ML19308C188
| ML19308C188 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Crane  |
| Issue date: | 07/03/1979 |
| From: | Baroff J AFFILIATION NOT ASSIGNED |
| To: | Rogovin M NRC - NRC THREE MILE ISLAND TASK FORCE |
| References | |
| TASK-TF, TASK-TMR NUDOCS 8001210523 | |
| Download: ML19308C188 (5) | |
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7 Statement of James !!. Baroff Before the Subcommittee on Fossil & Nuclear Energy Research, Development & Demonstration of the llouse Committee on Science and Technology licaring on Three Mile Island Nuclear Power Plant Incident Submitted May 16, 1979 I am an independent energy consultant with offices at 715 8th Street,S.E., Washington, D.C.,
20003, and appreciate this opportunity to record my thoughts on the Three Mile Island nuclear accident.
In 1976, I wrote a report on the pros and cons of nuclear power, while serving as science adviser to the National Governors' Association (then called the National Governors' Conference, referred to hereinafter as NGA).
That report dealt with various issues of nuclear power such as economics, waste management, and power plant safety and was pre-pared in response to a request by several governors, who at that time were concerned about the States' role in nuclear power development.
That report contains a chapter on the safety of operation of a nuclear plant.
Although the governors ultimately decided not to publish the report, and treated it as a staff paper, certain controversial statements therein were discussed in' depth with the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) both in per. son'and via an exchange of letters.
One such point made in the repdrt, if heeded, might have prevented the situation which took place at Three Mile Island.
My purpose in coming forward in this way is to point out that the accident could have and.should have been anticipated and prevented.
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The NGA staff report pointed out that it was entirely within a nuclear reactor operator's control to induce a core meltdown by means jofuite simple steps.
Motivation for such a deed f
n;o could be sabotage or malicious intent, or could result from 1
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their standards for operator performance, to dedicate more g
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attention to the training of operators, and to establish periodic mental and physical testing, and to increase the surveillance of operator behavior.
One suggestion discussed, for example, was that when an emergency alarm went off at any plant, a duplicate alarm be sounded at the governor's designated state office and at the NRC.
That this recommen-dation should have been implemented seems obvious in retrospect.
My educational background is a Ph.D. in Physics (Johns Hopkins University, 1964) so I understand in principle how nuclear reactors and power plants operate.
The design of the safety backup systems are such that a single operator can override the automatic emergency core cooling' systems, and within a few hours an uncontrollable meltdown can occur.
I never felt and still feel that more nearly perfect " fail-safe" mechanisms are
-possible and desirable.
Again, these concerns were communicated
'to.the NRC in 1976.
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What.is needed, in my view, is for the human engineering of the conrol room of a nuclear plant to bear the sophistication given
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tosuchcomplicatedsystemsinaerospacesystemsEbbfsyEEems.
The type of thorough training undergone by the Naval officers who operate nuclear submarine reactors should be emulated in the commercial power setting.
Despite the incredible series of mechanical failures and human acts, the engineering system did " work", in the sense that there was no breach of containment and no serious radio-active release to the public.
When NRC directs as much effort to redesigning the human end of the system as has been devoted-to the hardware in the development of the safety systems, then it seems to me that nuclear power can look forward to a con-tinuing future without accidents of the nature of Three Mile Island.
I am lookin'g forward to the reports of this Committee, the President's Commission, and other inquiries into this accident, which will tell us e.xactly what took~ place in the control room of that reactor during the critical hours, what was the thinking and motivation of the operators in charge, and what were the l
. facts.
Only then can industry and government react 'with. counter-j me,asures.;to prevent similar near-misses in the future.
s.
In closing, there is one aspect of the accident which troubles me.
Imagine yourself as the operator of your automobile (in analogy to the operator at Three Mile Island).
You are i
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. speeding down a mountain road and find to your horror that the foot brake fails.
After a few terrifying moments of confusion, you remember to reach for the emergency hand brake (cooling system) and gingerly apply it.
To your relief, your nerves begin to settle as the speed decreases --- 50 ---
40 --- 30 --- and then you release the handbrake and head for the precipice.
Is this human error?
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Statement of James II. Baroff Before the Subcommittee on Fossil & Nuclear Energy Research, Development & Demonstration of the llouse Committee on Science and Technology licaring on Three Mile Island Nuclear Power Plant Incident Submitted May 16, 1979 I am an independent energy consultant with offices at 715 8th Street,S.E., Washington, D.C.,
20003, and appreciate this opportunity to record my thoughts on the Three Mile Island nuclear accident.
In 1976, I wrote a report on the pros and cons of nuclear power, while serving as science adviser to the National Governors' Association (then called the National 5
Governors' Conference, referred to hereinafter as NGA).
That report dealt with various issues of nuclear power such as economics, waste management, and power plant safety and was pre-pared in response to a request by several governors, who at that time were concerned about the States' role in nuclear power development.
That report contains a chapter on the safety of operation of a nuclear plant.
Although the governors ultimately decided not to publish the report, and treated it as a staff paper, certain controversial statements therein were discussed
'in depth with the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) both in
= - -
f person:and via an exchange of letters.
One such point made in the report, if heeded, might have prevented the situation which took place at Three Mile Island.
My purpose in coming forward in this way is to point out that the accident could havc"and.should have been anticipated and prevented.
890+2roS23 K-
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7 s,
. The NGA staff report pointed out that it was entirely within a nuclear reactor operator's control to induce a core meltdown 5
by means of quite simple steps.
Motivation for such a deed h[/
could b sabotage or malicious intent, or could result from 6
y m
pure human error.
The NGA report admonished NRC to improve p
Iud)d
',I s
'their standards for operator performance, to dddicate more k' Y a
UN attention to the training of operators, and to establish periodic mental and physical testing, and to increase the surveillance of operator behavior.
One suggestion discussed, for example, was that when an emergency alarm went off at any plant, a duplicate alarm be sounded at the governor's designated state office and at the NRC.
That this recommen-dation should have been implemented seems obvious in retrospect.
My educational background is a Ph.D. in Physics (Johns Hopkins University, 1964) so I understand in principle how nuclear reactors and power plants operate.
The design of the safety backup systems are such that a single operator can override the automatic emergency core cooling' systems, and within a few hours an uncontrollable meltdown can occur.
I never felt and still feel that more nearly perfect " fail-safe" mechanisms are l
-possible and desirable.
Again, these concerns were communicated l tor,the,NRC in 1976.
What.is needed, in my view, is for the human engineering of the conrol room of a nuclear plant to bear the sophistication given l
4 e
~~
~-
wn ~
w n
turnu p
e tosuchcomplicatedsystemsinaerospacesystemsSkbfsysEems.
The type of thorough training undergone by the Naval officers who operate nuclear submarine reactors should be emulated in the commercial power setting.
Despite the incredible series of mechanical failures and human acts, the engineering system did " work", in the sense that there was no breach of containment and no serious radio-active release to the public.
When NRC directs as much effort to redesigning the human end of the system as has been devoted to the hardware in the development of the safety systems, then it seems to me that nuclear power can look forward to a con-tinuing future without accidents of the nature of Three Mile Island.
I am lookin'g forward to the reports of this Committee, the President's Commission, and other inquiries into this accident, which will tell us exactly what took place in the control room of that reactor during the critical hours, what was the thinking and motivation of the operators in charge, and what were the
. facts.
Only then can industry and government react *w'ith. counter-me,asures;to prevent similar near-misses in the future.
u,' ', :-.
s In closing, there is one aspect of the accident which troubles me.
Imagine yourself as the operator of your automobile (in analogy to the operator at Three Mile Island).
You are t
k-
y speeding down a mountain road and find to your horror that
]
the foot brake fails.
After a few terrifying moments of confusion, you remember to reach for the emergency hand brake (cooling system) and gingerly apply it.
To your relief, your nerves begin to settle as the speed decreases --- 50 ---
40 --- 30 --- and then you release the handbrake and head for the precipice.
Is this human error?
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