ML19308B849
| ML19308B849 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Crane  |
| Issue date: | 05/29/1979 |
| From: | William Ward NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE) |
| To: | NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE) |
| References | |
| TASK-TF, TASK-TMR NUDOCS 8001170440 | |
| Download: ML19308B849 (2) | |
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RESULTS OF INTERVIEW WITH ROBERT C. JONES,_AS RECORDED BY INVESTIGATOR WILLIAM J. WARD, US NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION (ON MAY 29. 19791 r.
idones,: employed as a Senior Engineer with the Babcock & Wilcox (B&W) Nuclear Power Generation Group, Lynchburg, Virginia was interviewed at the B&W facility in Lynchburg under favorable conditions (private office) commencing at 1415 hours0.0164 days <br />0.393 hours <br />0.00234 weeks <br />5.384075e-4 months <br />, on May 29, 1979 by the reporting investigator.
Jones provided the following information in substance:
He was familiar with a report prepared by Mr. Carlyle Michelson, an engineer with the Tennessee Valley Authority (TVA) and consultant to the NRC Advisory Committee on Reactor Safeguards which raised some questions regarding the vulnerability of the B&W Pressurized Water g,~.
Reactors to small break loss of coolant accidents. He received 97 a copy of the Report sometime in early May, 1978 and was asked to Q:
review it and to reply to TVA regarding its concerns. He was quite t
busy at the time on a small break analysis project that prevented
,him from paying immediate-attention to the _ Report. ' These small,
,1 breaks.that.he. was analyzing were of a 1arger_ size than thosei
. postulated by Michelsonf Shortly afterwards, sometime in the
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period of May-June'1978, he took the Report home with him and gave it a cursory review. Based on this preliminary evaluation, he decided that although some of the concer.
appeared to be valid, he did not see that they had significant.afety implications. He O
Rarticuiariy dis 9 reed with net ne described as sicneisoa's c1 aim that small breaks would discharge more water,:than would larger breaks.
He also disputed that an{ energy balance methodology,was the valid waytoapproachtheanalysis.EHeLdid' agree;with'thefollowingpoints:
- 1., Thatksmall breaks would. require the luse[bf the _ steam
- generator;in order to maintain adequate cooling.
2.
That aI oss.~of[ natural circuiatioh would causeirepres-l (surization.;
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ThatD pressurizer. level indications alone. did _ not providei ian accurate depiction 'of-water level (water over the core).
On the _othet. hand.1 [ felt that3hese.weie__ ob'vious" conclusions (and thati
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, B&W essentially, already knew the foregoing. ' For ~ this re' son, he assigned a
the response to the' Report a very low p'riority and so informed his super-visor, Bert Dunn, Manager of the ECCS Analysis Group. He indicated that he had full authority as a senior engineer to make a decision of this nature.
He remained very busy over the next few months, often working'14 hour1.62037e-4 days <br />0.00389 hours <br />2.314815e-5 weeks <br />5.327e-6 months <br /> days. He estimated that a proper response would require one full week of-effort and that he did not-have-the week sto devote to it.lHei. _
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' emphasized that most of_the work:would-.be in the area;of proving;the (
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o O ivalidit[of hi[ posit 3oniwith more sophisticated modeling and computation than' Michelson had used'in his report, and that at ro point did he think that such analysis would prove him wrong and Michelson right. He was chided by Robert Lightle of the B&W Project Management on several occasions to reply to TVA, but he kept getting interrupted and just could not come up with the needed one week. During this period he did not discuss the Report with any higher management officials and had no discussions con-cerning it with anyone from the NRC.
Telephone conferences and receipt of a one page summary from Michelson in addition to completion of his small break analysis, served.to allow him
.to complete his work on the. Report and.to, dispatch a reply to TVA inj
. January 1979...He added that as he had expected, his calcul_ationst tvindicated his position." Upon receipt of~another letter from TVA in
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early February, 1979, he agreed to do additional analysis, but informed his supervisor that he would assign the response a low priority. He promised that he would finish it within two months. The Three Mile Island accident and the work that it engendered has. prevented.him from
, drafting a.. formal. reply _ to TVA. On the other hand, he claimed that i Appendix K:to a two volume studyientitled " Evaluation of Transient Behavidr~'and Sm'all Reactor ^ Coolant Assembly -Breaks in the.177. Fuel
_ Assembly. Plant"< prepared by C&W and' furnished to the.NRC or. May 7, O.
(1979istheformalresponsetotheMichelson, Report.
_ Jones!did notiat any. time in_his handlingifebl that the issues rai$ed i
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L by Michelson fell within the. scope of,10.CFR 21l. Thus"he'did not
^ discuss it 'with higher management nor generate a'ny internal correspondence regarding it.
He added that he was quite familiar with Part 21 and that he, himself had recently filed a Part 21 report.
The interview was concluded at 1458 hours0.0169 days <br />0.405 hours <br />0.00241 weeks <br />5.54769e-4 months <br /> with Jones averring that he did not view the Michelson Report as having.had any substantial safety ignificance.
'l l
r William J. Ward Senior Investigator Office of Inspection and Enforcement
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