ML19308C141
| ML19308C141 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Crane  |
| Issue date: | 10/03/1979 |
| From: | Chipman G NRC - NRC THREE MILE ISLAND TASK FORCE |
| To: | Rogovin M NRC - NRC THREE MILE ISLAND TASK FORCE |
| References | |
| TASK-TF, TASK-TMR NUDOCS 8001210447 | |
| Download: ML19308C141 (4) | |
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OCT 3 1979 y
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MEMORANDUM FOR: Mitchell Rogovin, Db ector
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' r flRC/THI Special Inquiry Group
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FROM:
Gordon Chipman j
flRC/TMI Special Inquiry Group
SUBJECT:
VIDE 0 DOCU"EllTATION OF SIG FINDINGS-l i
As you know, we have contracted with Essex Corporation to assist the SIG-
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in evaluating Human Factors. As part of this contract, Essex is to provide a video tape of the first 150 minutes of the sequence of events in the mocked-up control room. This is being done to provide an analytical tool
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to Essex and to provide a visual record for possible us,e before other comittees (Congressional, etc.)._
Once the tape is completed, I expect there will be considerdble public and government interest and it could even receive national ~' news. coverage.
Sinde this is the only planned video presentation of the TMI. accident and it is unlikely that more than a select few will read much if any of the SIG written report I am concerned that the public and even our lawmakers will' never be fully exposed to our findings as expressed by the SIG.
Instead, they will rely on others to assimilate, interpret, and selectively communicate for i
them.
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A The production of a quality film would assure that a significant number of.
I people would get a fairly complete appreciat.jon for the accident and its impact. An appreciation for the time relationship of the sequence of:
events and the plant behavior can only be communicated by film with any l
expectation of significant understar. ding.
I recommend that serious con-:
l sideration be given to the production of such a film.' A first'cutN
.J suggested film cont.ent is attached.
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i The OIE considered a suggestion to make a film of the TMI-2 accident in.
April for the reasons stated above and as a possible training film. While7 no formal action has been taken on the suggestion, apparently it has.been rejected as an inappropriate staff function.
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made a similar suggestion in May.
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Through informal discussions, I have found ' considerable support for such'aq"" % ;
project among the SIG staff and management.
While Congress and the NRC~ f
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Comissioners have expressed concern over the expenditure of NRC funds.tof;;C,^.,'.W.'
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.$. GOVERNMENT PAINTING OFFICE: 1979489 369 -
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I OM 3M Mitchell Rogovin.
f produce films *, 'the existing unique 3 circumstances should justify such a 4
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".T project at this time. The Comission would need to be consulted in 'any a
such endeavor as' indicated 'in the Chairman's statement which is attached.' W.'
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Any meaningful effort in this regard would need to be initiated immediat'ely:
in order to complete before publishing the hard bound report. Depending V "' ff%f'
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range of $50,000 to $100,000.
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,3 ORIGINAL SIGNED BY:
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Gordon Chipman s
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SIG lluman Factors Task Force Attachments:
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- 1. Suggested Film Content l
- 2. Chairman's Statement -
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G. Frampton C
K. Cornell i
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- These concerns were expressed at the hearing on February 27, 1979, the Subcomittee on Energy and Power, in regard to an NRC film about the W.W.m'.,.
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tu.s. cOVERNMENT PRINitNG OFFICE: 1979-289-369
CHAIRMAN HENDRIE'S STATEMENT CONCERNING NRC FILMS *
"I think the Commission itself would like to know about any plans for such projects before they go forward, and have a chance to discuss them and understand the nature of the pre-sentation, and the context, and everything else...
I think there are several areas that one would want to do, and things that one would want to consider.
I think the first would be for the program office itself, the need and the apprgpriate-ness of the film, to sketch out^ exactly what it had in mind to the Exte5f'that they could put it down on paper, and then come in and discuss it with first the EDO, and then with the Commission.
I think in terms of the office that ought to do the film, if a film is going to be done, I think the Public Affairs Office needs to have a fairly strong part in the ac-tion, on the assumption-that the Public Affairs Office is to be sensitive to nuances of presentation and overall context.
On the other hand, the program office clearly has to know more details that they w s.',d like to explain.
I think'that it needs the combination, and not either one or the other.
I think that it would be important for the Public Affairs Office to have a strong handle on this matter."
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- February 27, 1979 hearings before the Subcommittee on Energy and Power.
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SUGGESTED FILM CONTENT Film (or video tape) summarizing the factual findings of SIG including:
1.
Summary' of accident sequence Include use of TMI CR and neck-up, animation of plant systems and pt ameters.
2.
Radiological releases and exposures Include footage of local area and residents, plume animation, exposure and health effects summary.
Significance of accident -
economic, radiological, and social.
3.
Emergency response of Utility, NRC, Federal, and State agencies Describe informati:n flow problems.
4.
Summarize major causal findings of SIG Inattention to precursors.
Lack of HF regulation and standards.
Poor emergency planning.
"mssible institutional difficulties.
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