' thi al'lo4 'for conct'ructive human intervention during the
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cource of an, accident, simply because it is impossible to quantify.
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' As' individ$alh', 'I be'liev'e that each of us' has dif ferent views about-
'the relative importance of these factors, but we probEbly agree on.
t'he sign of each one.
Thus,'our conclusion.
1:onetheless, havinJ concluded that the methodology is sound and therefore holds great potential for making the subject of nuclear safety more rational, we strongly urged the Co=aission to work to infuse this methodology into its organism.
This should only be done, however, where the universe of disco'urse is sufficiently limited as to permit credible eniculations founded upon an adequate data base, and this carries with it the conclusion that the metho-dology cannot yet, if ever, be used to seek a final. absolute number for the probability of an accident.
There are many places within the Co=aission, in the orientation of the research program, in the allocation of inspection resources, in the definition of regulatory constraints, etc., in which a foundation based on credibic proba-s bilistic calculations is more sound than one based on that elusive item knowir as " engineering judgment.
We strongly urged the co=nis- -
sion to get cracking in that direction.
There are hopeful signs.
The Commission has spoken for itself on these points, an(' we can hardly fail to be gratified at the warm and constructive response our reco.m.cndations have had from them.
(When we began this job, we received from the Commission a commit-ment not to interfere with our deliberations -- a co=aitment they 1
honored -- but never thought to try to extract a co=nitment to obey our reco;;mendations.
That is a veicome bonus.)
1:ow allow me a few co=nents of my own.
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You askrd in your letter whether. I would recommend a new study, along the lines of WASH-1400.
My reco:=nendation would be negative, even though such a new effort would benefit from the four years of It would di: bate that' have followed. the issuance of the early one.
not b'c that much better (and I doubt that Norm Rasmussen vould volunteer to do the job), and it would be much better to use the rather sub-stantial amount of energy' and money that would be required to put the methodology to work where it can do the most good -- in assigning priorities within the NRC.
Though we didn't make an explicit recom-mendation on this point in our report, I believe the other members of
.our group feel as I do.
Now some truly personal comments.
Even though the Washington
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Post characterized ne a week ago as an " anti-nuclear-cult hero", I have to tell'you that I am pro-nuclear.
There are many reasons, but I generally feel' that the risk.is small, and that it is the potential
'for a l'drge and unfamiliar _ event that so ' frightens people that the risk tends to be exaggerated.
The demonstrated risk of coal mining, over oil (which seems frighteningly real to me the risk nf war these days), the risk (nay, fact) of a decline in our economy - all Further, of the three issues involved in the nuclear these are worse.
- I regard question - proliferation, waste disposal, and safety the second as trivially the first as insoluble, but controllable, soluble (technically) but as yet unsolved, and the third as in much Even on the safety issues, my better shape than the first two.
l (and I emphasize that others on our panel may well
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1 personal view hold different viewc) is that the conservative elements in UASH-1400 overbalance the nonconservative ones, and that, in particular, failure to account for constructive human response during the course e
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Testimeny of H. H. Lewis.-
of an acciden't is an omission which outweighs all others.
(As a Pilot, I often think of how aviation safety would look if we did an analysis which omitted the response or the pilot iri averting
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accidents.)
Even so, I believe there is'.a-Iong way -to go in bringing both rationality and credibility to reactor safety.
Ninally, and I am almost embarrassed to mention it, there really h an energy crisis, particularly acute in the mat'ter of petroleum.
It is worth noticing that if we had six or eight more nuclear power plants in the United Sta,tes (that is, the nucicar share of our eiectrical supply were to go from ten percent to twelve percent), that would absorb the shortfall in our petroleum in:perts
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cuased by the Iranian crisis.
If we had a healthy nuclear industry, we would not need to import oil at all.
It is worth some hard wo'rk to ' achieve that objective.
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