ML19308C153

Nucleonics Article Describing AEC Response to Id Falls Accident in 1961

ML19308C153
Person / Time
Site:	Crane
Issue date:	02/28/1961
From:	NUCLEONICS WEEKS, MCGRAW-HILL, INC. PUBLICATION
To:
References
TASK-TF, TASK-TMR PR-610228, NUDOCS 8001210479
Download: ML19308C153 (1)

Text

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' t hich - school graduates j and ' had in ~the operation; the diflicult job strikingly different. Tbt is note- ?

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attended Anny or Navy specialist ni determining the condition of the worthy, as the mild-steel cylindrical 9

schools.- t reactor can be strm ture is not even classed as a more certainly, pursued more slowly,with refined equip. containment

c.

.I As soori as it was light-about 10 hours1.157407e-4 days <br />0.00278 hours <br />1.653439e-5 weeks <br />3.805e-6 months <br /> after the accident-AEC sent ment. As AEC Cencral Manager negative pressure, is not air tight: in.;

j up a plane with scintillation counters Alvin H. Luedecke told a nuct.romcs fact the 1959 SI 1 annual report re n'

but found no airbome radiation. A editor dispatched to Idaho Falls to complained of the winter heating 2 floor be-g chemicil analysis of sagebrush down. reimrt on the accident:

problem on the operating"not tight.

wind from the reactor building and "We had two first tasks: to recover cause the cargo doors were 3

I'g.jpl-highway traverses across U. S. Route the victims, and to assure ourselves fitting). Nevertheless it apparently,y

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20, % mi south of the SIrl site, that the reactor is in such a endition containM the release of radioactivity q showed quite negligible or no ground that it can't give us more trouble. from the ente so well that outside_itd,.

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i. b contamination. At 10:45 am AEC's ' I'm anxious for us to urderstand what on Jan. c 'ho Icvel in the control '

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Idaho Operations OEco. issued a f caused this accident and the Board room-in ti. idjacent building-was.,

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i. bulletin,saying it was ' safe for the is investigating that matter with a. only 1.15 rAr; 0.25-5 r/hr in most s,/

e y %"N public to travel on Route 20.3 '

' total' effort. But those two things. of the reactorTenclosure, and an p.g kh[ilF IIe.dth physics set up field head. ' came' fint. One job is now done.

average of 150 mr/hr around the yf j h simple perimeter of the 350-ft. square-on a-y/

quarters at the cro:.sroads of Route 20. The remaining one is no

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- y side endosure (sce page W.

2 with5 the. SI 1 access road. Late mat ter. We are not certain as to the i

? $., Wedn'esday evening a military team state of the reactor-the water level,-

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f 6vC working in relays succeded in recover.,for;etample, or the conditian of the

2. Emergency Organ.

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]b f b '. ing 'the ' body of the second victim,- core, or the integrity of the pressure Many of the best nuclear brains in M

% but,,it(was not untd 3 am' Monday vessel. Action that might seem at a the country flowed to Idaho Falls inA' R Q

7,', morningpfive days and 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br /> after gbnce to assure reactor safety might the hours after the saident, assigned.

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[Q.h 2recseled.MIt had been"Iodged in the, have no' reason to be volunteering-to help in rescue,M the accide'nt-that the third body was achially lead to more trouble. We t

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decontamination or investiption. '

y gf.uppec' structure of the reactor build (.is not safe at present-we want to be In charge of all post. accident oper-lj

j above the operating floor and certain it is safe.

W.

ations is Albn C. Johmon, manager.g

( q.( ? ing f'tif'above the top of the damaged. g"h

'l ?,i h W.direc It's vital.in a situation like this, of AEC's Idaho Operations -O!!iceg G ft h,; reactor, AEC said; a net had to be. witbe done,ger information and much to.,(IDO), workin jk.1'.Pfrom falling on the reactor.

{If mea

. extended beneath the lmdy.to l<eep it that we act with proper-repmting to Luedecke and Reactory d, ]Q Yet all urgency but not freyy.,- Everyone Development Director Frank K. Pitt j,

$ *ithis -hadtto be done by men whose

,is anxious to get the job done: it's man, both of whom were on the scene e 4 M

py In addition, three s ceial conun$

in Idaho Falls.

jy ' WQ.g. stay' in the building-where radiation essential that it bo done with deliber.

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- levels fwere.-1000 r/hr-was timed a tion. We've got to sit down and

.SO.,,with>R stopwatch. ' 'The direct re. ' think out each step."?

tees were named in t ie first wecki.Q

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L Combustion Engineering ofilcials a Board of Inquiry; a gmup to advise T.

'] f]. I'{.),; ? men,yywas accomplished iby eight vm i r s cover

- paired in quick-moving relays were clearly shocked by the develop-on technical aspects of decontamina 1,

O to avoid excessive radiation exposure," ment. They refused to specidate on tion and other operations at they h

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AEC said. "No two.rnan team was the cause of the explosion but said reactor; and an ad hoc panel to advise 4

h.,, semnds." ~

more ;than 05 they 'doubied it was related to the on futme use or dSposition of the'h j'

in the building corrosion of the boron strips attached SI,1. The three groups are headed q 3

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h The bodies were taken to decon-to the fuel elements.

"We, as opera-respectively by Curtis A.

Nebonc-W tors," they pointed out,' "tried to Director of AEC's Division of Inspec '..

f[I g tamination cells at the Chemied Proc-essing Plant as the force of the blast satisfy ourselves y$ p M had blown radioactive particulate ' adequate shut-down margin." They of health & safety,IDO; and i.L (For,ncmbers of cach, see p. 22.)

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materials into the bodies. For this ' abo confinned that the stainless-clad y h Q(,Q;',E Objectives of the Nelson Board of.

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! 9 reason no autopsies were made; how-Coro 2 design had been completed ever AEC announced that the death but that fabrication had not yet-Inquiry, as formulated by AEC, are:3}

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. begun'.

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'"1. Determine the nature and extente hq M (h1(, of the three men resulted from iealtinjuries sustained-that mu ti le The weekly operating' report for of the incident; ?_ detennine thd k3.j/ ?

,dQ,' injuries received at the instant of he SI,1 for the week of Dec. 0-13 gives muse of the incident; 3. deterremeT 1 ggg accident ' were.suilicient J to have. cumulative plant statistics from start. the responsibility:for the incic'entis-i 10 days before the plant was shu't

'4. determine corrective action at pmM of operations through Dec.13--only nd gr.b ' caused doth but the level of 'radia- ~

down routinely but, as events proved.. priate to minhnize sIg WCtion in the building would abo have j ]

hkproved fatal.' Radiation readings for incidents." 'lle Board met W

.m the first body brought out, AEC said, for the last time prior to' the accident. ~ around the clock during the werk of'y g.

400 'r at the The plant had operated 10,738 hours0.00854 days <br />0.205 hours <br />0.00122 weeks <br />2.80809e-4 months <br /> the accident, taking testimony fromQ

p, f Mig were/approximately:

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head; 100 r at feet; and 200-300 r - (as against 9,109 through Sept. 30); contractor, Army, AEC and technicalM H; # Cg over iemainder ' f body. fr : V,.

it had been at power 9.002 hr (8,0S0 consultant personnel, and reviewingM o

!!! M 7 ' T. ' observations relevant' Reactor Corklition. The taking of ' hr 'to Sept. 30); total Mwd /t was

't The technical advisory con hjM to fixing the 908.0 (747);- gross kwh generated tions.

passes on the safety an cause of the necident was' ham cred, 1,922,100.i(1,641,700); ' sinmlated mittee "g not only;b the almost prohi itive heat ' load,"3,0S9,600 (2,659,000); soundness of every proposed actierry j[% g radiation! !cvel.within the' reactor fuel humup in grams of U-235, at the reactor. 'The Pittman mmy the moral pres- ~ 1,144.8. (941); percent of core life mittee-like the other two a top-IcvelX M,1.Ug, budding, but also b 7,su e on recovering e victims

• bodies, expended, 39.5 (32.5).-

group-was namol at this time 'inVj order that it might now pose questions (;

i -(-ge with its attendant great emotional Hadiation Contained. The closest thing to a bright spot in the ' tragedy to the operatin group that mightj

4 y With the third victim re-

,Qju W@4/ stress.

f i e

Aftern was the fact that outside the reactorpg p vgi 1

. moved on Jan. 9,'. there came a

chp building the radiation picture was franun 1s est hk$s partial relaxation for the men involvedG.W 4..sMi.k.%:d M W,. %. [

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is note- ]5. I h' 'y

' % ghigWsShool graduatesbar$d1 had in 'the operation;- t$e discult 'obstrikingly differ'ent.' This O-attended Army or Navy? specialist. of determining the condition of the worthy, as the mi!d. steel cylindrical '.}

ff y, schools. ".

reactor can be pursued more slowly, structure is not even cbssed as a j i

d

. As soon as it was light-about 10 more certainly, with reEned equip. containment shell (it is not kept at a 3 i

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hours after the accident-AEC sent ment. As AEC Ceneral Afanager negative pressure, is not air. tight: in c 3 j

U up a plane with scintilbtion counters Alvin R. Luedecke told a m:cz.romcs fact the 1959 SI,1 annual report rf T

but found no airborne radiation. A editor dispatched to Idaho Falls to com lained of the winter heaing 4 chenucal analysis of sagebrush down-report on the accident:

prob $em on the operating fleur be-4 h

wind frorn the reactor building and "We had two first tasks: to recover cause the cargo doors were "not tight-4 y

y highway traverses across U. S. Route the victims, and to assure ourselves fitting"). Nevertheless it apparen 2

20, %. mi south of the SL-1 site, that the reactor is in such a condition contained the release of radioactivity M

[

h R. showed quite negligible or no ground that it can't give us more trouble. from the core so well that outsiddtdi L

L p : conbmim tion. At 10:45 am AEC's ' I'm anxious for us to understand what on Jan. 7, the level in the control. '

J h W WIdaho iOperations OEce : issued a caused this accident and the Board room-in the adjacent building-wasJ L

e $. bulletinisayinkon Route 20;3 '

is investigating that matter with a, only 1.15 r/hr; 0.25-5 r/hr in mostj 1

i it was Jsafe for the S h?" public to trave total ' effort. But those two things. of the reactor fenclosure, and an y "

j

?

, j h IIealth physics set up Eeld head ; came' Erst.. One job is now done.'

2 average of 156 mr/hr around the We are not certain as to the ' perimeter of the 3 L r 6 p. :

quarters at the crossroads of Route 20..The

f. '

with> the1SL-1 access road.

remaining one ' is no simple. '

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Late matter.

side enclosure (see page 19).

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4 Qfl Wednesday. evening a military team state of the reactor-the water level, s p

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['Mworkingia rclays succededia recover-l for enmple, or the condition of the 12. Emergency Organ.izat. ion y@L"M-'

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'ing'the' body of the second victim, n wre, or the integrity of the pressure hiaoy of the best nuclear brains in5 e

l b y

. but;itewas not until 3 am 'hfonday vessel. Action that might seem at a the country flowed to Idaho Falls in" i ! l/

morning-Eve days and 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br /> after glance to assure reactor safety might the hours after the accident, assigned 1

.i O ' the iicident-that the third body wasE 1 recovered.V,It had beenPlodged in the, have no lead actually We

--or volunteering-to help in rescue,-

2 3

reason to believe the reactor decontamination or investigationc M y

J 1

j j )h g ;upgr structure of the reactor build-.m ing 'above the operating Hoor and, is not safe at present-we w In charge of all post-accident oper

'ation*

• Allan C. Johnson, manager (s j

certain it is safe.

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g& reactor,i AEC said; p of the damaged.,."It's vital.in a situation like this, of AC's Idaho - Operations -Offic

.directly'above the to

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a net had to be with meager information and much to.,(IE0), working closely with and y

b, extended beneath the body.to keep it b c be done,. that we act with proper-reporting to Luede.cke and Reactor; 1 b yf.F 'from falling on the reactor. ; Yet all urgency but not frenzy. - Everyme Development Director Frank K. Pitt ~

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^ f kg this hadtto be done b men whose,is anxious to get the' job done. it'.

man. both cf whom were on the scene

-'i 3i I gj VQ :,J : stay in the building-w ers radiation essential that it be done with deliber. in Idaho Falls. '

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levels iwere.-1000 rbvas timed stion.. We've got to sit down and In addition, three lI h. d k.%

ecial commit ?

withJ lstopwatch. ' "The ' direct re- ' think out each step" tees were named in a

e first weeki e t 'J E, covery swas accomplished :by eight

- Combustion Engineering oBeials a Board of Inquiry; a group to advisef j; M. 7' ~ men, paired in quick-moving relay"s were clearly shocked by the develop-on technical aspects of decontamina 1! t f.I.r.

to avoid excesswe radiation exposure, ment. They refused to speculate on reactor; and an ad hoc panel to advis tion and other operations at the 0 h! t +ty

' AEC said. "No two-man team was the cause of the explosion but said d

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in the building more lthan 65 thEy doubt'ed it was related to the on future use or disposition of theN

', e lp g

secondsf corrosion of the boron strips attached SI 1.

The three groups are headed g FA N

The bodies were taken to decon-to the fuel elements "We, as opera-respectively by Curtis A. Nelson,4.

h 4

tamination cells at the Chemical Proc-tors,* they pointec out, "tried to Director of AEC's Division of Inspec

k -(I 7

h;, had - blown ii essing Plant as the force of the blast satisfy ourselves that there was always tion; C. Wayne Bills, deputy director r !4 gb,, materials into the bodies. radioactive particulate ~ adequate shut-down margin." They of 1.ealth & safety,

/ Ty For this 'also confirmed that the stainless-clad (For members of each, see p. 22-)~

(

< Q 41 fl. reason no autopsies were made; how-Core 2 design had been completed.

Objectives of the Nelson Board of.

inf h ever AEC announced that the death - but-that fabrication had not yet, Inquiry, as formuhted by AEC, are

$ y 4 '. %d of the three men resulted from ph s-begun'.

9

'"1. Determine the nature and extent

.M-Q,icallinjuries sustained-that' multi le 4The weekly operating ~ report for of 'the incident; 2. determine th g $pgaccident' were.suBeient C to"have cumuhtive plant statistics from start

{

finjuries received at the instant of SI 1 for the week of Dcc. 6-13 gives cause of the incident; 3. determine' e

the responsibility:for the incidenti

{ j,hcaused death but the level of radia. ' of operations through Dec.13--only

4. determine corrective action approe f

! su st :

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. tion in the building would also have 10 days before the phnt was shut 'priate to minimize or preclude simili)r W, proved fatal.' Radiation readings for down routinely but, as events proved,.. incidents." The Board met almost.

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sth' first body brought out, AEC said, for the last time prior to'the accident. ' around the clock during the week of' ~

e i

. M@. were.'approximately:. 400 r ' at the The phnt had operated'10,758 hours0.00877 days <br />0.211 hours <br />0.00125 weeks <br />2.88419e-4 months <br /> the accident, taking testimony i

i g

' head :100 r at feet; and 200 4 00 r - (as against 9,109 through Sept. 30); ~ contractor, Army, AEC and technical' i

N;p over remainder of body., V;

it had been at power 9,602 hr (8,086 consultant personnel, and reviewin h-

. ' Reactor Con'dition. The taking of ' hr 'to Sept. 30); total Alwd/t was 'information from the field investig g

observations relevant to -fixing the 908.6 (747); - gross kwh generated. tions. The technical advisory co.d y'y j

cause of the accident was' ham ered. 1,922,100. -(1,641,700);. ' simulated. mittee passes on the safety L an not onlyjby the almost-prohi itive heat load,"3,089,600 - (2,659,000); 1 soundness of every proposed actiotr r.

radiation # level avithin d

building, but also by the moral pres-the reactor - fuel ' burnup );in grams of U.235,.. at the reactor.

• The Pittman. come jp,,!

,g

~ 1,144.8 (941 percent'of core life.~.mittee-like the other two a top-le; s

a., ;.,u re on recovering the victims' bodies,. expended, 39.5 (32.5).

group-was named ~at this time 8 su d9%rwith its attendant great emotional

. Radiation Contained., The closest order that it might now pose questionshg q 3 %' ;istress. With the > third victim thing to a bright spot in the tragedy to the operating group that might.M k'r M. moved on Jan, 9,1 there re--

came a was the fact that outside the reactor affect the work of the btter. AIter"

$g;W.o ipartialrelaxation for the men involved building the radiation picture was framing such questions as it feelssi W...g

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February,1961 - NUCLEONI M-W

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