ML19308B859
| ML19308B859 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Crane  |
| Issue date: | 10/29/1979 |
| From: | Steiger J NATIONAL ACADEMY OF PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION |
| To: | Lynch O NRC - NRC THREE MILE ISLAND TASK FORCE |
| References | |
| TASK-TF, TASK-TMR NUDOCS 8001170460 | |
| Download: ML19308B859 (9) | |
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NATION.\\l, INSTITtTE OF l'I'lli.lC AFFAIRS 3 223 connccu<vi Aicm.c. N.w.. wa~huston arc. 2aw>
i fx teoenmoim October 29, 1979 j
l Oliver D.
T.
Lynch, JR.
Special Inquiry Group Building AR 400 gd-.
C/0 The Nuclear Regulatory Commission
{u,T!g
'7 :..e Washington, D.
C.
20055 s.
W.1Wi Dear Olivers l&
Many thanks for giving us such a generous amount of yohr time last week.
It was I
very signific nt material and we are most r
appreciative.
Would you please read the short enclosed L
draft for factual errors and/or any inadvertent misrepresentation f the system?
Additions are, of course, als
- welcome, i
Our deadline is upon s and we need corrected
(
copy by November 2, so please just phone us your comments.
Either can Levin or I can be reached at 223-6 74 a d either one of (O) us can make the nee d c anges.
xd
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Kind regards, and again, t anks.
y i
J et Steiger
/
Research Associate i
i Amilated with the Nauonal Academy of Public Adm>mtstratJon Q '-
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i Nevada Nuclear Peaponc Test Orranization
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t While the hazardous substances plan is one of the fcu " live" models of a totally coordinated emergency response plan, two other relevant models exist for on-site emergency managenent.
The Nevada 'Juclear lie n Test Organization fer fes hng may be the cost pertinent, in spite of the fact such tests 7 preplanned.
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Test Controllers.h&VC-had to deal with the sane basic problen of tr-diite deternina-o cars e ; cx(MM<&
pe< ou g
tion of threat to public health and fety fa<ed in a nuclear plant accident and y'u L;.,/ /u er s
, -.o
.. t.cn 6 s.-
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- f ully equipped to do sv.
The Mine Safety and llealth Administration plan is g
particularly relevant for its clearly defined chain of co.amand, advance provi-sions for deployment of resources, and applicability to nultiple sites.
a rt-m Uhile specific details of tests..'
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'.,m cnm ru :1, o.
classified, test experts were able to detail the significant elements of organi-sational philosophy and nanagement. The two key provisions are the conmand fed operr~bt (e to-structure and the actual physical cr i.ml,roon arrangement peraitting immediate access to all necessary information.
Command and Control T3s Y
^
The Nevada coat-rel Wrganization existed only for the duration of a test, and carried on other duties before and after test periods. Total control during and following a test rested with the Test Controller,
-11y a high level Department of Energy employee with long job experience, technical skill, and Mo%fraded
^ decision-making capability.
(Diagram 2)
So complete was his authority that #
head ta h of Lasik p c-6e-m b 6 e M ch u he did nob Mave 40 mig. urx.m t
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- LL-. ~l;c.uly in the event of an evr3ency.
"The problen was his baby,"
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according to an experienced tcet - neeber.
"No one overrode his decision "
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D Environgnental Protection Ager.r. ?
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(Off-site radiation protectiv a
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nadi'dAI Advisor u
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Test Director (Device exrk2tt)
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_2-355 The Controller, whose job was filled on a rotation basis by one of four
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or five, DOE personnel, was supported by a four-aan advisary e e an Environmental Protection Agency expert to assist indeterminatioj
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s.g Qr of off-site s'onsequences of a radiological release; f) g j
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e--a-physicisn with uap+rtice in rsd 5 tier con >c,ucnccc 2dvi M m. th_
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J wkt4ve-eeri t s u f.m L iv uo to be tden f-r publ!^
et; el w, e;^c
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-and imrdiet4cn of milk supplics; wod'
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e a National Oceanographic and Atmospheric Administration meteorologigt to ctdmte en we ho-o %,cd c:fods wo dcx/depos. ho.W provide camputatiere nf n1"-e path 'nd speed;
%en 4. 9c. 4htstn A t ov<- Thur A41*t* *v *rW eu daice c:ge rt, *the man-who knew the M.' At Nevada, this slot was M
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delces&-
filled by a technician affiliated with the laboratory c t-
- the3 device.
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(For nuclear plant crisis management, a reactor expert would be required, most hip lc<<f probably a high ranking tecgleora +org +ecka' cia.,iticianfromthereactorvendor,.J.
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eo had eb a
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- s' test liaison of ficerAfunctioned as an information " gopher
- and link to staff support personnel but not as information nt reen or filter.
Staff p.S l~
and advisory panel members had direct access to the Controller to prevent garbling 3
of information in transmittal. vdiselag.
a fdHal ctn oMVisorg'hea.m
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j The Controller and his advisory,s.eerr were supported by =-
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0f SPectalIS fS Syyt*
~1558 4.W ae, each in two-way communication with their staff and the Controller.
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Radiological safety gathered continuous infornation from on-and off-o site radiation monitors, dispatched survey teans, and fed information to display workers for immediate posting on screens.
Support coordinated food, transportation and sleeping arrangements for e
M the. 'J~esl-L fe.ct 5 ct tu ho crisis team members.
Duration of logistical support might be required for weeks
- o. tv9 h inel after a test'should radiological release occur.
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Air operations dispatched and controlled over-site flights for radiation
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ty ge pig ltpe-y,eua.5 p p+y L i b-+Cic dMe monitoring.
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,L'aborato ry provided,.M-rc y: n cd,
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Spxelsk1 p> ble-Finally, the public relations '
'. i ;.7, serving as the single, voice of e
information statements, with the approval issued all press and public[m DOE J1QtadM.
the test, pg (ggorrewe -
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of the3Controllerf During a test and for the duration of any emergency follow-epc.aAr".s ing, all incoming calls were screened by a switchboard separate from the -centrol-roc" cuvNcH2d center, with no public access permitted to the Test Controller unless hr. cacpest--
-ed it.
Cre4bs Ccwke-Test -Gont-rel Room es,d o.5 N
A Nevada test expert maintains that the physical aspects of the e^ntrol w tcA toe 4 dev*teced oe gees of-tohg ed ecseme **enie-e
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center were parallel in importance to the command structure.
"You must know 3
what information you need, be able to displan it visually, and you must be able to see your experts." Diagram 3 gives an approximation of the arrangement in the
-[~es & Qfbakb u -- 6 =.ar;l benter.
Significant points are the displays of the two major informational needs -- the performance of the device and potential of f-site impact -- and constant two-way communication and physical contiguity of major participants.
For a nuclear plant accident, device performance would be replaced Allinformation,constantlyupdatedby%
with readings of reactor conditions.
vgwof mg4 micI refe wntten wdh hlt Ytfftd FM display personnel, was tg.*e* r.id
- tgon mylar c-
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sheet numbered,and saved in sequence of use and time to permit 1-*r-d ion
- 3gy, evaluation and on going computation comparisons.
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Diagram 3.
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!!EVI.DA TEST ORGAt:IZATIC:4 Mr.: AGEME!!T ROOM CO ;FIGURATIC:1
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Proposed plume Materology Display Radiation Mcasures trajectory Dith
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radiation content Current data
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and
,various other estimates x
forecast
/ site readings i
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Milk shed map Air observations (location of all milk producers)
Gas sample readings 4
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Davice Inf rmation
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_4-Plume projections, refined with each new radiation report and incoming meterological data, were overlaid on locality maps indic : ting population concen-trations and milk producing sites.
In the event of possible public contamination, N.6<
o(( tea f3 the Test Controller r.utified the Governor and khe-state -r-m!-!^bgical 'f f he with suggestions for mitigating action to be taken.
Notification and suggested course Ws*
of action were, as was every other decision, the sole responsibility of the, Con-w.,ac.c< a 414 ue Terr 0,ce ab t &ccee d -
tto11er3 Relevance to the NRC Experienced personnel who explained the Nevada systen insist the Nuclear Regulatory Commission will need a similar structure and comnunications network should it anticipate future crisis management in nucicar reactor incidents.
It is, pointed out, however, that Nevada team nenbers were all highly skilled ks f* ]W j
technicians,, p3g administrators, and were T ysically on-site.
Bethesda control h
would have to be in the hands of a similar technical team equipped with sophis-ticated site communication. The most feasibla alternative would be fully equipped on-site crisis centers, and rapidly deployable regional NRC technical teams.
In-depth drill involving the team, industry management, and of f-site support agencies al4%
would be required since the system would lack the Nevada advantage of frequent p" p1 W exercise.
Clear definition of Controller authority is essential.
NRC critics maintain the agency's role has never been properly defined. (4ltW]h NM
,Energency response plans call for rrg h nal NRC management of a reactor crisis in the event of licensee failure or inability, hue emphasis is on the region's role as observer and advisor. day.
ge4 vles fufgj NRC sta f had assumed their authority to take over fron the regional g
( arrival on-site...a detail, it is said, the regionals failed to anticipate.
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1..a^c, "lihoever sits in that crisis mana;;ement seat had l
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better know his authorit before he ~~+.-
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