Text

Forwards Revision 4 to TVA Response to Auxiliary Sys Branch Fire Protection Review Questions,In Response to NRC 780901 Request.Includes 23 Oversize Drawings
	ML19308A526
Person / Time
Site:	Sequoyah
Issue date:	10/23/1979
From:	Mills L; TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY
To:	Rubenstein L; Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
References
	NUDOCS 7910260159
	Download: ML19308A526 (116)
	v • d • e

{{#Wiki_filter:__ - TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY CH ATTANOOGA TENNcSSEc 37401 400 Chestnut Street Tower 11 October 23, 1979 Director of Nuclear Reactor Regulation At t en't ion : Mr. L. S. Rubenstein, Acting Chief Light Water Reactors Branch No. 4 Djvision of Project Management U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission i Washington, DC 20555

Dear Mr. Rubenstein:

1 ) In the Matter of the Application of ) Docket Nos. 50-327 Tennessee Valley Authority ) 50-328 Enclosed is Revision 4 of TVA's response to the Auxiliary Systems Branch (ASB) fire protection review questions for the Sequoyah Nuclear Plant. This information was requested in your letter to N. B. Hughes dated September 1, 1978. The original information, Revision 1, Revision 2, and Rqvision 3 were submitted by my letters to you dated November 9, 1978, December 19, 1978, January 19, 1979, and March 8, 1979, respec-j tively. This revision includes: 1. Revisions to our responses to ASB questions 1, 3, 7, 9, 15, 18, 20, and 27. These revisions answer open items that remained after your subsequent evaluation of our responses. 2. Revised responses to additional discussion items. 3. Various figures to supplement our responses. 4. Revised commitment schedule. Very truly yours l TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY g ' N,/ b / .,.s L. M. Mills, Manager Nuclear Regulation and Safety I g h 8' Enclosure g, POOR QUALITY PAGES g 910260177 4 0 $4

11/9/78 Rl 12/15/78 R2--l/ iS/79 AUXILIARY SYSTEMS BRAfCH R3--3/5/79 FIRF. PROlECTION REVIEW R4--10/19/79 l P00R O 1 IN SEQUOYAH flUCLEAR PLAtlT - UtilTS 1 Af1D 2 DOCKET NUMBERS 50-327/328 1. Your submittal provides only part of the information requested in to our letter dated September 30, 1976. A fire hazards analysis should be conducted for each plant fire area, and the effects of postulated fire involving permanent and/or transient combustibles on systems, circuits, or equipment required for safe plant cold shutdown should be evaluated. The fire detection and primary and secondary fire suppression systems for each area should also be indicated. In the fire hazards analysis you should identify all the redundant mechanical and electrical systems necessary for safe cold shutdown which are separated only by distance (no fire barriers). The fire hazards analysis should demonstrate that, assuming failure of the primary suppression system, a fire in installed or transient ccmbustibles will not damage redundant trains or divisions of systems required for safe plant cold shutdown. Where this cannot be demonstrated, an alternate means of assuring safe plant shutdown (cold shutdown) should be provided. TVA Response Sequoyah fluclear Plant's fire protection system design was based on the results of a fire hazards analysis covering those areas where cn unmitigated fire could affect a unit's ability to reach and maintain a safe cold shutdown. The analysis involved a detailed review of the plant design and an evaluation of the effects of postulated fires. The results of the analysis are provided in part in the Sequoyah fluclear Plant Fire Protection Program Reevaluation forwarded to the NRC by letter from J. E. Gilleland to R. S. Boyd dated January 24, 1977. The following discussion supplements the original documentation. Based upon the fuel loading and compartmentation of fire cells, fire suppression and detection systems have been provided in the various plant areas as identified in Table 1-1. When fixed suppression systems are provided in an area, they are considered the primary systems. Backup protection is provided by standpipe systems or yard hydrants. When manual systems are used exclusively in an area, they are considered the primary systems and are backed up by manual systems in adjacent areas. Figure 1.1 is a safe shutdown logic diagram for a fire at Sequoyah Nuclear Plant. This figure and its comment sheet identify those plant features necessary to achieve and maintain a safe plant shutdown in the event of a fire. TVA has conducted an analysis of the plant based upon this diagram and its comment sheet assuming a postulated exposure fire with a zone of influe::ce requiring a minimum 20-foot spatial separation of redundant equipment, circuits, or components in all plant areas outside of containment. This analysis has identified where additional protection _.... __ 875M 0

/ and/or "!paration is required to assure that the hot shutdown condition is react. J during a fire using only existing hardware and no extraordinary operating action (i.e., the operator's response will not be required in less than 15 minutes and will consist of plant manipulations typical of those required for normal operation). The analysis does not consider inside primary containment because transient fire loads in this area, when the plant is at power, are not credible, and fixed hazards which pose an exposure threat to equipment components or circuits required for safe shutdown (i.e., reacto coolant pumps) are provided with fixed automatic water suppression systems, automatic detection capability, and an oil collection pan with drains to prevent spilled oil from c"ntacting hot piping. flote that terms such as inadequate sgaratio_n and unacceptable interaction when used in this discussion refer to the inabil~ity to achieve YO foot spatial separation within a fire cell. These tenns ~ do not imply violation of separation as specified in the plant design criteria. Throughout this discussion an asterisk (*) will be used to identify the title of a function block on the shutdown logic diagram (Figure 1.1). This diagram and its keyed comnents are germane and are an integral part of the following discussion. Hot Shutdown Each of the six conditions necessary to achieve hot shutdown are discussed separately. Refer to the six conditions which provide input into the AtlD block that leads to the hot shutdown condition on the shutdown logic diagram. Secondary Side Pressure Control - The Secondary Safety Valves

and the Secondary Relief Valves
can satisfy this plant condition. The spring-loaded secondary safety valves used for short-term control are considered immune to fire damage. The secondary relief valves used for long-tenn control are adequately separated so that access to the required two valves for manual actuation can be assured during a fire.

The redundant circuits for the steam generator pressure instrumentation were found to be inadequately separated. TVA will provide the required instrumentation integrity in accordance with Table 1.3. Since this satisfies the required condition, TVA has not evaluated control via the Main Steam System

nor remote electrical control of the power-operated secondary relief valves.

Steam Gencrator Inventory Control - This plant condition requires an auxiliary icedwater pump capable of feeding any two steam generators, level control for these steam generators, and suction to the pump. This analysis has identified areas where the postulated exposure fire described above would affect both the A and B train sections of the Motor-Driven Auxiliary Feedwater Pump

function. Other areas were identified where a separate postulated exposure fire would affect both trains of the Turbine-Driven Auxiliary Feedwater Pump
function. However, no single postulated fire exists which would affect both of these functions.

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Interactions also exist for the automatic control of the Steam Generator Level Control

function. These interactions have been deemed acceptable because the control valves themselves are adequately separated and manual control is achievable. Unacceptable interactions were found to exist for the steam generator level signal which is necessary for both manual or automatic level control.

TVA will provide the necessary protection of this function in accordance with Table 1.3. Suction from the ERCW* (essential raw cooling water system) was not evaluated because suction from the Condensate Storage Tank

is assured due to the tank being immune to fire damage.

Reactor Coolant System Inventory Control - This condition requires that RCS letdown be controlled, that RCS makeup be provided, and that reactor coolant pump seal integrity be assured. These three conditinns are discussed separately. RCS Letdown Control - This condition can be satisfied by closure of any one of a number of Letdown Isolation Valves

in each of two series strings of valves. Since all of the valves involved are air-operated valves which would fail in the desired position should their control cable be damaged, these control circuits were not evaluated for separation.

RCS Makeup - This condition requires the availability of a charging pump, pump suction, and a flow path into the RCS. Of these, water, via Volume Control Tank Suction

and Refueling Water Storage Tank Suction *, is assured since the tanks themselves perform only a passive function which would not be jeopardized by a fire, and j

manual handwheel operation of the RWST suction valves is acceptable. i The analysis noted that the single postulated exposure fire i described above could cause the loss of both trains of the CVCS Centrifugal Charging Pump

and the Positive Displacement Charging Pump *. TVA will correct this unacceptable condition by rerouting the wiring for the positive displacement charging pump and the positive displacement pump room cooler in accordance with Table 1.2.

This pump was chosen for rerouting because it is the pump used in normal operation; hence, its flow path is already properly aligned. The ECCS charging Flow Path

associated with the centrifugal pumps contains interactions which can affect both A and B train sections.

These interactions are acceptable because they do not affect the positive displacement charging pump; hence, either the positive displacement pump via the nor-mal charging path or the centrifugal charging pump (s) via the i ECCS path (s) are available during any postulated fire.. Control of RCS makeup via either the ECCS (centrifugal) pumps or the normally operating (positive displacement) pumps requires a pressurizer level signal. Unacceptable interactions were found to exist between conduits associated with the required instrumentation wiring. TVA will correct this condition in accordance with Table 1.3. The component cooling water and 1 36741/577295

essential raw cooling water systems are identified in the keyed comments as being required for RCS makeup. Unacceptable interactions do exist in both of these systems. The CCS mechanical system inter-actions and how they are resolved are discussed in the response to question 13. The CCS and ERCW electrical system interactions will be protacted in accordance with Table 1.4. RCP Seal Integrity - Seal integrity for the reactor coolant pumps can be assured if either the positive displacement charging pump or the centrifugal charging pump and the associated Charging Flow Control Valve, FCV62-93*, are available to provide injection water to the seals. The modifications proposed to upgrade the system in the preceding paragraph will assure RCP seal integrity. RCP Thermal Barrier Cooling

also would assure this required condition.

This path does contain interactions which would affect both its A and B train sections. These interactions are deemed acceptable because RCP seal injection is assured. Secondary Side Isolation - The Main Steam Isolation Valves

are stored-energy, fail-closed valves which require both A and B control signals to remain in the open position. A postulated fire which would affect the control cables would cause the valves to slut, assuring this function.

Hence, these control cables and those for the parallel path, Steam Load Isolation *, were not evaluated. Analysis of the Main Feedwater Isolation Valves

indicated that at least one of the two valves in each feedwater line could be shut for the postula.ed fire. Hence, the Main Feedwater Pump
function, a parallel path to feedwater isolation, was not evaluated.

Each steam generator blowdown line contains an A and B train blowdown Isolation Valve

in series. Both valves would fail in the desired, closed pos.ition if there was fire damage to the control cables; hence, this feature is considered to be assured and was not evaluated.

RCS Pressure Control - Trained power cables outside primary containment for the Pressurizer Heaters

were found to interact within 20 feet in two locations. Within the reactor building annulus, the two trains are separated by 19 feet for most of their routing, but approach 13 feet at the primary containment penetration. This interaction has been deemed acceptable because of the low probability for transient fire loads within the annulus area and because all exposed surfaces of cable within this area have been provided with a flame-retardant mastic coating.

The second interaction involves opposite trains approaching to within three feet at an orthoganal crossing on elevation 759 of the auxiliary building near the pressurizer transformers and switchgear. The divisional medium-voltage (6900 volts) power cables for the supply to the 6.9-kV/480V stepdown pressurizer heater transformer are routed in cable trays located above power cables of the redundant division. TVA will reroute the unit 1 and unit 2 pressurizer heater 6900V power cables to achieve a minimum 20 feet separation from the redundant division in accordance with Table 1.2. Automatic sprinkler protection will be provided in the area of the power cables in trays. Instrumentation conduits which contain the pressure signals necessary for control interact within the auxiliary building. TVA will correct this condition in accordance with Table 1.3. 36740/855462

Initial Reactivity Control - The trained Reactor Trip System

which provides this condition is a fail-safe system which will respond to the postulated fire by causing the control rods to be inserted.

Thus, no evaluation was considered necessary. Cold Shutdown The dashed section of the shutdown logic diagram identifies two additional plant conditions, Long Term Heat Removal and Long Term Reactivity Control, which must be established to place the plant in the cold shutdown condition. This section of the shutdown logic diagram has been analyzed to assure that all required plant conditions can be established within 72 hours of a postulated fire having a zone of influence requiring a minimum 20-foot separation. 'It should be noted that unlike the hot shutdown analysis, the cold shutdown analysis does take credit for damage control measures which cannot be considered typical of normal plant operation. These extra-ordinary actions are described below. Long Term Heat Removal - The condition requires the Residual Heat Removal (RHR) system to be operable. It is realized when an RHR Shutdown Cooling Flow Path

is established and the RHR Pumps
are operational. Manual hand-wheel operation of all required valves is acceptable with no further evalua-tion. All other features were found to be adequately separated except the cables which supply the RHR pump room coolers. TVA's resolution of this interaction is described in table 1.5.

(Note: Unacceptable inter-actions do exist within the component cooling water--CCS--system. These interactions and their resolutions have been discussed in the hot shutdown analysis above and also in the response to question 13.) Long Term Reactivity Control - To establish an acceptable shutdown margin under cold conditions, the contents of the boron injection tank (BIT) must be charged into the reactor coolant system. The Flow Path Through the BIT

can be established by manual handwheel operation of the required valves and was not evaluated further.

Analysis of RCS Makeup Capability

has been made above as part of RCS INVENTORY CONTROL analysis. Please refer to this discussion for interactions and their resolution.

Conclusion As a result of the preceding analysis and the identification of areas where 20-foot spatial separation of redundant circuits required for safe shutdown within a fire cell has not been achieved, protective measures described in Tables 1.2,1.3, and 1.4 shall be implemented. TVA has provided by separate submittal, marked drawings showing the new cable routing for relocated cables and conduits listed in Table 1.2 and the relative locations of the redundant counterpart cables and/or conduits. These modifications will assure the ability to achieve the hot shutdown condition as discussed previously in this response. The cold shutdown condition can be achieved within 72 hours through the implementation of temporary damage control measures and extraordinary operator actions described in table 1.5. Strict administrative procedures have been established to control transient combustibles and are included in the Sequoyah Physical Instruction, PHYSI-13. The procedure requires identification of the routes for transient combustibles and the procedure takes no credit 192843 /922336

~. 4 for the fixed suppression system in regard to its extinguishing capability for transient fire loads. The procedure requites provisions for additional fire protection that is capable of suppressing the transient. fire load. With the defense-in-depth as described above, protection to redundant divisions of systems from installed or transient combustibles has been provided to ensure capability of safe shutdown of the plant. f I 1 e 4 ~ l T 36739 ~~~~ )

FIRE l t + + CVCS KEYI CHARGING KEY 2 VOLUME KEY 4 KEY 5 CENTRIFUGAL FLOWCONTROL CONTROL RWST CHARGING PUMP VALVE TANK SUCTION A B FCV 62-93 SUCTION A B d e e AND POSITIVE KEY 3 AND { i DISPLACEPENT AND18 ECCS KEY 6 CHARGING CHARGING PUMP RCP THERMAL KEY 9 BA RIER ANDIO PATH k s A B ( A B f + u v RCP LETDOWN KEYS 7 ISOLATION AND 8 AND AND SEAL VALVE INJECTIOf i A B g / OR AND AND p r-- RCS RCS RCP LETDOWN MAKEUP OR SEAL CONTROL / \\ INTEGRIT l I

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AND I RCS 4 MOTOR DRIVEN KEYli SG LEVEL KEY 12 INVENTORY MAIN STEAM KEY 2O STEAM LOAD KEY 2O AUX FEED-CONTROL AND13 CONTROL INSOLATION INSOLATION WATER PUMP VALVES A B A B A B 4-AND OR 4 1 TURBINE KEY SG KEYl3 DRIVEN AUX 14 LEVEL AND16 MAIN KEY 22 MAIN KEY 23 FEEWATERN AND CONTROL FEEDWATER A 8 15 A B FEEDWATER ISOLATION PUMP VALVES AND I SUCTihFM SUCTf0N KEY KEYl9 OR OR CONDENSATE IT FROM

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B g AND g + SIDE SG ISOLATION INVENTORY CONTROL i l i + PRESSURlZER KEY 28 SECONDARY KEY 25 SECONDARY KEY 26 HEATERS KEY SAFETY RELIEF A B 29 VALVES VALVES p REACTOR m4 TRIP SYSTEM ND AND RCS l A B PRESSURE I CONTROL o MAIN KEY OR STEAM 27 INITIAL SYSTEM RE N TY ECOND CONTROL I SIDE PRESSURE PLANT l CONTROu IN HOT w SHUTDOWN 00f0lTIO NOTES: J _____J ,_. _ __. _ _ _ _ _ 3

i. IN GENERALONCE A PARTICULAR S AFETY TRAIN HAS BEEN INWKE THISTRAIN RHR KEY RHR KEY FLCW PATH KEY RCS KEY MUST BE USED THROUGHOUT THE LOGIC. EXCEPTIONS MUST Cc EVALUATED SHUTDOWN 3)

THAOUGH 32 MAKEUP 33 ON ACASE BASIS. 30 PUMPS 'L' Y 2. FW TH A B -A B A B SOLID LINES ARE USED FOR PATHS LEADING TO THE HOTSHUTDOWN CONDITION. THIS SECTION OF THELOGIC DIAGRAM HAS BEEN ANALYZEDTO

l. _ - -,

L--- ASSURE THAT ALL REOUIRED CONDITIONS CAN BE REALIZED DURING A FIRE. r- - - - 5F -+ THE CRITERIA FOR ACCEPTABILITY lS AS FOLLOWS: AND AND GIVEN A FIREWHICH EFFECTS ANY FUCTION ON THE DIAGRAM THE REOUIRED CONDITION MUST BE CAPABLE OF BEING REACHED ElTHER 4 4 VIA A PARALLEL REDUNDENTOR CIVERSE PATH WHICHIS PHYSICALLY m LONG SEPARATED OR FROTECTFD FROM THE FIRE OR BY VIRTUE OF THE FACT H EACTIV TY THAT THE FUNCTION MAY BE CONSIDERED IMMUNE TO FIRE DAMAGE (E.G. THEREFUELING WATER STORAGE TANK) 3.

DASH UNES AREUSEDTODEPICT PATHSLEADINGBEYONDHOT SHUTDOWN TO THECOLD SHUTDOWN CONDITION. THESE PATHS CAN BE AND ASSURED UNDER POST-FIRE CONDITIONS EITHER BY ADEOUATE PHYSICAL SEPARATION OR BY TEMPORARY MEASURES DEFINED NCASUALTYPROCEDlRES PLANT FIGURE I-I 4.

BLOCKS WHICH CONTAIN AN A AND 8 SUB BLOCKDENOTE TRAINIZED FEATURESL T TAL RE UNMNCY IS PROVIDED FOR THIS BLOCK. IN LD SEQUOYAH NUCLEAR PLANT 5 KEYED COMMENTS ARE WCATED ON SEPARATE COMMENT SHEET. CObOITION SHUTDOWN LOGIC-FIRE

KEYED COMMENTS 1. Requires auxiliary lube oil pump AND power to pump room cooler AND ERCW to pump oil cooler AND ERCW to pump room cooler AND CCS water to ERCW heat exchangers. ~ 2. Requires appropriate section of pressurizer level control system AND EITHER B auxiliary air compressor OR station air compressor. 3. Requires ERCW to pump room cooler AND power to pump room cooler AND CCS water to pump oil cooler AND CCS water to pump speed control AND ERCW to CCS exchanger AND EITHER automatic speed control from approrpriate section of pressurizer level control system M manual speed control using pressurizer level instrumentation. 4. Short-term make up source, normally aligned, no action required. 5. Long-term make up source requires opening of FCV62-135 OR FCV62-136, hand wheel operation acceptable. 6. Flow path ; squires opening an inlet valve (EITHER FCV63-25 OR FCV63-26) Ah; an outlet valve (EITHER FCV63-39 OR FCV63-40)~' Tar the boron injection tank. 7. Termination of normal letdown requires closure of FCV62-77 OR FCV62-70 OR FCV62-69 OR all three valves FCV62-72, FCV62-73 and FCV62-74.-~ 8. Termination of excess letdown requires closure of FCV62-54 OR~~~ CCV62-55 OR_ FCV62-56. 9. Requires CCS water to thermal barrier booster pump AND ERCW to CCS heat exchangers. ~ 10. IF. B train is selected, an additional requirement is opening capability for FCV70-9, FCV70-10, FCV70-195 and FCV70-196.

11. Requires automatic control AND hydraulic motor for back pressure regulating valve (A train PCV3-122, B train PCV3-132).

12. Requires automatic control signal to level control valves (A train LCV3-156 AND_LCV3-164, B train LCV3-148 AND LCV3-171) OR steam generator level instrumentation for manual control (A TFain steam generator 1 AND 2, B train steam generator 3 AND 4). Manual control consists of on/off operation of the pump.

13. IF automatic control is selected, an additional requirement is the appropriate train of auxiliary air compressor E service air compressor.

14. Not a true A and B train system--the turbine-driven auxiliary feedwater subsystem may be considered to be a separate single train, which can be supplied with control and power from either of the traditional A and B trains.

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15. Requires turbine trip and throttle valves (FC"l-51), AND governor valve (FCVl-52).

16. Requires automatic signal to any two level control valves (LCV3-172, LCV3-173, LCV3-174 LCV3-175) OR steam generaf.or level instrumentation for manual control of any two steam generatori. Manual operation consists of handwheel operation of the level control valves.

17. Normally aligned, no action required.

18. E automatic speed control is selected, an additional requirement is B train auxiliary air compressor OR service air compressor.

19. Requires suction valves to open AND ERCW system availability.

20. Requires closure of all main steam isolation AND isolation bypass valves (FCV1-4, FCVI-ll, FCVl-22, FCVl-29, FCVl-147, FCVl-148, FCVl-149,FCVl-150).

21. Requires closure of main steam dump valves AND main turbine trip and throttle valve AND main feedwater pump turbine trip and throttle valves.

22. Requires closure of a feedwater isolation vaIve (FCV3-33, FCV3-47, FCV3-87, FCV3-100) OR closure of a feedwater control and bypass valve pair in each feed line (FCV3-35 AND FCV3-35A, FCV3-48, AND FCV3-48A, FCV3-90 AND FCV3-90A, FCV3-1D3 AND FCV3-103A).

23. Requires trip of main feedwater pump turbine.

24. Requires closure of one valve in each blowdown line (FCVl-7 OR FCVl-181) AND (FCVl-14 OR FCVl-182) AND (FCVl-25 OR FCV1-183T AND (FCVl-32 M FCVl-184). ~~

25. Self actuating, short-term control.

26. Long-term control, requires operability of any two relief valves (PCVl-5, PCVl-12, PCV1-23, PCVl-30 manual control acceptable) AND pressure instrumentation for same two steam generators.

27. Requires opening of two main steam isolation OR isolation bypass valves AND control of main steam dump valves XfiD condenser circulating water.

28. Manual control requires RCS wide range temperature and pressure instrumentation.

29. Requires reactor shutdown by driving in control rods OR manual scram signal 0 of rod drive m_R_ manual opening of scram breakers OR de-energizing

] otor generator.

30. Requires opening FCV74-1 AND FCV74-2. Handwheel operation is acceptable.

952800

31. Requires RHR pump operability (temporary cables are acceptable) AND CCS water to RHR heat exchanger (handwheel operation of A train

. valve FCV70-156 or B train valve FCV70-153 is acceptable) AND CCS water to RHR pump seal cooler AND RHR pump room cooling (portable -blower is acceptable).

32. Flow path requires opening an inlet valve (EITHER FCV63-25 OR FCV63-26) AND an outlet valve (EITHER FCV63-39 OR FCV63-40)~for the boron injection tank. Handwheel operation isIacceptable.

33. Requires (water to charging pump via Volume Control Tank Suction *

(key 4) or RWST Suction * (key 5)) AND (CVCS Centrifugal Charging Pump * (key 1) 0Ft (Positive Displacement Charging Pump * (key 3) AND Charging Flow Control Valve FCV 62-94*, (this valve may be manually opened by isolating and venting control air from its operator)). l l l l I l 952298

TABLE l-1 The following table sunnarizes the fire protectior, systems provided in the Sequoyah Nuclear Plant. The table covers 011y those areas where an unmitigated fire could affect a unit's ability to reach and maintain a safe cold shutdown condition. Notes: (1) Refer to tL' SK-1000 series of compartmentation drawings for 10:stier. Of the tabulated arear. (2) The compartmentation fire rating column identifies j the rating of the most limiting compcnent in the compart-mentation boundary. Refer to the response to question 3 for additional compartmentation information. (3) Refer to the response to question 12 for a discussion of the fire retardant coating of exposed cable trays. (4) Legend: I - Ionization smoke detector IR - Infrared flame detector LT - Linear thermistor PE - Photoelectric smoke detector RC - Rate compensated thermal detector T - Fixed temperature thermal detector e 36733

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I A2 HCLDUP TANK ROCM A 1-1/2 HR. X X A3 Il0LDUP Tf.*;K ROOM B l-1/2 HR. X X A4 FLOOR DRAIN COLL PUMP & FILTER ROOM ~ X X A41 FLCOR DRAIN COLL TANK ROOM X X A5 GAS STRIPPER FEED PUMP I X I X X I A6 SUMP PUMP ROOM A7 SUMP TANK ROOM X X ~ A3 CONTAIrg'ENT SPRAY IB-B l-1/2 HR. X X I A9 CONTAINMENT SPRAY Pt".1P 1 A-A 1-1/2 HR. X. X I Alf P.HR PUMP ROOM IB-B 1-1/2 HR. X X I All RHR PUMP ROOM 1A-A 1-1/2 HR. X X I Al? RHR PUMP ROOM 2A-A 1-1/2 HR. X X I Al' RHR PUMP ROOM 28-8 1-1/2 HR. X X I Alt CO*JTAINMENT SD" PUMP 2A-A 1-1/2 HR. X X ale CONTAINMENT SPRAY PUMP 28-B l-1/2 HR. X X I Alf PIPE GALLERY l-1/2 HR. X X A17 PIPE GALLERY l-1/2 HR. X X E59.0 Al CORRIDOR X X X X A2 VALVE GALLERY X X X A3 GAS DECAY ROOM X X 85407 ~ ~ ~ ~ P00RBRENAl.

l e

n+

t t t 3,.,7. = Ei FIRE Md I RE ::. A' T 55 0 t 2.2 m TV:'E Cr 7." CPAlit Et;T CCATI:;3 CF CC= 0"

- E =

E'= 51 E FIRE S';*L,*:;3 ILEY.

.C.

RCC's f; AXE FIRE. RATI ;3 XPCSEO CA3LES dE# =5 8;# p 5E e{ CITECTCRS sfC Ed ESU f 50 Ee cmm om vom em c - AUXILIARY 669.C A4 CHEMICAL DRAIN TANK ROOM X X X AS CAS DECAY ROCM X X AE AUX FEES :ATER PUMP 1 A-A 1-1/2 HR. X X X I RC A7 PIPE GALLERY l-l/2 HR. X X X I A8 PIPE GM LERY & CHASE X X A9 CHARGI?;G PUMP 1A-A 1 1/2 HR. X X X I, RC Al f. CHARG!f:G PUMP 18-B l-1/2 HR. X X X I RC All CHARGI?:G PU:'? 1C-C 1-1/2 HR. X X X I, RC A12 SAFETY INJECTICN PUMP IB-B l-1/2 HR. X X X I, RC A13 SAFETY INJECTION PUMP 1A-A 1-h2HR. X X X I, RC A14 CASK CECCNTN. COLL. TANK ROOM X X X Alf SPEf!T RESIN TANK ROOM X X X Al t-VALVE CALLERY X X X A17 MASTE EVAP PACKAGE X X X-I Al." AUX WASTE EVAP PACKAGE X X X I A19 SAFETY INJECTION PUMP 2A-A 1-1/2 HR. X X X I, RC A20 SAFETY INJECTION PUMP 2B-B l-1/2 HR. X X X I, RC ' A21 CHARCING eUMP 2C-C 1-1/2 HR. X X X I, RC A22 CHARG!f:G PUMP 28-B

l-1/2 HR.

X X X I, RC A2] CHARGif1G. PUMP D-A 1-1/2 HR. X X X I, RC A24 PIPE GALLERY & CF.ASE X X A25 PIPE GALLERY l-1/2 HR. X X X I A2C AUX. FEEDWATER PLHP 2A-A 1-1/2 HR. X' X X 'I. RC A27 CONCENTRATE FILTER X X 85406

- - "**-**8u*==-m===.eoe P00RORIGlm J

tPC*.T!C1 rs-t v. a . n i t.:. ~ d F1 i 2M E RETA CAri! C5 RO E w$ IFE CF m C0: GAT :'E:.T CCATI:.0 C.: %d= S* nE= E= 21O E FIEE SU LCI:s3 ELEV. :.0. RCOM 2:E FIRE iA!!:;3 LXPOSED CA3LES EU; =G 8RZ 0

fis oM CE!iCIC;5 MEU ME E f 3 0 50 E$

c_ m.n om vom en cw n.sJc.aar

m. C {j gg.aus i,3/,enn.

A g A3 TITRATICN F0ut X A4 RADIO CliEM LAB. X X I X AS COUNT!r:0 ROCM X X I X X X I A6 PIPE GALLERY UNIT 1 1-1/2 HR. X X* X X !!_*, PE *" A7 VOL CONT. 0L TANK ROCM 1-1/2 HR. X X X A8 REACTOR BLDG. ACCESS RCCM 3-HR. I A9 VALVE GALLERY X X X X. Alf SEAL MATER HEAT EXCHANGER 1A X X All HEAT EXCHANGEks la" 1-T/2 HR. X X A10 HEAT EXCHANGERS 1A 1-1/2 HR. X X A12,S?MPLE ROOM I 1-1/2 HR. X X X g A14 STMPLE RCOM 11 1-1/2 HR. X X X I All HEAT EXCHANGERS 2A 1 1/2 HR. X X Alf HEAT EXCHANGERS 28 1-1/2 HR. A17 SEAL WATER HEAT EXCHANGER 2A y y A10 VALVE GALLERY X X l X X Als PIPE GALLERY UNIT 2 1-1/2 HR. X X X I A20 VOL CONTROL TANK ROOM 1-1/2 HR. X X X A21 REACTOR ELDG. ACCESS RM. 3 HR. I**,PE*** l X X

IN CHARCOAL FILTERS
- LOCATED IN GENERAL AREA.
  - LCCATED IN CHANC0AL FILTEF DUCTS.
    - LABORATORY COMPLEX SEPARA' ED FROM AUXILILRY BLDG BY A : -HR. FIR :

BARRIEF. 85405 ewe e

L CGT:0N g t s p -' ww u ,, h-. 2....

n-dG 5

w ,O' 'i. Md sa h IE C / 7 ^'t u y.. I. s. k.-i$th3shCA5LE hy h.] [gh h h gh EN$CRS F5$[ su:LOI:G ILEV. II it=: N;st Eha 85 55% MG 20 EE ~ MY 690.C A22 ALVE GALLEiiY A A A23 CVCS VALVE GALLERY X X A23 CVCS VALVE GALLERY X X A2' VALVE GALLERY X X A2; WASTE GAS COMP B X X A2K WASTE CAS COMP A X X-A2: DECCNTANNATION ROOM X X X A2: PIPE CHASE l-1/2 HR. X X A2 PIPE' CHASE l-1/2 HR. X X A3' AIR LOCK X X A31 WASTE GAS ANALYZER ROOM X X 706.( Al PAIN STEAM VALVE ROOM X X A2 PAIN STEA!! VALVE ROOM X X X A3 WASTE PACKAGE AREA. 1-1/2 HR. X. X I A' WASTE PACKAGE AREA X X X I ~ X X X I AS CASK LOADING AREA 1-1/2 HR. A6 N STORAGE AREA 1-1/2 HR. X X I 2 705.0 A7 CASK DECON ROOM X X 706.0 AS FUEL TRAf;SFER VALVE ROOM X-X X I A9 FUEL TRANSFER VALVE ROOM I X X A1: PAIN STEAM VALVE ROOM X X Al' PAIN STEAM VALVE ROCM X X A1; STEAM VALVE INST. ROOM A X X A1: STEAM VALVE INST. ROOM B X X Ali UHI EQUIP 1-1/2 HR. X X X I Alf UHI EQUIP 1 1/2 HR, X X y i

ggan,

^ ~~ ~-

Il l [tI8 [ t l Ii: l S F A C C ET E F. C F E YFT E E T E P P O I1 1 I I I ! eI E3= s oE> ib7J3i%w i XX X X X X X X X X X X X X X X d$5c. =%Oo XX X X X X X X X X X X X X X X ME8$n =%0o M02o =85v - #f" 4km dO8 =Eo X X =;fo 5 dlf m_ i XX X X X X X X 5CMEc \\ S S E R L E T. F B T

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R 1l 1

1 1 l C CC CI O UU CF L DD l E EE F Fr TTT S LL Y II S FF YLL M R R M AAA O E E O R 0O O G G O P CC SRR E P R N N R M M AA M O A A A H R H H R O O E HH t S M i C C I M O O L CC i O A X X A O R R Z T O E E O Z NN 4 0 N R E E R R R 0 II 0 E C T T G O O N R AM T R A A R T T T DD EU N U E E U N C C DEE RR E P H H P E E E E TT AT V K K K K V K K T T S AA S C & C 4 4 & C C C C E E OCC s

4 : & C O 4 4 O O & O O D D L OO t

0I L . L 0' 0' . L L L L C LL T D D T L L T, 3 . R N R T T N R R G R R E E t

T T OO G I

E I E E E I I T I I U U r, A L L V A A H A A F F CH H A i t E2 C l 2 3 4 5 6 t M5 3 4 S 6 7 S 9 l l 1 1 1 1 1 A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A I-p l V. 0 E 4 L 1 E Y G R N A I I D L I L 7 X I, U 0 2 E'. A 8 i R

,I rS-r ,I FIRE d ICT RETArA.T 55 RO f wd COM? ART!'E:;T CCATIt.G CF Cdm 8" nM= E= MS E fit.E T d

CF BL'!LCI*;G ELEV. 70.

R0;4 ide E FIRE 'A!Ir.G ..XPOSED CA3:.ES Y 3 #" n.'i SRd .4 :" 55 eM OETECTCRS e j MEC tk 420 50 5c.0 49 a v. m om vom em .a AUXILIARY 734 0 Al A' XILIARY CONTRCL ROOM 1-1/2 HR. X X J X X I A2 6.9 KV SHUTDOWN BD. ROOM A 1-1/2 HR. X X X X I A3 125V VITAL BATT. BD. RM II 1-1/2 HR. X X*** = X X I A4 125V VITAL BATT. BD. RM I 1-1/2 HR. X X*** = X X I A5 400V SHUTDOL'N BD. ROCM 182 1-1/2 HR. X X X X I A5

20'/ SHU;T7.fi ED. ROOM 181 1-1/2 HR.

X X X X I-A7 480V SHUTDOWN BD. ROOM TAl 1-1/2 HR. X X X X I A8 480V SHUTDOWN BD. ROOM 1A2 1-1/2 HR. X X X X I A9 PERSOUNEL & EQUIP ACCESS 1-1/2 HR. X X X X I Alf STEAM CEtl. CLOWDOWN 1-1/2 HR. X X X X I All REACTOR BLDG. EQUIP HATCH 3 HR. X X X A12 REACTOR CLDG. ACCESS RM. 1-1/2 HR. X X A1: REFUELING ROOM X X I l-l/2 HR. X X I l. Alt REACTCR BLOG. ACCESS RM. 1-1/2 HR. X X X X I A1E REACTOR BLDG. EQUIP. HATCH 3 HR. X X X I All Et:ERGELCY GAS TREATMENT FILTEi1-1/2 HR. X X X* X X A17 PERSONNEL & EQUIP. ACCESS 1-1/2 HR. X X I**, PE*** l All: 480V SHUTDOUN BD. ROOM 282 1-1/2 HR. X X X X I X X I Aa 480V SHUTDOWN BD. RG0H 281 1-1/2 HR. X X X X I A2C 480V SHUTDCWN BD. ROOM 2Al 1-1/2 HR. X X X X I-A2 480V SHUTDOWN BD. ROON 2A2 1-1/2 HR. X X X X I

CLOSED tiOZZLE SPRAY IN FI.TER
- LOCATED IN FILTER DUCTS AlD GENERAL AREA
  - LOCATED IN FILTER UNIT l
  - T.AftJAL ACTUATION 501350

~ 4

' ' AT I G*i r 1.n e,w t 01.. 2 N RE 9 $5 N E Y' ' M5.3 COM AR!r.Ei.T CCAT!'.3 Cr -ar 2:

o=

c- = ao Fm ~. m EUILD::s0 ' LEV. *a. P00 4 7.A*4E FIRE.RA!!.3 u.: POSED CABLES yf3 =y yy3 j-y y$ gj CETECTORS 25% 85 555 55 EO 25 AUXILIARY 73.0 A22 125V VITAL BATT BD. ROOM IV l-1/2 HR. X X* X X I A23 125V VITAL BATT BD. ROOM III 1-1/2 HR. X X* X X I A24 6.9 KV SHUTD0; *4 BD. RM B l-1/2 HR. X X X X I A25 AUX CCUTROL INST. RM 1A 1-1/2 HR. X X X X I A26 AUX CONTRCL INST. RM 1B 1-1/2 HR. X X X X I A27 AUX CONTROL INST. RM 2Af 1-1/2 HR. X X X X I A28 AUX., CONTROL INSE. RM 28 l-1/2 HR. X X X X 1 749.C A1 480V BOARD RM. lA' l-1/2 HR. X X X X I A2 480V BOARD RM. 1B 1-1/2 HR. X X X X 1 A3 125V VITAL BATT. RM II 1-1/2 HR. X* X X A4 125V VITAL BATT. RM. I 1-1/2 HR. X* X X I A6 400V TRA*i5FORMER RM 18 1-1/2 HR. X X X X I A7 480V TRANSFORMER RM 1A 1-1/2 HR. X X X X I 4 A8 MECH. EQUIPMENT RM. 1-1/2 HR. X X X X I ( A8A HEPA FILTER PLENUM RM. 1-1/2 HR. X X X I A9 f:ECH. EQUIPMENT ROOM l-1/2 HR. X X X X I A9A HEPA FILTER PLENUM RM. 1-1/2 HR. X X X X A10 480V TRANSFORVIR RM. 28 1-1/2 HR. X X X X I All 480V TRANSFORMER RM. 2A 1-1/2 HR. X X. X X I i A13 125V VITAL BATT. RM. IV l-1/2 HR. X* X X I A14 125V VITAL BATT. RM. III 1-1/2 HR. X* X X I ~ A15 480V BOARD RM. 28 1-1/2 HR. X X X X I rev y

u ".
l '3r AFTt'fTinu

== s P00R ORGNAL 4

l

00AT!0's l

llNL i r ',. L L i l l. 8 I i i i I FIRE d4 5 RETA?.0A*.T 55 OC E' wd '0L e TY E OF 6 CC -? ART::E ;T CCAT;:.0 CF C"r S" nd= E= US E F:'.I 30:L3!".3 ELE 7.

0.

K00:1 :.A -:E FIRE.RAll:,G EXPOSED CA3LES E f. b =E 8R% O# hE oM OETECTC15 EEC ME ESC 50 ER ES c-m m om vom em aw >. = t I AUXILIARY 749.0 A16 400V E3ARD RM. 2A l-1/2 HR. X X X X 759.0 Al CO.*; TROL ROD DRIVE EQUIP. TM. 1-1/2 HR. X X X X I 'A2 PRESSURE ETR. TRN;SF. R008 */ l-l/2 HR. X X X X I l A3 CONTROL R03 ORIVE EQUIP RM l-1/2 HR. X X X X I I A4 PRESSURE HTR. TRANSF ROOM 2 1-1/2 HR. X X X X l 76 3. 0 Al F#; ROOM

X X

A2 ROOF ACCESS AIR LOCK 3 HR. i X X. l

EXTENSION OF RM. 734.0-A13 I

l l 1 370M P00RORG E l t i I

~CATIO" l

ch: v:tu i t i FIRE RETAR ANT 55 %C O w "- m TYPE CF Z"

COM?A.1TMENT CO* TING CF Cd=

3* -- M c E= 33 E F:;E S'.:L3ING ILEV. NO. RCO:: ::x:E FIRE. RATING ..X'>CSED CABLES Od0 =j 80# 9 5il oM CEIECTCRS MEC Es 520 NU EO %? com om vom em

c. w

>= REACTOR ANNULUS X X X PE PR!r*/sRY CONTAIN!XfiT. EOUIPi*E!.T WITHIN PRDARY CONTA!i. TENT REQUIRING FIRE PROTECTION A*iD/OR DETECTIGB LO'AER COMPARTMENT COOLER A-A PE LOWER COMPARTMENT C00CER B-B PE LOW.R CO'4PARTMENT "00LER C-A PE LOWER COMPARTMENT COOLER D-B PE UPPER COMPARTMENT C00LES. UNIT A PE UPPER COMPARTMENT COOLER UNIT B PE UPPER COMPARTMENT COOLER UNIT C PE UPPER COMPARTMENT COOLER UNIT D PE REACTOR COOLANT RUMP NO. 1 X X X RC. IR REACTOR COOLANT PUMP NO. X X X .RC. IR REACTOR COOLANT PUMP NO. 3 X X X RC. IR REACTOR COOLANT PUMP NO. 4 X X X RC. IR CABLE TRAYS I X

THE REACTOR BUILDING IS RATO AS A 3-HOUR I IRE AREA. WITh NO INTEF ':AL FIRE CELLS CCNSIDEREO 85417
- PREACTION SPRINKLER SYSTEM PROVIDED FOR DI) ISIONAL CABLE ' RAP INTERACTIONS ONLY s

P00R.0RIGINAL

i

e 1

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5. -

!!11SAS H I rRll)!dS 6 !;0113V181 E i m"i C e - u.,o l'1'{ 'O n I z u A L';.5.;t a. t# x <<o.s m P. I ... n .5, :S ~: -

f u.4 m

M ia >: u 1 o. = uu a d a J n5 o ee H a taa H Z ~65 5 E.

u. a u E

1"r E!!" 58 8.a 5 n. w -r* se a o - na M M gE

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t. ts - 8.:5 5

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l l rat. a w :s - i ,,.y.,... i l M I" E n l' FIRE

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- d r Ex dR E

FI;E SUI'DII.0 ELEV.

.0.

R7 1.WE FIRE.RA!!r.; apCSED CA3LE! M E ;" SR 9M lb il of CE!LCTORS t] 2 WEO $20 SO 50 E3 o.a s.n.n a vom em ca -= DIESEL CEN. 722.0 1 CO2 STC uGE R*.. 1-1/2 HR. X X 2 Lt'BE OIL STORAGE RM. 3 HR. X X X RC 3 TOILET X X 4 UNIT 1A-A I X X RC. I* 5 UNIT 2A-A X X X. RC != 6 UNIT 1B-B X X X RC. !* 7 UNIT 23-B X X X RC. I* 8 FUEL'0!L TRANSFER RM. 1-1/2 HR. X X X RC 9 PIPE GALLERY & CORRIDOR l-1/2 HR. X X X RC D1 STAIR 3 HR. X X 740.- 1 CORRIDCR 3 HR. X X 2 RADIAT!(t3 SHELTER RM. 1-1/2 HR. X X 3 AIR EXHAUST RM. X. X RC l 4 48DV BOARD RM. lA .,X X X 1.* RC 5 AIR INTAKE RM. X X RC 6 AIR EXHAUST RM. X X RC

LOCATED IN ELECTRICAL PANELS
- THREE-HOUR FIRE FATED CONSTRUCT ON HAS BEEN MA:NTAINED BETWEEN REDUNDANT DIESEL.:ENERATOR UNITS.

85420 P00R ORIGINAL

l 'I"'" t ',c ',T IO:: y, = .s i FIRE d;~ t ?ETADA'.T E~a RC 'd S TVTE CF o ' ~. 'T CC?*PARTMEtiT C0ATI?.O CF .~ :~ c 3#

- II ::

E :c 33 E F!RE EU!LDIt.3 ' lev. .3. R^C:4 NAME FIRE.RATINO LXP05ED CASLEs liii = C-SRO !?O 15 d e "4 CETECTORS i E20 El ESO MO 5 0., E2 com o s. vom om -= 1' DIESEL GEN. 740.' 7 480V C0ARD RM. 2A X X X !. RC 8 AIR INTAKE R*t. X X RC 9 AIR EXHAUST RM. X X RC 10 480V BOARD RM. 18 X X X I. RC 11 AIR IN:AKE RM. X X- .R C 12 AIR EXHAUST RM. X X RC 13 480V SOARD RM. 2S X X X I. RC 14 AIR' INTAKE RM. X X RC D1 STAIR 3 tiR. X X

- THREE-HOUR FIRE RATED t.G 7ene 10N HAS BEEN t AINTAlf;E BETWEEN REDUNDA'T DIESEL GENERoTOR UNITS.

R;414 i

- 3 I

T, m YJ b ... I',' ! *

u;*!

r l'! -L a Sif.YJ0All OdVA i

H];GIAS: 11r]

x x x x x x x x 33311001 183LSAS u u u n n n n u 3diduflV15 I ll315AS 30lX010 4 t:0!!dV3

5..

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t,,;

x bg 55 = u u. rm Y C# uu <<M M" Zb & N o k ur n6 s= ddN '( N* E 2 ~g~5552 gi5 8 o e, x E$ Y "'"* " d d d Y fl3 M x u, ,.g,---w g u (J t_. .E BEsaaos @=g 2 w m u. oe a u om w w - i. U 'd 'N SY d d d b .m ---= ' 2 E. c 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 c:::3 9,, 4 s d i m ~ ~ g n c::3 z c::3 ., m 0 a50 i O-= mas = wae e

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0.

R00 l 1:~4:E FIRE. RAT 17.0 !:XPOSED CA3LES 'EE% ={ 8%% E!# dd o E: OEIt'IOIS eEO h ESO SC SR E2 c_ m m om von mm cw >- = INTAKE 553.0 ENTIRE ELEVATION X X PUMPINy"

30.5 ENTIRE ELEVATION X

X STATIO 593.0 ENTIRE ELEVATICN x X 7 705.0 ENTIRE ELEVATICN X X FC** 4 i 4

3-HOUR COMPARTMENTATION PROVI ]ED FOR ERCW FUMP TRAINS.
DETECTORS WITH HEAT COLLECTOR i PROVIDE 0 AB0VE EACH ERCW Pij: P.

l 35416

eue + = *

.e m P00R ORIGINAL I. t

I r ic ri me R - I = 5! FIRE d; M RETAR3"c;T E55 DN U J e IFE' ES E FBE 'CC" CCMPARTMENT CCATI:,3 CF RC'= fi * ., M = ~= e y~y $y g$ 0,EIECICES SUILDING ELEV.

3.

RCOM NAME FIRE. RATING

XPOSED CABLES dj[

gy g ES5 S5 $~5 G5 25 ME X .X RC TURB!f.E

62.5 ENTIRE FLOOR X

X RC No. 7 HEATER CRAIN PU?.PS X X RC i:o. 3 HEATER DRAIN PUv.PS X X RC CONDENSATE B0OSTER PUMPS X X, RC HOTWELL PUMPS X X. RC CABLE INSULATION X X RC EB5.0 ENTIRE FLOOR X X RC CASLE INSULATION ELEVATOR i%CHINERY ROOM 1-1/2 HR. X X RC PURIFICATION ROOM. 1-1/2 HR. X X X RC X X RC DIRTY LUBE OIL TRANSFER PUPP X X RC STATION AIR CCP. X X RC 59 0.0 ENTIRE FLOOR X X X RC ~ ~ ~ FEEDVATER PUMP TURBINE X X RC 706.0 ENTIRE FLOOR X X RC CASLE INSULATION LUBE OIL DISPENSING ROOM l-1/2 HR. X X X RC X X X RC MAIN TURSINE LUBE OIL TANKS X X RC TURBINE LUBE OIL COOLERS ELECTRO-HYDRAULIC CONTROL PUMTS X X RC-X X RC PMIN OIL PUMPS AND PIPING X X X RC l HYDROGEN SEAL OIL UNIT

THE 'URBINE BUILDING IS ONE F IRE AREA WITH EO INTERNAL FIF : CELLS, EXCEPT tie LUBE (IL DISPE; SING ROC 1 AND TH PURIFICATIOi ROOM.

Acal? s P00R BRENM.

-..a-i 5 m ~ su a U O w.- u w u. o ..~.w b c -uW 's cca o o u o. <c cc ce w V* .-l e o SitJVEGAH Q GUVA r o ci ok

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TABLE 1.2 CIRCUITS TO BE RELOCATED FOR UNIT 1 OPERATION Cable or Conduit No. Function Resolution IPL4742B CCS Pump 18-B Supply Relocate conduit to provide minimum IPL4743B 20' separation from train A 2PL4742B CCS Pump 2B-B Supply Relocate conduit to provide minimum 2PL4743B 20' separation from train A IPL47488 CCS Pump 18-B Control Route in conduit from 480V S/D Brds, to 2PL4748B CCS Pump 2B-B Control pumps with 20' minimum separation from redundant train A circuits IPL5025 Reciprocal Charging Route in conduit from 480V S/D Brd. Pump Supply to pump with 20' minimum separation from redundant train A circuits i 1PL5026 Reciprocal Charging Route in conduit from 480V S/D Brd. ~ Pump Control to pump with 20' minimum separation from redundant train A circuits 1PL3021 Reciprocal Charging Route in conduit from 480V vent Brd 1PL3023 Pump Room Cooler to Room Cooler with 20' minimum separation from redundant train A circuits l 1PP800A Pressurizer Heater Route in conduit from cable trays 2PP800A Transformer Supplies AT-A and AS-A at elev 759.0 to elev 734.0 out of area containing train B circuits and back up to press. htrs. on elev 759.0. Sheet 1 of 2 j 36738

TABLE 1.2 (Continued) CIRCUITS TO BE RELOCATED FOR UNIT 2 OPERATION r, t.tn.o u.. ns. Function Resolution 2PL5025 Reciprocal Charging Pump Supply Route in conduit from 480V S/D Brd. to pump with 20' minimum separation from redundant train A circuits. 2PL5026 Reciprocal Charging Pump Control Route in conduit from 480V S/D Brd, to pump with 20' minimum separation from redundant train A circuits. 2PL3021 Reciprocal Charging Pump Room Route in conduit from 480V vent Brd. ~ Cooler to Room Cooler with 20' minimum separation from redundant train A circuits. Sheet 2 of 2 92210'1

TABLE 1.3 CIRCUITS TO BE PROTECTED BY A 1/2 HOUR FIRE RATED BARRIER The following conduits for unit 1 operation shall be wrapped in a 1-inch-thick B&W Kaolwool Blanket in the auxiliary building, from the reactor building containment penetrations at auxiliary building EL 734.0 to the control building Q-line wall penetrations at auxiliary building EL 714.0. These conduits are protected by an automatic sprinkler system. Conduit No. Function IPM100ll Pressurizer level and pressure indication, loops 2 and 3 1PM100211 steam generator instrumentation 1PM10031II IPM1004IV IPM1068I 1PM850l! 1PM1066III 1PM1065III 1PM2142III IPM1067I IPM21281 IPM211111 1PM851II iPM2145IV IPM2080I IPM2084I 1PM21321 1PM2136I 1PM2087II 1PM2091II 1PM210411 1PM21211I IPM21181I 1PM210711 1PM2094III LPM 2098III 1PM2100IV IPM21031V IPM21241V y Sheet 1 of 2 ,c,,, 1-

I-i TABLE 1.3 (Continued) l -l i CIRCUITS TO BE PROTECTED BY A 1/2 HOUR FIRE RATED BARRIER ' ~ i t .The following conduits for unit 2 operation shall be wrapped in a 1-inch-thick B&W Kao wool Blanket in the l auxiliary building, from the reactor building containment penetrations at auxiliary building El 734.0 i to the control building Q-line wall penetrations at auxiliary building El 714.0. These conduits are i protected by an automatic sprinkler system. I. i Conduit No. Function l 2PM100ll Pressurizer level and pressure indication, loops 2 and 3 steam generator 2PM1002II instrumentation 2PM1003III 2PM10041V 2PM2080I i 2PM2084I 1 2PM208711 2PM2091II 2PM2094III I.; 2PM2098III ( 2PM2100lV 2PM2103IV i 2PM2107II [ 2PM2111II 2PM2114II 2PM21241V l 2PM21281 2PM21361 j 2PM2142III I 2PM21451V y Sheet 2 of 2 j t l 922334

~ TABLE 1.4 CIRCUITS TO BE PROTECTED BY 1-1/2 HOUR FIRE RATED BARRIERS The following conduits shall be enclosed by 1-1/2 hour fire rated barriers utilizing a UL-approved configuration from the junction box at UAl, auxiliary building EL 690.0 to UA6, auxiliary building EL 734.0, or to the point where the conduits transition to cable trays where 20-foot minimum separation between trains is achieved. These enclosures are protected by automatic sprinkler systems. Conduit No. Function IPP780A 6900V Power Feed to ERCW 480V XFMR 'IA-A 1PP7858 6900V Power Feed to ERCW 480V XFMR 18-B 2PP780A 6900V Power Feed to ERCW 480V XFMR 2A-A 2PP785B-6900V Power Feed to ERCW 480V XFMR 28-B 1PP712B ERCW Pump N-B Supply IPP7008 ERCW Pump C-B Supply 2PP7008 ERCW Pump M-B Supply 2PP7128 ERCW Pump F-B Supply 1PP675A ERCW Pump A-A Supply IPP687A ERCW Pump Q-A Supply 2PP675A ERCW K-A Supply 2PP687A ERCW H-A Supply 16716

TABLE 1.5 INTERACTIONS IDENTIFIED FOR COLD SHUTDOWN Fix Required in the Event of Fire Interaction Location Redundant Functions Lost Cable Numbers Causing Loss of Redundancy Col. S,A3 El. 669.0

Provide portable blower for room cooling Power to both RHR pump room 1PL3041B coolers IPL3031A Automatic and local control 1PL3043B to both RHR pump room coolers IPL3033B Col U,A7 El. 669.0 Power to both RHR pump room 1PL3041B coolers IPL3031A i

Automatic and local control 1PL3043B i to both RHR pump room coolers 1PL3033A y Col. Q-S, A3-A8

Provide portable blower for room cooling Automatic and local control 1PL3043B for both RHR pump room air 1PL3033A coolers q
Attachment A to Emergency Operating Instruction E01 10 has been written to define procedures for providing and placing into operation a portable blower for room cooling.

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2. Item B - Administrative Procedures, Controls, and Fire Brigade - You plan to use administrative procedures, controls, and fire brigade programs previously accepted by the staff for the return to service of Browns Ferry, Units Nos.1 and 2. We request that you review these procedures against the staff supplemental guidance contained in " Nuclear Plant Fire Protection Function Responsibilitics, Administrative Controls, and Quality Assurance," dated June 14, 1977. It is our position that you either (1) confirm that your existing administrative procedures and fire brigade program meet the staff supplement guidelines, or (2) provide a commitment that they will be revised accordingly. TVA Response We are presently reviewing our administrative procedures, controls, and fire brigade programs against the staff supplemental guidance contained in " Nuclear Plant Fire Protection Function Responsibilities, Administrative Controls, and Quality Assurance," dated June 14, 1977. We plan to revisc these procedures accordingly. ( 682538 ~ 7

{ 3. Item 0, General Guidelines for Plant Protection A. You state that the majority of the materials used will conform to NFPA definitions of noncombustible or limited combustible material. During our site visit, we noted that some materials such as ventilation duct insulation were not UL listed or i FM approved. Therefore, modify your fire hazard analysis to include the limited combustibles or show that these materials will meet the criteria of Section C.4.a(4), BTP ASB 9.5-1, Revision 1. B. For the following listed items substantiate their fire resis-tance capabilities as they pertain to safety-related areas or l high hazard areas by verifying that their construction will be in accordance with a particular fire tested design. Identify the design, test method, and acceptance criteria. (1) Rated fire barriers including floor, ceiling, wall systems, structural members and doors. Indicate the type of protective material used and the design number in reference to ASTM E-119. (ii) Fire dampers and fire doors, including the installation of the same in ventilating ducts penetrating fire barriers of safety related areas; fire door dampers are required in a 3 hr. rated fire bariier penetration. (iii) Fire barrier penetration seals around ducts, pipes, cables, cable trays, and conduit or any other openings. Verify that the seals will meet the 3 hr. requirements for ASTM E-119. Verify that the inplant cable tray supports are similar to the o,es used in the fire tests and that, in case of collapse of the trays, the resultant unsupported load and torque on the penetration seal will not affect the integrity of the seal. C. It is our position that where the fire loadings exceed a 1-1/2 hr. duration (see Table 6-8A, Fire Protection Handbook) and thus, exposes safety related conduit-cables or equipment that such barriers be upgraded to a 3 hr. fire resistance. Confirm that your design will meet this position. D. You have not responded to the Appendix A guidelines concerning fire doors being locked and alarmed. Confirm that you will meet this position. In particular, all fire doors used to protect openings in the wall separating the control building from the turbine building be alarmed and annunciated in the control room. These circuits should be electrically supervised. TVA Response A. The duct insulation installed in safety-related plant areas has been tested by Underwriters Laboratories and has a flame spread rating of 25 and smoke developed rating of 50. TVA did not require the manufacturer to label the duct insulation. l 577043

i B. (i) Compartmentation will be provided in accordance with the SK-1000 series compartmentation drawings. These drawings indicate the boundaries where fire-resistive construction and assemblies will be utilized to maintain the integrity of fire areas and fire cells. Additional infonnation is provided in Table 1-1 showing the minimum fire resistive rating of the most limiting structural componer.ts in each area or cell. A minimum three-hour fire resistive rating has been assigned to the construction between the following buildings: Reactor Building and Auxiliary Building i Control Building and Auxiliary Building Service Building and Auxiliary Building Control Building and Turbine Building The three-hour and 1-1/2-hour rated construction consists of reinforced concrete, reinforced concrete block, or metal j lathe and plaster. Construction ratings are assigned based on the equivalency to similar construction denoted by 1 Figure 6-7H of the NFPA Fire Protection Handbook and/or Data Sheet 1-21, Table 2, of Factory Mutual Loss Prevention Data for reinforced concrete and reinforced concrete block i walls; and Data Sheet 1-21, Table 4, of Factory Mutual Loss Prevention Data for plaster partitions. A minimum three-hour fire rated coating of Pyrocrete 102 is applied to all exposed structural steel within the cable spreading room. Applications are in accordance with UL Design No. X-716 and Code approved design based on Design D-717 (B0CA R.R. 73-42-I-C-1-b). UL-labeled fire door assemblies are provided in opening in most fire cell and fire area boundaries. The assemblies are tested in accordance with UL Standard 10B and have a fire resistance rating at least equivalent to the designated rating of the boundary. The nonlabeled boundar 3.B.(1)-1,3.B.(1)-2,and3.B.(i)ydoorsarelistedinTables -3. These doors a;- identi-fled by number in the SK-1000 series compartmentation drawings. Table 3.B.(i)-1 lists Auxiliary Building special purpose doors which are designed to ASME standards and are of heavy welded steel construction. The doors have multiple side hinges and multiple latch points on the sides, top and bottom. TVA has evaluated these doors and determined that they provide an equivalent fire rating commensurate to the fubl loading in the areas or cells they separate. Table 3.B.(1)-2 lists the security doors in the Main Control Room. The doors are made of bullet-resistant, heavy gauge

teel and have not been tested by UL. However, the door manufacturer has certified that the doors are equivalent to UL tested fire doors rated for three hours.

Table 3.B.(i)-3 lists Auxiliary Building fire-rated door assemblies which will be added in fire wall openings presently containing nonrated doors or no doors. 577044

I l B. (ii) Fire dampers or fire doors will be provided in ventila-tion ducts when the ducts penetrate fire barriers. The fire dampers / doors will have a fire resistance rating equivalent to the designated rating of the installed barrier as identified on the SK-1000 series compartmen-tation drawings. Fire damper / doors provided after the submission of TVA's Fire Protection Program Reevaluation (forwarded to the NRC by letter from J. E. Gilleland to R. S. Boyd dated January 24, 1977) are UL listed and tested in accordance with UL Stan-dards 10B or 555. Fire dampers procured and installed prior to the submission of TVA's Fire Protection Program Reevaluation are not UL labeled. These dampers are listed in Tables 3.B.(ii)-1 and 3.B.(ii)-2. The nonlabeled fire dampers identified in Table 3.B.(ii)-1 conform to the standards of the National Fire Protection Association that existed when the dampers were procured. These fire dampers have since been certified by the manufacturer to be equivalent to their presently manu-factured UL-listed and labeled models. The location of these dampers is show on flow diagrams 47W866-2, -3, -4, and -11. The fire dampers identified in Table 3.B.(ii)-2 are non-labeled fire dampers procured under identical specifications as the fire dampers in Table 3.B.(11)-1, but provided by a different manufacturer. These fire dampers comply with the 1966-1967 requirements of NFPA No. 90A. A detailed comparison of construction features of these dampers with the certified dampers identified in Table 3.B.(ii)-1 is presentedinTable3.B.(ii)-4. Construction features such as the frame design, blade dimensions, blade shaft and bearings, linkage, and materia'Is compare favorably. Therefore, TVA feels that the dampers identified in Table 3.B.(ii)-2 are adequate in their installed configuration to provide the required compartmentation. The location of these dampers is shown on flow diagrams 47W866-2, -3, -4, and -11. Table 3.B.(ii)-3 lists fire dampers which will be added in ventilation ducts penetrating fire barriers presently containing nonrated dampers or no dampers. The location of these dampers is shown on flow diagrams 47W866-2, -3, -4, -8, -9, and -11. As a result of NRC concerns raised during the Sequoyah Nuclear Plant Fire Protection Reivew Meeting of February 12, 1979, additional fire dampers shall be installed in ventilation ducts penetrating the unit 1 auxiliary instrument' room in C.B. and the refueling purification filter rooms in the auxiliary building. The installation schedule is indicated in the SCHEDULE FOR COMMITMENTS. 577045

None of the fire dampers or fire doors have been installed in ventilation ducts in strict compliance with UL 555 or manufacturer's instructions. TVA discussed the installation details for these dampers / doors with the NRC Staff on February 12, 1979. It was agreed that the installation details meet the intent of UL 555 with one exception. TVA has installed two dampers, PCO-39-17A and 0-31A-148, in ventilation ducts inmediately below fire rated ceilings. Each damper will be enclosed in a 1-1/2-hour fire rated barrier that will extend around the ventilation duct to the ceiling. 't 4 064034

B. (iii) The design of the Sequoyah electrical penetration fire stops (EPFS) for cables and cable trays and their installa-tion are based on TVA tests of full-scale mockups that must seal against air pressure. The tested design was modified to provide a greater depth of sealant material 'to give protection equivalent to a 3-hour fire resistance rating. The modification was based on a similar design, using the same type of cables and sealant material, and tests conducted by others to the standard time-temperature curve of ASTM E-119. The design of the wall and floor electrical penetration fire stops through a fire barrier utilize a separate cable sleeve or slot for each cable tray. The design and installation of these penetration fire stops employ Dow Corning 3-6548 silicone RTV (room temperature vulcanizing) foam as the sealant material and inorganic fire barrier materials. From each side of the wall or floor opening, the cables are separated within the cable sleeve or slot using an inorganic fiber. The sealant material is then installed within the cable sleeve or slot. The cable sleeve opening is covered with a fire barrier board that is cut to fit around the cables and cable tray configuration. In addition, the exposed surfaces of cables are coated from the fire barrier board for a minimum distance of five feet or to the nearest electrical panel or enclosure with material similar to Flamemastic 77 that is approved by Factory Mutual Research Corporation. Typical electrical penetration.firestops through walls and floors are shown in Figures 3.B.(iii)-1 and 3.B.(iii)-2, respectively. The bare metal barrier plate in the cable tray wall penetration shown in Figure 3.B.(iii)-1 will be protected or modified to afford a fire rating at least equivalent to that assigned to the installed fire barrier. Conduit penetrations, containing cables, through designated fire barriers, utilize RTV silicone rubber as the sealant material. This material is installed around the cables ) 979730

in either the end of the conduit termination or in the nearest available conduit box on each side of the barrier. Inorganic fiber is used on each side of the sealant material. Spare conduits are plugged or capped until used. The sealant material used in cable tray penetration fire stops is Dow Corning's 3-6548 silicone RTV foam (com-ponents A and B). This material in its cured foam state is noncorrosive and fire resistant. A sample of this material has been tested by an independent laboratory according to ASTM E84, standard method of testing of " Surface Burning Characteristics of Building Materials." The result of the test was that the material has a flame spread rating of 20. The fire barrier material ased in the design and instal-lation of the penetration fire stops employ a combination of inorganic fiber and fiber board similar to Jchns-Manville Cerafiber and Cera Form Board. These materials are made from exceptionally high purity alumina and silica constituents and are capable of withstagding conginuous exposure to a temperature range of 2000 to 2300 F. TVA has conducted fire tests on full-scale assemblies of electrical penetration fire stops that must seal against air pressure. The required differential air pressure across j the penetration under test was maintained by adjusting a nonnal damper together with an exhaust fan in the exhaust duct. An external gas burner was located under the cables outside the area of coated cables. The burner was ignited on the fire side of test facility and allowed to burn for 30 minutes before shutoff. The fire was allowed to self-extinguish; therefore, no water spray test was conducted. The results of the tests were that no fire burned through the penetration onto the cold side of the test facility and pressure seal maintained its integrity. The results from the tests demonstrate that the design provides an effective fire stop and pressure seal under simulated conditions when tested as a completed system. In addition, fire tests on similar designs using the same type of cables and sealant material have been conducted 577046

by others. Test results are recorded in report serial No. 26543 dated October 28, 1975, of Factory Mutual Research Corporation. TVA has dcne a comparative study between the Sequoyah design of cable-cable tray penetration fire stops and cable penetration assemblies tested to f.0TM E-119 in Factory Mutual (FM) report No. 26543. From this study TVA has determined that the Sequoyah cable penetration fire stops are equivalent to those portions of the FM test No. 26543 that passed a 3-hour ASTM E-119 fire test. The installed cable tray supports are similar to those used in the fire tests. From a review of the design of the cable trays supports together with post-test observations of the TVA mockup, we have determined that in case of collapse of trays on the fire side of the barrier, no loss of seal integrity will occur. The design of the inplant cable tray supports are typically shown in Figures 3.B.(iii)-1 and 3.B.(111)-2 for wall and floor penetrations with cable trays, respectively. During the tests conducted by TVA, warpage of the cable trays and supports was observed to occur outside the cable coated area. No visual distortion of the cable trays or their supports was observed at the wall opening following the test. The design of the mechanical penetration fire stops are based on similar designs that use the same type of sealant and daming materials and that have been tested by others to the standard time-temperature curve of ASTM E-119. The design of the mechanical fire stops utilize pipe sleeves for each penetration. Fire stops for pipe and duct pene-trations consist of foamed-in-place Dow Corning 3-6548 silicone RTV foam installed to a depth of 12 inches or the thickness of the wall (minimum 8 inches). A typcial pipe penetration fire stop is shown in Figure 3.B.(iii)-4. In those pipe penetrations where pipe movements are present, a fire stop assembly consisting of a rolled silicone foam coated ceramic fiber blanket is wrapped around the pipe and stuffed into the sleeve on each side of the penetration. Airtight bellows seals are then installed over these fire stops. A typical fire stop of this type is shown in Figure 3.B.(iii)-5. Fire tests on similar mechanical penetration fire stop designs have been conducted by Factory Mutual Research Corporation. 577047

The results are recorded in Factory Mutual Report Serial No. 26543 dat,ed October 28, 1975. The tests were performed fol',cwing the procedures for evaluating floor-ceiling ass'.nnblies as defined under the Standard for Fire Testing of Building Construction and Materials ASTM E-119 (NFPA 251). C. The following safety-related fire cells have been identified fromthefiregazardsanalysisashavingafireloadinggreaterthan i 120,000 Btu /ft (1) Auxilia Instrument Rooms (unit 1, 685.0-C1; and unit 2, 685.0-C4. (2) Cable Spreading Room (706.0-C2). (3) Diesel Generator Rooms (lA-A, 2A-A, 18-B, 28-B). (4) Diesel Generator tube Oil Storage Room. (5) 480V Electrical Board Rooms (lA-A, 2A-A,1B-B, 28-B) (6) Intake Pump Station (El. 705.0 Upper Deck-ERCW Pump Trains) (7) Additional Equipment Buildings TVA will provide equivalent three-hour fire rated compartmentation for these fire cells with the exception of the Diesel Generator Rooms and the Auxiliary Instrument Rooms. The Die ci Generator Rooms and their associated board rooms are not sepat hd by fire barriers. However, the Diesel Generator Room and board room for each diesel generator are separated by three-hour fire,ated barriers from the same rooms of other diesel generators. The unit 1 and unit 2 auxiliary instrument rooms (685.0-Cl and C4) are separated from the Turbine Building and Auxiliary Building by minimum three-hour fire resistant barriers. The Auxiliary Instrument Rooms are separated from each other by two 1-1/2-hour fire resistant barriers, the nonsafety-related computer room, and a corridar. (Refer to compartmentation drawing SK-1006.) Although the fire loading of each Auxiliary Instrument Room exceeds a 1-1/2-hour duration, the fire loading consists mainly of exposed cable insulation in trays and all exposed cabling within the rooms is coated with a fire retardant material similar to Flamemastic 77. 825342 1 r

In addition, each Auxiliary Instrument Room is provided with an automatic total flooding CO system actuated by cross-zoned 2 ionization smoke detectors and rate compensated heat detectors. This is supplemented by a fire hose station located in each stairwell. As indicated in the response to question 21, loss of either Auxiliary Instrument Room does not prevent the ability to achieve and maintain a safe shutdown condition. Due to the above considerations, TVA takes the position that the two as-built 1-1/2-hour fire barriers that separate the safety-related Auxiliary Instrument Rooms are adequate. D. The fire doors listed in Table 3.D-1 are alarmed through the security system's primary alarm station in the gatehouse and secondary alarm station in the control building. Refer to the SK-1000 series of compartmentation drawings for details showing door numbers and column lines. TVA does not propose to supervise the operation of other fire doors. Doors separating the control building from the turbine building are normally closed, heavy equipment doors which are locked and operated by card readers. Operation of these doors (except for flood-pressure door C27) is alarmed in the main control room. All of the heavy equipment doors separating the control and turbine buildings are augmented by 3-hour rated sliding fire doors which are held open by fusible links. There is no alarm capability associated with the sliding ~ fire doors. 501342

TABLE 3.B.(i)-1 Door No. Door Type Elevation Column A55 Flood door 690.0 s-t,Al A57 Flood-pressure door 690.0 r-q,Al A60 Pressure door 690.0 r-s,Al-A2 A64 Pressure door 690.0 u-v,A15-C13 A65 Flood door 690.0 v-w,Al-S1 A77 Pressure door 690.0 u-v,Al-S1 A78 Flood door 690.0 v-w,A15-Cl3 A101 Pressure door 706.0 u-v,A2-A3 A105 Pressure door 706.0 u-v,A13-A14 A112 Flood door 706.0 x-y,A5 All5 Pressure door 706.0 w-x,A6-A8 A123 Pressure door 714.0 t-u,A3 A132 Pressure door 714.0 t-u,A13 l A152 Pressure door 734.0 t-u,AS A153 Pressure door 734.0 t-u,A8 A154 Pressure door 734.0 u-w,A8-A10 A159 Pressure door 734.0 t-u,All A173 Pressure door 734.0 u-x,AS-A6 A184 Pressure door 749.0 r-s,A3-A4 A191 Pressure door 749.0 r-s,Al2-A13 A214 Pressure door 714.0 w-x,Al2-A13 A215 Pressure door 714.0 w-x,A3-A4 l ( 116431

TABLE 3.B.(i)-2 Door No. Door Type Elevation Column C49 Security door 732.0 q,C4-C5 C50 Security door 732.0 q,C9-C10 CSS Security door 732.0 n,C9-C10 C56 Security door 732.0 n,C4 i i 4 r E ( i i f k e i l l l ' 825338

TABLE'3.B.(1)-3 Door No. Elevation Column Remarks (See note) A19 669.0 s-t,A6-A8 (1) A20 669.0 s-t,AS-A6 (1) A37 669.0 w,A8-A10 (1) A38 669.0 w,A10-A11 (1) A82 690.0 q,A4-A5 (1) A83 690.0 r-s,A3-A4 (1) A127 714.0 u-v,A6-A8 (1) A128 714.0 u-v,A8-A10 (1) A183 714.0 w-x,A3-A4 (2) A192 714.0 w-x,A11-A12 (2) Notes: (1) Fire door modifications identified in Nonconformance Report SWP-78-S-2. (2) Modifications resulting from canmitments made in response toquestion3.B.(i).- l 4 4 116316

TABLE 3.B.(ii)-1 TVA Damper No. TVA Drawing No. 0-31 A-12 47W866-4 0-31A-20 0-31A-25 0-31A-26 0-31A-8 0-31A-39 0-31A-159 PC0-39-17A 0-31A-13 0-31A-21 l-31C-792 47W866-3 2-31C-818 1-31C-793 2-31C-819 1-31C-796 2-31C-822 1-31C-794 2-31C-820 1-31C-802 2-31C-828 1-31C-829 2-31C-830 1-31C-800 2-31C-826 1-31C-795 2-31C-821 Tl 1-31C-781 2-31C-807 l-31C-1199 47W866-2 2-31C-1333 47W866-11 1-31C-955-47W866-3 2-31C-955 1-31C-777 2-31C-603 1-31C-957 2-31C-957 H 1-31C-1200 47W866-2 2-31C-1335 47W866-11 501343

4 TABLE 3.B.(ii)-2 TVA Damper No. TVA Drawing No. 1-31C-914 47W866-3 2-31 C-914 1-31 C-908 2-31C-908 1-31C-926 2-31C-926 1-31 C-913 2-31C-913 1-31C-906 2-31C-906 1-31C-941 2-31C-941 1-31C-949 2-31C-949 1-31C-935 2-31C-935 Y 1-31 C-1204 47W866-2 2-31C-1338 47W866-11 1-31C-1206 47W866-2 2-31 C-1337 47W866-11 1-31C-918 47W866-3 2-31C-918 1-31C-919 2-31 C-919 1-31C-916 2-31C-916 1-31 C-921 2-31C-921 y 0-31A-148 47W866-4 l 502074 N

TABLE 3.B.(fi)-3 TVA Damper No. TVA Drawing No. Remarks (Seenote) 0-31A-243 47W866-4 (2) 0-31A-231 0-31A-233 0-31A-241 0-31A-242 0-31A-236 U 0-31A-257 v (1) 1-31C-1219 47W866-2 1-31C-1220 1-31C-1217 1-31C-1218 u 2-31C-1221 47W866-3 2-31C-1222 2-31C-1223 47WE66-11 1 1-31C-611 47W866-8 (2) 2-31C-662 i t 0-30-613 47W866-9 (1) 0-30-594 i (2) Notes: (1) Fire damper modifications identified in Nonconformance Report SWP-78-S-2. (2) Modifications resulting from commitments made in response to question 3.B.(ii). 576923

TABLE 3.B.(11)-4 Dowco Corporation and American Foundry and Furnance Co., Model Ruskin Manufacturing Company Feature FNM-2003-16 (Non-Labeled) Model FD, FD/SS (Certified) Frame 2" x 1/2" x 1/8" HR steel 3-1/2" x 7/8" x 16 ga. (1/16") Design channel - Braced with 1/8" galvanized with internally x 1" steel corner brace braced corners Blade 7" wide maximum,16 ga. 6" wide, 16 ga. galvanized Dimensions galvanized steel steel Blade 7/16" cadium steel shaft 1/2" zinc plated shaft oilite Shaf t and oil impregnated bearings bronze bearings Bearings Linkage 1/4' diameter cadium plated 3/16" x 3/4" steel tiebars CR steel Fusible Yes - 160* Yes - 1600 Link Finish Zincilate-frame mill Mill galvanized galvanized e 4 855292 a

TABl.E 3.D-1 Door No. Building Elevation Column A3 Auxiliary 653.0 t-u,A6-A7 A4 Auxiliary 653.0 t-u,A6-A7 A5 Auxiliary 653.0 u-v,A6-A7 A6 Auxiliary 653.0 v-w,A50A7 A8 Auxiliary 653.0 v-w,A9-A10 A9 Auxiliary 653.0 u-v,A9-A10 A10 ' Auxiliary 653.0 t-u,A9-A10 All Auxiliary 653.0 t-u,A9-A10 A25 Auxiliary 669.0 t-u,A2 A46 Auxiliary 669.0 t-u,A14 All7 Auxiliary 706.0 w-x,A3-A4 All8 Auxiliary 706.0 x-y,A12-A13 A125 Auxiliary 714.0 u-v,A2-A3 A130 Auxiliary 714.0 u-v,A13-A14 A169 Auxiliary 734.0 q-r,All-A12 A170 Auxiliary 734.0 q-r,A11-A12 A172 Auxiliary 734.0 q-r,A8-A10 A181 Auxiliary 749.0 q-r, A6 A182 Auxiliary 749.0 q-r,A4 A194 Auxiliary 749.0 q-r,Al2 A195 Auxiliary 749.0 q-r,A10 A203 Auxiliary 759.0 w-x,A4-A5 A204 Auxiliary 759.0 w-x,A11-A12 A207 Aux 111ary 763.0 s-t,A6-A8 C1 Control 669.0 n-p,C3-C4 C10 Control 669.0 n-p,C9-C10 C12 Control 669.0 n-p,C10-C11 C21 Control 685.0 n-p,C3-C4 C22 Control 685.0 n-p,C6-C7 C23 Control 685.0 n-p,C6-C7 C24 Control 685.0 n-p,C7-C8 C25 Control 685.0 n-p,C10-Cll C30 Control 706.0 n-p,C3-C4 C33 Control 706.0 n-p,C10-C11 C49 Control 732.0 q,C4-C5 C50 Control 732.0 q,C9-C10 1 C51 Control 732.0 n-p,C12-C13 C52 Control 732.0 n-p,C10 CSS Control 732.0 n-p,C9-C10 C56 Control 732.0 n-p,C4-05 825337

s 1 l'J fiW'( li; C.;Uld; jd"U !;I b'.: .-s, b' 1" Jnorr,anic Fire ' A ' A * * '# l'.nrrier l'oard, Cat to ' 4,, # ' Yit Aroted Tray ar.d Cab)c Conficurations !!ozinal 12-inch il-fr.:h (both eltics of woll)n depth of silicone E7 foam') s._ t_. vpb [ Sisa.rc conduit 2 r2 s 6" cchic ciceve: f 9,, n)ceve where V. i.-rr;. ---{f l e.pplicable i % (l" inorge.nic felt

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s Mupport for be.~rtl /.1-it.ch t hli ?. I terrir '- fire b trrier bn. ira er. l / top surrneo (with t _ _'_0 ! _ _ _ i :--- _ c j'y __ g/2-in:S r:ininna ove 'O 1 'O' o,geble cleeva h, H 4 as e A jfQO O O O O O 0 'g.d A l' g {A Cab 3c ciceve! fi er around cabIes,inorr,snic rox l-inch donth Cable typical both endo of cable ricevo TOP PIAH VIEW Coat exposed surfaces i of cables for a r.ini-cu:n distance of 5 feet above and below fira barrier board,icel or to nearest electr pa el with a 3/16-inch e Cable, tray m m se-

1 16-inch thlehr.ess Cable tray support, (v t depth of typical to ablative caterial, (each side)p and bottom.

Nominal 12-inch Silicono RIV fcau }l il inch depth of ( . ): Finished scalant Q.] floor t< MxYXXXE l'(cabic sleeve Embedded Q [ ..'s l 6 t' p. ,..s p,. p. i s ..s N e A A p i, t l < s. i ,A* .g n ,v, p p p a I b b kE7 Support for fire IV x xil X y Y yilX X X Xil W E barrier board } (typical) W W W f 1-inch thick firo barrier board ' Cable tray % ,,,_ l A-A. EIEVATION Figure 3.3."(111)-2 Typical Vertiera Electrical Penetration Fire Stop through Flo.3r with Mr. bedded Cablo Siceve i e ~ r l l l

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4. Item 3.e. - It is our position that fire stops be installed every 20 ft. along horizontal uncoated cable routings in areas not protected by automatic water systems. Between. levels or in vertical uncoated cable chases, fire stops should be 'r ttalled at the mid-height if the vertical run is 20 ft. or more. t less than 30 ft. or at 15-foot intervals in vertical runs of i (t. cr more unless 4 such vertical cable routings are protected by automatic water 4 systems directed on the cable trays. Individual fire stop designs should prevent the propagation of a fire for a minimum period of 30 minutes when tested for the largest number of cable routings and maximum cable density. Confinn that your design will meet this position. TVA Response In areas outside primary containment containing one or both safety-related divisions, all exposed surfaces of cables in horizontal or vertical routings will be coated with a flame-retardant material i i such as Flamemastic 77. Thus, the design meets the stated NRC posi-3 tion and no fire stops will be installed at intervals in horizontal or vertical routings. i 1, ? Y e } 4 i t O l l J

5. Item D.4, Ventilation - Describe the procedure employed for heat and smoke removal using fixed or portable equipment in areas that house systems or components necessary for cold shutdown of the plant. Describe how these areas can be ventilated for manual firefighting purposes. Include a discussion regarding control accesses to ventilation equipment (including fire dampers) as well as the ability to handle high temperature gases and particulates. TVA Response In general, heat and smoke removal capability is provided in areas that house systems or components necessary for cold plant shutdown by the norr31 ventilation systems discussed in FSAR Section 9.4 1 J A developing fire will cause the isolation of these ventilation systems in the immediate vicinity of the fire through the closing of fusible link or fire detector actuated dampers. Smoke venting at this point will be accomplished by the use of portable smoke ejectors. Two ejectors are provided for the use of the fire brigade and each is rated at 7200 cfm. Smoke will be vented from a fire area to adjacent areas, where it will be removed by the normal ventilation systems. Those areas of the plant utilizing recirculating ventilation systems will rely upon portable smoke ejectors exclusively. Due to containment requirements, smoke removal in the reactor building will be provided by the containment purge air system. Should the smoke and fire gas temperautres exceed the capability of the containment purge air system, it will be isolated and smoke removal will be accomplished by the redundant trains of the standy gas treatment systems, i i f 1 e j '577314

6. Jtem D.5,1:ighting and Comunication A. Item (a). You state that adequate emergency lighting system is provided in safety-related areas of the plant. Power supply for the system is from the plant emergency diesel generator. Your proposed emergency lighting system is unacceptable. It is our position that fixed self-contained lighting consisting of fluorescent or sealed beam units with an individual 8 hr. minimum battery power supply be provided in areas that must be manned for safe cold shutdown and for access and egress routes to and from all fire areas. B. Item (d). You indicate that fixed repeaters are being installed in the Sequoyah plant to facilitate the use of portable radio equipment. It is our position, however, that the fixed repeaters should be protected against exposure fire damage using 1/2 hour fire rated barriers such as 1" mineral wool. In addition, verify that the portable radio communica-tion system will be tested to demonstrate that its frequencies will not interfere with the actuation of protective relays. TVA Response A. Item (a). Fixedselh-containedlightingconsistingoffluorescent or scaled beam units with an individual 8 hour minimum battery power supply will be provided in areas that must be manned for safe cold shutdown and for access and egress routes to and from all fire areas. B. Item (d). The protection of fixed radio repeaters by 1/2 hour fire rated barriers such as mineral wool is not feasible since the repeater would be damaged by overheating. It is TVA's position that such protection is not necessary due to the redundancy and physical separation of the repeaters. There are three independent intraplant radio repeater systems at Sequoyah. Two of these systems known as the inplant repeaters, operate with 26 two-channel portable radios (this group includes the six fire brigade portables). One of these repeaters is located in the turbine building and one is located in the auxiliary building, providing multiple fire barriers between systems. The associated protables can address either of these repeaters. The third intraplant repeater system (the public safety service repeater system) consists of one repeater located in the turbine building and 18 portable radios. These portable radios have three channels capable of addressing all three intraplant repeater systems. The public safety service repeater is located on a different turbine building elevation from one inplant repeater and in a different building from the other. The portable radio comunication system will be tested during the preoperational test program to demonstrate that its frequencies will not interfere with other plant systems. 117112

7. Item E.1, Fire Detection - Your description of the fire detection system is incomplete. Describe the type of detector provided for each room or area containing safety related equipment or systems. Also, provide a detailed description of the fire detection system, supported where necessary, by diagrams or appropriate prints (in-clude a single line draiwng from the detection circuits, waterflow alarms, through the subpanels and into the control room). It is our position that primary and secondary power be supplied as follows: A. Using normal offsiste power as the primary supply with a 4 hr. battery supply as secondary supply; and B. Having capability for manual connection to the Class lE emergency power, but within 4 hrs. of loss of offsite power. Such connection should follow the applicable guidelines in Regulatory Guides 1.6, 1.32, and 1.75. Confirm that your design will meet this position. TVA Response The fire detection system complies with the requirements of BTP 9.5-1, Appendix A, and is designed in accordance with NFPA 720 and 72E. The system consists of initiating devices, local control panels, remote transmitter-receivers providing remote multiplex (MUX) functions, and computerized multiplex central control equipment. Refer to Figure 7-1 for a block diagram of the system. The system's initiating devices consist of fire detectors which are identified as to type and location in Table 1-1 and flow alarm pressure switches which are provided for each fixed suppression system. A central processor unit (CPU) communicates with the local control 4 panels via the remote MUX units over looped circuits. The MUX equip-ment allows the processor to interrogate each local control panel in turn and to receive data from the panels. When an initiating device changes from normal to a trouble or alarm status, it is detected at the remote MUX transmitter-receiver and when next interrogated by the central processor will transmit this status change. The change is evaluated by the processor and visual and audible indications provided. An alarm condition results in the following system responses: (1) Sounding of audible devices locally and in the main control room. (2) Illumination of indicating lamps on the local control panel indicating the location of the alarming device. (3) Actuation of local control panel circuits for the control of automatic. suppression systems, fire pumps, fire dampers, fire doors, and ventilation equipment. 577311

(4) Identification of the location and time of receipt of the alarm condition on a cathode ray tube (CRT) display in the main control room and on a line printer in the unit 2 auxiliary instrument room. The fire detection system is electrically supervised as required in NFPA 72D Article 240, for ground and open wiring faults in the detection, power supply, alarm, and data transmission circuits. Electrical supervision of the supplementary output circuitry that actuates fire suppression systems, fire dampers, fire door holders, and ventilation equipment is not provided. However, TVA will check these supplemental circuits every 18 months for operability. Super-vision is Class A in the detection and data transmission circuits and Class B in the local audible alarm circuits. A wiring fault in the supervised circuits results in an audible and visual trouble indi-cation at both the local and control locations. The system is capable of processing and displaying multiple alarm and trouble conditions. A second CPU is provided in the main control rcom as an installed spare. Upon failure of the primary processor, the spare can be connected to the system by jumper cables in less than 30 minutes. The fire detection system is powered from a single 120V ac distribution panel as shown in Figure 7-2. The panel is provided with a manual transfer switch to allow normal or alternate power feed from 480V ac control and auxiliary building ventilation boards lAl-A and 2Al-A, respectively. Both ventilation boards are auto-matically connected after 10 seconds to the emergency diesel generators on loss of offsite power. The system's power supply complies with the applicable guidelines in Regulatory Guides 1.6 and 1.32 and partially complies with Regulatory Guide 1.75 as discussed in FSAR section 8.3. The fire protection power distribution panel will be electrically supervised to provide an alarm in the main control room upon loss of power. The momentary loss of power to the CPU resulting from the transfer to the diesel generators will cause a loss of the CRT display in the main control room. However, when power is restored, all persisting alarm and trouble conditions will be redisplayed. Fire detection system components are located as identified in Table 7.1. Refer to compartmentation drawing SK-1004 for definition of the column lines. The Sequoyah Nuclear Plant Technical Specifications will reflect the requirement for six month surveillance testing of detection circuits from the local panel to the actuated devices, i.e., fire dampers, fire door holders, ventilation equipment or preaction valves as agreed in the resolution of open item 7.a during the meeting of February 12, 1979. e o gg

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TABLE 7.1 Component Building Elevation Column Room Name Central processor unit Control 732.0 p,C7 Main control room and CRT display Line printer Control 685.0 p,C10 U2 aux. inst. room Local control panels

Located throughout plant -----------

Power distribution Auxiliary 734.0 t,A8 6.9 kV shutdown panel board room B 480V cont. and aux. Auxiliary 734.0 t,A3 480V shutdown b1dg. vent board 1Al-A board room 1A2-A Transformer 1 Auxiliary 734.0 u,A2 480V shutdown board room 1Al-A 480V cont. and aux. Auxiliary 734.0 r,A13 480V shutdown b1dg. vent board 2Al-A board room 2A2-A Transformer 2 Auxiliary 734.0 r,A15 480V shutdown board room 2Al-A ) 577313

8. Item E.2.c., Fire Protection Water Supply System - In Section E.2.c you state' that the fire pumps at the Sequoyah Nuclear Plant are electric motor driven and are connectable to the emergency diesel generators. Confirm that these pump motors will be connected automatically to the lE bus, upon loss of offsite power. The required alarms and status are annunciated in the main control room. It is not clear that the pump monitoring system meets the guidelines of BTP 9.5-1, Appendix A. Therefore, verify that the fire punps are individually monitored and the monitoring circuits are electrically supervised. Alarms indicating pump running, driver availability, or failure to start, should be provided in the control room. TVA Response The electric motor-driven fire pump motors are powered by the 480V shutdown boards. Upon loss of offsite power, these boards are auto-matically loaded on the diesels. Two minutes after the power loss, the fire pumps are in turn loaded on the 480V shutdown boards. Supervised alarm circuits will be provided for loss of line pcwer and motor running condition for the fire pumps and will alarm and annunciate in the MCR. The fire pumps are not designed or installed in accordance with NFPA 20. The pumps are vertical, subnersible, turbine-type, electric motor-driven units that meet ASME Section III and Siesmic Category I requirements. 682487 j

i 9. Item E.3, Water Sprinklers and Hose Standpipe Systems A. Item-(a). You state that the fire protection system or plant equipment will be so designed such that a pipe break or a single inadvertent actuation of the fire protection will not prevent the functioning of both trains of the safety-related system. This design arrangement is unacceptable. It is our position that the safety related systems or equipment should be protected against moderate energy line cracks in accordance with BTP APCSB 3-1, by water shields or baffles. B. Item (d). Verify that the hose station will be able to reach any locations that contain or present a fire hazard to safety related equipment with at least one hose not over 100' long. C. Your submittal does not indicate the hourly fire rating of the protected openings in the stairwell. Indicate their hourly fire ratings.. D. Throughout your fire hazards analysis, you state that sprinkler systems will be ~1 stalled in various areas of the plant. We observed during our site visit that the sprinkler systems were installed at the ceiling level. However, no provisions were made to locate sprinkler heads clear of overhead obstructions, especially in areas housing the auxiliary feed- ) water pumps and the component cooling water pumps. It is our i position that where such systems are to be installed that additional sprinkler heads be provided below any obstructions to obtain minimum interference to dishcarge patterns of the sprinkler heads on the floor below. TVA Response A. The Sequoyah fire protection systems in safety-related areas are seismically qualified, preaction sprinkler systems. They are i charged with water only when cross-zoned detectors (smoke and smoke; smoke and thermal) are actuated. Areas provided with cross-zoned smoke and thermal detection that actuate l preaction sprinkler systems are identified in Table 9.1. Due to the inherent tendency of smoke detectors to drift toward their alarm setpoint with time, cross-zoning provides an additional margin of safety against spurious application of water to safety-related equipment. In addition, low pressure i air superision of the sprinkler system is provided in areas containing sensitive electrical equipment. If system integrity is not maintained, the supervision air pressure is lost and annunciation is provided in the MCR. Water shields are also provided in areas where actuation of the suppression systems could unacceptably impair safety-related equipment. This design philosophy complies fully with BTP APCSB 3-1, Sections B.1 and B.3a which require protection of essential systems and components against postulated piping failures in high or moderate energy fluid systems that operate during normal plant conditions. In general, the cross-zoning technique utilizes two detectors in the same area that a single detector would normally occupy if-located in accordance with UL spacing guidelines. Based on this i l i 117113/-064039 l

detection z'one overlap, TVA is satisfied that preaction valve actuation will be accomplished prior to the fusing of any sprinkler heads. B. All areas of safety-related structures are within reach of fire hose stations equipped with 100' of hose. C. The protected stairwells in the control building have equivalent 1-1/2 hour rated reinforced concrete and concrete block construction. The plaster partition assemblies above the fire doors have a fire resistive rating at least equivalent to that assigned the wall construction. Fire barrier seals around pipe penetrations in the stairwells are in accordance with the designs discussed in 3.B. There are no cable tray or ducts penetrating the stairwells. D. Additional sprinkler heads shall be provided or existing heads relocated in order to clear overhead obstructions and obtain minimum interference patterns where possible. l s .l f 117114 c

TABLE 9.1 CROSS-ZONED SM0KE AND THERMAL DETECTORS The following areas are provided with cross-zoned smoke and thermal detectionthatactuatesthepreactiongprinklersystems. The thermal 4 detector's setpoint temperature is 135 F. Refer to the compartmentation drawings SK-1000 series for room locations. Protected Area Building Elevation Room No Auxiliary Feedwater Pump 1A-A Rm Auxiliary 669.0 A6 Charging Pump 1A-A Rm Auxiliary 669.0 A9 Charging Pump 18-B Rm Auxiliary 669.0 A10 Charging Pump 1C Rm / Auxiliary 669.0 All Safety Injection Pump 1B-8 Rm Auxiliary 669.0 A12 Safety Injection Pump 1A-A Rm Auxiliary 669.0 A13 Safety Injection Pump 2A-A Rm Auxiliary 669.0 A19 Safety Injection Pump 28-B Rm Auxiliary 669.0 A20 Charging Pump 2C Rm Auxiliary 669.0 A21 Charging Pump 2B-B Rm Auxiliary 669.0 A22 Charging Pump 2A-A Rm Auxiliary 669.0 A23 Auxiliary Feedwater Pump 2A-A Rm Auxiliary 669.0 A26 PS0 Engineers' Shop Control 732.0 C16 Record Storage Rm Control 732.0 Cl4 Shift Engineers' Office Control 732.0 C11 Chart Storage Control 732.0 C10 Instrument Calibration Rm Control 732.0 C9 Locker Rm Control 732.0 C6 Toilet Control 732.0 C5 Kitchen Area Control 732.0 C4 Mechanical Equipment Rm Control 669.0 C10 250V Battery Rm No. 2 Control 669.0 C6 250V Battery Rm No.1 Control 669.0 C3 Mechanical Equipment Room Control 669.0 C1 l

808132: 10. Safety related pumps of both trains for both Unit 1 and Unit 2 are contained in the Auxiliary Building elevation 653' and 660' area. Each train is in its own room; however, no fire rated door separates the room from the corrioor and adjacent pump rooms.

It is our position that each room be provided with a 3-hr. fire rated door, mounted in an approved fire rated frame to properly protect the room. In lieu of fire rated doors, provide a wet pipe sprinkler system to completely cover the corridor separating Unit No.1 from Unit No. 2. The sprinkler system should alarm and annunciate in the control room. TVA Response Three-hour fire doors are provided for each of the eight openings from safety-related pump rooms. At the time of the NRC site visit, these doors had not been installed. 1 1 e 117115

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11. On elevation 690' of the auxiliary building at Al ar.i U, all four power cables (both trains of both units) of the ERCW pump from the yard pump house come into a metal enclosure mounted on the concrete wall approximately 10 ft. above the floor. Each cable within the junction box is separated by a metal baffle.

From the enclosure, the cables are run in conduits and go up the wall and through the ceiling. We were informed that at the ceiling, all the conduits are supposed to be buried in concrete back to the switchgear room of the various trains and units. 1 It is our position that: A. Verify that these conduits are actually buried back to their switchgear rooms from the ceiling level above the junction box. B. A 3-hr. fire rated barrier be insta? led around the metal enclosure as well as around the conduits located on the wall above the enclosure and terminating at the ceiling to protect against potential exposure fires. In addition, we are concerned that the metal enclosure and metal baffles are inadequate to prevent an electrically initiated fire that may damage all power cablings in the enclosure. Revise your design of the metal enclosure and metal baffles to protect the cables such that an electrically initiated fire will cause damage to no more than one power train. TVA Response A. The conduits are not buried back to their switchgear rooms from the ceiling level above the junction box. The conduits ascend from the junction box to elevation 734.0 embedded only as they penetrate floor slabs. On elevation 734.0 the conduits terminate in cable trays that extend to the switchgear. B. In lieu of the 3-hour fire rated barriers, TVA will provide a 1" mineral wool barrier between the redundant power cables in the junction box as protection against an electrically initiated fire. The outside of the junction box and the four redundant power conduits routed between elevation 690' and 734' will be protected bj 1-1/2-hour fire rated barriers utilizing a UL-approved configuration. As indicated in the response to position 13.C, TVA will provide sprinkler coverage for the_ area around the component cooling water pumps and the ERCW pump cable junction box. ~ e 577315

~_. 9

12. During our site visit we noticed numerous places where redundant safety related cable trays as well as conduits were in close proximity to each other. This was noticed on almost all elevations.

Some of these locations are to have flamemastic and preaction sprinkler systems installed at the interaction. At the time of the site visit the function of these various cables-conduit could not be i detennined at these interactions. It is our positon that: A. Identify all such interactions in the areas of both Units 1 and 2 where the redundant safety related trains are within 4 20 ft. of each other. Also, the consequence of electrically initiated or exposure fires should be evaluated with regard 1 to plant shutdown capability (see item 1). B. For those areas indicated in item (A) above, where a fire can affect the plant shutdown capability, an area automatic j 1 l sprinkler system should be provided to afford protection against exposure fires. Also, a 1/2-hr. fire rated barrier such as 1" of mineral wool should be provided to separate one i safety related train from the other or from a common exposure fire source. The sprinkler system should alarm and annunciate l in the control room. f TVA Response } A. The criteria for the separation of Class 1E equipment and circuits basically meet RG 1.75, revision 0, although it was issued after the Sequoyah design was complete. The criteria used in the design for the separation of redundant cable trays at Sequoyah in general plant areas'are as follows. Redundant cable trays are separated a minimum of 3 feet horizontally, and a minimum of 5 feet vertically, except where trays containing cables of different divisions of separation cross. Where redundant cable trays cross, there is a minimum vertical separation of 12 inches (tray top of lower tray to tray bottom of upper tray) with the bottom tray covered with a solid steel cover and the top tray provided with a solid steel bottom for minimum distance of 3 feet on each side of the tray crossing. In the auxiliary building, each cable tray tier may contain a combination of nondivisional trays together with trays of only one division. As a result of the reevaluation of the Sequoyah fire protection program, it was detennined that in most fire cells,. containing redundant division of systems, the installed combustibles consisted of cable insulation and jacket materials. New criteria t were developed to identify and protect redundant circuits, whether ~ installed.in conduits and/or cable trays within a 5-foot radius of the point of interaction. This distance was established as the most. i credible. zone of influence for an electrically initiated fire. r l 117116. f

4 1 Following this 5-foot criterion, approximately 50 percent of the cable trays in the auxiliary building were identified as needing protection. The areas of divisional interactions are shown as hatched cable trays in figures 12-1 through 12-5. The hatched trays represent both tray-to-tray and tray-to-conduit divisional interactions. In each reactor building annulus there are 15 divisional interactions, in the cable spreading room there are 44 divisional interactions, and in each auxiliary instrument room there are 4 divisional interactions. Following a 20-foot criterion, between 75 and 80 percent of the trays will be involved in divisional interactions within the reactor building annulus, the auxiliary building, the cable spreading room, and the auxiliary instrument room. For example, in units 1 and 2 areas of the auxiliary building, the divisional interactions of redundant safety-related trains that are within 20 feet of each other are shown shaded in figures 12-6 through 12-10. The present design requires that the exposed surfaces of cables in the identified trays (bcth divisional and nondivisional) be coated with a flame-retardant material such as Flamemastic 77 for a 5-foot radius from the point of interaction (or to the nearest wall, floor, or ceiling). In addition, fixed suppression systems are provided for these interactions. TVA has evaluated the consequences of fires with regard to plant shutdown capability. Electrically initiated fires are judged to be acceptable based on the results of tests conducted at [ Sandia Laboratories and the commitment to add a fire-retardant coating to cables as discussed in the response to question 4. The tests demonstrate that a fire initiated in a shorted cable will not propagate to cables in adjacent trays and that cable coatings are effective in restricting fire propagation. The consequences of~ exposure fires are discussed in the response to question 1. B. TVA has provided automatic sprinkler systems for the protection of redundant circuits at interaction points based on the 5-foot criterion. Automatic sprinkler coverage is also provided for areas containing fixed combustibles which could impose an exposure fire threat to equipment, components, or circuits necessary to achieve safe plant shutdown. As indicated in the response to question 9.D, additional sprinkler heads shall be provided or existing heads relocated in order to clear overhead obstructions and obtain minimum interference patterns where possible, and additional suppression systems will be provided as described in the responses.to questions 1 and 13. TVA's present design philosophy provides for the alam and annunciation in the main control room of the operation of all fixed' suppression systems. See the response to question 1 for a discussion of the measures . roposed for protection of. redundant safety-related circuits required p for safe shutdown. e e 36735 .L. [.. 4

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13. On elevation 690' of the auxiliary building at coordinate A-3 and T, all five (two from each unit and one swing) component cooling water pumps are located together. Adjacent to these safety related pumps are the two motor driven auxi.11ary feedwater pumps (both trains), of Unit 1, which are also safety related. Both Unit flo. 2 auxiliary feedwater pumps are located approximately 125' away down the corridor at coordinates A-12 and S.
Power operated control valves for the component cooling water (CCW) pumps are located immediately above the CCW pumps on an open grating mezzanine. Various safety related cable trays are also located in the area. A preaction sprinkler system is proposed for the ceiling level only and would offer very little protection against an exposure fire due to the many obstructions between the ceiling level sprinkler and the floor below. It is our position that: A. A half hour fire rated barrier be provided between the redundant auxiliary feedwater pumps and extend up to the mezzanine above these pumps. At present, a metal decking barrier is used to partially separate each auxiliary feedwater pumps. This applies to both Unit 1 and 2 pumps. B. Provide automatic sprinkler protection under the partition above the auxiliary feedwater pumps of both Urit 1 and 2. Activation of the system should alann and annunciate in the control room. C. Provide automatic sprinklers over all five component cooling water pumps under the mezzanine above them. D. Provide a 1/2-hr. fire ratt.c
rier separating each component cooling water pump from each Gner.
The barrier should extend to the underside of the mezzanine above. Also provide a 1/2-hr fire rated barrier for the mezzanine floor above these pumps. The 1/2-hr. fire rating should protect against a fire from either side of the barrier. E. Provide a 1/2-hr. fire rated barrier protection (1" mineral wool or equivalent) for the control and power supplies to the various valves on the mezzanine level above the component cooling water pumps. F. Provide additional smoke detection throughout the area for early detection. Detection should be tied into the existing fire alann system and alarm and annunciate in the control room. G. Verify that the existing hose station location will be sufficient with the above fire rated barriers in place for protection of all pumps and valves. 117119 I
TVA Response A. The auxiliary feedwater system contains two motor-driven pumps (those described in the above question) and a steam turbine-driven pump (located on elevation 669). Since any one of these pumps has sufficient capacity to establish and maintain a safe shutdown, the loss of both motor-driven pumps to a fire is an acceptable event. Hence, fire rated barriers between pumps are not required. See discussion of steam generator inventory control in response to question 1. B. Automatic sprinkler protection will be provided under the pipe break barrier for the units 1 and 2 motor-driven auxiliary feedwater pumps. C. Automatic sprinkler coverage will be provided under the mezzanine for all five component cooling water pumps. Sprinkler heads will be a fast-response type and tested according to UL 199. Heat collectors will be provided for each sprinkler head. Sufficient heads will be provided to cover the entire general area at the mezzanine level with the maximum distance between heads of eight feet. D. A single fire barrier will be provided between train A and train B component cooling water pumps. The fire barrier will extend approximately three feet above the highest point on the pumps and have a minimum 1/2-hour fire resistance rating. E. Control and power supply cables that are required for safe shutdown and that are located on the mezzanine level above the component cooling water pumps will be protected as discussed in the response to question 1. F. Additional smoke detection will be provided to actuate the proposed sprinkler systems and to ensure early warning of a fire. Detection circuits will be Class A supervised in accordance with NFPA 720. G. Existing fire hose capability is sufficient to reach all equipment l within the area of the component cooling water pumps and motor-driven auxiliary feedwater pumps with no more than 100 feet of hose. i i 1 1 36734 _m
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14. The emergency raw cooling water pump house is separated into three compartments with train A of both units located on either end and train B of both units located together in the middle compartment.
It is our position that the following be provided for the ERCW pump house. I A. Provide a 3 hr. fire rated door to separate the center compart-ment from the south compartment. The door should be alarmed j and annunciated in the control room. B. Provide a 1/2-hr. fire rated partial barrier to separate the j two B trains in the center compartment. Barriers should be f l at least 6" high. TVA Response A. A 3-hour rated fire door is provided between the center and south compartments of the intake pumping station containing the ERCW pumps. At the time of the NRC site visit, the door had not 4 been installed. The door shall be locked in its nonnally closed position with the keys administratively controlled. Therefore, alarm and annunciation of the door is not necessary. B. It is TVA's position that the present compartmentation in the CCW intake pumping station is adequate based on the following discussion. i The NRC's understanding of the ERCW system appears to be incomplete. Sequoyah's ERCW system is a two-train, nonunitized system. Each of tha two trains contains four 50-percent capacity pumps in the CCW intake pumping station and four 50-percent capacity pumps in the ERCW pumping station. Figure -14.1 is a single-line drawing i of the two supply headers and the pumping stations. Note that in each pumping station, all pumps of a given train feed a connon header. For distribution purposes, two headers do branch off of each coninon header, both of these are required for operation of either unit (with single failure capability) as each serves not i only unit loads but also essential common plant loads. ) For unit one operation, all ERCW loads will be supplied by four pumps located at the CCW intake pumping station. The other four pumps at this station will never be used. When construction of the new ERCW pumping station is completed, some time before ur.it two operation, all ERCW pumps at the CCW intake pumping station will be abandoned. See Figures 14.1 and 14.2 to identify which pumps will be in service and to which diesel they may be loaded. Figure 14.3~ depicts the pump and header arrangement for the new ERCW pumping station. Sequoyah's two-train, nonunitized system is more fully described in Section 9.2.2 of the FSAR (see Figures 9.2-11, 9.2-15a, 9.2-20, ud 9.2-20a). It has been reviewed and found to be acceptable i by the'NRC's APCSB Branch.
117121
Additionally, the two required B train pumps in the central compart-ment of the CCW intake pumping station are located approximately 30 feet apart. This special separation precludes the need for any barrier. Thermal spot detectors and heat collectors will be provided immediately above each ERCW pump in both the CCW intake pumping station and the ERCW pumping station to provide early warning fire detection capability. o a 1 ) 1 i l l l 855293
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15. All four wood and PVC cooling towers for the Auxiliary Essential Rad Cooling Water System are located within 50 ft. of the emergency diesel generator building and approximately within 50 ft. from the two large diesel fuel oil storage tanks (also located approximately within 50 ft from the emergency diesel generator building and approximately 50 ft. from the AERCW pumps). These cooling towers are not protected by a deluge system. We are concerned that a fire in the cooling towers can threaten the diesel generator building, the diesel storage tanks, and the auxiliary essential raw cooling water pumps. It is our position that the cooling towers be protected in accordance with Section D.18 of Appendix A, i.e., providing deluge system, hydrants, and hose stations.
TVA Response TVA is not providing a deluge system or hose stations for the four auxiliary essential raw cooling water (AERCW) cooling towers for the following reasons: A. The AERCW system will also serve as interim backup to the ERCW system until the pennanent modifications discussed the response to questions 1 (table 1.4) for protection of circuits within the ERCW junction box on auxiliary building floor El. 690.0 and conduits exiting the junction box to El. 734.0 are completed and until completion of the new ERCW pumping (pumps and cooling towers) is station discussed in the response to question 14. The AERCW system required to shutdown the plant only upon loss of Chicamauga Dam (the downstream dam). The safety feature will be transferred to the new ERCW station when it is completed (prior to unit 2 operation). B. The diesel genrator building is about 50 feet from the closest tower (the distances of the other towers are 120, 200, and 280 feet). This distance is great enough so that an AERCW cooling tower fire would not constitute a hazard to this structure. The diesel generator building is a seismic 1A structure, designed to be tornado and missile resistant and its exterior walls are equivalent to at least a 3-hour rated fire barrier. C. The yard storage fuel oil tanks are 70 feet away from the closest cooling tower (distances to remaining towers are 75, 120, and 180 feet). This separation distance is sufficient such 'that an AERCW cooling tower fire would not constitute an exposure hazard to these tanks (see table 4-4, NFPA 30). The fuel oil tanks are diked and yard hydrant and hose / equipment capabilities are provided for the entire area. Further, the yard fuel oil tanks serve no safety function. The safety-related diesel seven-day tanks are embedded in concrete under the diesel generator building. D. Salient features of the cooling tower design are as follows: a. The use of fire retardant, corrugated fiberglass casing and louvers. b. Fire retardant glass reinforced polyester fan cylinder. c. PVC fill and eliminators with a flame spread rating of ~ 25 or less. 117122
16. It is our position that when the C0 total flooding system is locked 2 out local ~ly in any emergency diesel generator room that the operator in the control room receives an alarm and annunciator indicating that the system is inoperative. TVA Response A common MCR alarm and annunciation will be provided for the train A Emergency Diesel Generator Room and 480V Board Room C0 systems to indicate when any system is locked out locally. IdentTcal alarm and 7 annunciation capability will be provided for the train B Emergency Diesel Generator Room and 480V Board Room CO systems. 2 t 117123
l 17. A. The corridor outside each diesel generator room of the emergency diesel generator building has a preaction sprinkler system. Power conduits from each diesel run up the west wall of the corridor. A concrete barrier extending out approxi-mately 3 ft. from the west wall separates the redundant power trains. Unit No. 1 power conduit is located at one end of the corridor and Unit No. 2 at the opposite end. It is our position that a 1-1/2 hr. fire rated barrier separate each redundant train of each unit from each other in the corridor for protection against an exposure fire in the event of failure of the sprinkler system. It is also our position that the doors leading to each emergency diesel generator from the corridor be kept in the closed positon (at all times) and alanned and annunciated in the control room. B. Also verify that a fire in any one of the four switchgear rooms above the corridor of the diesel generator building, elevation 740 ft., will not involve cables and/or conduit for any other safety related train or unit. TVA Response A. The NRC understinding of the conduit assignment is in error. Unit 1 and unit 2 train A power conduits are located on the north end of the corridor, and unit 1 and unit 2 train B conduits are located on the south end of the corridor. There is approximately 50 fcet separation between train A and train B conduits. TVA considers the spacial separation to be adequate for fixed and transient fire hazards located in the area. Lubricating oil with a flash point of 465 F will be transported between the lube oil storage room and the diesel generator rooms in 55-gallon drums. If the contents of one or more drums were spilled in the corridor, the oil would run to the center of the corridor and out of the building through a 24-inch drain line. In the unlikely event that this oil were to ignite, the fire could affect the conduits of one train only, approaching the conduits of the.second train by no closer than 25 feet. A flammable liquid fire in the lube oil storage room, fuel oil transfer pump room, or any diesel generator room would present minimum danger to the conduits since each room is provided with a carbon dioxide suppression system, 3-hour fire rated compartmentation, floor drains, and curbs across the door's opening into the corridor. The hazard from the fuel oil transfer pump room is fu. ther minimized by the transfer pump's local control station which must be manned continuously when the pump is in service. Normally closed, 3-hour rated fire doors will be provided for the opening leading to each emergency diesel generator room from the corridor. The sliding fire doors presently installed will be removed. It is TVA's position that the fire doors require no supervision. 116200
B. There are.no cable trays and/or conduit that penetrate switchgear rooms of opposite divisions. 855294
18. We were informed at the time of the site visit that an alternative means of achieving cold shutdown if both redundant trains of conduit-cable trays (of both units) are lost due to a fire in the control room, or cable spreading room or remote shutdown panel room.
In order to evaluate this alternative, we require a description of how the alternate shutdown method for each area will be carried out, system modifications associated with the shutdown method, and confinnation that written procedures have been established for immediate use by responsible individuals. The staff position with respect to providing alternate or dedicated shutdown methods for fire protection is stated in Enclosure 1. Provide information that demonstrates that the requirements of Enclosure 1 will be satisfied. TVA Response Emergency Operating Instruction E01-7, Control Room Inaccessibility, provides for safe plant shutdown from the auxiliary control room should the main control room become inaccessible due to a fire (or for other reasons such as toxic gas, etc.) in either it, the spreading room, or Auxiliary Instrument Room. This instruction provides a discussion of symptoms, automatic actions, immediate operator act.fon, subsequent operator action, and recovery for: (a) control room inaccessibility at power or hot standby; (b) control room inaccessibility at hot shutdown, cold shutdown, or refueling shutdown; (c) hot standby to cold shutdown in the auxiliary control mode; and (d) return to main control rrom operation from test of E01-7. E01-7 and all E0I's have been submitted to NRC Region 2 Office of Inspection and Enforce-ment for review. The auxiliary control room has been divided into five independent compartments (a central control area and four transfer switch rooms) which are separated from each other by 1-1/2 hour fire rated barriers. The central control area is the only room where a fire could affect both safety trains. Panels and cables in the central area are normally inactive and their loss would have no effect upon plant control. A fire in one of the other four rooms could affect only a single train and would not prevent safe shutdown from the main control room. TVA will comply fully with all Staff positions in enclosure 1. Compliance with Sections 1.1 through 1.7 will be provided by dedicated shutdown methods or repair procedure: for fires located in any area of the plant except the Main Control Room, the Cable Spreading Room, or the Auxiliary l Instrument Rooms. Compliance for these areas is provided by alternate shutdown methods and E0I-7. Fire protection equipment and features will be provided that will meet the requirements of Sections 2.1 and 2.2. Standard Operating Instruction SOI 67.2 has been written to incorporate procedures for placing the AERCW system into operation in the event of l loss of normal ERCW system function. These procedures satisfy the requirements for interim protective measures specified in section 2.3. l 979030
19. It is our position that thc-ventilation system of each safety-related battery room be alarmed and annunciated in the control room upon failurelof such systems. Confirm that you will meet this position. TVA' Response Redundant ventilation systems are provided for each safety-related battery room. Failure of one system results in an alarm and annunciation in the main control room and the automatic starting of. the second system. i 1 4 b 9 -117102.
20. Control Room Complex A.
Provide the flamespread, smoke developed, and fuel contributed test results as'per E-84 of the dropped plastic ceiling in the control room. We were informed at the time of the site visit that this ceiling was a UL-approved dropout ceiling. Verify that the ceiling material meets the guidelines of Section C.4.a(4) of Revision 1 to BTP 9.5-1 or replace it with a ceiling material that does. B. It is our position that you provide a 3-hour fire rated barrier at T5 and T12 on the ends of the control. room. Present doors are not labeled as well as openings are above the suspended ceiling into the corridor. Verify that the doors are of 3-hour fire rated construction and that 3-hour fire doors / dampers are used in all ventilation duct penetrations where they penetrate the 3-hour barrier. C. The main safety-related consoles actually extend through the floor three to four feet into the cable spreading room. These are completely enclosed with metal walls and floor. A 3-hour fire rated coating is to be applied to the sides and bottom of these consoles from the cable spreading room side only. There is no fire rating from the control room side. The consoles are congested with cables (all non-IEEE-383 rated) e.nd would make manual firefighting difficult. It is our position that taking the above factors into consider-ation and providing a defense-in-depth protection that an auto-matic or local manual operated gas suppression system (either high or low pressure CO or halon) be provided for protection of these 2 consoles. D. Verify that the sprinkler system for protection in the records storage area conforms to NFPA 13. It was noted that the riser nipples appear to be 1/2-inch pipe, which is not permitted by NFPA 13. Also, verify that the wall separating the records storage room frc.n the relay room is of 3-hour fire rated con-struction, including protection of all duct penetrations. TVA Response A. The dropped plast'ic ceiling in the main control room is constructed of molded prismatic acrylic plastic (plexiglas G) panels. These panels have not been tested under ASTM E84 test and are not listed by UL in the Building Materials' i)irectory. The following test results are based on te,ts conducted on plexiglas G according to the designated standards: 1. Flammability rate of 1.9 inches per minute in accordance with ASTM D 635. 2. Minimum self-ignition temperature of 453 C in accordance with ASTM D 1929-68. 561981
3. Maximum smoke density of 10 in accordance with ASTM D 2843-70. 4. Deflection temperature of 75 C in accordance with A3TM D 648-56. 5. Plexiglas G is listed as a slow burning plastic material by UL as designated on UL cards MH4833A and 3, and Guide QLZQ2 dated March 18,1971. There are no safety-related equipment or cabling located above the dropped ceiling. i B. The control room coreplex is separated from the other plant areas by minimum 3-hour fire rated construction. Within the complex, the peripheral rooms are generally separated from the main control room by 1-1/2-hour fire rated construction. One-and-one-half hour fire separation between the main control room and the remaindar of the control room complex satisfies the requirements of section C.6.b of Regulatory Guide 1.120, Revision 1. Refer to control building elevation 732.0 on compartmentation drawing SK-1007 for the layout of the control room complex. The Sequoyah Nuclear Plant Fire Protection Program Reevaluation indicates that the fire load in the kitchen area exceeds the fire rating of its enclosure. This docomentation is in error since it is based on the use of wooden cabinets which have been replaced by metal cabinets. The mechanical equipment room on elevation 732.0 contains venti-lation equipment that is essential for continued operation of the main control room. Therefore, the equipment room is considered an extension vf the main control room fire cell. The two rooms are connected by ventilation ducts located above the suspended ceiling for the housekeeping area between columns C2 and C4. These ducts do not penetrate a fire barrier and are not provided with fire dampers. The housekeeping area is separated from the main control room, the mechanical equipment room, and the essential ventilation ducts for the main control room by 1-1/2-hour rated suspended ceilings and fire walls. The ventilation supply ducts penetrating the ceiling of the housekeeping area consisting of the shift engineer's office, instrument calibration shop, toilet and locker area, and the kitchen area are not provided with fire dampers at the ceiling penetration. Smoke dampers actuated by ionization smoke detectors are provided in the main supply trunk above the 1-1/2-hour fire rated ceiling for each of these areas. These dampers are UL listed and have a 1-1/2-hour fire rating. Upon detection of smoke in any of the housekeeping area rooms, the dampers in the main supply trunk to the affected room or rooms will be isolated thereby closing off supply air to the room or rooms without interrupting essential ventilation supply to the main control room. e 9 m /5 a ss
Return air ducts from the chart storage room and instrument calibration room are also provided with a rated smoke detector actuated. damper in the main return trunk above the suspended ceiling. Isolation of this damper will prevent smoke in these rooms from returning to the control room complex air-handling units thereby preventing contamination of the main control room. Return ventilation from the shift engineer's office is through a louver in the wall to the corridor and back to the mechanical equipment room. The louver in the wall between the shift engineer's office and the corridor is provided with a 1-1/2-hour fire rated damper. A glass window between the shift engineer's office and the corridor is provided with a 1-1/2-hour rated roll-up fire shutter which is released by a fusible link. Exhaust ventilation for the kitchen area and the toilet and locker rooms is through an exhaust fan located in the mechanical equipment room exhausting to the outside through the control building roof. No fire dampers are provided for these ducts. Additional detector-actuated rated fire dampers are provided between the corridor and the mechanical equipment room to prevent smoke present in the corridor from entering the mechanical equipment room, and in the return air duct within the mechanical equipment room supplying 5200 cfm makeup air to the main control room air-handling units to prevent smoke present in the mechanical equipment room from entering the main control room. The relay room is separated from the main control room by 1-1/2-hour rated fire wall that extends through the suspended ceilings. Refer to part D. of this response for a discussion of the separation between the relay room and the record storage room. All fire barrier openings are provided with appropriately rated, UL-labeled assemblies except the previously mentioned housekeeping area ventilation supply ducts and door openings C55 and C56 (refer to drawing SK-1007) which contain special purpose security doors. These doors are made of bullet-resistant, heavy gauge steel and have not been tested by UL. However, the manu-facturer has certified that the two doors are equivalent to UL-tested fire doors rated for three hours. The above-described fire rated separation and smoke control provide adequate protection of the main control room from a fire originating in the peripherial areas of the control room complex. As described 1 in the response to question 20.C, loss of the main control room is an acceptable event since reactor shutdown can be accomplished from the backup control room located in the auxiliary building. C. Automatic smoke detection is provided within the control room consoles to provide the earliest possible indication of a fire. Portable halon and pressurized water fire extinguishers are j provided within the main control room and manual fire hose backup capability is provided immediately outside the room in accordance with the requirements of BTP 9.5-1, Appendix A. ) l 577977/ 5770 % W.
The control room consoles cortain only low-voltage cable, which minimizes. the possibility of internally generated fires. The consoles are provided with full access doors on the rear of the panels which afford access to the lower recessed portions of the consoles with an extinguisher or fire hose nozzle. With early detection capability in the control room consoles, a fire can be detected and extinguished in the incipient stage with mininal effect on equipment and electrical circuits. Should a fire occur that develops beyond the capability of the extinguishing equipment, the main control room can be abandoned and reactor shutdown accomplished from the backup control room located in the auxiliary building. It is TVA's position that a gaseous suppression system is not necessary for the main control room consoles. Access inside the consoles for manual firefighting would be no better for a gaseous hose system than for a water system. In addition, a gaseous system would not be particularly effective against a deep-seated fire which is the most likely fire condition to occur in the consoles. In order to make a gaseous system effective, excessive amounts of the gas would be required and could result in the unnecessary evacuation of the Main Control Room. D. The 1/2-inch riser nipples will be replaced with 1-inch nipples to conform to NFPA 13 in the records storage area. The wall separating the records storage room from the relay room is of 1-1/2-hour fir; rated construction including 1-1/2-hour rated fire dampers in duct penetrations. J k -e** mmmee i
21. In the control building on elevation 685 ft. in both Units 1 and 2, auxiliary instrument rooms, both safety related divisions of one unit are located in 'each room. The consequence of electrically initiated or exposure fires should be evaluated with regard to plant shutdown capability. In the event that the plar t shutdown capability cannot be maintained, an alternate shutdowr, method should be provided. TVA Response The auxiliary instrument room (s) located on elevation 685.0 of the control building are considered an extension of the main control room for the sake of the design of the backup control system. Hence, Sequoyah can establish and maintain a safe shutdown with a total loss of an auxiliary instrument room. See response to question 18. l k 117103-
22. In the cable spreading room of the control building, a preaction sprinkler system is used for protection with one layer of sprinklers located at the ceiling and an intermediate level located approximately half way between the floor and the ceiling. Provide heat collectors for the lower sprinkler heads to prevent ceiling level sprinklers.from cold soldering the lower layer of sprinklers. TVA Response Heat collectors are provided for lower level sprinkler heads in the spreading room. At the time of the NRC site visit the heat collectors had not been installed. I h s M 117104 w r
23. Verify that the controllers of the four fire pumps are separated such that an exposure fire will not jeopardize more than one controller. List the location of each such controller.
.TVA Response The four fire pumps are controlled by switchgear located in separate 480V shutdown board rooms. Refer to compartmentation drawing SK-1004 and Table 23-1 for the switchgear locations. Table 23-1 Fire Pump 480V Shutdown Board Room Number 1A-A 1A2-A 734.0-A8 IB-B 182-B 734.0-A5 2A-A 2A2-8 734.0-A21 28-B 2B2-B 734.0-A18 l l m 117105 S m
24. Verify that the main control valve of the C0 system used for 7
protection of safety related equipment in various rooms is supervised and alarmed and annunciated in the control room. TVA Response The CO, system provides three valves between the storage tanks and the protected areas--a storage tank shutoff valve, a master selector valve, and a hazard selector valve. The tank shutoff valve is normally locked open and is administratively controlled. The master selector valve is a normally closed, pressure-operated piston valve controlled by a normally energized solenoid pilot valve. The hazard selector valve is identical to the master valve except it is controlled by a normally de-energized solenoid pilot valve. Upon system actuation, the master and hazard selector valves open releasing CO, to the hazard area. On loss of power the master selector valve fails open but the hazard selector valve remains - closed. Neither the master nor hazard selector valves can be supervised directly. However, TVA has provided an electrically supervised pressure switch downstream of the hazard selector valves to provide Main Control Room alarm and annunciation when CO is being released in a hazard area. 2 All fire detection circuits associated with the C07 protected areas which transmit alarm signals to the Main Control Room are electrically supervised. However, the automatic actuation logic for the C0 systems is not supervised. 2 The C0 system meets the requirements of NFPA 12 and 72D for equipment super-2 vision. It is TVA's position that the present design is adequate. e o t t 461134
25. The information obtained as the resu?' of the site visit was that the cable used at the Seq.myah Nuclear Plant will not pass the flame test in the current IEEE Standard 383. We were informed that some testing had been performed on this cable. Provide the information on the test used as well as the necessary data and criteria.
TVA Response Table 25.1 contains the requested data for the purchased electrical cable. A description of the various flame tests is given in table 25.2. 9
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I TAEIZ 25.1 e. f* . T7A l Flcme Tests, Cctle Description l-Ceb1'e Tvee o. .m . I?CEA S-19-81 ' Single conductor, strended, nylon. 2 1 l 73,TlC jacket, polyethylene insulation IEEE 3S3-1974. Multi-cenductor, twisted, strsnied,. j i y, 1M IFC2A S-19-61 shicided, chlorosulfonated polyethylene { IPCEA S-61 bO2 dcchet, crosslirAcd, polyethylene i MIDI-22759/16 insulation UL-% IPCEA S-19-81 Single conductor, TVC jacket, crosslieca % lid 2 .IEEE 383-197h- '~. polyethylene insuletion i IPCEA S-61 kO2 Telephone and coaxial cable 1:2 I
IPCEA S-19-81
Multi-conductor, sinsics - cresclicked
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. IPCEA S-19-61 ' Single conductor, asbestos braid jacket, l Tr*? 3 silicene rubber i'nculation VTFT I cr 1 1I,*4G,.TG r.
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Multi-conductor,singics-pol $cthylene 'IPCEA S-61 bO2 PVC jacket, overall PVC jacket l Q,* '.., ..,Kulti-conductor, sinsics silicone rubbe-tiU- 'VTFT j I??. glass braid, ove'rall jceket esbestos -l (0, " ] M.---3 braid j g j 1:0 IPCEA S-19-81 .. Themocouple cable-mil's22759/16 j 1 The T7A ceble type is actually 'a three* 1ctter designttion. The: third (- 16tter was *diopped for table breyity as the cabic description.rcncins unchanged.- 2 Single conductors snaller than No. 8 KdG are installed in conduits ~ j 3 TVA Vertical Tray Flane Test. e
nus. n.a~ I IE12 333-197 n 1. An c$cht foot "c'cbic tray t*as crected vertically und load d with multiple Icn ;t'- of cabics arranged in a singic layer. 2, The flome cource was a ribbon gas burner placed very near the bottom of the vertical tray. 3 The criteria for failure was a propagating fire in tihe tray above the flame source for the total length of the tray. l ~ tua.lh 1. A three sided metal enclosure uns erected vert $cally and loaded with ~ a singic conductor. 2. The flame cource was a Turrill gas burner placed opproximately near the center of the cable specimen. 3. The following is the criteria for failure: A. fi singic. conductor vire that flamed l'onger than 1 minute follouing any of the, five 15-second applications of the flame. B. The vire $gniting any combustibic mat.crial in its vicinity during, between, or after the various applications of the flomc. " C. A damage of more than 25 percent of the indicator material during, ,botvcen, or after the various applications of the flame. TVA Vertical Tray Finine Test ,.1. An eight foot ladder type metal cabic tray was crected vertienlly and 31oaded with several conductors fro:o end to end on a singic 1 cycl. A 120/2 iO-volt oc test circuit was used to monitor circuit integrity f i-2. - durin5 the test. I .3 Th6 flame source vas crumpled burlap soaked with transfonr.cr insulating oil and placed several inchen above the lower cabic cnd. I. The follo'uing was the criteria for failure: I Propaga'ing fire results. 'A. t B, Circuit integrity loss $n icss than 15 seconds after ignition. C.I xcessive smoke appearing from cabic. E D. Hot drippings from cabic that reoy ignite fire'in lower arcas. f I i.--- m ~~ :..:;. ;., - - - - - + 3 .,... ~.. -
1: TAhi.M 25.2 (Co: tinued) t' .e,. JICEA _ S-19-01/TTCEA S-61 !:02 (Fla :.c Retisting TesQ 1. Tho' flerae resisting tests of the above are 6xactly the some as the pr'cViously described test of UL Isis (1976) except pcrt D of the failure criteria which is not adhered to. = g. }nn!-22759/16
1.. A three-sided metal enclosure war; crected vertien11y end loaded uith t
et c. ingle wire.. j' 2. The flame source vos a Dunsen burner applied approximately near the center of the cabic specirsen. f 3. The following is the criteria for railure: i A. A singic conductor that ficmed longer than five seconds after the flame is withdraun. .B. A flame travel of more than 0.25 inch fror flame mark on cable g after th.e flame is removed. i I ( D I. k it ( r ^ g II l g. I l: g s'. g g., e gr ? t .i s. ll' .~ I g, t e e g 4 l l. e r- ., j. 2 h e. e .ng..,
26. Verify that hose houses equipped with hose and combination nozzle and other auxiliary equipment recommended in NFPA 24, "Outside Protection," is spaced not more than 1030 ft. apart.
TVA Response Hose houses are spaced less than 1000 feet apart. However, they are not completely furnished with the equipment listed in NFPA 24. The following will be provided: 250 ft 1/2" hose (on wheeled cart) 150 ft 1/2" hose 2 1/2" variable fog nozzles 2 1/2" variable fog nozzles 1 - Fire axe 1 - Crow t,ar 2 - Hydrant wrenches 4 - Coupling spanne~rs 2 - Hose and ladder straps 1 1/2" by 2-1/2" by 2-1/2" gated wye 1 1/2" by 1-1/2" by 1-1/2" gated wye 2 1/2" by 1-1/2" reducers 2 1/2" adapters (female to male) 2 1/2" adapters (female to male) 2 1/2" adapters (double male) 2 1/2" adapters (double male) 2 1/2" adapters (double ferale) 2 1/2" adapters (doubic feaale) 1 - Wheeled fire extinguisher (rated 320 d:C) 1 - Tee handle wrench 1 - Portable hand lantern (battery operated) I a 577416
27. Provide a' description on the operation and sequencing of the station fire pumps including isolation of the RWST valves, pushbutton stations located next to fire hose stations including supervision of the circuits and how they are connected to the fire alarm control panel as well as the fire pump controllers. Consideration should be given to failure of any of the above circuits and its affect on the fire protection system. TVA Response The four station fire pumps are capable of three modes of operation-- automatic, manual, and standby. In normal operation, two pumps are placed in automatic mode and two in standby. Upon receipt of an auto-matic start signal, one automatic pump starts immediately and ths second starts three seconds later. If the fire protection system pressure cannot be maintained above 130 psig because of hiah systen demand, the two standby pumps start ten seconds after the receipt of the initial signal. Manual operation of-the pumps is also provided from the main control room and the individual pump switchgear. The automatic start signals are originated in the circuits shown in block diagram form in Figure 27-1. Local control panels are provided for each fixed suppression system to actuate the system and to transmit a signal to start the fire pumps. These panels recei.'e initiation inputs from the fire detection system and/or from hand-switches located in the protected areas. Additional fire pump start signals are generated by pushbuttons near fire hose stations located throughout the plant. All the start signals.are processed through the centralized automatic start logic located in three panels in the unit 1 and 2 auxiliary instrument rooms. From this logic, the start signals are transmitted simultaneously through separation relays to the individual pump switchgear. The pump sequencing is controlled-by the switchgear as determined by the position of the handswitches located in the main control room. Refer to Table 27-1 for the location of the major system components and the SK-1000 series compartmenta-tion drawings for definition of the column lines. Upon starting a fire pump in any mode, its switchgear provides an output to close the raw service water head tank isolation valves. The pushbutton stations located next to the fire ha stations are provided to start the fire pumps only. They are not connected to the fire detection system and they are not supervised. No single failure in the circuits shown in Figure 27-1 or their power supplies will result in an unacceptable loss of firefighting capability. A failure in a local control panel could prevent the automatic initiation of the associated suppression system and the fire pumps during a fire. However, the failure would not affect the detection system's annunciation capability so the unit operator can manu9'ly start one or mere fire pumps and can dispatch the fire brigade to manually initiate the suppression. system. Automatic start logic failures can prevent the automatic-actuation of all fire YOO b,
pumps. This would not affect the suppression system operation, but would require manual starting of pumps from the main control room upon receipt of a detection system annunciation. A f.ilure in the separation relays, 480V switchgear, or fire pumps would affect one pump only. The remaining three pumps would be operable in any mode. Failures in the handswitches, pilot valves, pushbuttons, and the system's con-necting circuits a'e no more restrfetive than those failures discussed r above. The consequences of an exposure fire are no more restrictive than the failures addressed above except in the case of the separation relays. This relay logic will be separated by 20 feet to ensure that the MCR control functions for no more than one fire pump can be affected by an exposure fire. The fire pumps are assigned trained designations with two pumps in train A and two in train B. The manual control circuits (main control room switch, 480V switchgear, power supply, and connecting circuits) for the pumps are separated per the requirements for Class lE electrical com-ponents. 4 h r 572825 m
INPUT FROM FIRE DETECTION SYSTEM LOCAL MULTIPLE INPUTS CONTROL FROM LOCAL PANEL CONTROL PANELS C I HANDSWITCH O PUSHBUTTON .C f l d 3 MULTIFLE I! PUTS F'.:" >(., 4 AUTOMATIC 4 PUSHBUTTO :S LOCA~I: PILOT VALVE FOR FIRE PUMP J flEAR FIRE h0SE STAT.'::. START LOGIC SUPPRESSION [ SYSTEM l SEPARATION SEPARATION SEPARATION SEPARATION RELAYS RELAYS RELAYS RELAYS HANDSWITCH ~ r C C D I LOCATEL Ill HANDSWITCH HANDSWITCH HANDSWITCH MAIH CONTROL MCR MCR MCR ROOM (MCR) 480-V 480-V 480-V 480-V SWITCHGEAR SWITCHGEAR SWITCHGEAR SWITCHGEAR .t f% .I( % r r I I 2A-A I 28-B FIRE PUMPS l FIGURE 27-1 1
TABLE 27.1 Component Building Elevation Column Room Name Local control

Located Throughout the Plant-------------

panels Automatic fire Control 685.0 p,C5 Units 1&2 l pump start logic p,C9 Aux. Instr. Fire pump 1A-A Intake 705.0 Pumping Station lA-A separation Control 685.0 Unit I relays
Aux. Instr.
lA-A 480V switch-Auxiliary 734.0 t,A2 480V Shutdown gear Bd. Rm. lA2 Fire Pump 1B-B Intake 705.0 Pumping Station 18-B separation Control 685.0 Unit 1 relays Aux. Instr. 1B-B 480V switch-Auxiliary 734.0 r,A3 480V Shutdown gear Bd. Rm. 182 Fire pump 2A-A Intake 705.0 Pumping Station 2A-A separation Control 685.0 Unit 1 relays Aux. Instr. 2A-A 480V switch-Auxiliary 734.0 r,A13 480V Shutdown gear Bd. Rm. 2A2 Fire Pump 2B-B Intake 705.0 Pumping Station 28-B separation Control 685.0 Unit 1 relays Aux. Instr. 28-B 480V switch-Auxiliary 734.0 t A14 480V Shutdown gear Bd. Rm. 282 576967 j
Quality Assurance Branch Request for Additional Information Your description in Sections A.1 and B.5 of your submittals relative to your compliance with the " Guidelines in Appendix A of BTP 9.5-1" does not provide adequate information on your fire protection organization for us to complete our review. Therefore, please provide the following information: 1. Describe the upper level management position that has the overall responsibility for the formulation, implementation, and assessment of the effectiveness of the fire protection program. 2. Describe the offsite position (s) that has direct responsibility for formulating, implementing, and periodically assessing the effectiveness of the fire prttection program for the nuclear plant, including fire drills and fire protection training. 3. While the Plant Superintendent is generally responsible for all activities at the facility, describe any further delegation of these responsibilities for the fire protection program such as training, maintenance of fire protection systems, testing of fire protection equipment, fire safety inspections, fire fighting procedures, and fire drills. 4. Describe the authority of your fire brigade leader relative to that of your Shift Engineer. TVA Response 1. In the TVA organization structure, the General Manager has overall responsibility for the formulation, implementation, and assess-ment of the effectiveness of the fire protection program. In accordance with the TVA policy of management accountability, the General Manager has delegated these fire protection program responsibilities through the respective managers of offices to the Director of Engineering Design, the Director of Construction, and the Director of Power Production within their respective i areas. To fulfill these responsibilities, these directors. maintain qualified staffs to ensure that all aspects of the fire protection program are, at a minimum, consistent with applicable regulatory requirements. To ensure that an integrated program is maintained, TVA has established a fire protection panel composed j 'of key management representatives from each of these three divisions for review and coordination of program policies and application in interface areas. D 577300 , m mm e mee e om* "
2. The offsite position (s) that has direct responsibility for formulating implementing, and periodically assessing the effectiveness of the fire protection program for the nuclear plant, including fire drills and fire protection training is the Fire Protection Section of Safety Engineering-Services. The program is formulated and implemented through Division Procedures Manual N7852. Section F8 of this manual establishes tne requirement for an annual fire audit of each nuclear facility. 3. Delegation of responsibilities for the fire protection program such as training, maintenance of fire protection systems, testi,g of fire protection equipment, fire inspections, firefighting procedures, and fire drills is contained in Division Procedures Manual N78S2. 4. The authority of the fire brigade leader relative to that of the shift engineer is contained in Sequoyah Nuclear Plant Physical Security Instruction Physi-13, Section 1.0. This instruction statas in part that the duty assistant silift engineer, unit 1, shall be the fire brigade leader. He shall remain the leader unless relieved by his inline supervisor (the shiftengineer). It further states.that he shall keep the control room informed as to the fire conditions. o / -95215 s ~~
REQUEST FOR ADDITICNAL INFORMATION QA FOR FIRE PROTECTION FOR SEQUDYAH (AND WATTS BAR) NUCLEAR PLANTS F421.1 TVA's letter of January 24, 1977, to NRC regarding fire protection for Sequoyah (and Watts Bar) does not indicate whether the QA program for fire protection during design and construction is under the rnagement control of the QA organization. This control consists of (1) formulating and/or verifying that the fire protection QA program incor-porates suitable requirements and is acceptable to the management responsible for fire protection and (2) verifying the effectiveness of the QA program for fire protection through review, surveillance, and audits. Performance of other QA program functions for meeting the fire protection program requirements may be performed by personnel outside of the QA organization. The QA program for fire protection should be part of the overall plant QA program. These QA criteria apply to those items within the scope of the fire protection program, such as fire protection systems, emer-gency lighting, comunciation, and emergency breathing apparatus as well as the fire protection requirements of applicable safety-related equipment, We find that the letter does not describe sufficient detail to addrew the ten specific quality assurance criteria in Branch Technical Position APCSB 9.5-1 during design and construciton. In order for the QAB to fully evaluate your plan to meet these criteria, additional detailed description is necessary. Examples of the detail we would expect TVA to provide are given in Attachment 6 to Mr. D. B. Vassallo's letter of August 29, 1977. If, however, you choose not to provide this detail, you may apply the same controls to each criterion that are commensurate with the controls described in your QA program description, Section 17.1A. These controls would apply to the remaining design and construction activities of Unit Nos. 1 and 2. If you select this method, a statement to this effect would be adequate for our review of the QA program for fire protection. TVA Response The QA program fire protection has been reviewed by appropriate TVA management including the QA organization to verify that the program incorporates suitable requirements and is acceptable. The appropriate QA personnel are responsible for verifying the effectiveness of the program through periodic audits. The QA criteria apply to all fire protection related systems equipment and components within the scope of the fire protection program including fire protection systems, emergency lighting, communication, and emer-gency breathing apparatus, to the extent that they may affect the fire 577301
protection for nuclear safety-related plant features. Our submittal of January 24, 1977, to the NRC will be revised as follows to reflect a more detailed discussion of the existing procedures and programs within the Office of Enginering Design and Construction (0EDC) that are required for fire protection related systems: j C. Quality Assurance i TVA Compliance As indicated in the response to item A.1, Personnel, and as amplified in our response to Quality Assurance Branch question 1, TVA has delegated tha responsibilities associated with the various aspects of fire prevention and protection to or-ganizations which have personnel qualified to handle those functions. l The responsibility for the operational aspects of fire pro-tection has been delegated to the Division of Power Production ' TVA's Office of Power. The Office of Power utilizes TVA's _;ablished QA program designed to meet the requirements of Appendix B to 10CFR Part 50. This program applies, for the operational phase of TVA's nuclear power plants, to the activities affecting the quality of those critical structures, syst' ems, and components (CSSC) whose satisfactory performance is requirrd for safe plant operations; to prevent accidents that could cause undue risk to the health and safety of the public; and to mitigate the consequences of such accidents in the unlikely event that they should occur. Those fire protection features protecting critical structures or areas will be included in the CSSC list and as such will fall under TVA's operational QA program. The operational QA program is described in the Sequoyah Nuclear Plant Final Safety Analysis Report (FSAR), Chapter 17. Responsibility for the design and construction aspects of fire protection has been delegated to the Office of Engineering Design and Construction (OEDC). OEDC has documented procedures and specifications which govern its activities and which apply to all systems for which OEDC has responsibility. These procedures are aimed at ensuring that the design and construction of TVA facilities result in a reliable and quality product. As applied to fire protection, these documents will require, in part, that the actions required in C.1 through C.10 below be accomplished. C.1 Design Control and Procurement Document Control TVA Compliance All fire protection related design criteria and procurement documents be reviewed by appropriate qualified indi-viduals to ensure that applicable regulatory and design requirements are properly and adequately specified and, as appropriate, quality standards-such as fire 577302 ~. -..
protection codes and independent laboratory testing are included. All changes to these documents and deviations therefrom, including requests for field changes, are reviewed in a similar manner. The above includes appropriate design reviews to verify separation and isolation requirements as they relate to fire protection. C.2 Instructions, Procedures, and Drawings TVA Compliance The design, installation, and tests associated with fire protection related systems be accomplished in accordance with written and approved instructions, procedures, and drawings. These documents must be reviewed by qualified personnel to ensure that applicable regulatory and design requirements are properly and adequately specified. This documentation includes any specialized training requirements for installation. C.3 Control of Purchased Material and Equipment TVA Compliance The procurement of fire protection related material and equipment require either an inspection at the manufacturer's facility or a receiving inspection to verify conformance to procurement requirements. C.4 Inspection TVA Compliance The installation of fire protection related systems be verified by independent inspection to ensure that it meets the specified requirements and conforms to installation drawings and procedures. The inspection must be conducted in accordance with documented procedures. The procedures controlling inspection activity require that the inspection procedures or instructions shall be available with necessary drawings and specifications to use prior to perfonning inspection operations. Further, the procedures, instructions, and/or drawings, including revisions, supporting the inspection activities shall be documented. The results of these inspections shall be recorded. C.5 Test and Test Control TVA Compliance Fire protection systems be tested under TVA's preoperational test program. This program requires that tests be conducted in accordance with written test instructions which are reviewed to ensure that applicable regulatory and design requirements are properly and adequately specified. The acceptance criteria shall be evaluated and documented and all exceptions documented and controlled. c m nv
e'\\f? 'p 0 1 sp g g////q,f N,*A}$ 4 /// k\\ IMAGE EVALUATION 'NNY TEST TARGET (MT-3) 1.0 ""2 W [I B g =a l a :n b "5 lIly 2.0 l,l .e.: a== l.8 l.25 1.4 1.6 6" 0 MICROCOPY RESOLUTION TEST CH ART dcvef9e 't [.g;y ~ (teg&>($
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C.6. Inspection, Test, and Operating Status TVA Compliance Items that have satisfactorily completed tests or inspections be identified by appropriate means. C.7 Nonconforming Items TVA Compliance Nonconforming items be identified and controlled to prevent inadvertent use or installation. This includes documentation of the disposition of the nonconformance. The Thermal Power Engineering (TPE) Design Project shall review all noncon-formance reports and may request review by other branches within EN DES as appropriate. The TPE Design Project Manager shall approve the disposition of the nonconformance. C.8 Corrective Action TVA Compliance Significant and repetitive conditions adverse to fire protection such as nonconformances with install ~ tion drawings and deviations from specifications be cos.;colled and appropriate corrective action taken and documented. Conditions involving fire incidents and the corrective actions taken shall be promptly reported to a cognizant level of management for i review and assessment. C.9 Records TVA Compliance Records be maintained for fire protection systems to document conformance to the prescribed criteria. These records must include review of criteria, procurement documents and drawings, inspections, test results, non-conformances, and modification records. C.10 Audits TVA Compliance Independent audits by QA personnel be conducted annually in accordance with written procedures to ensure conformance to procedural requirements applicable to fire protection related systems. The audits must be documented along with the corrective action taken and reviewed by the appropriate level of management to ensure that the program is effective. 5 577308
Additional Discussion Items e The following items have been discussed informally with the NRC Staff and are included as additional information, l. No air-cooled transformers are located such that fires resulting from their failure would affect equipment or circuits identified in the response to question 1 that are required to achieve hot shutdown. 2. There is no fixed equipment containing flammable liquids in the vicinity of the entrance to the central room of the auxiliary control area. However, TVA will provide curbs at the doors between the auxiliary control area's central room and transfer switch rooms as protection against transient flammable liquid hazards. The curbs will ensure that a flammable liquid fire in any one of the five rooms will not jeopardize safe shutdown capability from the MCR. 3. Spray shields are provided for the reactor coolant pumps and all associated external lubricating oil piping and lift pumps such that the rupture of any oil-containing component will be contained. An dil collection basin is provided at the access platform elevation of each pump to collect and drain away any combustible liquid and/or suppression system discharge. Each reactor coolant pump is provided with a separate heat collection hood structure located approximately six feet above the pump designed to reduce the response time of the thermal detectors and thermal actuated water spray nozzles below the hood. Neither the heat collector hood above, nor the collection system below the reactor coolant pump motor will jeopradize the ventilation air flow to the pump motor. The above modifies TVA's description provided in Item F1 of the Sequoyah Nuclear Plant Fire Protection Program reevaluation forwarded to the NRC by letter from J. E. Gilleland to R. S. Boyd dated January 24, 1977. 4. During tha NRC site visit, September 4 and 5,1979, some concern was expressed by the NRC reviewers about the butt joint installation of the 1-inch Kaolwool blanket conduit wrap noted in Table 1.3. Discussions in subsequent telecons resulted in TVA's commitnent to modify the butt joints of the wrap as shown in the following figure. This modification will be complete on conduits associated with unit 1 by January 1, 1980. The 1-inch Kaowool installation for conduits associated with unit 2 will be in accordance with the following figure and will be complete prior to initial fuel loading for unit 2. f 855295
y S.S.. Bands h I ~ 3 i y -. _ _ - - ~ ~ T--- s, g, I 3 \\ e l .I l \\' J1-inch
minimum l
l overlap Conduit 1-inch Koalwool N Blanket (3-inch 3-indi minimum minimum overlap overlap e MODIFICATION TO 1-INCH KAOLWOOL BLANKET WRAP BUTT JOINT INSTALLATION o O e 4 4 e e l I e 1 l
I SCHEDULE FOR COMMITMENTS All modifications resulting from commitments made in our submittal of January 24, 1977, shall be implemented prior to the initial fuel loading of the associated unit. TVA proposes to implement modifications resulting from Nonconformance Report SWP-78-S-2 and from commitments made in this document per the following schedule: ASB Design Construction Question Completion Completion No. Action or Modification Required Date Date 1 Reroute conduit and cable identified 7/9/79 10/5/79 in Table 1.2. (unit 1) 7/9/79 See note 1 (unit 2) Wrap instrumentation conduit identi-5/9/79 10/5/79 fied in Table 1.3 with 1-inch-thick (unit 1) Kaowool Blanket. 7/9/79 See note 1 (unit 2) Enclose exposed conduit identified in 12/1/79 4/1/80 Table 1.4 with a 1-1/2-hour fire barrier. Reroute units 1 and 2 pressurizer 5/7/79 10/5/79 htr 6900V power cables to achieve 20 feet spatial separation. 3B(i) Install additional fire doors iden-3/6/79 See note 1 tified in Nonconfonnance Report SWP-78-S-2. Install remaining fire doors iden-3/6/79 See note 1 tified in Table 3B(i)-3. 3B('ii) Install additional fire dampers 3/6/79 See note 1 identifed in Nonconformace Report SWP-78-S-2. Install remaining fire dampers iden-6/26/79 10/5/79 tified in Table 3B(11)-3. Add pyrocrete to fire dampers PC0 3/7/79 10/5/79 17A and 0-31A-148. Install additional fire dampers 12/31/79 See note 2 required as result of NRC concerns of February 12, 1979, meeting. 855299
ASB Design Construction Question Completion Completion No. Action or Modification Required Date Date 3B(iii) Coat the metal barrier plate in cable 12/1/79 4/1/79 tray penetrations with pyrocrete. 4 Coat _ exposed surfaces of cables with 12/1/79 See note 2,3 flame retardant material in areas outside primary containment containing one or both safety-related divirions. 6 Install fixed self-contained lighting 7/10/79 10/5/79 in areas that must be manned for safe cold shutdown and for access and egress routes to and from all fire areas. 7 Electrically supervise the fire protec-7/9/79 11/7/79 tion pow 2r distribution panel for loss of power. 8 Electrically supervise the fire pumps 7/9/79 11/7/79 'for loss of line power and motor running condition. 9D Provide additional sprinkler heads 3/31/80 See note 2 or relocate existing heads to clear overhead obstructions. IlB Enclose ERCW junction box with 1-1/2-12/1/79 2/1/80 hour fire barrier. Provide a 1/2-hour fire barrier of 6/29/79 10/5/79 1-inch Kaowool Blanket between re-dundant power cables in the ERCW junction box. 138 Provide automatic sprinkler protec-7/9/79 10/5/79 tion under the pipe break barrier for the auxiliary feedwater pumps. 13C Provide automatic sprinkler protec-7/17/79 10/5/79 tion under the mezzanine for all component cooling water pumps. 130 Provide a 1/2-hour fire barrier 7/9/79 10/5/79 between train A and B component cooling water pumps. 13F Provide additional smoke detectors to 7/9/79 10/5/79 actu' ate the sprinkler systems in TVA responses to questions 138 and 13C. 855301
ASB Design Construction l Question Completion Completion No. Action or Modification Required Date Date 16 Provide M:,R alarm and annunciation for 7/9/79 10/5/79 lock-out of diesel generator room and board room C0 systems. 2 17A Remove sliding fire doors for 12/1/79 2/1/80 diesel generator rooms and replace with normally closed fire doors. 200 Replace the existing 1/2-inch riser 6/21/79 9/21/79 nipples with 1-inch nipples in the records storage area. 26 Provide additionai equipment for 8/10/79 10/16/79 fire equipment houses. 27 Relocate fire pump separation relays 7/9/79 11/7/79 to achieve 20-foot spatial separation. Install curbs at doors to transfer 6/20/79 10/5/79 switch rooms of the auxiliary control complex. Notes: 1. Prior to initial fuel loading of the associated unit. 2. End of first refueling outage for unit 1. 3. Cable coating is progressing. Areas identified in submittal of January 4,1977, will be completed prior to initial fuel loading of the associated unit. 707193 - - -..}}

ML19308A526

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