ML19308C043
| ML19308C043 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Crane  |
| Issue date: | 01/07/1980 |
| From: | Harold Denton Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation |
| To: | Bucy H AFFILIATION NOT ASSIGNED |
| References | |
| NUDOCS 8001180075 | |
| Download: ML19308C043 (1) | |
Text
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January 7, 1980 Mr. Harry R. Bucy 550 North Brighton Avenue Burbank, CA 91506
Dear Mr. Bucy:
Your Ictter to President Carter suggesting ways to prevent or mitigate i
accidents like that which occurred at Three Mile Island Nuclear Station, Unit 2 was referred to this agency for response.
I apologize for not providing an answer to you sooner, but the Commission and staff have been occupied with continu3d support of the efforts at Three Mile Island, Orders to other facilities, appearances before the President's Commission and various committees of Congress that are investifating the Three Mile Island accident, and the realignment of our own resources and priorities to give immediate attention to the problems resulting from the accident.
We are continuing to review, carefully, all the information obtained and developed as a result of the Three Mile Island accident and will reevaluate our requirements in light of our findings. Your suggestions regarding the incorporation of " dead man" fail safe controls into nuclear power plant designs will be considered in this effort.
Thank you for your interest and contribution.
Sincerely, M
liarold R. Denton, Director Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation l
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'ID HIE PRESIDENT OF MIE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA DEAR MR. PRESIDENT CARTER :
THIS LETTER CONCERNS DIE FAIL SAFE OPERATION OF MIE NUCLEAR, ELECTRIC GENERATING PLAMPS, REFERANCE THE 3 MILE ISLAND NUC EAR FACILITY.
FIRST FORGIVE THE FORMAT OF UlIS LETTER, AS IT WILL BE PRINTED BY MY COMPlTTER. AISO FORGIVE SOME MISSPELLED WORDS, IT HAS BEEN A LONG TIME SINCE I flAVE TACKLED A LETTER. I MIGliT INCLUDE, AND NEVER 'IO A PRESIDENT OF MIE U.S.A.
MY COMPlTTER PRINT OLTP IS FORMATTED FOR DATA, N7P LET. TER WRITING.
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UlE MISilAP OF HIE 3 MIG ISLAND FACILITY, PROBABLY DUE TO ALL OF THE i
NEWS CARRIED ON TELEVISION, ATTRACTED MY ATTENTION & I DECIDED TO LOOK DEEPER l
l INTO IT. HIE KNOWLEDGE TilAT I ACCRUED C04CERNING PNUEMATICS, HYDRAULICS, TEMP-CONTROLS, & ENVIRONMENTAL CONTROL FOR REMOTE CONTROLLED VALVES-FROM OPERATING MY BUSINESS SUCCESSFULLY, LED ME 'IO BELIEVE THAT SOMEmiING WAS TO FAR OUT OF WILACK. DIAT IS FOR ALL OF 'nIE BRAIN 'UlUST MIAT WAS SUPPOSED 'ID BE INVOLVED.
SURE ENOUGli MIE DEEPER I WD4T HIE MORE I BECAME C04VINCED TRAT WHAT HAPPENED, Sil3ULD NOT HAVE BEEN POSSIBLE TO HAPPEN. MIE LOS A!CELES TIMES HAD e
A VERY OVER SIMPLIFIED DRAWING OF A NUC2AR GENERATING PIAVf THAT WOKE ME UP
'ID A VERY STARTLING FACT. BlIS WAS 31AT I WAS U10 ROUGHLY ACGUAINTED WITH ALL 1
AT ALL. SINCE I IN ACQUAINTED WITil DEAD TW1 CONTR3LS, I BECAME AFPALLED AT DIE IACK OF DlIS TYPE OF EQUIPMDff, 04 DIE LINE AT DIE 3 MILE ISIAND FACILITY.
IF IT liAD BEEN ON DIE LINE DlIS EPISODE WOULD HAVE BEEN S'IOPPED SIDRT AND j
1 NOT llAVE GONE SO FAR. IN FACT IT COULD NOT HAVE GJITEN PAST IST BASE. THE FACT DIAT IT DID, LENDS CREDENCE DIAT SOMEnlING IS MISSING. IT AISO LLT ME TRACE DIE MISSING DEAD MAN FAIL SAFE C04 TROLLS EASILY, AS EACH EPISODE UN-FOLDED. DIE EPISODE OF DIE STEAM BUBBE THAT PUSHED Tile WATER IN THE REACT-OR PRESSURE CHAMBER DOWN & CAUSED SOME OF DIE FUEL RODS 'IO MELT OR BURST.
WHEN TilIS IIAPPENED IT LET RAW FUEL PELLETS ESCAPE INTO THE REACIDR COOLING WATER OR FWID. 'IEE REASON I MD4TIONED FWID IS BD'AUSE I HAVE SO4E REASON i
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'ID BELIEVE THE WATER CONTAINS AN AIDITIVE DIAT HELPS 'IO DETER DIE WATER i
FR04 TURNING 'IO STEAM, BEYOND JUST DIE PRESSURE APPLIED ON THE WATER. PRESS-f AIDNE CAN ACCOMMODATE THIS FEAT. HOWEVER AN AEDITIVE THAT WOULD INCREASE DIE MARGIN OF 'IOLERANCE WOULD BE HIGHLY DESIREABLE.
DIE PROBEM ENCOUNTERED WIDI DEPLETING DIE STEAM BUBBLE CREATED BY THE PRESSURE DROP IN DIE REACIOR, DIE SPEED IN WHICH DIE FOLLOWING RUP'IURE OF DIE FUEL RODS 'IDOK PLACE & DIE FOLIDWING FORMATION OF DIE HYDROGEN BUBBG EMPHAS-SIZE DIE FACT UlIS IS NOT A DlING 'IO FOOL AROUND WITH. IT AISO EMPHASIZED THE FACT 'IRAT IT IS FAR 'IO RISKY, IN LIEU OF BIE EXTERT OF DIE POSSIBLE DISSAS-
'IOR, 'IO CONTINUE 'IO OPERATE NUCEAR FACILITIES, WIDIOUT DIE DEAD MAN FAIL
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..s.w RESULTS OF A frJMAN ERROR & PREVENT IT FR34 BEC04ItG A BIG CAUJ4ITY.
DIERFOR I AM CONVINCED THAT YOU ARE SI'I' RING ON A TIME BOMB UMT w
CAN GO OFF AT ANY TIME IN ANY OF DIE NUCEAR FACILITIES REXWIDLESS OF WHO w
DESIGNED OR BUILT DIEM. DIE REASONING INVOLVED IN THIS STATEMENT IS, IF AW OF DE NUCEAR FACILITIES IIAD DIE DEAD MAN FAIL SAFE C060LLS DEY ALL WOULD.
EXCEPT FOR DIE FACT DE REACMR CAN NOT BE SH'Jr DOWN UNTIL DIE FUEL CONTAMINATION IN DIE REAC'IOR FLUID IMS BEEN BURNT OUP & STOPS PRODUCING llEAT ABOVE Tile NORMAL BOILING POINT OF WATER OR A EMFE POINT BELON, & UIE RE-AC'IOR PRESSURE VESSEL HAS A NUCEAR REAC'IOR INSIDE OF IT, DIE OPERATION OF TIE FACILITY COULD BE TERMED RADIER NORMAL. FOR COOLING PURPOSES TIE REAC-TOR PRESSURE VESSEL MUST BE MAINTAINED COMPLETELY FULL OF COOLING LIGUID &
S1100LD NEVER IMVE A STEAM BUBBE FJRM.(UlIS IS NO PROBEM AT ALL FOR DEAD MAN CONTROLL SYSTEMS. IT WOULD BE UI'rERLY IMPOSSIDE FOR STEAM 'IO COLLECT BECAUSE IT WOUID INSTAVfLY BE BLED OFF, MEN TilERE ARE NUMEROUS WAYS OF DISPOSING OF BIE STEAM DIAT WILL BE SAFE.)IT IS RADIER HARD 'IO BELIEVE THAT ANYONE COUID IMVE TIE CREDIBILITY OF BEING ABE 'IO DESIGN A CIDSED HYDRAULIC SYSTEM SUCH AS DIE REACTOR SYSTEM, AND NOT HAVE AN AUTOMATIC BEED OFF DESIGNED INTO THE SYSTEM TO TAKE CARE OF UlIS PROBABILITY, ESPECIALLY IN A SITUATION WHERE DIE GAS OR STEAM BUBB E CAN HAVE SUCH A DISASTEROUS AFFECT, AS THE REACTOR VESSEL.
AS MENTIONED BEFORE DE REAC'IOR PRESSURE VESSEL SYSTEM IS ACDJALLY A
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SPECIAL GAS IN DIE TOP 1/3 OF IT. VIE GAS IS USED M ACC040DATE Tile EXPANSION OF TIE FWID AS IT IS HEATED UP. 'IllE PRESSURE CAN BE CIDSELY CarIROLLED BY EITHER VENTING SOME OF E!E GAS OR AIDING GAS. IT WAS THE TANK 'IllAT DIE GAS NORMALLY VDfrS INTO DLAT RUPWRED & CAUSED DIE IIIGli RADIATION LEVEL IN DIE BUILDING. 'IllE CAUSE WAS FWID IN DIE R4UEMATIC LINE DIAT GUT I!fr0 MIE VALVE PARTIALLY CHA!GING ITS TIMING FROM RJUEMATIC 'IO HYDRAULIC ACTION WHICH SIDWED Tile VALVES CIDSIPTJ CYCIE & CAUSED 'IO MUCil HIGil PRESUTE GAS 'IO BE VErfrED Ilfr0 Tile StMP TANK (OR CNICil TANK). SINCE 'IllIS TYPE OF TANK IS NJr MEAtfr 'IO BE A PRESSURE VESSEL, IT WON'T NORMALLY TAKE MUCH PRESSURE 'IO RU17TURE IT. UlIS IS EVIDDirLY WilAT llAPPENED, SPILLING ITS C04 TENTS 04 MIE FIDOR OF HIE REACTOR BUILDING. 'IllIS IS 'IllE PRIMARY CAUSE OF DIE IIIGH RADIATION LEVEL IN BUILDItG.
VIE WATER OR FWID (CONDENSATE OR UrflER WISE) TilAT WAS IN Tile PNUE-MATIC LINE, THAT CAUSED TliE TIMItG MALFUNCTION OF DIE R4UEMATIC VALVE, IS A COMM01 PROBLEM WITil R4UEMATICS. 'IllIS PROBLEM IKMEVER IS AN EASY ONE 'IO TAKE CARE OF, WHEN YOU KNOW 110W. MY WAY OF SOLVING THIS PROBLEM, WILL SUS-TAIN AN ABSOLlTTE REQUIREMDTP OF AlliOST ANY'111ING TilAT YOU DESIRE AT DIE VALVE.
AN NIMOSPilERE COMPLETELY VOID OF MOISVJRE IS AMCNG THE EASIEST FOR ME 'IO MAIN-l TAIN AS A CONSTAtfr ENVIRONMDir.
'IllE FIVE UlINGS 'IllAT STAND Olfr MIE MOST IN nlIS INCIDDir ARE, DIE MOISTURE OR C0fDENSED WATER IN 'IllE R4UD4ATIC LINES, 'lilE StDDEN IDSS OF 'IO
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. ' TO CIDSE 'IllE VALVE IN TIME)CAUSItG UlE STEAM BU3BLE 'ID FORM, NO ABILITY 'ID BLEED DIE STEAM BUBBIE OFF IN TIME 'ID PREVE?fl' OVERilEATItG & RUPTURE OF 111E EXPOSED FUEL RODS, DIE 'ACK OF DIE DEAD MAN CCNWOLL THAT WOULD IMVE SMPPED 'IllE IDSS OF PRESSURE BEFmE IT ILAD DROPPED TO DIE POItfI' WilERE WATER COULD CilA?GE 'ID STEAM IN 'ITIE REACIDR VESSEL. DIE IAST IS 'IllE CLINCilER-THE USE OF MANUAL ON/OFF VALVES IN THE DifRGENCY COOLING SYSTEM. BlIS IS AN ABSO-LWE NO-NO IN A FAIL SAFE SYSTEM. BlIS IS ACWAILY IDOKED UPON AS BREEDING llUMAN ERRORS & SELF DEFEATItG IN A FAIL SAFE SYSTEM.
MY KNOWLEDGE AND EXPERIENCE WI'I11 HEAT, PRESSURE, ilYDRAULICS, STEAM &
l PNUEMATICS, AFFORDS ME TO KNOW PRETTY WELL WIRT HAPPENED & IN JUST ABOW DIE L"A"I' CilAIN OF EVEfflS UMT IT OCCURRED.
'IllE REST OF DIE APPARRATUS IS SOMEWIMT STANDARD. UlIS IS NW 'ID SAY TIMT A FEW MORE DEAD MAN CONTROLS WILL NW BE NECESSARY 'IV INSURE THE REST OF Tile OPERATION IS FAIL SAFE. IF 'I1lE COOLING SYSTEM FCR REAC1DR COOLItG FWID Sil00LD FAIL VMT WOULD BE 'IllE END. HOWEVER I WOULD BE WILLING 'ID BET DIEY IMVE A STAND BY. WE !! EAT FROM DIE REACIDR IS DISSIPATED Iffr0 THE COOLING FWID, hilICH IS CIRCULATED TiiRU A ilEAT EXCIMfGER (KN0l*4 AS A STEAM GENERA 1DR IN DiIS CASE) TilEN BACK Itfr0 'IllE REACIOR. DIE STEAM GENERATED BY COOLING 'I11E REACIOR FWID DIEN DRIVES A STEAM WRBINE DMT DRIVES DIE ELECIRICITY GENER-A'IDR. DIE STEAM IS RECAPIURED WHEN IT IS EXilAUSTED FROM VIE 1URBINE & DIE
liEAT ECilMCER WOULD BE KN3iN AS A CONDEMSOR & IS COOLED WITil COLD WATER FR34 A RIVER OR DIE OCEAN. MERE IS ONE MORE ITEM WHICil WAS DESCRIBED EARLIER AS BEING A DEAD ACCLNUIATOR. IT IS ACTUALLY A IHUEMATIC ACCLNULA'IDR BtTT TERMED DEAD BDCAUSE FWID IS NW EXCIMNGED. DE PRESSURE DEFINES HOW IDr DEY CAN RtN THE REACIDRS COOLING FWID & N7f HAVE IT PRODUCE STEAM. MIE PNUEMATIC ACCIN-ULA'IOR'S PURPOSE IS 'IO ALIDW AIUUSTMDfr OF PRESSURE UP OR DOWN & 'IU HOLD THE PRESURE CCNS" ANT & SMOMH. DE HEAT EXCHAFCERS & DE PNUEMATIC ACCLMULA'IDR IS l
t N0r!!ING NEW, HIESE TECINIQUES HAVE BEEN AROUND FOR YEARS.
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llON EVER DIAT DOES NOT SAY THEY ARE NOT DANGEROUS IF N7F HANDLED CORRECTLY.
IT WAS BOILERS & PNUEMATIC ACCLNULA'IORS DIAT INTRODUCED ME 'IO TEE NEED &
DEPD;DABILITY OF HE DEAD MAN CCNTROLI-S 'ID ELIMINATE THE IMZARDS OF VALVES i
THAT DEPEND ON MAN MADE FLNCTION3 'IO OPERATE THEM.
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SORRY FOR WIE LDGTH OF DlIS IEPTER, I DIDN'T KN3V llOW 'ID SAY IT IN FEW i
l WORDS. OF COURSE HIIS IS ONLY MEANT 'IO BE, AN OVER SIMPLIFIED VERSION OF DIE REAL T!!ING, ONLY HITTING THE HIGH SPUIS AND TilEN AS BRIEFLY & AS SIMPLE AS I COULD. THE MAIN OBJECTIVE WAS 'IU LET YOU DETERMINE FOR YOURSELF, HIE ACCURACY OF DIE ROUGH FLNDAMENTAIS OF DE NUCIIAR FACILITIES. DE DISCRIFFION IS BAS-ICALLY THAT A NUCIEAR REACIDR CREATES DE HEAT DIAT CREATES DE STEAM REQUIR-ED 'IO OPERATE A 'IURBINE TIMT RtNS & ELECIRICITY GENERA'IDR.
I KN3V I AM NOT ONE OF YOUR ADVISERS, IUVEVER I KNOW DMT I AM OFFERING TFT5! FsWK5?I6TA 1%9 N UtfrIL
TilEY GET SO4E DEAD fWJ FAIL EAFE CarrROLLS 04 TilEM.!!!!
I WAN*r 'IO EXTRESS MYSELF VERY CIIARLY WilEN DESCRIBItG MIE DEAD MAN FAIL SAFE TYPE OF CONTROLL. DIEY ARE MEAfff TO BE BACK UP CONTROLLS nlE FINCTION-ING CHARACTERISTICS ARE GOVERNED BY NATURE & UIE IAWS OF PHYSCHICS.'IllE TIMItG OF 'I11ERE POINT OF TAKEOVER, FOR 'IllIS APPLICATION MUST BE AIlJUSTABLE.' liley WILL BE SET JUST BELOW 'IllE OPERATING 'IOLERANCE OF DIE NORMAL OPERATING VALVES Bttr ABOVE 'IllE POIrff OF 'I1100B2. MIE COMPtfrER S1100LD CHECK Otfr & KEEP TABS ON THE SETTING, 'IO ELIMINATE 'IllE POSSIBILITY OF TAMPERING,-HOWEVER 'IllE COMPtfrER S!!OULD N7T BE USED OR llAVE MIE CAPABILITY OF CilAtGING 'IllE SETTING. 'IllE DEAD MAN FAIL SAFE CCNTROLLS S1100LD BE SEAIID AWAY SO ONLY QUALIFIED PERSONAL CAN llAVE ACCESS 'IO '111EM. 'IllESE C04 TROLLS CAN BE MADE 'IO BRItG & OEk7ECT 'IO A SAFE STOP-OR KEEP A PLAffr RtNNING SAFELY WHEN ALL ELSE FAILS & WILL ItirER-CEDE WIIEN A IPJMAN ERROR EXISTS TilAT WOULD Ptfr THE SYSTEM IN'IO DMGER.
MR. PRESIDENT I 'IllIED VERY liARD 'IO END 'IllIS LETTER AT 'IllIS POINT. Blff IT IDOKS LIKE I WILL FAIL, & C04SEQUFRTLY StEJECT MYSELF 'IO DOING SO4E VERY SERIOUS NO NDE'S IN LETTER WRITItG. MIEIR ARE 'I11REE LITTLE WORDS 'IllAT SHOULD BE AVOIDED IF AT ALL POSSIBII. I AM N7f AF11 AID OF GETTItG EGG ON MY FACE, AS I KNOW 'IllAT I AM CAPABLE OF PROVI!G MY STATEMD4TS. BLTP SINCE I AM AWAPI TRAT ALL OF WilICH I SPEAK IS NOT COMMCN KNOWLEDGE TAUGilT IN BOOKS & COLLEGES.
MY METHOD OF ELIMINATING MOISTURE IN R4UEMATIC LINES IN CIDSE PROXIMITY OF A VALVE FG104E. IGWEVER IT IS HARD FOR ME 'IO COMPREHEND 'IllAT KNOWLEDGE OF
Tile DEAD fWJ FAIL SAFE CONTROLLS, IS NOT A IDT MJ1E CO'.OALY iWhN. TalEREFOR IT IS *IN MY OPINION AT LEAST" DMT AN AIAR4ING AMOU'JT OF ?=BIR!K=? HAS BEEN
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DISPLAYED IN DIE DGINEERItG DRT SET UP Tile 3 MILE ISIAND 7ACILLITY. ElIS HAS BEEN REVEAED IN A SERIES OF CIRCLMSTANCES DIAT OCCURRED DMT SHOULD llAVE BEEN IMPOSSIBE 'IO HAVE IMPPENED. DIE FACT DIAT HIE N.R.C. GAVE IT'S APPROVAL FOR DIE PIAVT 'IO START OPERATION, DISPLAYS DIE FACT DIAT DlIS ?=BIANK=? EX-TENDS BEYOND DIE DGINEERS UMT DESIGNED THE PIANT. DIE STATEMDfrS MADE BY A NUCEAR SCIDfrIST ON WALTER KRONKITES NEWS PROGRAM, DIAT DIE PIAvr WAS OPER-ATIONAL WITHIN DIE CAlfULATED RISK AREA, IS APPALLING. FOR nlIS STATEMDJT 'IO BE MADE BY f. PERSON DMT IS SUPPOSEDLY QUALIFIED BY A TITLE OF NUCEAR PHYS-ACIST IS SilEAR ?=BIANK=?. MAYBE I SHOULD FEEL SORRY FOR THE GUY & KRCNKITE &
Sil'JT UP.
DIE LEAST HE MIGilT HAVE DONE, WOULD BE 'IO ASK IF THERE WAS ANY PERSON IN THE IMTION UMT BELIEVED HE COULD DO A BETTER JOB OF IT, 'IO STEP FORWARD & BE HEARD. THIS IS WIMT llAPPENS I GUESS WHEN BIG BRAINS GET OVER CCNFIDENT & EXPOSE THEMSEVES IN A FIELD FOREIGN 'IO THEIR EXPERTICE.
MY AIARM IS GROWING IN LEAPS & BOUNDS HJWEVER, WHEN THE GOVT. GETS IN'IO DIE PICTURE (N.R.C.) & WITH ALL OF IT'S PRESTIGE, DISPLAYS DIE SAME DEGREE OF ?=BIANK=?, BY ISSUEING A PERMIT FOR DlIS FACILITY 'IO BEGIN OPERAT-ING. DIERE IS NOBODY WIni ANY KNOWLEDGE OF SIMPLE HYDRAULICS THAT WOULD BUY A SYSTD4 DMT CONTAINED A PRESSURE VESSEL,DIAT MUST FLNCTION AS A SOLID HY-DRAULIC LNIT,INSIDE OF CIDSED SYSTEM CONTROLLED BY A DEAD PNUEMATIC ACCLM-
,' WOULD INSURE MMT IT WOULD REMAIN IN A SOLID STATE AT ALL TIMES, REGARDLESS OF h1MT IMPPENED. 'nlIS ONE LITTLE STATEMDfr "IN MY OPINION" SAYS Tile N.R.C.
1 COOFED VERY BADLY. IT AISO MAKES ME WCNDER IF 'lllE N.R.C. IIAS 'IllE ABILITY &
'111E EXPERTICE 'ID JUDGE WHEN A NUCLFAR FACILITY IS REASONABLY SAFE 'ID OPERATE OR WilETHER IT HAS SERIOUS DEFELTS AND SHOULD NOT BE PERMI'ITED 'ID START UP OPERATIONS. 'lllERE ARE AT LEAST 3 VERY SERIOUS DEFECTS IN THIS PIRTP TilAT ARE SERIOUS ENOUGli 'ID EVEN S'IDP A MORE NORMAL COAL OR GAS FIRED OPERATION. PtTP TilESE IN A NUCEAR FACILITY & YOU HAVE A POTENTIAL Fm A VERY SERIOUS DISAS-TOR.
IT WAS CCNTENDING WITil DEFECTS SUCH AS A MANUAL VALVE IN A LINE, 'IllAT FOR ANY REASON COULD BE LEFT OFF, COULD CAUSE A BOILER 'ID BIDWUP, 'I1MT I?TTRO-DUCED ME 'ID A SYSTEM KNOWN AS 'IllE DEAD MAN CONTROLL SYSTEM. WHEN TiiESE RULES ARE APPLIED TilIS VALVE MUST HAVE A BY PASS. 'IllE BYPASS WILL OPEN ONLY IF Tile FEED WATER FAILS 'ID BE DELIVERED DIRU DIE MANUAL VALVE,DIUS CAUSING 'IllE SYS-TEM 'ID BE ENDANGERED. IT IS NO WONDER TIRT 'IliF RUSSIANS SAY "NYLT" TO OUR l
SUPPOSEDLY WONDERFULL AMEIIICAN TDCHNOUXiY.
l Tile COTTROLLS I MENTIONED ARE POSSIBIE & AVAILABLE NOV, BtTP NOT IN EVERY C mNER DRLE S'IORE YET.
(LIKE THE COGRESS WOULD LIKE 'ID IRVE THEM)
WELL MR. PRESIDErff I HAVE SPOKE MY MIND, & NOW ALL 'I1MT IS LEFT 'ID SAY IS 'IllE BEST OF IDCK & HEALD1 'IU YOU. (EVR ALL US CITIZENS)
'IllE COST OF BRItGING ONE OF 'liiESE FACILITIES Itfr0 A FAIL SAFE CCND-6
AFTER 04E OF DIESE MISRAPS. AND FOR NEW PLWrS STILL TO BE BUILT, DIE COST SMALLER YET. IT IS C04CEIVEABIE THAT 'nlE FAIL SAFE OPERATION OF DIE PLA!GS MIGHT EVEN REDUCE THE COST OF BRAND NEW FACILITIES E!GINEERING & CCNSTRUCTION l
COGTS.
9 RESPECTFULLY YOUR'S
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adV HARRY R. BUCY
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l 550 N. BRIGifION KVE BURBANK, CALIFORNIA 91506 (TP) 1 213 849 2749 I
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